Republic of the Philippines During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:

SUPREME COURT
Manila
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St.
Augustine, Manila;
EN BANC

2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born
  on July 29, 1986;

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997 3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,  4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;

 
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated in
the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's
effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based on this
ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case
of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel
provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless
expressive of his frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence,
this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie
Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita
Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted
documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only
during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner
was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present
recourse.
The Issue

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of
interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and
the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, 3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel
made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended
Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of "psychological incapacity" under
"to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."
Article 36 of the Family Code.

In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied  5 heavily on the trial court's
The Facts
findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting
personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal and family
verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition rights. . . ." It concluded that:
alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church  4 in Manila;
that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a
"immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with
broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative
his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and
of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with
assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels
the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment
between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since
of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and considered
then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very
as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very
intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel
objectives of marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their
resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later,
individual fates.
Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus
shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a
highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in
and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason
free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start. to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made.

In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.
together as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were
due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their
marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3)
Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent
to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the
marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders
them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals 6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that
"psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that
(t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila,  7 Justice
Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect
spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences"
and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove
that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that
they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with
each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence
nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only
incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:  8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist
based on your findings that it is better for the Court to annul
(sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another
woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are
psychologically unfit for each other but they are
psychologically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their
professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of
psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to
prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on
Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of
expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's
temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-
visexisting law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty
experienced by many trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici
curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, 9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C.
Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these
friends of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument on
December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and
the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage
and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it
"as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical.
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified
as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given
qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of
a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that
Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive
weight should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence
— what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the
Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the
inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling
becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 132955             October 27, 2006
ORLANDO VILLANUEVA, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LILIA CANALITA-VILLANUEVA, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the January 26, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832, affirming with modification the Decision 2 dated January 12, 1996 of the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 (a) dismissing
petitioner's petition for the annulment of his marriage to private respondent and (b) ordering him to pay moral and
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs. Also assailed is the March 5, 1998 Resolution 3 denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got married on April 13, 1988 in
Puerto Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with the trial court a petition for annulment of
his marriage alleging that threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who was already
pregnant; that he did not get her pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her after the
marriage; and that he later learned that private respondent's child died during delivery on August 29, 1988. 4
In her answer with compulsory counterclaim,5 Lilia prayed for the dismissal of the petition, arguing that petitioner
freely and voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed with her in Palawan for almost a month after their
marriage; that petitioner wrote letters to her after he returned to Manila, during which private respondent visited
him personally; and that petitioner knew about the progress of her pregnancy, which ended in their son being
born prematurely. Private respondent also prayed for the payment of moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s
fees and costs.
On January 12, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Dismissing the above-entitled case; and
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00,
exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00,
plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.6
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the petition and the award of attorney’s fees and
costs, but reduced the award of moral and exemplary damages to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively. The
Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, hence, the instant petition for review based on
the following assigned errors:
 I. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
NOT GRANTING THE ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE THE CONSENT OF THE PETITIONER
HAVING BEEN OBTAINED BY FRAUD, INTIMIDATION AND UNDUE AND IMPROPER
PRESSURE AND INFLUENCE PLUS THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO COHABITATION
WHATSOEVER BETWEEN PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
II. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS ERROR IN AWARDING
MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AS WELL AS ATTORNEY'S FEES, SAID AWARDS NOT
BEING THOSE ALLOWED BY LAW.7
The issues for resolution are (a) whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent;
and (b) whether petitioner should be liable for moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees and
costs.
The petition is partly granted.
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those of the trial court, as in the instant
case, are generally binding on this Court. 8 We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner freely and
voluntarily married private respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress or violence compelled him to do
so, thus –
To begin with, We are at once disturbed by the circumstance that despite the alleged coerced
consent which supposedly characterized his marriage with Lilia on April 13, 1988, it was only on
November 17, 1992 or after a span of not less than four (4) years and eight (8) months when Orlando
took serious step to have the same marriage annulled. Unexplained, the prolonged inaction evidently
finds basis in Lilia’s allegation that this annulment suit was filed by Orlando solely in the hope that a
favorable judgment thereon would bolster his defense, if not altogether bring about his acquittal in the
criminal case for bigamy which was then already pending against him. Unfortunately, however, let
alone the fact that the criminal case was admittedly decided ahead with a judgment of conviction
against Orlando x x x even the very outcome of the present case disappointed his expectation. At this
late, with his appeal in the bigamy case still pending with this Court x x x Orlando must be hoping
against hope that with a decree of annulment ensuing from this Court, he may yet secure an acquittal
in the same bigamy charge. Viewed in this perspective, the instant appeal is, therefore,
understandable.
But even in terms of merit, the recourse must have to fall.
Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not freely
consent to be married to the appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a
reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life and safety, to wit: the
harassing phone calls from the appellee and strangers as well as the unwanted visits by three men at
the premises of the University of the East after his classes thereat, and the threatening presence of a
certain Ka Celso, a supposed member of the New People’s Army whom appellant claimed to have
been hired by appellee and who accompanied him in going to her home province of Palawan to
marry her.
The Court is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of danger to his person is so overwhelming
as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the
time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a bank. Given his
employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume that appellant knew the rudiments of self-
defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harm’s way. For sure, it is even
doubtful if threats were indeed made to bear upon appellant, what with the fact that he never sought
the assistance of the security personnel of his school nor the police regarding the activities of those
who were threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge about his predicament prior to
solemnizing their marriage.
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe by appellee that the
latter was pregnant with his child when they were married. Appellant’s excuse that he could not have
impregnated the appellee because he did not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and
an outright lie at worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with the
appellee. His counsel also conceded before the lower court that his client had a sexual relationship
with the appellee x x x. He also narrated x x x that sometime in January 1988, he and the appellee
went to a hotel where "the sexual act was consummated, with the defendant on top" x x x.
Instead of providing proofs that he was tricked into marrying his wife, appellant resorted to
undermining the credibility of the latter by citing her testimony that her child was born, and died, on
August 29, 1989, a year off from August 29, 1988, the date of fetal death as appearing in the registry
of deaths of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Puerto Princesa City x x x.
To Our mind, appellant cannot make capital of the lapse because it is inconsequential, as there is no
controversy regarding the date of death of appellee’s fetus. Nevertheless, during the continuation of
the cross-examination of the appellee, she declared that her child was prematurely born on August
29, 1988, matching the date in the certification of the Civil Registrar x x x. The Court is not prepared
to disbelieve the appellee and throw overboard her entire testimony simply on account of her
confusion as to the exact date of the death of the fetus, especially when she herself had presented
documentary evidence that put August 29, 1988 as the date her fetus died.
Appellant’s propensity to rely on his perceived weakness of the appellee’s evidence continues in his
argument that if indeed there is truth to her claim that she was impregnated sometime in December
1987, then she could not have a premature delivery on August 29, 1988, as she had testified during
the trial, because the 35-week period of pregnancy is complete by that time. Whether the appellee’s
impression that she had delivered prematurely is correct or not will not affect the fact that she had
delivered a fetus on August 29, 1988. In the light of appellant’s admission that he had a sexual
intercourse with his wife in January 1988, and his failure to attribute the latter’s pregnancy to any
other man, appellant cannot complain that he was deceived by the appellee into marrying her.
Appellant also puts in issue the lower court’s appreciation of the letters allegedly written by him to the
appellee. During his cross-examination, when confronted with thirteen (13) letters, appellant identified
the seven (7) letters that he sent to the appellee, but denied the remaining six (6) x x x. The letters
admitted by the appellant contained expressions of love and concern for his wife, and hardly the
rantings of a man under duress. During the re-direct examination, however, appellant suddenly
changed mind and denied authorship of those seven (7) letters, claiming that he was forced to admit
them because he was threatened with harm by the appellee. If he was laboring under duress when
he made the admission, where did he find the temerity to deny his involvement with the remaining six
(6) letters? The recantation can only be motivated by a hindsight realization by the appellant of the
evidentiary weight of those letters against his case.
As to the second assignment of error, appellant cannot claim that his marriage should be annulled
due to the absence of cohabitation between him and his wife. Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a
ground to annul a marriage. Otherwise, the validity of a marriage will depend upon the will of the
spouses who can terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate. The failure to cohabit
becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the
marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x x x.
Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of those grounds,
the validity of his marriage must be upheld. 9
We also agree that private respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees. Article 2208 (11) of the Civil Code provides
that attorney’s may be awarded where the court deems it just and equitable under the circumstances, as in the
instant case.
We, however, delete the award of moral and exemplary damages for lack of factual and legal basis. There is
nothing in the records or in the appealed decision that would support an award of moral damages. In justifying
the award, the Court of Appeals merely said thus:
It is not difficult to imagine the suffering of the appellee from the baseless portrayal of her by the
appellant as the perpetrator of fraudulent schemes to trap an unwilling mate. x x x 10
However, the aforesaid finding is only a supposition as it has no reference to any testimony of private respondent
detailing her alleged physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury as would entitle her to moral damages.
In Mahinay v. Velasquez, Jr.,11 we held that:
 In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral suffering,
mental anguish, fright and the like. While respondent alleged in his complaint that he suffered mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and moral shock, he failed to prove them during the trial.
Indeed, respondent should have taken the witness stand and should have testified on the mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and other emotional and mental suffering he purportedly
suffered to sustain his claim for moral damages. Mere allegations do not suffice; they must be
substantiated by clear and convincing proof. No other person could have proven such damages
except the respondent himself as they were extremely personal to him.
As private respondent is not entitled to moral damages, a fortiori, she is not entitled to exemplary damages. This
is clear in Article 2234 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show
that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the
question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. In case liquidated damages have
been agreed upon, although no proof of loss is necessary in order that such liquidated damages may
be recovered, nevertheless, before the court may consider the question of granting exemplary in
addition to the liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show that he would be entitled to moral,
temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation for liquidated damages.
Hence, exemplary damages is allowed only in addition to moral damages such that no exemplary damages can
be awarded unless the claimant first establishes his clear right to moral damages. 12 In the instant case, private
respondent failed to satisfactorily establish her claim for moral damages, thus she is not likewise entitled to
exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The January 26, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 51832 affirming with modification the January 12, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 dismissing petitioner’s petition for the
annulment of his marriage with private respondent, is AFFIRMED. However, the award of moral and exemplary
damages is DELETED for lack of basis.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 167684             July 31, 2006
JAIME O.SEVILLA, petitioner, 
vs.
CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 74416 dated 20 December 2004 which set aside the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City, in Civil Case No. 94-1285 dated 25 January 2002.
In a Complaint3 dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC, he claimed that on 19 May 1969,
through machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's
father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the Philippines, he and Carmelita went to the City
Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the
Gospel. On the said date, the father of Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before
the said Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license for his supposed
marriage to Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no
marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.
For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims that she and Jaime were married civilly on
19 May 1969,4 and in a church ceremony thereafter on 31 May 1969 5 at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish in
Quezon City. Both marriages were registered with the local civil registry of Manila and the National Statistics
Office. He is estopped from invoking the lack of marriage license after having been married to her for 25 years.
The trial court made the following findings:
In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime] testified that on May 19, 1969, he and defendant
[Carmelita] appeared before a certain Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales, a Minister of the Gospel, at the city
hall in Manila where they executed a Marriage Contract (Exh. "A") in civil rites. A certain Godofredo
Occena who, plaintiff alleged, was an aide of defendant's father accompanied them, and who,
together with another person, stood as witness to the civil wedding. That although marriage license
no. 2770792 allegedly issued in San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969 was indicated in the marriage
contract, the same was fictitious for he never applied for any marriage license, (Ibid., p. 11). Upon
verifications made by him through his lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Abola, with the Civil Registry of San Juan,
a Certification dated March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") was issued by Rafael D. Aliscad, Jr., Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by said office." On
May 31, 1969, he and defendant were again wed, this time in church rites, before Monsignor Juan
Velasco at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish Church in Brixton Hills, Quezon City, where they
executed another marriage contract (Exh. "F") with the same marriage license no. 2770792 used and
indicated. Preparations and expenses for the church wedding and reception were jointly shared by
his and defendant's parents. After the church wedding, he and defendant resided in his house at
Brixton Hills until their first son, Jose Gabriel, was born in March 1970. As his parents continued to
support him financially, he and defendant lived in Spain for some time, for his medical studies.
Eventually, their marital relationship turned bad because it became difficult for him to be married he
being a medical student at that time. They started living apart in 1976, but they underwent family
counseling before they eventually separated in 1978. It was during this time when defendant's
second son was born whose paternity plaintiff questioned. Plaintiff obtained a divorce decree against
defendant in the United States in 1981 and later secured a judicial separation of their conjugal
partnership in 1983.
Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the plaintiff, himself manifested that when his service was
engaged by plaintiff, and after the latter narrated to him the circumstances of his marriage, he made
inquiries with the Office of Civil Registry of San Juan where the supposed marriage license was
obtained and with the Church of the Most Holy Redeemer Parish where the religious wedding
ceremony was celebrated. His request letters dated March 3, 1994 (Exh. "J"), March 7, 1994 (Exh.
"L"), March 9, 1994 (Exh. "M") and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "K") were all sent to and received by the
Civil Registrar of San Juan, who in reply thereto, issued Certifications dated March 4, 1994 (Exh. "I"),
and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") and September 20, 1994 (Exh. "C"), that "no marriage license no.
2770792 was ever issued by that office." Upon his inquiry, the Holy Redeemer Parish Church issued
him a certified copy of the marriage contract of plaintiff and defendant (Exh. "F") and a Certificate of
Marriage dated April 11, 1994 (Exh. "G"), wherein it noted that it was a "purely religious ceremony,
 having been civilly married on May 19, 1969 at the City Hall, Manila, under Marriage License No.
2770792 issued at San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969."
Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local Registry of San Juan, identified the Certificates
dated March 4, 1994, March 11, 1994 and September 20, 1994 issued by Rafael Aliscad, Jr., the
Local Civil Registrar, and testified that their office failed to locate the book wherein marriage license
no. 2770792 may have been registered (TSN, 8-6-96, p. 5).
Defendant Carmelita Cardenas testified that she and plaintiff had a steady romantic relationship after
they met and were introduced to each other in October 1968. A model, she was compelled by her
family to join the Mutya ng Pilipinas beauty pageant when plaintiff who was afraid to lose her, asked
her to run away with him to Baguio. Because she loved plaintiff, she turned back on her family and
decided to follow plaintiff in Baguio. When they came back to Manila, she and plaintiff proceeded to
the latter's home in Brixton Hills where plaintiff's mother, Mrs. Sevilla, told her not to worry. Her
parents were hostile when they learned of the elopement, but Mrs. Sevilla convinced them that she
will take care of everything, and promised to support plaintiff and defendant. As plaintiff was still
fearful he may lose her, he asked her to marry him in civil rites, without the knowledge of her family,
more so her father (TSN, 5-28-98, p. 4) on May 19, 1969, before a minister and where she was made
to sign documents. After the civil wedding, they had lunch and later each went home separately. On
May 31, 1969, they had the church wedding, which the Sevilla family alone prepared and arranged,
since defendant's mother just came from hospital. Her family did not participate in the wedding
preparations. Defendant further stated that there was no sexual consummation during their
honeymoon and that it was after two months when they finally had sex. She learned from Dr.
Escudero, plaintiff's physician and one of their wedding sponsors that plaintiff was undergoing
psychiatric therapy since age 12 (TSN, 11-2-98, p. 15) for some traumatic problem compounded by
his drug habit. She found out plaintiff has unusual sexual behavior by his obsession over her knees of
which he would take endless pictures of. Moreover, plaintiff preferred to have sex with her in between
the knees which she called "intrafemural sex," while real sex between them was far and between like
8 months, hence, abnormal. During their marriage, plaintiff exhibited weird sexual behavior which
defendant attributed to plaintiff's drug addiction (TSN, 11-5-98, pp. 5-8). A compulsive liar, plaintiff
has a bad temper who breaks things when he had tantrums. Plaintiff took drugs like amphetamines,
benzedrine and the like, "speed" drugs that kept him from sleep and then would take barbiturates or
downers, like "mogadon." Defendant tried very hard to keep plaintiff away from drugs but failed as it
has become a habit to him. They had no fixed home since they often moved and partly lived in Spain
for about four and a half years, and during all those times, her mother-in-law would send some
financial support on and off, while defendant worked as an English teacher. Plaintiff, who was
supposed to be studying, did nothing. Their marriage became unbearable, as plaintiff physically and
verbally abused her, and this led to a break up in their marriage. Later, she learned that plaintiff
married one Angela Garcia in 1991 in the United States.
Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified that he was not aware of the civil wedding of his
daughter with the plaintiff; that his daughter and grandson came to stay with him after they returned
home from Spain and have lived with him and his wife ever since. His grandsons practically grew up
under his care and guidance, and he has supported his daughter's expenses for medicines and
hospital confinements (Exhs. "9" and "10").
Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendant's sister, testified and corroborated that it was plaintiff's family
that attended to all the preparations and arrangements for the church wedding of her sister with
plaintiff, and that she didn't know that the couple wed in civil rites some time prior to the church
wedding. She also stated that she and her parents were still civil with the plaintiff inspite of the marital
differences between plaintiff and defendant.
As adverse witness for the defendant, plaintiff testified that because of irreconcilable differences with
defendant and in order for them to live their own lives, they agreed to divorce each other; that when
he applied for and obtained a divorce decree in the United States on June 14, 1983 (Exh. "13"), it
was with the knowledge and consent of defendant who in fact authorized a certain Atty. Quisumbing
to represent her (TSN, 12-7-2000, p. 21). During his adverse testimony, plaintiff identified a recent
certification dated July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that the
marriage license no. 2770792, the same marriage license appearing in the marriage contract (Exh.
"A"), is inexistent, thus appears to be fictitious.6
In its Decision dated 25 January 2002, declaring the nullity of the marriage of the parties, the trial court made the
following justifications:
Thus, being one of the essential requisites for the validity of the marriage, the lack or absence of a
license renders the marriage void ab initio. It was shown under the various certifications (Exhs. "I",
"E", and "C") earlier issued by the office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of San Juan,
and the more recent one issued on July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") that no marriage license no. 2770792
was ever issued by that office, hence, the marriage license no. 2770792 appearing on the marriage
contracts executed on May 19, 1969 (Exh. "A") and on May 31, 1969 (Exh. "F") was fictitious. Such a
certification enjoys probative value under the rules on evidence, particularly Section 28, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court, x x x.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the civil marriage between Jaime O. Sevilla and Carmelita
N. Cardenas solemnized by Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales at the Manila City Hall on May 19, 1969 as well
as their contract of marriage solemnized under religious rites by Rev. Juan B. Velasco at the Holy
Redeemer Parish on May 31, 1969, NULL and VOID for lack of the requisite marriage license. Let the
marriage contract of the parties under Registry No. 601 (e-69) of the registry book of the Local Civil
Registry of Manila be cancelled.
Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries in accordance
with Article 52 of the Family Code. Likewise, let a copy hereof be forwarded the Office of the Solicitor
General for its record and information. 7
Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 20 December 2004, the Court of
Appeals disagreed with the trial court and held:
In People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994), the Supreme Court explained
that: "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by
no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted,
it becomes conclusive."
In this case, We note that a certain Perlita Mercader of the local civil registry of San Juan testified
that they "failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered," for the
reason that "the employee handling is already retired." With said testimony We cannot therefore
just presume that the marriage license specified in the parties' marriage contract was not issued for in
the end the failure of the office of the local civil registrar of San Juan to produce a copy of the
marriage license was attributable not to the fact that no such marriage license was issued but rather,
because it "failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered." Simply put,
if the pertinent book were available for scrutiny, there is a strong possibility that it would have
contained an entry on marriage license no. 2720792.
xxxx
Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the parties' marriage on the basis of a mere perception of
plaintiff that his union with defendant is defective with respect to an essential requisite of a marriage
contract, a perception that ultimately was not substantiated with facts on record. 8
Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which the Court of Appeals denied in a
Resolution dated 6 April 2005.
This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.
He raises the following issues for Resolution.
1. Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law to the parties herein
prior to the celebration of the marriages in question;
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied and relied on the presumption of regularity of
officials acts, particularly the issuance of a marriage license, arising solely from the contents of the
 marriage contracts in question which show on their face that a marriage license was purportedly found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is
issued by the Local Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, and admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.

3. Whether or not respondent could validly invoke/rely upon the presumption of validity of a marriage We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the certifications by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan in
arising from the admitted "fact of marriage." 9 connection with Marriage License No. 2770792 complied with the foregoing requirements and deserved to be
accorded probative value.

At the core of this controversy is the determination of whether or not the certifications from the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan stating that no Marriage License No. 2770792 as appearing in the marriage contract of the The first Certification15 issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, was dated 11 March 1994.
parties was issued, are sufficient to declare their marriage as null and void ab initio. It reads:

We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative. TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which was the law in force at the time of the marriage of the parties are No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic) ever issued by this Office. With regards (sic) to
Articles 53,10 5811 and 80.12 Marriage License Number 2880792,16 we exert all effort but we cannot find the said number.

Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is an essential requisite for the validity of marriage. The Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above problem.
marriage between Carmelita and Jaime is of no exception.

San Juan, Metro Manila

At first glance, this case can very well be easily dismissed as one involving a marriage that is null and void on the
ground of absence of a marriage license based on the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registar of San
Juan. As ruled by this Court in the case of Cariño v. Cariño13: March 11, 1994

[A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such
marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that such a certification is adequate (SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the             Local Civil Registrar
present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the
officer charged under the law to keep a record of all date relative to the issuance of a marriage
license. The second certification17 was dated 20 September 1994 and provides:

Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and
that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was declared in default before the trial
court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage license This is to certify that no marriage license Number 2770792 were ever issued by this Office with
in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the regards to Marriage License Number 2880792, we exert all effort but we cannot find the said number.
issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the
presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above problem.

It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased,
having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages San Juan, Metro Manila
exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
September 20, 1994
The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar should be
read in line with the decision in the earlier case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 where it was held that:
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
            Local Civil Registrar
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a
particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor
was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public
officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to The third Certification,18 issued on 25 July 2000, states:
enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the
marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. (Emphasis supplied.)
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the document does
not exist in his office or the particular entry could not be found in the register despite diligent search. Such This is to certify that according to the records of this office, no Marriage License Application was filed
certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of and no Marriage License No. 2770792 allegedly dated May 19, 1969 was issued by this Office to MR.
Court: JAIME O. SEVILLA and MS. CARMELITA CARDENAS-SEVILLA.

SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – a written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an This is to further certify that the said application and license do not exist in our Local Civil Registry
official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is Index and, therefore, appear to be fictitious.
 This certification is being issued upon the request of the interested party for whatever legal intent it
may serve.
San Juan, Metro Manila
July 25, 2000
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
            Local Civil Registrar
Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that "hope and understand our loaded work cannot give
you our full force locating the above problem." It could be easily implied from the said statement that the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts to locate and determine the existence of Marriage License
No. 2770792 due to its "loaded work." Likewise, both certifications failed to state with absolute certainty whether
or not such license was issued.
This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated that they cannot locate the logbook due to the fact that the person in
charge of the said logbook had already retired. Further, the testimony of the said person was not presented in
evidence. It does not appear on record that the former custodian of the logbook was deceased or missing, or that
his testimony could not be secured. This belies the claim that all efforts to locate the logbook or prove the
material contents therein, had been exerted.
As testified to by Perlita Mercader:
Q Under the subpoena duces tecum, you were required to bring to this Court among other things the
register of application of/or (sic) for marriage licenses received by the Office of the :Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Province of Rizal, from January 19, 1969 to May 1969. Did you bring with you
those records?
A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.
Q Is that the book requested of you under no. 3 of the request for subpoena?
A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .
Q Did you bring that with you?
A No, sir.
Q Why not?
A I cannot locate the book. This is the only book.
Q Will you please state if this is the register of marriage of marriage applications that your office
maintains as required by the manual of the office of the Local Civil Registrar?
COURT
May I see that book and the portion marked by the witness.
xxxx
COURT
Why don't you ask her direct question whether marriage license 2880792 is the number
issued by their office while with respect to license no. 2770792 the office of the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan is very definite about it it was never issued. Then ask him how
about no. 2880792 if the same was ever issued by their office. Did you ask this 2887092,
but you could not find the record? But for the moment you cannot locate the books?
Which is which now, was this issued or not?
A The employee handling it is already retired, sir. 19
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not exerted to locate the
logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the presumption of regularity of
performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing the certifications, is effectively rebutted.
According to Section 3(m),20 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed is among the disputable presumptions.
In one case, it was held:
A disputable presumption has been defined as a species of evidence that may be accepted and
acted on where there is no other evidence to uphold the contention for which it stands, or one which
may be overcome by other evidence. One such disputable/rebuttable presumption is that an official
act or duty has been regularly performed. x x x. 21
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to
perform a duty.22
The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is disputable and can be overcome by other
evidence as in the case at bar where the presumption has been effectively defeated by the tenor of the first and
second certifications.
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792.
It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of
showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept that absence of the same also
means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds.23 The courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be
lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight. 24
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the validity of the marriage. 25
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together for several years producing two
offsprings,26 now adults themselves. It took Jaime several years before he filed the petition for declaration of
nullity. Admittedly, he married another individual sometime in 1991. 27 We are not ready to reward petitioner by
declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his own
deceit and perfidy.28
Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our family law
is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally
interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of
families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of the family members
alone.29
"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x x marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not
only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to
the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were
not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of
law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio – Always presume marriage." 30
This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. 31
By our failure to come to the succor of Jaime, we are not trifling with his emotion or deepest sentiments. As we
have said in Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,32 regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither law nor
society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
20 December 2004 and the Resolution dated 6 April 2005 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., J.J., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329            March 8, 2001
(Formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 99-706-MTJ)
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, 
vs.
JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a prior existing
marriage is the bone of contention of the instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez,
Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges
respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator on 12 May 1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him on 21
May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. 1 Four children were born out of that
marriage.2 On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao
before respondent Judge.3 When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that
the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were
"separated."
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage between
Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had
been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested
in their joint affidavit.4 According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have
advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed
that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended that respondent
Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for
resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in the affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the complaint and
setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to two separate affidavits 5 of the
late Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff upon his instruction. In
those affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to Herminia
Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their respective marriages had been marked by constant
quarrels, they had both left their families and had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore.
Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question
in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law
to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years
before the marriage;
 2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;

3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of
marriage;

Republic of the Philippines

4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years SUPREME COURT
[and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and Manila

5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications FIRST DIVISION
of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage. 6

G.R. No. 132955             October 27, 2006

Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits
executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda
Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated ORLANDO VILLANUEVA, petitioner, 
that both were "separated." vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LILIA CANALITA-VILLANUEVA, respondents.

Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which
would make the subsequent marriage null and void. 7 In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known that
the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from contracting another marriage. And
respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzano’s and Payao’s subsisting previous marriage, as the same
was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.
DECISION
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time already is
immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to
live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal
separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the
more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating
that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary
cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the January 26, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court
Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832, affirming with modification the Decision 2 dated January 12, 1996 of the
other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 (a) dismissing
Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage. petitioner's petition for the annulment of his marriage to private respondent and (b) ordering him to pay moral and
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs. Also assailed is the March 5, 1998 Resolution 3 denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous
marriage. The maxim "ignorance of the law excuses no one" has special application to judges, 8 who, under Rule
1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. It The antecedent facts are as follows:
is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles. 9 And when the law
transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. 10
Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got married on April 13, 1988 in
Puerto Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with the trial court a petition for annulment of
ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION his marriage alleging that threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who was already
that the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000. pregnant; that he did not get her pregnant prior to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her after the
marriage; and that he later learned that private respondent's child died during delivery on August 29, 1988. 4

SO ORDERED.
In her answer with compulsory counterclaim,5 Lilia prayed for the dismissal of the petition, arguing that petitioner
freely and voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed with her in Palawan for almost a month after their
Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur. marriage; that petitioner wrote letters to her after he returned to Manila, during which private respondent visited
him personally; and that petitioner knew about the progress of her pregnancy, which ended in their son being
born prematurely. Private respondent also prayed for the payment of moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s
fees and costs.

On January 12, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1) Dismissing the above-entitled case; and

 2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00,
exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00,
plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.6
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the petition and the award of attorney’s fees and
costs, but reduced the award of moral and exemplary damages to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively. The
Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, hence, the instant petition for review based on
the following assigned errors:
I. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
NOT GRANTING THE ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE THE CONSENT OF THE PETITIONER
HAVING BEEN OBTAINED BY FRAUD, INTIMIDATION AND UNDUE AND IMPROPER
PRESSURE AND INFLUENCE PLUS THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO COHABITATION
WHATSOEVER BETWEEN PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
II. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS ERROR IN AWARDING
MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AS WELL AS ATTORNEY'S FEES, SAID AWARDS NOT
BEING THOSE ALLOWED BY LAW.7
The issues for resolution are (a) whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent;
and (b) whether petitioner should be liable for moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees and
costs.
The petition is partly granted.
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those of the trial court, as in the instant
case, are generally binding on this Court. 8 We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner freely and
voluntarily married private respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress or violence compelled him to do
so, thus –
To begin with, We are at once disturbed by the circumstance that despite the alleged coerced
consent which supposedly characterized his marriage with Lilia on April 13, 1988, it was only on
November 17, 1992 or after a span of not less than four (4) years and eight (8) months when Orlando
took serious step to have the same marriage annulled. Unexplained, the prolonged inaction evidently
finds basis in Lilia’s allegation that this annulment suit was filed by Orlando solely in the hope that a
favorable judgment thereon would bolster his defense, if not altogether bring about his acquittal in the
criminal case for bigamy which was then already pending against him. Unfortunately, however, let
alone the fact that the criminal case was admittedly decided ahead with a judgment of conviction
against Orlando x x x even the very outcome of the present case disappointed his expectation. At this
late, with his appeal in the bigamy case still pending with this Court x x x Orlando must be hoping
against hope that with a decree of annulment ensuing from this Court, he may yet secure an acquittal
in the same bigamy charge. Viewed in this perspective, the instant appeal is, therefore,
understandable.
But even in terms of merit, the recourse must have to fall.
Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not freely
consent to be married to the appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a
reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life and safety, to wit: the
harassing phone calls from the appellee and strangers as well as the unwanted visits by three men at
the premises of the University of the East after his classes thereat, and the threatening presence of a
certain Ka Celso, a supposed member of the New People’s Army whom appellant claimed to have
been hired by appellee and who accompanied him in going to her home province of Palawan to
marry her.
The Court is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of danger to his person is so overwhelming
as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the
time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a bank. Given his
employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume that appellant knew the rudiments of self-
defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harm’s way. For sure, it is even
doubtful if threats were indeed made to bear upon appellant, what with the fact that he never sought
the assistance of the security personnel of his school nor the police regarding the activities of those
who were threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge about his predicament prior to
solemnizing their marriage.
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe by appellee that the
latter was pregnant with his child when they were married. Appellant’s excuse that he could not have
impregnated the appellee because he did not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and
an outright lie at worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with the
appellee. His counsel also conceded before the lower court that his client had a sexual relationship
with the appellee x x x. He also narrated x x x that sometime in January 1988, he and the appellee
went to a hotel where "the sexual act was consummated, with the defendant on top" x x x.
Instead of providing proofs that he was tricked into marrying his wife, appellant resorted to
undermining the credibility of the latter by citing her testimony that her child was born, and died, on
August 29, 1989, a year off from August 29, 1988, the date of fetal death as appearing in the registry
of deaths of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Puerto Princesa City x x x.
To Our mind, appellant cannot make capital of the lapse because it is inconsequential, as there is no
controversy regarding the date of death of appellee’s fetus. Nevertheless, during the continuation of
the cross-examination of the appellee, she declared that her child was prematurely born on August
29, 1988, matching the date in the certification of the Civil Registrar x x x. The Court is not prepared
to disbelieve the appellee and throw overboard her entire testimony simply on account of her
confusion as to the exact date of the death of the fetus, especially when she herself had presented
documentary evidence that put August 29, 1988 as the date her fetus died.
Appellant’s propensity to rely on his perceived weakness of the appellee’s evidence continues in his
argument that if indeed there is truth to her claim that she was impregnated sometime in December
1987, then she could not have a premature delivery on August 29, 1988, as she had testified during
the trial, because the 35-week period of pregnancy is complete by that time. Whether the appellee’s
impression that she had delivered prematurely is correct or not will not affect the fact that she had
delivered a fetus on August 29, 1988. In the light of appellant’s admission that he had a sexual
intercourse with his wife in January 1988, and his failure to attribute the latter’s pregnancy to any
other man, appellant cannot complain that he was deceived by the appellee into marrying her.
Appellant also puts in issue the lower court’s appreciation of the letters allegedly written by him to the
appellee. During his cross-examination, when confronted with thirteen (13) letters, appellant identified
the seven (7) letters that he sent to the appellee, but denied the remaining six (6) x x x. The letters
admitted by the appellant contained expressions of love and concern for his wife, and hardly the
rantings of a man under duress. During the re-direct examination, however, appellant suddenly
changed mind and denied authorship of those seven (7) letters, claiming that he was forced to admit
them because he was threatened with harm by the appellee. If he was laboring under duress when
he made the admission, where did he find the temerity to deny his involvement with the remaining six
(6) letters? The recantation can only be motivated by a hindsight realization by the appellant of the
evidentiary weight of those letters against his case.
As to the second assignment of error, appellant cannot claim that his marriage should be annulled
due to the absence of cohabitation between him and his wife. Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a
ground to annul a marriage. Otherwise, the validity of a marriage will depend upon the will of the
spouses who can terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate. The failure to cohabit
becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the
marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x x x.
Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of those grounds,
the validity of his marriage must be upheld. 9
We also agree that private respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees. Article 2208 (11) of the Civil Code provides
that attorney’s may be awarded where the court deems it just and equitable under the circumstances, as in the
instant case.
We, however, delete the award of moral and exemplary damages for lack of factual and legal basis. There is Republic of the Philippines
nothing in the records or in the appealed decision that would support an award of moral damages. In justifying SUPREME COURT
the award, the Court of Appeals merely said thus: Manila

It is not difficult to imagine the suffering of the appellee from the baseless portrayal of her by the FIRST DIVISION
appellant as the perpetrator of fraudulent schemes to trap an unwilling mate. x x x 10

G.R. No. 174689             October 22, 2007

However, the aforesaid finding is only a supposition as it has no reference to any testimony of private respondent
detailing her alleged physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury as would entitle her to moral damages. ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner, 
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
In Mahinay v. Velasquez, Jr.,11 we held that:

DECISION
In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral suffering,
mental anguish, fright and the like. While respondent alleged in his complaint that he suffered mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and moral shock, he failed to prove them during the trial. CORONA, J.:
Indeed, respondent should have taken the witness stand and should have testified on the mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and other emotional and mental suffering he purportedly
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and female.
suffered to sustain his claim for moral damages. Mere allegations do not suffice; they must be
(Genesis 5:1-2)
substantiated by clear and convincing proof. No other person could have proven such damages
except the respondent himself as they were extremely personal to him.
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from inside
the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed
As private respondent is not entitled to moral damages, a fortiori, she is not entitled to exemplary damages. This
once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings;
is clear in Article 2234 of the Civil Code, which provides:
one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the
woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)
ART. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show
that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the changes made
question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. In case liquidated damages have
by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a person’s sex? May a person successfully
been agreed upon, although no proof of loss is necessary in order that such liquidated damages may
petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment
be recovered, nevertheless, before the court may consider the question of granting exemplary in
surgery?
addition to the liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show that he would be entitled to moral,
temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation for liquidated damages.
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name
and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case
Hence, exemplary damages is allowed only in addition to moral damages such that no exemplary damages can
No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
be awarded unless the claimant first establishes his clear right to moral damages. 12 In the instant case, private
respondent failed to satisfactorily establish her claim for moral damages, thus she is not likewise entitled to
exemplary damages. Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio
and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his
certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The January 26, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 51832 affirming with modification the January 12, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 dismissing petitioner’s petition for the He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a
annulment of his marriage with private respondent, is AFFIRMED. However, the award of moral and exemplary female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. 1 Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he
damages is DELETED for lack of basis. consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment
and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when
he underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino
SO ORDERED.
Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate
attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his
name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."

An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal Tonight, a newspaper of
general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks. 3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.

On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the petition was
made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fiancé,
Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision 4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for
any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present
sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the
principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt,
thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to
be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or the
community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-
awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fiancé] and the realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition despite
due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose
any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil Registrar
of Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for
petitioner’s first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioner’s gender from "Male"
to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of
sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial
court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of
birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republic’s
petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration but it was denied.9 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles
407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048. 10
The petition lacks merit.
A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex. As found by
the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for
any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his
present sex. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to the civil
registry changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. 11 A change
of name is a privilege, not a right. 12 Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes. 13 In this connection,
Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048
provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or
Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except
for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or
changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the
provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for
change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore,
jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned
administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage
of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules
of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. 15 It
likewise lays down the corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings
regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change of first name
or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and
he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his
first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of
name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. 18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on
the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared
purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any
compelling reason justifying such change. 19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his
true and official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a
result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was not within
that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned,
assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative,
that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office
of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use
of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly
dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to
the statutes. 21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or
typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit
of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. 22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial
changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. 23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxx       xxx       xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of
clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is
harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like,
which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or
changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That
no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the
petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are
those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code: 24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded
in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of
natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction;
(14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of
name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur
after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the
correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change means "to
replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute." 26 The
birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name
and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as legitimations,
acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization
and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of
marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of
filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch
upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In
contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized
nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and
incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership. 27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term status… include such matters as
the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its
various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and
sometimes even succession.28 (emphasis supplied)
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal capacity and
civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special
laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to
petitioner’s cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child,
shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt
from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after
the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn
child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour
of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the
father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was
born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.
xxx       xxx       xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of
birth.29Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or
midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by
error,30 is immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence
of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register Law and laws
concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common and
ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of
peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a female" 32 or "the distinction between male
and female."33Female is "the sex that produces ova or bears young" 34 and male is "the sex that has organs to
produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding do
not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute
which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context
compels to the contrary." 36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s
and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then is something alterable through
surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the category
"female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the
intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that
reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth
certificate.

Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of Equity

The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. It
believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.

The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. First,
even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage to his
male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman.37 One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting
parties who must be a male and a female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially
reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with
another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second,
there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on
employment of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code 40 and the presumption of survivorship in
case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, 41 among others. These laws underscore the public
policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted.
Republic of the Philippines
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by SUPREME COURT
reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in Manila
judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
EN BANC
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines
should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes
particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based. G.R. No. L-31763 December 27, 1929

To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or change of THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, 
entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented vs.
and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex H. JANSSEN, defendant-appellant.
reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact
legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege. W. E. Greenbaum and Luis G. Hofileña for appellant. 
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as having
successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on  
anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of
its co-equal branch of government, Congress.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the] realization
of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and H. Janssen appeals to this court from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Antique convicting him of a
orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for violation of section 2 of Act No. 3412, and sentencing him to pay a fine of P200, with subsidiary imprisonment in
them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be case of insolvency at the rate of one day for every 12 ½ pesetas, and to pay the court costs.
addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.

In support of his appeal, the appellant assigns the following alleged errors as committed by the court a quo in its
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. decision, to wit:

Costs against petitioner. The trial court erred:

SO ORDERED. 1. In holding that it is the duty of the accused to inquire into and determine the residence of the bride
before solemnizing marriage.
Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.
2. In finding that the habitual residence of the bride, Juana S. del Rosario is the municipality of
Banga, Province of Capiz, and not the municipality of San Jose, Province of Antique.

3. In holding that the accused cannot solemnize marriage without publishing or proclaiming such
marriage 10 days prior to the celebration thereof.
 4. In holding that the accused has violated section 2 of Act No. 3412. contract marriage require banns or publications prior to the solemnization of the marriage, it shall not
be necessary for the municipal secretary to make the publication required in this paragraph, and in
this case the license shall issue immediately after the filing of the application and shall state the
5. In convicting the accused. church, sect, or religion in which the marriage is to be solemnized.

The following facts were proved at the trial beyond a reasonable doubt.
On December 26, 1928, Pedro N. Cerdeña and Juana S. del Rosario appeared before Reverend Father H.
Janssen, a Catholic parish priest of the municipality of San Jose, Antique, to have their names inscribed in the
marriage registry, Exhibit 3, which was done. On December 30, 1928, the banns were published in his parish in
San Jose, Antique.
As the classes opened on January 7, 1929, the contracting parties asked the defendant-appellant to marry them
before that date. Upon petition of the defendant-appellant, the Bishop of Jaro issued the following dispensation
on December 29, 1928:
In view of the exposition and petition contained in the foregoing document, and with the
understanding that no obstacle has been discovered in the investigation made or to be made of the
status and liberty of the contracting parties, Pedro Cerdeña, single, of age, a resident of San Jose,
Antique, and Juana S. del Rosario, a native of Banga, Province of Capiz, residing in San Jose,
Antique, single, of age; dispensation is granted from one call of the banns, as prayed for, subject to
alms --------pesos, to be applied to charitable work and the expenses of divine worship, enjoining the
Reverend Parish Priest of San Jose, Province of Antique, to whom a copy of this decree shall be
transmitted, not to solemnize the marriage under consideration, without being certain of the status
and liberty of both contracting parties, and that in the realization of said act, no complaint of any kind
shall be made on any legal ground; and that otherwise, it is our will that the dispensation be granted.
While it is true that section 2 of Act No. 3412 quoted above, requires the municipal secretary to post a notice for
ten days upon a conspiciuous place of the building where he has his office, setting forth the names, surnames,
and residence of applicants for a license to contract marriage, their age, the names of their parents, if alive, or of
their guardians, as the case may be, before issuing the license applied for, the same section contains a proviso
to the effect that when the contracting parties desire to marry in a church which requires previous proclamation
before the celebration of the marriage, there is no need of said publication. The only doubt is whether said
proclamation must be made during ten days, as in the publication in case the marriage is not celebrated in a
church. The law simply says that if the marriage takes place in a church whose rules and practices require
proclamation, the license applied for shall at once be issued, and it does not say that the proclamation required
by said church is to be made during ten days. As section 2 of Act No. 3412 is penal in character, it should be
strictly construed. And as said section does not require that the proclamation be made during ten days, but that it
is sufficient that the church in which the marriage is to take place requires a proclamation, it is immaterial how
many days said proclamation is made in.
For the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold that the defendant-appellant did not violate
section 2 of Act No. 3412 in solemnizing the marriage of Pedro N. Cerdeña and Juana S. del Rosario after two
proclamations, before ten days were up, the third proclamation having been dispensed with by a competent
ecclesiastical authority.lawphi1.net
The trial court was also of opinion that the defendant-appellant was bound to investigate whether the license was
issued by an official duly authorized by law, that is, by the municipal secretary of the municipality where the
woman habitually resides.

Causes: Urgent business of both parties, who being Government employees, cannot await the last
call without serious prejudice.
On the 1st of January, 1929, another proclamation was made to that effect.
The law does not impose this duty upon priest or ministers of religion. It is sufficient to know that the license has
been issued by a competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of said license that said official
has complied with his duty of ascertaining whether the woman who desires to get married resides habitually in
his municipality. (Act N. 190, sec. 334, No. 14.)

On January 4, 1929, the municipal secretary of San Jose, Antique, issued the following authority to solemnize Wherefore, we are of opinion and so hold, that when a marriage is solemnized by a church, sect, or religion
marriage: whose rules and practices require proclamation or publicity, it is not necessary that said proclamation be made
during ten days, unless said rules or practices so require.

To all those authorized to celebrate marriage:

You are hereby authorized to solemnize the marriage of Pedro N. Cerdeña and Juana S. del Rosario,
in accordance with the rites and ceremonies of your Church, sect, or religion, and with the laws of the
Philippine Islands.lawphi1.net
By virtue whereof, the appealed judgment is reversed, and the defendant is absolved from the information, with
costs de oficio. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.

Given this day, January 4, 1929, in the municipality of San Jose, Antique, P. I.

Attached hereto is a copy of the petition filed by the contracting parties.

By virtue of the above-quoted dispensation, and in view of said authority of the municipal secretary of San Jose,
Antique, the defendant-appellant on January 6, 1929, solemnized the marriage of Pedro N. Cerdeña to Juana S.
del Rosario.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
The only question to be decided in this appeal is whether or not the defendant-appellant violated section 2 of Act Manila
No. 3412, the pertinent part of which reads as follows:
EN BANC
The municipal secretary or clerk of the municipal court of Manila, as the case may be, shall post
during ten days in a conspicuous place in the building where he has his office, a notice setting forth
G.R. No. L-4904            February 5, 1909
the full names and domiciles of the applicants for marriage licenses, their respective ages, and the
names of their parents if living or of their guardians if otherwise. At the expiration of this term, a
license shall issue: Provided, however, That in case any such applicant states in writing and under
oath that the rules and practices of the church, sect, or religion under which such applicant desires to
ROSALIA MARTINEZ, plaintiff-appellant,  examination was adjourned to a future day and was completed in her house where she was sick in bed. It is
vs. claimed by counsel that her collapse was due to the fact that she recognized that she testified falsely in stating
ANGEL TAN, defendant-appellee. the office of the justice of the peace was at the time in the municipal building, when, in fact, it was in a private
house. We do not think that the record justifies the claim of the appellant. The statement as to the location of the
office of the justice of the peace was afterwards corrected by the witness and we are satisfied that she told the
Domingo Franco, for appellant. facts substantially as they occurred.
Doroteo Karagdag, for appellee.

There is, moreover, in the case written evidence which satisfies us that the plaintiff was not telling the truth when
WILLARD, J.: she said she did not appear before the justice of the peace. This evidence consists of eight letters, which the
defendant claims were all written by the plaintiff. The plaintiff admits that she wrote letters numbered 2 and 9.
The authenticity of the others was proven. No. 9 is as follows:
The only question in this case is whether or not the plaintiff and the defendant were married on the 25th day of
September, 1907, before the justice of the peace, Jose Ballori, in the town of Palompon in the Province of Leyte.
ANGEL: Up to this time I did not see my father; but I know that he is very angry and if he be informed
that we have been married civilly, I am sure that he will turn me out of the house.
There was received in evidence at the trial what is called an expediente de matrimonio civil. It is written in
Spanish and consists, first, of a petition directed to the justice of the peace, dated on the 25th of September,
1907, signed by the plaintiff and the defendant, in which they state that they have mutually agreed to enter into a Do what you may deem convenient, as I don't know what to do.
contract of marriage before the justice of the peace, and ask that the justice solemnize the marriage. Following
this is a document dated on the same day, signed by the justice of the peace, by the plaintiff, by the defendant,
and by Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori. It states the presentation of the petition above mentioned; that the Should I be able to go to-morrow to Merida, I shall do so, because I can not remain here.
persons who signed it where actually present in the office of the justice on the same day named; that they ratified
under oath the contents of the petition, and that they insisted in what they had there asked for. It also stated that
being required to produce witnesses of the marriage, the presented Zacarias Esmero as a witness for the Yours,           ROSAL.
husband and Pacita Ballori as a witness for the wife. Following this is a certificate of marriage signed by the
justice of the peace and the witnesses Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori, dated the 25th day of September,
Letter No. 6, which bears no date, but which undoubtedly was written on the morning of the 25th of September,
1907, in which it is stated that the plaintiff and the defendant were legally married by the justice of the peace in
is as follows:
the presence of the witnesses on that day.

Sr. D. ANGEL, TAN.

The court below decided the case in favor of the defendant, holding that the parties were legally married on the
day named. The evidence in support of that decision is: First. The document itself, which the plaintiff admits that
she signed. Second. The evidence of the defendant, who testifies that he and said plaintiff appeared before the ANGEL: It is impossible for me to go to the house of Veles this morning because my sister in law will
justice of the peace at the time named, together with the witness Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori, and that not let me go there; if it suits you, I believe that this afternoon, about 5 or 6 o'clock, is the best hour.
they all signed the document above mentioned. Third. The evidence of Zacarias Esmero, one of the above-
named witnesses, who testifies that the plaintiff, the defendant, and Pacita Ballori appeared before the justice at
the time named and did sign the document referred to. Fourth. The evidence of Pacita Ballori, who testified to the Arrange everything, as I shall go there only for the purpose of signing, and have Pacita wait for me at
same effect. Fifth. The evidence of Jose Santiago, the bailiff of the court of the justice of the peace, who testified the Chinese store, because I don't like to go without Pacita.
that the plaintiff, the defendant, the two witnesses above-named, and the justice of the peace were all present in
the office of the justice of the peace at the time mentioned.
The house must be one belonging to prudent people, and no one should know anything about it.

The only direct evidence in favor of the plaintiff is her own testimony that she never appeared before the justice
of the peace and never was married to the defendant. She admits that she signed the document in question, but
says that she signed it in her own home, without reading it, and at the request of the defendant, who told her that
it was a paper authorizing him to ask the consent of her parents to the marriage.
There is some indirect evidence which the plaintiff claims supports her case, but which we think, when properly
considered, is not entitled to much weight. The plaintiff at the time was visiting, in the town of Palompon, her
married brother and was there for about two weeks. The wife of her brother, Rosario Bayot, testified that the
plaintiff never left the house except in her company. But she admitted on cross-examination that she herself went
to school every morning and that on one occasion the plaintiff had gone to church unaccompanied. The
testimony of this witness loses its force when the testimony of Pacita Ballori is considered. She says that at the
request of the defendant on the day named, about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, she went to the store of a Chinese
named Veles; that there she met the plaintiff and her mother; that she asked the mother of the plaintiff to allow
the plaintiff to accompany her, the witness, to her own house for the purpose of examining some dress patterns;
that the mother gave her consent and the two rights left the store, but instead of going to the house of the
witness they went directly to the office of the justice of the peace where the ceremony took place; that after the
ceremony had taken place, one came advising them that the mother was approaching, and that they thereupon
hurriedly left the office of the justice and went to the house of Pacita Ballori, where the mother later found them.
Yours,           ROSAL.
It will be noticed that this corroborates completely the testimony of Pacita Ballori as to her meeting the plaintiff in
the afternoon at the store of the Chinese, Veles. Letter No. 7 is also undated, but was evidently written after the
marriage before the justice of the peace. It is as follows:
Sr. D. ANGEL, TAN.
ANGEL: If you want to speak to my mother, who is also yours, come here by and by, at about 9 or
10, when you see that the tide is high because my brother will have to go to the boat for the purpose
of loading lumber.
Don't tell her that we have been civilly married, but tell her at first that you are willing to celebrate the
marriage at this time, because I don't like her to know to-day that we have been at the court-house,
inasmuch as she told me this morning that she heard that we would go to the court, and that we must
not cause her to be ashamed, and that if I insist on being married I must do it right.

The other testimony of the plaintiff relating to certain statements made by the justice of the peace, who died after
the ceremony was performed and before the trial, and certain statements made by Pacita Ballori, is not sufficient Tell her also that you have asked me to carry you.
to overcome the positive testimony of the witnesses for the defendant.
I send you herewith the letter of your brother, in order that you may do what he wishes.
The other testimony of Pacita Ballori is severely criticized by counsel for the appellant in his brief. It appears that
during her first examination she was seized with an hysterical attack and practically collapsed at the trial. Her
 Yours,           ROSAL. Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, and Carson, JJ., concur.

Letter No. 8 was also evidently written after the marriage and is in part as follows:

Sr. D. ANGEL TAN.

ANGEL: I believe it is better for you to go to Ormoc on Sunday of the steamer Rosa, for the purpose
of asking my father's permission for our marriage, and in case he fails to give it, then we shall do
what we deem proper, and, if he does not wish us to marry without his permission, you must request
his consent.

Tell me who said that my sister in law knows that we are civilly married; my brother ill treatment is a
matter of no importance, as every thing may be carried out, with patience.

It was proven at the trial that the defendant did go to Ormoc on the steamer Rosa as indicated in this letter, and
that the plaintiff was on the same boat. The plaintiff testified, however, that she had no communication with the
defendant during the voyage. The plaintiff and the defendant never lived together as husband and wife, and upon
her arrival in Ormoc, after consulting with her family, she went to Cebu and commenced this action, which was
brought for the purpose of procuring the cancellation of the certificate of marriage and for damages. The
evidence strongly preponderates in favor of the decision of the court below to the effect that the plaintiff
appeared before the justice of the peace at the time named.

It is claimed by the plaintiff that what took place before the justice of the peace, even admitting all that the
witnesses for the defendant testified to, did not constitute a legal marriage. General orders, No. 68, section 6, is
as follows:

No particular form from the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must declare in the
presence of the person solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as husband and wife.

Zacarias Esmero, one of the witnesses, testified that upon the occasion in question the justice of the peace said
nothing until after the document was signed and then addressing himself to the plaintiff and the defendant said,
"You are married." The petition signed the plaintiff and defendant contained a positive statement that they had
mutually agreed to be married and they asked the justice of the peace to solemnize the marriage. The document
signed by the plaintiff, the defendant, and the justice of the peace, stated that they ratified under oath, before the
justice, the contents of the petition and that witnesses of the marriage were produced. A mortgage took place as
shown by the certificate of the justice of the peace, signed by both contracting parties, which certificates gives
rise to the presumption that the officer authorized the marriage in due form, the parties before the justice of the
peace declaring that they took each other as husband and wife, unless the contrary is proved, such presumption
being corroborated in this case by the admission of the woman to the effect that she had contracted the marriage
certified to in the document signed by her, which admission can only mean the parties mutually agreed to unite in
marriage when they appeared and signed the said document which so states before the justice of the peace who
authorized the same. It was proven that both the plaintiff and the defendant were able to read and write the
Spanish language, and that they knew the contents of the document which they signed; and under the
circumstances in this particular case were satisfied, and so hold, that what took place before the justice of the
peace on this occasion amounted to a legal marriage.

The defendant's original answer was a general denial of the allegations contained in the complaint. Among these
allegations was a statement that the parties had obtain previously the consent of the plaintiff's parents. The
defendant was afterwards allowed to amend his answer so that it was a denial of the allegations of the complaint
except that relating to the condition in regard to the consent of the parents. The plaintiff objected to the allowance
of this amendment. After the trial had commenced the defendant was again allowed to amend his answer so that
it should be an admission of paragraphs 2 and 3 of the complaint, except that part which related to the consent of Republic of the Philippines
the parents. It will be seen that this second amendment destroyed completely the first amendment and the SUPREME COURT
defendants lawyer stated that what he intended to allege in his first amendment, but by reason of the haste with Manila
which the first amendment was drawn he had unintentionally made it exactly the opposite of what he had
intended to state. After argument the court allowed the second amendment. We are satisfied that in this
allowance there was no abuse of discretion and we do not see how the plaintiff was in any way prejudiced. She FIRST DIVISION
proceeded with the trial of the case without asking for a continuance.
 
The judgment of the court below acquitting the defendant of the complaint is affirmed, with the costs of this
instance against the appellant. G.R. No. L-28248 March 12, 1975
LEONORA PERIDO, joined by husband MANUEL PIROTE, INOCENCIA PERIDO, ALBENIO PERIDO,
PAULINO PERIDO, LETIA PERIDO, joined by husband BIENVENIDO BALYAO, LETICIA PERIDO, joined
by husband FELIX VILLARUZ, EUFEMIA PERIDO, CONSOLACION PERIDO, ALFREDO PERIDO, GEORGE
PERIDO, AMPARO PERIDO, WILFREDO PERIDO, MARGARITA PERIDO, ROLANDO SALDE and
EDUARDO SALDE, petitioners,  IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court renders judgment as follows: declaring
vs.
MARIA PERIDO, SOFRONIO PERIDO, JUAN A. PERIDO, GONZALO PERIDO, PACITA PERIDO,
MAGDALENA PERIDO, ALICIA PERIDO, JOSEFINA PERIDO, FE PERIDO, TERESA PERIDO and LUZ
PERIDO, respondents.
Januario L. Jison, Jr. for petitioners.
Antonio T. de Jesus for respondents.
MAKALINTAL, C.J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in its CA-G.R. No. 37034-R, affirming the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Case No. 6529.
Lucio Perido of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, married twice during his lifetime. His first wife was Benita
Talorong, with whom he begot three (3) children: Felix, Ismael, and Margarita. After Benita died Lucio married
Marcelina Baliguat, with whom he had five (5) children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria, Sofronia and Gonzalo. Lucio
himself died in 1942, while his second wife died in 1943.
Of the three (3) children belonging to the first marriage only Margarita Perido is still living. Her deceased brother,
Felix Perido, is survived by his children Inocencia, Leonora, Albinio, Paulino, Letia, Leticia, and Eufemia, all
surnamed Perido. Nicanora Perido, another daughter of Felix, is also deceased, but is survived by two (2) sons,
Rolando and Eduardo Salde.
Margarita's other deceased brother, Ismael Perido, is survived by his children, namely: Consolacion, Alfredo,
Wilfredo, and Amparo. Susano Perido, another son of Ismael, is dead, but survived by his own son George
Perido.
Of Lucio Perido's five (5) children by his second wife, two are already dead, namely: Eusebio and Juan. Eusebio
is survived by his children Magdalena Perido, Pacita Perido, Alicia Perido, Josefina Perido, Fe Perido, Teresa
Perido, and Luz Perido, while Juan is survived by his only child, Juan A. Perido.
On August 15, 1960 the children and grandchildren of the first and second marriages of Lucio Perido executed a
document denominated as "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-judicial Partition," whereby they partitioned among
themselves Lots Nos. 458, 471, 506, 511, 509, 513-B, 807, and 808, all of the Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan,
Occidental Negros.
Evidently the children belonging to the first marriage of Lucio Perido had second thoughts about the partition. On
March 8, 1962 they filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, which complaint was
later amended on February 22, 1963, against the children of the second marriage, praying for the annulment of
the so-called "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-Judicial Partition" and for another partition of the lots mentioned
therein among the plaintiffs alone. They alleged, among other things, that they had been induced by the
defendants to execute the document in question through misrepresentation, false promises and fraudulent
means; that the lots which were partitioned in said document belonged to the conjugal partnership of the
spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong, and that the five children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina Baliguat
were all illegitimate and therefore had no successional rights to the estate of Lucio Perido, who died in 1942. The
defendants denied the foregoing allegations.
After trial the lower court rendered its decision dated July 31, 1965, annulling the "Declaration of Heirship and
Extra-Judicial Partition." However, it did not order the partition of the lots involved among the plaintiffs exclusively
in view of its findings that the five children of Lucio Perido with his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, were
legitimate; that all the lots, except Lot No. 458, were the exclusive properties of Lucio Perido; and that 11/12 of
Lot No. 458 belonged to the conjugal partnership of Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:têñ.£îhqwâ£
the following as the legitimate children and grandchildren and heirs of Lucio Perido and
Benita Talorong: Felix Perido, deceased; grandchildren: Inocencia Perido, Leonora
Perido, Albinio Perido, Paulino Perido, Letia Perido, Leticia Perido, Eufemia Perido;
Nicanora Perido, deceased; great grandchildren: Rolando Salde and Eduardo Salde;
Ismael Perido, deceased; grandchildren: Consolacion Perido, Alfredo Perido, Susano
Perido, deceased; great grandson: George Perido; Amparo Perido and Wilfredo Perido;
and, Margarita Perido; (2) declaring the following as the legitimate children and
grandchildren and heirs of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat: Eusebio Perido,
deceased; grandchildren: Pacita Perido, Magdalena Perido, Alicia Perido, Josefina
Perido, Fe Perido, Teresa Perido, and Luz Perido; Juan B. Perido, deceased; grandson,
Juan A. Perido; Maria Perido; Sofronia Perido; and Gonzalo Perido; (3) declaring all lots
(471, 506, 511, 509, 513-part, 807, and 808) except Lot No. 458 as exclusive properties
of Lucio Perido so that each of them should be divided into eight (8) equal parts: 1/8
belongs to Felix Perido, but because of his death leaving eight (8) children, the same
should be divided and alloted as follows: 1/64 to Inocencia Perido of age, widow; 1/64 to
Leonora Perido, of age, married to Manuel Pirote; 1/64 to Albinio Perido, of age, married
to Honorata Villasana; 1/64 to Paulino Perido, of age, married to Norma Villalba 1/64 to
Letia Perido, of age, married to Bienvenido Balyac; 1/64 to Leticia Perido, of age, married
to Felix Villaruz; 1/64 to Eufemia Perido, of age, single; 1/64 to Nicanora Perido, but
because she is now dead the same should be divided and alloted as follows: 1/128 to
Rolando Salde, of age, single; and 1/128 to Eduardo Salde, of age, single; 1/8 belongs to
Ismael Perido, but because he is already dead leaving five children, the same should be
divided and alloted as follows: 1/40 to Consolacion Perido, of age, widow; 1/40 to Alfredo
Perido, of age married to Trinidad Tamargo; 1/40 to Susano Perido, but he is already
dead with one son, the same goes to George Perido, of age, single; 1/40 to Wilfredo
Perido, of age, single; 1/8 belongs to Margarita Perido, of age, widow; 1/8 belongs to
Eusebio Perido, but because he is already dead with seven children, the same should be
divided and alloted as follows: 1/56 goes to Pacita Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes to
Magdalena Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes to Alicia Perido, of age, married to Isaias
Ruiz; 1/56 goes to Josefina Perido, of age, married to Leopoldo Doloroso; 1/56 goes to
Fe Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes to Teresa Perido, of are single; 1/56 goes to Luz
Perido, of age, married to Fidel de la Cruz; 1/8 belongs to Juan B. Perido, but because he
is already dead with one child, the same 1/8 goes to Juan A. Perido, of age, married to
Salud Salgado 1/8 goes to Maria Perido. of age, married to Julio Pirote; 1/8 goes to
Sofronia Perido, of age, widow; and, 1/8 goes to Gonzalo Perido, of age, married to
Lacomemoracion Estiller; (4) declaring the 11/12 shares in Lot No. 458 as conjugal
partnership property of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat, which should be divided and
alloted as follows: 11/24 goes to Lucio Perido to be divided into eight (8) equal shares
and 11/24 goes to Marcelina Baliguat to be divided into five (5) equal shares or 11/120 for
each of the children and again to be divided by the children of each child now deceased;
(6) declaring Fidel Perido owner of 1/12 share in Lot 458 to be divided among his heirs to
be determined accordingly later; and (6) declaring null and void Exhibit "J" of the plaintiffs
which is Exhibit "10" for the defendants, without costs and without adjudication with
respect to the counterclaim and damages, they being members of the same family, for
equity and justice.
The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial court erred: (1) in declaring that Eusebio
Perido, Juan Perido, Maria Perido, Sofronia Perido and Gonzalo Perido, were the legitimate children of Lucio
Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat; (2) in declaring that Lucio Perido was the exclusive owner of
Lots Nos. 471, 506, 511, 509, 513-Part, 807, and 808 of Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental,
and in not declaring that said lots were the conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and his first wife, Benita
Talorong; and (3) in holding that 11/12 of Lot 458 was the conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and
Marcelina Baliguat.
Finding no reversible error in the decision of the lower court, the Court of Appeals affirmed it in toto. The
appellants moved to reconsider but were turned down. Thereupon they instituted he instant petition for review
reiterating in effect the assignments of error and the arguments in the brief they submitted to the appellate court.
The first issue pertains to the legitimacy of the five children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina Baliguat. The
petitioners insist that said children were illegitimate on the theory that the first three were born out of wedlock
even before the death of Lucio Perido's first wife, while the last two were also born out of wedlock and were not
recognized by their parents before or after their marriage. In support of their contention they allege that Benita
Talorong died in 1905, after the first three children were born, as testified to by petitioner Margarita Perido and
corroborated by petitioner Leonora Perido; that as late as 1923 Lucio Perido was still a widower, as shown on
the face of the certificates of title issued to him in said year; and Lucio Perido married his second wife, Marcelina
Baliguat, only in 1925, as allegedly established through the testimony of petitioner Leonora Perido.
The petition cannot be sustained. The Court of Appeals found that there was evidence to show that Lucio
Perido's wife, Benita Talorong, died during the Spanish regime. This finding conclusive upon us and beyond our
power of review. Under the circumstance, Lucio Perido had no legal impediment to marry Marcelina Baliguat
before the birth of their first child in 1900.
With respect to the civil status of Lucio Perido as stated in the certificates of title issued to him in 1923, the Court
of Appeals correctly held that the statement was not conclusive to show that he was not actually married to
Marcelina Baliguat. Furthermore, it is weak and insufficient to rebut the presumption that persons living together
husband and wife are married to each other. This presumption, especially where legitimacy of the issue is
involved, as in this case, may be overcome only by cogent proof on the part of those who allege the illegitimacy.
In the case of Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee  1 this Court explained the rationale behind this presumption, thus:
"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not
only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to
the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were
not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would he living in the constant violation of decency and of
law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper praesumitur
pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage."
While the alleged marriage ceremony in 1925, if true, might tend to rebut the presumption of marriage arising
from previous cohabitation, it is to be noted that both the trial court and the appellate court did not even pass
upon the uncorroborated testimony of petitioner Leonora Perido on the matter. The reason is obvious. Said
witness, when asked why she knew that Marcelina Baliguat was married to Lucio Perido only in 1925, merely
replied that she knew it because "during the celebration of the marriage by the Aglipayan priest (they) got flowers
from (their) garden and placed in the altar." Evidently she was not even an eyewitness to the ceremony.
In view of the foregoing the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the five children of Lucio Perido and
Marcelina Baliguat were born during their marriage and, therefore, legitimate.
The second assignment of error refers to the determination of whether or not Lots Nos. 471, 506, 511, 509-513-
Part, 807 and 808 were the exclusive properties of Lucio Perido. In disposing of the contention of the petitioners
that said lots belong to the conjugal partnership of spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong, the Court of
Appeals said:têñ.£îhqwâ£
... We cannot agree again with them on this point. It is to be noted that the lands covered
by the certificates of title (Exhs. B to G) were all declared in the name of Lucio Perido.
Then there is evidence showing that the lands were inherited by Lucio Perido from his
grandmother (t.s.n., p. 21, Feb. 20, 1964). In other words, they were the exclusive
properties of the late Lucio Perido which he brought into the first and second marriages.
By fiat of law said Properties should be divided accordingly among his legal heirs.
The petitioners take exception to the finding of the appellate court that the aforementioned lots were inherited by
Lucio Perido from his grandmother and contend that they were able to establish through the testimonies of their
witnesses that the spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong acquired them during their lifetime. Again, the
petitioners cannot be sustained. The question involves appreciation of the evidence, which is within the domain
of the Court of Appeals, the factual findings of which are not reviewable by this Court.
The third assignment of error is with regard to the ruling of the Court of Appeals sustaining the finding of the trial
court that 11/12 of Lot 458 was the conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina
Baliguat. Said the appellate court:têñ.£îhqwâ£
With respect to Lot No. 458 which is now covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
21769 issued in 1925 the same should be considered conjugally owned by Lucio Perido
and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. The finding of the lower court on this point need
not be disturbed. It is expressly stated in the certificate of title (Exh. L) that Lucio Perido,
the registered owner, was married to Marcelina Baliguat unlike in the previous land titles.
If the law presumes a property registered in the name of only one of the spouses to be
conjugal (Guinguing vs. Abutin, 48 Phil. 144; Flores vs. Flores, 48 Phil. 288, Escutin vs.
Escutin, 60 Phil. 922), the presumption becomes stronger when the document recites that
the spouse in whose name the land is registered is married to somebody else, like in the
case at bar. It appearing that the legal presumption that the No. 458 belonged to the
conjugal partnership had not been overcome by clear proofs to the contrary, we are
constrained to rule, that the same is the conjugal property of the deceased spouses Lucio
Perido and Marcelina Baliguat.
In impugning the foregoing ruling, the petitioners maintain that they were able to prove that 6/12 of said Lot 458
was the conjugal property of spouses Lucio Perido and his first wife, Benita Talorong, and that the purchase
price of the additional 5/12 of said lot came from the proceeds of sale of a lot allegedly belonging to Lucio Perido
and his three children of the first marriage. As in the second assignment of error, the issue raised here also
involves appreciation of the evidence and, consequently, the finding of the appellate court on the matter is
binding on this Court. Indeed, a review of that finding would require an examination of all the evidence introduced
before the trial court, a consideration of the credibility of witnesses and of the circumstances surrounding the
case, their relevancy or relation to one another and to the whole, as well as an appraisal of the probabilities of
the entire situation. It would thus abolish the distinction between an ordinary appeal on the one hand and review
on certiorari on the other, and thus defeat the purpose for which the latter procedure has been established.  2
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners.
Castro, Teehankee, Makasiar and Esguerra, JJ., concur.1äwphï1.ñët
Muñoz Palma, J., is on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
 
G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990
TOMAS EUGENIO, SR., petitioner, 
vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City,
DEPUTY SHERIFF JOHNSON TAN, JR., Deputy Sheriff of Branch 20, Regional Trial Court, Cagayan de
Oro City, and the Private Respondents, the petitioners in Sp. Proc. No. 88-55, for "Habeas Corpus",
namely: CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, SANTOS and NARCISA VARGAS-BENTULAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 86470 May 17, 1990.
TOMAS EUGENIO, petitioner-appellant, 
vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City,
CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, FELIX VARGAS, ERNESTO VARGAS, NATIVIDAD VARGAS-CAGAPE,
NENITA VARGAS-CADENAS, LUDIVINA VARGAS-DE LOS SANTOS and NARCISA VARGAS-
BENTULAN,respondents-appellees.
Maximo G. Rodriguez for petitioner.
Erasmo B. Damasing and Oliver Asis Improso for respondents.
 
PADILLA, J.:
On 5 October 1988, petitioner came to this Court with a petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for
restraining order and/or injunction (docketed as G.R. No. 85140) seeking to enjoin respondent Judge from
proceeding with the Habeas Corpus case (Sp. Proc. No. 88- 55, RTC, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City), * the
respondent Sheriff from enforcing and implementing the writ and orders of the respondent Judge dated 28, 29,
and 30 September 1988, and to declare said writ and orders as null and void. In a resolution issued on 11
October 1988, this Court required comment from the respondents on the petition but denied the application for a
temporary restraining order.
The records disclose the following:
Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of (Vitaliana Vargas Vitaliana for brevity), her full blood brothers and
sisters, herein private respondents (Vargases', for brevity) filed on 27 September 1988, a petition for habeas
corpusbefore the RTC of Misamis Oriental (Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City) alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly
taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and confined by herein petitioner in his palacial residence in Jasaan,
Misamis Oriental. Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty without any legal
authority. At the time the petition was filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and living
with petitioner Tomas Eugenio.
The respondent court in an order dated 28 September 1988 issued the writ of habeas corpus, but the writ was
returned unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to
the respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject of habeas corpus proceedings; besides,
according to petitioner, he had already obtained a burial permit from the Undersecretary of the Department of
Health, authorizing the burial at the palace quadrangle of the Philippine Benevolent Christian Missionary, Inc.
(PBCM), a registered religious sect, of which he (petitioner) is the Supreme President and Founder.
Petitioner also alleged that Vitaliana died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in his residence on 28
August 1988. As her common law husband, petitioner claimed legal custody of her body. These reasons were
incorporated in an explanation filed before the respondent court. Two (2) orders dated 29 and 30 September
1988 were then issued by respondent court, directing delivery of the deceased's body to a funeral parlor in
Cagayan de Oro City and its autopsy.
Petitioner (as respondent in the habeas corpus proceedings) filed an urgent motion to dismiss the petition
therein, claiming lack of jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action under sec. 1(b) of Rule 16 in relation
to sec. 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court.  1 A special proceeding for habeas corpus, petitioner argued, is not
applicable to a dead person but extends only to all cases of illegal confinement or detention of a live person.
Before resolving the motion to dismiss, private respondents (as petitioners below) were granted leave to amend
their petition. 2 Claiming to have knowledge of the death of Vitaliana only on 28 September 1988 (or after the
filing of the habeas corpus petition), private respondents (Vargases') alleged that petitioner Tomas Eugenia who
is not in any way related to Vitaliana was wrongfully interfering with their (Vargases') duty to bury her. Invoking
Arts. 305 and 308 of the Civil Code, 3the Vargases contended that, as the next of kin in the Philippines, they are
the legal custodians of the dead body of their sister Vitaliana. An exchange of pleadings followed. The motion to
dismiss was finally submitted for resolution on 21 October 1988.
In the absence of a restraining order from this Court, proceedings continued before the respondent court; the
body was placed in a coffin, transferred to the Greenhills Memorial Homes in Cagayan de Oro City, viewed by
the presiding Judge of respondent court, and examined by a duly authorized government pathologist. 4
Denying the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner, the court a quo held in an order, 5 dated 17 November 1988,
that:
It should be noted from the original petition, to the first amended petition, up to the
second amended petition that the ultimate facts show that if the person of Vitaliana
Vargas turns out to be dead then this Court is being prayed to declare the petitioners as
the persons entitled to the custody, interment and/or burial of the body of said deceased.
The Court, considering the circumstance that Vitaliana Vargas was already dead on
August 28, 1988 but only revealed to the Court on September 29, 1988 by respondent's
counsel, did not lose jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of this case because
it may entertain this case thru the allegations in the body of the petition on the
determination as to who is entitled to the custody of the dead body of the late Vitaliana
Vargas as well as the burial or interment thereof, for the reason that under the provisions
of Sec. 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which reads as follows:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation;
xxx xxx xxx
(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital
relations;
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions:
xxx xxx xxx
it so provides that the Regional Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to try this
case. The authority to try the issue of custody and burial of a dead person is within the
lawful jurisdiction of this Court because of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and because of the
allegations of the pleadings in this case, which are enumerated in Sec. 19, pars. 1, 5 and
6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Thereafter, the court a quo proceeded as in or civil cases and, in due course, rendered a decision on 17 January
1989, 6 resolving the main issue of whether or not said court acquired jurisdiction over the case by treating it as
an action for custody of a dead body, without the petitioners having to file a separate civil action for such relief,
and without the Court first dismissing the original petition for habeas corpus.
Citing Sections 19 and 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981), 7 Sections 5
and 6 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court  8 Articles 305 and 308 in relation to Article 294 of the Civil Code and
Section 1104 of the Revised Administrative Code, 9 the decision stated:
. . . . By a mere reading of the petition the court observed that the allegations in the
original petition as well as in the two amended petitions show that Vitaliana Vargas has
been restrained of her liberty and if she were dead then relief was prayed for the custody
and burial of said dead person. The amendments to the petition were but elaborations but
the ultimate facts remained the same, hence, this court strongly finds that this court has
ample jurisdiction to entertain and sit on this case as an action for custody and burial of
the dead body because the body of the petition controls and is binding and since this
case was raffled to this court to the exclusion of all other courts, it is the primary duty of
this court to decide and dispose of this case. . . . . 10
Satisfied with its jurisdiction, the respondent court then proceeded to the matter of rightful custody over the dead
body, (for purposes of burial thereof). The order of preference to give support under Art. 294 was used as the
basis of the award. Since there was no surviving spouse, ascendants or descendants, the brothers and sisters
were preferred over petitioner who was merely a common law spouse, the latter being himself legally married to
another woman. 11
On 23 January 1989, a new petition for review with application for a temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction was filed with this Court (G.R. No. 86470). Raised therein were pure questions of law,
basically Identical to those raised in the earlier petition (G.R. No. 85140); hence, the consolidation of both
cases. 12 On 7 February 1989, petitioner filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an injunction to
maintain status quo pending appeal, which this Court denied in a resolution dated 23 February 1989 stating that
"Tomas Eugenio has so far failed to sufficiently establish a clear legal right to the custody of the dead body of
Vitaliana Vargas, which now needs a decent burial." The petitions were then submitted for decision without
further pleadings.
Between the two (2) consolidated petitions, the following issues are raised:
1. propriety of a habeas corpus proceeding under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court to
recover custody of the dead body of a 25 year old female, single, whose nearest surviving
claimants are full blood brothers and sisters and a common law husband.
2. jurisdiction of the RTC over such proceedings and/or its authority to treat the action as
one for custody/possession/authority to bury the deceased/recovery of the dead.
3. interpretation of par. 1, Art. 294 of the Civil Code (Art. 199 of
the new Family Code) which states:
Art. 294. The claim for support, when proper and two or more
persons are obliged to give it, shall be made in the following order:
(1) From the
spouse;
xxx xxx xxx
Section 19, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides for the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts
over civil cases. Under Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus may be granted by a
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court). It is an elementary rule of procedure that what controls is not
the caption of the complaint or petition; but the allegations therein determine the nature of the action, and even
without the prayer for a specific remedy, proper relief may nevertheless be granted by the court if the facts
alleged in the complaint and the evidence introduced so warrant. 13
When the petition for habeas corpus was filed before the court a quo, it was not certain whether Vitaliana was
dead or alive. While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere
perfimetory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is exercised in its issuance, and such facts
must be made to appear to the judge to whom the petition is presented as, in his judgment, prima facie entitle
the petitioner to the writ. 14 While the court may refuse to grant the writ if the petition is insufficient in form and
substance, the writ should issue if the petition complies with the legal requirements and its averments make
a prima facie case for relief. However, a judge who is asked to issue a writ of habeas corpus need not be very
critical in looking into the petition for very clear grounds for the exercise of this jurisdiction. The latter's power to
make full inquiry into the cause of commitment or detention will enable him to correct any errors or defects in the
petition. 15
In Macazo and Nunez vs. Nunez, 16 the Court frowned upon the dismissal of a habeas corpus petition filed by a
brother to obtain custody of a minor sister, stating:
All these circumstances notwithstanding, we believe that the case should not have been
dismissed. The court below should not have overlooked that by dismissing the petition, it
was virtually sanctioning the continuance of an adulterous and scandalous relation
between the minor and her married employer, respondent Benildo Nunez against all
principles of law and morality. It is no excuse that the minor has expressed preference for
remaining with said respondent, because the minor may not chose to continue an illicit
relation that morals and law repudiate.
xxx xxx xxx
The minor's welfare being the paramount consideration, the court below should not allow
the technicality, that Teofilo Macazo was not originally made a party, to stand in the way
of its giving the child full protection. Even in a habeas corpus proceeding the court had
power to award temporary custody to the petitioner herein, or some other suitable person,
after summoning and hearing all parties concerned. What matters is that the immoral
situation disclosed by the records be not allowed to continue. 17
After the fact of Vitaliana's death was made known to the petitioners in the habeas
corpus proceedings, amendmentof the petition for habeas corpus, not dismissal, was proper to avoid multiplicity
of suits. Amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice
in order that every case may so far as possible be determined on its real facts and in order to expedite the trial of
cases or prevent circuity of action and unnecessary expense, unless there are circumstances such as
inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party by surprise or the like, which justify a refusal of permission
to amend. 18 As correctly alleged by respondents, the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy became moot and
academic due to the death of the person allegedly restrained of liberty, but the issue of custody remained, which
the court a quo had to resolve.
Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, the term spouse used therein
not being preceded by any qualification; hence, in the absence of such qualification, he is the rightful custodian
of Vitaliana's body. Vitaliana's brothers and sisters contend otherwise. Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize
common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife,
who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the
community where they live may be considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions but not in the
Philippines. 19
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in our society,
and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed by law, 20 authority exists in
case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and woman living together must not
in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. 21 In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with
another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs.
CFI of Cavite, 22 ,the Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of Surviving
Spouse and Children During Liquidation of Inventoried Property) stated: "Be it noted however that with respect to
'spouse', the same must be the legitimate 'spouse' (not common-law spouses)."
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse" embraces common law
relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief
committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a
couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and wife de
facto. 23 But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil
Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a
lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was
not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.
Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters (the
Vargases). Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial. — The immediate duty of burying the
body of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense thereof,
shall devolve upon the persons hereinbelow specified:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or a child,
and left any kin, the duty of burial shall devolve upon the nearest
of kin of the deceased, if they be adults and within the Philippines
and in possession of sufficient means to defray the necessary
expenses.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Both petitions are hereby DISMISSED. No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Gancayco and Grino-Aquino, JJ., are on leave. Answering petitioners petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains
that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry
of Carmona, Cavite. Contrary to petitioners representation, respondent gave birth to their first child named Rose
Ann Alcantara on 14 October 1985 and to another daughter named Rachel Ann Alcantara on 27 October 1992.[7] Petitioner
has a mistress with whom he has three children. [8] Petitioner only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution
for concubinage.[9] Respondent, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against petitioner before
the Metropolitan Trial Court ofMandaluyong City, Branch 60.[10] Respondent prays that the petition for annulment of
marriage be denied for lack of merit.
 
On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, rendered its Decision disposing as follows: 
 
The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as follows:
 
1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;
 
2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) per
month as support for their two (2) children on the first five (5) days of each month; and
 
3. To pay the costs.[11]
 
 
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petitioners appeal. His Motion for
THIRD DIVISION Reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 6 April 2005.[12]
   
  The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties is presumed to be regularly issued and petitioner had not
RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA,   G.R. No. 167746 presented any evidence to overcome the presumption.Moreover, the parties marriage contract being a public document is
Petitioner,   a prima facie proof of the questioned marriage under Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.[13]
  Present:  
    In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:
  YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,  
  Chairperson, a. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it ruled that the Petition for
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, Annulment has no legal and factual basis despite the evidence on record that there
  CHICO-NAZARIO,  was no marriage license at the precise moment of the solemnization of the marriage.
  NACHURA, and  
  REYES, JJ. b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it gave weight to the
    Marriage License No. 7054133 despite the fact that the same was not identified and
ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT OF Promulgated: offered as evidence during the trial, and was not the Marriage license number
APPEALS,   appearing on the face of the marriage contract.
Respondents. August 28, 2007  
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to apply the ruling
laid down by this Honorable Court in the case of Sy vs. Court of Appeals. (G.R. No.
  127263, 12 April 2000 [330 SCRA 550]).
 
d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to relax the
DECISION observance of procedural rules to protect and promote the substantial rights of the
  party litigants.[14]
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:  
   
  We deny the petition.
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Restituto Alcantara assailing the Decision[1] of the  
Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66724 denying petitioners appeal and affirming the Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with the respondent was celebrated, there was no marriage
decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 143, in Civil Case No. 97-1325 dated 14 February license because he and respondent just went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a fixer who arranged everything for
2000, dismissing his petition for annulment of marriage.  them.[15] The wedding took place at the stairs in Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel where Rev. Aquilino Navarro
  who solemnized the marriage belongs.[16] He and respondent did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage
The antecedent facts are: license. Assuming a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the respondent was a
  resident of the place. The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight because
A petition for annulment of marriage[3] was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 the certification states that Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss
December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the Rosita Almario[17] but their marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage license number.
purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their  
wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel.[4] They got married on The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December 1982, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code,
the same day, 8 December 1982. Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage ceremony at the San Jose the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.
de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties  
securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the
is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)[18] in relation to Article 58 of the same Code.[19]
civil registrar of the said place. On 14 October 1985, respondent gave birth to their child Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they  
parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage Article 53 of the Civil Code[20] which was the law applicable at the time of the marriage of the parties states:
void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract[5] and its entry on file.[6]  
  Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
  
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
 
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
 
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
 
 
The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the States demonstration of its involvement and participation in every
marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.[21]
 
Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage. The cases where the
court considered the absence of a marriage license as a ground for considering the marriage void are clear-cut.
 
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[22] the Local Civil Registrar issued a certification of due search and
inability to find a record or entry to the effect that Marriage License No. 3196182 was issued to the parties. The Court held
that the certification of due search and inability to find a record or entry as to the purported marriage license, issued by the
Civil Registrar of Pasig, enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data
relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Based on said certification, the Court held that there is absence of a marriage
license that would render the marriage void ab initio.
 
In Cario v. Cario,[23] the Court considered the marriage of therein petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased Santiago
S. Carino as void ab initio. The records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage
license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such
marriage license. The court held that the certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance
of the marriage license. Their marriage having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license and not being one of
the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly
void ab initio.
In Sy v. Court of Appeals,[24] the marriage license was issued on 17 September 1974, almost one year after the ceremony
took place on 15 November 1973. The Court held that the ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted
without a marriage license. 
 
In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a marriage license which rendered the marriage void.
 
Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the
law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least,
supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case,
the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect
was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite.[25] The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically
identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further
validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein. 
 
The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite, reads:
This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed in this office, Marriage License
No. 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss
Rosita Almario on December 8, 1982.
 
This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs. Rosita A. Alcantara for whatever legal
purpose or intents it may serve.[26]
 
 
This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage
license was done in the regular conduct of official business. [27]The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted
by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome
by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes
conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and, in case of doubt as to an officers
act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness. [28] Significantly, apart from these, petitioner,
by counsel, admitted that a marriage license was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite.[29]
Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent is
a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondents
marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and
issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for
publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. [30] An irregularity in any of the
formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly,
criminally and administratively liable.[31]
Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage license number in the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar, which states that the marriage license issued to the parties is No. 7054133, while the marriage contract states that
the marriage license number of the parties is number 7054033. Once more, this argument fails to sway us. It is not
impossible to assume that the same is a mere a typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of the marriage contract reveals the
overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1, such that the marriage license may read either as 7054133 or 7054033. It therefore does
not detract from our conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage license to the parties. 
Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands, [32] petitioner cannot pretend that he was not
responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which he now insists took place without the requisite marriage
license. Petitioner admitted that the civil marriage took place because he initiated it.[33] Petitioner is an educated person. He
is a mechanical engineer by profession. He knowingly and voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly
and voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action and be allowed to extricate himself
from the marriage bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no longer palatable to his taste or suited to his lifestyle. We
cannot countenance such effrontery. His attempt to make a mockery of the institution of marriage betrays his bad faith.[34]
 
Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony twice in a span of less than one year utilizing the same
marriage license. There is no claim that he went through the second wedding ceremony in church under duress or with a gun
to his head. Everything was executed without nary a whimper on the part of the petitioner.
 
In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they presented to the San Jose de Manuguit Church the
marriage contract executed during the previous wedding ceremony before the Manila City Hall. This is confirmed in
petitioners testimony as follows
 
WITNESS
 
As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the necessary document prior to the wedding.
 
COURT
What particular document did the church asked you to produce? I am referring to the San Jose
de Manuguit church.
 
WITNESS
 
I dont remember your honor.
 
COURT
 
Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage License?
 
WITNESS
 
I think they asked us for documents and I said we have already a Marriage Contract and I dont
know if it is good enough for the marriage and they accepted it your honor.
COURT
 
In other words, you represented to the San Jose de Manuguit church that you have with you
already a Marriage Contract?
 
WITNESS
Yes your honor.
COURT
 
That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the same marriage License in the Marriage
Contract issued which Marriage License is Number 7054033.
WITNESS
 
Yes your honor.[35]
 
The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing participant to all that took place at that time. Obviously,
the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby cleansing whatever irregularity or defect attended the
civil wedding.[36]
 
Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared before a fixer who arranged everything for them and who
facilitated the ceremony before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel -- will not
strengthen his posture. The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be
presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary. [37] Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to
investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar.  All the
solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from
the issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the
requirements of law.[38]
 
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage.[39] Every
intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption with
great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.
 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 30 September 2004 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143 of Makati City, dated 14
February 2000, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. 
 
SO ORDERED.