Special Proceedings

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
JUDGE CALDONA
MINI DIGESTS
SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
I. SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONS
A. Jurisdiction and Venue
- Jurisdiction = authority of a court to take cognizance of a case
- RTC = 100k; MM:200k
- MENDOZA v TEH
Facts:
1. Wife filed before the RTC a complaint for reconveyance
of title and damages.
2. The complaint includes a prayer that she be appointed
as administratrix.
3. Private respondents MTD: LoJ
Doctrines:
1. An action for reconveyance = cognizable by RTC
o Likewise, actions incapable of pecuniary
estimation such as appointment of an
administratrix of an estate
2. Respondents confuses juris with venue
o Mere fact that husband resides in QC at time of
death = affects only venue and NOT j
o Whether a particular matter should be resolved
by the RTC in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction is
NOT a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of
procedure
- NATCHER v CA
Facts:
1. Father and children entered into an extra-j settlement of
estate of mother.
2. Father married again.
3. Father died.
4. Children filed a complaint with RTC alleging that upon
fathers death, stepmom forged the TCT of a lot to make
it appear that father sold it to her.
Doctrines:
1. Action v Special Proceeding
o Action = formal demand of ones right in a court
of justice in the manner prescribed by the
court/law
Special Proceeding = remedy by which a party
seeks to establish status, right, or a particular
fact
o Action for reconveyance and annulment of title
with damages = civil action
Matters relating to settlement of estate such as
advancement of property = special proceeding
2. ?s of Advancement = probate court
Camille Sapnu SpecPro Caldona 1

o RTC, acting in its general j, in an action for
reconveyance = NOT authorized to render
adjudication and resolve such issue
o Only a probate court is allowed to hear questions
as to the advancement of inheritance
B. Residence
- DE BORJA v DE BORJA
Facts:
1. X filed for probate of will of deceased wife where he was
named executor.
2. Due to physical disability of X, Z filed a petition to
appoint Y as co-admin.
3. Court granted.
4. MR.
5. Court denied: appointment of co-admin NOT appealable
Doctrines: Court is wrong!
1. Appointment of co-admin = appealable
Appointment of special admin = NOT appealable
2. Special admin = appointed only for a limited time and
for a specific purpose
a. When there is delay in granting letters
testamentary/administration occasioned by an
appeal from allowance/disallowance of a will OR
from any other cause
b. When the regular executor/admin has a claim
against the estate he represents
Co-admin = performs all the functions and duties and
exercises all powers of regular admin, only that he is not
alone in the administration
- FULE v CA
Facts:
1. X filed a petition for letters of admin with CFI Calamba.
2. Residence = QC
Properties = Calamba
Doctrine: Proper venue = QC
Residence v Domicile = matter of venue
Residence = simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in
a given place
o Signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat
Domicile = bodily presence + intention to make it ones
domicile
- EUSEBIO v EUSEBIO
Facts:
1. Father had always been domiciled in Pampanga.
2. Due to his health, son bought a condo unit for his father
in Manila.
3. Two weeks after father moved to Manila, he died.
4. Son filed petition for probate before RTC Manila.
5. Respondents filed MTC improper venue.
Doctrine: Grant MTD
Residence must be accompanied with the intention to maintain
presence. Neither did he manifest his wish to live there

permanently. The new house was because he had been advised
to do so due to his illness.
o Where the domicile of origin of the decedent was San
Fdo, Pampanga where he resided for over 70 yrs, the
presumption is that he retained such domicile, and
hence, residence in the absence of satisfactory proof to
the contrary
C. Extent of Jurisdiction of Probate Court
- LIM v CA
Facts:
1. Properties of five corporations were included in the
inventory of the estate of Lim.
2. They filed a motion for the lifting of lis pendens and
motion for exclusion of the properties.
3. Probate court granted.
Doctrine: The court had j to rule on the ownership of the
properties
1. Function of resolving whether a certain property is
included in the inventory = one clearly within the
competence of the probate court
However, the courts determination is only
provisional in character and is subject to the final
decision in a separate action, which may be
instituted by the parties.
2. Wife argues that the properties should be included in the
inventory.
Torrens title of corporations = presumption of
conclusiveness of the titles were not countered
by the evidence presented by the wife
- HEIRS OF SANDEJAS v LINA
Facts:
1. Husband filed a petition praying that the letters of admin
be issued in his favor for the settlement of the estate of
his wife.
2. Court records were burned due to a fire. Husband filed a
motion for reconstitution.
3. X filed a motion to intervene alleging that husband sold
certain parcels of land (which formed part of the estate
of wife) to him.
4. Heirs allege that probate court has no j to compel
performance of a K.
Doctrines: Yes, j.
ALL matters relating to
1. Settlement of estate
2. Probate of wills
3. Appointment and removal of admin and executors
4. Matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of
recognized powers
o In this case, the motion for approval of the sale was meant
to settle the obligation to X. Hence, the obligation clearly
falls under the j.
o To require X to file a separate action will unnecessarily
prolong the settlement of the estate.

- DE BORJA v DE BORJA
Facts:
1. X as admin filed his accounts for the estate.
2. His co-heirs opposed such and prayed for dispproval of
the same.
3. X filed a reply contatining a counterclaim for damages.
Doctrine:
The claim for damages may not be entertained given the
limited j of probate courts.
o The limited j cannot expand to collateral matters NOT
arising out of or in any way related to the settlement
and adjudication of the properties of the deceased.
o Although there is a tendency now to relax this rule and
extend the j in respect to matters incidental and
collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers, this
should be understood to comprehend only cases related
to those powers specifically allowed by the statutes.
- TESTATE OF ADAPON v MARALIT
Facts:
1. X, admin, filed an inventory.
2. Wife presented properties to include in the inventory.
3. X argued that he owns the properties exclusively.
Doctrine: Petition of oppositor will NOT prosper
The law does not extend the j of probate court to the
determination of ?s of ownership that arise during the
proceeding.
o A contested claim of an admin that certain rights of
possession and ownership are the property of the estate
that he represented = must be determined in a separate
action and NOT in the course of admin proceedings
o When questions arise as to the ownership of property
alleged to be a part of the estate of a deceased person,
but claimed by some other person to be his property by
title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such
?s CANNOT be determined in that course of admin
proceedings
- GR: Limited to examination and resolution of the EXTRINSIC
validity of the will
E: Probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its
face it appears to be intrinsically void
o Nepomuceno v CA: Testator admitted in the will that
he was disposing the properties to his concubine.
o Acain v IAC: Obvious fact of preterition (Wife and
adopted daughter were omitted in the will)
- BERNARDO v CA
Facts:
1. Both sps have died and estate are probated.
2. X, executor of estate of husband, filed a project of
partition in accordance with the terms of the will of
husband.
3. Collateral relatives of wife filed a counter-proj of
partition on the theory that half of the properties of the
husband belonged to the conjugal partnership.

Doctrine:
Title to Property and Ownership
GR: CANNOT be passed upon
E:
1. Parties interested are ALL heirs
2. Claimant and all other parties having legal interest in the
property consent AND interests of third persons are NOT
prejudiced
3. Inclusion or exclusion in inventory = provisional
determination
o In this case, the issue is question of ownership, i.e.
whether the properties belong to the conjugal
partnership or not.
This is a matter within the j of the probate court
which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal
partnership in order to determine the estate of
the decedent.
There are no third parties whose rights may be
affected. The collateral relatives are enforcing the
wifes right to the conjugal property.
o By presenting proj of partition, the party is deemed to
have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the
probate court for the purpose of determination of the
question of ownership
- AGTARAP v AGTARAP
Facts:
1. Decedent husband left parcels of land to his children of
first marriage, and 2nd wife and children of second
marriage.
2. X, one of the children of second marriage, filed a
petition for settlement of intestate.
3. Court issued an order ruling that the bulk of the estate
were acquired during the existence of the first marriage.
4. X alleges that the court has no j to determine questions
of ownership.
Doctrine:
Same with Bernardo case
- AJERO v CA
Facts:
1. Petitioners, named devisees, instituted a proceeding fro
the allowance of Zs holographic will.
2. X opposed: not in handwriting, alterations not signed,
procured through undue influence.
3. Court allowed probate: no reason for disallowance for
failure to comply with the formalities of law nor for lack
of testamentary capacity
Doctrine: Will should be admitted to probate
Holographic Will
1. Identity = whether the instrument is indeed the will
2. Due execution
3. Testamentary capacity
4. Whether the execution and its signing were voluntary
acts

- REYES-MESUGAS V REYES
Facts:
1. The heirs entered into a compromise agreement.
2. RTC approved the same.
3. X filed a motion to cancel lis pendens in view of the
finality of the judgment in the settlement of the estate.
4. Y opposed claiming that there are side agreements yet
to be fulfilled between them.
Doctrine:
Settled is the rule that a probate court is a tribunal of limited
jurisdiction. It acts on matters pertaining to the estate but
never on the rights to property arising from the contract.
o It is apparent therefor that when the RTC approved the
compromise agreement, the settlement of the estate
proceeding came to an end.
o Any agreement other than the judicially approved
compromise agreement between the parties = outside
the limited j of the probate court
- VDA DE MANALO v CA
Facts:
1. X filed a petition for issuance of letters of admin.
2. Other compulsory heirs opposed on the ground that
earnest efforts towards a compromise have not been
resorted to.
Doctrine:
Art 222 of the NCC which provides for a compromise as a
condition precedent is applicable only in ordinary civil actions.
o Not applicable in spec pro = non-adversarial in nature
- VDA DE RAMOS v CA
Fact: Negative testimony of the witnesses as opposed to the
positive testimony of the notary public
Doctrines:
1. The will was valid. The presumption of regularity must
be upheld and cannot be overcome by negative
testimony of the witnesses.
2. Absence of a picture of decedent signing her will is not
fatal because pictures are only worthy of what they
show and prove.
o Probate of a will is a proceeding not imbued with
adverse character
o Court should relax rules on evidence
D. Production and Probate of Will
- ALBAN v CA
Facts:
1. X filed a petition for probate of a will.
2. Granted.
3. Petitioners opposed; claiming RTC did not acquire j due
to lack of notice to other heirs.
Doctrine:
Notice is required to be given personally to the known heirs,
legatees and devisees.

o The petitioners, as nephews and nieces, are neither
compulsory nor testate heirs who are entitled to be
notified of the probate proceedings
o Besides, personal notice upon the heirs is a matter of
procedure convenience and not a jurisdictional requisite.
o Publication is enough
- Who may petition
1. Executor
2. Devisee/legatee
3. Person interested in the estate
E. Allowance or Disallowance of Will
- Jurisdictional Facts
1. Fact of death of the decedent
2.
a. Inhabitant of PH = Residence at time of death in the
province where the probate court is sitting
b. Inhabitant of a foreign country = estate he left in
such province
- IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF PETTION TO APPROVE WILL
OF RUPERTA PALAGANA
Probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although not yet
been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution =
ALLOWED
- FLUEMER v HIX
Reprobate
Evidence necessary for the reprobate/allowance of wills which
have been probated outside PH:
1. Due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign
laws
2. Testator has his domicile in the foreign country and NOT
in PH
3. Will has been admitted to probate in such country
4. The fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court
5. Laws of the foreign country on procedure and allowance
of wills
F. Letters Testamentary and of Administration
- ANGELES v MAGLAYA
Facts:
1. X filed a petition for letters and her appointment as
admin; alleging that she is the sole LC of the decedent.
2. Y opposed that X had not proven that she is a LC, and
that she, as surviving spouse (2nd wife), be declared as
admin.
Doctrine: Surviving spouse
1. Not a LC
o Birth certificate was not signed by both alleged
parents
o Birth certificate to be considered as validating
proof of paternity and an instrument of
recognition = must be signed by both, or by the
mother alone if the father refuses
2. Surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin
o Next of kin = heir

o Issue of whether an application for letters is an
heir = probate court has to determine and pass
upon the issue of filiation; separate action will
only result in multiplicity of suits
- SAN LUIS v SAN LUIS
Facts:
1. Second wife of decedent filed a petition for letters.
2. One of the children filed MTD alleging that she has no
legal personality to file the petition because she is only a
mistress.
Doctrine: Mistress has legal capacity
1. Divorce decree obtained by first wife was not sufficiently
proved to be valid.
2. Even assuming that the marriage was not valid, mistress
has legal personality.
o Considered as co-owner of the properties
acquired through their joint efforts during their
cohabitation
o Interested person who has a direct interest in the
estate of the decedent by virtue of their
cohabitation
- Appointment of Co-Admin (Gabriel v CA)
1. If it is to the best interest of the state
2. If the estate is so large, which requires the
administration by more than one person
3. If justice and equity demands that all persons be
represented
4. When the opposing party needs to be represented
5. Upon petition or application of an interested party
- ANCHETA v GUERSEY-DALAYGON
Facts:
1. X was appointed as ancillary admin of estate of foreigner
wife.
2. In the proceedings for wifes estate, X filed a project of
partition.
3. Granted.
4. Relative filed an opposition, alleging that X willfully
breached his fiduciary duty when he disregarded the
laws of the State of Maryland on the distribution of
wifes estate.
Doctrine: X committed fraud in the performance of his duties.
As ancillary admin, X occupies a position of highest trust and
confidence, and is required to exercise reasonable diligence and
act in entire GF in the performance of that trust.
o Duty-bound to introduce in evidence the pertinent
foreign law
o Failure to proficiently manage the distribution in
accordance to decedents will and as dictated by the
applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud
G. Claims against Estate
- GR: NOT extinguished
E:
1. Law

2. Stipulation
3. Nature
- STRONGHOLD v REPUBLIC-ASAHI
Facts:
1. Republic-Asahi entered into a K with decedent.
2. Republic-Asahi filed a complaint against decedent. It
also sought from Stronghold the payment of the
performance bond.
Doctrine:
Strongholds liability under the performance bond was NOT
extinguished due to death of decedent.
o In this case, whatever obligations decendent has were
not intransmissible by their law, stipulation or nature.
Hence, his death did not result in their extinguishment.
It merely passed to his estate.
o As surety, Stronghold is solidarily liable with decedent in
accordance with the NCC.
- GABRIEL v BILON
Fact:
1. Drivers filed ID case against decedent.
2. LA ruled in favor of drivers and ordered decedent to pay.
3. Wife refused since decedent had already did before the
promulgation of the decision.
Doctrine: The claim survives.
A favorable judgment obtained shall be enforced in the manner
provided in the rules for prosecuting claims against the estate.
o Action on Kal money claims when the defendant dies
before entry of final judgment = allowed to continue
until entry of final judgment
- IN RE MATTER OF ESTATE OF DE DIOS
Facts:
1. X alleges to have a claim against the estate of De Dios.
2. He filed a motion for extension of time to file claim on
the ground that he relied upon the word of an heir who
promised to pay the debt in behalf of the estate.
Doctrine:
Time within which to file claims
GR: NO extension (6-12 months AFTER 1st publication of
notice)
E: Sound reasons; discretion of court
o In this case, no reason why claim was not presented.
Although negotiations with the heir may have been
pending, he should have presented his claim
nevertheless.
- MONTINOLA v VILLANUEVA
Facts:
1. The court approved claim of creditor in the settlement
proceeding.
2. While the claim was pending, court adjudicated the lots
to the heirs in the cadastral proceedings.
3. Back to the settlement, court order admin to sell the lots
to pay creditor.

4. Admin could not make the sale since the lots were
already in the name of heirs.
5. Creditor prayed that there be declared a lien on the said
lands and that the heirs be ordered to pay.
6. Heirs countered that the titles were adjudicated in their
favor without liens.
Doctrine:
Even after the partition, heirs and distributes are liable
individually for the payment of all lawful outstanding claims
against the estate in proportion to the amt/value they have
received.
o Property comes to them charged with the debts of the
deceased so that they cannot alienate or charge it free
of such debts until such is extinguished by payment
- GUEVARRA v DEL ROSARIO
Fact:
1. Petitioners prayed for writ of mandamus to compel court
to conduct investigation based on a complain filed by
them.
2. Petitioners died.
3. Heirs asked to substitute the petitioners
Doctrine:
The action survives if the COA survives.
o COA is personal = failure of court to conduct prelim
investigation which gave rise to this proceeding was
based on petitioners complaint
o A proceeding in mandamus cannot be prosecuted or
continued by the heirs/legal reps upon the death of
petitioners where the COA is personal and did not
survive to said heirs and reps
H. Actions by and Against Executors and Administrators
- PHIL TRUST v LUZON SURETY
Facts:
1. X was dismissed as admin.
2. Phil Trust, as new admin, submitted a report that only
P57 was left in the estate.
3. Court held X guilty of disbursement without authority.
4. X also guilty of estafa.
5. Court issued order requiring Luzon Surety to show cause
why the admin bond it filed on behalf of X should not be
confiscated.
6. Luzon Surety: a probate court cannot, ex proprio motu,
prosecute the probate bond
Doctrines: Probate court can order the confiscation/forfeiture of
probate bond
1. Probate court has power to execute/forfeit an admin
bond
Execution/forfeiture = deemed to be a necessary
part and incident of admin proceedings
Probate court may have the bond executed in the
same probate proceeding
2. Sureties on the admins bond may be held liable
although they were not parties to the proceeding against

the admin, nor were they notified prior to the issuance
of the court order for the confiscation of the bond
- ROMUALDEZ v TIGLAO
Facts:
1. Decedent is a solidary debtor in a case decided in favor
of creditor.
2. Judgment was not satisfied.
3. Decedent died.
4. Creditor filed an action for revival of judgment.
5. MTD: Based on Sec 1 of Rule 87 (No action upon claim
for recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall
be commenced against the executor/admin)
Doctrine:
The action for revival was proper instead of presenting the
claim in the settlement of the estate.
o The original action had been stale because of its non-
execution after lapse of 5 yrs.
o Accordingly, it cannot be presented against the estate
unless it is first revived by action.
o Object of the suit is not to make the estate pay but
merely to keep alive the judgment.
I. Distribution and Partition
- Liquidation = determination of all assets of the estate and
payment of all debts and expenses
II. SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES
A. Extrajudicial Settlement
- Found will after partition = probate proceedings
- Disagree = ordinary action of partition
- GUEVARRA v GUEVARRA
Facts:
1. X executed a will.
2. X died without his will being presented in court nor did
the admin proceedings of settlement of estate started.
3. IC of X filed an action to recover her legitime not based
on will but intestate succession.
Doctrine:
Probate of a will cannot be dispensed by extrajudicial
settlement of heirs
o ICs contention violates procedural law and considered
an attempt to circumvent the will of the decedent.
o The presentation of the will for probate is mandatory.
o Suppression of the will is contrary to law and public
policy. Without probate, the right of the person to
dispose of his property by will may be rendered
nugatory.
B. Affidavit of Self-adjudication by Sole Heir
- PORTUGAL v PORTUGAL-BELTRAN
Facts:
1. X executed an affidavit of adjudication by sole heir.
2. Other heirs filed a complaint against X for the annulment
of the affidavit.

3. Court dismissed for lack of COA on the ground that their
status and right as putative heirs had not been
established before a probate court.
Doctrine: A special proceeding need not be filed.
Remedy of parties alleging to be putative heirs in case one heir
self-adjudicates the estate is to file either:
a. Special proceeding
i. Specpro is pending
ii. None but there is a need to file one under the
circumstances of the case
b. Civil action for declaration of heirship
i. Specpro had been finally closed and terminated
ii. Putative heir has lost the right to have himself
declared in the specpro as co-heir and he can no
longer ask for its re-opening
o In this case, only property is the Caloocan property and
to subject it to specpro which could be long and not
expeditious = not only impractical but also burdensome
to the estate with the costs and expenses of an admin
proceeding
Also superfluous since the parties had already in
fact presented evidence
No compelling reason to still subject the estate to
admin proceedings
- CUA v VARGAS
Facts:
1. Extra j was executed by some of the heirs.
2. Other heirs filed a case for annulment of the settlement
for she came to know the same only after its execution.
Doctrine: The extraj settlement was not valid.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute
constructive notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or did
not take part in it because the same was notice after the fact o
execution.
Requirement of publication = geared for the protection
of creditors and was never intended to deprive heirs of
their lawful participation in the decedents estate
- PEREIRA v CA
Facts:
1. Decedent died without a will.
2. Sister instituted special proceeding for the issuance of
letters of admin in her favor.
3. Wife opposed alleging that there exists no estate for
purposes of admin.
Doctrine:
Judicial admin proceeding is NOT necessary where there are no
debts left by the decedent
o GR: when a person dies leaving property, the same
should be judicially administered and a admin must be
appointed
E: When all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no
debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to

partition the property without instituting the judicial
admin or applying for the appointment of admin
o When partition is possible, the estate should not be
burdened with admin proceeding without good and
compelling reasons.
What constitutes good reason = circumstantial
C. Summary Settlement of Estates of Small Value
- Gross value = does NOT exceed 10k
- Petition
- Hearing
- Without appointment of exec/admin
- Without delay to grant allowance of will
D. Remedies of Aggrieved Parties AFTER Extrajudicial Settlement
- Within 2 yrs AFTER settlement and distribution (Sec. 4)
a. Lawful participation
b. Lawful participation payable in money
E. Two-yr Prescriptive Pd
- PEZA v FERNANDEZ
Facts:
1. Some heirs executed extraj settlement.
2. Other heirs alleged they were excluded from the extraj
settlement.
3. MTD already prescribed; beyond 2 yrs.
Doctrine: Claim already prescribed.
GR: 2 yrs
E:
1. Do NOT apply to those who had no part in or notice of
the settlement
2. Title remains in the hands of the heirs who fraudulently
caused the partition
3. Transferees NOT considered innocent purchasers for
value
o In this case, the other heirs were deemed to have been
constructively notified of the extraj settlement by reason
of its registration and annotation in the certificate of
title.
o From time of registration, other heirs had 2 yrs within
which to file their claim.
- Remedy = action for damages against perpetuator/s of fraud +
crim action for falsification + writ of attachment
ESCHEAT
- Intestate + NO heirs
- Last residence/estate (RTC)
- One of the incidents of sovereignty
- State = NOT the sole and exclusive interested party
o Any person alleging to have a direct right/interest in the property
sought to be escheated
- BALAIS-MABANAG v REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF QC
Facts:
1. Sellers rescinded agreement with first buyer of a parcel of land since
the second buyer had greater amt of offer.

2. First buyer filed a case for specific performance.
3. RTC granted.
4. Second buyer questioned the citizenship of buyer.
Doctrine: Petitioner is not the proper party to challenge buyers qualifications
to acquire land.
o Under Section 7, BP 185, the Solicitor General or his representative
shall institute escheat proceedings against its violators.
o Only the Government, through the Solicitor General, has the
personality to file a case challenging the capacity of a person to
acquire or to own land based on non-citizenship.
This limitation is based on the fact that the violation is
committed against the State, not against any individual; and
that in the event that the transferee is adjudged to be not a
Filipino citizen, the affected property reverts to the State, not to
the previous owner or any other individual.
o Herein, even assuming that Ramona was legally disqualified from
owning the subject property, the decision that voids or annuls their
right of ownership over the subject land will not inure to the benefit of
the petitioner. Instead, the subject property will be escheated in favor
of the State in accordance with Batas Pambansa Blg. 185.
- RP v CA
Facts:
1. Republic filed a petition for escheat.
2. Husband of X filed a motion for intervention but was denied for lack of
evidence.
3. Estate was escheated after finding that there were no known heirs.
4. X, alleged donee, filed a petition for annulment alleging that she had
found the deeds of donations.
5. MTD barred by prescription
Doctrine: Barred
Judgment = conclusive against all persons with actual or constructive notice
but NOT against those who are not parties/privies thereto
o X, through her husband, already participated. X failed to establish her
titled to the properties.
GUARDIANSHIP
- Ward = must be a natural person
Wards estate = may be a juridical person
- Primordial consideration is the best interest of the ward = closeness; subj to
discretion of the court
o Relatives are preferred
- Defect in petition = opposition
- Guardian ad litem
- Notice by publication = estate (in rem)
- Powers and duties = similar with admin of estate
o Admin = settle and distribute estate
o Guardian = preserve
- HERNANDEZ v SAN JUAN-SANTOS
Fact: Obese Cinderella
Doctrine:
Incompetent = includes those who, though of sound mind but by reason of
age/disease/weak mind/other similar causes, are incapable of taking care of
themselves and their property without outside aid
-

- PEOPLE OF THE PH v FLORES
Facts:
1. X raped the adopted daughter of his wife.
2. Court considered qualifying circumstance of relationship since they
stipulated that X is the guardian of the minor.
Doctrine: Court erred in considering circumstance of relationship
1. Qualifying circumstances cannot be subj of stipulation
2. Law requires a legal/judicial guardian since it is the consanguineous
relation/solemnity of the judicial appointment which impresses upon
the guardian the lofty purpose of his office and normally deters him
from violating its objectives
Guardian = denote a legal relationship
- UY v CA
Facts:
1. Son prayed that letters of guardianship be issued in favor of wife.
2. Wife herself filed a petition for assumption of sole powers of admin of
conjugal properties and authorization to sell the same.
3. Court approved pursuant to the Family Code.
Doctrine:
Non-consenting spouse is incompetent or incapacitated to give consent in the
administration of conjugal properties = proper remedy is judicial guardianship
o FC provision = does NOT apply when the consenting spouse is
incapacitated or incompetent to give consent
o Even assuming the FC provision applies, the law provides that the
spouse who assumes sole powers of admin = same powers and duties
as a guardian. Hence, sale of property should be subject to approval of
court.
- CABALES v CA
Facts:
1. Co-heirs of minor X sold a part of the estate to a third party.
2. Petitioner filed a complaint for redemption of the subject land;
contending that they could not have sold their respective shares when
he was a minor.
Doctrine: Sale was void
Co-heirs of X were not his legal guardians with legal authority to alienate or
encumber his property
o Property under parental authority is 2k or less = father/mother,
without necessity of appointment, shall be his guardian
o Mother was Xs legal guardian
o The sale by co-heirs could not have pertained to the share of X. X
retained ownership.

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS (FINALS)
JUDGE CALDONA
MINI DIGESTS
ADOPTION
DSWD v JUDGE ANTONIO BELEN
Facts:
1. Spouses filed a verified petition for adoption of their minor niece.
2. RTC granted based on the findings and recommendations of the DSWD, which
are contained in the Adoptive Home Study Report and Child Study prepared
by the local office of DSWS through the social worker.
3. DSWD: No record in its files regarding such adoption case.
Doctrine: The adoption decree was not proper.
o A case study should be conducted by the DSWD, involving the child to be
adopted, its natural parents, and the adopting parents.
o The proper course that respondent judge should have taken was to notify the
DSWD at the outset about the commencement of the case so that the
corresponding case study could have been accordingly conducted by said
department which undoubtedly has the necessary competence to make the
proper recommendation.
o Moreover, respondent judge should never have merely presumed that it was
routinary for the social welfare officer to coordinate with the DSWD regarding
the adoption proceedings. It was his duty to exercise caution and to see to it
that such coordination was observed in the adoption proceedings, together
with all the other requirements of the law.
o By respondents failure to do so, he may well have wittingly or unwittingly
placed in jeopardy the welfare and future of the child whose adoption was
under consideration. Adoption, after all, is in a large measure a legal device
by which a better future may be accorded an unfortunate child like in this
case.
REPUBLIC v HERNANDEZ
Facts:
1. Spouses filed a petition to adopt a minor child.
2. In the same petition, they prayed for the change of the minors name.
Doctrine: Change of given name NOT allowed
1. The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the
surname of the aer upon the issuance of the decree of adoption.
HOWEVER, the given/proper name, also known as first/Christian name,
of the aee must remain as it was originally registered on the civil
register.
The creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the
adopter a license to change the adoptees given name. Neither is it a
mere incident nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding.
2. If change in ones name is desired, the separate filing of petition for change of
name is necessary.
Different substantive and procedural requirements
IN RE: PETITION FOR MICHAEL LIM

Facts:
1. Wife sought to adopt the children, who lived with her since they were babies.
2. At the time of the filing of the petition, girl child was 25 yrs old and already
married and boy child was 18 yrs old.

3. Girl child and her husband, boy child, and new American husband of wife
(former died) gave their consent as shown by their separate Affidavits of
Consent.
Doctrine: Joint adoption of spouses is mandatory.
1. The use of the word shall means that the joint mandatory is mandatory.
This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over
the child, which is the ideal situation.
In this case, wife having remarried at the time the petitions were filed
must jointly adopt.
Wife: joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the
children have been emancipated having reached the age of majority.
SC: Even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is
still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights of a
legitimate child.
Wife: joint adoption could no longer be possible because American
husband has filed a case for dissolution
SC: We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage is
of no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of
marriage. Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution
of the marriage, the marriage still subsists.
2. The fact that the new husband gave his consent to the adoption does not
suffice. There are certain requirements that the new husband must comply
being an American citizen.
ANONYMOUS v EMMA CURAMEN

Facts:
1. This is an admin case against X who was charged with falsification of a public
document and simulation of birth.
2. X admitted that she misrepresented herself as the biological mother, when in
fact she is the maternal grandmother. But claimed that the childs parents,
being unemployed, were unable to support themselves and the child.
Doctrine: She is guilty of falsification of the childs birth certificate.
o Birth certificate = being a public document, serves as prima facie evidence of
filiation
The making of a false statement therein constitutes dishonesty and
falsification of a public document.
o X cannot escape liability by claiming that she did not have any intention to
conceal the childs identity nor cause the loss of any trace as to the childs
true filiation. When public documents are falsified, the intent to injure a third
person because the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith
and the destruction of the truth.
o With respect to her justification that the true parents are unable to support
the child, respondent can very well continue supporting the child without
having to tamper the birth certificate.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE CATINDIG

Facts:
1. Father filed a petition to adopt his minor IC Stephanie.
2. Father also prays that the IC use the surname of her mother as a middle
name.
Doctrine: Yes, the underlying intent of adoption is in favor of the adopted child.

o The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a
relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows the
child with a legitimate status.
o No law that prohibits the adopted IC child to use her mothers surname, no
reason why she should not be allowed to do so. (Liberal construction in favor
of adoption)
1. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is
entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her
father and her mother.
2. Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanies continued use of her
mothers surname as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. The
adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence,
Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural
mother in the future.
3. Moreover, records show that they are one normal happy family. Hence, to
allow Stephanie to use her mothers surname as her middle name will not only
sustain her continued loving relationship with her mother but will also
eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.
LAHOM v SIBULO
Fact: Adopter wanted to rescind the decree of adoption.
Doctrine: Adopter cannot rescind the decree of adoption.
o Prior to the institution of the case, the Domestic Adoption Act went into
effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a
decree of adoption. The action for rescission of the adoption decree, having
been initiated by petitioner after such act had come into force, no longer
could be pursued.
o Adoption is a privilege that is governed by the states determination on what it
may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child. Matters relating
to adoption are subject to regulation by the State. Concomitantly, a right of
action given by statute may be taken away at anytime before it has been
exercised.
o It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing
the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of
certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance,
upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted
child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from
having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.
LANDINGAN v RP
Facts:
1. Aunt filed a petition for adoption of her minor nieces and nephew.
2. DSWD social worker reported that the minors are eligible for adoption given
that the surviving parent has given her consent.
3. However, aunt failed to present the DSWD social worker as a witness and
offer in evidence the voluntary consent of the biological parent; no
documentary evidence that the biological mother consented.
Doctrine:
o The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity
of a decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child
requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and

duties may be terminated and re-established in adoptive parents. In this
case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent to the adoption.
1. Aunt: consent not necessary since biological parent abandoned the children.
SC: Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of
others is not abandonment. To dispense with the requirement of consent, the
abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.
In this case, petitioner relied solely on her testimony and that of the adopted
to prove her claim that the mother had abandoned her children. If, as claimed
by petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors had indeed abandoned
them, she should, thus have adduced the written consent of their legal
guardian.
When she left for Italy, she had not intended to abandon her children,
or to permanently sever their mother-child relationship. She was
merely impelled to leave the country by financial constraints. Yet, even
while abroad, she did not surrender or relinquish entirely her motherly
obligations of rearing the children to her now deceased mother-in-law,
for, as claimed by Elaine herself, she consulted her mother for serious
personal problems. Likewise, the mother continues to send financial
support to the children, though in minimal amounts as compared to
what her affluent in-laws provide.
2. Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of the child, it
follows that the financial capacity of prospective parents should also be
carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly, the adopter should be in a
position to support the would-be adopted child or children, in keeping with the
means of the family.
It is indeed doubtful whether petitioner will be able to sufficiently
handle the financial aspect of rearing the three children in the US. She
only has a part-time job, and she is rather of age.
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

GO v DIMAGIBA
Facts:
1. X was convicted for BP 22.
2. The judgment became final executory. Hence, court issued Order of Arrest.
3. X filed MR. Denied. Arrested.
4. X filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus, relying on the case of Vaca where the SC
ruled that BP 22 cases required imposition of fines only instead of
imprisonment.
Doctrine: NOT the proper remedy
o Writ of habeas corpus = applies to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention in which individuals are deprived of liberty
o Writ may NOT be availed of when the person is under a judicial process or by
virtue of a valid judgment
o As post-conviction remedy, may be allowed when:
1. Deprivation of constitutional right resulting to restraint of person
2. Court = no j to impose the sentence
3. Imposed penalty = excessive
o In this case, X sought the retroactive effect of the Vaca case; same grounds
in his MR.
Proper remedy should have been an appeal of the Order denying his
motions.

Petition for writ of habeas corpus = attempt to reopen a case that
already had become final and executory
VICENTE v MAJADUCON
Facts:
1. X was found guilty of BP 22.
2. X filed an MR, which she prayed to be considered a petition for issuance of
writ of habeas corpus, citing Vaca case.
3. Court allowed her to post bail.
Doctrine: X should not have been granted bail based on the writ.
o GR: Issuance of writ is disallowed when the person alleged to be restrained of
his liberty by is suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
ONLY E: convict has applied for probation before he commences to serve
sentence, provided the penalty and offense are within the purview of the
Probation Law.
o Rule 102, Sec 14 applies to cases where the applicant for writ is restrained by
virtue of the criminal charges against him and NOT where he is serving a
sentence by reason of final judgment.
o In this case, the judgment finding her guilty and imposing upon her the
penalty of imprisonment has already become final and executory.
She did not apply for probation.
At the time court granted her bail, she was already serving her
sentence.
IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF KUNTING

Facts:
1. X was arrested in Malaysia and was turned over to PNP-IG.
2. PNP-IG requested for Xs temporary detention at Camp Crame.
3. RTC issued an Order directing the immediate turnover of X to the court.
4. PNP-IG Director requested to Chief State Prosecutor for a motion to be filed
for the transfer of venue.
5. RTC reiterated its order. PNP-IG Dir reiterated request.
6. X filed a petition for issuance of writ of habeas corpus.
Doctrine:
o Remedy of habeas corpus has one objective = to inquire into the cause of
detention of a person, and if found illegal, the court orders the release of the
detainee.
o Writ NOT allowed when:
1. Person is in custody of an officer under process issued by a court or
judge who has j to issue the process, render the judgment, or make
the order
2. By mere reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment
or order
3. Person charged with or convicted of an offense in the PH
4. Person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment
o In this case, X was arrested by PNP-IG by virtue of the alias order of arrest
issued by RTC. The trial court thus authorized his temporary detention.
Moreover, X was charged with a criminal offense. Once the person
detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his
detention by a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
SALIENTES v ABANILLA
Facts:

1. Due to problems with in-laws, husband demanded that the family move into
their own home.
2. Wife refused. Husband ended up living alone and was prevented from seeing
his son.
3. Husband filed a petition for habeas corpus and custody for his son.
Doctrine: Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is
withheld from a person entitled thereto.
1. Husband and wife have joint parental authority over their son and
consequently, joint custody.
Although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet
to be adjudicated by the court.
In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one, both are still
entitled to custody.
2. In this case, husbands coa is the deprivation of his right to see his child. The
remedy of habeas corpus is available to him.
NOT to give custody but to free the child from restraint
MONCUPA v ENRILE
Facts:
1. X filed a petition for habeas corpus.
2. MTD: temporarily released from detention.
Doctrine: Temporary release does NOT render the petition moot and academic
o Temporary release = merely shifted the legality of his actual detention to the
legality of the imposed conditions
o Restrictions attached to his temporary release = restraints on his liberty; limit
the freedom of X
o It is NOT the physical restraint alone which is inquired into by the writ of
habeas corpus
o A release that renders a petition for writ of habeas corpus moot and academic
= one which is free from involuntary restraints
o The ff may still avail of this remedy
1. Person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his
constitutional freedom
2. Restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to be unnecessary
3. Deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in the light of subsequent
developments, become arbitrary
GO, SR. v RAMOS

Facts:
1. X, allegedly a Chinese, was detained for subsequent deportation.
2. X filed a petition for issuance of habeas corpus.
3. Denied.
4. X assailed the denial in a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the SC.
Doctrine:
1. Proper remedy = appeal
Extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus =
available only when no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
48 hr appeal pd for petitions for habeas corpus demonstrates the
adequacy of such remedy
2. Petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus = NOT proper once a person
detained is duly charged in court

Objective of the writ = determine whether the confinement or
detention is valid or lawful
Once a person is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his
detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus =
remedy is to quash the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest
3. Given that Jimmy has been duly charged and in fact ordered arrested pending
his deportation = petition for habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic
IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA

Facts:
1. X was found guilty of the rape of his niece by affinity.
2. Years later, X files a petition for habeas corpus and MNT on ground that DNA
test (conducted after trial) revealed that there is no match between the
putative child born of the rape and X.
Doctrine:
The writ of habeas corpus has very limited availability as a post-conviction
remedy (See Go v Dimagiba)
Petitioner invokes the remedy of habeas corpus in order to seek the review of
findings of fact long passed upon with finality. This relief is far outside the
scope of habeas corpus proceedings. A habeas corpus petition reaches
the body, but not the record of the case. A record must be allowed to remain
extant, and cannot be revised, modified, altered or amended by the simple
expedient of resort to habeas corpus proceedings.
VETUZ v VILLANUEVA
Facts: Two versions of facts
a. X (petitioner) asserts that his aunt was taken from him, who was then living
with him. Despite repeated demands, remained futile.
b. Respondents maintain that the aunt willingly went with them.
Doctrine: Aunt is NOT being restrained of her liberty
1. Writ contemplates two instances
i. Deprivation of a persons liberty either through illegal confinement or
through detention
ii. Withholding of the custody of any person from someone entitled to
such custody
2. X: Even though he does not have legal custody of his aunt, respondents have
no right to her custody. Issue of legal custody is irrelevant; what is important
is the aunts personal freedom.
SC: Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ, the restraint of
liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of
freedom of action.
In general, the purpose of the writ is to determine WoN a particular
person is legally held.
First ascertain whether the person is being restrained of his liberty.
3. While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or
as a mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition
Judicial discretion
It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully
restrained if his liberty, will the writ be granted.
If the respondents are not detaining or restraining the
applicant/person in whose behalf the petition is filed = dismissal of
petition

AMPATUAN v MACARAIG
Facts:
1. A police was administratively charged as a suspect for murder.
2. He was then placed under restrictive custody
3. Chief Inquest Prosecutor ordered his release for further investigation.
4. Police Superintendent refused.
5. The accuseds wife filed a petition for habeas corpus.
Doctrine: Accused is not illegally detained.
o Accused has been placed under restrictive custody. R.A. 6975 authorizes the
PNP Chief to place police personnel under restrictive custody during the
pendency of a grave administrative against such personnel.
o Restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police
officers under investigation by their superiors = NOT a form of illegal
detention or restraint of liberty.
o Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint, which is beyond the ambit
of habeas corpus.
It is a permissible precautionary measure to assure the PNP authorities
that the police officers concerned are always accounted for.
o Since the basis of his restrictive custody is the administrative case filed
against him, his remedy is within such administrative process.
o Wife is unable to discharge the burden of showing that she is entitled to
issuance of the writ; the petition fails to show on its face that the husband is
unlawfully deprived of his liberty
SO v JUDGE TACLA
Facts:
1. Father filed the petition for writs of habeas corpus and amparo on behalf of
daughter-accused whose case was pending.
2. Daughter was confined in a hospital, as ordered by the RTC, to determine
whether she could stand the rigors of trial.
3. During pendency of these cases, criminal case against daughter was
dismissed.
Doctrine: Moot and academic due to dismissal of case against her
o She remained in custody of the law to answer for the non-bailable criminal
charge against her, and was simply allowed to pursue medical treatment in
the hospital and from a doctor of her choice.
o Certainly, with the dismissal of the non-bailable case against accused
Guisande, she is no longer under peril to be confined in a jail facility, much
less at the hospital.
IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF CESAR GONZALES

AND JULIUS MESA v GEN. ABU, ET AL.
Facts:
1. X and Y, both personnel of PH Navy, participated in the Oakwood mutiny.
2. Both were taken into custody.
3. While cases against them were pending, X and Y were discharged from
military service.
4. Both posted bail. Granted by the court.
5. Despite said orders, they were not released.
6. Z filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of X and Y.
7. During the pendency of the case, both are enjoying temporary liberty by
virtue of release orders.

Doctrine: When the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a Writ
of Habeas Corpus was filed is effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ
becomes moot and academic
o With the release of both Mesa and Gonzales, the Petition for Habeas
Corpus has, indeed, been rendered moot. Courts of justice constituted to pass
upon substantial rights will not consider questions where no actual interests
are involved.
o Thus, the well-settled rule that courts will not determine a moot question.
Where the issues have become moot and academic, there ceases to be any
justiciable controversy, thus rendering the resolution of the same of no
practical value.
WRIT OF AMPARO AND WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

MASANGKAY v HON JUDGE DEL ROSARIO
Facts:
1. Spouses filed a complaint for forcible entry against X who entered their
premises without permission, armed with bolos and firearms.
2. Court decided in favor of the spouses.
3. While order of demolition is pending before the CA, X filed a petition for
certiorari and an issuance of habeas data and writ of amparo.
Doctrine:
1. Writ of Amparo
It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life,
liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy
beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy
supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect
concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ
that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo in line with the extraordinary character
of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands
requires that every petition for the issuance of the Pwrit must be
supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:
i. The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
ii. The name and personal circumstances of the respondent
responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is
unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an
assumed appellation;
iii. The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is
committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in
supporting affidavits;
iv. The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names,
personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating
authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of
the investigation, together with any report;
v. The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine
the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity
of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
vi. The relief prayed for.
vii. The petition may include a general prayer for other just and
equitable reliefs.

Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a continuing threat to
the persons of the petitioners, the violent incidents alleged appear to
us to be purely property-related and focused on the disputed
land. Thus, if the petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the alleged
perpetrators criminally accountable, the remedy may lie more in the
realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the
extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo.
2. Writ of Habeas Data
Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following
material allegations of ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a
writ of habeas data:
i. The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the
respondent
ii. The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and
how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the
aggrieved party;
iii. The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the
data or information;
iv. The location of the files, registers or databases, the
government office, and the person in charge, in possession or
in control of the data or information, if known;
v. The reliefs prayed for
vi. May include such other relevant reliefs as are just and
equitable.
Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful
violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty or
security. The petition likewise has not alleged, much less
demonstrated, any need for information under the control of police
authorities other than those it has already set forth as integral
annexes. The necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ,
based on the insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure
information, has not also been shown. In sum, the prayer for the
issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than the fishing
expedition that this Court - in the course of drafting the Rule on
habeas data - had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of
habeas data is not. In these lights, the outright denial of the petition
for the issuance of the writ of habeas data is fully in order.
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE v MANALO

Facts:
1. Brothers were detained on the allegation that they are NPA members.
2. While in detention, they were tortured.
3. After luckily having escaped, they filed a petition for prohibition, injunction
and TRO to stop the military from violating their constitutional rights.
4. While the petition was pending, the Rule of Writ of Amparo took effect.
5. Brothers sought that their petition be treated as an amparo petition.
Doctrine:
1. Respondents claim that they are under threat of being once again abducted,
kept captive or even killed, which constitute a direct violation of their right to
security of person.
There is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured,
and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty,
security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo.

2. WoA v search warrant
Petitioners argue that the production order sought by respondents
partakes of the characteristics of a search warrant.
The production order under the Amparo Rule should not be confused
with a search warrant for law enforcement under Article III, Section 2
of the 1987 Constitution. This Constitutional provision is a protection
of the people from the unreasonable intrusion of the government, not
a protection of the government from the demand of the people such as
respondents.
Instead, the amparo production order may be likened to the
production of documents or things under Section 1, Rule 27 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO IN FAVOR OF

MELISSA ROXAS v GLORIA ARROYO
Facts:
1. An American citizen was abducted and detained in the PH for being a member
of the CPP-NPA.
2. She was interrogated and tortured.
3. Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well the suppression
of any existing government files or records linking her to the communist
member, petitioner filed a petition for the writs of amparo and habeas data.
4. Petitioner impleaded public officials occupying the uppermost echelons of the
military and police hierarchy as respondents, on the belief that it was
government agents who were behind her abduction and torture. Petitioner
likewise included in her suit Rose, Dex and RC.
Doctrine:
1. Writ of Amparo
Petitioner invokes the doctrine of command responsibility to implicate
the high-ranking civilian and military authorities she impleaded as
respondents in her amparo petition.
The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive law
that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal
basis to implead a party-respondent in an amparo petition.
ince the application of command responsibility presupposes an
imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-blown
criminal or administrative case rather than in a
summary amparo proceeding.
The obvious reason lies in the nature of the writ itself: While the
principal objective of its proceedings is the initial determination of
whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats
thereof had transpired the writ does not, by so doing, fix liability for
such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be criminal,
civil or administrative under the applicable substantive law.
Commanders may be impleaded not actually on the basis of command
responsibility but rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at
least accountability
2. Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy
enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to
informational privacy of individuals. The writ operates to protect a
persons right to control information regarding himself, particularly in

the instances where such information is being collected through
unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.
Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of
the writ may be extended is the showing, at least by substantial
evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in
life, liberty or security of the victim. This, in the case at bench, the
petitioner failed to do.
WRIT OF KALIKASAN
ARIGO v SCOTT SWIFT
Facts:
1. An American military ship collided with the shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs.
2. No one was reported killed or injured. The fuel and oil likewise did not leak.
3. Petitioners claim that the operations of the US caused environmental damage,
violating their right to a balanced and healthful ecology.
Doctrine:
1. Legal standing
Oposa v Factoran, Jr: SC recognized the public right of citizens to a
balanced and healthful ecology, which for the first time in the nations
constitutional history, is incorporated in the fundamental law.
Right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the
Constitution for it is assumed to exist from the inception of mankind
and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational
implications.
Not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the
enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in representation
of their own and future generations.
2. Waiver of state immunity under the VFA
Waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal
jurisdiction and not to SCAs such as the present petition. In fact, it can
be inferred from Sec 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case
against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to
be filed separately.
In any case, a ruling on the application/non-application of criminal
jurisdiction of the VFA to US personnel who may be found responsible
for the grounding of the ship would be premature and beyond the
province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.
3. Writ of Kalikasan = NOT proper remedy to assail the constitutionality of the
VFA
INTERNATIONAL SERVICE v GREENPEACE

Facts:
1. The Department of Agriculture issues an Order providing rules and regulations
for the importation and release into the environment of plants and plant
products derived from the use of modern biotechnology.
2. UPLB Foundation, UP Mindanao Foundation, and International Service entered
into an agreement for a collaborative research and development project on
eggplants.
3. Greenpeace, et al filed a petition for writ of Kalikasan.
Doctrine:
1. Legal standing

Oposa v Factoran, Jr: SC recognized the public right of citizens to a
balanced and healthful ecology, which for the first time in the nations
constitutional history, is incorporated in the fundamental law.
Personality to sue = based on concept of intergenerational
responsibility
Citizen suits in environmental cases = enshrined in the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases which aims to further encourage
the protection of environment
2. Precautionary principle
The principle provides that governments are obliged to foresee and
forestall harm to the environment. The constitutional right of people to
a balanced and healthful ecology shall be given the benefit of the
doubt.
In applying the principle, the ff may be considered:
i. Threat to human life or health
ii. Inequity to present and future generations
iii. Prejudice to the environment without legal consideration of the
environmental rights of those affected
In this case, all three conditions are present.
There exists a preponderance of evidence that the release of GMOs
into the environment threatens to damage our ecosystems and not
just the field trial sites, and eventually the health of the people once
the eggplants are consumed as food.
CHANGE OF NAME
ALBA v CA
Facts:
1. Alleged father filed a petition for cancellation of the ff entries in the birth
certificate of his alleged son:
i. His surname as attached to the name of the child
ii. Reference to petitioner as father
iii. Alleged marriage of petitioner to mother
2. The court issued an order setting the petition for hearing and directed
publication and service of said order to the address of the mother appearing
in the birth certificate.
3. Hearing was conducted with the mother not appearing in trial.
4. Petitioners filed a petition for annulment of judgment on the ground of
extrinsic fraud and lack of j over the person. They claim that alleged father
knew that they lived in a different place since it was him who gave the condo
to them. They also alleged that the aunt made the mistake regarding the
address in the birth certificate.
Doctrine:
1. Jurisdiction
A petition for substantial corrections or cancellations of entries under
Rule 108 is a proceeding in rem because it is directed to the thing
itself, the entries in the birth certificate.
In actions in rem, jurisdiction over the res is acquired either by the
seizure of property under legal process, or as a result of the institution
of legal proceedings.
In this case, the court acquired j over the res through the mere
institution of the case.

Furthermore, the service at the address in the birth certificate
complied with due process since the certificate bore the mothers
signature and as such, it was presumed made with her approval.
Besides, Sec 4 of Rule 108 only requires reasonable notice. The
publication cured the absence of personal service.
2. Petition should not be granted on the merits
According to the Family Code, IC shall use the surname of the mother
UNLESS recognized by the father.
In this case, the mother never claimed to be lawfully married to the
alleged father. Thus, the child is an IC. And as the alleged father does
not recognize the child as his own, the latter is not entitled to the
formers surname.
CERUILA v DELANTAR
Facts:
1. Spouses filed a petition praying that the birth certificate of rape victim be
cancelled and declared null and void due to alleged simulation of birth.
2. Summons was sent only to the Civil Register of Manila.
3. RTC granted the petition.
4. Months after, the victim, represented by DSWD, filed a petition for the
annulment of judgment in the petition for cancellation of entry of her birth
certificate.
Doctrine:
1. Petition for annulment and cancellation of the birth certificate = specpro
Considering that the petition, based on its allegations, does not
question the fact of birth of Rosilyn, all matters assailing the
truthfulness of any entry in the birth certificate properly, including the
date of birth, fall under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court which governs
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry.
2. Notice requirement
Not only the civil registrar but also all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected by a proceeding concerning the
cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register must be made
parties thereto.
Petitioners further claim that the lack of summons on Rosilyn was
cured by the publication of the order of the trial court setting the case
for hearing for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation.
We do not agree. Summons must still be served, not for the purpose
of vesting the courts with jurisdiction, but to comply with the
requirements of fair play and due process. This is but proper, to afford
the person concerned the opportunity to protect her interest if she so
chooses.
Indeed, there were instances when we ruled that even though an
interested party was not impleaded in the petition, such defect was
cured by compliance with Sec. 4, Rule 108 on publication. In said
cases, however, earnest efforts were made by the petitioners in
bringing to court all possible interested parties.
Such is not the case at bar. The victim was never made a party at all
to the proceedings seeking the cancellation of her birth certificate.
Neither did petitioners make any effort to summon the Solicitor
General.

DIFFERENCES UNDER RULES 103, RA 9048, AND RULE 108
RP V BRINGAS
Facts:
1. Change of first name since it was the name she used since childhood and in
all of her documents and IDs.
2. Duly published.
3. Dec. 7 Last day of publication
Feb 20 Original date of hearing
Sept 25 Reset date of hearing
Doctrine:
1. Date of hearing
Sec 3 of Rule 104 prohibits the hearing from being set within 30 days
from election, and from being set within 4 months from the date of the
last publication
In this case, the original date of hearing was within the prohibited
period. But since the hearing was reset and was actually heard on Sept
25, then it was well outside the prohibited pd.
2. Republication of reset of hearing
It cannot be over-emphasized that in a petition for change of name,
any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the
petition. Likewise, the Solicitor General or his deputy shall appear on
behalf of the Government.
In this case, the Solicitor General deputized the provincial prosecutor
of Abra for the purpose of appearing in the trial on his behalf. As it
were, the provincial prosecutor was fully apprised of the new dates of
the initial hearing. Accordingly, there was no actual need for a
republication of the initial notice of the hearing.
During the hearing, provincial prosecutor of Abra interposed no
objection as to the genuineness, authenticity, relevancy or sufficiency
of the exhibits presented to prove the jurisdictional requirements
exacted by the Rules. In a very real sense, therefore,
the petitioner Republic fully and knowingly acquiesced in the
jurisdiction of the trial court.
3. Change of name
A person can be authorized to change his name appearing in either his
certificate of birth or civil registry upon showing not only of reasonable
cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change, but
also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.
Jurisprudence has recognized certain justifying grounds to warrant a
change of name. Among these are:
a. When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult
to write or pronounce;
b. When the change will avoid confusion;
c. When one has been continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien
parentage;
d. When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no
showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name will prejudice public
interest.
The matter of granting or denying petitions for change of name and
the corollary issue of what is a proper and reasonable cause therefor
rests on the sound discretion of the court. The evidence presented

need only be satisfactory to the court; it need not be the best evidence
available.
Judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the
justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent
results in the event of its grant and with the sole prerogative for
making such determination being lodged in the courts.
In this case, petition is meritorious; to avoid confusion.
RE: FINAL REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED AT RTC BRANCH

67, PANIQUI, TARLAC
Facts:
1. Judge granted 375 petitions for change of name and/or correction of entries
in the civil registry without hearing and publication.
2. Judge: RA 9048 covers all of these petitions, which is within the authority of
city/municipal civil registrars without a need for judicial order. These cases
were filed before the court since there was no incumbent local civil registrar
at that time.
Doctrine: Jurisdiction of trial courts remain over petitions for correction of clerical
errors and change of first name and nickname in the civil registry
o The obvious effect of R.A. No. 9048 is merely to make possible the
administrative correction of clerical or typographical errors in entries and the
administrative change of first name or nickname in the civil register, leaving
to Rule 108 the correction of substantial changes in the civil registry in
appropriate adversarial proceedings.
o There was no intent on the part of the lawmakers to remove the authority of
the trial courts to make judicial corrections of entries in the civil registry. It
can thus be concluded that the local civil registrar has primary, not exclusive,
jurisdiction over such petitions for correction of clerical errors and change of
first name or nickname, with R.A. No. 9048 prescribing the procedure that the
petitioner and local civil registrar should follow.
o Since R.A. No. 9048 refers specifically to the administrative summary
proceeding before the local civil registrar it would be inappropriate to apply
the same procedure to petitions for the correction of entries in the civil
registry before the courts. The promulgation of rules of procedure for courts
of justice is the exclusive domain of the Supreme Court.
o In other words, the procedure provided in the Revised Rules of Court for such
petitions remains binding and should be followed by the courts. The
procedural requirements laid down in Rules 103 and 108 still have to be
complied with
RP v MERCADERA
Fact: Change of first name. Filed a petition for correction of some entries as
appearing in the certificate of liver birth under Rule 108.
Doctrine: Correct petition
o In the case at bench, the OSG posits that the conversion from "MARILYN" to
"MERLYN" is not a correction of an innocuous error but a material correction
tantamount to a change of name which entails a modification or increase in
substantive rights. For the OSG, this is a substantial error that requires
compliance with the procedure under Rule 103, and not Rule 108.
o A change of ones name under Rule 103 can be granted, only on grounds
provided by law. In order to justify a request for change of name, there must
be a proper and compelling reason for the change and proof that the person
requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his official name. To assess the

sufficiency of the grounds invoked therefor, there must be adversarial
proceedings.
o In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other
innocuous errors in the civil registry may be raised. Considering that the
enumeration in Section 2, Rule 108 also includes "changes of name," the
correction of a patently misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to
say, not all alterations allowed in ones name are confined under Rule 103.
Corrections for clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108.
o This rule in "names," however, does not operate to entirely limit Rule 108 to
the correction of clerical errors in civil registry entries by way of a summary
proceeding. As explained above, Republic v. Valencia is the authority for
allowing substantial errors in other entries like citizenship, civil status, and
paternity, to be corrected using Rule 108 provided there is an adversary
proceeding. "After all, the role of the Court under Rule 108 is to ascertain the
truths about the facts recorded therein."
o The petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly falls under Rule 108
as it simply sought a correction of a misspelled given name.
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL

REGISTRY
RP v COSETENG-MAGPAYO
Facts:
1. Claiming that his parents were never legally married, X filed a proceeding
under Rule 103 praying for Change of Name (change of surname).
2. RTC granted the petition but also included an order deleting the date and time
of marriage of his parents as well as an order making Coseteng as his last
name and deletion of Y as his father.
Doctrine: Rule 108 is the proper remedy
o The change being sought in respondents petition goes so far as to affect
his legal status in relation to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to
that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant respondents
supplication.
o Changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate =
substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after
appropriate adversary proceedings
o Since respondents desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to
illegitimate, Rule 108 applies.
o Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns ones civil status should
be filed in the civil registry in which the entry is sought to be cancelled or
corrected that of Makati in the present case, and all persons who have or
claim any interest which would be affected thereby should be made parties to
the proceeding.
As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not
in Makati where his birth certificate was registered but in Quezon City. And as
the above-mentioned title of the petition filed by respondent before the RTC
shows, neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were
made parties thereto.
o Rule 108 clearly mandates two sets of notices to different potential
oppositors. The first notice is that given to the persons named in the petition
and the second (which is through publication) is that given to other persons
who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered
interested or affected parties, such as creditors. That two sets of notices are

mandated under the above-quoted Section 4 is validated by the subsequent
Section 5, also above-quoted, which provides for two periods (for the two
types of potential oppositors) within which to file an opposition (15 days from
notice or from the last date of publication).
o What is clear then in Barco and Kho is the mandatory directive under Section
3 of Rule 108 to implead the civil registrar and the parties who would
naturally and legally be affected by the grant of a petition for correction or
cancellation of entries. Non-impleading, however, as party-respondent of one
who is inadvertently left out or is not established to be known by the
petitioner to be affected by the grant of the petition or actually participates in
the proceeding is notified through publication.
o IN FINE, when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register involves substantial and controversial alterations including those on
citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a
strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is
mandated.
CORPUZ v STO.TOMAS
Facts:
1. X is a naturalized Canadian.
2. He married Y whom he found out was cheating on him. He filed a petition for
divorce in Canada and was granted.
3. He returned in PH and plans to marry Z.
4. He wen to the civil registry office and registered the divorce decree.
5. The civil registrar refused to enter the same on the ground that judicial
recognition is necessary.
6. He filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration
of marriage as dissolved.
Doctrine: Not the proper proceeding for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry
o The recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does
not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A
petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding,
contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the
civil registry.
o Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected, without judicial order. The Rules of Court supplements
Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial
proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or
corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and
procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil
registry. As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the
present case, we cannot consider the petition filed with the RTC as one filed
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
o We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as
requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce
decree in the civil registry one for recognition of the foreign decree and
another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a
party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve
as the appropriate adversarial proceeding by which the applicability of the

foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional
infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact.
APPEALS IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

ZAYCO v HINLO, JR.
Facts:
1. Heirs filed a petition for letters of admin of decedents estate. X was initially
appointed as special administratrix.
2. Petitioners were appointed as co-admin.
3. Respondent filed a petition for the issuance of letters of admin in his favor
and urgent motion for removal of petitioners as co-admin.
4. RTC granted.
5. Aug 2 Petitioners received copy of the said order
Aug 9 MR
July 31 Receipt of order denying MR
July 31 Notice of appeal
Aug 29 Record of appeal
Doctrine: Appeal was made on time
o An order appointing an administrator of a deceased persons estate is a final
determination of the rights of the parties in connection with the
administration, management and settlement of the decedents estate. It is a
final order and, hence, appealable.
o In appeals in special proceedings, a record on appeal is required. The notice
of appeal and the record on appeal should both be filed within 30 days from
receipt of the notice of judgment or final order. Pursuant to Neypes v. CA, the
30-day period to file the notice of appeal and record on appeal should be
reckoned from the receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration.
o From the time petitioners received the July 23, 2003 order (denying their
motion for reconsideration of the July 23, 2002 order) on July 31, 2003, they
had 30 days or until August 30, 2003 to file their notice of appeal and record
on appeal. They did so on August 29, 2003. Thus, the appeal was made on
time.

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SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

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IN RE: PETITION FOR MICHAEL LIM

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ANONYMOUS v EMMA CURAMEN

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE CATINDIG

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WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

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IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF KUNTING

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GO, SR. v RAMOS

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IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA

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IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF CESAR GONZALES

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WRIT OF AMPARO AND WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE v MANALO

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IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO IN FAVOR OF

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INTERNATIONAL SERVICE v GREENPEACE

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RE: FINAL REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED AT RTC BRANCH

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CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL

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APPEALS IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

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