G.R. No.
178044 January 19, 2011 Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent
ALAIN M. DIÑO , Petitioner,
vs.
MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO, Respondent.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 18 October
2006 Decision2 and the 12 March 2007 Order3 of the Regional Trial
Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 254 (trial court) in Civil Case No. LP-
01-0149.
The Antecedent Facts
Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño (respondent)
were childhood friends and sweethearts. They started living
together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996,
petitioner and respondent decided to live together again. On 14
January 1998, they were married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las
Piñas City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage against respondent, citing psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged that
respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support
to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family,
choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her
friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner further alleged
that respondent was not faithful, and would at times become
violent and hurt him.
Page 1 of 21
who, at the time of the filing of the petition, was already living in the
United States of America. Despite receipt of the summons,
respondent did not file an answer to the petition within the
reglementary period. Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a
petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage with petitioner,
which was granted by the Superior Court of California on 25 May
2001. Petitioner also learned that on 5 October 2001, respondent
married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara.
On 30 April 2002, the Office of the Las Piñas prosecutor found that
there were no indicative facts of collusion between the parties and
the case was set for trial on the merits.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a
psychological report establishing that respondent was suffering from
Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was deeply ingrained in her
system since her early formative years. Dr. Tayag found that
respondent’s disorder was long-lasting and by nature, incurable.
In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition
on the ground that respondent was psychologically incapacited to
comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.
The Decision of the Trial Court
The trial court ruled that based on the evidence presented,
petitioner was able to establish respondent’s psychological
incapacity. The trial court ruled that even without Dr. Tayag’s
psychological report, the allegations in the complaint, substantiated
in the witness stand, clearly made out a case of psychological
incapacity against respondent. The trial court found that respondent
committed acts which hurt and embarrassed petitioner and the rest
of the family, and that respondent failed to observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity required of her under Article 68 of the Family
Code. The trial court also ruled that respondent abandoned
petitioner when she obtained a divorce abroad and married another
man.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIÑO and
defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO on January 14, 1998, and all its
effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the beginning; and
2. Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued
upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the parties, the Office of the
Solicitor General, Office of the City Prosecutor, Las Piñas City and the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Piñas City, for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the
dissolution of the absolute community of property and the ruling
that the decree of annulment shall only be issued upon compliance
with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Page 2 of 21
In its 12 March 2007 Order, the trial court partially granted the
motion and modified its 18 October 2006 Decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIÑO and
defendant MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO on January 14, 1998, and all its
effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the beginning; and
2) Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after
liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code.
Let copies of this Order be furnished the parties, the Office of the
Solicitor General, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City
and the Local Civil Registrar of Las Piñas City, for their information
and guidance.5
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it
ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be
issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court ordering that a decree
of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation,
partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article
147 of the Family Code. Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages6 (the Rule) does not apply to
Article 147 of the Family Code.
We agree with petitioner.
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in
a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the
parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of the
Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated
and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void,8 such as petitioner and respondent in
the case before the Court.
Article 147 of the Family Code provides:
Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to
marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while
they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by
Page 3 of 21
their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in
equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall
be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if
the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or
her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned
in common, without the consent of the other, until after the
termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the
share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited
in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by
any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the
absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent
party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of
the cohabitation.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements
must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each
other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is
void.9
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question
that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations
between petitioner and respondent.
We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after
liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis
because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed
under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the
Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the
petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or
decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after
compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as
implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and
Distribution of Properties.
The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited in Section 19(1) of
the Rule are:
Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5)
of Article 43 and in Article 44 shall also apply in proper cases to
marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final
judgment under Articles 40 and 45.10
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the
custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of
their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
Page 4 of 21
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community of
the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for
liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is
situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of
Articles 102 and 129.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes
of all common children, computed as of the date of the final
judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or
sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially
approved, had already provided for such matters.
The children of their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may
ask for the enforcement of the judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in
no way prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children
accruing upon the death of either or both of the parents; but the
value of the properties already received under the decree of
annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on
their legitime.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of
the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio
or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family
Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to
marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the
Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the
liquidation of the properties of the parties.
 ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of
Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is
second or bigamous marriage was contracted.1avvphil Under Article governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.16
40, "[t]he absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on
declaring such previous marriage void." Thus we ruled: co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, "[p]artition may
be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial
x x x where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to proceedings. x x x." It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of
be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of
basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from marriage.
legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring a previous marriage
void.11 WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court with the
MODIFICATION that the decree of absolute nullity of the marriage
Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable shall be issued upon finality of the trial court’s decision without
marriages, meaning, marriages which are valid until they are set waiting for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’
aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
annulment.12 In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the
marriages are governed either by absolute community of SO ORDERED.
property13 or conjugal partnership of gains14 unless the parties
agree to a complete separation of property in a marriage settlement
entered into before the marriage. Since the property relations of the
parties is governed by absolute community of property or conjugal
partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and
distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be
issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the
ordinary rules on co-ownership.

In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void

under Article 3615 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or
45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in
common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-

Page 5 of 21
G.R. No. 243722 (Formerly UDK-16060) January 22, 2020
CYNTHIA A. GALAPON, PETITIONER, V. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
CAGUIOA, J:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 (Petition) filed under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court against the Decision2 dated February 27,
2017 (assailed Decision) and Resolution3 dated September 29, 2017
(assailed Resolution) in CA-G.R. CV No. 106950, rendered by the
Court of Appeals (CA), Eleventh Division and Former Eleventh
Division, respectively.
The assailed Decision and Resolution reversed the Decision4 dated
July 3, 2015 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sto.
Domingo, Nueva Ecija, Branch 88 in Special Proceedings No. SD(14)-
417, which recognized the foreign divorce decree obtained by
Cynthia A. Galapon (Cynthia) and her spouse Noh Shik Park (Park), a
Korean national.
The Facts
The antecedents, as narrated by the CA, are as follows:
[Cynthia], a Filipina, and [Park], a South Korean national, got
married in the City of Manila, Philippines on [February 27, 2012.
Unfortunately, their relationship turned sour and ended with a
divorce by mutual agreement in South Korea. After the divorce was
confirmed on [July 16, 2012 by the Cheongju Local Court, [Cynthia]
filed before the [RTC] a Petition for the Judicial Recognition of a
Foreign Divorce [(Recognition Petition)].
Page 6 of 21
The [RTC], finding the [Recognition] Petition sufficient in form and
substance, issued an Order dated [November 11, 2014 setting the
case for hearing. The said Order was then published once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks in The Daily Tribune. Meanwhile, the
Office of [the] Solicitor General [(OSG)] filed a Notice of Appearance
as counsel for the Republic of the Philippines. The Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Baloc, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija was also
deputized to assist the OSG.
During the presentation of evidence, Abigail Galapon [(Abigail)],
[Cynthia's] sister and attorney-in-fact, testified in court. Abigail
identified and affirmed her Judicial Affidavit, including the contents
thereof and her signature thereon. Furthermore, Abigail averred
that [Cynthia] could not personally testify because the latter's
Korean visa expired upon her divorce with Park. Nevertheless,
Abigail [alleged that she] has personal knowledge of the facts
alleged in the [Recognition] Petition and claimed, among other
things, that Park intended to many his former girlfriend [and that
Cynthia] was forced to agree to the divorce because Park made a
threat to her life x x x.5
RTC Ruling
On July 3, 2015, the RTC issued a Decision6 granting the Recognition
Petition. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the [Recognition Petition] is hereby
GRANTED and the Divorce Decree obtained in Seoul, Korea between
[Cynthia] and [Park] on [July 16, 2012 is hereby RECOGNIZED. The
Civil Registrar General and [the] Office of the Manila Civil Registrar
are hereby DIRECTED to RECORD the said divorce decrees (sic) upon
presentation of a duly authenticated copy thereof and payment of
appropriate fees, if any. [Cynthia] is now legally capacitated to
remarry under Philippine Laws pursuant to [Article] 26, [Paragraph]
2 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Solicitor
General, the Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Ecija, the Office of the
Civil Registrar General-National Statistics Office, the Office of the
Civil Registrar of the City of Manila and the Embassy of the
Philippines in Seoul, Korea through the Department of Foreign
Affairs.
SO ORDERED.7
The OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The arguments therein,
as summarized by the RTC, are as follows:
1. The [Recognition Petition] should [have been] filed in the RTC of
Manila because the marriage was celebrated and was recorded in
the City Civil Registry of Manila. Citing the case of Fujiki vs. Marinay8
x x x, the (OSG] argued that [the recognition] of foreign divorce
judgments may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court. Thus, the venue of such proceedings is laid on the
appropriate RTC where the civil registry is located;
2. Absolute divorce is not allowed in this jurisdiction. Considering
that the divorce x x x was obtained not by the alien spouse alone
but by both spouses, x x x [Cynthia] is not qualified to avail of the
benefits provided by [Article] 26 of the Family Code.9 (Italics
supplied)
The Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the RTC through its
Resolution10 dated March 17, 2016.
Page 7 of 21
Foremost, the RTC held that while the Court, in Fujiki v. Marinay,11
ruled that the recognition of a foreign divorce decree may be made
in a special proceeding, the use of the permissive word "may" was
intentional so as not to foreclose the option of seeking such
recognition through a special civil action for declaratory relief under
Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, as in the case of Republic v. Orbecido
III12 (Orbecido).13 Expounding further, the RTC held that since
there are no specific rules governing petitions for recognition of
foreign divorce, it applied by analogy Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules
of Court (Rules) which requires personal actions to be filed at the
place where either the plaintiff or defendant resides.14
In addition, the RTC found that the requisites for the application of
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code [Article 26(2)] concur.
First, there was a valid marriage celebrated between Cynthia and
Park, as shown by the Certificate of Marriage issued by the National
Statistics Office.15
Second, a valid divorce was obtained abroad by Park capacitating
him to remarry, as shown by the Certification16 issued by the
Cheongju Local Court stating that he and Cynthia were divorced on
July 16, 2012. While the RTC recognized that the divorce decree in
question was obtained by mutual agreement, it ruled that such fact
does not preclude its recognition in this jurisdiction since the
testimony of Abigail Galapon (Abigail) confirms that Park merely
coerced Cynthia to agree to the divorce.17
Not satisfied, the OSG appealed to the CA via Rule 41.
CA Ruling
On February 27, 2017, the CA issued the assailed Decision18
granting the OSG's appeal, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant [a]ppeal is GRANTED.
The Decision dated [July 3, 2015 and Resolution dated [March 17,
2016 issued by Branch 88, [RTC] of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, [are]
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the Petition filed by [Cynthia] is hereby DISMISSED, for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.19
The CA found no merit in the OSG's contention that the RTC erred
when it acted on the Recognition Petition since venue was
improperly laid. While Section 1, Rule 108 requires petitions for
judicial recognition of foreign divorce decrees to be filed with the
RTC where the civil entry of the marriage in question is registered,
the CA held that courts cannot motu proprio dismiss an action on
the ground of improper venue.20 Hence, the CA found that the RTC
did not err in taking cognizance of the Recognition Petition since the
OSG failed to move for its dismissal on the ground of improper
venue at the first instance.21
Nonetheless, the CA held that the divorce decree in question cannot
be recognized in this jurisdiction insofar as Cynthia is concerned
since it was obtained by mutual agreement.22 Said the CA:
To be sure, it is crystal clear from pertinent law and jurisprudence
that the foreign divorce contemplated under the second (2nd)
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code must have been initiated
and obtained by the foreigner spouse. Thus, the Supreme Court had
Page 8 of 21
made it also clear that in determining whether or not a divorce
secured abroad would come within the pale of the country's policy
against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the
parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.
There can be no dispute that [Cynthia] was a Filipino citizen when
she obtained the divorce decree with her foreign spouse and, in
fact, remains to be so up to the present. Clearly, since the divorce
under consideration was jointly applied for and obtained by a
Filipino and a foreigner spouse, it was incorrect for the [RTC] to
apply the provision of the second (2nd) paragraph, Article 26 of the
Family Code. Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article
15 of the Civil Code, Philippine nationals, like [Cynthia], are covered
by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
Notably, the [RTC] took as gospel truth the assertion of Abigail that
[Cynthia] was merely acting under duress when she agreed to the
demand of Park to sever their marriage, lest something bad would
happen to her. Said allegation was used by the [RTC] as basis to
conclude that the divorce was initiated by Park alone and that there
was actually no divorce by mutual agreement that took place.
This was obviously a serious error on the part of the [RTC].
For one, the very evidence relied upon by [Cynthia] clearly show
that the divorce between [Cynthia] and Park was obtained by
mutual agreement, in accordance with Section 5, Article 834 of the
Korean Civil Code. If [the CA follows] the [RTC's] conclusion, then it
is with more reason that the [Recognition] Petition should be denied
since it becomes evident that the divorce obtained by Park is
contrary to, nay in violation of, [the Korean Civil Code], which clearly
requires a divorce by mutual agreement. It is not amiss to point out
x x x that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized
in the Philippines only when the divorce is valid according to his or
her national law.
For another, [Cynthia] herself was not presented in court while her
sister, Abigail, testified on matters not derived from her own
perception but from what [Cynthia] allegedly told her. x x x Verily,
the personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for
accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a
disputed fact. x x x23
On September 29, 2017, the CA denied Cynthia's subsequent
Motion for Reconsideration through the assailed Resolution.24
Cynthia received the assailed Resolution through counsel on
October 10, 2017.25
On October 24, 2017, Cynthia filed a Motion for Extension of Time
to File Petition for Review with Application for Authorization to
Litigate as Indigent Party.26 Therein, Cynthia moved for an
additional period of thirty (30) days, or until November 24, 2017 to
file her petition for review. In addition, Cynthia alleged that she
remains in Korea "under questionable alien status," and is suffering
from an illness which requires immediate medical attention.
Because of these circumstances, Cynthia prayed that she be granted
authorization to litigate as an indigent party, for while her counsel
on record has agreed to continue handling her case pro bono, she
has no sufficient means to pay the required filing fees.27
Cynthia filed the present Petition on November 20, 2017.
Page 9 of 21
On January 31, 2018, the Court issued a Resolution28 granting
Cynthia's prayer for extension, and requiring Cynthia to submit
proof of her indigency within five (5) days from notice. The Court
also directed the OSG to file its comment on the Petition.
Upon submission of the required proof, the Court granted Cynthia's
application to litigate as an indigent party.29
Meanwhile, the OSG filed its Comment30 on the Petition on April
26, 2018. In turn, Cynthia filed her Reply31 on September 25, 2018.
In this Petition, Cynthia avers that this case calls for the exercise of
the Philippine courts' power of "limited review" over a foreign
judgment. Cynthia argues that by reversing the RTC Decision, the CA
erroneously delved into the merits of the divorce decree in
question, and substituted its judgment for the judgment of the
Korean courts with respect to matters relating to the status,
condition and legal capacity of Park who is a Korean national.32
Further, Cynthia claims that the assailed Decision and Resolution
would result in the unjust situation Article 26(2) is meant to
prevent.33
In her Reply, Cynthia further argues that all doubts as to the
application of Article 26(2) to foreign divorce decrees obtained by
mutual consent of the Filipino citizen and the alien spouse have
been laid to rest in the recent case of Republic v. Manalo34
(Manalo).35
The Issue
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether the CA erred in
denying the recognition of the divorce decree obtained by Cynthia
and her foreign spouse, Park.

The Court's Ruling
The Petition is granted.
The controversy is centered on the interpretation of Article 26(2) as
applied to divorce decrees obtained jointly by the foreign spouse
and Filipino citizen.
Article 26 of the Family Code states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with
the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
(Emphasis supplied)
In Orbecido, the Court laid down the elements for the application of
Article 26(2), bearing in mind the spirit and intent behind the
provision as reflected in the Committee deliberations. The Court
held:
x x x [The Court states] the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
Page 10 of 21
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time
of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a
valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the
latter to remarry.
In this case, when [the Filipino spouse's] wife was naturalized as an
American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between [them]. As fate would have it, the naturalized
alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to
remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph
2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus x x x the
"divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.36
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied; italics in the original)
Here, the CA anchored the assailed Decision on the absence of the
second element set forth in Orbecido. According to the CA, the fact
that the divorce decree had been obtained by mutual agreement of
Cynthia and Park precludes the application of Article 26(2), since the
language of the provision requires that the divorce decree be
obtained solely by the foreign spouse.
Adopting the same view, the OSG argues that the divorce decree in
question is not one "obtained x x x by the alien spouse alone[,] but
[one obtained] at the instance of both [spouses]."37 Hence, the OSG
insists that Article 26(2) simply cannot apply to Cynthia.38 In this
connection, the OSG claims that Abigail 's testimony to the effect
that Cynthia had been merely forced to agree to the divorce should
not be given credence for being hearsay.39
The CA and OSG are mistaken.
In the recent case of Manalo, the Court en banc extended the scope
of Article 26(2) to even cover instances where the divorce decree is
obtained solely by the Filipino spouse. The Court's ruling states, in
part:
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry."
Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires
that there be a divorce valid l y obtained abroad. The letter of the
law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who
initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It
does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or
the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is
bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put words in the
mouths of the lawmakers. "The legislature is presumed to know the
meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have
expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the
statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a
statute there should be no departure."
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained"
should be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be
actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow
the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true
intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions
inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Laws have ends to
achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to
carry out such ends and purposes. As held in League of Cities of the
Phils., et al. v. COMELEC, et al.:
Page 11 of 21
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the
manner in which the resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a
verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it
meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation or
injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the
principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself,
resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the law controls its
letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in
the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an
anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the
foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country.
Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding
or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and
capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same
result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or
wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the
same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the
receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject
provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is
extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign
divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses
are severed by operation of the latter's national law.40 (Emphasis
supplied; italics in the original)
Pursuant to the majority ruling in Manalo, Article 26(2) applies to
mixed marriages where the divorce decree is: (i) obtained by the
foreign spouse; (ii) obtained jointly by the Filipino and foreign
spouse; and (iii) obtained solely by the Filipino spouse.
 29, 2017 rendered by the Court of Appeals, Eleventh Division and
Based on the records, Cynthia and Park obtained a divorce decree Former Eleventh Division, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 106950 are
by mutual agreement under the laws of South Korea. The sufficiency REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
of the evidence presented by Cynthia to prove the issuance of said
divorce decree and the governing national law of her husband Park Accordingly, the Decision dated July 3, 2015 issued by the Regional
was not put in issue. In fact, the CA considered said evidence Trial Court of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, Branch 88 in Special
sufficient to establish the authenticity and validity of the divorce in Proceedings No. SD(14)-417 is REINSTATED. By virtue of Article 26,
question: paragraph 2 of the Family Code and the Certification of the
Cheongju Local Court dated July 16, 2012, petitioner Cynthia A.
x x x [T]he records show that [Cynthia] submitted, inter alia, the Galapon is declared capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
original and translated foreign divorce decree, as well as the
required certificates proving its authenticity. She also offered into SO ORDERED.
evidence a copy of the Korean Civil Code, duly authenticated
through a Letter of Confirmation with Registry No. 2013-020871,
issued by the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in the Philippines.
These pieces of evidence may have been sufficient to establish the
authenticity and validity of the divorce obtained by the estranged
couple abroad but [the CA agrees] with the OSG that the divorce
cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction insofar as [Cynthia] is
concerned since it was obtained by mutual agreement of a foreign
spouse and a Filipino spouse.41 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

In this light, it becomes unnecessary to delve into the admissibility

and probative value of Abigail's testimony claiming that Cynthia had
been constrained to consent to the divorce. As confirmed by
Manalo, the divorce decree obtained by Park, with or without
Cynthia's conformity, falls within the scope of Article 26(2) and
merits recognition in this jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The

Decision dated February 27, 2017 and Resolution dated September

Page 12 of 21
G.R. No. 188289 August 20, 2014
DAVID A. NOVERAS, Petitioner,
vs.
LETICIA T. NOVERAS, Respondent.
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 9 May 2008
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R .. CV No. 88686, which
affirmed in part the 8 December 2006 Decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96.
The factual antecedents are as follow:
David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras (Leticia) were
married on 3 December 1988 in Quezon City, Philippines. They
resided in California, United States of America (USA) where they
eventually acquired American citizenship. They then begot two
children, namely: Jerome T.
Noveras, who was born on 4 November 1990 and JenaT. Noveras,
born on 2 May 1993. David was engaged in courier service business
while Leticia worked as a nurse in San Francisco, California.
During the marriage, they acquired the following properties in the
Philippines and in the USA:
Page 13 of 21
The Sampaloc property used to beowned by David’s parents. The
parties herein secured a loan from a bank and mortgaged the
property. When said property was about to be foreclosed, the
couple paid a total of ₱1.5 Million for the redemption of the same.
Due to business reverses, David left the USA and returned to the
Philippines in 2001. In December 2002,Leticia executed a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing David to sell the Sampaloc
property for ₱2.2 Million. According to Leticia, sometime in
September 2003, David abandoned his family and lived with
Estrellita Martinez in Aurora province. Leticia claimed that David
agreed toand executed a Joint Affidavit with Leticia in the presence
of David’s father, Atty. Isaias Noveras, on 3 December 2003 stating
that: 1) the ₱1.1Million proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc
property shall be paid to and collected by Leticia; 2) that David shall
return and pay to Leticia ₱750,000.00, which is equivalent to half of
the amount of the redemption price of the Sampaloc property; and
3) that David shall renounce and forfeit all his rights and interest in
the conjugal and real properties situated in the Philippines.5 David
was able to collect ₱1,790,000.00 from the sale of the Sampaloc
property, leaving an unpaid balance of ₱410,000.00.
Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a
petition for divorce with the Superior Court of California, County of
San Mateo, USA. The California court granted the divorce on 24 June
2005 and judgment was duly entered on 29 June 2005.6 The
California court granted to Leticia the custody of her two children, as
well as all the couple’s properties in the USA.7
On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of
Conjugal Property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora. She relied on the
3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit and David’s failure to comply with
his obligation under the same. She prayed for: 1) the power to
administer all conjugal properties in the Philippines; 2) David and his
partner to cease and desist from selling the subject conjugal
properties; 3) the declaration that all conjugal properties be
forfeited in favor of her children; 4) David to remit half of the
purchase price as share of Leticia from the sale of the Sampaloc
property; and 5) the payment of₱50,000.00 and ₱100,000.00
litigation expenses.8
In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution of
their marriage was entered on 29 June 2005 by the Superior Court
of California, County of San Mateo. He demanded that the conjugal
partnership properties, which also include the USA properties, be
liquidated and that all expenses of liquidation, including attorney’s
fees of both parties be charged against the conjugal partnership.9
The RTC of Baler, Aurora simplified the issues as follow:
Page 14 of 21
1. Whether or not respondent David A. Noveras committed acts of
abandonment and marital infidelity which can result intothe
forfeiture of the parties’ properties in favor of the petitioner and
their two (2) children.
2. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the properties in
California, U.S.A. and the same can be included in the judicial
separation prayed for.
3. Whether or not the "Joint Affidavit" x x x executed by petitioner
Leticia T. Noveras and respondent David A. Noveras will amount to a
waiver or forfeiture of the latter’s property rights over their conjugal
properties.
4. Whether or not Leticia T. Noveras isentitled to reimbursement of
onehalf of the ₱2.2 [M]illion sales proceeds of their property in
Sampaloc, Manila and one-half of the ₱1.5 [M]illion used to redeem
the property of Atty. Isaias Noveras, including interests and charges.
5. How the absolute community properties should be distributed.
6. Whether or not the attorney’s feesand litigation expenses of the
parties were chargeable against their conjugal properties.
Corollary to the aboveis the issue of:
Whether or not the two common children of the parties are entitled
to support and presumptive legitimes.10
On 8 December 2006, the RTC rendered judgment as follows:
1. The absolute community of property of the parties is hereby
declared DISSOLVED;
2. The net assets of the absolute community of property ofthe
parties in the Philippines are hereby ordered to be awarded to
respondent David A. Noveras only, with the properties in the United
States of America remaining in the sole ownership of petitioner
Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana pursuant to the divorce
decree issuedby the Superior Court of California, County of San
Mateo, United States of America, dissolving the marriage of the
parties as of June 24, 2005. The titles presently covering said
properties shall be cancelled and new titles be issued in the name of
the party to whom said properties are awarded;
3. One-half of the properties awarded to respondent David A.
Noveras in the preceding paragraph are hereby given to Jerome and
Jena, his two minor children with petitioner LeticiaNoveras a.k.a.
Leticia Tacbiana as their presumptive legitimes and said legitimes
must be annotated on the titles covering the said properties.Their
share in the income from these properties shall be remitted to them
annually by the respondent within the first half of January of each
year, starting January 2008;
4. One-half of the properties in the United States of America
awarded to petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana in
paragraph 2 are hereby given to Jerome and Jena, her two minor
children with respondent David A. Noveras as their presumptive
legitimes and said legitimes must be annotated on the
titles/documents covering the said properties. Their share in the
income from these properties, if any, shall be remitted to them
annually by the petitioner within the first half of January of each
year, starting January 2008;
Page 15 of 21
5. For the support of their two (2) minor children, Jerome and Jena,
respondent David A. Noveras shall give them US$100.00 as monthly
allowance in addition to their income from their presumptive
legitimes, while petitioner Leticia Tacbiana shall take care of their
food, clothing, education and other needs while they are in her
custody in the USA. The monthly allowance due from the
respondent shall be increased in the future as the needs of the
children require and his financial capacity can afford;
6. Of the unpaid amount of ₱410,000.00 on the purchase price of
the Sampaloc property, the Paringit Spouses are hereby ordered to
pay ₱5,000.00 to respondent David A. Noveras and ₱405,000.00 to
the two children. The share of the respondent may be paid to him
directly but the share of the two children shall be deposited with a
local bank in Baler, Aurora, in a joint account tobe taken out in their
names, withdrawal from which shall only be made by them or by
their representative duly authorized with a Special Power of
Attorney. Such payment/deposit shall be made withinthe period of
thirty (30) days after receipt of a copy of this Decision, with the
passbook of the joint account to be submitted to the custody of the
Clerk of Court of this Court within the same period. Said passbook
can be withdrawn from the Clerk of Court only by the children or
their attorney-in-fact; and
7. The litigation expenses and attorney’s fees incurred by the parties
shall be shouldered by them individually.11
The trial court recognized that since the parties are US citizens, the
laws that cover their legal and personalstatus are those of the USA.
With respect to their marriage, the parties are divorced by virtue of
the decree of dissolution of their marriage issued by the Superior
Court of California, County of San Mateo on 24June 2005. Under
their law, the parties’ marriage had already been dissolved. Thus,
the trial court considered the petition filed by Leticia as one for
liquidation of the absolute community of property regime with the
determination of the legitimes, support and custody of the children,
instead of an action for judicial separation of conjugal property.
With respect to their property relations, the trial court first classified
their property regime as absolute community of property because
they did not execute any marriage settlement before the
solemnization of their marriage pursuant to Article 75 of the Family
Code. Then, the trial court ruled that in accordance with the
doctrine of processual presumption, Philippine law should apply
because the court cannot take judicial notice of the US law since the
parties did not submit any proof of their national law. The trial court
held that as the instant petition does not fall under the provisions of
the law for the grant of judicial separation of properties, the
absolute community properties cannot beforfeited in favor of Leticia
and her children. Moreover, the trial court observed that Leticia
failed to prove abandonment and infidelity with preponderant
evidence.
The trial court however ruled that Leticia is not entitled to the
reimbursements she is praying for considering that she already
acquired all of the properties in the USA. Relying still on the
principle of equity, the Court also adjudicated the Philippine
properties to David, subject to the payment of the children’s
presumptive legitimes. The trial court held that under Article 89 of
the Family Code, the waiver or renunciation made by David of his
property rights in the Joint Affidavit is void.
Page 16 of 21
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court’s Decision
by directing the equal division of the Philippine properties between
the spouses. Moreover with respect to the common children’s
presumptive legitime, the appellate court ordered both spouses to
each pay their children the amount of ₱520,000.00, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. Numbers 2, 4
and 6 of the assailedDecision dated December 8, 2006 of Branch 96,
RTC of Baler, Aurora Province, in Civil Case No. 828 are hereby
MODIFIED to read as follows:
2. The net assets of the absolute community of property of the
parties in the Philippines are hereby divided equally between
petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana (sic) and
respondent David A. Noveras;
xxx
4. One-half of the properties awarded to petitioner Leticia Tacbiana
(sic) in paragraph 2 shall pertain to her minor children, Jerome and
Jena, as their presumptive legitimes which shall be annotated on the
titles/documents covering the said properties. Their share in the
income therefrom, if any, shall be remitted to them by petitioner
annually within the first half of January, starting 2008;
xxx
6. Respondent David A. Noveras and petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic)
are each ordered to pay the amount of₱520,000.00 to their two
children, Jerome and Jena, as their presumptive legitimes from the
sale of the Sampaloc property inclusive of the receivables
therefrom, which shall be deposited to a local bank of Baler, Aurora,
under a joint account in the latter’s names. The payment/deposit
shall be made within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt ofa
copy of this Decision and the corresponding passbook entrusted to
the custody ofthe Clerk of Court a quowithin the same period,
withdrawable only by the children or their attorney-in-fact.
A number 8 is hereby added, which shall read as follows:
8. Respondent David A. Noveras is hereby ordered to pay petitioner
Leticia Tacbiana (sic) the amount of ₱1,040,000.00 representing her
share in the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property.
The last paragraph shall read as follows:
Send a copy of this Decision to the local civil registry of Baler,
Aurora; the local civil registry of Quezon City; the Civil
RegistrarGeneral, National Statistics Office, Vibal Building, Times
Street corner EDSA, Quezon City; the Office of the Registry of Deeds
for the Province of Aurora; and to the children, Jerome Noveras and
Jena Noveras.
The rest of the Decision is AFFIRMED.12
In the present petition, David insists that the Court of Appeals
should have recognized the California Judgment which awarded the
Philippine properties to him because said judgment was part of the
pleading presented and offered in evidence before the trial court.
David argues that allowing Leticia to share in the Philippine
properties is tantamount to unjust enrichment in favor of Leticia
considering that the latter was already granted all US properties by
the California court.
Page 17 of 21
In summary and review, the basic facts are: David and Leticia are US
citizens who own properties in the USA and in the Philippines.
Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the Superior Court of
California in June 2005 wherein the court awarded all the properties
in the USA to Leticia. With respect to their properties in the
Philippines, Leticiafiled a petition for judicial separation ofconjugal
properties.
At the outset, the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree
which severed the bond of marriage between the parties. In Corpuz
v. Sto. Tomas,13 we stated that:
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is
the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a
rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a
judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means
that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must beproven as
facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s
applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the
alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action
instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a
party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or
defense.14
The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree and the
national law of the foreigner must comply with our Rules of
Evidence. Specifically, for Philippine courts to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign
judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under
Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of
the Rules of Court.15

Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a
sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by: (1) an official
publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody thereof. Such official publication or copy must
beaccompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof.
The certificate may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine
embassy or consular officials stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct
copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, asthe case may be,
and must be under the official seal of the attesting officer.
Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a
document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy
of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The
attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if
there be any, or if hebe the clerk of a court having a seal, under the
seal of such court.
Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in
evidence. The required certificates to prove its authenticity, as well
as the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented.
It may be noted that in Bayot v. Court of Appeals,16 we relaxed the
requirement on certification where we held that "[petitioner
therein] was clearly an American citizenwhen she secured the
divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the
States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce
decree duly authenticatedby the foreign court issuing said decree is,
Page 18 of 21
as here, sufficient." In this case however, it appears that there is no
seal from the office where the divorce decree was obtained.
Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption17 as the
lower courts did with respect to the property regime of the parties,
the recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter because, to
begin with, divorce is not recognized between Filipino citizens in the
Philippines. Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it
follows that the parties are still legally married in the Philippines.
The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation.
As a general rule, any modification in the marriage settlements must
be made before the celebration of marriage. An exception to this
rule is allowed provided that the modification isjudicially approved
and refers only to the instances provided in Articles 66,67, 128, 135
and 136 of the Family Code.18
Leticia anchored the filing of the instant petition for judicial
separation of property on paragraphs 4 and 6 of Article 135 of the
Family Code, to wit:
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for
judicial separation of property:
(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a
penalty which carries with it civil interdiction;
(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an
absentee;
(3) That loss of parental authority ofthe spouse of petitioner has
been decreed by the court;

(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or
failed to comply with his or her obligations to the family as provided
for in Article 101;
(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the
marriage settlements has abused that power; and
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been
separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly
improbable.
In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2), and (3), the
presentation of the final judgment against the guiltyor absent
spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree ofjudicial
separation of property. (Emphasis supplied).
The trial court had categorically ruled that there was no
abandonment in this case to necessitate judicial separation of
properties under paragraph 4 of Article 135 of the Family Code. The
trial court ratiocinated:
Moreover, abandonment, under Article 101 of the Family Code
quoted above, must be for a valid cause and the spouse is deemed
to have abandoned the other when he/she has left the conjugal
dwelling without intention of returning. The intention of not
returning is prima facie presumed if the allegedly [sic] abandoning
spouse failed to give any information as to his or her whereabouts
within the period of three months from such abandonment.
In the instant case, the petitioner knows that the respondent has
returned to and stayed at his hometown in Maria Aurora,
Page 19 of 21
Philippines, as she even went several times to visit him there after
the alleged abandonment. Also, the respondent has been going
back to the USA to visit her and their children until the relations
between them worsened. The last visit of said respondent was in
October 2004 when he and the petitioner discussed the filing by the
latter of a petition for dissolution of marriage with the California
court. Such turn for the worse of their relationship and the filing of
the saidpetition can also be considered as valid causes for the
respondent to stay in the Philippines.19
Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial
separation of property was not tackled in the trial court’s decision
because, the trial court erroneously treated the petition as
liquidation of the absolute community of properties.
The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and
David had indeed separated for more than a year and that
reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while actual abandonment
had not been proven, it is undisputed that the spouses had been
living separately since 2003 when David decided to go back to the
Philippines to set up his own business. Second, Leticia heard from
her friends that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez,
who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who
worked in the hospital where David was once confined, testified that
she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the
Consent for Operation form.20 Third and more significantly, they
had filed for divorce and it was granted by the California court in
June 2005.
Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for
at least one year, the petition for judicial separation of absolute
community of property should be granted.
The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community
property automatically dissolves the absolute community regime, as
stated in the 4th paragraph of Article 99 ofthe Family Code, thus:
Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage
under Articles 134 to 138. (Emphasis supplied).
Under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows the
dissolution of the absolute community regime and the following
procedure should apply:
Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the
following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the
properties of the absolute community and the exclusive properties
of each spouse.
(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be
paid out of its assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the
spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their
separate properties in accordance with the provisions of the second
paragraph of Article 94.
Page 20 of 21
(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses
shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.
(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community
shall constitute its net assets, which shall be divided equally
between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division
was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has
been a voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code. For
purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in
accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2),the said profits
shall be the increase in value between the market value of the
community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage
and the market value at the time of its dissolution.
(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be
delivered upon partition, in accordance with Article 51.
(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of
the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is
situated shall be adjudicated tothe spouse with whom the majority
of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age
of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the
court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the
court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of
said children. At the risk of being repetitious, we will not remand the
case to the trial court. Instead, we shall adopt the modifications
made by the Court of Appeals on the trial court’s Decision with
respect to liquidation.
We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not
acquire jurisdiction over the California properties of David and
Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real xxxx
property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be limited to Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he
the Philippine properties. legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half
or the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother." The
We affirm the modification madeby the Court of Appeals with children arc therefore entitled to half of the share of each spouse in
respect to the share of the spouses in the absolutecommunity the net assets of the absolute community, which shall be annotated
properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of their on the titles/documents covering the same, as well as to their
children’s presumptive legitimes, which the appellate court respective shares in the net proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc
explained in this wise: property including the receivables from Sps. Paringit in the amount
of ₱410,000.00. Consequently, David and Leticia should each pay
Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds them the amount of ₱520,000.00 as their presumptive legitimes
of the Sampaloc property.1âwphi1 While both claimed to have therefrom.21
contributed to the redemption of the Noveras property, absent a
clear showing where their contributions came from, the same is WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the
presumed to have come from the community property. Thus, Leticia Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 88686 is AFFIRMED.
is not entitled to reimbursement of half of the redemption money.
SO ORDERED.
David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale of
the Sampaloc property for the benefit of the absolute community
cannot be given full credence. Only the amount of ₱120,000.00
incurred in going to and from the U.S.A. may be charged thereto.
Election expenses in the amount of ₱300,000.00 when he ran as
municipal councilor cannot be allowed in the absence of receipts or
at least the Statement of Contributions and Expenditures required
under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 duly received by the
Commission on Elections. Likewise, expenses incurred to settle the
criminal case of his personal driver is not deductible as the same
had not benefited the family. In sum, Leticia and David shall share
equally in the proceeds of the sale net of the amount of
₱120,000.00 or in the respective amounts of ₱1,040,000.00.

Page 21 of 21