SUNACE INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION et al.
480 SCRA 146 (2006)

FACTS: Respondent Divina Montehermozo is a domestic helper deployed to Taiwan by Sunace

International Management Services (Sunace) under a 12-month contract. Such employment was made
with the assistance of Taiwanese broker Edmund Wang. After the expiration of the contract,
Montehermozo continued her employment with her Taiwanese employer for another 2 years.

When Montehermozo returned to the Philippines, she filed a complaint against Sunace, Wang, and her
Taiwanese employer before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). She alleges that she was
underpaid and was jailed for three months in Taiwan. She further alleges that the 2-year extension of her
employment contract was with the consent and knowledge of Sunace. Sunace, on the other hand, denied
all the allegations.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Montehermozo and found Sunace liable thereof. The National Labor
Relations Commission and Court of Appeals affirmed the labor arbiters decision. Hence, the filing of this
appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 2-year extension of Montehermozos employment was made with the
knowledge and consent of Sunace

HELD: There is an implied revocation of an agency relationship when after the termination of the original
employment contract, the foreign principal directly negotiated with the employee and entered into a new
and separate employment contract.

Contrary to the Court of Appeals finding, the alleged continuous communication was with the Taiwanese
broker Wang, not with the foreign employer.

The finding of the Court of Appeals solely on the basis of the telefax message written by Wang to
Sunace, that Sunace continually communicated with the foreign "principal" (sic) and therefore was aware
of and had consented to the execution of the extension of the contract is misplaced. The message does
not provide evidence that Sunace was privy to the new contract executed after the expiration on February
1, 1998 of the original contract. That Sunace and the Taiwanese broker communicated regarding
Montehermozos allegedly withheld savings does not necessarily mean that Sunace ratified the extension
of the contract.

As can be seen from that letter communication, it was just an information given to Sunace that
Montehermozo had taken already her savings from her foreign employer and that no deduction was made
on her salary. It contains nothing about the extension or Sunaces consent thereto.

Parenthetically, since the telefax message is dated February 21, 2000, it is safe to assume that it was
sent to enlighten Sunace who had been directed, by Summons issued on February 15, 2000, to appear
on February 28, 2000 for a mandatory conference following Montehermozos filing of the complaint on
February 14, 2000.

Respecting the decision of Court of Appeals following as agent of its foreign principal, [Sunace] cannot
profess ignorance of such an extension as obviously, the act of its principal extending [Montehermozos]
employment contract necessarily bound it, it too is a misapplication, a misapplication of the theory of
imputed knowledge.

The theory of imputed knowledge ascribes the knowledge of the agent, Sunace, to the principal,
employer, not the other way around. The knowledge of the principal-foreign employer cannot, therefore,
be imputed to its agent Sunace.
There being no substantial proof that Sunace knew of and consented to be bound under the 2-year
employment contract extension, it cannot be said to be privy thereto. As such, it and its "owner" cannot be
held solidarily liable for any of Montehermozos claims arising from the 2-year employment extension. As
the New Civil Code provides, Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns, and heirs,
except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their
nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. Furthermore, as Sunace correctly points out, there was an
implied revocation of its agency relationship with its foreign principal when, after the termination of the
original employment contract, the foreign principal directly negotiated with Montehermozo and entered
into a new and separate employment contract in Taiwan. Article 1924 of the New Civil Code states that
the agency is revoked if the principal directly manages the business entrusted to the agent, dealing
directly with third persons.

SUNACE INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. v. NLRC

SUNACE INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. v. NLRC

G.R. No. 161757; January 25, 2006
Ponente: J. Carpio-Morales

FACTS:

Petitioner, Sunace International Management Services (Sunace), deployed to Taiwan Divina A.

Montehermozo (Divina) as a domestic helper under a 12-month contract effective February 1, 1997. The
deployment was with the assistance of a Taiwanese broker, Edmund Wang, President of Jet Crown
International Co., Ltd.
After her 12-month contract expired on February 1, 1998, Divina continued working for her Taiwanese
employer, Hang Rui Xiong, for two more years, after which she returned to the Philippines on February 4,
2000.
Shortly after her return or on February 14, 2000, Divina filed a complaint before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) against Sunace, one Adelaide Perez, the Taiwanese broker, and the
employer-foreign principal alleging that she was jailed for three months and that she was underpaid

Reacting to Divina's Position Paper, Sunace filed on April 25, 2000 an ". . . ANSWER TO
COMPLAINANT'S POSITION PAPER" alleging that Divina's 2-year extension of her contract was without
its knowledge and consent, hence, it had no liability attaching to any claim arising therefrom, and Divina
in fact executed a Waiver/Quitclaim and Release of Responsibility and an Affidavit of Desistance, copy of
each document was annexed to said

The Labor Arbiter, rejected Sunace's claim that the extension of Divina's contract for two more years was
without its knowledge and consent.

ISSUE:
Whether the act of the foreigner-principal in renewing the contract of Divina be attributable to Sunace

HELD:

No, the act of the foreigner-principal in renewing the contract of Divina is not attributable to Sunace.

There being no substantial proof that Sunace knew of and consented to be bound under the 2-year
employment contract extension, it cannot be said to be privy thereto. As such, it and its "owner" cannot be
held solidarily liable for any of Divina's claims arising from the 2-year employment extension.
Furthermore, as Sunace correctly points out, there was an implied revocation of its agency relationship
with its foreign principal when, after the termination of the original employment contract, the

ANTONIO M. SERRANO VS.GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC.

FACTS:
Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow
Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12 months, as Chief Officer,
with the basic monthly salary of US$1,400, plus $700/month overtime pay, and 7 days paid vacation
leave per month.
On the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract
upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be Chief Officer by the end of April
1998.
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer.
Hence, Serrano refused to stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines, serving only
two months and 7 days, leaving an unexpired portion of nine months and twenty-three days.
Upon complaint filed by Serrano before the Labor Arbiter (LA), the dismissal was declared illegal.
On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision based on the provision of RA 8042.
Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the constitutionality of the
last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on non-impairment
of contracts;
2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18,
Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector.
HELD:
On the first issue.
The answer is in the negative. Petitioners claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the
stipulations in his contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary package he will receive is
not tenable.
The subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the impairment
clause, for the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a business,
profession or calling, particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in view of
ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever they may be employed.
On the second issue.
The answer is in the affirmative.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to
economic security and parity.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However, a
closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious
impact on, OFWs at two levels:
First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis--vis OFWs with employment contracts
of one year or more;
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and
Third, OFWs vis--vis local workers with fixed-period employment;
The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.
Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the right of
petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection.
The subject clause or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less in the 5th
paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

ANTONIO M. SERRANO VS. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC. AND MARLOW NAVIGATION
CO., INC. GR No. 167614 - March 24, 2009

FACTS:
Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow
Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12 months, as Chief Officer,
with the basic monthly salary of US$1,400, plus $700/month overtime pay, and 7 days paid vacation
leave per month.

On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a downgraded
employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000 upon the
assurance and representation of respondents that he would be Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.

Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer. Hence, Serrano refused to
stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May 26, 1998, serving only two (2)
months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-
three (23) days.

Serrano filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for constructive dismissal and
for payment of his money claims in the total amount of US$26,442.73 (based on the computation of
$2590/month from June 1998 to February 199, $413.90 for March 1998, and $1640 for March 1999) as
well as moral and exemplary damages.

The LA declared the petitioner's dismissal illegal and awarded him US$8,770, representing his salaray for
three (3) months of the unexpired portion of the aforesaid contract of employment, plus $45 for salary
differential and for attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total amount; however, no compensation for
damages as prayed was awarded.

On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision and awarded Serrano $4669.50, representing three (3)
months salary at $1400/month, plus 445 salary differential and 10% for attorney's fees. This decision was
based on the provision of RA 8042, which was made into law on July 15, 1995.

Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the constitutionality of the
last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042, which reads:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or
authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of
his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired
portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever
is less.

The NLRC denied the Motion; hence, Serrano filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals
(CA), reiterating the constitutional challenge against the subject clause. The CA affirmed the NLRC ruling
on the reduction of the applicable salary rate, but skirted the constitutional issue raised by herein
petitioner Serrano.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on non-impairment
of contracts;
2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18,
Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector.

HELD:

On the first issue.

The answer is in the negative. Petitioner's claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the
stipulations in his contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary package he will receive is
not tenable.
Section 10, Article III of the Constitution provides: No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be
passed.

The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly enacted have only a prospective
operation, and cannot affect acts or contracts already perfected; however, as to laws already in existence,
their provisions are read into contracts and deemed a part thereof. Thus, the non-impairment clause
under Section 10, Article II is limited in application to laws about to be enacted that would in any way
derogate from existing acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention
of the parties thereto.

As aptly observed by the OSG, the enactment of R.A. No. 8042 in 1995 preceded the execution of the
employment contract between petitioner and respondents in 1998. Hence, it cannot be argued that R.A.
No. 8042, particularly the subject clause, impaired the employment contract of the parties. Rather, when
the parties executed their 1998 employment contract, they were deemed to have incorporated into it all
the provisions of R.A. No. 8042.

But even if the Court were to disregard the timeline, the subject clause may not be declared
unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the impairment clause, for the law was enacted in the
exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a business, profession or calling, particularly the
recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and
well-being of OFWs wherever they may be employed. Police power legislations adopted by the State to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people are
generally applicable not only to future contracts but even to those already in existence, for all private
contracts must yield to the superior and legitimate measures taken by the State to promote public welfare.

On the second issue.

The answer is in the affirmative.

Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law.

Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector, without distinction
as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare.

To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to
economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of similar
category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in equal degree; none should be denied
the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like
circumstances.

Such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of Congress to incorporate, when it sees fit,
a system of classification into its legislation; however, to be valid, the classification must comply with
these requirements: 1) it is based on substantial distinctions; 2) it is germane to the purposes of the law;
3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and 4) it applies equally to all members of the class.

There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality of a classification
embodied in a law: a) the deferential or rational basis scrutiny in which the challenged classification
needs only be shown to be rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest; b) the middle-tier or
intermediate scrutiny in which the government must show that the challenged classification serves an
important state interest and that the classification is at least substantially related to serving that interest;
and c) strict judicial scrutiny in which a legislative classification which impermissibly interferes with the
exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed
unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to
achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.

Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However, a
closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious
impact on, OFWs at two levels:
First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis--vis OFWs with employment contracts
of one year or more;
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and
Third, OFWs vis--vis local workers with fixed-period employment;

In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term employment who were illegally
discharged were treated alike in terms of the computation of their money claims: they were uniformly
entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their contracts. But with the enactment of R.A.
No. 8042, specifically the adoption of the subject clause, illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired
portion of one year or more in their employment contract have since been differently treated in that their
money claims are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed on local workers with
fixed-term employment.

The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the computation
of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap
on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the
claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one
classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.

There being a suspect classification involving a vulnerable sector protected by the Constitution, the Court
now subjects the classification to a strict judicial scrutiny, and determines whether it serves a compelling
state interest through the least restrictive means.

What constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and powers arrayed in the
Constitution and calibrated by history. It is akin to the paramount interest of the state for which some
individual liberties must give way, such as the public interest in safeguarding health or maintaining
medical standards, or in maintaining access to information on matters of public concern.

In the present case, the Court dug deep into the records but found no compelling state interest that the
subject clause may possibly serve.

In fine, the Government has failed to discharge its burden of proving the existence of a compelling state
interest that would justify the perpetuation of the discrimination against OFWs under the subject clause.

Assuming that, as advanced by the OSG, the purpose of the subject clause is to protect the employment
of OFWs by mitigating the solidary liability of placement agencies, such callous and cavalier rationale will
have to be rejected. There can never be a justification for any form of government action that alleviates
the burden of one sector, but imposes the same burden on another sector, especially when the favored
sector is composed of private businesses such as placement agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is
composed of OFWs whose protection no less than the Constitution commands. The idea that private
business interest can be elevated to the level of a compelling state interest is odious.

Moreover, even if the purpose of the subject clause is to lessen the solidary liability of placement
agencies vis-a-vis their foreign principals, there are mechanisms already in place that can be
employed to achieve that purpose without infringing on the constitutional rights of OFWs.
The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-Based Overseas
Workers, dated February 4, 2002, imposes administrative disciplinary measures on erring foreign
employers who default on their contractual obligations to migrant workers and/or their Philippine agents.
These disciplinary measures range from temporary disqualification to preventive suspension. The POEA
Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Seafarers, dated May 23, 2003,
contains similar administrative disciplinary measures against erring foreign employers.

Resort to these administrative measures is undoubtedly the less restrictive means of aiding local
placement agencies in enforcing the solidary liability of their foreign principals.

Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the right of
petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection.

The subject clause or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less in the 5th
paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Case Digest: Yap v. Thenamaris Ships & Intermare Maritime

G.R. No. 179532: May 30, 2011

CLAUDIA S. YAP, Petitioner, v. THENAMARIS SHIPS MANAGEMENT and INTERMARE MARITIME

AGENCIES, INC.,Respondents.

NACHURA, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner was employed as an electrician of the vessel, M/T SEASCOUT by Intermare Maritime
Agencies, Inc. in behalf of its principal, Vulture Shipping Limited.The contract was for 12 months.On 23
August 2001,Yapboarded M/T SEASCOUT and commenced his job as electrician. However, on or about
08 November 2001, the vessel was sold.

Yap received his seniority bonus, vacation bonus, extra bonus along with the scrapping bonus.However,
he insisted that he was entitled to the payment of the unexpired portion of his contract since he was
illegally dismissed from employment.He alleged that he opted for immediate transfer but none was made.

Respondents contended that Yap was not illegally dismissed.They further alleged that Yaps contract was
validly terminated due to the sale of the vessel and no arrangement was made for Yaps transfer to
Thenamaris other vessels.

Thus, Yap brought the issue before the Labor Arbiter (LA) which ruled that petitioner was illegally
dismissed; that respondents acted in bad faith when they assured petitioner of re-embarkation but he was
not able to board; and that petitioner was entitled to his salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract
for a period of nine months (US$12,870.00), P100,000 for moral damages, and P50,000 for exemplary
damages with 10% of the same for Attys fees.

Respondents sought recourse from the NLRC which modified the award of salaries from that
corresponding to nine months to only three months (US$4,290.00) pursuant to Section 10 R.A. No. 8042.

Respondents and petitioner both filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration.

NLRC affirmed the finding of Illegal Dismissal and Bad Faith on the part of respondent. However, the
NLRC reversed its earlier Decision, holding that "there can be no choice to grant only 3 months salary for
every year of the unexpired term because there is no full year of unexpired term which this can be
applied."

Respondents filed an MR, which the NLRC denied. Undaunted, respondents filed a petition
forcertiorariunder Rule 65 before the CA.

The CA affirmed the findings and ruling of the LA and the NLRC. However, the CA ruled that the NLRC
erred in sustaining the LAs interpretation of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042. The CA relied on the clause "or
for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" provided in the 5th paragraph of
Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042.

Both parties filed their respective MRs which the CA denied. Thus, this petition.

ISSUE:

[1] Whether Section 10 of R.A. 8042, to the extent that it affords an illegally dismissed migrant worker the
lesser benefit of "salaries for [the] unexpired portion of his employment contract for three (3) months for
every year of the unexpired term,whichever is less" is constitutional;

[2] Assuming that it is, whether the CA gravely erred in granting petitioner only three (3) months
backwages when his unexpired term of 9 months is far short of the "every year of the unexpired term"
threshold.

HELD: The petition is impressed with merit.

We have previously declared that the clause "or for three months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less" is unconstitutional for being violative of the rights of (OFWs) to equal protection.
Moreover, the subject clause does not state any definitive governmental purpose, hence, it also violates
petitioner's right to substantive due process.

Generally, an unconstitutional act is not a law. An exception to this is the doctrine of operative fact applied
when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the
invalid law. This case should not be included in the exception. It was not the fault of petitioner that he lost
his job due to an act of illegal dismissal committed by respondents.

Also, we cannot subscribe to respondents postulation that the tanker allowance of US$130.00 should not
be included in the computation of the lump-sum salary. First, fair play, justice, and due process dictate
that this Court cannot now, for the first time on appeal, pass upon this question. Second, the allowance
was encapsulated in the basic salary clause.

SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., Petitioner, vs. JOY C. CABILES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 170139 August 5, 2014

PONENTE: Leonen
TOPIC: Section 10 of RA 8042 vis-a-vis Section 7 of RA 10022

FACTS:
Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement agency.
Respondent Joy Cabiles was hired thus signed a one-year employment contract for a monthly
salary of NT$15,360.00. Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26,
1997. She alleged that in her employment contract, she agreed to work as quality control for one year. In
Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter.
Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy, without
prior notice, that she was terminated and that she should immediately report to their office to get her
salary and passport. She was asked to prepare for immediate repatriation. Joy claims that she was told
that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of NT$9,000.15 According to her, Wacoal
deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila.
 On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC against petitioner
and Wacoal. LA dismissed the complaint. NLRC reversed LAs decision. CA affirmed the ruling of the
National Labor Relations Commission finding respondent illegally dismissed and awarding her three
months worth of salary, the reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation, and attorneys fees
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cabiles was entitled to the unexpired portion of her salary due to illegal
dismissal.

HELD:
YES. The Court held that the award of the three-month equivalent of respondents salary
should be increased to the amount equivalent to the unexpired term of the employment contract.
In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., this court ruled
that the clause or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less is
unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and substantive due process.
A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been
passed at all.
The Court said that they are aware that the clause or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less was reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon promulgation of
Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010.
Ruling on the constitutional issue
In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the government
may exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless of the existence of
any law that supports such exercise. The Constitution cannot be trumped by any other law. All laws must
be read in light of the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it is a nullity.
Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the Constitution,
the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law or provision. A
law or provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances
have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.
The Court observed that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in Republic Act. No.
10022, violates the constitutional rights to equal protection and due process.96 Petitioner as well as the
Solicitor General have failed to show any compelling change in the circumstances that would warrant us
to revisit the precedent.
The Court declared, once again, the clause, or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.