THE DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS

CASE NO. 1
A.C. No. 7325, January 21, 2015
DR. DOMICIANO F. VILLAHERMOSA, SR., Complainant, v. ATTY. ISIDRO L. CARACOL, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a complaint for disbarment filed by Dr. Domiciano F. Villahermosa, Sr., against Atty. Isidro L. Caracol for
deceit, gross misconduct and violation of oath under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

Villahermosa is respondent in two land cases involving cancellation of emancipation patents and transfer certificates of
title, cancellation of special power of attorney and deeds of absolute sale and recovery of ownership and possession of
parcels of land derived from Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 433 which covered 23.3018 hectares of land in
Valencia, Bukidnon. Counsel on record for plaintiff was Atty. Fidel Aquino.

OCT No. 433 was a homestead patent granted to Micael Babela who had two sons, Fernando and Efren. As legal heirs of
Micael, Fernando received 53,298 square meters while Efren received 33,296 square meters. Subsequently, Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCTs) were issued in their respective names.

When the agrarian reform law was enacted on October 21, 1972, emancipation patents and titles were issued to
Hermogena and Danilo Nipotnipot, beneficiaries of the program, who in turn sold the parcels of land to complainants
spouse, Raymunda Villahermosa. A deed of absolute sale was executed in favor of Raymunda.

On March 2, 1994, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) issued a decision ordering the
cancellation of the emancipation patents and TCTs derived from OCT No. 433 stating that it was not covered by the
agrarian reform law. This decision was appealed to and affirmed by the DARAB Central Board and the Court of Appeals.

On September 25, 2002, Atty. Caracol, as Addl Counsel for the Plaintiffs-Movant, filed a motion for execution with the
DARAB, Malaybalay, Bukidnon praying for the full implementation of the March 2, 1994 decision.

On December 20, 2005, Atty. Caracol filed a Motion for Issuance of Second Alias Writ of Execution and Demolition which
he signed as Counsel for the Plaintiff Efren Babela.

Villahermosa filed this complaint alleging that Atty. Caracol had no authority to file the motions since he obtained no
authority from the plaintiffs and the counsel of record. Villahermosa posited that Efren could not have authorized Atty.
Caracol to file the second motion because Efren had already been dead for more than a year. He claimed that Atty.
Caracols real client was a certain Ernesto I. Aguirre, who had allegedly bought the same parcel of land. Villahermosa
presented affidavits of Efrens widow and daughter both stating that Efren never executed a waiver of rights and that
the parcel of land was sold to Villahermosa through a deed of sale. Both also stated that they were familiar with Efrens
signature. They state that the signature in the waiver was different from his usual signature. Villahermosa averred that
Atty. Caracol committed deceit and gross misconduct.

In addition, Villahermosa claimed that Atty. Caracol introduced falsified and manufactured evidence into the
proceedings. Atty. Caracol, in introducing a document denominated as Waiver of Rights where Efren waived all his
rights in favor of Ernesto Aguirre, was able to secure the execution of the judgment in one of the cases in favor of
Ernesto Aguirre. Villahermosa also filed a case for falsification of public document and use of falsified document against
Ernesto Aguirre and Atty. Caracol.

Atty. Caracol insists that Efren and Ernesto authorized him to appear as additional counsel. He said that he had
consulted Atty. Aquino who advised him to go ahead with the filing. Moreover, he stated that he was not aware that
there was a waiver of rights executed in Ernesto Aguirres favor.

In its Report and Recommendation, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) found
that Atty. Caracol committed deceitful acts and misconduct. It found that respondent did not present credible evidence
to controvert the allegation that he was not authorized by plaintiff or counsel of record. Respondent admitted that at
the time of the filing of the second motion, Efren was dead. It noted that Atty. Caracol did not explain how he obtained
the authority nor did he present any proof of the authority. However, there was insufficient evidence to hold him liable
for falsification.

The IBP CBD stated that Atty. Caracol clearly misled and misrepresented to the DARAB, Region X that he was counsel of
Efren to protect the interest of Ernesto Aguirre, his real client, violating his oath as a lawyer. It thus recommended that
Atty. Caracol be suspended from the practice of law for a period of five years.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the report and recommendation but modified the penalty to one year suspension
from the practice of law. Atty. Caracol moved for reconsideration but was denied.

Atty. Caracol filed a notice of appeal which this Court returned to him since no legal fees are required in administrative
cases.

We adopt the findings of the IBP.

The Rules of Court under Rule 138, Section 21 provides for a presumption of a lawyers appearance on behalf of his
client, hence:c

SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in
which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client, but
the presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any
attorney who assumes the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and to
disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who employed him, and may thereupon make such
order as justice requires. An attorney willfully appearing in court for a person without being employed, unless by leave
of the court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions.
(Emphases supplied)

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Pamintuan Devt. Co., this Court said that while a lawyer is not required to present
proof of his representation, when a court requires that he show such authorization, it is imperative that he show his
authority to act. Thus:

A lawyer is not even required to present a written authorization from the client. In fact, the absence of a formal notice
of entry of appearance will not invalidate the acts performed by the counsel in his clients name. However, [a] court, on
its own initiative or on motion of the other party may require a lawyer to adduce authorization from the client.

Lawyers must be mindful that an attorney has no power to act as counsel for a person without being retained nor may
he appear in court without being employed unless by leave of court. If an attorney appears on a clients behalf without a
retainer or the requisite authority neither the litigant whom he purports to represent nor the adverse party may be
bound or affected by his appearance unless the purported client ratifies or is estopped to deny his assumed authority. If
a lawyer corruptly or willfully appears as an attorney for a party to a case without authority, he may be disciplined or
punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transaction.

We must also take into consideration that even if a lawyer is retained by a client, an attorney-client relationship
terminates upon death of either client or the lawyer.

Here, Atty. Caracol was presumed to have authority when he appeared in the proceedings before the DARAB. The
records are unclear at what point his authority to appear for Efren was questioned. Neither is there any indication that
Villahermosa in fact questioned his authority during the course of the proceedings.

However, Atty. Caracol knew that Efren had already passed away at the time he filed the Motion for Issuance of Second
Alias Writ of Execution and Demolition. As an honest, prudent and conscientious lawyer, he should have informed the
Court of his clients passing and presented authority that he was retained by the clients successors-in-interest and thus
the parties may have been substituted.

We also note the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz in People v. Mendoza where he stated:

I am bothered by the improvident plea of guilty made by accused Juan Magalop, presumably upon the advice of his
counsel, Atty. Isidro L. Caracol of the CLAO (now the PAO). It would seem that this lawyer was less than conscientious
when he advised his indigent client to admit a crime the man did no[t] commit. As the ponencia observes, outside of
his improvident plea of guilt, there is absolutely no evidence against him presented or forthcoming. From the
evidence of the prosecution, there is no way by which Magalop could have been implicated.

It seems to me that if any one is guilty in this case, it is the PAO lawyer who, through an incredible lack of zeal in the
discharge of his duties, was apparently willing, without any moral compunctions at all, and without proof, to consign an
innocent man to prison.

The PAO is supposed to defend the accused, not to condemn them without cause. The defense counsel in this case did
not seem to appreciate this responsibility when he prodded Magalop to plead guilty and waived the right to submit
evidence in his behalf.

While this observation does not serve to exacerbate Atty. Caracols liability under the present circumstances, we would
like to highlight the important role of an attorney in our judicial system. Because of the particular nature of an
attorneys function it is essential that they should act with fairness, honesty and candor towards the courts and his
clients. Under Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to
be misled by any artifice.

This flows out from the lawyers oath which each lawyer solemnly swears to uphold the law and court processes in the
pursuit of justice. Thus, a lawyer must be more circumspect in his demeanor and attitude towards the public in general
as agents of the judicial system.

Here, Atty. Caracol, as observed by the IBP CBD, has been less than candid about his representation. We also observe
that he has used underhanded means to attain his purpose. Atty. Caracols blatant disregard of his duties as a lawyer
cannot be countenanced. In view of his actions of contravening his lawyers oath and in violation of Canons 8 and 10
and Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility we deem it proper to suspend him from the practice of law for
a period of one year.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Isidro L. Caracol GUILTY. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Isidro L.
Caracol from the practice of law for ONE YEAR effective upon finality of this Resolution, with a warning that a repetition
of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondents personal
record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for
their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
**************************************************************************************************

CASE NO. 2

A.C. No. 10135 January 15, 2014

EDGARDO AREOLA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MARIA VILMA MENDOZA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
This refers to the administrative complaint1 filed by Edgardo D. Areola (Areola) a.k.a. Muhammad Khadafy against Atty.
Maria Vilma Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), from the Public Attorney s Office (PAO) for violation of her attorney s oath of
office, deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in office under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court,
and for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In the letter-complaint dated November 13, 2006 addressed to the Honorable Commissioners, Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Areola stated that he was filing the complaint in behalf of his co-
detainees Allan Seronda, Aaron Arca, Joselito Mirador, Spouses Danilo Perez and Elizabeth Perez. He alleged that on
October 23, 2006, during Prisoners Week, Atty. Mendoza, visited the Antipolo City Jail and called all detainees with
pending cases before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 73, Antipolo City where she was assigned, to attend her
speech/lecture.2 Areola claimed that Atty. Mendoza stated the following during her speech:
"O kayong may mga kasong drugs na may pangpiyansa o pang- areglo ay maging praktikal sana kayo kung gusto ninyong
makalaya agad. Upang makatiyak kayo na hindi masasayang ang pera ninyo ay sa akin ninyo ibigay o ng kamag-anak
ninyo ang pera at ako na ang bahalang maglagay kay Judge Martin at Fiscal banqui; at kayong mga detenidong mga
babae na no bail ang kaso sa drugs, iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso
noon."3
Atty. Mendoza allegedly said that as she is handling more than 100 cases, all detainees should prepare and furnish her
with their Sinumpaang Salaysay so that she may know the facts of their cases and their defenses and also to give her the
necessary payment for their transcript of stenographic notes.4
Areola furthermore stated that when he helped his co-inmates in drafting their pleadings and filing motions before the
RTC Branch 73, Antipolo City, Atty. Mendoza undermined his capability, to wit:
(1) Atty. Mendoza purportedly scolded detainee Seronda when she learned that the latter was assisted by Areola in
filing a Motion to Dismiss for Violation of Republic Act No. 8942 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) in the latters criminal case for
rape, which was pending before the RTC, Branch 73, Antipolo City. She got angrier when Seronda retorted that he
allowed Areola to file the motion for him since there was nobody to help him.
(2) Areola assisted Spouses Danilo and Elizabeth Perez in filing their Joint Motion for Consolidation of Trial of
Consolidated Offenses and Joint Motion to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense. The spouses were likewise scolded for
relying on the Complainant and alleged that the respondent asked for P2,000.00 to represent them.
(3) Areola helped another co-detainee, Mirador in filing an "Ex-parte Motion to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense". When
Atty. Mendoza learned of it, she allegedly scolded Mirador and discredited Areola.5
In her unverified Answer6 dated January 5, 2007, Atty. Mendoza asseverated that the filing of the administrative
complaint against her is a harassment tactic by Areola as the latter had also filed several administrative cases against
judges in the courts of Antipolo City including the jail warden of Taytay, Rizal where Areola was previously detained.
These actuations show that Areola has a penchant for filing various charges against anybody who does not accede to his
demand.7 Atty. Mendoza contended that Areola is not a lawyer but represented himself to his co-detainees as one.8 She
alleged that the motions/pleadings prepared and/or filed by Areola were not proper.
After both parties failed to appear in the Mandatory Conference set by the IBP on August 15, 2008, the Investigating
Commissioner considered the non-appearance as a waiver on their part. Nonetheless, in the interest of justice, both
parties were required to submit their respective position papers.9
On December 29, 2009, the Investigating Commissioner issued his Report and Recommendation. 10 The Investigating
Commissioner stated that the Complainant is knowledgeable in the field of law. While he may be of service to his fellow
detainees, he must, however, be subservient to the skills and knowledge of a full fledged lawyer. He however found no
convincing evidence to prove that Atty. Mendoza received money from Areolas co-detainees as alleged. The charges
against Atty. Mendoza were also uncorroborated, viz:
There is no convincing evidence that will prove that the respondent received money from the inmates since the charges
are uncorroborated. In fact, the complainant is not the proper party to file the instant case since he was not directly
affected or injured by the act/s being complained of. No single affidavits of the affected persons were attached to prove
the said charges. Hence, it is simply hearsay in nature.11
Nonetheless, Atty. Mendoza admitted in her Answer that she advised her clients and their relatives to approach the
judge and the fiscal "to beg and cry" so that their motions would be granted and their cases against them would be
dismissed. To the Investigating Commissioner, this is highly unethical and improper as the act of Atty. Mendoza
degrades the image of and lessens the confidence of the public in the judiciary.12 The Investigating Commissioner
recommended that Atty. Mendoza be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) months.13
In a Notice of Resolution14 dated November 19, 2011, the Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Atty. Mendoza sought to reconsider the Resolution15 dated November 19, 2011 but the IBP Board of Governors denied
her motion in its Resolution16 dated May 10, 2013. The Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors was transmitted to the
Court for final action pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 12, Paragraph b17 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The Courts Ruling
After a judicious examination of the records, the Court finds that the instant Complaint against Atty. Mendoza
profoundly lacks evidence to support the allegations contained therein. All Areola has are empty assertions against Atty.
Mendoza that she demanded money from his co-detainees.
The Court agrees with the IBP that Areola is not the proper party to file the Complaint against Atty. Mendoza. He is not
even a client of Atty. Mendoza. He claims that he filed the Complaint on behalf of his co-detainees Seronda, Arca,
Mirador and Spouses Perez, but it is apparent that no document was submitted which would show that they authorized
Areola to file a Complaint. They did not sign the Complaint he prepared. No affidavit was even executed by the said co-
detainees to substantiate the matters Areola raised. Consequently, the Court rejects Areolas statements, especially as
regards Atty. Mendozas alleged demands of money.
The Court agrees with the observations of the Investigating Commissioner that Areola initiated this complaint when he
felt insulted because Atty. Mendoza refused to acknowledge the pleadings and motions he prepared for his co-detainees
who are PAO clients of Atty. Mendoza.18 It appears that Areola is quite knowledgeable with Philippine laws. However, no
matter how good he thinks he is, he is still not a lawyer. He is not authorized to give legal advice and file pleadings by
himself before the courts. His familiarity with Philippine laws should be put to good use by cooperating with the PAO
instead of filing baseless complaints against lawyers and other government authorities. It seems to the Court that Areola
thinks of himself as more intelligent and better than Atty. Mendoza, based on his criticisms against her. In his Reply19, he
made fun of her grammatical errors and tagged her as using carabao english20. He also called the PAO as "Pa-Amin
Office"21 which seriously undermines the reputation of the PAO. While Areola may have been frustrated with the way
the PAO is managing the significant number of cases it deals with, all the more should he exert efforts to utilize his
knowledge to work with the PAO instead of maligning it.
Interestingly, Atty. Mendoza admitted that she advised her clients to approach the judge and plead for compassion so
that their motions would be granted. This admission corresponds to one of Areolas charges against Atty. Mendoza
that she told her clients " Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon." Atty.
Mendoza made it appear that the judge is easily moved if a party resorts to dramatic antics such as begging and crying in
order for their cases to be dismissed.
As such, the Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Mendoza made irresponsible advices to her clients
in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It is the mandate of Rule 1.02 that "a
lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system."
Rule 15.07 states that "a lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness."
Atty. Mendozas improper advice only lessens the confidence of the public in our legal system. Judges must be free to
judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors22 according to the merits of a case. Atty. Mendozas
careless remark is uncalled for.
It must be remembered that a lawyers duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice.1wphi1 To that end,
his clients success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law
and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his
devotion to his clients cause, is condemnable and unethical.23
In spite of the foregoing, the Court deems the penalty of suspension for two (2) months as excessive and not
commensurate to Atty. Mendozas infraction. Disbarment and suspension of a lawyer, being the most severe forms of
disciplinary sanction, should be imposed with great caution and only in those cases where the misconduct of the lawyer
as an officer of the court and a member of the bar is established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.24 The Court
notes that when Atty. Mendoza made the remark "Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo.
Malambot ang puso noon", she was not compelled by bad faith or malice. While her remark was inappropriate and
unbecoming, her comment is not disparaging and reproachful so as to cause dishonor and disgrace to the Judiciary.
In several administrative cases, the Court has refrained from imposing the actual penalties in the presence of mitigating
factors. Factors such as the respondents length of service, the respondents acknowledgement of his or her infractions
and feeling of remorse, family circumstances, humanitarian and equitable considerations, respondents advanced age,
among other things, have had varying significance in the Courts determination of the imposable penalty.25 The Court
takes note of Atty. Mendozas lack of ill-motive in the present case and her being a PAO lawyer as her main source of
livelihood.26 Furthermore, the complaint filed by Areola is clearly baseless and the only reason why this was ever given
consideration was due to Atty. Mendozas own admission. For these reasons, the Court deems it just to modify and
reduce the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza GUILTY of giving improper advice to her
clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is accordingly meted out
the penalty of REPRIMAND, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
**************************************************************************************************

CASE NO. 3

A.C. No. 5581 January 14, 2014

ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment dated January 8, 2002 filed by complainant Rose Bunagan-Bansig (Bansig) against
respondent Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera (respondent) for Gross Immoral Conduct.
In her complaint, Bansig narrated that, on May 8, 1997, respondent and Gracemarie R. Bunagan (Bunagan), entered into
a contract of marriage, as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Civil
Registry of Manila. Bansig is the sister of Gracemarie R. Bunagan, legal wife of respondent.
However, notwithstanding respondent's marriage with Bunagan, respondent contracted another marriage on January 8,
1998 with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba (Alba), as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage
issued by the City Registration Officer of San Juan, Manila.
Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and Bunagan was still valid and in full legal existence when he
contracted his second marriage with Alba, and that the first marriage had never been annulled or rendered void by any
lawful authority.
Bansig alleged that respondents act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his marriage is still subsisting, constitutes
grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar, which renders him unfit to continue his membership
in the Bar.
In a Resolution dated February 18, 2002, the Court resolved to require respondent to file a comment on the instant
complaint.
Respondent failed to submit his comment on the complaint, despite receipt of the copy of the Court's Resolution, as
evidenced by Registry Return Receipt No. 30639. Thus, the Court, in a Resolution dated March 17, 2003, resolved to
require respondent to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failing to file his
comment on the complaint against him.
On December 10, 2002, Bansig filed an Omnibus Ex Parte Motion praying that respondent's failure to file his comment
on the complaint be deemed as a waiver to file the same, and that the case be submitted for disposition.
On May 4, 2003, in a Motion, respondent claimed that while it appeared that an administrative case was filed against
him, he did not know the nature or cause thereof since other than Bansig's Omnibus Motion, he received no other
pleading or any processes of this Court. Respondent, however, countered that Bansig's Omnibus Motion was merely a
ploy to frighten him and his wife from pursuing the criminal complaints for falsification of public documents they filed
against Bansig and her husband. He also explained that he was able to obtain a copy of the Court's Show Cause Order
only when he visited his brother who is occupying their former residence at 59-B Aguho St., Project 3, Quezon City.
Respondent further averred that he also received a copy of Bansig's Omnibus Motion when the same was sent to his law
office address.
Respondent pointed out that having been the family's erstwhile counsel and her younger sister's husband, Bansig knew
his law office address, but she failed to send a copy of the complaint to him. Respondent suspected that Bansig was
trying to mislead him in order to prevent him from defending himself. He added that Bansig has an unpaid obligation
amounting to P2,000,000.00 to his wife which triggered a sibling rivalry. He further claimed that he and his wife received
death threats from unknown persons; thus, he transferred to at least two (2) new residences, i.e., in Sampaloc, Manila
and Angeles City. He then prayed that he be furnished a copy of the complaint and be given time to file his answer to the
complaint.
In a Resolution dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to (a) require Bansig to furnish respondent with a copy of the
administrative complaint and to submit proof of such service; and (b) require respondent to file a comment on the
complaint against him.
In compliance, Bansig submitted an Affidavit of Mailing to show proof that a copy of the administrative complaint was
furnished to respondent at his given address which is No. 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City, as
evidenced by Registry Receipt No. 2167.
On March 17, 2004, considering that respondent failed anew to file his comment despite receipt of the complaint, the
Court resolved to require respondent to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt
for such failure.
On June 3, 2004, respondent, in his Explanation, reiterated that he has yet to receive a copy of the complaint. He
claimed that Bansig probably had not complied with the Court's Order, otherwise, he would have received the same
already. He requested anew that Bansig be directed to furnish him a copy of the complaint.
Again, on August 25, 2004, the Court granted respondent's prayer that he be furnished a copy of the complaint, and
required Bansig to furnish a copy of the complaint to respondent.
On October 1, 2004, Bansig, in her Manifestation, lamented the dilatory tactics allegedly undertaken by respondent in
what was supposedly a simple matter of receipt of complaint. Bansig asserted that the Court should sanction
respondent for his deliberate and willful act to frustrate the actions of the Court. She attached a copy of the complaint
and submitted an Affidavit of Mailing stating that again a copy of the complaint was mailed at respondent's residential
address in Angeles City as shown by Registry Receipt No. 3582.
On May 16, 2005, the Court anew issued a Show Cause Order to respondent as to why he should not be disciplinarily
dealt with or held in contempt for failure to comply with the Resolution dated July 7, 2003 despite service of copy of the
complaint by registered mail.
On August 1, 2005, the Court noted the returned and unserved copy of the Show Cause Order dated May 16, 2005 sent
to respondent at 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subd. under Registry Receipt No. 55621, with notation "RTS-Moved."
It likewise required Bansig to submit the correct and present address of respondent.
On September 12, 2005, Bansig manifested that respondent had consistently indicated in his correspondence with the
Court No. 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City as his residential address. However, all notices
served upon him on said address were returned with a note "moved" by the mail server. Bansig averred that in Civil Case
No. 59353, pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Tuguegarao City, respondent entered his
appearance as counsel with mailing address to be at "Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City."
On February 13, 2006, the Court resolved to resend a copy of the Show Cause Order dated May 16, 2005 to respondent
at his new address at Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City.
On June 30, 2008, due to respondent's failure to comply with the Show Cause Order dated May 16, 2005, for failure to
file his comment on this administrative complaint as required in the Resolution dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to:
(a) IMPOSE upon Atty. Celera a FINE of P1,000.00 payable to the court, or a penalty of imprisonment of five (5) days if
said fine is not paid, and (b) REQUIRE Atty. Celera to COMPLY with the Resolution dated July 7, 2003 by filing the
comment required thereon.
In a Resolution dated January 27, 2010, it appearing that respondent failed to comply with the Court's Resolutions dated
June 30, 2008 and July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to: (1) DISPENSE with the filing by respondent of his comment on the
complaint; (2) ORDER the arrest of Atty. Celera; and (3) DIRECT the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
to (a) ARREST and DETAIN Atty. Celera for non-compliance with the Resolution dated June 30, 2008; and (b) SUBMIT a
report of compliance with the Resolution. The Court likewise resolved to REFER the complaint to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.
However, the Return of Warrant dated March 24, 2010, submitted by Atty. Frayn M. Banawa, Investigation Agent II,
Anti-Graft Division of the NBI, showed that respondent cannot be located because neither Halili Complex nor No. 922
Aurora Blvd., at Cubao, Quezon City cannot be located. During surveillance, it appeared that the given address, i.e., No.
922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City was a vacant lot with debris of a demolished building. Considering that the given
address cannot be found or located and there were no leads to determine respondent's whereabouts, the warrant of
arrest cannot be enforced.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, meanwhile, in compliance with the Court's Resolution, reported that as per their
records, the address of respondent is at No. 41 Hoover St., Valley View Royale Subd., Taytay, Rizal.
Respondent likewise failed to appear before the mandatory conference and hearings set by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), despite several notices. Thus, in an Order dated August 4, 2010,
Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, of the IBP-CBD, declared respondent to be in default and the case was
submitted for report and recommendation. The Order of Default was received by respondent as evidenced by a registry
return receipt. However, respondent failed to take any action on the matter.
On January 3, 2011, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and Recommendation, recommended that respondent Atty. Celera be
suspended for a period of two (2) years from the practice of law.
RULING
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is rather an investigation by the court
into the conduct of its officers. The issue to be determined is whether respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer
of the court in the dispensation of justice. Hence, an administrative proceeding for disbarment continues despite the
desistance of a complainant, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same, or in this case, the failure of
respondent to answer the charges against him despite numerous notices.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the
complaint. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent
must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequence of the disbarment
or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to
justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.
In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent contracted a second marriage despite the
existence of his first marriage. The first marriage, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage
issued on October 3, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of Manila, Gloria C. Pagdilao, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A.
Celera contracted marriage on May, 8, 1997 with Gracemarie R. Bunagan at the Church of Saint Augustine, Intramuros,
Manila; the second marriage, however, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on
October 4, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of San Juan, Manila, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted
marriage on January 8, 1998 with Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba at the Mary the Queen Church, Madison St., Greenhills, San
Juan, Metro Manila.
Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates to prove that respondent entered into a second
marriage while the latters first marriage was still subsisting. We note that the second marriage apparently took place
barely a year from his first marriage to Bunagan which is indicative that indeed the first marriage was still subsisting at
the time respondent contracted the second marriage with Alba.
The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, are admissible as the
best evidence of their contents, as provided for under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When the original of a document is in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the
public officer in custody thereof.
Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates, other than being admissible in evidence, also clearly
indicate that respondent contracted the second marriage while the first marriage is subsisting. By itself, the certified
xerox copies of the marriage certificates would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of two marriages
entered into by respondent. The certified xerox copies should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public
documents. For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Certificates bearing the name of respondent
are competent and convincing evidence to prove that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a
member of the Bar.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of
the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. He made a
mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage while
his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
This case cannot be fully resolved, however, without addressing rather respondents defiant stance against the Court as
demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of its Resolution requiring him to file his comment on the complaint. This case
has dragged on since 2002. In the span of more than 10 years, the Court has issued numerous directives for
respondent's compliance, but respondent seemed to have preselected only those he will take notice of and the rest he
will just ignore. The Court has issued several resolutions directing respondent to comment on the complaint against him,
yet, to this day, he has not submitted any answer thereto. He claimed to have not received a copy of the complaint,
thus, his failure to comment on the complaint against him. Ironically, however, whenever it is a show cause order, none
of them have escaped respondent's attention. Even assuming that indeed the copies of the complaint had not reached
him, he cannot, however, feign ignorance that there is a complaint against him that is pending before this Court which
he could have easily obtained a copy had he wanted to.
The Court has been very tolerant in dealing with respondent's nonchalant attitude towards this case; accommodating
respondent's endless requests, manifestations and prayers to be given a copy of the complaint. The Court, as well as
Bansig, as evidenced by numerous affidavits of service, have relentlessly tried to reach respondent for more than a
decade; sending copies of the Court's Resolutions and complaint to different locations - both office and residential
addresses of respondent. However, despite earnest efforts of the Court to reach respondent, the latter, however
conveniently offers a mere excuse of failure to receive the complaint. When said excuse seemed no longer feasible,
respondent just disappeared. In a manner of speaking, respondents acts were deliberate, maneuvering the liberality of
the Court in order to delay the disposition of the case and to evade the consequences of his actions. Ultimately, what is
apparent is respondents deplorable disregard of the judicial process which this Court cannot countenance.
Clearly, respondent's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which under Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court is in itself alone a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment. Respondents cavalier attitude
in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution.
Respondents conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. We have repeatedly held that a Courts Resolution is
"not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively."
Respondents obstinate refusal to comply with the Courts orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his character; it
also underscores his disrespect of the Court's lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof."
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or
for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Considering respondent's propensity to disregard not only the laws of the land but also the lawful orders of the Court, it
only shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is, thus, unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, guilty of grossly immoral conduct
and willful disobedience of lawful orders rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He
is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken of the Roll of Attorneys, effective
immediately.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith record it in the personal file
of respondent. All the Courts of the Philippines and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall disseminate copies thereof
to all its Chapters.
SO ORDERED.
*************************************************************************************************

CASE NO. 4
FIDELA BENGCO AND TERESITA BENGCO, A.C. No. 6368
Complainants,
-versus-
ATTY. PABLO S. BERNARDO,
Respondent. June 13, 2012

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment filed by complainants Fidela G. Bengco (Fidela) and Teresita N. Bengco (Teresita)
against respondent Atty. Pablo Bernardo (Atty. Bernardo) for deceit, malpractice, conduct unbecoming a member of the
Bar and violation of his duties and oath as a lawyer.

The acts of the respondent which gave rise to the instant complaint are as follows:

That sometime on or about the period from April 15, 1997 to July 22, 1997, Atty. Pablo Bernardo with the help and in
connivance and collusion with a certain Andres Magat [wilfully] and illegally committed fraudulent act with intent to
defraud herein complainants Fidela G. Bengco and Teresita N. Bengco by using false pretenses, deceitful words to the
effect that he would expedite the titling of the land belonging to the Miranda family of Tagaytay City who are the
acquaintance of complainants herein and they convinced herein complainant[s] that if they will finance and deliver to
him the amount of [P]495,000.00 as advance money he would expedite the titling of the subject land and further by
means of other similar deceit like misrepresenting himself as lawyer of William Gatchalian, the prospective buyer of the
subject land, who is the owner of Plastic City at Canomay Street, Valenzuela, Metro Manila and he is the one handling
William Gatchalians business transaction and that he has contracts at NAMREA, DENR, CENRO and REGISTER OF DEEDS
which representation he well knew were false, fraudulent and were only made to induce the complainant[s] to give and
deliver the said amount ([P]495,000.00) and once in possession of said amount, far from complying with his obligation to
expedite and cause the titling of the subject land, [wilfully], unlawfully and illegally misappropriated, misapplied and
converted the said amount to his personal use and benefit and despite demand upon him to return the said amount, he
failed and refused to do so, which acts constitute deceit, malpractice, conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and
Violation of Duties and Oath as a lawyer.
In support of their complaint, the complainants attached thereto Resolutions dated December 7, 1998 and June 22, 1999
of the Third Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Sto. Tomas and Minalin, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga and the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando, Pampanga, respectively, finding probable cause for the filing of the criminal
information against both Atty. Bernardo and Andres Magat (Magat) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San
Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 48, charging them with the crime of Estafa punishable under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code.

The respondent was required to file his Comment. On September 24, 2004, the respondent filed an undated Comment,
wherein he denied the allegations against him and averred the following:

2. He had not deceived both complainants between the period from April 15, 1997 to July 22, 1997 for purposes of
getting from them the amount of [P]495,000.00. It was Andy Magat whom they contacted and who in turn sought the
legal services of the respondent. It was Andy Magat who received the said money from them.

3. There was no connivance made and entered into by Andy Magat and respondent. The arrangement for titling of the
land was made by Teresita N. Bengco and Andy Magat with no participation of respondent.

4. The acceptance of the respondent to render his legal service is legal and allowed in law practice.

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

On February 16, 2005, the IBP ordered the respondent to submit a verified comment pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 6
of the Rules of Court as it appeared that the respondents undated comment filed with the Court was not verified.

On March 15, 2005, respondent through counsel requested for an additional fifteen (15) days from March 17, 2005, or
until April 1, 2005, within which to comply due to his medical confinement.

Thereafter, on April 4, 2005, the respondent filed a second motion for extension praying for another 20 days, or until
April 22, 2005, alleging that he was still recovering from his illness.

On August 3, 2005, the case was set for mandatory conference. The respondent failed to appear; thus, the IBP
considered the respondent in default for his failure to appear and for not filing an answer despite extensions granted.
The case was then submitted for report and recommendation.

Based on the records of the case, Investigating Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala made the following findings:

[O]n or before the period from 15 April 1997 to 22 July 1997, respondent with the help and in connivance and collusion
with a certain Andres Magat (Magat), by using false pretenses and deceitful words, [wilfully] and illegally committed
fraudulent acts to the effect that respondent would expedite the titling of the land belonging to the Miranda family of
Tagaytay City, who were the acquaintance of complainants.

Respondent and Magat convinced complainants that if they finance and deliver to them the amount of [P]495,000.00 as
advance money, they would expedite the titling of the subject land. Respondent represented himself to be the lawyer of
William Gatchalian, the owner of Plastic City located at Canomay Street, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, who was allegedly
the buyer of the subject land once it has been titled. Respondent and Magat also represented that they have contacts at
NAMREA, DENR, CENRO and the Register of Deeds which representation they knew to be false, fraudulent and were
only made to induce complainants to give and deliver to them the amount of [P]495,000.00. Once in possession of the
said amount, far from complying with their obligation to expedite and cause the titling of the subject land, respondent
and Magat [wilfully], unlawfully and illegally misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount to their
personal use and benefit and despite demand upon them to return the said amount, they failed and refused to do so.

In view of the deceit committed by respondent and Magat, complainants filed a complaint for Estafa against the former
before the Third Municipal Circuit Trial Court, of Sto. Tomas and Minalin, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. In the preliminary
investigation conducted by the said court, it finds sufficient grounds to hold respondent and Magat for trial for the crime
of Estafa defined under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The case was transmitted to the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga for appropriate action as per Order dated 7 December 1998.

The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga conducted a re-investigation
of the case. During the re-investigation thereof, Magat was willing to reimburse to complainants the amount of
[P]200,000.00 because according to him the amount of [P]295,000.00 should be reimbursed by respondent considering
that the said amount was turned over to respondent for expenses incurred in the documentation prior to the titling of
the subject land. Both respondent and Magat requested for several extensions for time to pay back their obligations to
the complainants. However, despite extensions of time granted to them, respondent and Magat failed to fulfil their
promise to pay back their obligation. Hence, it was resolved that the offer of compromise was construed to be an
implied admission of guilt. The Asst. Provincial Prosecutor believes that there was no reason to disturb the findings of
the investigating judge and an Information for Estafa was filed against respondent and Magat on 8 July 1999 before the
Regional Trial Court, San Fernando, Pampanga.

The failure of the lawyer to answer the complaint for disbarment despite due notice on several occasions and appear on
the scheduled hearings set, shows his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrates his despiciency for
his oath of office as a lawyer which deserves disciplinary sanction x x x.

From the facts and evidence presented, it could not be denied that respondent committed a crime that import deceit
and violation of his attorneys oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which he was bound to
obey the laws of the land. The commission of unlawful acts, specially crimes involving moral turpitude, acts of dishonesty
in violation of the attorneys oath, grossly immoral conduct and deceit are grounds for suspension or disbarment of
lawyers (Rule 138, Section 27, RRC).

The misconduct complained of took place in 1997 and complainants filed the case only on 16 April 2004. As provided for
by the Rules of Procedure of the Commission of Bar Discipline, as amended, dated 24 March 2004, A complaint for
disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys prescribes in two (2) years from the date of the professional
misconduct (Section 1, Rule VIII).

The Investigating Commissioner recommended that:

x x x [R]espondent ATTY. PABLO A. BERNARDO be SUSPENDED for a period of TWO YEARS from receipt hereof from the
practice of his profession as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.

On February 1, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2007-065, viz:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo is hereby ordered, the restitution of the amount of [P]200,000.00 within sixty (60) days from
receipt of notice with Warning that if he does not return the amount with in sixty days from receipt of this Order then
he will be meted the penalty of Suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.

On May 16, 2007, the respondent promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution of the IBP.
The respondent averred that: (1) the IBP resolution is not in accord with the rules considering that the complaint was
filed more than two (2) years from the alleged misconduct and therefore, must have been dismissed outright; (2) he did
not commit any misrepresentation in convincing Fidela to give him money to finance the titling of the land; (3) he was
hired as a lawyer through Magat who transacted with Teresita as evidenced by a Memorandum of Agreement signed by
the latter; (4) he was denied due process when the Investigating Commissioner considered him as in default after having
ignored the representative he sent during the hearing on August 3, 2005; and (5) he long restituted the amount of
P225,000.00 not as an offer of compromise but based on his moral obligation as a lawyer due to Teresitas declaration
that he had to stop acting as her legal counsel sometime in the third quarter of 1997. The respondent pointed out the
admission made by Fidela in her direct testimony before the RTC that she received the amount, as evidenced by
photocopies of receipts.

In an Order dated May 17, 2007 issued by the IBP, the complainant was required to comment within fifteen (15) days
from receipt thereof.

In her Comment, Fidela explained that it took them quite some time in filing the administrative case because they took
into consideration the possibility of an amicable settlement instead of a judicial proceeding since it would stain the
respondents reputation as a lawyer; that the respondent went into hiding which prompted them to seek the assistance
of CIDG agents from Camp Olivas in order to trace the respondents whereabouts; that the respondent was duly
accorded the opportunity to be heard; and finally, that no restitution of the P200,000.00 plus corresponding interest has
yet been made by the respondent.

On June 21, 2008, Fidela filed a Manifestation stating that the RTC rendered a decision in the criminal case for Estafa
finding the accused, Atty. Bernardo and Magat guilty of conspiracy in the commission of Estafa under Article 315 par.
2(a) of the Revised Penal Code and both are sentenced to suffer six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as
minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum.
In a Letter dated March 23, 2009, addressed to the IBP, Fidela sought the resolution of the present action as she was
already 86 years of age. Later, an Ex-parte Motion to Resolve the Case dated September 1, 2010 was filed by the
complainants. In another Letter dated October 26, 2011, Fidela, being 88 years old, sought for Atty. Bernardos
restitution of the amount of P200,000.00 so she can use the money to buy her medicine and other needs.

The Court adopts and agrees with the findings and conclusions of the IBP.

It is first worth mentioning that the respondents defense of prescription is untenable. The Court has held that
administrative cases against lawyers do not prescribe. The lapse of considerable time from the commission of the
offending act to the institution of the administrative complaint will not erase the administrative culpability of a lawyer.
Otherwise, members of the bar would only be emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding
from the fact that as long as no private complainant would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being
completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for.

Further, consistent with his failure to file his answer after he himself pleaded for several extensions of time to file the
same, the respondent failed to appear during the mandatory conference, as ordered by the IBP. As a lawyer, the
respondent is considered as an officer of the court who is called upon to obey and respect court processes. Such acts of
the respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the courts authority which can not be countenanced.

It can not be overstressed that lawyers are instruments in the administration of justice. As vanguards of our legal
system, they are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity
and fair dealing. In so doing, the peoples faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. Lawyers may be
disciplined whether in their professional or in their private capacity for any conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty,
probity and good demeanor.

Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.

Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-
laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.

There is no question that the respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admitted in his answer that his
legal services were hired by the complainants through Magat regarding the purported titling of land supposedly
purchased. While he begs for the Courts indulgence, his contrition is shallow considering the fact that he used his
position as a lawyer in order to deceive the complainants into believing that he can expedite the titling of the subject
properties. He never denied that he did not benefit from the money given by the complainants in the amount of
P495,000.00.

The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary
consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that
necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The duty to public service and
to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal
interests or what they owe to themselves.

It is likewise settled that a disbarment proceeding is separate and distinct from a criminal action filed against a lawyer
despite having involved the same set of facts. Jurisprudence has it that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not
necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, the respondents acquittal does not
necessarily exculpate him administratively.

In Yu v. Palaa, the Court held that:

Respondent, being a member of the bar, should note that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their
own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of criminal cases. A criminal prosecution will not
constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative
proceedings. Besides, it is not sound judicial policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case before a complaint
against a lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise, this Court will be rendered helpless to apply the rules on admission to,
and continuing membership in, the legal profession during the whole period that the criminal case is pending final
disposition, when the objectives of the two proceedings are vastly disparate. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private
interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare
and for preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice law. The attorney is called
to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. (Citations omitted)
As the records reveal, the RTC eventually convicted the respondent for the crime of Estafa for which he was meted the
penalty of sentenced to suffer six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one
(1) day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum. Such criminal conviction clearly undermines the respondents moral fitness
to be a member of the Bar. Rule 138, Section 27 provides that:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience
appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.

In view of the foregoing, this Court has no option but to accord him the punishment commensurate to all his acts and to
accord the complainants, especially the 88-year old Fidela, with the justice they utmost deserve.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo is found guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon
notice hereof.

Further, the Court ORDERS Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo (1) to RETURN the amount of P200,000.00 to Fidela Bengco and
Teresita Bengco within TEN (10) DAYS from receipt of this Decision and (2) to SUBMIT his proof of compliance thereof to
the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant within TEN (10) DAYS therefrom; with a STERN WARNING that failure
to do so shall merit him the additional penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
**************************************************************************************************

CASE NO. 5

A.C. No. 9116, March 12, 2014

NESTOR B. FIGUERAS AND BIENVENIDO VICTORIA, JR., Complainants, v. ATTY. DIOSDADO B. JIMENEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review filed by Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez assailing the February 19, 2009 Resolution of the
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) suspending him from the practice of law for a period of
six months for breach of Rule 12.03, Canon 12, Canon 17 Rule 18.03, and Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He likewise assails the June 26, 2011 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors denying his motion for
reconsideration.

The facts are as follows: c

Congressional Village Homeowners Association, Inc. is the entity in charge of the affairs of the homeowners of
Congressional Village in Quezon City. On January 7, 1993, the Spouses Federico and Victoria Santander filed a civil suit
for damages against the Association and Ely Mabanag before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 104
for building a concrete wall which abutted their property and denied them of their right of way. The spouses Santander
likewise alleged that said concrete wall was built in violation of Quezon City Ordinance No. 8633, S-71 which prohibits
the closing, obstructing, preventing or otherwise refusing to the public or vehicular traffic the use of or free access to
any subdivision or community street. The Law Firm of Gonzalez Sinense Jimenez and Associates was the legal counsel
for the Association, with respondent as the counsel of record and handling lawyer. After trial and hearing, the RTC
rendered a decision on October 4, 1996 in favor of the Spouses Santander. The Association, represented by said law firm,
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). On February 5, 1999, the CA issued a Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 55577
dismissing the appeal on the ground that the original period to file the appellants brief had expired 95 days even before
the first motion for extension of time to file said brief was filed. The CA also stated that the grounds adduced for the said
motion as well as the six subsequent motions for extension of time to file brief were not meritorious. The CA resolution
became final.

Eight years later or on April 11, 2007, complainants Nestor Figueras and Bienvenido Victoria, Jr., as members of the
Association, filed a Complaint for Disbarment against respondent before the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) for
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 12.03, Canon 12; Canon 17; and Rule 18.03, Canon
18 thereof for his negligence in handling the appeal and willful violation of his duties as an officer of the court.
In his Verified Answer with Counter Complaint, respondent denied administrative liability. He claimed that although his
law firm represented the homeowners association in CA-G.R. CV No. 55577, the case was actually handled by an
associate lawyer in his law office. As the partner in charge of the case, he exercised general supervision over the
handling counsel and signed the pleadings prepared by said handling lawyer. Upon discovery of the omissions of the
handling lawyer, appropriate sanctions were imposed on the handling lawyer and he thereafter personally took
responsibility and spent personal funds to negotiate a settlement with Federico Santander at no cost to the Association.
No damage whatsoever was caused to the Association.

Respondent likewise alleged that after he defeated complainant Figueras in the election for President of the
homeowners association in 1996, Figueras and his compadre, complainant Victoria, stopped paying their association
dues and other assessments. Complainants and other delinquent members of the association were sanctioned by the
Board of Directors and were sued by the association before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). In
retaliation, complainants filed the present disbarment case against him and several other cases against him and other
officers of the association before the HLURB to question, among others, the legitimacy of the Association, the election of
its officers, and the sanctions imposed by the Association. Thus, he concluded that the disbarment case was filed to
harass him. Respondent added that complainants have no personality to file the disbarment complaint as they were not
his clients; hence, there was likewise no jurisdiction over the complaint on the part of the IBP-CBD.

As counterclaim, respondent prayed for the outright dismissal of the disbarment case for lack of merit, the imposition of
sanctions on complainants, and the payment of damages for the filing of the baseless complaint for disbarment.

On October 3, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD found respondent liable for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 12.03 of Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03, and Canon 18 thereof, and
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three to six months, with warning
that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. crallawlibrary

On February 19, 2009, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XVIII-2009-14 adopting the
recommendation with modifications as follows: chanRoble sVirtualawlibrary

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution [as]
Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and considering Respondents breach of Rule 12.03, Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03 and Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6)
months. The Warning imposed against respondent is hereby deleted.

Respondent sought reconsideration of the resolution but his motion was denied in IBP Resolution No. XIX-2011-480
dated June 26, 2011. The IBP Board of Governors noted that respondents motion was a mere reiteration of matters
already discussed and there were no substantial grounds to disturb the February 19, 2009 Resolution.

Respondent now comes to this Court essentially raising the issue whether the IBP correctly found him administratively
liable for violation of Rule 12.03, Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03, and Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

After careful consideration of the records of the case, the Court finds that the suspension of respondent from the
practice of law is proper.

The Court finds no merit in respondents contention that complainants have no personality to file a disbarment case
against him as they were not his clients and that the present suit was merely instituted to harass him.

The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-in-interest must initiate the
suit does not apply in disbarment cases. In fact, the person who called the attention of the court to a lawyers
misconduct is in no sense a party, and generally has no interest in the outcome. crallawlibrary

In Heck v. Judge Santos, the Court held that [a]ny interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary
proceedings. The right to institute disbarment proceedings is not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person
complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and
the only basis for the judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charges.

The Court agrees with the IBP that respondent had been remiss in the performance of his duties as counsel for
Congressional Village Homeowners Association, Inc. Records show that respondent filed the first motion for extension
of time to file appellants brief 95 days after the expiration of the reglementary period to file said brief, thus causing the
dismissal of the appeal of the homeowners association. To justify his inexcusable negligence, respondent alleges that he
was merely the supervising lawyer and that the fault lies with the handling lawyer. His contention, however, is belied by
the records for we note that respondent had filed with the CA an Urgent Motion for Extension, which he himself signed
on behalf of the law firm, stating that a previous motion had been filed but due to the health condition of the
undersigned counselhe was not able to finish said Appellants Brief within the fifteen (15) day period earlier requested
by him. Thus, it is clear that respondent was personally in charge of the case.

A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the latters interest with utmost
diligence. In failing to file the appellants brief on behalf of his client, respondent had fallen far short of his duties as
counsel as set forth in Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which exhorts every member of
the Bar not to unduly delay a case and to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the same Code also states that: chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Canon 18A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03.A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.

In In Re: Atty. Santiago F. Marcos the Court considered a lawyers failure to file brief for his client as amounting to
inexcusable negligence. The Court held: chanRoble sVirtualawlibrary

An attorney is bound to protect his clients interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. (Del Rosario vs.
Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 159) A failure to file brief for his client certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence on his
part. (People vs. Villar, 46 SCRA 107) The respondent has indeed committed a serious lapse in the duty owed by him to
his client as well as to the Court not to delay litigation and to aid in the speedy administration of justice. (Canons 21 and
22, Canons of Professional Ethics; People vs. Daban, 43 SCRA 185; People vs. Estocada, 43 SCRA 515).

It has been stressed that the determination of whether an attorney should be disbarred or merely suspended for a
period involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion. The penalties for a lawyers failure to file a brief or other
pleading range from reprimand, warning with fine, suspension and, in grave cases, disbarment. In the present case, we
find too harsh the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of six months. Under the circumstances, we deem the penalty of suspension for one month from the
practice of law to be more commensurate with the extent of respondents violation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez is found administratively liable for violation of Rule
12.04, Canon 12 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is suspended from the practice
of law for one (1) month effective from finality of this Resolution, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar
violation shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished, upon its finality, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all the courts in
the Philippines, and spread on the personal record of respondent lawyer in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme
Court of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.
**************************************************************************************************

CASE NO. 6

A.C. No. 7360

JULY 24, 2012
ATTY. POLICARPIO I. CATALAN, v. ATTY. JOSELITO M. SIL VOSA

DECISION
This is a complaint filed by Atty. Policarpio l. Catalan, Jr. (Atty. Catalan) against Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa (Atty. Silvosa).
Atty. Catalan has three causes of action against Atty. Silvosa: ( 1) Atty. Silvosa appeared as counsel for the accused in the
same case for which he previously appeared as prosecutor; (2) Atty. Silvosa bribed his then colleague Prosecutor Phoebe
Toribio (Pros. Toribio) for 30,000; and (3) the Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa in Criminal Case No. 27776 for
direct bribery. Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commissioner for Bar Discipline Dennis A.B. Funa (Comm. Funa)
held Atty. Silvosa liable only for the first cause of action and recommended the penalty of reprimand. The Board of
Governors of the IBP twice modified Comm. Funas recommendation: first, to a suspension of six months, then to a
suspension of two years.

Atty. Silvosa was an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Bukidnon and a Prosecutor in Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
10, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Atty. Silvosa appeared as public prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 10256-00, People of the
Philippines v. SPO2 Elmor Esperon y Murillo, et al. (Esperon case), for the complex crime of double frustrated murder,
in which case Atty. Catalan was one of the private complainants. Atty. Catalan took issue with Atty. Silvosas manner of
prosecuting the case, and requested the Provincial Prosecutor to relieve Atty. Silvosa.

In his first cause of action, Atty. Catalan accused Atty. Silvosa of appearing as private counsel in a case where he
previously appeared as public prosecutor, hence violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.1 Atty.
Catalan also alleged that, apart from the fact that Atty. Silvosa and the accused are relatives and have the same middle
name, Atty. Silvosa displayed manifest bias in the accuseds favor. Atty. Silvosa caused numerous delays in the trial of
the Esperon case by arguing against the position of the private prosecutor. In 2000, Provincial Prosecutor Guillermo
Ching granted Atty. Catalans request to relieve Atty. Silvosa from handling the Esperon case. The RTC rendered
judgment convicting the accused on 16 November 2005. On 23 November 2005, Atty. Silvosa, as private lawyer and as
counsel for the accused, filed a motion to reinstate bail pending finality of judgment of the Esperon case.

In his second cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the affidavit of Pros. Toribio. In a case for frustrated murder where
Atty. Catalans brother was a respondent, Pros. Toribio reviewed the findings of the investigating judge and downgraded
the offense from frustrated murder to less serious physical injuries. During the hearing before Comm. Funa, Pros. Toribio
testified that, while still a public prosecutor at the time, Atty. Silvosa offered her 30,000 to reconsider her findings and
uphold the charge of frustrated murder.

Finally, in the third cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the Sandiganbayans decision in Criminal Case No. 27776,
convicting Atty. Silvosa of direct bribery on 18 May 2006. Nilo Lanticse (Lanticse) filed a complaint against Atty. Silvosa
before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Despite the execution of an affidavit of desistance by the complainant
in a homicide case in favor of Lanticses father-in-law, Arsenio Cadinas (Cadinas), Cadinas still remained in detention for
more than two years. Atty. Silvosa demanded 15,000 from Lanticse for the dismissal of the case and for the release of
Cadinas. The NBI set up an entrapment operation for Atty. Silvosa. GMA 7s television program Imbestigador videotaped
and aired the actual entrapment operation. The footage was offered and admitted as evidence, and viewed by the
Sandiganbayan. Despite Atty. Silvosas defense of instigation, the Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa. The dispositive
portion of Criminal Case No. 27776 reads:

WHEREFORE, this court finds JOSELITO M. SILVOSA GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of direct bribery and
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of:

(A) Imprisonment of, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, one year, one month and eleven days of prision
correccional, as minimum, up to three years, six months and twenty days of prision correccional, as maximum;
(B) Fine of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Php 10,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and
(C) All other accessory penalties provided for under the law. SO ORDERED.

In his defense, on the first cause of action, Atty. Silvosa states that he resigned as prosecutor from the Esperon case on
18 October 2002. The trial court released its decision in the Esperon case on 16 November 2005 and cancelled the
accuseds bail. Atty. Silvosa claims that his appearance was only for the purpose of the reinstatement of bail. Atty.
Silvosa also denies any relationship between himself and the accused.

On the second cause of action, Atty. Silvosa dismisses Pros. Toribios allegations as self-serving and purposely dug by
[Atty. Catalan] and his puppeteer to pursue persecution.

On the third cause of action, while Atty. Silvosa admits his conviction by the Sandiganbayan and is under probation, he
asserts that conviction under the 2nd paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, do [sic] not involve moral
turpitude since the act involved do [sic] not amount to a crime. He further claims that it is not the lawyer in
respondent that was convicted, but his capacity as a public officer, the charge against respondent for which he was
convicted falling under the category of crimes against public officers x x x.

In a Report and Recommendation dated 15 September 2008, Comm. Funa found that:

As for the first charge, the wordings and prohibition in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility [are] quite
clear. [Atty. Silvosa] did intervene in Criminal Case No. 10246-00. [Atty. Silvosas] attempt to minimize his role in said
case would be unavailing. The fact is that he is presumed to have acquainted himself with the facts of said case and has
made himself familiar with the parties of the case. Such would constitute sufficient intervention in the case. The fact
that, subsequently, [Atty. Silvosa] entered his appearance in said case only to file a Motion to Post Bail Bond Pending
Appeal would still constitute a violation of Rule 6.03 as such act is sufficient to establish a lawyer-client relation.
As for the second charge, there is certain difficulty to dissect a claim of bribery that occurred more than seven (7) years
ago. In this instance, the conflicting allegations are merely based on the word of one person against the word of
another. With [Atty. Silvosas] vehement denial, the accusation of witness [Pros.] Toribio stands alone unsubstantiated.
Moreover, we take note that the alleged incident occurred more than seven (7) years ago or in 1999, [l]ong before this
disbarment case was filed on November 2006. Such a long period of time would undoubtedly cast doubt on the veracity
of the allegation. Even the existence of the bribe money could not be ascertained and verified with certainty anymore.
As to the third charge, [Atty. Silvosa] correctly points out that herein complainant has no personal knowledge about the
charge of extortion for which [Atty. Silvosa] was convicted by the Sandiganbayan. [Atty. Catalan] was not a party in said
case nor was he ever involved in said case. The findings of the Sandiganbayan are not binding upon this Commission. The
findings in a criminal proceeding are not binding in a disbarment proceeding. No evidence has been presented relating
to the alleged extortion case.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that [Atty. Silvosa] is GUILTY only of the First Charge in violating Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and should be given the penalty of REPRIMAND.
Respectfully submitted.3
In a Resolution dated 9 October 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the Report
and Recommendation of Comm. Funa and suspended Atty. Silvosa from the practice of law for six months. In another
Resolution dated 28 October 2011, the IBP Board of Governors increased the penalty of Atty. Silvosas suspension from
the practice of law to two years. The Office of the Bar Confidant received the notice of the Resolution and the records of
the case on 1 March 2012.

We sustain the findings of the IBP only in the first cause of action and modify its recommendations in the second and
third causes of action.

Atty. Catalan relies on Rule 6.03 which states that A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service. Atty.
Silvosa, on the hand, relies on Rule 2.01 which provides that A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons the cause
of the defenseless or the oppressed and on Canon 14 which provides that A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the
needy.
We agree with Comm. Funas finding that Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03. When he entered his appearance on the
Motion to Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa conveniently forgot Rule 15.03 which provides that A lawyer
shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of facts.
Atty. Silvosas attempts to minimize his involvement in the same case on two occasions can only be described as
desperate. He claims his participation as public prosecutor was only to appear in the arraignment and in the pre-trial
conference. He likewise claims his subsequent participation as collaborating counsel was limited only to the
reinstatement of the original bail. Atty. Silvosa will do well to take heed of our ruling in Hilado v. David:4
An attorney is employed that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or counselor when he is
listening to his clients preliminary statement of his case, or when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is
drawing his clients pleadings, or advocating his clients pleadings, or advocating his clients cause in open court.

Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and client as the yardstick for
testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from
fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. It is
founded on principles of public policy, on good taste. As has been said in another case, the question is not necessarily
one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these
thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesars wife, not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to
avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to
their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.

Indeed, the prohibition against representation of conflicting interests applies although the attorneys intentions were
honest and he acted in good faith.

Atty. Silvosa denies Pros. Toribios accusation of bribery and casts doubt on its veracity by emphasizing the delay in
presenting a complaint before the IBP. Comm. Funa, by stating that there is difficulty in ascertaining the veracity of the
facts with certainty, in effect agreed with Atty. Silvosa. Contrary to Comm. Funas ruling, however, the records show that
Atty. Silvosa made an attempt to bribe Pros. Toribio and failed. Pros. Toribio executed her affidavit on 14 June 1999, a
day after the failed bribery attempt, and had it notarized by Atty. Nemesio Beltran, then President of the IBP-Bukidnon
Chapter. There was no reason for Pros. Toribio to make false testimonies against Atty. Silvosa. Atty. Silvosa, on the other
hand, merely denied the accusation and dismissed it as persecution. When the integrity of a member of the bar is
challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him. He must meet the issue and overcome the evidence
against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is
expected of him.6 Atty. Silvosa failed in this respect.

Unfortunately for Atty. Silvosa, mere delay in the filing of an administrative complaint against a member of the bar does
not automatically exonerate a respondent. Administrative offenses do not prescribe. No matter how much time has
elapsed from the time of the commission of the act complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint,
erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court.

We disagree with Comm. Funas ruling that the findings in a criminal proceeding are not binding in a disbarment
proceeding.
First, disbarment proceedings may be initiated by any interested person. There can be no doubt of the right of a citizen
to bring to the attention of the proper authority acts and doings of public officers which a citizen feels are incompatible
with the duties of the office and from which conduct the public might or does suffer undesirable consequences.8 Section
1, Rule 139-B reads:
Section 1. How Instituted. Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the
Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person.
The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons
having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers,
or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys including those in
government service.
It is of no moment that Atty. Catalan is not the complainant in Criminal Case No. 27776, and that Lanticse, the
complainant therein, was not presented as a witness in the present case. There is no doubt that the Sandiganbayans
judgment in Criminal Case No. 27776 is a matter of public record and is already final. Atty. Catalan supported his
allegation by submitting documentary evidence of the Sandiganbayans decision in Criminal Case No. 27776. Atty.
Silvosa himself admitted, against his interest, that he is under probation.

Second, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment. Moral turpitude is defined as an act
of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general,
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. Section 27, Rule 138 provides:

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)

In a disbarment case, this Court will no longer review a final judgment of conviction.
Third, the crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. In Magno v. COMELEC,11 we ruled:

By applying for probation, petitioner in effect admitted all the elements of the crime of direct bribery:
1. the offender is a public officer;
2. the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through another;
3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with a view to committing some
crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to
refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do; and
4. the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the performance of his official
duties.

Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and
deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from performing an official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a
malicious intent on the part of the offender to renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and society in general.
Also, the fact that the offender takes advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the
public. It is a conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and good morals. In all
respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. (Italicization in the original)

Atty. Silvosas representation of conflicting interests and his failed attempt at bribing Pros. Toribio merit at least the
penalty of suspension. Atty. Silvosas final conviction of the crime of direct bribery clearly falls under one of the grounds
for disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138. Disbarment follows as a consequence of Atty. Silvosas conviction of the
crime. We are constrained to impose a penalty more severe than suspension because we find that Atty. Silvosa is
predisposed to flout the exacting standards of morality and decency required of a member of the Bar. His excuse that his
conviction was not in his capacity as a lawyer, but as a public officer, is unacceptable and betrays the unmistakable lack
of integrity in his character. The practice of law is a privilege, and Atty. Silvosa has proved himself unfit to exercise this
privilege.
Wherefore, respondent Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa is hereby DISBARRED and his name ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent's
personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to the Office
of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

**************************************************************************************************
CASE NO. 7

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, A. C. No. 5355

Petitioner,
- versus -
ATTY. DANIEL B. LIANGCO,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
December 13, 2011

DECISION

Per Curiam:

The Case

This is an administrative Complaint for Disbarment filed by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) against
respondent Atty. Daniel B. Liangco.
In a per curiam En Banc Resolution in Gozun v. Hon. Liangco, dated 30 August 2000, this Court ordered the dismissal
from service of respondent as judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Fernando, Pampanga and as acting judge
of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Mexico-San Luis, Pampanga. His dismissal was with forfeiture of all his
retirement benefits and accumulated leave credits; and with prejudice to his reinstatement or reemployment in any
branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including government-owned or -controlled corporations. The
Court further directed the OCA to initiate disbarment proceedings against him for misconduct as a member of the bar.
Hence, this present case for resolution by the Court.

The Facts

We quote the facts as stated in A. M. No. MTJ-97-1136, as follows:

Complainant Hermogenes T. Gozun (hereinafter referred to as Gozun) was in open and adverse possession of subject
land for a period of more than thirty years. His familys house was erected on the land. The house was made of old
vintage lumber, cement, hollow blocks, G. I. sheet roofing and other strong materials. Gozun inherited the house and lot
from his parents.

The municipality of San Luis, Pampanga claimed to own the same lot.

On January 12, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga issued Resolution No. 26-96, stating:

RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED that the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga do hereby consider (sic) the lot
under Tax Dec. No. 114 owned by the Municipal Government of San Luis, Pampanga, specifically the lot where Mr.
Hermogenes Gozun and family were squatting (sic) as the new site of the Rural Health Center will rise (sic).

On May 17, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan issued Resolution No. 34-96 to amend the correct Resolution No. 26-96.

On May 24, 1996, Romulo M. Batu, Vice Mayor, on behalf of the Sangguniang Bayan, filed with the MTC, San Luis,
Pampanga, a petition for declaratory relief. We quote the petition:

PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF

THE HONORABLE JUDGE DANIEL LIANGCO

In behalf of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis, Pampanga, We would like to petition your good office to render legal
opinion on the following matters, to wit:

1. The validity of the attached Resolution.

2. The powers of the Municipal Mayor to enforce said Resolution.

3. To issue an order to the PNP to assist the Municipal Mayor in implementing said Resolution.

These request are (sic) in connection with our plan to construct a new site for the Rural Health Center of San Luis,
Pampanga. However, the designated place thereof is presently being squatted (sic) by a certain Mr. Hermogenes Gozun
and inspite of the official notice of Atty. Benlfre S. Galang, our Provincial Legal Officer, and personal request of our
Municipal Mayor Jovito C. Bondoc to Mr. Gozun to vacate his (sic) premises, he continues to defy such notices and
request to the detriment of the proposed project.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this petition will merit your favorable consideration and appropriate action
for the sake of public interest.

On the very same day, May 24, 1996, respondent judge issued a resolution, reasoning: First, the municipality of San Luis,
Pampanga through its Sangguniang Bayan may enact resolutions and ordinances to regulate the use of property within
its jurisdiction. Second, Resolution No. 34-96 is not contrary to law, morals and public policy. Third, the municipal mayor
through an executive order may order the Philippine National Police or any government law enforcement agency to
enforce or implement the resolution, using reasonable force if necessary and justified. Fourth, squatting in government
property is considered a nuisance per se. Respondent judge ruled:

With the issuance by the Municipal Mayor of an executive order, the municipality of San Luis may order the Philippine
National Police (PNP) stationed in San Luis, Pampanga to effect the eviction of Hermogenes Gozun and all other persons
who may be claiming any right under him from Lot No. 114 covered by tax Declaration No. 6030 (underscoring ours).

Again, on the same day, March 24, 1996, the municipal mayor, Jovito C. Bondoc, pursuant to the aforequoted resolution,
issued Executive Order No. 1, series of 1996, ordering the PNP to implement Resolution No. 34-96.

Note that complainant Gozun was not served with summons or given notice of the petition for declaratory relief.

On June 2, 1996, complainant Gozun learned about the resolution.

On June 3, 1996, complainant Gozuns wife together with other public school teachers went to the office of the
respondent judge. When asked about the resolution, respondent judge answered, Ing Apung Guinu yu y Mayor Bondoc
at kaya ko makisabi (Your God is Mayor Bondoc and you should talk to him).

On August 8, 1996, agents of the municipal government demolished complainant Gozuns house, using respondent
judges resolution and the mayors executive order as basis.

On December 18, 1996, complainant Gozun filed this administrative complaint with the Office of the Court
Administrator. He averred that respondent judges issuance of the resolution amounts to gross misconduct, gross
inefficiency and incompetence. Complainant Gozun further accused the municipal mayor of having bribed respondent
judge. Mayor Bondoc told complainant Gozun that the respondent judge is in his pocket because he (Mayor Bondoc) has
given him (respondent judge) a lot of things (dacal naku a regalo kaya).

On January 20, 1997, the Office of the Court Administrator submitted the petition to this Court for its consideration,
recommending that the complaint be given due course.

On March 21, 1997, the Court resolved to require respondent judge to comment thereon, within ten (10) days from
notice.

On May 15, 1997, respondent judge submitted his comment, denying the charges and urging that the case be dismissed.

On June 23, 1997, we referred the case back to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation.

On April 13, 2000, after investigation, Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo submitted a memorandum,
recommending the dismissal from office of respondent judge.

A.M. No. MTJ-97-1136

Dismissal of Respondent from the Bench

The OCA Resolution was forwarded to this Court for evaluation and action and docketed as A.M. No. MTJ-97-1136. On
30 August, 2000, the Court En Banc promulgated a per curiam Resolution adopting the report and recommendation of
the Court Administrator. It ruled that respondent had blatantly ignored the basic rules of fair play, in addition to acting
without jurisdiction in entertaining a Petition for Declaratory Relief despite his being a judge of a first-level court. Court
also pointed out that his ruling on the said Petition resulted in the demolition of the house of complainant Gozun, thus
rendering his family homeless. It described respondents acts as biased and maleficent and ruled that those acts merited
the punishment of dismissal from the service, viz:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court hereby orders the DISMISSAL of respondent Judge Daniel B. Liangco, Municipal Trial
Judge, Municipal Trial Court, San Fernando, Pampanga, and Acting Judge Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Mexico-
San Luis, Pampanga, from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and accumulated leave credits, if any,
and with prejudice to reinstatement or reemployment in any branch, instrumentality or agency of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.

The Court directs the Court Administrator to initiate disbarment proceedings against respondent Judge for misconduct
as a member of the bar within thirty (30) days from finality of his decision.

This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5355

Disbarment

On 10 November 2000, the OCA filed a Complaint for Disbarment against respondent. In its Complaint dated 06
November 2000, docketed as Administrative Case No. (A.C.) 5355, the OCA charged him with gross misconduct for acting
with manifest bias and partiality towards a party, as well as for inexcusable ignorance of well-established rules of
procedure that challenged his competence to remain a member of the legal profession. Thus, it prayed that he be
disbarred, and that his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

On 28 November 2000, the Court En Banc promulgated a Resolution requiring respondent to file his Comment on the
Complaint for Disbarment against him. On 01 June 2001, he filed his Comment on/Answer to Complaint for Disbarment,
appealing for understanding and asking that the Court allow him to continue practicing as a lawyer. He reasoned that
when he acted on the Petition for Declaratory Relief filed by the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of San Luis,
Pampanga, he was merely rendering a legal opinion honestly and in good faith; and that his actions were not attended
by malice, bad faith or any other ulterior motive. He further pleads for compassion from this Court and for permission to
remain a member of the bar, because the practice of law is his only means of livelihood to support his family.

On 07 August 2001, the Court En Banc noted the submission of respondent and referred the case to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt of the records
of the case.[

IBPs Report and Recommendation

The IBP held a series of hearings on the disbarment case with respondents participation. On 03 October 2003, the
investigating commissioner issued her Report and Recommendation finding justification for the disbarment of
respondent and recommending that his name be struck off the Roll of Attorneys. The investigating commissioner found
that, based on the facts of the case, there was clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence to warrant the disbarment of
respondent. She observed that he had exhibited lapses, as well as ignorance of well-established rules and procedures.
She also observed that the present Complaint was not the first of its kind to be filed against him. She further noted that
before his dismissal from the judiciary, respondent was suspended for six (6) months when he assigned to his court,
without a raffle, fifty-four (54) cases for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1602 a violation of Supreme Court Circular
No. 7 dated 23 September 1974. Also, pending with the Supreme Court were three (3) administrative cases filed against
him for dishonesty, gross ignorance of the law, and direct bribery. In the bribery case, he was caught by the National
Bureau of Investigation in an entrapment operation.

On 30 January 2009, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Report and Recommendation of the IBP. He
alleged that the evidence presented in the proceedings for his dismissal as judge was the same as that which was used in
the disbarment case against him. Thus, because he did not have the chance to cross-examine the witnesses, he claimed
to have been deprived of due process. In addition, respondent emphasized the submission by Gozun of an Affidavit of
Desistance from the Complaint the latter had originally filed against him and contended that the case should have been
dismissed. Lastly, respondent averred that he had endeavored to improve himself as a devout Catholic by joining
religious organizations. He also impressed upon the IBP his effort to improve on his knowledge of the law by attending
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE).

On 12 May 2009, respondent filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration wherein he implored the IBP to take a
second look at his case. He emphasized the submission by Gozun of an Affidavit of Desistance and the fact that the
former had already suffered the supreme penalty of dismissal as MTC judge. Respondent also reiterated the grounds
already stated in his first Motion for Reconsideration.

On 09 October 2008, the IBP board of governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-525, which adopted the Report and
Recommendation of the investigating commissioner, who found that respondent had acted with manifest bias and
partiality in favor of a party-litigant and shown inexcusable ignorance of the Rules of Procedure. The Resolution likewise
adopted the recommendation to disbar respondent.

On 30 June 2011, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline transmitted the case records of A. C. No. 5355 to this Court,
which noted it on 16 August 2011.
The Courts Ruling

The Court affirms in toto the findings and recommendations of the IBP.

The evidence on record overwhelmingly supports the finding that respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and
inexcusable ignorance of well-established rules of procedures.

Gross Misconduct

In Sps. Donato v. Atty. Asuncion, Jr. citing Yap v. Judge Aquilino A. Inopiquez, Jr., this Court explained the concept of
gross misconduct as any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned with the
administration of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right determination of the cause.
The motive behind this conduct is generally a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.

In the case at bar, respondent acted upon the Petition for Declaratory Relief filed by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Luis,
Pampanga, without the mandatory notice to Gozun who would be affected by the action. The records show that
respondent, upon receipt of the Petition, had it docketed in his court, designated Gozun as respondent in the case title,
and quickly disposed of the matter by issuing a Resolution all on the same day that the Petition was filed without notice
and hearing. Respondent admitted that, to his mind, he was merely rendering a legal opinion at the local governments
behest, which he gladly and expeditiously obliged. Without denying this fact in his Comment, he admitted that he had
erred in acting upon the Petition, but emphasized that his actions were not attended by malice or bad faith.
We find his statements hard to believe.

The undue haste with which respondent acted on the Petition negates good faith on his part. Moreover, the testimonial
evidence on record indicates that he maintained close relations with the municipal vice-mayor of San Luis, Pampanga, a
party-litigant who had an obvious interest in the outcome of the case. The testimony of Romulo A. Batu, former vice-
mayor of San Luis, Pampanga, showed that respondent denigrated his impartiality as a judge is as follows:

COMM. SANSANO: You dont remember therefore that at any time at all you were with the mayor in going to see the
respondent?

WITNESS: (Mr. Batu) I do not know any instance that the mayor visited the respondent, Your Honor. I do not know any
instance that I was with him.

COMM. SANSANO: But other than the occasion of the filing of this request there were times when you went to see the
respondent also in his office?

WITNESS: There was no other visit, Your Honor.

COMM. SANSANO: So May 24, 1996 was the first time you went to see him in his office?

WITNESS: Before that, Your Honor, nagpupunta na kami doon kung minsan may nagpapatulong na mga may kaso.

COMM. SANSANO: Yon ang tanong ko kanina sa iyo kung bago May 24 pumupunta ka na sa opisina niyang datihan?

WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor.

The testimony of respondents own witness clearly showed his wanton disregard of Canon 1, Sections 4 and 5 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which requires the observance of judicial independence and its
protection from undue influence, whether from private or from public interests.
In Edao v. Judge Asdala, we explained the rationale behind this imposition:
As the visible representation of the law and justice, judges, such as the respondent, are expected to conduct themselves
in a manner that would enhance the respect and confidence of the people in the judicial system. The New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only maintain their independence, integrity
and impartiality; but they must also avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may erode the peoples
faith in the judiciary. Integrity and impartiality, as well as the appearance thereof, are deemed essential not just in the
proper discharge of judicial office, but also to the personal demeanor of judges. This standard applies not only to the
decision itself, but also to the process by which the decision is made. Section 1, Canon 2, specifically mandates judges to
ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of reasonable
observers. Clearly, it is of vital importance not only that independence, integrity and impartiality have been observed by
judges and reflected in their decisions, but that these must also appear to have been so observed in the eyes of the
people, so as to avoid any erosion of faith in the justice system. Thus, judges must be circumspect in their actions in
order to avoid doubt and suspicion in the dispensation of justice. To further emphasize its importance, Section 2, Canon
2 states:

Sec. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must
not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.

As early as June 6, 2003, OCA Circular No. 70-2003 has directed judges as follows:

In view of the increasing number of reports reaching the Office of the Court Administrator that judges have been
meeting with party litigants inside their chambers, judges are hereby cautioned to avoid in-chambers sessions without
the other party and his counsel present, and to observe prudence at all times in their conduct to the end that they only
act impartially and with propriety but are also perceived to be impartial and proper.

Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the decision itself but also to
the process by which the decision is made. As such, judges must ensure that their conduct, both in and out of the court,
maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge
and of the judiciary. In the same vein, the Code of Judicial Conduct behooves all judges to avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all their activities, as such is essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge in
order to maintain the trust and respect of the people in the judiciary.

Also relevant is Canon 3, particularly Section 2 of the new code, which exhorts judges not only to be impartial in deciding
the cases before them, but also to project the image of impartiality. Unfortunately, as shown by the facts of the case,
these rules were not properly observed by respondent as a judge of a first-level court.

Inexcusable Ignorance of the Law

We are appalled by respondents ignorance of the basic rules of procedure. His wanton use of court processes in this
case without regard for the repercussions on the rights and property of others clearly shows his unfitness to remain a
member of the bar.

A cursory look at the Resolution dated 24 May 1996 issued by respondent would prompt an ordinary person to conclude
that an action in the form of a Petition for Declaratory Relief was indeed filed, because it bears the name and the branch
of the court of law that issued it. It had a docket number and the names of the parties involved. The Resolution even
states the justiciable question to be resolved and accordingly makes a judicial determination thereof. In reality, though,
there was no notice sent to Gozun, the named respondent in the Petition; nor was a hearing held to thresh out the
issues involved. As far as respondent was concerned, he simply issued a legal opinion, but one with all the hallmarks of a
valid issuance by a court of law, despite the absence of mandatory processes such as notice especially to Gozun and
hearing. Even this excuse is unacceptable. Judges do not, and are not allowed, to issue legal opinions. Their opinions are
always in the context of judicial decisions, or concurring and dissenting opinions in the case of collegiate courts, and
always in the context of contested proceedings.

What is most unfortunate is that the Sanguniang Bayan, relying on the Resolution respondent issued, caused the
demolition of the house of Gozun and his family, who were thus ejected from the property they had been occupying for
decades. In effect, Gozun was deprived of his property without due process. To us, this is precisely the injustice that
members of the bench and the bar are sworn to guard against. Regrettably, respondent as judge was even instrumental
in its commission. When his liability for his act was invoked, he casually justifies them as honest mistakes not attended
by malice or bad faith. His justification is unacceptable to us.

As a member of the bar and former judge, respondent is expected to be well-versed in the Rules of Procedure. This
expectation is imposed upon members of the legal profession, because membership in the bar is in the category of a
mandate for public service of the highest order. Lawyers are oath-bound servants of society whose conduct is clearly
circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth
and justice, for which they have sworn to be fearless crusaders.[
As judge of a first-level court, respondent is expected to know that he has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for
declaratory relief. Moreover, he is presumed to know that in his capacity as judge, he cannot render a legal opinion in
the absence of a justiciable question. Displaying an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he in effect erodes the publics
confidence in the competence of our courts. Moreover, he demonstrates his ignorance of the power and responsibility
that attach to the processes and issuances of a judge, and that he as a member of the bar should know.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer must uphold the Constitution and promote
respect for the legal processes. Contrary to this edict, respondent malevolently violated the basic constitutional right of
Gozun not to be deprived of a right or property without due process of law.

Under Canon 10, Rule 10.03, respondent as lawyer is mandated to observe the Rules of Procedure and not to misuse
them to defeat the ends of justice. In this case, however, the opposite happened. Respondent recklessly used the
powers of the court to inflict injustice.

Should the misconduct of respondent as judge also warrant his disbarment from the legal profession? We answer in the
affirmative.

In Collantes v. Renomeron, we ruled therein that the misconduct of the respondent therein as a public official also
constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer:

As the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro said:

"A person takes an oath when he is admitted to the Bar which is designed to impress upon him his responsibilities. He
thereby becomes an officer of the court on whose shoulders rest the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the
proper, fair, speedy and efficient administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid discipline that
demands that in his every exertion the only criterion be that truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what has given
the law profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are
expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest
observance of fiduciary responsibility - all of which, throughout the centuries, have been compendiously described as
'moral character.'

xxx xxx xxx

"A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession." (Rule 7.03, Code of
Professional Responsibility.)

This Court has ordered that only those who are "competent, honorable, and reliable" may practice the profession of law
(Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293) for every lawyer must pursue "only the highest standards in the practice of his calling"
(Court Administrator vs. Hermoso, 150 SCRA 269, 278).

Recently, in Samson v. Judge Caballero, we ruled that because membership in the bar is an integral qualification for
membership in the bench, the moral fitness of a judge also reflects the latters moral fitness as a lawyer. A judge who
disobeys the basic rules of judicial conduct also violates the lawyers oath.

We note that on 25 August 2011, respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing Resolution No. XVIII-2008-
525 dated 09 October 2008 promulgated by the IBP board of governors, which adopted and approved the findings of the
investigating commissioner recommending his disbarment. Respondent alleged therein that he had served as assistant
provincial prosecutor in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga for thirteen (13) years prior to his dismissal
as MTC judge of San Luis, Pampanga and as acting MCTC judge of Mexico-San Luis, Pampanga. He also complains that he
was deprived of due process by the IBP board of governors when it approved and adopted the findings of the
investigating commissioner recommending his disbarment; and he prays for a second look at his case, considering the
withdrawal of the Complaint originally filed by Gozun.

In the light of our ruling in this case, we can no longer consider the undocketed Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by
respondent. In the first place, such kind of petition is not available to assail the resolution of the IBP in an administrative
case. His remedies from an adverse resolution is to seek a reconsideration of the same, and when denied, to raise the
same defenses against administrative liability before this Court. He has availed of both remedies in this case.

Disbarment proceedings are sui generis. As such, they render the underlying motives of complainant unimportant and of
little relevance. The purpose of disbarment proceedings is mainly to determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue acting
as an officer of the court and as participant in the dispensation of justice an issue which the complainants personal
motives have little relevance. For this reason, upon information of an alleged wrongdoing, the Court may initiate the
disbarment proceedings motu proprio.

Recently in Garrido v. Atty. Garrido, we reiterated the unique characteristic of disbarment proceedings and their
purpose in this wise:

Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or
in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant do not apply in the
determination of a lawyers qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the past and we see
no reason to depart from this ruling. First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of
justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the public. The admission qualifications are also
qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation
of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may inquire into
through this Court. In this sense, the complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party whose interest in the
outcome of the charge is wholly his or her own; effectively, his or her participation is that of a witness who brought the
matter to the attention of the Court.

Thus, despite Gozuns desistance in A.M. No. MTJ-97-1136, from whence this case originated, respondent is not
exonerated.

WHEREFORE, this Court resolves to DISBAR Atty. Daniel B. Liangco for the following offenses:

1. GROSS MISCONDUCT in violation of Canon 1, Sections 4 and 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary
2. INEXCUSABLE IGNORANCE OF THE LAW in violation of Canons 1 and 10, Rule 10.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Daniel B. Liangco in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and another copy furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The Bar Confidant is hereby directed to strike out the name of Daniel B. Liangco from the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.
 DISCIPLINE OF FILIPINO LAWYERS PRACTICING ABROAD

CASE NO. 1

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, A.C. No. 6697

Complainant,
versus -
ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA,
Respondent.
x-------------------------x
RE: OATH-TAKING OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA, INCOMING
PRESIDENT OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
x-------------------------x
IN THE MATTER OF THE REMOVAL OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA
FROM THE IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS AS EXECUTIVE VICE
PRESIDENT AND GOVERNOR Bar Matter No. 1227

IN THE MATTER OF THE LETTER-COMPLAINT OF ATTY. LEONARD S.

DE VERA DATED MAY 18, 2005 TO FORTHWITH DENY/DISAPPROVE
THE IBP RESOLUTION UNJUSTLY, ILLEGALLY, ARBITRARILY, AND
ABRUPTLY REMOVING HIM FROM THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF
THE IBP FOR ABSOLUTE LACK OF BASIS AND FOR FLAGRANT DENIAL
OF DUE PROCESS.
A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC

Promulgated:

July 25, 2006

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
Per Curiam:

Before Us are three consolidated cases revolving around Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Governor and Executive
Vice-President (EVP) Atty. Leonard de Vera. The first pertains to a disbarment case questioning Atty. de Veras moral
fitness to remain as a member of the Philippine Bar, the second refers to Atty. de Veras letter-request to schedule his
oath taking as IBP National President, and the third case concerns the validity of his removal as Governor and EVP of the
IBP by the IBP Board. The resolution of these cases will determine the national presidency of the IBP for the term 2005-
2007.
A.C. No. 6697
The Office of the Bar Confidant, which this Court tasked to make an investigation, report and recommendation on
subject case, summarized the antecedents thereof as follows:

In a Complaint dated 11 April 2005, complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez moved for the suspension and/or disbarment of
respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera based on the following grounds:

1) respondents alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered against him by the State Bar of
California; and
2) respondents alleged violation of the so-called rotation rule enunciated in Administrative Matter No. 491 dated 06
October 1989 (in the Matter: 1989 IBP Elections).

Complainant averred that the respondent, in appropriating for his own benefit funds due his client, was found to have
performed an act constituting moral turpitude by the Hearing Referee Bill Dozier, Hearing Department San Francisco,
State Bar of California in Administrative Case No. 86-0-18429. Complainant alleged that the respondent was then forced
to resign or surrender his license to practice law in the said state in order to evade the recommended three (3) year
suspension. Complainant asserted that the respondent lacks the moral competence necessary to lead the countrys most
noble profession.

Complainant, likewise, contended that the respondent violated the so-called rotation rule provided for in Administrative
Matter No. 491 when he transferred to IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter. He claimed that the respondent failed to meet the
requirements outlined in the IBP By-Laws pertaining to transfer of Chapter Membership. He surmised that the
respondents transfer was intended only for the purpose of becoming the next IBP National President. Complainant
prayed that the respondent be enjoined from assuming office as IBP National President.

Meanwhile, in his Comment dated 2 May 2005, respondent stated that the issues raised in above-mentioned Complaint
were the very issues raised in an earlier administrative case filed by the same complainant against him. In fact, according
to him, the said issues were already extensively discussed and categorically ruled upon by this Court in its Decision dated
11 December 2005 in Administrative Case No. 6052 (In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard De Vera). Respondent
prayed that the instant administrative complaint be dismissed following the principle of res judicata.

On 15 June 2005, both parties appeared before the Office of the Bar Confidant for presentation of evidence in support
of their respective allegations.

Subsequently, in a Memorandum dated 20 June 2005, complainant maintained that there is substantial evidence
showing respondents moral baseness, vileness and depravity, which could be used as a basis for his disbarment.
Complainant stressed that the respondent never denied that he used his clients money. Complainant argued that the
respondent failed to present evidence that the Supreme Court of California accepted the latters resignation and even if
such was accepted, complainant posited that this should not absolve the respondent from liability.

Moreover, complainant added that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the case at bar. He asserted that the
first administrative case filed against the respondent was one for his disqualification. x x x.

Bar Matter No. 1227

A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC

As earlier adverted to, Bar Matter No. 1227 refers to Atty. de Veras letter-request to this Court to schedule his oath
taking as IBP National President. A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, on the other hand, is a letter-report dated 19 May 2005 of IBP
National President Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz (IBP President Cadiz) furnishing this Court with the IBPs Resolution, dated 13
May 2005, removing Atty. De Vera as member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP, for committing acts inimical to the IBP
Board and the IBP in general.

The controversy in Bar Matter No. 1227 and A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC arose from the regular meeting of the IBP Board of
Governors held on 14 January 2005. In said meeting, by 2/3 vote (6 voting in favor and 2 against), the IBP Board
approved the withdrawal of the Petition filed before this Court docketed as Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose
Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs. Senate of the Philippines, et al. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, SC-R165108. The Petition was intended to
question the legality and/or constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9227, authorizing the increase in the salaries of judges
and justices, and to increase filing fees.

The two IBP Governors who opposed the said Resolution approving the withdrawal of the above-described Petition were
herein respondent Governor and EVP de Vera and Governor Carlos L. Valdez.

On 19 January 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed this Court of the decision taken by the IBP Board to withdraw the
afore-mentioned Petition. Attached to his letter was a copy of the IBP Boards 14 January 2005 Resolution.

On 15 April 2005, Bar Matter No. 1227, pertaining to Atty. de Veras request for oathtaking as National President, was
filed. The same was subsequently consolidated with A.C. No. 6697, the disbarment case filed against Atty. de Vera.

On 22 April 2005, a plenary session was held at the 10th National IBP Convention at the CAP-Camp John Hay Convention
Center, Baguio City. It was at this forum where Atty. de Vera allegedly made some untruthful statements, innuendos and
blatant lies in connection with the IBP Boards Resolution to withdraw the Petition questioning the legality of Republic
Act No. 9227.

On 10 May 2005, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining Atty. de Vera from assuming office as
IBP National President.

On 12 May 2005, IBP Gov. Romulo A. Rivera wrote IBP National President Cadiz a letter wherein he prayed for the
removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board for having committed acts which were inimical to the IBP Board
and the IBP.

On 13 May 2005, in the 20th Regular Meeting of the Board held at the Waterfront Hotel, Cebu City, the IBP Board, by 2/3
vote, resolved to remove Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board of Governors and as IBP Executive Vice President.
Quoted hereunder is the dispositive portion of said Resolution:
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that Governor Leonard S. de Vera is REMOVED as a
member of the IBP Board of Governors and Executive Vice President for committing acts inimical to the IBP Board of
Governors and the IBP, to wit:

1. For making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in public about the Supreme Court and members of the
IBP Board of Governors, during the Plenary Session of the IBP 10th National Convention of Lawyers, held at CAP-Camp
John Hay Convention Center on 22 April 2005, making it appear that the decision of the IBP Board of Governors to
withdraw the PETITION docketed as Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs. The Senate of the
Philippines, et al., Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer for the Issuance of A Temporary Restraining Order
or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, S.C.-R. 165108, was due to influence and pressure from the Supreme Court of the
Philippines;

2. For making said untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies that brought the IBP Board of Governors and the
IBP as a whole in public contempt and disrepute;

3. For violating Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers which mandates that A lawyer shall
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others, by making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies during the Plenary Session of the IBP 10th National
Convention of Lawyers in Baguio City;

4. For instigating and provoking some IBP chapters to embarrass and humiliate the IBP Board of Governors in order to
coerce and compel the latter to pursue the aforesaid PETITION;

5. For falsely accusing the IBP National President, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, during the Plenary Session of the 10 th National
Convention in Baguio City of withholding from him a copy of Supreme Court Resolution, dated 25 January 2005, granting
the withdrawal of the PETITION, thereby creating the wrong impression that the IBP National President deliberately
prevented him from taking the appropriate remedies with respect thereto, thus compromising the reputation and
integrity of the IBP National President and the IBP as a whole.

On 18 May 2005, Atty. de Vera aired his sentiments to this Court by writing the then Hon. Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr. a letter captioned as Urgent Plea to Correct a Glaring Injustice of the IBP Board of Governors; Vehement Protest to
the Board Resolution Abruptly Removing Atty. Leonard de Vera from the Board of Governors in Patent Violation of Due
Process; Petition to Deny/Disapprove the Completely Unjustified and Highly Arbitrary Resolution Precipitately Ousting
Atty. de Vera from the Board of Governors in Less Than Twenty Four (24) Hours from Notice and Judgment Without
Formal Investigation.

In the said letter, Atty. de Vera strongly and categorically denied having committed acts inimical to the IBP and its Board.
He alleged that on the basis of an unverified letter-complaint filed by IBP Governor Rivera, the IBP Board voted to expel
him posthaste, without just cause and in complete disregard of even the minimum standards of due process. Pertinent
portions of his letter read:

It is evident that the Board of Governors has committed a grave and serious injustice against me especially when, as the
incumbent Executive Vice President of the IBP, I am scheduled to assume my position as National President of the IBP on
July 1, 2005. x x x

I was denied the very basic rights of due process recognized by the Supreme Court even in administrative cases:

1. The denial of the right to answer the charges formally or in writing. The complaint against me was in writing.
2. The denial of the right to answer the charges within a reasonable period of time after receipt of the complaint.
3. The denial of the right to a fair hearing.
4. The denial of the right to confront the accuser and the witnesses against me. I challenged Gov. Rivera to testify under
oath so I could question him. He refused. I offered to testify under oath so I could be questioned. My request was
denied.
5. The denial of my right to present witnesses on my behalf.
6. The denial of my right to an impartial judge. Governor Rivera was my accuser, prosecutor, and judge all at the same
time.
7. Gov. Riveras prejudgment of my case becomes even more evident because when his motion to expel me was lost in a
5-3 votes (due to his inhibition to vote), Gov. Rivera asked for another round of voting so he can vote to support his own
complaint and motion to expel me (Emphasis and underscoring in original.)

On 27 May 2005, the IBP Board responded to the 18 May 2005 letter of Atty. de Vera. In their Reply, the IBP Board
explained to this Court that their decision to remove Atty. de Vera was based on valid grounds and was intended to
protect itself from a recalcitrant member. Among the grounds cited and elucidated by the IBP Board were the following:
 (i) Atty. de Vera engaged himself in a negative media campaign and solicited resolutions from IBP Chapters to condemn
the IBP Board of Governors for its decision to withdraw the PETITION, all with the end in view of compelling or coercing
the IBP Board of Governors to reconsider the decision to withdraw the PETITION.
(ii) Atty. de Vera embarrassed, humiliated and maligned the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP National President in
public or during the Plenary Session at the 10th National Convention of Lawyers.
(iii) Rather than pacify the already agitated solicited speakers (at the plenary session), Atty. de Vera fanned the fire, so
to speak, and went to the extent of making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies about the Supreme Court
and some members of the IBP Board of Governors. He deliberately and intentionally did so to provoke the members of
the IBP Board of Governors to engage him in an acrimonious public debate and expose the IBP Board of Governors to
public ridicule.
(iv) Atty. de Vera uttered untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies, e.g., that some of the members of the IBP
Board of Governors voted in favor of the withdrawal of the petition (without mentioning names) because nakakahiya
kasi sa Supreme Court, nakakaawa kasi ang Supreme Court, kasi may mga kaibigan tayo sa Court. He made it appear
that the IBP Board of Governors approved the resolution, withdrawing the petition, due to influence or pressure from
the Supreme Court.

The IBP Board explained that Atty. de Veras actuation during the Plenary Session was the last straw that broke the
camels back. He committed acts inimical to the interest of the IBP Board and the IBP; hence, the IBP Board decided to
remove him.

On 3 June 2005, Atty. de Vera furnished the Court with copies of resolutions and a position paper coming from various
IBP Chapters all condemning his expulsion from the IBP Board and as IBP EVP.

On 15 June 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed Chief Justice Davide that in a special meeting of the IBP Board held at the
EDSA Shangri-la Plaza on 13 June 2005, the IBP Board took note of the vacancy in the position of the IBP EVP brought
about by Atty. de Veras removal. In his stead, IBP Governor Pura Angelica Y. Santiago was formally elected and declared
as IBP EVP.

On 17 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested against the election of Atty. Santiago. On 20 June 2005, Atty. Santiago
voluntarily relinquished the EVP position through a letter addressed to the IBP Board. Thus, on 25 June 2005, during its
last regular meeting, the IBP Board elected a new EVP in the person of IBP Governor Jose Vicente B. Salazar to replace
Atty. Santiago.

On 28 June 2005, IBP National President Cadiz, through a letter addressed to Chief Justice Davide, reported to this Court
Atty. Salazars election. IBP National President Cadiz also requested, among other things, that Atty. Salazars election be
approved and that he be allowed to assume as National President in the event that Atty. de Vera is disbarred or
suspended from the practice of law or should his removal from the 2003-2005 Board of Governors and as EVP is
approved by this Court. Also on 28 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested the election of Atty. Salazar.

In his Extended Comment dated 25 July 2005, Atty. de Vera maintained that there was absolutely no factual or legal
basis to sustain the motion to remove him from the IBP Board because he violated no law. He argued that if the basis for
his removal as EVP was based on the same grounds as his removal from the IBP Board, then his removal as EVP was
likewise executed without due notice and without the least compliance with the minimum standards of due process of
law.

Atty. de Vera strongly averred that, contrary to the utterly false and malicious charges filed against him, the speakers at
the Plenary Session of the Baguio Convention, although undeniably impassioned and articulate, were respectful in their
language and exhortations, not once undermining the stature of the IBP in general and the IBP Board of Governors in
particular. He posited that speaking in disagreement with the Resolution of the Board during the Conventions Plenary
Session is not a valid cause to remove or expel a duly-elected member of the IBP Board of Governors; and the decision
to remove him only shows that the right to freedom of speech or the right to dissent is not recognized by the incumbent
IBP Board.

Anent the charges that he accused the National President of withholding a copy of this Courts Resolution granting the
withdrawal of the Petition questioning the legality of Republic Act No. 9227, Atty. de Vera avowed that he made no such
remarks. As regards the election of a new IBP EVP, Atty. de Vera contended that the said election was illegal as it was
contrary to the provisions of the IBP By-Laws concerning national officers, to wit:

Section. 49. Term of office. - The President and the Executive Vice President shall hold office for a term of two years
from July 1 following their election until 30 June of their second year in office and until their successors shall have been
duly chosen and qualified.

In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his functions and duties shall be performed by the Executive Vice
President, and in the event of death, resignation, or removal of the President, the Executive Vice President shall serve as
Acting President for the unexpired portion of the term. In the event of death, resignation, removal or disability of both
the President and the Executive Vice President, the Board of Governors shall elect an Acting President to hold office for
the unexpired portion of the term or during the period of disability.

Unless otherwise provided in these By-Laws, all other officers and employees appointed by the President with the
consent of the Board shall hold office at the pleasure of the Board or for such term as the Board may fix.

To bolster his position, Atty. de Vera stressed that when both the President and the EVP die, resign, are removed, or are
disabled, the IBP By-Laws only provides for the election of an Acting President and that no mention for an election for
EVP was made. Thus, when such election for EVP occurs, such is contrary to the express provision of the IBP By-Laws.

Atty. de Vera also argued that even if he were validly removed as IBP EVP, his replacement should come from Eastern
Mindanao and not from any other region, due to the Rotation Rule embodied in par. 2, Section 47, Article VII of the IBP
By-Laws.

In response to Atty. de Veras averments, the 2003-2005 IBP Board, through its counsel, submitted a Reply dated 27
January 2006 and clarified as follows:

i) The IBP Board of Governors is vested with sufficient power and authority to protect itself from an intractable member
by virtue of Article VI, Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws;
ii) Atty. de Vera was removed as a member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP not because of his disagreement with the
IBP Boards position but because of the various acts that he committed which the IBP Board determined to be inimical to
the IBP Board and the IBP as a whole;
iii) Atty. de Vera cannot exculpate himself from liability by invoking his constitutional right to Free Speech because, as a
member of the Bar, it is his sworn duty to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and
to insist on similar conduct by others;
iv) The IBP Board, in effecting the removal of Atty. de Vera, observed the fundamental principles of due process. As the
records would bear, Atty. de Vera was duly notified of the Regular Meeting of the IBP Board held on 13 May 2004; was
furnished a copy of Governor Riveras Letter-Complaint the day before the said meeting; was furnished a copy of the said
Meetings Agenda; and was allowed to personally defend himself and his accuser, Gov. Rivera;
v). de Vera was validly removed because the required number of votes under Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws to remove
Atty. de Vera as a member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP was duly complied with;
vi) Atty. de Veras replacement as IBP EVP need not come from Eastern Mindanao Region because: (a) the rotation rule
under Article VII, Section 47, par. 2 of the IBP By-Laws had already been complied with when Atty. de Vera, who hails
from Eastern Mindanao, was elected IBP EVP; and (b) the rotation rule need not be enforced if the same will not be
practicable, possible, feasible, doable or viable; and, finally, that
vii) Atty. Salazar was validly elected as IBP EVP and, thus, should now be allowed to take his oath as IBP National
President.

The Courts Ruling

AC No. 6697
In his Memorandum dated 20 June 2005, complainant tendered the following issues for the consideration of the Court:
I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DE VERA (sic) COMMITTED MALPRACTICE WHICH
AMOUNTED TO MORAL TURPITUDE IN THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA AND IN THE PHILIPPINES, IN THE COURSE OF HIS
PRACTICE OF LAW.

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE OATH OF OFFICE AS LAWYER IS ATTACHED TO THE PERSON OF ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DE
VERA (sic) WHEREVER HE MAY GO AND NOT NECESSARILY BOUND BY THE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE
PHILIPPINES.

III. WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE MORAL TURPITUDE, AS BASIS FOR DISBARMENT
OF RESPONDENT IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING.

IV. WHETHER OR NOT RES JUDICATA APPLIES IN THIS CASE, DUE TO ADMIN. CASE NO. [6052]

The disposition of the first three related issues hinges on the resolution of the fourth issue. Consequently, we will start
with the last issue.
A.C. No. 6052 is not a bar to the filing of the present administrative case.
In disposing of the question of res judicata, the Bar Confidant opined:

To reiterate, the instant case for suspension and/or disbarment against respondent Leonard De Vera is grounded on the
following:
1) respondents alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered against him by the State Bar in
California; and
2) respondents alleged violation of the so-called rotation rule enunciated in Administrative Matter No. 491 dated 06
October 1989 (In the Matter: 1989 IBP Elections).

It appears that the complainant already raised the said issues in an earlier administrative case against the respondent.
Verily, these issues were already argued upon by the parties in their respective pleadings, and discussed and ruled upon
by this Court in its Decision dated 11 December 2003 in Administrative Matter No. 6052 (In Re: Petition to Disqualify
Atty. Leonard de Vera).

As such, with respect to the first issue, this Court held that:

As for the administrative complaint filed against him by one of his clients when he was practicing law in California, which
in turn compelled him to surrender his California license to practice law, he maintains that it cannot serve as basis for
determining his moral qualification (or lack of it) to run for the position he is aspiring for. He explains that there is as yet
no final judgment finding him guilty of the administrative charge, as the records relied upon by the petitioners are mere
preliminary findings of a hearing referee which are recommendatory findings of an IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline
which are subject to the review of and the final decision of the Supreme Court. He also stresses that the complainant in
the California administrative case has retracted the accusation that he misappropriated the complainants money, but
unfortunately the retraction was not considered by the investigating officer. xxx

On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while he was still practicing law in California,
he explained that no final judgment was rendered by the California Supreme Court finding him guilty of the charge. He
surrendered his license to protest the discrimination he suffered at the hands of the investigator and he found it
impractical to pursue the case to the end. We find these explanations satisfactory in the absence of contrary proof. It is a
basic rule on evidence that he who alleges a fact has the burden to prove the same. In this case, the petitioners have not
shown how the administrative complaint affects respondent De Vera's moral fitness to run for governor.

On the other hand, as regards the second issue:

Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post because he is not really from Eastern Mindanao.
His place of residence is in Paraaque and he was originally a member of the PPLM IBP Chapter. He only changed his IBP
Chapter membership to pave the way for his ultimate goal of attaining the highest IBP post, which is the national
presidency. Petitioners aver that in changing his IBP membership, respondent De Vera violated the domicile rule.

The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19, Article II, a lawyer included in the Roll of Attorneys
of the Supreme Court can register with the particular IBP Chapter of his preference or choice, thus:

xxx

It is clearly stated in the aforequoted section of the By-Laws that it is not automatic that a lawyer will become a member
of the chapter where his place of residence or work is located. He has the discretion to choose the particular chapter
where he wishes to gain membership. Only when he does not register his preference that he will become a member of
the Chapter of the place where he resides or maintains office. The only proscription in registering one's preference is that
a lawyer cannot be a member of more than one chapter at the same time.

The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In fact, under this Section, transfer of IBP membership is allowed
as long as the lawyer complies with the conditions set forth therein, thus:

xxx

The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that the transfer must be made not less than three months prior
to the election of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer wishes to transfer.

In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer of his IBP membership to Agusan del Sur on 1 August 2001.
One month thereafter, IBP National Secretary Jaime M. Vibar wrote a letter addressed to Atty. Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr.,
Secretary of IBP PPLM Chapter and Atty. Lyndon J. Romero, Secretary of IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter, informing them of
respondent de Vera's transfer and advising them to make the necessary notation in their respective records. This letter is
a substantial compliance with the certification mentioned in Section 29-2 as aforequoted. Note that de Vera's transfer
was made effective sometime between 1 August 2001 and 3 September 2001. On 27 February 2003, the elections of the
IBP Chapter Officers were simultaneously held all over the Philippines, as mandated by Section 29.a of the IBP By-Laws
which provides that elections of Chapter Officers and Directors shall be held on the last Saturday of February of every
other year. Between 3 September 2001 and 27 February 2003, seventeen months had elapsed. This makes respondent de
Vera's transfer valid as it was done more than three months ahead of the chapter elections held on 27 February 2003.
In the case of Romulo G. Dinsay vs. Atty. Leopoldo D. Cioco (Administrative Case No. 2995, 27 November 1996), this
Court declared that:

The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of the [Courts]
administrative powers.

In the said case, respondent Clerk of Court Cioco was dismissed from service for grave misconduct highly prejudicial to
the service for surreptitiously substituting the bid price in a Certificate of Sale from P3,263,182.67 to only P730,000.00.
Thereafter a complaint for disbarment was filed against the respondent on the basis of the same incident. Respondent,
interposing res judicata, argued that he may no longer be charged on the basis of the same incident. This Court held that
while the respondent is in effect being indicted twice for the same misconduct, this does not amount to double jeopardy
as both proceedings are admittedly administrative in nature. This Court qualified that, in the first case, the respondent
was proceeded against as an erring court personnel under the Courts supervisory power over courts while, in the second
case, he was disciplined as a lawyer under the Courts plenary authority over membersof the legal profession.

In subsequent decisions of this Court, however, it appears that res judicata still applies in administrative cases. Thus, in
the case of Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera vs. Judge William Layague (Administrastive Matter No. RTJ-93-986), this Court ruled
that:

While double jeopardy does not lie in administrative cases, it would be contrary to equity and substantial justice to
penalize respondent judge a second time for an act which he had already answered for.

Likewise, in the recent case of Executive Judge Henry B. Basilia vs. Judge Amado L. Becamon, Lolita Delos Reyes and
Eddie Delos Reyes (Administrative Matter No. MTJ-02-1404, 14 December 2004), this Court held that:

Applying the principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment, the present administrative case becomes dismissible.

xxx

Under the said doctrine, a matter that has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction must be deemed to
have been finally and conclusively settled if it arises in any subsequent litigation between the same parties and for the
same cause. It provides that

[a] final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties
and their privies; and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of
action. Res judicata is based on the ground that the party to be affected, or some other with whom he is in privity, has
litigated the same matter in the former action in a court of competent jurisdiction, and should not be permitted to
litigate it again.

This principle frees the parties from undergoing all over again the rigors of unnecessary suits and repetitious trials. At the
same time, it prevents the clogging of court dockets. Equally important, res judicata stabilizes rights and promotes the
rule of law.

In the instant administrative case, it is clear that the issues raised by the complainant had already been resolved by this
Court in an earlier administrative case. The complainants contention that the principle of res judicata would not apply in
the case at bar as the first administrative case was one for disqualification while the instant administrative complaint is
one for suspension and/or disbarment should be given least credence. It is worthy to note that while the instant
administrative complaint is denominated as one for suspension and/or disbarment, it prayed neither the suspension nor
the disbarment of the respondent but instead merely sought to enjoin the respondent from assuming office as IBP
National President.

Contrary to the findings of the Bar Confidant, Adm. Case No. 6052 entitled, In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de
Vera, on Legal and Moral Grounds, From Being Elected IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the May 31 IBP Election
and promulgated on 11 December 2003 does not constitute a bar to the filing of Adm. Case No. 6697. Although the
parties in the present administrative case and in Adm. Case No. 6052 are identical, their capacities in these cases and the
issues presented therein are not the same, thereby barring the application of res judicata.

In order that the principle of res judicata may be made to apply, four essential conditions must concur, namely: (1) the
judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment or order on the
merits, and (4) there must be between the first and second action identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and
identity of causes of action. In the absence of any one of these elements, Atty. de Vera cannot argue res judicata in his
favor.

It is noteworthy that the two administrative cases involve different subject matters and causes of action. In Adm. Case
No. 6052, the subject matter was the qualification of Atty. de Vera to run as a candidate for the position of IBP Governor
for Eastern Mindanao. In the present administrative complaint, the subject matter is his privilege to practice law. In the
first administrative case, complainants cause of action was Atty. de Veras alleged violation or circumvention of the IBP
By-laws. In the present administrative case, the primary cause of action is Atty. de Veras alleged violation of lawyers
oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Finally, the two administrative cases do not seek the same relief. In the first case, the complainants sought to prevent
Atty. de Vera from assuming his post as IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present case, as clarified by
complainant in his Memorandum, what is being principally sought is Atty. de Veras suspension or disbarment.

The distinctions between the two cases are far from trivial. The previous case was resolved on the basis of the parties
rights and obligations under the IBP By-laws. We held therein that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified from running as
Regional Governor as there is nothing in the present IBP By-laws that sanctions the disqualification of candidates for IBP
governors. Consequently, we stressed that the petition had no firm ground to stand on. Likewise, we held that the
complainants therein were not the proper parties to bring the suit as the IBP By-laws prescribes that only nominees -
which the complainants were not - can file with the IBP President a written protest against the candidate. The Courts
statement, therefore, that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the ground that he was not morally fit was mere
obiter dictum. Precisely, the IBP By-laws do not allow for pre-election disqualification proceedings; hence, Atty. de Vera
cannot be disqualified on the basis of the administrative findings of a hearing officer of the State Bar of California
suspending him from the practice of law for three years. We held in that case that

There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit before he can run for IBP
governorship. For one, this is so because the determination of moral fitness of a candidate lies in the individual
judgment of the members of the House of Delegates. Indeed, based on each member's standard of morality, he is free
to nominate and elect any member, so long as the latter possesses the basic requirements under the law. For another,
basically the disqualification of a candidate involving lack of moral fitness should emanate from his disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law by this Court, or conviction by final judgment of an offense which involves moral
turpitude.

What this simply means is that absent a final judgment by the Supreme Court in a proper case declaring otherwise,
every lawyer aspiring to hold the position of IBP Regional Director is presumed morally fit. Any person who begs to
disagree will not be able to find a receptive audience in the IBP through a petition for disqualification but must first file
the necessary disbarment or suspension proceeding against the lawyer concerned.

And this is precisely what complainant has chosen to do in the instant case. As his petition is sufficient in form and
substance, we have given it due course pursuant to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. And, considering that this case is not
barred by the prior judgment in Adm. Case No. 6052, the only issue left for consideration is whether or not Atty. de Vera
can be suspended or disbarred under the facts of the case and the evidence submitted by complainant.

The recommendation of the hearing officer of the State Bar of California, standing alone, is not proof of malpractice.

In the case of the Suspension From The Practice of Law In The Territory of Guam of Atty. Leon G. Maquera, we were
confronted with the question of whether or not a member of the Philippine Bar, who is concomitantly an attorney in a
foreign jurisdiction and who was suspended from the practice of law in said foreign jurisdiction, can be sanctioned as
member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction.

We take the issue in Atty. Maquera one notch higher in the case of Atty. de Vera who was admitted to the practice of
law in a foreign jurisdiction (State Bar of California, U.S.A.) and against whom charges were filed in connection with his
practice in said jurisdiction. However, unlike the case of Atty. Maquera, no final judgment for suspension or disbarment
was meted against Atty. de Vera despite a recommendation of suspension of three years as he surrendered his license
to practice law before his case could be taken up by the Supreme Court of California.

In Maquera, we emphasized that the judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a foreign jurisdiction does not
automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the Philippines as the acts giving rise to his suspension are not
grounds for disbarment and suspension in this jurisdiction. Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may
transmute into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of the foreign courts action includes
any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. We likewise held that the judgment of the foreign
court merely constitutes prima facie evidence of unethical acts as lawyer.

The Maquera ruling is consistent with Rule 39, Section 48, of the Rules of Court which provides:

Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign
country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:

xxxx

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right
as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

In Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc. v. Fasgi Enterprises, Inc., we explained that [a] foreign judgment is presumed to be
valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of
regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum.

In herein case, considering that there is technically no foreign judgment to speak of, the recommendation by the hearing
officer of the State Bar of California does not constitute prima facie evidence of unethical behavior by Atty. de Vera.
Complainant must prove by substantial evidence the facts upon which the recommendation by the hearing officer was
based. If he is successful in this, he must then prove that these acts are likewise unethical under Philippine law.

There is substantial evidence of malpractice on the part of Atty. de Vera independent of the recommendation of
suspension by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California

Section 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinary agency in a
foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the
basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground
for disbarment or suspension.

Disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the
court and to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be
competent, honorable and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. The statutory enunciation of
the grounds for disbarment on suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend
or disbar a lawyer. The inherent power of the court over its officers cannot be restricted.

Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer. Section 27 gives a special
and technical meaning to the term Malpractice. That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the
practice of law is a profession, not a business.

Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules on ethical code of his profession or which is
unbecoming a member of that profession.

Now, the undisputed facts:

1. An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was filed before the State Bar of California, docketed then as Adm. Case
No. 86-0-18429. It arose from an insurance case Atty. de Vera handled involving Julius Willis, III who figured in an
automobile accident in 1986. Atty. de Vera was authorized by the elder Willis (father of Julius who was given authority
by the son to control the case because the latter was then studying in San Diego California) for the release of the funds
in settlement of the case. Atty. de Vera received a check in settlement of the case which he then deposited to his
personal account;

2. The Hearing referee in the said administrative case recommended that Atty. de Vera be suspended from the practice
of law for three years; and
3. Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar which resignation was accepted by the Supreme Court of California.

Atty. de Vera vehemently insists that the foregoing facts do not prove that he misappropriated his clients funds as the
latters father (the elder Willis) gave him authority to use the same and that, unfortunately, the hearing officer did not
consider this explanation notwithstanding the fact that the elder Willis testified under oath that he expected de Vera
might use the money for a few days.

By insisting that he was authorized by his clients father and attorney-in-fact to use the funds, Atty. de Vera has impliedly
admitted the use of the Willis funds for his own personal use.

In fact, Atty. de Vera did not deny complainants allegation in the latters memorandum that he (de Vera) received
US$12,000.00 intended for his client and that he deposited said amount in his personal account and not in a separate
trust account and that, finally, he spent the amount for personal purposes.

At this point, it bears stressing that in cases filed before administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed
established if it is supported by substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. It means such evidence which affords a substantial basis from which
the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred.

Beyond doubt, the unauthorized use by a lawyer of his clients funds is highly unethical. Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is emphatic about this, thus:

CANON 16. A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME TO HIS
POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by
him.

In Espiritu v. Ulep, we held that:

The relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature. Being such, it requires utmost good faith, loyalty,
fidelity and disinterestedness on the part of the attorney. Its fiduciary nature is intended for the protection of the client.

The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates every lawyer to hold in trust all money and properties of his client that
may come into his possession. Accordingly, he shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client. Even more specific is the Canon of Professional Ethics:

The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the
confidence reposed in him by his client.

Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer should be
reported and accounted for promptly and should not under any circumstances be commingled with his own or be used
by him.

Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or property held by him on behalf of his client gives
rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the
trust reposed in him by, his client. It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs the
public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.

Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and are guilty of
betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. Those who are guilty of such infraction may be disbarred or
suspended indefinitely from the practice of law. (Emphases supplied.)
In herein case, as it is admitted by Atty. de Vera himself that he used his clients money for personal use, he has
unwittingly sealed his own fate since this admission constitutes more than substantial evidence of malpractice.
Consequently, Atty. de Vera now has the burden of rebutting the evidence which he himself supplied.

In his defense, Atty. de Vera claims that he was duly authorized by the elder Willis to use the funds intended for the
latters son. Atty. de Vera also points out that he had restituted the full amount of US$12,000.00 even before the filing of
the administrative case against him in the State Bar of California.

Aside from these self-serving statements, however, we cannot find anywhere in the records of this case proof that
indeed Atty. de Vera was duly authorized to use the funds of his client. In Radjaie v. Atty. Alovera we declared that:

When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he
must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of
morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him.

Atty. de Vera cannot rely on the statement made by the hearing officer that the elder Willis had indeed testified that he
expected de Vera might use the money for a few days. As Atty. de Vera had vigorously objected to the admissibility of
the document containing this statement, he is now estopped from relying thereon. Besides, that the elder Willis
expected de Vera might use the money for a few days was not so much an acknowledgment of consent to the use by
Atty. de Vera of his clients funds as it was an acceptance of the probability that Atty. de Vera might, indeed, use his
clients funds, which by itself did not speak well of the character of Atty. de Vera or the way such character was
perceived.

In the instant case, the act of Atty. de Vera in holding on to his clients money without the latters acquiescence is conduct
indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. It is clear that Atty. de Vera, by depositing the check in his own account and
using the same for his own benefit is guilty of deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and unethical behavior. He caused
dishonor, not only to himself but to the noble profession to which he belongs. For, it cannot be denied that the respect
of litigants to the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the profession betrays their trust and
confidence. Respondent violated his oath to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his client.

Nevertheless, we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law. The power to
disbar must be exercised with great caution. Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment
should not be decreed.

In Mortera v. Pagatpatan, we imposed upon Atty. Pagatpatan two years suspension from his practice of law for
depositing the funds meant for his client to his personal account without the latters knowledge. In Reyes v. Maglaya;
Castillo v. Taguines; Espiritu v. Atty. Cabredo IV, the respondents were meted one year suspension each for failing to
remit to their clients monies in the amounts of P1,500.00; P500.00, and P51,161.00, respectively, received by them for
their clients without the latters permission. In Dumadag v. Atty. Lumaya, we indefinitely suspended respondent for
failure to remit to his client the amount of the measly sum of P4,344.00 representing the amount received pursuant to a
writ of execution. Considering the amount involved here US$12,000.00, we believe that the penalty of suspension for
two (2) years is appropriate.

Transferring IBP membership to a chapter where the lawyer is not a resident of is not a ground for his suspension or
disbarment

Complainant insists that Atty. de Veras transfer of membership from the Pasay, Paraaque, Las Pias and Muntinlupa
(PPLM) Chapter to the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter is a circumvention of the rotation rule as it was made for the sole
purpose of becoming IBP National President. Complainant stresses that Atty. de Vera is not a resident of Agusan del Sur
nor does he hold office therein.

In Adm. Case No. 6052, we held that Atty. de Veras act of transferring to another IBP Chapter is not a ground for his
disqualification for the post of IBP Governor as the same is allowed under Section 19 of the IBP By-Laws with the
qualification only that the transfer be made not less than three months immediately preceding any chapter election.

As it was perfectly within Atty. de Veras right to transfer his membership, it cannot be said that he is guilty of unethical
conduct or behavior. And while one may incessantly argue that a legal act may not necessarily be ethical, in herein case,
we do not see anything wrong in transferring to an IBP chapter that -- based on the rotation rule will produce the next
IBP EVP who will automatically succeed to the National Presidency for the next term. Our Code of Professional
Responsibility as well as the Lawyers Oath do not prohibit nor punish lawyers from aspiring to be IBP National President
and from doing perfectly legal acts in accomplishing such goal.
Bar Matter No. 1227
Administrative Matter No. 05-5-15-SC

To resolve Bar Matter No. 1227 and Administrative Matter No. 05-5- 15-SC, the following issues must be addressed:
I. Whether the IBP Board of Governors acted with grave abuse of discretion in removing Atty. de Vera as Governor and
EVP of the IBP on 13 May 2005.
i. Whether the IBP Board of Governors complied with administrative due process in removing Atty. de Vera.
ii. Whether the IBP removed Atty. De Vera for just and valid cause.

II. Whether Governor Salazar was validly elected as EVP of the IBP on 25 June 2005, and can consequently assume the
Presidency of the IBP for the term 2005-2007.
The IBP Board observed due process in its removal of Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor

We start the discussion with the veritable fact that the IBP Board is vested with the power to remove any of its members
pursuant to Section 44, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws, which states:

Sec. 44. Removal of members. If the Board of Governors should determine after proper inquiry that any of its members,
elective or otherwise, has for any reason become unable to perform his duties, the Board, by resolution of the Majority
of the remaining members, may declare his position vacant, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.

Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause, including three consecutive absences from
Board meetings without justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by two-thirds of the remaining members of the Board,
subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.

In case of any vacancy in the office of Governor for whatever cause, the delegates from the region shall by majority vote,
elect a successor from among the members of the Chapter to which the resigned governor is a member to serve as
governor for the unexpired portion of the term. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the aforementioned section, a member of the IBP Board may be removed for cause by resolution adopted by
two-thirds (2/3) of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of this Court.

In the main, Atty. de Vera questions his removal from the Board of Governors on procedural and substantive grounds.
He argues that he was denied very basic rights of due process recognized by the Honorable Court even in administrative
cases like the right to answer formally or in writing and within reasonable time, the right to present witnesses in his
behalf, the right to a fair hearing. Atty. de Vera protests the fact that he was not able to cross-examine the complainant,
IBP Gov. Romulo H. Rivera (Atty. Rivera) and that Atty. Rivera voted as well for his expulsion which made him accuser,
prosecutor and judge at the same time. Atty. de Vera emphasized the fact that Atty. Rivera initially inhibited himself
from voting on his own motion. However, when his inhibition resulted in the defeat of his motion as the necessary 2/3
votes could not be mustered, Atty. Rivera asked for another round of voting so he could vote to support his own motion.

The IBP Board counters that since its members were present during the plenary session, and personally witnessed and
heard Atty. de Veras actuations, an evidentiary or formal hearing was no longer necessary. Since they all witnessed and
heard Atty. de Vera, it was enough that he was given an opportunity to refute and answer all the charges imputed
against him. They emphasized that Atty. de Vera was given a copy of the complaint and that he was present at the Board
Meeting on 13 May 2005 wherein the letter-complaint against him was part of the agenda. Therein, he was given the
opportunity to be heard and that, in fact, Atty. de Vera did argue his case.

We are in agreement with the IBP Board.

First, it needs stressing that the constitutional provision on due process safeguards life, liberty and property. It cannot be
said that the position of EVP of the IBP is property within the constitutional sense especially since there is no right to
security of tenure over said position as, in fact, all that is required to remove any member of the board of governors for
cause is a resolution adopted by 2/3 of the remaining members of the board.

Secondly, even if the right of due process could be rightfully invoked, still, in administrative proceedings, the essence of
due process is simply the opportunity to explain ones side. At the outset, it is here emphasized that the term due
process of law as used in the Constitution has no fixed meaning for all purposes due to the very nature of the doctrine
which, asserting a fundamental principle of justice rather than a specific rule of law, is not susceptible of more than one
general statement. The phrase is so elusive of exact apprehension, because it depends on circumstances and varies with
the subject matter and the necessities of the situation.

Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with judicial process for a trial in court is not always essential
to due process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative
proceedings since they rest upon different principles. The due process clause guarantees no particular form of
procedure and its requirements are not technical. Thus, in certain proceedings of administrative character, the right to a
notice or hearing are not essential to due process of law. The constitutional requirement of due process is met by a fair
hearing before a regularly established administrative agency or tribunal. It is not essential that hearings be had before
the making of a determination if thereafter, there is available trial and tribunal before which all objections and defenses
to the making of such determination may be raised and considered. One adequate hearing is all that due process
requires. What is required for hearing may differ as the functions of the administrative bodies differ.

The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process. Nor is an actual hearing always essential
especially under the factual milieu of this case where the members of the IBP Board -- upon whose shoulders the
determination of the cause for removal of an IBP governor is placed subject to the approval of the Supreme Court all
witnessed Atty. de Veras actuations in the IBP National Convention in question.

It is undisputed that Atty. de Vera received a copy of the complaint against him and that he was present when the
matter was taken up. From the transcript of the stenographic notes of the 13 May 2005 meeting wherein Atty. de Vera
was removed, it is patent that Atty. de Vera was given fair opportunity to defend himself against the accusations made
by Atty. Rivera.

Atty. de Vera, however, additionally questions the fact that Atty. Rivera, who authored the complaint against him, also
voted for his expulsion making him accuser, prosecutor and judge at the same time. Atty. de Vera likewise laments the
fact that Atty. Rivera initially inhibited himself from voting but when this resulted in the defeat of his motion for lack of
the necessary 2/3 vote, he agreed to another round of voting and that, this time, he voted in favor of his motion.

For the record, of the nine governors comprising the IBP Board, six voted for Atty. de Veras expulsion (including Atty.
Rivera) while 3 voted against it (including Atty. de Vera).

Section 44 (second paragraph) of the IBP By-Laws provides:

Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause, including three consecutive absences from
Board meetings without justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by two-thirds of the remaining members of the Board,
subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)

Under the rules, a resolution for expulsion of an IBP Governor is done via a resolution adopted by 2/3 of the remaining
members. The phrase remaining members refers to the members exclusive of the complainant member and the
respondent member. The reason therefore is that such members are interested parties and are thus presumed to be
unable to resolve said motion impartially. This being the case, the votes of Attys. Rivera and de Vera should be stricken-
off which means that only the votes of the seven remaining members are to be counted. Of the seven remaining
members, five voted for expulsion while two voted against it which still adds up to the 2/3 vote requirement for
expulsion.

The IBP Board removed Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor for just and valid cause

All the concerned parties to this case agree that what constitutes cause for the removal of an IBP Governor has not been
defined by Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws albeit it includes three consecutive absences from Board meetings without
justifiable excuse. Thus, the IBP Board argues that it is vested with sufficient power and authority to protect itself from
an intractable member whose removal was caused not by his disagreement with the IBP Board but due to various acts
committed by him which the IBP Board considered as inimical to the IBP Board in particular and the IBP in general.

Atty. de Vera, on the other hand, insists that speaking in disagreement with the Resolution of the Board during the
Conventions Plenary Session is not a valid cause to remove or expel a duly-elected member of the IBP Board of
Governors and the decision to remove him only shows that the right to freedom of speech or the right to dissent is not
recognized by the IBP Board.

After weighing the arguments of the parties and in keeping with the fundamental objective of the IBP to discharge its
public responsibility more effectively, we hereby find that Atty. de Veras removal from the IBP Board was not capricious
or arbitrary.

Indubitably, conflicts and disagreements of varying degrees of intensity, if not animosity, are inherent in the internal life
of an organization, but especially of the IBP since lawyers are said to disagree before they agree.

However, the effectiveness of the IBP, like any other organization, is diluted if the conflicts are brought outside its
governing body for then there would be the impression that the IBP, which speaks through the Board of Governors, does
not and cannot speak for its members in an authoritative fashion. It would accordingly diminish the IBPs prestige and
repute with the lawyers as well as with the general public.
As a means of self-preservation, internecine conflicts must thus be adjusted within the governing board itself so as to
free it from the stresses that invariably arise when internal cleavages are made public.

The doctrine of majority rule is almost universally used as a mechanism for adjusting and resolving conflicts and
disagreements within the group after the members have been given an opportunity to be heard. While it does not
efface conflicts, nonetheless, once a decision on a contentious matter is reached by a majority vote, the dissenting
minority is bound thereby so that the board can speak with one voice, for those elected to the governing board are
deemed to implicitly contract that the will of the majority shall govern in matters within the authority of the board.

The IBP Board, therefore, was well within its right in removing Atty. de Vera as the latters actuations during the 10 th
National IBP Convention were detrimental to the role of the IBP Board as the governing body of the IBP. When the IBP
Board is not seen by the bar and the public as a cohesive unit, it cannot effectively perform its duty of helping the
Supreme Court enforce the code of legal ethics and the standards of legal practice as well as improve the administration
of justice.

In view of the importance of retaining group cohesiveness and unity, the expulsion of a member of the board who insists
on bringing to the public his disagreement with a policy/resolution approved by the majority after due discussion,
cannot be faulted. The effectiveness of the board as a governing body will be negated if its pronouncements are resisted
in public by a board member.

Indeed, when a member of a governing body cannot accept the voice of the majority, he should resign therefrom so that
he could criticize in public the majority opinion/decision to his hearts content; otherwise, he subjects himself to
disciplinary action by the body.

The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto meant his removal as EVP as well

The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto meant his removal as EVP as well. Section
47, Article VII of the By-Laws of the IBP provides:

SEC. 47. National Officers. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President and Executive Vice President to be
chosen by the Board of Governors from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. x
xx

Thus, to be EVP of the IBP, one must necessarily be a member of IBP Board of Governors. Atty. de Veras removal from
the Board of Governors, automatically disqualified him from acting as IBP EVP. To insist otherwise would be contrary to
Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.

The Court will not interfere with the Resolution of the IBP Board to remove Atty. de Vera since it was rendered without
grave abuse of discretion

While it is true that the Supreme Court has been granted an extensive power of supervision over the IBP, it is axiomatic
that such power should be exercised prudently. The power of supervision of the Supreme Court over the IBP should not
preclude the IBP from exercising its reasonable discretion especially in the administration of its internal affairs governed
by the provisions of its By-Laws. The IBP By-Laws were precisely drafted and promulgated so as to define the powers and
functions of the IBP and its officers, establish its organizational structure, and govern relations and transactions among
its officers and members. With these By-Laws in place, the Supreme Court could be assured that the IBP shall be able to
carry on its day-to-day affairs, without the Courts interference.

It should be noted that the general charge of the affairs and activities of the IBP has been vested in the Board of
Governors. The members of the Board are elective and representative of each of the nine regions of the IBP as
delineated in its By-Laws. The Board acts as a collegiate body and decides in accordance with the will of the majority.
The foregoing rules serve to negate the possibility of the IBP Board acting on the basis of personal interest or malice of
its individual members. Hence, the actions and resolutions of the IBP Board deserve to be accorded the disputable
presumption of validity, which shall continue, until and unless it is overcome by substantial evidence and actually
declared invalid by the Supreme Court. In the absence of any allegation and substantial proof that the IBP Board has
acted without or in excess of its authority or with grave abuse of discretion, we shall not be persuaded to overturn and
set aside the Boards action or resolution.

There is no question that the IBP Board has the authority to remove its members as provided in Article VI, Section 44 of
the IBP By-Laws. Issue arises only as to whether the IBP Board abused its authority and discretion in resolving to remove
Atty. de Vera from his post as an IBP Governor and EVP. As has been previously established herein, Atty. de Veras
removal from the IBP Board was in accordance with due process and the IBP Board acted well within the authority and
discretion granted to it by its By-Laws. There being no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the IBP Board, we find no
reason to interfere in the Boards resolution to remove Atty. de Vera.
The election of Atty. Salazar by the IBP Board as IBP EVP in replacement of Atty. De Vera was conducted in accordance
with the authority granted to the Board by the IBP By-Laws

In the same manner, we find no reason to disturb the action taken by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors in holding a
special election to fill-in the vacant post resulting from the removal of Atty. de Vera as EVP of the IBP since the same is a
purely internal matter, done without grave abuse of discretion, and implemented without violating the Rules and By-
Laws of the IBP.

With the removal of Atty. de Vera from the Board, by virtue of the IBP Board Resolution dated 13 May 2005, he was also
removed from his post as EVP; thus, there was a resultant vacancy in the position of IBP EVP.

Article VI, Section 41(g) of the IBP By-Laws expressly grants to the Board the authority to fill vacancies, however arising,
in the IBP positions, subject to the provisions of Section 8 of the Integration Rule, and Section 11 (Vacancies), Section 44
(Removal of members), Section 47 (National officers Section 48 (other officers), and Section 49 (Terms of Office) of the
By-Laws. The IBP Board has specific and sufficient guidelines in its Rules and By-Laws on how to fill-in the vacancies after
the removal of Atty. de Vera. We have faith and confidence in the intellectual, emotional and ethical competencies of
the remaining members of the 2005-2007 Board in dealing with the situation within the bounds of the IBP Rules and By-
Laws.

The election by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors of a new EVP, who will assume the Presidency for the term 2005-
2007, was well within the authority and prerogative granted to the Board by the IBP By-Laws, particularly Article VII,
Section 47, which provides that the EVP shall automatically become President for the next succeeding term. The phrase
for the next succeeding term necessarily implies that the EVP that should succeed Atty. Cadiz as IBP President for the
next succeeding term (i.e., 2005-2007) should come from the members of the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors.
Hence, in A.M. No. 05-7-19-SC, we restrained now IBP EVP Feliciano Bautista from assuming the position of Acting
President because we have yet to resolve the question as to who shall succeed Atty. Cadiz from the 2003-2005 IBP Board
of Governors.

Accordingly, the elections of Governor Santiago on 13 June 2005 as IBP EVP, and thereafter, Governor Salazar on 25 June
2005, as the new IBP EVP, upon the relinquishment of Gov. Santiago of the position, were valid.

Neither can this Court give credence to the argument of Atty. De Vera that, assuming his removal as IBP Governor and
EVP was valid, his replacement as IBP EVP should come from Eastern Mindanao Region pursuant to the rotation rule set
forth in Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws.

According to Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws, the EVP shall be chosen by the Board of Governors from among
the nine Regional Governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. This is based on our pronouncements in Bar
Matter 491, wherein we ruled:

ORDER
xxxx

3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President elected by the Board of Governors
(composed of the governors of the nine [9] IBP regions) from among themselves (as provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original
IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of automatic succession by the Executive Vice-President to the presidency
upon the expiration of their two-year term (which was abolished by this Court's resolution dated July 9, 1985 in Bar
Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby restored.

4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall automatically succeed to the office of
president. The incoming board of governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-President from among themselves. The
position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among the nine (9) IBP regions. One who has served as president
may not run for election as Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until after the rotation of the presidency
among the nine (9) regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.

xxxx
(Emphasis Supplied)

In Bar Matter 491, it is clear that it is the position of IBP EVP which is actually rotated among the nine Regional
Governors. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is merely a result of the automatic succession rule of the IBP EVP
to the Presidency. Thus, the rotation rule pertains in particular to the position of IBP EVP, while the automatic
succession rule pertains to the Presidency. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is but a consequence of the
automatic succession rule provided in Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.
In the case at bar, the rotation rule was duly complied with since upon the election of Atty. De Vera as IBP EVP, each of
the nine IBP regions had already produced an EVP and, thus, the rotation was completed. It is only unfortunate that the
supervening event of Atty. de Veras removal as IBP Governor and EVP rendered it impossible for him to assume the IBP
Presidency. The fact remains, however, that the rotation rule had been completed despite the non-assumption by Atty.
de Vera to the IBP Presidency.

Moreover, the application of the rotation rule is not a license to disregard the spirit and purpose of the automatic
succession rule, but should be applied in harmony with the latter. The automatic succession rule affords the IBP
leadership transition seamless and enables the new IBP National President to attend to pressing and urgent matters
without having to expend valuable time for the usual adjustment and leadership consolidation period. The time that an
IBP EVP spends assisting a sitting IBP President on matters national in scope is in fact a valuable and indispensable
preparation for the eventual succession. It should also be pointed out that this wisdom is further underscored by the
fact that an IBP EVP is elected from among the members of the IBP Board of Governors, who are serving in a national
capacity, and not from the members at large. It is intrinsic in the IBP By-Laws that one who is to assume the highest
position in the IBP must have been exposed to the demands and responsibilities of national leadership.

It would therefore be consistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule for Governor Salazar to
assume the post of IBP President. By electing the replacement EVP from among the members of the 2003-2005 Board of
Governors, the IBP benefits from the experience of the IBP EVP of 2003-2005 in this case, Governor Salazar who would
have served in a national capacity prior to his assumption of the highest position.

It will also be inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule if the EVP for the term 2003-2005
will be elected exclusively by the members of the House of Delegates of the Eastern Mindanao region. This Court notes
that the removal of Atty. De Vera in 13 May 2005 was about a month before the expiration of the term of office of the
2003-2005 Board of Governors. Hence, the replacement Governor would not have been able to serve in a national
capacity for two years prior to assuming the IBP Presidency.

In any case, Section 47 of the IBP Rules uses the phrase as much as practicable to clearly indicate that the rotation rule is
not a rigid and inflexible rule as to bar exceptions in compelling and exceptional circumstances.

It is in view of the foregoing that the argument advanced by Atty. De Vera that the IBP national presidency should be
assumed by a nominee from Eastern Mindanao region from where he comes, cannot hold water. It would go against the
intent of the IBP By-Laws for such a nominee would be bereft of the wealth of experience and the perspective that only
one who is honed in service while serving in a national post in the IBP would have.

We therefore rule that the IBP Board of Governors acted in accordance with the IBP By-Laws, in electing Atty. Salazar as
IBP EVP and in ensuring a succession in the leadership of the IBP. Had the Board of Governors not done so, there would
have been no one qualified to assume the Presidency of the IBP on 1 July 2005, pursuant to Section 47 of the IBP By-
Laws.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we rule as follows:

1) SUSPEND Atty. Leonard de Vera in A.C. No. 6697 from the practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS, effective from the
finality of this Resolution. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal record of Atty. Leonard de Vera and
copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all
courts;
2) DISMISS the letter-complaint of Atty. Leonard de Vera, dated 18 May 2005, in A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, praying for the
disapproval of the Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
removing him from his posts as Governor and Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the said
Resolution having been rendered without grave abuse of discretion;
3) AFFIRM the election by the Board of Governors of Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar as Executive Vice President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the remainder of the term 2003-2005, such having been conducted in accordance
with its By-Laws and absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion; and
4) DIRECT Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar to immediately take his oath of office and assume the Presidency of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the term 2005-2007 in accordance with the automatic succession rule in Article VII,
Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws, upon receipt of this Resolution.

SO ORDERED.
**************************************************************************************************

CASE NO. 2

IN RE: PETITION TO RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES,

EPIFANIO B. MUNESES, Petitioner.
B.M. No. 2112
Promulgated:
JULY 24, 2012
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses (petitioner) with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC)
praying that he be granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.

The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on March 21, 1966; that
he lost his privilege to practice law when he became a citizen of the United States of America (USA) on August 28, 1981;
that on September 15, 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the
Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003 by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the
Philippine Consulate General in Washington, D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in the Philippines and if granted, to
resume the practice of law. Attached to the petition were several documents in support of his petition, albeit mere
photocopies thereof, to wit:
1. Oath of Allegiance dated September 15, 2006 before Consul General Domingo P. Nolasco;
2. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship of same date;
3. Order for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship also of same date;
4. Letter dated March 13, 2008 evidencing payment of membership dues with the IBP;
5. Attendance Forms from the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE).

In Bar Matter No. 1678, dated December 17, 2007, the Court was confronted with a similar petition filed by Benjamin M.
Dacanay (Dacanay) who requested leave to resume his practice of law after availing the benefits of R.A. No. 9225.
Dacanay was admitted to the Philippine Bar in March 1960. In December 1998, he migrated to Canada to seek medical
attention for his ailments and eventually became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. On July 14, 2006, Dacanay re-acquired
his Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 after taking his oath of allegiance before the Philippine Consulate
General in Toronto, Canada. He returned to the Philippines and intended to resume his practice of law.

The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and is, in fact, a continuing
requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof means termination of the petitioners membership in the bar; ipso
jure the privilege to engage in the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired
their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a
citizen of another country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a member
of the Philippine Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay, the right to resume the practice of law is not automatic. R.A. No.
9225 provides that a person who intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must apply with the proper
authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice.

It can not be overstressed that:

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is so delicately affected with public interest that it is both
the power and duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the
public welfare.
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful observance of
the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of
membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good
standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions
makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise
of his professional privilege.

Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of law, the OBC required the herein
petitioner to submit the original or certified true copies of the following documents in relation to his petition:
1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration;
5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;
6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of annual membership dues;
7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and
8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.

In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted the following:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
 4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship issued by the Bureau of Immigration, in lieu of
the IC;
5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City Chapter attesting to his good moral character as well as
his updated payment of annual membership dues;
6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;
7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance period; and
Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator, UC-MCLE Program, University
of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his compliance with the MCLE.

The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with the MCLE. After all the requirements
were satisfactorily complied with and finding that the petitioner has met all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications for membership in the bar, the OBC recommended that the petitioner be allowed to resume his
practice of law.

Upon this favorable recommendation of the OBC, the Court adopts the same and sees no bar to the petitioner's
resumption to the practice of law in the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED, subject to the condition that he shall re-
take the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by the Court and subject to the payment of appropriate fees.

Furthermore, the Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to draft the necessary guidelines for the re-acquisition of the
privilege to resume the practice of law for the guidance of the Bench and Bar.

SO ORDERED.
 REINSTATEMENT AFTER DISBARMENT

CASE NO. 1

[BAR MATTER No. 712. March 19, 1997]

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH
RESOLUTION
PADILLA, J.:

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred his oath-taking
due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner' s conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte during fraternity
initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of not guilty
to homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty
to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on each of the accused a
sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.
On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by the Probation
Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from probation
On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based on the order
of his discharge from probation.
On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution requiring
petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the
requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.
In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters executed by
among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise
submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim,
through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.
On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on petitioner's prayer to
be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:
a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son was deliberate rather
than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but murder since the accused took advantage of the
neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and treachery.
b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide only out
of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one of the accused who went to their house on Christmas
day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying and begging for forgiveness and compassion. They
also told him that the father of one of the accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of his son's involvement in
the incident.
c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son. However, as a loving father who
had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his law practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely demise
and the stigma of the gruesome manner of his death.
d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar. He therefore submits the
matter to the sound discretion of the Court.
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications
required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration o f justice. It is the sworn duty of
this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of
equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer' s oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of
lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.
The resolution of the issue before us required a weighing and re-weighing of the reasons for allowing or disallowing
petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident
absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and
uncalled for.
In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:
"x x x participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes impossible a finding that the
participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of good moral character."
In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether
petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above.
Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The death of one's
child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering becomes even more pronounced and profound in cases
where the death is due to causes other than natural or accidental but due to the reckless imprudence of third parties.
The feeling then becomes a struggle between grief and anger directed at the cause of death.
Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no less than praiseworthy
and commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in this cases, to find room for forgiveness.
However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now morally fit to be a lawyer.
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath,
sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral
fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties
and public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are
prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash,
temerarious and uncalculating.
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer
should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all
lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.
The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his community. As a
lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of
society.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath on a date to be
set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession.
SO ORDERED.
************************************************************************************************

CASE NO. 2

RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS B.M. No. 1222

x ---------------------------------------- x

ATTY. DANILO DE GUZMAN,

Promulgated:
April 24, 2009
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This treats the Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion dated November 10, 2008 filed by petitioner Danilo de
Guzman. He prays that this Honorable Court in the exercise of equity and compassion, grant petitioners plea for judicial
clemency, and thereupon, order his reinstatement as a member in good standing of the Philippine Bar.

To recall, on February 4, 2004, the Court promulgated a Resolution, in B.M. No. 1222, the dispositive portion of which
reads in part:

WHEREFORE, the Court, acting on the recommendations of the Investigating Committee, hereby resolves to

(1) DISBAR Atty. DANILO DE GUZMAN from the practice of law effective upon his receipt of this RESOLUTION;

xxxx

The subject of the Resolution is the leakage of questions in Mercantile Law during the 2003 Bar Examinations. Petitioner
at that time was employed as an assistant lawyer in the law firm of Balgos & Perez, one of whose partners, Marcial
Balgos, was the examiner for Mercantile Law during the said bar examinations. The Court had adopted the findings of
the Investigating Committee, which identified petitioner as the person who had downloaded the test questions from the
computer of Balgos and faxed them to other persons.

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) has favorably recommended the reinstatement of petitioner in the Philippine Bar.
In a Report dated January 6, 2009, the OBC rendered its assessment of the petition, the relevant portions of which we
quote hereunder:

Petitioner narrated that he had labored to become a lawyer to fulfill his fathers childhood dream to become one. This
task was not particularly easy for him and his family but he willed to endure the same in order to pay tribute to his
parents.
Petitioner added that even at a very young age, he already imposed upon himself the duty of rendering service to his
fellowmen. At 19 years, he started his exposure to public service when he was elected Chairman of the Sangguniang
Kabataan (SK) of Barangay Tuktukan, Taguig City. During this time, he initiated several projects benefiting the youth in
their barangay.

Thereafter, petitioner focused on his studies, taking up Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and eventually pursuing
Bachelor of Laws. In his second year in law school, he was elected as the President of the Student Council of the Institute
of Law of the Far Eastern University (FEU). Here, he spearheaded various activities including the conduct of seminars for
law students as well as the holding of bar operations for bar examinees.

Despite his many extra-curricular activities as a youth and student leader, petitioner still managed to excel in his studies.
Thus, he was conferred an Academic Excellence Award upon his graduation in Bachelor of Laws.

Upon admission to the bar in April 1999, petitioner immediately entered government service as a Legal Officer assigned
at the Sangguniang Bayan of Taguig. Simultaneously, he also rendered free legal services to less fortunate residents of
Taguig City who were then in need of legal assistance.

In March 2000, petitioner was hired as one of the Associate Lawyers at the Balgos and Perez Law Offices. It was during
his stay with this firm when his craft as a lawyer was polished and developed. Despite having entered private practice,
he continued to render free legal services to his fellow Taguigeos.

Then in February 2004, by a sudden twist of fate, petitioners flourishing career was cut short as he was stripped of his
license to practice law for his alleged involvement in the leakage in the 2003 Bar Examinations.

Devastated, petitioner then practically locked himself inside his house to avoid the rather unavoidable consequences of
his disbarment.

On March 2004, however, petitioner was given a new lease in life when he was taken as a consultant by the City
Government of Taguig. Later, he was designated as a member of the Secretariat of the Peoples Law Enforcement Board
(PLEB). For the next five (5) years, petitioner concentrated mainly on rendering public service.

Petitioner humbly acknowledged the damaging impact of his act which unfortunately, compromised the integrity of the
bar examinations. As could be borne from the records of the investigation, he cooperated fully in the investigation
conducted and took personal responsibility for his actions. Also, he has offered his sincerest apologies to Atty. Balgos, to
the Court as well as to all the 2003 bar examinees for the unforeseen and unintended effects of his actions.

Petitioner averred that he has since learned from his mistakes and has taken the said humbling experience to make him
a better person.

Meanwhile, as part of his Petition, petitioner submitted the following testimonials and endorsements of various
individuals and entities all attesting to his good moral character:
1) Resolution No. 101, Series of 2007, Resolution Expressing Full Support to Danilo G. De Guzman in his Application for
Judicial Clemency, Endorsing his Competence and Fitness to be Reinstated as a Member of the Philippine Bar and for
Other Purposes dated 4 June 2007 of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, City of Taguig;
2) Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga
Kasapi ng Southeast Peoples Village Homeowners Association, Inc. (SEPHVOA) kay Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang
Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa
Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado dated 1 June 2007 of the Southeast Peoples Village Homeowners
Association, Inc. (SEPHVOA), Ibayo-Tipas, City of Taguig;
3) Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga
Kasapi ng Samahang Residente ng Mauling Creek, Inc. (SAREMAC) kay G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong
Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang
mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado dated 1 June 2007 of the Samahang Residente ng Mauling Creek, Inc. (SAREMAC),
Lower Bicutan, City of Taguig;
4) Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga
Kasapi ng Samahan ng mga Maralita (PULONG KENDI) Neighborhood Association, Inc. (SAMANA) kay G. Danilo G. De
Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan
Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado dated 1 June 2007 of the Samahan ng mga Maralita
(PULONG KENDI) Neighborhood Association, Inc. (SAMANA), Sta. Ana, City of Taguig;
5) An Open Letter Attesting Personally to the Competence and Fitness of Danilo G. De Guzman as to Warrant the Grant
of Judicial Clemency and his Reinstatement as Member of the Philippine Bar dated 8 June 2007 of Miguelito Nazareno V.
Llantino, Laogan, Trespeses and Llantino Law Offices;
6) Testimonial to the Moral and Spiritual Competence of Danilo G. De Guzman to be Truly Deserving of Judicial Clemency
and Compassion dated 5 July 2007 of Rev. Fr. Paul G. Balagtas, Parish Priest, Archdiocesan Shrine of St. Anne;
7) Testimonial Letter dated 18 February 2008 of Atty. Loreto C. Ata, President, Far Eastern University Law Alumni
Association (FEULAA), Far Eastern University (FEU);
8) Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga
Kasapi ng Samahang Bisig Kamay sa Kaunlaran, Inc. (SABISKA) kay G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong
Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang
mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado dated 8 July 2008 of the Samahang Bisig Kamay sa Kaunlaran, Inc. (SABISKA);
9) Board Resolution No. 02, Series of 2008, A Resolution Recognizing the Contributions of Danilo G. De Guzman to the
Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) Taguig City, Attesting to his Utmost Dedication and Commitment to the Call of
Civic and Social Duty and for Other Purposes dated 11 July 2008 of the Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB);
10) A Personal Appeal for the Grant of Judicial Forgiveness and Compassion in Favor of Danilo G. De Guzman dated 14
July 2008 of Atty. Edwin R. Sandoval, Professor, College of Law, San Sebastian College Recoletos;
11) An Open Letter Personally Attesting to the Moral competence and Fitness of Danilo G. De Guzman dated 5
September 2008 of Mr. Nixon F. Faderog, Deputy Grand [Kn]ight, Knights of Columbus and President, General Parent-
Teacher Association, Taguig National High School, Lower Bicutan, Taguig City;
12) Testimonial Letter dated 5 September 2008 of Atty. Primitivo C. Cruz, President, Taguig Lawyers League, Inc.,
Tuktukan, Taguig City;
13) Testimonial Letter dated 21 October 2008 of Judge Hilario L. Laqui, Presiding Judge, Regional Trail Court (RTC),
Branch 218, Quezon City; and
14) Testimonial Letter dated 28 October 2008 of Justice Oscar M. Herrera, former Justice, Court of Appeals and former
Dean, Institute of Law, Far Eastern University (FEU).

Citing the case of In Re: Carlos S. Basa, petitioner pleaded that he be afforded the same kindness and compassion in
order that, like Atty. Basa, his promising future may not be perpetually foreclosed. In the said case, the Court had the
occasion to say:

Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, admitted to the bars of California and the Philippine Islands.
Recently, he was charged in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila with the crime of abduction with consent,
was found guilty in a decision rendered by the Honorable M.V. De Rosario, Judge of First Instance, and was sentenced to
be imprisoned for a period of two years, eleven months and eleven days of prision correccional. On appeal, this decision
was affirmed in a judgment handed down by the second division of the Supreme Court.

xxxx

When come next, as we must, to determine the exact action which should be taken by the court, we do so regretfully
and reluctantly. On the one hand, the violation of the criminal law by the respondent attorney cannot be lightly passed
over. On the other hand, we are willing to strain the limits of our compassion to the uttermost in order that so promising
a career may not be utterly ruined.

Petitioner promised to commit himself to be more circumspect in his actions and solemnly pledged to exert all efforts to
atone for his misdeeds.

There may be a reasonable ground to consider the herein Petition.

In the case of Re: Petition of Al Argosino to Take the Lawyers Oath (Bar Matter 712), which may be applied in the
instant case, the Court said:

After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath,
sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following admonition:

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyers oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral
fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties
and public service.

The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts, to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are
prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash,
temerarious and uncalculating.

xxxx

Meanwhile, in the case of Rodolfo M. Bernardo vs. Atty. Ismael F. Mejia (Administrative Case No. 2984), the Court [in]
deciding whether or not to reinstate Atty. Mejia to the practice of law stated:
The Court will take into consideration the applicants character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and
character of the charge/s for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment and the time that has
elapsed in between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement.

Petitioner was barely thirty (30) years old and had only been in the practice of law for five (5) years when he was
disbarred from the practice of law. It is of no doubt that petitioner had a promising future ahead of him where it not for
the decision of the Court stripping off his license.

Petitioner is also of good moral repute, not only before but likewise, after his disbarment, as attested to overwhelmingly
by his constituents, colleagues as well as people of known probity in the community and society.

Way before the petitioner was even admitted to the bar, he had already manifested his intense desire to render public
service as evidenced by his active involvement and participation in several social and civic projects and activities.
Likewise, even during and after his disbarment, which could be perceived by some as a debilitating circumstance,
petitioner still managed to continue extending his assistance to others in whatever means possible. This only proves
petitioners strength of character and positive moral fiber.

However, still, it is of no question that petitioners act in copying the examination questions from Atty. Balgos computer
without the latters knowledge and consent, and which questions later turned out to be the bar examinations questions
in Mercantile Law in the 2003 Bar Examinations, is not at all commendable. While we do believe that petitioner sincerely
did not intend to cause the damage that his action ensued, still, he must be sanctioned for unduly compromising the
integrity of the bar examinations as well as of this Court.

We are convinced, however, that petitioner has since reformed and has sincerely reflected on his transgressions. Thus,
in view of the circumstances and likewise for humanitarian considerations, the penalty of disbarment may now be
commuted to suspension. Considering the fact, however, that petitioner had already been disbarred for more than five
(5) years, the same may be considered as proper service of said commuted penalty and thus, may now be allowed to
resume practice of law.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully recommended that the instant Petition for Judicial Clemency and
Compassion dated 10 November 2008 of petitioner DANILO G. DE GUZMAN be GRANTED. Petitioners disbarment is now
commuted to suspension, which suspension is considered as served in view of the petitioners five (5) year disbarment.
Hence, petitioner may now be allowed to resume practice of law.

The recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant is well-taken in part. We deem petitioner worthy of clemency to
the extent of commuting his penalty to seven (7) years suspension from the practice of law, inclusive of the five (5) years
he has already served his disbarment.

Penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders. While the Court is ever mindful of its
duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to show compassion when the penalty imposed has already
served its purpose.

In cases where we have deigned to lift or commute the supreme penalty of disbarment imposed on the lawyer, we have
taken into account the remorse of the disbarred lawyer and the conduct of his public life during his years outside of the
bar. For example, in Valencia v. Antiniw, we held:

However, the record shows that the long period of respondent's disbarment gave him the chance to purge himself of his
misconduct, to show his remorse and repentance, and to demonstrate his willingness and capacity to live up once again
to the exacting standards of conduct demanded of every member of the bar and officer of the court. During
respondent's disbarment for more than fifteen (15) years to date for his professional infraction, he has been persistent
in reiterating his apologies and pleas for reinstatement to the practice of law and unrelenting in his efforts to show that
he has regained his worthiness to practice law, by his civic and humanitarian activities and unblemished record as an
elected public servant, as attested to by numerous civic and professional organizations, government institutions, public
officials and members of the judiciary.

And in Bernardo v. Atty. Mejia, we noted:

Although the Court does not lightly take the bases for Mejias disbarment, it also cannot close its eyes to the fact that
Mejia is already of advanced years. While the age of the petitioner and the length of time during which he has endured
the ignominy of disbarment are not the sole measure in allowing a petition for reinstatement, the Court takes
cognizance of the rehabilitation of Mejia. Since his disbarment in 1992, no other transgression has been attributed to
him, and he has shown remorse. Obviously, he has learned his lesson from this experience, and his punishment has
lasted long enough. x x x

Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated the remorse expected of him considering the gravity of his transgressions. Even
more to his favor, petitioner has redirected focus since his disbarment towards public service, particularly with the
Peoples Law Enforcement Board. The attestations submitted by his peers in the community and other esteemed
members of the legal profession, such as retired Court of Appeals Associate Justice Oscar Herrera, Judge Hilario Laqui,
Professor Edwin Sandoval and Atty. Lorenzo Ata, and the ecclesiastical community such as Rev. Fr. Paul Balagtas testify
to his positive impact on society at large since the unfortunate events of 2003.

Petitioners subsequent track record in public service affords the Court some hope that if he were to reacquire
membership in the Philippine bar, his achievements as a lawyer would redound to the general good and more than
mitigate the stain on his record. Compassion to the petitioner is warranted. Nonetheless, we wish to impart to him the
following stern warning:

Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for
him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very
bands of society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and
dangerous elements of the body politic.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion is hereby GRANTED IN PART.
The disbarment of DANILO G. DE GUZMAN from the practice of law is hereby COMMUTED to SEVEN (7) YEARS
SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW, reckoned from February 4, 2004.

SO ORDERED.
**************************************************************************************************

CASE NO. 3

Adm. Case No. 6148 January 22, 2013

FLORENCE TEVES MACARUBBO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO, Respondent.
RE: PETITION (FOR EXTRAORDINARY MERCY) OF EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO.

RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For resolution is the Petition (For Extraordinary Mercy) filed by respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo (respondent) who
seeks to be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.
Records show that in the Decision dated February 27, 2004, the Court disbarred respondent from the practice of law for
having contracted a bigamous marriage with complainant Florence Teves and a third marriage with one Josephine
Constantino while his first marriage to Helen Esparza was still subsisting, which acts constituted gross immoral conduct
in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The dispositive
portion of the subject Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo is found guilty of gross immorality and is hereby DISBARRED from the
practice of law. He is likewise ORDERED to show satisfactory evidence to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline and to
this Court that he is supporting or has made provisions for the regular support of his two children by complainant.
Let respondents name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Appeal for Compassion and Mercy which the Court denied
with finality in the Resolution dated June 1, 2004. Eight years after or on June 4, 2012, respondent filed the instant
Petition (For Extraordinary Mercy) seeking judicial clemency and reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys. The Court
initially treated the present suit as a second motion for reconsideration and accordingly, denied it for lack of merit in the
Resolution dated September 4, 2012. On December 18, 2012, the same petition was endorsed to this Court by the Office
of the Vice President for re-evaluation, prompting the Court to look into the substantive merits of the case.
In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for Clemency, the
Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency, to wit:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to certifications or
testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and
prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an
administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reform.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him that can be put
to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal
scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for
public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency. (Citations omitted)
Moreover, to be reinstated to the practice of law, the applicant must, like any other candidate for admission to the bar,
satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character.
Applying the foregoing standards to this case, the Court finds the instant petition meritorious.
Respondent has sufficiently shown his remorse and acknowledged his indiscretion in the legal profession and in his
personal life. He has asked forgiveness from his children by complainant Teves and maintained a cordial relationship
with them as shown by the herein attached pictures. Records also show that after his disbarment, respondent returned
to his hometown in Enrile, Cagayan and devoted his time tending an orchard and taking care of his ailing mother until
her death in 2008. In 2009, he was appointed as Private Secretary to the Mayor of Enrile, Cagayan and thereafter,
assumed the position of Local Assessment Operations Officer II/ Office-In-Charge in the Assessors Office, which office
he continues to serve to date. Moreover, he is a part-time instructor at the University of Cagayan Valley and F.L. Vargas
College during the School Year 2011-2012. Respondent likewise took an active part in socio-civic activities by helping his
neighbors and friends who are in dire need.
The following documents attest to respondents reformed ways: (1) Affidavit of Candida P. Mabborang; (2) Affidavit of
Reymar P. Ramirez; (3) Affidavit of Roberto D. Tallud; (4) Certification from the Municipal Local Government Office; (5)
Certification by the Office of the Municipal Agriculturist/Health Officer, Social Welfare Development Officer; (6)
Certification from the Election Officer of Enrile, Cagayan; (7) Affidavit of Police Senior Inspector Jacinto T. Tuddao; (8)
Certifications from nine (9) Barangay Chairpersons; (9) Certification from the Office of the Provincial Assessor; (10)
Certification from the Office of the Manager, Magsaka ca Multi-Purpose Cooperative; and (11) Certification of the Office
of the Federation of Senior Citizens, Enrile Chapter. The Office of the Municipal Treasurer also certified that respondent
has no monetary accountabilities in relation to his office while the Office of the Human Resource Management Officer
attested that he has no pending administrative case. He is not known to be involved in any irregularity and/or accused of
a crime. Even the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) attested that he has no record on file as of May 31, 2011.
Furthermore, respondents plea for reinstatement is duly supported by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Cagayan
Chapter and by his former and present colleagues. His parish priest, Rev. Fr. Camilo Castillejos, Jr., certified that he is
faithful to and puts to actual practice the doctrines of the Catholic Church. He is also observed to be a regular
churchgoer. Records further reveal that respondent has already settled his previous marital squabbles, as in fact, no
opposition to the instant suit was tendered by complainant Teves. He sends regular support to his children in
compliance with the Courts directive in the Decision dated February 27, 2004.
The Court notes the eight (8) long years that had elapsed from the time respondent was disbarred and recognizes his
achievement as the first lawyer product of Lemu National High School, and his fourteen (14) years of dedicated
government service from 1986 to July 2000 as Legal Officer of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports;
Supervising Civil Service Attorney of the Civil Service Commission; Ombudsman Graft Investigation Officer; and State
Prosecutor of the Department of Justice. From the attestations and certifications presented, the Court finds that
respondent has sufficiently atoned for his transgressions. At 58 years of age, he still has productive years ahead of him
that could significantly contribute to the upliftment of the law profession and the betterment of society. While the Court
is ever mindful of its duty to discipline and even remove its errant officers, concomitant to it is its duty to show
compassion to those who have reformed their ways, as in this case.
Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered reinstated to the practice of law. He is, however, reminded that such
privilege is burdened with conditions whereby adherence to the rigid standards of intellect, moral uprightness, and strict
compliance with the rules and the law are continuing requirements.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. Respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo is hereby
ordered REINSTATED in the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
**************************************************************************************************

CASE NO. 4
A.M. No. 07-7-17-SC
RE: LETTER OF JUDGE AUGUSTUS C. DIAZ, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 37, APPEALING
FOR JUDICIAL CLEMENCY.
Promulgated:
September 19, 2007
x-------------------------------------------------x

In a letter dated July 18, 2007, Judge Augustus C. Diaz, presiding judge of Branch 37 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City, informed the Court that he is an applicant for judgeship in one of the vacant Regional Trial Court branches
in Metro Manila. In connection therewith, he was interviewed by the Judicial and Bar Council on July 10, 2007. He was
told to seek judicial clemency due to the fact that he was once fined P20,000 for not hearing a motion for demolition. He
claims that this lapse happened only once as a result of oversight. He requests judicial clemency and, in particular, that
he be allowed to again be nominated to one of the vacant branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila or in any of the
cities where [his] application [is being] considered.

In a subsequent letter, Judge Diaz stated that he has been the presiding judge of Branch 37 of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Quezon City since March 1, 1995. He expressed deep remorse for the lapse for which he was held
administratively liable in Alvarez v. Diaz. He confessed that [t]he stain of the penalty has taught [him] a bitter lesson and
promised to avoid the commission of the same or similar acts. He submitted himself to the judicious discretion of this
Court for whatever action the Court may take on his plea for judicial clemency.

In Alvarez, Judge Diaz was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law when he granted the following motions: (1) a
motion for execution which was fatally defective for lack of notice to the defendant and (2) a motion for demolition
without notice and hearing. His action on the motion for demolition also made him liable for grave abuse of authority.
He was fined P20,000.
Section 5, Rule 4 of the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council provides:
SEC. 5. Disqualification. The following are disqualified from being nominated for appointment to any judicial post or as
Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman:
1. Those with pending criminal or regular administrative cases;
2. Those with pending criminal cases in foreign courts or tribunals; and
3. Those who have been convicted in any criminal case; or in an administrative case, where the penalty imposed is at
least a fine of more than P10,000, unless he has been granted judicial clemency. (emphasis supplied)

Under the said provision, Judge Diaz is disqualified from being nominated for appointment to any judicial post, until and
unless his request for judicial clemency is granted.
Concerned with safeguarding the integrity of the judiciary, this Court has come down hard and wielded the rod of
discipline against members of the judiciary who have fallen short of the exacting standards of judicial conduct. This is
because a judge is the visible representation of the law and of justice. He must comport himself in a manner that his
conduct must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to the performance of his official duties but also as
to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. His character must be able to withstand the most searching
public scrutiny because the ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation of the
peoples faith in the judicial system.
Clemency, as an act of mercy removing any disqualification, should be balanced with the preservation of public
confidence in the courts. The Court will grant it only if there is a showing that it is merited. Proof of reformation and a
showing of potential and promise are indispensable.
In the exercise of its constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts and all personnel thereof, the
Court lays down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to certifications or
testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and
prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an
administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reformation.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him that can be put
to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal
scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for
public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.

In this case, Judge Diaz expressed sincere repentance for his past malfeasance. He humbly accepted the verdict of this
Court in Alvarez. Three years have elapsed since the promulgation of Alvarez. It is sufficient to ensure that he has
learned his lesson and that he has reformed. His 12 years of service in the judiciary may be taken as proof of his
dedication to the institution. Thus, the Court may now open the door of further opportunities in the judiciary for him.

Accordingly, the letter dated July 18, 2007 of Judge Augustus C. Diaz is hereby NOTED. His request for judicial clemency
is GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.