CHAPTER 17

Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army (CPLA)

Overview
The Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army (CPLA) is an armed group of indig-
enous people in the Cordillera mountain range of northern Luzon, many
members of which have been integrated into the Armed Forces of the Philip-
pines (AFP). Originally made up of units that split from the Communist Party
of the Philippines-New Peoples Army (CPP-NPA), it has since suffered from
factionalism and inghting. It continues to push for regional autonomy, more
than 20 years after signing a peace pact with the Philippine government.

Basic characteristics
Typology
The CPLA is an armed group of indigenous people based in the Cordillera
mountains that seeks regional autonomy and is currently being integrated
into the government armed forces. The group now considers armed struggle
to be secondary to legal parliamentary struggle (Buendia, 1991).

Current status
There are conicting reports about the status of the CPLA. The group was
rst reportedly unied under the leadership of Mailed Molina and Corazon
Cortel (Conrado Balwegs widow, see below) with Arsenio Humiding acting
as chair when Molina ran for a government position (Cabreza, 2007). Molina
was still claiming the chairmanship in 2008.1 According to the Ofce of the
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP), the CPLA has divided
into at least three factions. Once applauded for helping with peacekeeping in
the region, some CPLA elements and factions have been accused of murder,
illegal logging, and marijuana trafcking (CRC, 1989). Hundreds of CPLA

318 Primed and Purposeful

members were integrated into the Philippine Army (AFP) and Citizens Armed
Force Geographical Unit (CAFGU) militia in 2001 (see Chapter 6).

Origin
In the early 1970s, indigenous people joined the New Peoples Army (NPA)
and the Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA) in resisting the Marcos dictator-
ship and the operations of multinational companies in the Cordillera, in par-
ticular the Cellophil Resources Corporation in Abra, the Chico River Dam
project spanning the Mountain Province and Kalinga, and the Batong Buhay
Gold Mining Project in Kalinga. The Cordillera mountain ranges soon became
known as active operations bases for the NPA (CRC, 2000, p. 1). The Cordillera
units seceded from the NPA because of perceived discrimination against high-
land NPA members; by the drive by ex-Catholic priest turned NPA commander
Conrado Balweg for the self-determination of mountain tribes to be recognized
immediately and not only after victory; and by the decision by the NPA to
put Balweg under house arrest on suspicion of sexual and nancial oppor-
tunism (Coronel-Ferrer, 1997, pp. 21314; CRC, 2000, p. 1). They established
the CPLA in April 1986soon after the fall of the Marcos dictatorshipand
focused on the struggle for regional autonomy and self-determination. The
founding members were mostly Cordillerans belonging to different ethno-
linguistic national minorities.
In September 1986, the CPLA entered into a sipat (cessation of hostilities)
with President Corazon Aquino. It became a partner of the government for
development projects in the Cordilleras, though it continued to agitate against
the Cellophil Resources Corporation and the Chico River Dam project. The
group continued to advocate regional autonomy, which was only partially
granted by the governments of Aquino and her successors, Fidel Ramos, Joseph
Estrada, and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (see Chapter 6).
Internally, the CPLA faced a leadership problem and accused Balweg of mis-
use of the organizations funds, corruption, and dereliction of duties as leader
(CPLA, 1993). On 30 June 1993 the CPLA and its political arm, the Cordillera
Bodong Administration (CBA), announced a reshufe, which Balweg rejected,
leading to the creation of another CPLA faction headed by Mailed Molina and
James Sawatang. The government sided with Balweg. The NPA killed Balweg

Part Two Armed Group Proles 319

in Abra in 1999 (Rousset, 2003), whereupon his widow Corazon Cortel took
over the CPLA leadership. Cortel eventually joined Molina;2 she died of natu-
ral causes in March 2008. The government, through the OPAPP, continues to
deal with this faction (OPAPP, 2008).
The group has suffered politically and economically in recent years, and
has expressed anger at the failure of successive governments to honour their
commitments to grant the region greater autonomy and to integrate CPLA
members into the AFP and the ofcial auxiliary groups of the security forces.
In 2001, President Arroyo signed an order integrating 264 Mailed-faction
members into the AFP and 528 members into six CAFGU companies deployed
in six Cordillera provinces and elsewhere (OPAPP, 2008; Solmerin, 2004). In
2004, the CBA and the CPLA again declared autonomy and threatened war.
In April 2008, a new agreement was signed promising to full the commitments
of the 1986 Mount Data Peace Accord.

Aims and ideology

The core CPLA demand was the setting up of a Cordillera autonomous re-
gion founded on the indigenous peace pact institution of the bodong, which
results in alliances and commonwealths of tribes. The CPLA and the CBA do
not wish to secede from the national government, but aim to free their indig-
enous people from the Filipino majority that makes use of the State to per-
petuate national oppression against the minority people in the Cordillera
(Garming, 1989, p. 9). They seek autonomy, equal rights, justice against oppres-
sion and exploitation, and participation in peacekeeping in their territories.
Formerly with the CPP-NPA, the CPLA has since eschewed Marxism-Leninism-
Maoism, aiming instead for Cordillera regional autonomy through parliamentary
struggle based on the bodong.

Leadership
Arsenio Humiding is acting leader of the unied CPLA. Former chair Mailed
Molinathe former mayor of Bucloc town who was briey arrested in June
2007 on charges of drug trafcking and possession of illegal weaponscon-
tinues to describe himself as CPLA chair (Andrade, 2007; Cabreza, 2007). As
of 200304, at least three other CPLA factions exist: the Yao group, the Bun-as

320 Primed and Purposeful

group, and the Aydinan group of the CPLA-Kalinga (OPAPP, 2008). When
interviewed in Cagayan de Oro City on 30 November 2006, Corazon Cortel
and Arsenio Humiding of the unied CPLA dismissed them as leftovers
rather than factions. The Balweg and the Molina factions united under their
newly elected chairman Mailed Molina at a Workshop on CPLA Concerns
held on 25 April 2008 in Tabuk City, Kalinga province. The April 2008 Joint
Declaration of Commitment promising to full the commitments of the 1986
Mount Data Peace Accord with the GRP was signed on the CPLAs behalf by
Molina and CBA President Marcelina Bahatan.

Political base, combatants, and constituency

The various CPLA factions claim the same mass base, eld commanders, and
foot soldiers among the indigenous people in the central Cordillera region.
This region comprises the provinces of Abra, Apayao, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga,
and Mountain Province (CPA, n.d., p. 7). The Cordillera Bodong Administra-
tion led by Marcelina Bahatan is the CPLAs political centre (Cabreza, 2007).

Sources of nancing and support

The government released PHP 10 million (USD 380,400) in livelihood loan
assistance to former rebels in 198696 and PHP 7.5 million (USD 285,300) for
development projects in the Cordillera (Coronel-Ferrer, 1997).3 Twenty years
after the peace pact, the government admitted it had not delivered on its
promises of land reform, integration, or even clean water, good roads, and
livelihood projects for the Kalinga CPLA (Cabreza, 2006a, p. A20). The Phil-
ippine Senate cut the 2006 budget allocation for development projects in the
Cordilleras (Cabreza, 2006b).

Military activities
Size and strength
In 2001, around 1,200 CPLA members were integrated into the AFP and prom-
ised livelihood projects by the government. In 2006, President Arroyo directed
the Department of National Defense to integrate 3,800 CPLA members into
the ofcial security forces and the armed civilian auxiliary forces (see Chap-

Part Two Armed Group Proles 321

ter 6). The government estimated active CPLA members to number 4,000 in
2007 (PIA, 2007).

Collaboration and friction with other armed groups

The CPLA engages in sporadic ghting with NPA units in the Cordilleras. In
2004, the CPLA urged all non-Cordillera armed groupsincluding the AFP,
the NPA, and private armiesto leave their territory (Solmerin, 2004).
In 1999, the Mailed CPLA faction forged an alliance with the Sosyalitang
Partido ng Paggawa (SPP), which is reportedly made up of breakaway organi-
zations and personalities from the local Communist movements with links to
the MNLF, the MILF, and the Abu Sayyaf Group (Benguet Police Provincial
Ofce, 2000). The SPP eventually merged with the Filipino Workers Party
(Partido ng Manggagawang Pilipino, PMP) in 2002 (see Chapter 14).

Small arms and light weapons

Guns are highly valued among the people in the Cordilleras and nearby prov-
inces. CPLA members and their sympathizers have not laid down arms, and
argue that the peace pact between the government and the CPLA does not
require them to do so.
Spears, bolos, and other primitive weapons have traditionally been used by
Cordillera indigenous people in warfare but have been supplanted in many
instances by guns, which have reportedly altered the nature of ritual peace
processes among politically autonomous villages engaged in conict over
water rights, boundary disputes, or killings and counter-killings. Previously
a declaration of war accompanied by rituals and omens used to precede hos-
tilities in traditional warfare. In addition, peace sanctuary areas were main-
tained, and combat was face-to-face. Such rituals are reportedly no longer
followed because bullets made reprisals too impersonal (Prill-Brett, 2005).

Human security issues

Children associated with ghting forces
A 2005 independent report suggests child soldiers were recruited (PHRIC, 2005).

322 Primed and Purposeful

Human rights
The CPLA has been accused of human rights abuses, including the killing of
CPP sympathizer and tribal leader Daniel Ngayaan in 1987 and harassment
of an NGO conducting relief operations for earthquake victims that same
year. Molina has been accused of continuing to recruit peoplesome with
criminal recordsto his private army and of using his private army to his
personal political advantage; he rejects the accusations. In 1999, the Baguio
City Council proclaimed Molina persona non grata after he paraded in the city
with 300 armed men on Cordillera day (Benguet Police Provincial Ofce, 2000;
CPA, c. 1988).

Outlook
More than 20 years after signing a peace pact with the government in 1986,
the CPLA has not realized its goal of helping to develop the tribal communi-
ties of the Cordillera, much less achieved the autonomy it aspires to (Malanes,
2007). The Cordillera peace pactthe rst peace agreement between the Phil-
ippine government and a rebel groupmay be an example of a failed experi-
ence in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) if it is not saved
by the present government. The GRP and the CBA-CPLA signed a Joint Dec-
laration of Commitment on 25 April 2008 toward the completion of the 1986
Mount Data Peace Accord. Consensus points included an expansion of liveli-
hood assistance to CPLA members who have not beneted in the past and
the involvement of the Department of Justice to determine the correct inter-
pretation of the provision for the establishment of the Cordillera Regional
Security Force (see Chapter 6).

Endnotes
1 A news report from 8 November 2009 suggests that Molina was voted out of the leadership
(Madarang, 2009).
2 Interview with Corazon Cortel, 30 November 2006.
3 Currency conversions at the rate obtaining on 31 December 1996.

Part Two Armed Group Proles 323

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