The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 1945-85

Author(s): Arend Lijphart

Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 84, No. 2 (Jun., 1990), pp. 481-496
Published by: American Political Science Association
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 CONSEQUENCES
THEPOLITICAL
LAWS,1945-85
OF ELECTORAL
AREND LIJPHART
Universityof California
San Diego

A systematicanalysis of the relationshipsbetween the main

electoralsystem variables (electoralformula, districtmagnitude,and ballot structure)
and electoraloutcomes (the degreesof disproportionalityand multipartism)in the 20
Westerndemocraciesfrom 1945 to 1985-representing 32 distinctelectoralsystems (an
electoralsystem beingdefinedas a set of electionsheld underbasicallythe same rules)-
shows that the effects of both formula and magnitude on proportionalityare very
strong, muchstrongerthan Douglas W. Rae and subsequentresearchershavesuggested;
that on the other hand, theireffectson the numberof partiesparticipatingin electionsis
surprisinglyweak; and that ballot structureaffects the degree of multipartismonly in
single-memberdistrictsystems. Thesefindingssuggestthat strategicbehaviorby politi-
cians and voters plays a less importantrole in reducingmultipartismthan is usually
assumed.

W henthe first ficientcriticalattention.In theprefaceto

editionof DouglasW. Rae'sThePolitical thesecondedition,Rae(1971,vii) himself
Consequencesof ElectoralLawswas pub- chides "the over-gentlecolleagueswho
lishedin 1967,it wasalmostinstantlyrec- reviewedthe originaledition."'In fact,
ognizedas a greatscholarlybreakthrough. thebooksuffersfroma varietyof concep-
A secondeditionwas publishedin 1971, tual, methodological, and empirical
andit hasmaintained itsstellarreputation weaknesses,which are so grave and
as themostimportantbookin thefieldof numerousthat they cast doubton all of
comparative electoralsystemseversince. Rae'sconclusions.Moreover,someof his
Morerecentmajorinnovativebookshave conclusionsare so surprising-especially
explicitlyusedit bothas a modelandas a thefindingthatdifferences in proportion-
pointof departure (Katz1980,20;Nohlen al representation (PR)formulashaveonly
1978, 14), and contemporaryauthors minor effects and that neithertwo-tier
writingon thesubjectstillunfailinglycite districting systemsnortheballotstructure
it. It receivedthe 1989GeorgeH. Hallett have any effectat all-that they cry out
Awardof the AmericanPoliticalScience for a criticalnew examination.
Association's Representation andElector- My purposehereis to reanalyzeRae's
al Systemssection. classic study with more accuratedata,
As thefirstsystematicbroadlycompar- strongerhypotheses,andbettermethods.
ativestudyof electoralsystemsand as a I shallalso use more data:to Rae'selec-
powerfulstimulusto subsequent research, tions (of the loweror only housesof the
it clearly deservesits reputationas a legislature) in the20 Westerndemocracies
classicin the field.On the otherhand,it duringthe 20-yearperiodfrom 1945 to
hasbeenaccordedthisstatuswithoutsuf- 1964, I shall add the few electionsin

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

VOLUME 84 NO. 2 JUNE 1990

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 American Political Science Review Vol. 84
1945-64 missing from Rae's book and,
more importantly, all elections in these
countries during the subsequent21-year
period from 1965 through1985.2 In order
to save space and becauseI found no ma-
jor differences between the patterns in
Rae's 1945-64 period and in the entire
1945-85 period, I shall presentthe results
for the latter only.
My reanalysis and update will yield
conclusionsthat are significantlydifferent
from the relationshipsthat Rae finds be-
tween his variables. Rae defines three
aspectsof the electoralsystem as his inde-
pendent variables: (1) the electoral for-
mula, such as plurality, various forms of
PR, and so on; (2) the average district
magnitude,that is, the averagenumberof
legislatorselected per district;and (3) the
ballot structure,which may or may not
allow the voters to split their votes be-
tween two or more parties (pp. 15-46).
His two dependentvariables are (1) the
proportionalityof the electoral outcome,
which is the immediateor (in Rae'stermi-
nology) "proximal"effect of the electoral
system's translation of votes into seats;
and (2) the degree of multipartismthat
is-or is presumedto be-the indirector
"distal"effect of the electoralaystem (pp.
47-64, 67-68, 84-85).
Rae examines five major relationships
between his independentand dependent
variables.With regardto all five of these,
my conclusionswill divergefrom Rae'sin
crucial respects: (1) the relationshipbe-
tween the electoral formula and the pro-
portionalityof the election result is much
stronger than Rae finds; (2) the link be-
tween districtmagnitudeand proportion-
ality is also much stronger, especially as
far as concernsthe effects of two-tier dis-
trictingsystems(whichRaeclaimsto have
no effect);(3) the relationshipbetweenthe
electoralformulaand the degreeof multi-
partism is much weaker than in Rae's
finding; (4) similarly, district magnitude
and multipartismare much less strongly
and perfectlyrelatedthan Rae claims; (5)
482
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the link between ballot structure and
multipartism hypothesized and rejected
by Rae is in fact valid for one majorcate-
gory of electoralsystems-single-member
districtsystems. In otherwords, the prox-
imal effects of electoralsystems are much
stronger than their distal effects. The
theoretical significance of this finding,
which I shall discuss in greater detail in
the concludingsection, is that strategic(or
insincere)voting and strategicelite behav-
ior play a considerablyless importantrole
in helping the larger, and hurting the
smaller, parties than is usually supposed.
How do my methods differ from, and
how are they superiorto, Rae's?Five dif-
ferencesare of importancethroughoutthe
analysis. Firstin contrastwith Rae'streat-
ment of each election as a differentcase,
my unit of analysisis the electoralsystem,
defined as one or more elections held
underbasicallythe same or closely similar
rules. For instance, instead of counting
the 11 Israeli elections as 11 separate
cases, I have only two cases: the PR
system that used the d'Hondtformula(the
1949 election and the four elections from
1973 to 1984) and the system under the
largest-remaindersrule (the six elections
in the 1951-69 period). My approach
avoids the artificial and deceptive infla-
tion of the weight of the available evi-
dence; elections under the same rules are
not really independentcases but merely
repeatedoperationsof the same electoral
system. It also avoids the relatedproblem
of artificiallyweighting the evidence. For
instance, France held only 3 elections
under the pure d'Hondt rule while the
Netherlandshad 12; but this is not a good
reason to give the Frenchevidence only
one-fourththe weight of the Dutch. This
approach yields 32 cases (based on 255
elections) in the 1945-85 period.
Second, I use the evidence of all of the
available cases as much as possible. For
instance, in contrastwith Rae, who simp-
ly disregardsthe difficultcases of two-tier
systems that use different formulas at
 ElectoralLaws
theirtwo levels, I determinewhich level is
of predominantimportance and classify
the electoralsystem accordingto the for-
mula at this level. This procedure in-
creasesthe numberof casesin my analysis
from 20 to 31; the-onlycase that I cannot
use for the purposeof studyingthe effects
of electoralformulasis France(1951-56),
because it used majority, d'Hondt, and
largest remainders formulas in such a
complex way (in different parts of the
country, not at differentlevels) that they
cannot be disentangled.
Third, since Rae finds that both for-
mula and magnitudestrongly affect pro-
portionality and multipartism, it is a
curious omission in his analysis that he
fails to examinethe possibleinteractionof
his two explanatory variables. I correct
this omission by systematically control-
ling for the influenceof the otherindepen-
dent variable.
Fourth,in order to measurethe degree
of disproportionalityof differentelectoral
systems, I use JohnLoosemoreand Victor
J. Hanby's (1971) index D. It has become
the most widely used index of dispropor-
tionality (see, e.g., Mackie and Rose
1982, 411-12; Rose 1984; Taageperaand
Shugart1989, 104-11). D is the total per-
centage by which the overrepresented
parties are overrepresented-which is, of
course,the same as the total percentageof
underrepresentation. In orderto calculate
D, the absolute values of all differences
between the parties'vote and seat shares
are added and then divided by 2. Rae's
measureI appears to be similar. It, too,
entails the addition of all vote-seat share
differences;but this sum is dividednot by
2 but by the number of parties. As
RichardS. Katz (1980, 140) has pointed
out, Rae'sindex I has the grave defect of
"givingtoo much weight to small parties;
at the extreme, if the infinite number of
(hypothetical) parties that receive no
votes and obtain no seats is included,
every electoral system would appear
483
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perfectly proportional."Rae (p. 84) tries
to avoid this problem by disregarding
parties with less than .5 percent of the
vote, but this arbitrarycutoff point is still
quite low; the presenceof several parties
with just over .5% of the votes will
depressI even if these parties fail to win
any seats.3
Finally, a relatively minor difference
between Rae's methods and mine con-
cerns the measure of multipartism.Rae
uses a large number of indicators of
multipartism-such as the total number
of partiescontestingan election, the total
numberelectedto the legislature,the vote
and seat shares of the largest party, and
the vote and seat sharesof the two largest
parties combined-but his most impor-
tant and comprehensivemeasure is the
fractionalization of the party system,
which is sensitive to both the numbersof
partiesand their relativesizes (pp. 47-64,
67-68, 84-85). I shall use an adaptationof
Rae'sfractionalizationindex-Laakso and
Taagepera's(1979) "effective number of
parties"-which carries exactly the same
information as Rae's index but is more
meaningful. For instance, in a party
system with two equally strong parties,
the effective numberof parties is exactly
2.0; for three equal parties it is 3.0; for
two strongpartiesand one weakerparty,
it will be somewherein the neighborhood
of 2.5. Rae'sfractionalizationindexescan
be easily converted into the Laakso-
Taagepera measure. The effective
numberof parties (as well as the index of
fractionalization)can be calculatedon the
basis of either the parties' vote or seat
shares. The former is the better indicator
of the long-term nature of the party
system. It is affected by the operation of
the electoral system in previous elections
but not yet by the translationof votes into
seats in the currentelection. I shall there-
fore use the effective number of elective
(insteadof legislative)parties as my indi-
cator of multipartism.
 AmericanPoliticalScienceReview Vol. 84

ElectoralFormulasand followingscalefromthemostto theleast

ElectoralDisproportionality proportional:pure Sainte-Lague, modi-
fiedSainte-Lague, andd'Hondt(seeBalin-
Rae finds, as expected,that plurality skiandYoung1982,60-66;Lijphart 1986,
and majorityformulasare considerably 172-75).
lessproportional thanPRbut, rathersur- Similardifferencesoccurwithinlargest
prisingly,thatthereis not a greatdealof remainders (LR)systems.The oldestand
difference within the family of PR best known of these simplyuses as its
systems.The mainreasonfor the latter, quotathetotalnumberof validvotescast
unexpectedconclusionis Rae'simproper in a districtdividedby thedistrictmagni-
classificationof thedifferentPRformulas. tude (m, the total numberof seats avail-
He hypothesizes thathighestaverages(or able in the district).This quota, usually
divisor)formulasyield less proportional referredto as theHarequota,is impartial
results than largestremainders(quota) as betweensmall and large partiesand
formulas.The distinctionbetweenthese tendsto yieldcloselyproportional results.
two typesof list PRformulasis indeedan Lessproportional outcomesareproduced
importantone-but mainlyas regardsthe by the Droop quota, which dividesthe
practical procedureselection officials votes by m + 1 insteadof m, and the Im-
haveto useto allocateseatsto partylists. perialiquota,which uses m + 2 as the
However, the two groups of methods denominatorsThe use of these lower
should not be expectedto differ with quotasmeansthattherewill be fewerre-
regardto the proportionalitythey pro- mainingseats to be allocatedand hence
duce,sincethe degreeof proportionality also more wastageof remainingvotes,
depends on the particularquota that whichis especiallyharmfulto thesmaller
quota methods use and the particular partiesandresultsin a decreasein propor-
divisor used by divisor methods.This tionality.It can be shownthatwhenthe
meansthatdifferences withregardto pro- quotais loweredeven further,to the ex-
portionalityshould occur within each tent thattherewill not be any remaining
groupinsteadof betweenthem. seats, the outcomebecomesexactlythe
Amongthe highestaveragesmethods, sameas thatof thed'Hondtformula(Van
the d'Hondtformula (which uses the den Bergh1955, 68-72). In preferential
divisorseries1, 2, 3, 4, etc.) is the least PR, usuallyreferredto as singletransfer-
proportionaland systematicallyfavors able vote (STV)systems,the quotais as
the largerparties.It contrastswith the importantfor the proportionality of the
Sainte-Lagudformula, which, in the electoraloutcomeas in list-PRlargest-
originalform proposedby its inventor remainders systems.Theone caseof STV
(usingthe odd-integerdivisorseries1, 3, among the Western democracies-Ire-
5, 7, etc.), approximates proportionality land-uses the Droopquota.
very closely and treatslarge and small This discussion suggests a much
partiesin a perfectlyevenhanded way. In strongerand more plausiblehypothesis
practice,theSainte-LaguE methodis more aboutthe effectsof PR formulason the
often used in a modifiedform that uses proportionality of theelectionresultthan
1.4 instead of 1 as the first divisor, Rae'shypothesis,which is basedon the
therebymakingit harderfor smallparties twofold distinctionbetween largest-re-
to gaintheirfirstseatsandhencereducing maindersand highest-averages methods.
the proportionality of the electionresult Mine is based on a threefoldclassifica-
to someextent.Accordingto theirlogical tion: (1) pureSainte-Lagud and LR-Hare
properties,therefore,the three highest arelikelyto be themostproportional; (2)
averagesmethodscan be placedon the modified Sainte-LaguE, LR-Droop,LR-

484

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 ElectoralLaws

Table 1. AverageDegrees of Disproportionalityof ElectoralSystems Classifiedby

ElectoralFormulaand AdjustedDistrict Magnitude,1945-85 (%)

LR-Droop,
LR-Imperiali,
Adjusted LR-Hare Modified Plurality
District and Pure and
Sainte-LaguE, and
Magnitude Saint-LaguE STV-Droop d'Hondt Majority Alla
1-1.1 - - - 12.93 (6) 12.93 (6)
1.1-5 _~ 4.60 (1) 8.51 (3) - 7.53 (4)
5-10 - 5.18 (3) 5.83 (6) 5.61 (9)
10-25 2.81 (2) - 4.28 (3) - 3.69 (5)
100-150 2.46 (3) 3.53 (2) 4.39 (2) - 3.32 (7)
Alla 2.60 (5) 4.53 (6) 5.87 (14) 12.93 (6) 6.45 (31)

Source:Basedon data in Mackieand Rose1982, 1983, 1984;Mackie1985, 1986;Ornstein,Mann,and Malbin

1987, 47-48; and Luxembourg,ServiceCentralde la Statistique1984, 120-21.
Note: The numbersof cases on which the percentagesare basedare in parentheses.
aExceptFranceof 1951-56.

Imperiali,and STV-Droopshouldbe less betweenhis two types?After carefully

proportional; and (3) d'Hondtis likelyto
be the least proportionalof the PR for-
mulas.
Thebottomrow of Table1 showsthat
this hypothesisis stronglysupportedby
the evidence.The pluralityand majority
systemsaremorethantwiceas dispropor-
tional as d'HondtPR, and the d'Hondt
systemsaremorethantwiceas dispropor-
tional as the LR-Hareand pure Sainte-
Laguesystems;thein-between PRsystems
are also, as hypothesized,roughlyinter-
mediatein termsof theirdegreeof dispro-
portionality.Thesefiguresare basedon
31 of the 32 cases,as explainedearlier.6
My findingspartly supportand partly
contrastwith Rae's. Rae (pp. 96, 106)
findsa similardifferencebetweenplural-
ity-majority andtheleastproportional PR
systems:3.96% and 1.78%respectively
(measured in termsof Rae'sI). Butthedif-
ferencebetweenhis two types of PR is
quitesmall:1.22%and1.78%(alsomea-
suredin termsof I).
Giventheweaknessof Rae'shypothesis
aboutPR systems,how can we account
for the fact that he finds any difference
485
checkingall of the likelyexplanations,I
foundthatneitherRae'sdifferentmethod-
ology nor his empiricalerrors(of the 56
list PR electionsthat accordingto Rae's
own criteria,shouldhave been included
in his analysis,28 are misclassifiedor
omitted)providethe answer.The expla-
nationis thatd'Hondthappensto be the
mostfrequentlyusedhighestaveragefor-
mula:of the 18 highestaveragescases,14
are d'Hondt.Since d'Hondtis also the
leastproportional of all PRmethods,it is
now clearwhy Rae'scategoryof highest
averagesturnsout to be lessproportional
than that of his largestremainders.His
finding,modestas it is, is entirelyfor-
tuitous.
Table1 also showsthe indicesof dis-
proportionality of the PRformulaswhen
district magnitude is held constant.
Withineachcategoryof adjustedmagni-
tude (to be definedin the next section),
the differencesbetweenthe formulasare
reducedto some extent; but they still
showup clearlyandtheyareall in theex-
pecteddirection.

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 American Political Science Review Vol. 84
District Magnitudeand
ElectoralDisproportionality
The strongest relationship found by
Rae is that between district magnitude
and proportionality: as magnitude in-
creases,disproportionalitygoes down. He
comparesthe effects of electoral systems
classified according to five categories of
averagedistrictmagnitude,m: (1) single-
memberdistrictswhere m = 1, (2) m be-
tween 2 and 6, (3) m between6 and 10, (4)
m between 10 and 20, and (5) m between
100 and 150, which occurs in the two
countries with a single nationwide dis-
trict, Israel and the Netherlands. Rae
never explainswhy he selected these par-
ticularfive categories;but with one excep-
tion the dividing lines make good sense,
since they coincidewith naturalbreaksin
the distribution of the magnitudes. The
exceptionis that the naturaldiscontinuity
in the range between single-memberdis-
tricts and a district magnitude of 10 oc-
curs at about m = 5 instead of m = 6.
Another small improvementis to make
1.1 the dividing point between the two
lowest categories. This takes care of the
few deviations from single-memberdis-
tricts in the pluralityand majority coun-
tries, which are all essentially single-
memberdistrict systems; and it removes
Rae'sawkwardgap betweenm = 1 and m
= 2. A final helpful adjustmentis to ex-
pand the 10-to-20-seat category to
10-to-25 so that it can accommodatethe
Austriancase, which since 1971 has had a
magnitudeof slightly higher than 20.7
Averagedistrictmagnitudeis definedas
the averagenumberof seats (or represen-
tatives) per district; and it can be calcu-
lated easily by dividing the total number
of seatsin the legislatureby the numberof
districts.Only with regardto two-tierdis-
trictingsystems do we run into complica-
tions. The solution proposed by Rae (p.
21) is that "this problem is tentatively
resolved by counting the total numberof
districtsat both levels in the computation
486
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of averagemagnitudes."This is an unsat-
isfactory solution because its effect is to
make the averagemagnitudelower than it
would be on the basis of either the low-
tier or the high-tier districts by them-
selves. Forinstance,from 1945to 1970the
Austrian 165-member legislature was
elected in 25 low-tier and 4 high-tierdis-
tricts. Counting the lower tier only, the
average magnitudewould be 6.6; count-
ing the highertier only, it would be 41.2.
The most reasonable assumption is that
the "true" magnitude should be some-
wherebetween6.6 and 41.2. Accordingto
Rae's definition, however, it is 5.7-well
below 6.6. Rae states that his solution is
only tentative,but he neverreconsidersit.
Since I do not want to prejudgethe effect
of the superimpositionof a higher tier of
districts (which is often a single national
district),my own tentativeand temporary
solution is to calculateaveragemagnitude
solely on the basis of the lower tier.
Rae's (p. 124) hypothesis concerning
the impact of two-tier or "complex"dis-
tricting is eminently plausible: "One
would expectcomplexdistricting-the use
of two tiers of districts-to increasepro-
portionality at any given level of magni-
tude." However, Rae immediatelyrejects
this hypothesis. Without supplying pre-
cise figures, he states that "the four
systems based on complex districting-
Icelandic, German, Austrian, and Dan-
ish-do not behave in accordance with
this expectation. For two of them, the
German and the Danish, disproportions
are below average for their respective
levels of district magnitude. But for the
Austrian and Icelandicsystems, complex
districting associates itself with greater-
than-averagedisproportions,given their
levels of district magnitude."It is worth
noting that Rae'sconclusion, for once, is
based on a controlled test. He does not
simply compare all complex-districting
cases with all simple-districtingcases but
controls for districtmagnitude.
Nevertheless, Rae's negative finding is
 ElectoralLaws

unsatisfactoryfor severalreasons. One is plex districtingor simple districting.The

that he fails to recognize and include one case of near-nationwidedistricts is
Belgiumand Italy as complex-districting Austria since 1971, which has used only
cases. Second, he suddenly shifts from two higher-tierdistricts. For the reasons
electionsto countriesas his unitsof analy- just outlined, the 1946-59 Icelandicelec-
sis and therebyignoresthe majorelectoral toral system should not be included
law changesin Icelandin 1959 and in Ger- among the strong complex-districting
many after the 1953 election. Third, his cases. When the disproportionalitiesof
conclusion is so surprisingthat a closer the two types of districtingsystems are
look at the deviantcases is calledfor. Rae contrasted,the strongcomplex-districting
(p. 124) gives up too quickly: "Sinceno systems do indeed turn out to be more
plausible explanation is available. . . , it proportional within each category of
must be concludedthat complex district- magnitudethan the other systems.
ing does not producegreaterproportion- I can now proposea modificationin my
ality than simple districtingat any given tentative definition of average district
level of district magnitude."In fact, the magnitude: strong complex-districting
deviant Austrian and Icelandiccases do systems should be classifiedone category
have some special features that may ex- higher than what their lower-tiermagni-
plain theirunexpecteddisproportionality. tude would entitlethem to. I shall call this
In the Icelandic electoral system from their adjusteddistrict magnitude. For in-
1946 to 1959, more than half of the seats stance, since 1970 Sweden has had a
at the lower tier were in single-member lower-tier magnitude of 12.5 seats but
districtsand almost a third in two-mem- also a single, nationwide, higher tier; its
ber districts. The few adjustment seats adjusted magnitude is therefore in the
available at the national level could not 100-to-150-seat category together with
neutralizethe disproportionalitiescaused Israel and the Netherlands.The relation-
by these low magnitudes. The Austrian ship between adjustedmagnitudeand dis-
electoral system from 1945 to 1970, proportionality is considerably stronger
despitethe country'srelativelysmall size, than that between magnitude,as I tenta-
had four higher-tierdistricts instead of tively defined it, and disproportionality.
one national district. The last column of Table 1 presents the
The Austriancase suggestsa generalex- average degrees of disproportionalityin
planation. Complex-districtingsystems the five classes of adjusted magnitude.
typically try to restrict the benefits The greatest differenceagain occurs be-
obtainableat the highertier to partiesthat tween the plurality-majority systems
have received a minimum number of (which are also the single-memberdistrict
votes or seats at the lower tier. Since this systems) and the least-proportionalcate-
entailsdiscriminationagainstthe smallest gory of PR systems. Within the family of
parties, it also places a limit on the pro- PR systems, the differencesamongthe dif-
portionalizingeffect of two-tierdistricting ferent categoriesof magnitudeare rough-
systems;and it means that the higher-tier ly similar to the differencesfound earlier
districtsmust be large, preferablynation- among the several formulas. These find-
wide, in orderto make the election result ings are in sharp contrastwith Rae's (pp.
appreciably more proportional. A 114-24) conclusion that district magni-
stronger hypothesis than Rae's would tude is a more potent force than the elec-
thereforebe that complex districtingwith toral formula,which has become the con-
nationwide-or almost nationwide- ventional wisdom (Sartori 1986, 53, 66;
higher-tierdistricts (which can be called see also Taagepera and Shugart 1989,
strong complex districting) yields greater 112-25).
proportionalitythan other forms of com- What is the effect of each of the inde-
487

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 American Political Science Review Vol. 84
pendentvariables-electoral formulaand
district magnitude-on the dependent
variable of proportionality when the
other independentvariable is controlled?
This question is relevant only for the PR
systems since the non-PR systems do not
vary with regard to magnitude. Table 1
also shows the indices of disproportional-
ity of all PR cases classifiedaccordingto
both effectivedistrictmagnitudeand elec-
toral formula.When districtmagnitudeis
held constant, the differencesbetweenthe
formulasare reducedbut not at all elimi-
nated. When we control for electoralfor-
mula, sizable differences between the
magnitudeclasses remain in the d'Hondt
systems; but the differencesare less im-
pressive for the other formulas. The
reason why these relationshipsnow ap-
pear less strong is that effective district
magnitude and electoral formula are
themselvescorrelated.As the numbersin
parentheses in Table 1 show, the most
proportionalformulas(LR-Hareand pure
Sainte-Lague)occur only in the two most
proportional classes of adjusted magni-
tude (those largerthan 10 seats); and the
majority of the least-proportional for-
mulas (d'Hondt)are used in the least-pro-
portional magnitudegroups (less than 10
seats).
BecauseTable 1 has severalempty cells,
its evidence is somewhat ambiguous.
Moreover,thereare a couple of cells with
values that are out of monotonic order.
Nevertheless,the overallpatternis one of
interactionbetween formula and magni-
tude but also of the independentimpactof
each of them on the proportionalityof the
electoral outcome. Further evidence of
this patternis providedby Figure1, which
shows the changes in disproportionality
due to major electorallaw changesin the
same country. For instance, Sweden first
shifted from d'Hondt to modified Sainte-
Lagueand subsequentlyto a much higher
adjusted magnitude. Because country-
specific characteristicsare now also con-
trolled, we have a rigoroustest of the ef-
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fect of magnitudeand formulaon dispro-
portionality.The nine majorelectorallaw
changesall produce the expectedchanges
in the degree of disproportionality.With
the exception of Israel'sreturn from LR-
Hare to d'Hondt after the 1969 election,
all of these major changes entailed shifts
to more proportionalrules.
To sum up, district magnitude was
found to have a very strongeffect on pro-
portionality, confirming Rae's conclu-
sion. This effect remains strong-albeit
not as strong-when the electoralformula
is held constant, a control that Rae fails to
apply. And contraryto Rae, complexdis-
tricting was found to make the election
result considerablymore proportional.
Formula,Magnitude, and
Multipartism
Thediscussionof the effectof the elec-
toral formula and district magnitude on
proportionalityhas paved the way for a
more expeditioustreatmentof their effect
on multipartism.The reason is that pro-
portionality is the logical link that con-
nects these electoral system variables to
the number of parties: the more propor-
tional the electoral system is, the more
favorable it is for small and new parties
and hence the more it will allow-some
would say encourage-a large numberof
parties.Of course, thereare also otherim-
portant causes of multipartism,particu-
larly the numberand depth of the cleav-
ages in a society (Taageperaand Grofman
1985). We should thereforenot expect a
very strong correlation between magni-
tude and formula on the one hand and
multipartismon the other. Rae (p. 141)
correctly points out that "party systems
are influencedby many variables-social,
economic, legal, and political. [The]elec-
toral law ... is to be counted only one of
many determining forces. And it is,
secondly, impossible to sort out all the
contributingfactors, or to assigneven ap-
 Electoral Laws

Figure1. Average Disproportionalityand Average Number of ElectiveParties

of ElectoralSystems in Change, 1945-85

ElectoralFormula
LR-Hare LR-Droop
and and
Pure S.-L. Mod. S.-L. d'Hondt
Germany
1953
D= 7.40
N= 3.31
1.1-5 Iceland
1946-59
D =9.72
N = 3.66

Norway Norway Germany

oD 1953-85 1945-49 1957-83
V3 D=7.06 D= 10.80 D=3.31
5-10
.+- N=3.77 N=3.87 N=2.56
CJ)
cm Austria Sweden Sweden
1945-70 1952-68 1948
D = 5.04 D = 3.42 D = 5.25
N = 2.49 N = 3.30 N = 3.35

Denmark Iceland
W 10-25 19361598
D= 3.21 D = 3.94
N =4.01 N = 3.84

Denmark Austria Sweden

1971-84 1971-83 1970-85
D=2.86 D=2.00 D=2.39
100-150 N = 5.49 N = 2.31 N = 3.52 Israel
Israel 1949 Israel
1951-69 D = 5.80 1973-84
D=2.53 N=5.40 D=5.88
N=5.10 ---

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 American Political Science Review Vol. 84

Table 2. Average EffectiveNumbersof ElectivePartiesin ElectoralSystems

Classifiedby ElectoralFormulaand AdjustedDistrictMagnitude,1945-85

LR-Droop,
LR-Imperiali,
Adjusted LR-Hare Modified Plurality
District and Pure Sainte-Lague,and and
Magnitude Sainte-LaguE STV-Droop d'Hondt Majority Alla
1-1.1 -- - 2.95 (6) 2.95 (6)
1.1-5 - 3.04 (1) 3.96 (3) - 3.73 (4)
5-10 - 3.19 (3) 4.10 (6) 3.80 (9)
10-25 4.04 (2) - 4.27 (3) - 4.18 (5)
100-150 4.30 (3) 3.75 (2) 4.76 (2) - 4.28 (7)
Alla 4.20 (5) 3.35 (6) 4.20 (14) 2.95 (6) 3.79 (31)

Source:Basedon datain Mackieand Rose1982, 1983, 1984;Mackie1985, 1986;Ornstein,Mann,andMalbin

1987, 47-48; and Luxembourg,ServiceCentralde la Statistique1984, 120-21.
Note: The numbersof cases on which the percentagesare basedare in parentheses.
aExceptFranceof 1951-56.

proximate weights to them. Worse yet, enceswith regardto multipartism.Rae (p.

electoral laws are themselves shaped by
party systems."
Notwithstanding these cautionary
words, Rae (p. 98) reportsa big difference
in multipartismfor pluralityand majority
systems (which are also the single-
memberdistrictsystems)on the one hand
and PR multimemberdistrict systems on
the other-2.17 and 3.70 parties respec-
tively. My figuresshow more modest dif-
ferences-2.95 and 4.07 parties.The main
reason why Rae finds such a small effec-
tive number of parties in plurality and
majority systems appears to be that he
counts in terms of elections:the 2 French
Fifth Republicmultipartyelections (5.56
parties) are overwhelmed by the 10
almost purely two-party U.S. elections
(2.04 parties). On the other hand, if we
focus on the plurality systems-Canada,
New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and
the UnitedStates-and excludethe French
and Australian majority systems, the
degree of multipartism is considerably
lower-only 2.54 parties.
Since the differencesin disproportion-
ality among PR systems are smallerthan
those between PR and plurality-majority,
we should also expectmore modest differ-
106) reports that in accordancewith his
hypothesis, highest-averageformulas are
associated with lower multipartismthan
largest-remainder formulas-3.57 and
4.00 partiesrespectively.However, when
the missing1945-64 data and the 1965-85
data are addedand the numerousmisclas-
sifications are corrected, the difference
disappears-4.39 and 4.40 parties.
My own findings are hardly more im-
pressive, however. They are summarized
in Table 2. The d'Hondtsystemshave ex-
actly as many partiesas the most propor-
tional LR-Hare and pure Sainte-Lague
systems (see the bottom row of the table).
Also unexpectedly,the intermediatesys-
tems in terms of proportionality (LR-
Droop, etc.) are considerablylower than
the d'Hondtsystemswith regardto multi-
partism. We must reject the hypothesis
that within the PR family, formula and
multipartismare related.
The findingsconcerningdistrictmagni-
tude are somewhatmore positive (see the
last column of Table 2) but not as strong
as Rae (p. 121) suggests. Rae reports a
monotonic relationship between magni-
tude and the numberof partiesfor the PR
systems-from 3.18 parties in the lowest

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 Electoral Laws
category of magnitudeto 4.65 parties in
the highest, an increaseof approximately
1.5 parties. My reanalysisshows a much
smallerincrease-only about .5 parties.
When the two independent variables
are cross-tabulated,the weak relationship
between magnitude and multipartismis
not weakenedfurther.The monotonic in-
creasein multipartismas magnitudegoes
up is even maintainedwithin each of the
three groups of formulas, but the differ-
ences are small. Controlling for magni-
tude makes the influenceof the electoral
formulaon multipartismlook worse. For
each magnitude class, multipartism is
lower insteadof higherin the intermediate
categorythan in d'Hondtsystems. And in
two of the four classes of magnitudethat
allow a comparisonof d'Hondtwith LR-
Hareand pureSainte-Lague,multipartism
is higher, not lower, in the d'Hondt sys-
tems-again contraryto our expectations
based on the formulas'tendenciesto dis-
proportionality.
Similar, mainly negative, evidence is
provided by Figure1, which applies the
within-countrytest of the effect of major
electoral law changes-applied earlier to
changes in disproportionality-to
changes in multipartism. Whereas the
electoral law changes produced the ex-
pectedchangesin disproportionalityin all
nine cases, thereis no commensuratepat-
tern for multipartism:the evidence runs
five to four against the hypothesis.Of the
five changes in electoral formula, only
one yields the expected change in the
degree of multipartism;and of the five
shifts to larger magnitudes (one case,
Austria, entails a change in both formula
and magnitude)threeyield more, and two
yield less, multipartism.
These findings suggest that the impact
of disproportionalityon the number of
parties is even weaker than our modest
expectationshad led us to believe. When
we take a direct look at this relationship,
we find that it is in the expecteddirection
but that the correlationcoefficient is an
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almost negligible -.10. However, as I
shallpointout shortly,thisnegativefind-
ing needs to be qualified in several
respects.
Ballot Structureand Multipartism
With regardto the impactof ballot
structureon multipartism,Raeformulates
hismostoriginalhypothesis.Basedon the
distinctionbetweenordinalballots,which
"allowthe voterto favormorethanone
partywith his mandate,"and categorical
ballots,which"require thatthevotergive
his mandateto a singleparty,"Rae (p.
126) hypothesizesthat ordinal ballots
"alloweach voter'smandateto be dis-
persed among several parties, thereby
producinga sort of microfractionaliza-
tion"and that electionsheld with such
ballots,and hencewith repeatedmicro-
fractionalizations,"producemore frac-
tionalizedelective party systems than
would be found underother elections."
However,he findsthattherelationship is
theotherway around:hisordinalsystems
havean averageeffectivenumberof only
2.94partiescomparedwith3.23partiesin
categoricalsystems. His conclusionis,
'My theoryis absolutelywrong"(p. 127).
Hereagain,we musttakea criticallook
at Rae's methods and procedures.He
makestwo seriousmistakesof classifica-
tion. His ordinal ballot systems are
Australia, Ireland, Luxembourg,and
Switzerland. Thefirsttwo usepreferential
ballotsthatallow-in theAustraliancase,
require-the votersto rank-order candi-
datesandpartiesaccordingto the voters'
preferences.Luxembourg andSwitzerland
uselist PRsystemsbutgiveeachvoteras
manyvotes as thereare seatsin the dis-
trict and allow the voter to distribute
these votes over two or more parties,
equallyor preferentially.
Thesefourelec-
toral systems are correctly classified.
However,Rae misclassifiesthe German
andFrenchFifthRepublicsystemsas cate-
 American Political Science Review Vol. 84

Table 3. Average EffectiveNumbersof ElectivePartiesClassifiedby

AdjustedDistrict Magnitudeand Ballot Structure,1945-85

AdjustedDistrictMagnitude
Ballot Structure 1-1.1 1.1-5 5-10 10-25 100-150 All
Categorical 2.54 (4) 4.28 (2) 3.99 (8) 4.34 (4) 4.28 (7) 3.92 (25)
Ordinal 3.78 (2) 3.18 (2) 4.00 (2) 3.53 (1) - 3.64 (7)
All 2.95 (6) 3.73 (4) 3.99 (10) 4.18 (5) 4.28 (7) 3.85 (32)
Source:Basedon data in Mackieand Rose1982, 1983, 1984;Mackie1985, 1986;Ornstein,Mann,and Malbin
1987, 47-48; and Luxembourg,ServiceCentralde la Statistique1984, 120-21.
Note: The numbersof cases on which the percentagesare based are in parentheses.

gorical; they are clearly ordinal. The
French two-ballot system allows the
voters to vote for differentparties on the
first and second ballots and quite often-
when candidatesare eliminatedor with-
draw after the first ballot-require that
they do so. In Germany, each voter has
two votes, which may be cast for different
parties;this ordinal ballot system has ex-
isted since the 1953 election.8
When these misclassificationsare cor-
rectedand also, as usual, the missingdata
are added and electoral systems rather
than elections are used as the cases for
analysis, the findingsare still negative(see
the last column of Table 3). The ordinal
systems have less, insteadof more, multi-
partism than categorical systems; al-
though the differences are relatively
small. In trying to explain his negative
result, Rae (p. 129) speculatesthat "ballot
structureconstitutes a rather weak vari-
able. It may be much less importantthan
electoral formulae, district magnitude,
and, more likely still, the sociopolitical
forces which underlieparty competition."
He continues, "Unfortunately,the avail-
able data allow no definitive test of this
notion, and it must be left unverified."
This is an unnecessary defeatist stance,
since we can test the influence of ballot
structureon multipartismwhile control-
ling for formula and magnitude.
Table 3 shows the average effective
numbersof parties under categoricaland
ordinal ballots when magnitude is con-
trolled. In the multimemberdistrict sys-
tems, my findings are still mainly nega-
tive: two of the three pairs of values still
run counterto the hypothesis,and the one
positive instanceis only marginallyposi-
tive. However, in single-memberdistrict
systems, ordinal ballots result in a dra-
matically higher degree of multipartism
than categoricalballots. The differenceis
roughly that between a two-and-a-half-
party system and an almost-four-party-
system. The explanationis not difficultto
find. The categoricalsystemsare plurality
systems in which the incentive to vote
strategicallyor insincerely,in ordernot to
waste one's vote, is strong. This resultsin
greater support for the large parties by
voters and by politiciansand a reduction
in the effectivenumberof parties.The or-
dinal ballot removes most of the risk of
wasting one's vote; hence it encourages
both sincerevoting and multipartism.
When we control for the electoral for-
mula, we find the same importantdiffer-
ence among the plurality-majorityfor-
mulas, since these coincide with the
single-memberdistrict systems, and the
same mainly negative result for the PR
systems.9 The link between ballot struc-
ture and multipartism applies only to
single-memberdistrictsystems, but it is a
strong link.

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 Electoral Laws
Conclusion
The two electoralsystemvariables,for-
mula and magnitude,have a strong effect
on electoral disproportionality(consider-
ably stronger than reportedby Rae) but
only a weak effect on multipartism(much
weaker than Rae suggests).The reason is
that disproportionality-the intervening
variablebetween the electoralsystem and
multipartism-is only a weak predictorof
the numberof parties.However, this con-
clusion has to be qualifiedin threeimpor-
tant respects.
In the first place, the hypothesis that
disproportionalityshould reduce multi-
partism is based on the assumption of
strategicbehavior. When smaller parties
are expected to be discriminatedagainst,
voters, as well as politicians, political ac-
tivists, and money givers will favor the
largerparties (Gunther1989; Riker1986,
33-41). The findingon the effect of ballot
structure suggests that the majority
systems should be excluded from the
hypothesizedrelationship.They are char-
acterizedby high disproportionality;but
becauseof their"ordinal"ballot structure,
they do not encouragestrategicbehavior
and hence do not discourage multi-
partism.10The case of Franceof 1951-56
should also be excluded because its dis-
proportionalitywas designedto favor the
smaller parties-those in the ideological
center-and thereforeencouragedinstead
of discouraged multipartism (Campbell
1965, 113-26). Forthe remaining29 cases,
the coefficientof correlationbetween dis-
proportionalityand the effective number
of partiesis now -.29 (comparedwith an
r of -.10 for all 32 cases).
The second qualification is that this
somewhat stronger relationship mainly
reflects the differencesbetween the four
plurality systems with high average dis-
proportionality (11.08%) and low aver-
age multipartism(2.54 parties)on the one
hand and the 25 PR systems with lower
disproportionality (4.89%) and higher
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multipartism(4.00 parties) on the other.
However, within the PR category,thereis
virtually no relationshipbetween the two
variables;the correlationis .02. This find-
ing casts doubt on Sartori's (1986, 54)
assertionthat within the family of PR sys-
tems, a distinctionmust be made between
highly proportional, hence "feeble,"
systems and less proportional "strong-
feeble"systems, with the latterin an inter-
mediateposition betweenthe "feeble"sys-
tems and "strong"pluralitysystems.
The third qualificationis that since the
focus has been on gauging the electoral
system's long-range effect on the party
system, multipartismhas been consistent-
ly measured in terms of the effective
numberof elective parties. It is logical to
expecta strongerimpactof disproportion-
ality on the effectivenumberof legislative
parties because the latter is affected not
only by strategicresponsesto the expecta-
tion of discriminationagainstsmallerpar-
ties-what Rae (pp. 67-68) calls the elec-
toral system's "distal"effect and Maurice
Duverger (1963, 226) its "psychological"
effect-but also by the immediate,"prox-
imal" (Rae) or "mechanical"(Duverger)
effect of the translationof votes into seats
in the particularelection under observa-
tion. For the 29 cases, the correlationbe-
tween disproportionalityand the effective
numberof legislativepartiesis a stronger
-.45. This means that disproportionality
explainsonly about 8 % of the variancein
elective multipartismbut about 20% of
that in legislativemultipartism.The latter
percentage must be interpreted as the
combined effect of the psychological and
mechanical factors, but it still indicates
that the mechanical factors are the
strongerinfluences."
To sum up, electoral systems display
wide and predictable differences in dis-
proportionality, smaller differences in
multipartismthat are the direct effect of
disproportionality,and even smaller dif-
ferences in elective multipartismdue to
strategiccalculationsby elites and voters,
 AmericanPolitical Science Review Vol. 84
Plurality systems are an exception: their
high disproportionalityaccounts, via the
effect of strategicbehavior, for theirrela-
tively small effective number of elective
parties. Strategicvoting is neutralizedin
majority systems, which can therefore
combine high disproportionality with
high elective multipartism.And the sub-
stantial differencesin disproportionality
among PR systems are apparently not
large enough to produce either commen-
suratedifferencesin strategicbehavioror,
as a result, commensuratedifferencesin
elective multipartism.
Notes
This is a revisedand muchshortenedversionof a
paperpresentedat the fourteenthWorldCongressof
the International Political Science Association
(IPSA),Washington,1988.1 shouldlike to acknowl-
edge the assistance and advice, especially with
regard to electoral laws and election data, that I
have receivedfrom my collaboratorsin the compar-
ative and collaborativeproject of which this is a
product: Don Aitkin (AustralianResearchCoun-
cil, Canberra),Asher Arian (Tel Aviv University,
Israel), Thomas C. Bruneau(Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey), Ivor Crewe (University of
Essex),WilfriedDewachter(CatholicUniversityof
Leuven,Belgium),A.-P. Frognier(CatholicUniver-
sity of Louvain, Belgium), William P. Irvine
(Queen's University, Kingston, Canada), W. K.
Jackson (Universityof Canterbury,Christchurch,
New Zealand), Gary C. Jacobson (University of
California,San Diego), MarkkuLaakso(University
of Kuopio, Finland),RafaelL6pezPintor (Autono-
mous University, Madrid), Thomas T. Mackie
(Universityof Strathclyde,Glasgow), George Th.
Mavrogordatos (University of Athens), Sten S.
Nilson (Universityof Oslo), DieterNohlen (Univer-
sity of Heidelberg),CorneliusO'Leary(Queen'sUni-
versity, Belfast), Jea-LucParodi (Fondation Na-
tionale des Sciences Politiques, Paris), Mogens
Pedersen (Odense University, Denmark), Anton
Pelinka (University of Innsbruck), Bo SArlvik
(GothenburgUniversity, Sweden), Yasunori Sone
(Keio University,Tokyo), Alberto Spreafico(Uni-
versity of Florence),Bjorn S. Stefansson(Agricul-
tural ResearchInstitute, Reykjavik),Jfirg Steiner
(Universityof North Carolina,ChapelHill), andJan
Verhoef (Ministryof Housing, Physical Planning,
andthe Environment,The Hague).I am also grateful
to the IPSA panel participantsand to Andre Blais,
Keith Bybee, David Collier, Richard Gunther,
494
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RichardG. Niemi, Matthew S. Shugart,and Rein
Taageperafor helpfulcomments.And I should like
to expressmy appreciationfor the financialsupport
of the GuggenheimFoundationand the German
MarshallFundof the UnitedStates.
1. My referenceswill be to the 1971 edition of
Rae'sbook.
2. Raewas so kind as to makehis originaldatafor
1945-64 availableto me, but I decidedthat it was
preferableto use the election data in Thomas T.
Mackie and RichardRose's (1982) standardhand-
book in order to facilitate replication by other
researchersandbecauseI also usedthe latterdatafor
the 1965-85 period.The Mackie-Rosehandbookin-
dudes the elections held through 1981. For the
1982-85 electionsI turnedto the annualupdatesin
the European Journal of Political Research by
Mackie and Rose (1983, 1984) and Mackie (1985,
1986). The resultsof U.S. House of Representatives
elections, not reportedby Mackie and Rose, were
takenfromOrnstein,Mann,andMalbin1987. Since
the Luxembourgvoting figuresprovidedby Mackie
and Rose fail to adjustfor the unequalnumbersof
votes that voters have in differentdistricts,I used
Luxembourg,ServiceCentralde la Statistique1984.
3. It may be arguedthat comparedwith 1, D errs
in the oppositedirection:it has a slight tendencyto
exaggeratethe disproportionalityof systems with
manyparties.However,the two-major-parties index
(definedas the averagevote-seatsharedeviationof
the two largest parties), which was expresslyde-
signedto steera middlecoursebetweenD and1, is in
practicemuch closer to D than to I (Lijphart1985,
10-12). A greatadvantageof D comparedwith both
I and the two-major-parties indexis that it does not
entailarbitrarydecisionseitheron cutoff points (for
I, should the cutoff point be .5%, which is Rae's
criterion,or shouldit be 1, 2, 5, or 10%?)or on the
numberof partiesto be counted.(Insteadof the two
largestparties,why not the three largestpartiesor
perhaps just the largest party?) Mackie and Rose
(1982)and Rose (1984)use a slightlydifferentform
of D. Insteadof usingthe "negative"indexof dispro-
portionality,they preferto thinkmorepositivelyin
termsof an indexof proportionality;that is, instead
of D, they subtractD from 100%.
4. If the index of fractionalizationis represented
by F and the effectivenumberof partiesby N, they
are relatedas follows: N 1/(1 - F). The F values
correspondingto 2.0, 2.5, and 3.0 partiesare .50,
.60, and .67.
5. In ContinentalEurope, the Droop quota is
often called the Hagenbach-Bischoff quota. Strictly
speaking, there is a slight differencebetween the
two. If v standsfor the total numberof districtvotes
and m for the districtmagnitude,the Hagenbach-
Bischoffquota is v/(m + 1), usually roundedup,
whereasthe Droop quota is definedas v/(m + 1) +
1, roundeddown if necessary(Leonardand Natkiel
1987, 3). Therefore,the two quotasdifferif v/(m +
 ElectoralLaws

1) happensto be an integer;but in mass elections 1957 on as two separatecases because they differ
wherev is measuredin thousandsof votes, this dif- with regardto districtmagnitude.
ferenceis so tiny that it can be safely ignored. To 9. In spite of these negative findings for PR
makematterseven more complicatedand (unfortu- systems, Rae's hypothesis still has a good deal of
nately) confusing, the term Hagenbach-Bischoff plausibility,and perhapsit should not be rejected
methodis sometimesalso used to describea divisor completely.Forinstance,it seemsquiteclearthatthe
system, as in Switzerland. This method merely smallbut cruciallyimportantFreeDemocraticparty
representsa shortcut in the application of the (FDP)in West Germanyhas benefitedsubstantially
d'Hondtformula,and Itsresultsareexactlythe same from its appeal to the voters to give it theirsecond
as those of d'Hondt. For all practical purposes, votes (whichare actuallythe moreimportantof the
therefore, the two can be regardedas identical. two votes); the FDP has in fact been called
Finally,I have to add a qualificationto my descrip- (somewhat sarcastically) the "party of second
tion of the Imperialiquota, whichis usedexclusively choice"(Dittberner1987). It is virtuallycertainthat
in Italy. It has been definedas v/(m + 2) since the withoutthe ordinalballot, the partywould not have
1958election;but it was evenlower-v/(m + 3)-in faredso well and thatmultipartismwouldhave been
the 1948and 1953electionsand, on average,slightly reduced.
higher in 1946, when v/(m + 2) applied to the 10. Thisis especiallyclearin the case of the French
higher-magnitude districtsand v/(m + 1) (in effect, Fifth Republic. The Australian ordinal majority
the sameas the Droop quota)in the smallerdistricts system does not behave very differentlyfrom the
(Carstairs1980, 157-59; Spreafico 1983, 188-90, pluralitysystems.
194). 11. For the 25 PR systems (excludingFranceof
6. In orderto classifythe difficulttwo-tiersystems 1951-56), the correlationbetweendisproportionali-
accordingto electoralformula,I distinguishbetween ty and legislativemultipartismis still only a very
two basictypes. In one type the districtsat the lower weak -.17.
level are used for the initial allocationof the seats;
but the final allocation takes place at the higher
level, often the nationallevel, on the basis of all of References
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