FEBRUARY 26, 1968 OFFICIAL GAZETTE [No. 05152-CR. September 20, 1966] THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPNES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. PanTaLeon V. PELAYo, Jx., accused and appellant. 1. Stanpex; Distiveursnep FromsIvreincume Agamst Honor — Where’ the source of the information can be pinpointed and definitely determined, and the accused, adopting as his own -the information he has obtained, passes the same to another for the purpose of causing dishonor to complainant's reputa- 4 tion, the act is not intriguing against honor, but clearly ene ef slander. But where the souree or the author of the dero- *.. gatory information cannot be determined .and the accused borrows the same and, without subseribing to the truth thereof, passes it to others, the act of the accused is one of intriguing against honor. 2. Ip; Devenses; Seur-Derense; Accusmo:Musr Nor Go Bsyonp Exrramixe CoMPLAINAN?’s InruTation.—In- appropriate cases, self-defense in libel, as well as in slander, may be invoked as a legitimate defense. For self-defense to exist, the accused should not retaliate with scurrilous words that are entirely independent of, and apart from, the alleged im- putation made to him by the complainant, or should not go beyond explaining what was previously said of him for the purpose of repairing or minimizing if not entirely removing the effect of the damage caused to him, unless, by explaining, he must of necessity have to use slanderous remarks. APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Davao. _Macapanton Abbas, J. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Oscar V. Breva & Blasito E. Angeles for accused and appellant. Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor Santiago M. Kapunan for plaintiff and appellee. VILLAMOR, J.: Appeal from a judgment convicting the accused-appel- Jant Pantaleon V. Pelayo Jr. of the crime of light oral “defamation and-sentencing him “to suffer an imprisonment of twenty (20) days of arresto.menor; to indemnify the offended party.-in the concept of. nominal damages for injury to reputation in the sum of P1,000.00, and in ease of insolvency to suffer the corresponding subsidiary impri- sonment which shall, however, not exceed’ one-third (44) “of the principal penalty ;'and to pay the costs.”” “ The" offended party. was then’ Governor, now Senator, Alejandro Almendras. The appellant was then city coun- _cilor of Davao City. - 3 © Tt appears that on November 15, 1956, in the: Office of Atty. Clapano, appellant told-the latterwithin the hearing of ‘Francisco Banez;Rafael Mascarifias and Prisco Par- _ misano, that while making one of his rounds to investi- gate the existence of gambling in the community, a chinese operator named Lim Peng told him that then Gov, Almen- 1 hee y5ogeg-—4 = roniieiprhh ae ath ss abe 19911992 OFFICIAL GAZETTE Vou. 64, No. 9 dras used to receive from the chinese 7500.00 protection money. Thus he said to Clapano: “Another operator whom I befriended, confided to me that he used to give Almendras P500.00 monthly. The governor was not satisfied and instead demanded that amount to be hiked to.?1,000.00 a month but because I could no longer afford that amount T gave to Almendras my watch costing P250,00. Failure to give 1,000.00 +a month, Gov. Almendras raided my place”, and other of similar import. On the following day, appellant delivered a privileged speech during the regular session of the City Council of Davao City wherein, although without directly inentioning the governor as receiving “tongs”, the reference to the lat- ter after a series of interpellations and answers, during the speech, became obvious- Appellant does not deny but even admits having uttered these words and phrases to Clapano, However, he of- fered as defenses the following: 4. That he uttered those words and phrases in confidence to Clapano and that they are covered by the rule on privileged com- amunication; : 2. That since the crime as charged which is for serious slander is different from, and not included in, the crime as proved which is imtriguing against honor, the convietion, is illegal; 3. That he uttered those words and phrases in self-defense to to what then Gov. Almendras in the latter's speoch had stated of him in another place a few days before; 4, The award for nominal damages should have been set off by what he was also entitled to as a result of the slander made to him by Gov. Almendras on a previous occasion. On appellant's first contention that the utterances made by him to Clapano were given in confidence to the latter and that the same should be covered by the rule on privi- Jeged communication, he argues that since Clapano is him- self a member of the City Council, he, appellant, had the legal and moral duty to make the communication to him. ‘We overrule this contention. In the first place, his con- tention of confidence is inconsistent with his other con- tention of self-defense. If the communication was for the purpose of self-defense, it should not have been made in confidence as he alleged; it should have reeeived some amount-of publicity. In the second place, the records also show that on the following day he delivered a speech at the session of the City Council, wherein although he did not mention names he made it obvious that he was refer- ring to the complainant as receiving money from gambling operators. In the third place there were others who heard the remarks when he was talking to Glapano. He could not have given the communication, therefore, in confi- dence. : On his other contention that the remarks should be covered by: the rule on privileged communication, we con-Eppa 26, 1968 OFFICIAL GAZETTE sider the same as untenable. We cannot accept as true that he was actuated by a sense of duty, moral, legal, or social to communicate the matter to Clapano. He himself was a member of the City Council. If he was carried by that.sense of duty as he claims, it was not necessary for him to give his information to Clapano who was not his su- perior nor-the-party to whom the information should be — given. He could have made the revelation himself either in. open session or by taking the necessary steps to have the matter investigated. - As a co-member of the City Coun- eil appellant owes no legal or moral duty to Clapano. The next point raised is that the evidence adduced is for intriguing against honor and not light oral defamation. The facts do not constitute intriguing against honor be- cause the information given: by appellant to Clapano, within.the hearing of others, allegedly came from a defi- nite séurce, to wit: Lim Peng. Where the source of the information can be pin-pointed and definitely determined, as what appellant had asserted by stating that it was from a certain Lim Peng, and he, appellant, adopting as his own the information he has obtained, passes the same to another for the purpose of causing dishonor to complain- ant’s reputation, the act is not intriguing against honor, but clearly one of slander. But where the source or the author of the derogatory information cannot be determined and the defendant borrows the same and, without subseribing to the truth thereof, passes it to others, the defendant's aet is one of intriguing against honor. We agree that, in appropriate cases, self-defense in li-_ bel, as well as in slander, may be invoked as a legitimate defense. But the situation obtaining in the instant case is not-one of those where that defense can be validly in= voked. [ven assuming that on a previous occasion the complainant in his speech had made derogatory remarks against the appellant, the appellant's retaliation with scur- rilous words does not bring him within the protection ‘of self-defense. His act of telling Clapano, within the hear- ing of others, that Almendras was receiving 500.00 monthly from operators of “panchong” and that he was demanding an inerease.to P1,000-00, is entirely independent of, and apart from, the alleged imputation made to him by the complainant. For self-defense to exist in instances such as this, the defendant should not go beyond explaining what was previously said of him for the purpose of repair- ing or minimizing if not entirely removing the effect of the damage caused to him. . The principle does not license him to utter blow-for-blow scurrilous language in_return for what he received, This is not, as we understand it, what the principle embraces, 19981994 OFFICIAL GAZETTE Vou, 64, No. 9 Where the defender goes beyond mere explaining his side and/or repairing, minimizing or removing the effeet of the damage by hitting back with equally if not more scurrilous remarks against the one who first made the imputation, his retaliation becomes entirely an indepen- dent act of his own of which he may stand to answer the consequences. The defense will lie only where the defen- dant makes a defens&of the imputation previously “made against him by another without, in turn, making slande- yous remarks against the latter unless the remarks are necessary for his explanation or defense. In other words, unless, in defending himself it is necessary for him to in turn make scurrilous remarks or language against the “person who has defamed him, the defendant is not justified to hit back with slanderous words that will subject him to criminal prosecution for libel or slander. In the case at bar, if it is true that on a previous occasion the com- plainant had imputed to the defendant that he, the latter, was receiving money from gambling operators, the defen- dant was not licensed to make the same imputation or ac- eusation because to do that is not an act of defense or one constitutive of an element thereof, but an aggression itself. Hitting back with words of the same derogatory nature ‘and degree does not repel the attack made against one’s honor. To repel that attack, the defendant may make an explanation of the imputation, and it is only where, if by explaining he must of necessity have to use scurrilous and slanderous remarks, that he may legally be allowed to do so without placing himself under criminal prosecution. We share the view of the Soliciter General that the award of nominal damages should be reduced to the amount of P200.00. This amount, however, is not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff, but as a form of vindication or recognition of a right that has been viola- ted or invaded by the defendant (Art, 2221, Civil Code). The penalty for light oral defamation is arresio menor -or a fine not exceeding P200.00. (Art. 358, last part). We have come acress no portion of appellant's brief invoking any mitigating cireumstance in his favor; nor is there evi- dence ofthe existence of any aggravating circumstance. WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction appealed from is affirmed, but the sentence imposed upon appeilant is hereby modified in the sense that he should pay a fine of 100.00 with subsidiary imprisonment not to exceed 15 days in ease of insolvency; to’ pay nominal damage to the offended party in the sum of 200.00 and the costs of this action. * Perez and Nolasco, JJ., concur. Judgment modified.FEBRUARY 26, 1968 OFFICIAL GAZETTE 1995 RESOLUTION December 21, 1966: ‘VILLAMOR, Jo: Pending resolution is a motion for reconsideration=of- the decision rendered herein by~this Court, and promul- _ gated on September 20, 1966, wherein appellant was found guilty of the crime of light oral défamation and sentenced to pay a fine of F100.00 with subsidiary imprisonment: not exceeding 15 days in case of insolvency, and to pay nominal damages to the offended party in the sum of ‘7200.0 as well as the costs of this action. The grounds for the motion for reconsideration are (1) that the evi- dence of the proseeution is insufficient to establish the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, and (2) that the sentence imposed is unreasonable or excessive in view of the failure on the part of this Court to appreciate the existence of the mitigating circumstances of provocation and voluntary surrender. ‘The first ground has already been amply discussed in the decision, subject-matter of the motion for reconside- ration, and need not be touched upon anew in this resolution. : ‘With respect to the second ground, let it be stated that the penalty provided for in the Revised Penal Code for the crime of light oral defamation is arresio menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00 (Art. 358). We have reviewed the evidence, and while it is true that two mitigating cir- cumstances were recommended by the Honorable Solicitor General to be taken into account, yet we believe that there is no sufficient ground to accede to that view. Hven then, the result“would not materially affect the sentence already imposed upon herein appellant. * Under Art. 75 of the Re- vised Penal Code, in reducing the penalty of fine by degree or degrees, the maximum should be lowered by one-fourth (4) for every degree without, however, changing the minimum. Inasmuch as the alternative penalty prescribed ig a fine not exceeding P200.00, the penalty one degree lower, which would correspond to the erime committed when two or more mitigating circumstances are present, applying Rule 5 of Art. 64 of the same Code, would he a fine not exceeding P150.00. The fine of P100.00 herein imposed upon appellant is still within the range of that penalty. In so far as the amount of the damages is con- cerned, we believe that with all the surrounding circum- stances of this case the same is reasonable. F ‘WHEREFORE, the motion fer reconsideration is hereby denied. Perez and Nolasco, JJ., coneur. Motion denied.