4 Moon, BATTLE OF A Genoese fleet—consisting of nine galleys, seven navi (ships), a galleass, and a huissier (horse trans- port) all commanded by Jean IT le Meingre, Marshal Boucicaut, thenew French governor of the city—had set off'in April to secure the position of the Genoese in Cyprus. The fleet appeared off Modon (a Venetian base) in May, but despite Venetian nervousness over its intentions no engagement took place. The Genoese continued on to Cyprus, and after set- tling matters there, Boucicaut, a fervent crusader, began to raid Ottoman cities on the Syrian coast. Beirut was thoroughly sacked, an action that infuri- ated the Venetians since most of the goods seized as booty were the property of Venetian merchants. In September Boucicaut, now overseeing a fleet of eleven galleys and two transport cogs, turned back and headed for home. ‘The Genoese again reached Modon on 4 October. Probably to prepare for battle, Zeno moved his fleet (eleven galleys augmented by two large round ships) out into the bay while the Genoese anchored off Sapienza. Early the morning of 7 October the Genoese fleet began to sail north but found itself pursued by Zeno. The ensuing bat- tle was very hard fought. Boucicaut's galley closed with that of Zeno in a furious hand-to-hand assault, Meanwhile the Venetian round ship the Pisana attacked three other Genoese galleys, which fell to the Venetians. At this point Boucicaut decided to break off the battle. The Genoese lost six hundred men, three galleys, and a further three hundred men as prisoners on the captured galleys. Venetian losses amounted to 153 wounded. The continuing confu- sion in the internal politics of Genoa ensured that the Venetians faced few further challenges from Genoese fleets. Soon the Ottoman Turks, rather than the Genoese, posed the greatest threat to Venetian domination of the region and the valuable trade with the East. [see also Jean Ile Meingre.] BIBLIOGRAPHY Epstein, Steven A. Genoa and the Genoese, 958-1528. ‘Chapel Hil: University of North Carolina Press, 1996, Lalande, Denis.fean {Ile Meingre, dit Boucicaut(1366-1421) Ftude d'une biographie héroique. Geneva, Switzerland: Librarie Droz, 1988. Lane, Frederic C. Venice, a Maritime Republic. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973. Rose, Susan. Medieval Naval Warfare, 1000-1500. London and New York: Routledge, 2002. ‘Susan Rose ‘Mon CS, BATTLE OF Sultan Sitleyman I (r. 1520-1566) inherited from his father an empire of about twelve million inhabitants, which extended over three continents, covering half a million square miles. The sultans of the Ottoman dynasty used most of these vast resources to finance their army. A record dating from 1527 informs us that 14,612 fully equipped and trained mercenaries (kapt ‘kul or kapi kala) were encamped in the capital city of Istanbul, thus making it possible for the sultan to rely on 80,000 to 100,000 good horsemen from the provinces and forts of the empire's frontiers. Besides these elite forces, many tax-exempt peasant soldiers also fought in the Ottoman army. Although the entire military force was never mobilized at the same time, with these additional troops the size of the campaigning army occasionally numbered well over a hundred thousand even in the early sixteenth century. In 1520 Sileyman's counselors were seeking a European target for this immense war machine. In such cases the choice normally fell on the weak- est neighbor. At the time Hungary seemed the most obvious choice. After the successful siege of Nandorfehérvar (Belgrade) (1521), Siileyman invaded Hungary in the summer of 1526 and captured the castles of Petrovaradin and Ilok. On 29 August Louis Il, King of Hungary, Croatia, and Bohemia (r. 1516-1526), blocked an Ottoman army of approxi- mately eighty thousand men and three hundred to four hundred cannons at Mohécs with the aid of his soldiers, ‘The papal legate Burgio estimated the Hungarian, Croatian, and Bohemian army that gathered before the battle at twenty-five to thirty thousand, with eighty-five cannons and five hundred Prague-type wall guns. It was a large army for its time, one of thegreatest armed forces that any medieval Hungarian king had ever assembled. The two opposing armies were equipped with quite similar armor, and it was not only the Ottomans who applied tactics based on the combination of an offensive cavalry and a defen- sive infantry. Skirting the marshland of the Danube with their left wing, the Hungarians formed two lines, stretch- ing out their forces in order to prevent the Ottoman. lines from enveloping their right flank. In the first line stood the majority of the infantry—some ten thou- sand soldiers—divided into two wings, while certain cavalry groups were inserted there, too. ‘The cannons were placed behind them. Then came the second line, with the king and his thousand armored cavalry in the center, flanked by magnates and their troops. ‘This battle formation suggests that the Hungarians wanted to stay on the defensive, as they hardly had any ofthe new-style combat infantry (Landsknechtc), and were holding their fast-moving, strong reserve forces for counterattacks, hoping to face only the advance troops of the enemy on the first day. Ibrahim Pasha, grand vizier and commander of the Rumelian corps—which formed the Turkish vanguard of approximately 30,000 soldiers, strength- ened by 4,000 janissaries, and 150 cannons—felt little urgency to attack. The ridge surrounding the ‘Mohécs plains provided him with excellent fight- ing positions, and probably neither the behavior nor the clearly visible battle order of the Hungarians suggested to him that fighting would be inevitable that day. It seemed more reasonable for him to wait. for the arrival of the Ottoman main force and post- pone the encounter until the next day, when their numerical superiority would almost guarantee vie- tory. Consequently, contrary to Hungarian expecta- tions, the Ottomans had no intention to attack on 29 August. Seeing the enemy's slow march and the Rumelians preparing their encampment, Pal Tomori, the Hungarian commander-in-chief, concluded that Siileyman’s full army would not reach the battle- field on that day. Taking advantage of the fact that the Christians would not have to face the whole Ottoman army at the time of the Muslims’ afternoon Monics, Barrie oF prayer (around 3:00 or 4:00), the right wing of the first Hungarian battle line attacked the Ottomans. The assault pushed the Ottoman units defend- ing the camp back to the cannons at the left wing of the Rumelian corps. The wagon fortress, set up to defend the cannons, halted the attackers. The Hungarian armored cavalry avoided the janissar- ies’ shooting and, turning to the left, they struck the Rumelian cavalry and broke through its lines. To exploit this success, the second Hungarian line also hurled itself into the battle, beginning to encircle the Rumelian corps, while the infantry reached the cannons. Fighting had been going on for about one or two hours when the rest of the Ottoman corps arrived at the field and joined the battle at various sites, inde- pendent of the continuing struggle of the Hungarian right flank. The Hungarian army command may have reckoned with this possibility, as the left flank had not engaged in the battle yet, and now it sue- cessfully took up the fight against the advancing Anatolian cavalry. The Hungarian commanders apparently reached the conclusion that Ottoman cavalry had been put to flight at both flanks, so an attack against the center was launched, which might have decided the battle for the Hungarians had it met with success. The last charge of the Hungarian heavy cavalry, however, was not successful, though certain sources recount their breaking through the line of janis- saries defending the sultan. Siileyman did not flee, however, and so few cavalrymen came near him that he was not killed, nor were the order and fighting morale of the Ottoman troops shaken. Following this event, Turkish numerical superi- ority dominated the battlefield. After almost four hours of fighting, the fight was terminated by dark- ness and heavy rain, Because of the increasing num- ber of fugitives and casualties, the Hungarian army, which had been smaller right from the beginning, ceased to represent any real threat. Its remaining segments were surrounded and eliminated by the Ottomans. The Ottomans could not believe that they had already annihilated the Hungarian army and 5remained alert throughout the night, with the sultan on horseback until midnight. Actually, they had nothing to fear. The Hungarian army lost about five thousand horsemen, and only about two thousand foot soldiers survived. All the command- ers except for two, together with six bishops and numerous secular barons, died during the fight. King Louis fled the whirl of battle. Later he was found dead, having drowned in the swollen Csele Brook. ‘The Hungarian government was decapitated by this defeat. The sultan entered Buda without resis- tance, and the only reason he did not make Hungary ‘a vassal state was that no one would take an oath of allegiance to him. After he left, Janos Szapolyai, voivode of Transylvania, was elected king, but, his rule was not recognized by the followers of Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria. In the country exposed to Ottoman power, a struggle for the crown, began. Hungary was divided for 150 years: the west- em and northern lands were ruled by the Austrian Habsburgs, with the capital at Buda; the central territories were occupied by the Ottomans; and ‘Transylvania, the easternmost province, became a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire. {See also Hungary, subentry on Narrative (1300~ 1526); Landsknechte; Nandorfehérvar (Belgrade), BIBLIOGRAPHY Gyaldkay, Eugen [Gyalkay Jené]. “Die Schlacht bei Mohdes (29 August 1526)” Ungarische Jahrbitcher 6 (1927): 228-257. Perjés, Géza. The Fall of the Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohées 1526-Buda 1541. War and Society in East Central Europe, vol. 26. New York: Columbia University Press, 989. Seabé, Jinos B. A mohécsi esata, Budapest: Corvina, 2006, Szabé, Jénos B. "A mohéesi esata és a *hadtigyi forradalom”" Hadtérténelmi Kézlemények 17 (2004): 443-480; 118 (2005): 573-632. Szakély, Ferenc. “The 1526 Mohécs Disaster” New Hangarian Quarterly 18, no.65 (Spring 1977): 43-63, Janos B. Szabé MONASTERIES AND Monks MONASTERIES AND MONKS During the Middle Ages monks wrote about war in both spiritual and secular contexts and observed important events, such as the Crusades, even as monasteries themselves became military targets and contributed to the prosecution of warfare. For the year 793 the author of the Canterbury manuscript of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle lamented the sacking of the Northumbrian monastery of Lindisfarne by Viking raiders, an event that caused consternation throughout western Christendom. Medieval writers also depicted monks engaged in unremitting daily battles with demons. Anselm of Canterbury described the world as a battle- ground between God and the devil, wherein God's kingdom represented a spiritual citadel defended by monks. Monks employed military terminology to describe their role as spiritual warriors fighting against the devil. As a brother of the Benedictine abbey of St. Evroul, the twelfth-century historian Orderic Vitalis recorded the military exploits, crusades, and careers of Norman lords such as Duke Robert II Curthose. Writing retrospectively about the founda- tion of Shrewsbury Abbey in 1083, Orderic created in his Historia Ecclesiastica a scene in which his father, Odelerius, urged Roger de Montgomery to establish the house, as “countless benefits are obtained there every day, and Christ's garrisons struggle manfully against the devil” Roger's foundation would serve as “a citadel of God against Satan, where the cowled champions may engage in ceaseless combat against Behemoth for your soul” The Historia Ecclesiastica Western provides the best account for warfare Europe during the early twelfth century. Monastic propaganda was more than rhetoric; it was a self-conscious attempt to express a monastic version of society to a supporting audience. During the twelfth century in particular, adult converts to the monastic life in Western Europe, either as monks or as conversi (lay brothers), came mainly from knightly or noble families; Herluin of Bee, for instance, founded the abbey of Bec in 1040. Motives were mixed: some joined communities as young ”360. TOLEDO, SiEGE OF Reilly, Bernard. The Kingdom of Leén-Castilla under King Afonso V1, 1065-1109. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988. ‘Ana Echevarria Tomort, PAL (1475?-1526), Hungarian nobleman, later Franciscan friar, archbishop of Kalocsa, captain-general of the lower parts of Hungary, commander of the Hungarian army at the battle of Mohics. Early in his career, Pal Tomori held various offices in the Hungarian treasury and was in charge of royal estates. In 1505 he became castellan of Figiras, in 1515 that of Mukacheve. As a military officer he par- ticipated in the suppression of the peasant upris- ing of 514. He rose to prominence when, in 1518, he expelled the nobles from under Buda Castle, where they were gathering to express their dissatisfaction at the Diet and preparing to attack the royal castle. In despair over family tragedies and the halt of his, professional career, Tomori joined the Franciscan order in 1520. With papal support, King Louis I of Hungary requested that he take over the arch- bishopric of Kalocsa in 1523, when the position of Hungary became critical. Never quitting the gray habit of the Franciscans, Tomori also became the captain-general of the lower parts of Hungary. Tomori attempted to reorganize the Hungarian defense system, structurally damaged after the Ottomans had captured Belgrade and Sabac in 152. Although Tomori did not personally participate in the battles, under his command a four-thousand- strong Hungarian army was able to destroy, piece by piece, an Ottoman army of ten to fifteen thousand soldiers in the Srem region in 1523. Despite his success, the situation of Hungary remained hopeless, and Tomori supported the idea of unconditional peace with the Ottomans. He even ‘wanted to use the sultan's envoy, who had been held in custody in Hungary since 1520, to this effect. The Hungarian government tried to negotiate peace through mediators in 1526, but failed. In summer 1526 Tomori tried to defend the line of the Danube, but his inferior forces could not prevent the Ottomans from occupying Petrovaradin and lo The main Ottoman forces soon crossed the Drava River. The Hungarians now had to decide whethet to undertake a battle with their modest forces of relying on the forts along the military route, to slo down the Ottoman campaign and postpone theb tle. In the absence of the most experienced leaders, Pal Tomori and Gyérgy Szapolyai were appointed) commanders in chief. for fighting, even though he estimated the sizeof enemy at 300,000 soldiers, whi thousand. 3 On 29 August 1526, the Ottoman troops met iit Hungarian army south of Mohdcs. Tomori and. Szapolyai, as well King Louis II and many prelates and barons, fell in thisbloody battle. Contempo and historians of later generations condemned ‘commanders of the Hungarian army, and esp and Mohacs, Battle of} Frakn6i, Vilmos. Tomori Pal élete és levelei. Athenaeum, 18 Kubinyi, Andr the Era of Ottoman Conquest, edited by Géza Davida Pal Fodor, pp. 75-5. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 20 Janos B.STHE OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDIEVAL WARFARE AND MILITARY TECHNOLOGY Clifford J. Rogers EDITOR IN CHIEF VOLUME 3 Mercenaries—Ziirich, Siege of Topical Outline of Contents 471 Directory of Contributors 483 Index 501 OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2010