Chua v.

Civil Service Commission

Case No. 60G.R. No. 88979 (February 7, 1992) Chapter IV,

Page 164, Footnote No.146

FACTS:

RA 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary

separation as well as for involuntary separation due to
reorganization. Section 2 covers those who are qualified:

Sec. 2. Coverage. This Act shall cover all appointive officials

and employees of the National Government. The benefits
authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary,
casual and emergency employees, regardless of age, who have
rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of
government service as of the date of separation...

Petitioner Lydia Chua, believing that she is qualified to avail of the

benefits of the program, filed an application on January 30, 1989
with Respondent Administration, which, however, denied the
same. Recourse by the petitioner to Respondent Commission
yielded the same result.

ISSUE:

W/N Petitioners status as a co-terminus employee is excluded

from the benefits of RA 6683 (Early Retirement Law).

HELD:

The petition is granted. The Early Retirement Law would violate

the equal protection clause of the constitution if the Supreme
Court were to sustain Respondents submission that the benefits
of said law are to be denied a class of government employees
who are similarly situated as those covered by the said law. The
court applied the doctrine of necessary implication in deciding
this case.

which holds that: "No statute can be enacted that

can provide all the details involved in its
application.
There is always an omission that may not
meet a particular situation. What is thought,
at the time of enactment, to be an all-
embracing legislation (may be inadequate to
provide for the unfolding events of the
future.)
So-called gaps in the law develop as the law
is enforced.
One of the rules of statutory construction used
to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary
implication. The doctrine states that what is implied
in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is
expressed. Every statute is understood, by
implication, to contain all such provisions as may be
necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to
make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction
which it grants, including all such collateral and
subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and
logically inferred from its terms.Ex necessitate legis.
And every statutory grant of power, right or privilege
is deemed to include all incidental power, right or
privilege. This is so because the greater includes the
lesser, expressed in the maxim, in eo plus sit, simper
inest et minus."
Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution
guarantees: "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws." ". . . In Felwa vs. Salas, L-26511, Oct. 29, 1966,
We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only
to persons or things identically situated and does not
bar a reasonable classi cation of the subject of
legislation, and a classi cation is reasonable where (1)
it is based on substantial distinctions which make real
differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of
the law; (3) the classi cation applies not only to
present conditions but also to future conditions which
are substantially identical to those of the present; (4)
the classification applies only to those who belong to
the same class."
DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY IMPLICATION; APPLICABLE
IN CASE AT BAR. The maxim of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius should not be the applicable maxim
in this case but the doctrine of necessary implication
which holds that: "No statute can be enacted that
can provide all the details involved in its
application.
There is always an omission that may not meet a
particular situation. What is thought, at the time of
enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation may be
inadequate to provide for the unfolding events of the
future. So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is
enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction
used to ll in the gap is the doctrine of necessary
implication. The doctrine states that what is implied in
a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is
expressed. Every statute is understood, by
implication, to contain all such provisions as may be
necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to
make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction
which it grants, including all such collateral and
subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and
logically inferred from its terms.Ex necessitate legis.
And every statutory grant of power, right or privilege
is deemed to include all incidental power, right or
privilege. This is so because the greater includes the
lesser, expressed in the maxim, in eo plus sit, simper
inest et minus."

Conclusion
To recapitulate, Asilos 2004-2007 term was not
interrupted by the Sandiganbayan-imposed
preventive suspension in 2005, as preventive
suspension does not interrupt an elective
officials term. Thus, the COMELEC refused to
apply the legal command of Section 8, Article X
of the Constitution when it granted due course
to Asilos certificate of candidacy for a
prohibited fourth term. By so refusing, the
COMELEC effectively committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; its action was a refusal to perform a
positive duty required by no less than the
Constitution and was one undertaken outside

the contemplation of law.21

Section 8, Article X of the Constitution is
violated and its purpose defeated when an
official fully served in the same position for three
consecutive terms. Whether as "caretaker" or
"de facto" officer, he exercised the powers and
enjoyed the perquisites of the office that
enabled him "to stay on indefinitely."