JUDICIAL ETHICS

Case No. 1
G.R. No. 174759 (September 7, 2011)
DENIS B. HABAWEL and ALEXIS F. MEDINA, Petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, FIRST DIVISION, Respondent.
Found guilty of direct contempt by the First Division of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA First Division), and sanctioned with
imprisonment for a period of ten days and a fine of P2,000.00, the petitioners have come to the Court for relief through
certiorari, claiming that the CTA First Divisions finding and sentence were made in grave abuse of its discretion because
the language they used in their motion for reconsideration as the attorneys for a party was contumacious. Specifically,
they assail the resolution dated May 16, 2006, whereby the CTA First Division disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds Attorneys Denis B. Habawel and Alexis F. Medina of the Ponce Enrile
Reyes and Manalastas Law Offices guilty of DIRECT CONTEMPT. Each counsel is hereby ORDERED TO PAY a fine of Two
Thousand Pesos and to SUFFER IMPRISONMENT for a period of ten (10) days.
SO ORDERED. and the resolution dated July 26, 2006, whereby the CTA First Division denied their motion for
reconsideration and reiterated the penalties.
Antecedents
The petitioners were the counsel of Surfield Development Corporation (Surfield), which sought from the Office of the
City Treasurer of Mandaluyong City the refund of excess realty taxes paid from 1995 until 2000. After the City
Government of Mandaluyong City denied its claim for refund, Surfield initiated a special civil action for mandamus in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Mandaluyong City, which was docketed as SCA No. MC03-2142 entitled Surfield
Development Corporation v. Hon. City Treasurer of Mandaluyong City, and Hon. City Assessor of Mandaluyong City, and
assigned to Branch 214. Surfield later amended its petition to include its claim for refund of the excess taxes paid from
2001 until 2003.
On October 15, 2004, the RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the period to file the claim had already
prescribed and that Surfield had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The RTC ruled that the grant of a tax refund
was not a ministerial duty compellable by writ of mandamus.
Surfield, represented by the petitioners, elevated the dismissal to the CTA via petition for review (CTA AC No. 5 entitled
Surfield Development Corporation v. Hon. City Treasurer and Hon. City Assessor, Mandaluyong City). The appeal was
assigned to the First Division, composed of Presiding Justice Ernesto D. Acosta, Associate Justice Lovell R. Bautista and
Associate Justice Caesar A. Casanova.
In its decision dated January 5, 2006, the CTA First Division denied the petition for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to
exhaust the remedies provided under Section 253 and Section 226 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code).
Undeterred, the petitioners sought reconsideration in behalf of Surfield, insisting that the CTA had jurisdiction pursuant
to Section 7(a)(3) of Republic Act No. 9282; and arguing that the CTA First Division manifested its lack of understanding
or respect for the doctrine of stare decisis in not applying the ruling in Ty v. Trampe (G.R. No. 117577, December 1, 1995,
250 SCRA 500), to the effect that there was no need to file an appeal before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals
pursuant to Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7160.
On March 15, 2006, the CTA First Division denied Surfields motion for reconsideration. On the issue of jurisdiction, the
CTA First Division explained that the jurisdiction conferred by Section 7(a)(3) of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended by
Republic Act No. 9282, referred to appeals from the decisions, orders, or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases and
did not include the real property tax, an ad valorem tax, the refund of excess payment of which Surfield was claiming.
Accordingly, the CTA First Division ruled that the jurisdiction of the CTA concerning real property tax cases fell under a
different section of Republic Act No. 9282 and under a separate book of Republic Act No. 7160.
In addition, the CTA First Division, taking notice of the language the petitioners employed in the motion for
reconsideration, required them to explain within five days from receipt why they should not be liable for indirect
contempt or be made subject to disciplinary action, thusly:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. And insofar as
the merits of the case are concerned let this Resolution be considered as the final decision on the matter.
However, this Court finds the statements of petitioners counsel that it is gross ignorance of the law for the Honorable
Court to have held that it has no jurisdiction over this instant petition; the grossness of this Honorable Courts ignorance
of the law is matched only by the unequivocal expression of this Honorable Courts jurisdiction over the instant case and
this Court lacked the understanding and respect for the doctrine of stare decisis as derogatory, offensive and
disrespectful. Lawyers are charged with the basic duty to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice
and judicial officers; they vow solemnly to conduct themselves with all good fidelity to the courts. As a matter of fact,
the first canon of legal ethics enjoins them to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its superior importance. Therefore, petitioners
counsel is hereby ORDERED to explain within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution why he should not be held for
indirect contempt and/or subject to disciplinary action.
SO ORDERED.
The petitioners submitted a compliance dated March 27, 2006, in which they appeared to apologize but nonetheless
justified their language as, among others, necessary to bluntly call the Honorable Courts attention to the grievousness of
the error by calling a spade by spade.
In its first assailed resolution, the CTA First Division found the petitioners apology wanting in sincerity and humility,
1
observing that they chose words that were so strong, which brings disrepute the Courts honor and integrity for brazenly
pointing to the Courts alleged ignorance and grave abuse of discretion, to wit:
In their Compliance, the Court finds no sincerity and humility when counsels Denis B. Habawel and Alexis F. Medina
asked for apology. In fact, the counsels brazenly pointed the Courts alleged ignorance and grave abuse of discretion.
Their chosen words are so strong, which brings disrepute the Courts honor and integrity. We quote:
a) Admittedly, the language of the Motion for Reconsideration was not endearing. However, the undersigned counsel
found it necessary to bluntly call the Honorable Courts attention to the grievousness of the error by calling a spade a
spade. The advocacy needed a strong articulation of the gravity of the error of the Honorable Court in avoiding the
substantial and transcendental issues by the simple expedient of dismissing the petition for alleged lack of jurisdiction, in
violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, which requires that the Decision must express clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which the Decision was based (par. 3 of the Compliance; docket, p. 349);
b) Since the Honorable Court simply quoted Section 7(a)(5) and it totally ignored Section 7(a)(3), to perfunctorily find
that (U)ndoubtedly, appeals of the decisions or rulings of the Regional Trial Court concerning real property taxes
evidently do not fall within the jurisdiction of the CTA, the undersigned counsel formed a perception that the Honorable
Court was totally unaware or ignorant of the new provision, Section 7(a)(3). Hence, the statements that it was gross
ignorance of the law for the Honorable Court to have held that it has not [sic] jurisdiction, as well as, the grossness of
the Honorable Courts ignorance of the law is matched only by the unequivocal expression of this Honorable Courts
jurisdiction over the instant case were an honest and frank articulation of undersigned counsels perception that was
influenced by its failure to understand why the Honorable Court totally ignored Section 7(a)(3) in ruling on its lack of
jurisdiction (par. 10 of the Compliance; docket, p. 353);
Accordingly, the CTA First Division adjudged both of the petitioners guilty of direct contempt of court for failing to
uphold their duty of preserving the integrity and respect due to the courts, sentencing each to suffer imprisonment of
ten days and to pay P2,000.00 as fine.
Seeking reconsideration, the petitioners submitted that they could not be held guilty of direct contempt because: (a) the
phrase gross ignorance of the law was used in its legal sense to describe the error of judgment and was not directed to
the character or competence of the decision makers; (b) there was no unfounded accusation or allegation, or
scandalous, offensive or menacing, intemperate, abusive, abrasive or threatening, or vile, rude and repulsive statements
or words contained in their motion for reconsideration; (c) there was no statement in their motion for reconsideration
that brought the authority of the CTA and the administration of the law into disrepute; and (d) they had repeatedly
offered their apology in their compliance.
Their submissions did not convince and move the CTA First Division to reconsider, which declared through its second
assailed resolution that:
The tone of an irate lawyer would almost always reveal the sarcasm in the phrases used. The scurrilous attacks made in
the guise of pointing out errors of judgment almost always result to the destruction of the high esteem and regard
towards the Court. and disposed thusly:

WHEREFORE, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Each counsel is hereby
ORDERED TO PAY a fine of Two Thousand Pesos and to SUFFER IMPRISONMENT for a period of ten (10) days.
SO, ORDERED.
Issues
Arguing that they were merely prompted by their (z)ealous advocacy and an appalling error committed by the CTA First
Division to frankly describe such error as gross ignorance of the law, the petitioners now attribute grave abuse of
discretion to the CTA First Division in finding that:
I
THE PETITIONERS LANGUAGE IN THE SUBJECT MOTION AND COMPLIANCE WAS CONTUMACIOUS;
II
THE PETITIONERS WERE NOT SINCERE IN THEIR APOLOGY AND WERE ARROGANT;
III
THE EXERCISE OF CONTEMPT POWER WAS WITHIN THE LIMITS SET BY THE SUPREME COURT; AND
IV
THE PETITIONERS WERE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF DIRECT CONTEMPT.

The petitioners continue to posit that the phrase gross ignorance of the law was used in its strict legal sense to
emphasize the gravity of the error of law committed by the CTA First Division; and that the statements described by the
CTA First Division as abrasive, offensive, derogatory, offensive and disrespectful should be viewed within the context of
the general tone and language of their motion for reconsideration; that their overall language was tempered, restrained
and respectful and should not be construed as a display of contumacious attitude or as a flouting or arrogant
belligerence in defiance of the court to be penalized as direct contempt; that the CTA First Division did not appreciate
the sincerity of their apology; and that they merely pointed out the error in the decision of the CTA First Division.

For its part, the CTA First Division contends that a reading of the motion for reconsideration and the character of the
words used therein by the petitioners indicated that their statements reflected no humility, nor were they expressive of
a contrite heart; and that their submissions instead reflected arrogance and sarcasm, that they even took the
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opportunity to again deride the public respondent on the manner of how it wrote the decision.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opines that submitting a pleading containing derogatory, offensive and
malicious statements to the same court or judge in which the proceedings are pending constitutes direct contempt; and
that the CTA First Division did not abuse its discretion in finding the petitioners liable for direct contempt under Section
1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

Ruling

We dismiss the petition for certiorari, and declare that the CTA First Division did not abuse its discretion, least of all
gravely, in finding that the petitioners committed direct contempt of court.

Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all attorneys to observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts and to judicial officers and to insist on similar conduct by others. Rule 11.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility specifically enjoins all attorneys thus:

Rule 11.03. A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.

It is conceded that an attorney or any other person may be critical of the courts and their judges provided the criticism is
made in respectful terms and through legitimate channels. In that regard, we have long adhered to the sentiment aptly
given expression to in the leading case of In re: Almacen:

xxx every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is not
diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, or that it is articulated by a lawyer. Such right
is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation, because then the courts actuation are
thrown open to public consumption.
xxx
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect critical evaluation of their performance. For like the
executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the
periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve.

Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in
properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. xxx
xxx
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider
it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he professionally answerable for a scrutiny into
the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen. xxx
xxx
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts
and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to
courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. (emphasis supplied)

The test for criticizing a judges decision is, therefore, whether or not the criticism is bona fide or done in good faith, and
does not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.

Here, the petitioners motion for reconsideration contained the following statements, to wit: (a) [i]t is gross ignorance of
the law for the Honorable Court to have held that it has no jurisdiction over the instant petition; (b) [t]he grossness of
the Honorable Courts ignorance of the law is matched only by the unequivocal expression of this Honorable Courts
jurisdiction; and (c) the Honorable Courts lack of understanding or respect for the doctrine of stare decisis.

The CTA First Division held the statements to constitute direct contempt of court meriting prompt penalty.

We agree.

By such statements, the petitioners clearly and definitely overstepped the bounds of propriety as attorneys, and
disregarded their sworn duty to respect the courts. An imputation in a pleading of gross ignorance against a court or its
judge, especially in the absence of any evidence, is a serious allegation, and constitutes direct contempt of court. It is
settled that derogatory, offensive or malicious statements contained in pleadings or written submissions presented to
the same court or judge in which the proceedings are pending are treated as direct contempt because they are
equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration
of justice. This is true, even if the derogatory, offensive or malicious statements are not read in open court. Indeed, in
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Dantes v. Judge Ramon S. Caguioa, where the petitioners motion for clarification stated that the respondent judges
decision constituted gross negligence and ignorance of the rules, and was pure chicanery and sophistry, the Court held
that a pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements when submitted before a court or judge in
which the proceedings are pending is direct contempt because it is equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the
presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice.

In his dissent, Justice Del Castillo, although conceding that the petitioners statements were strong, tactless and hurtful,
regards the statements not contemptuous, or not necessarily assuming the level of contempt for being explanations of
their position in a case under consideration and because an unfavorable decision usually incites bitter feelings.

Such contempt of court cannot be condoned or be simply ignored and set aside, however, for the characterization that
the statements were strong, tactless and hurtful, although obviously correct, provides no ground to be lenient towards
the petitioners, even assuming that such strong, tactless and hurtful statements were used to explain their clients
position in the case. The statements manifested a disrespect towards the CTA and the members of its First Division
approaching disdain. Nor was the offensiveness of their strong, tactless and hurtful language minimized on the basis that
snide remarks or sarcastic innuendos made by counsels are not considered contemptuous considering that unfavorable
decision usually incite bitter feelings. By branding the CTA and the members of its First Division as totally unaware or
ignorant of Section 7(a)(3) of Republic Act No. 9282, and making the other equally harsh statements, the petitioners
plainly assailed the legal learning of the members of the CTA First Division. To hold such language as reflective of a very
deliberate move on the part of the petitioners to denigrate the CTA and the members of its First Division is not
altogether unwarranted.

The petitioners disdain towards the members of the CTA First Division for ruling against their side found firm
confirmation in their compliance, in which they unrepentantly emphasized such disdain in the following telling words:

3. Admittedly, the language of the Motion for Reconsideration was not endearing. However, the undersigned counsel
found it necessary to bluntly call the Honorable Courts attention to the grievousness of the error by calling a spade a
spade. The advocacy needed a strong articulation of the gravity of the error of the Honorable Court in avoiding the
substantial and transcendental issues by the simple expedient of dismissing the petition for alleged lack of
jurisdiction, in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, which requires that the Decision must express
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which the Decision was based.
xxx
10. Since the Honorable Court simply quoted Section 7(a)(5), and it totally ignored Section 7(a)(3), to perfunctorily find
that (U)ndoubtedly, appeals of the decisions or rulings of the Regional Trial Court concerning real property taxes
evidently do not fall within the jurisdiction of the CTA, the undersigned counsel formed a perception that the
Honorable Court was totally unaware or ignorant of the new provision, Section 7(a)(3). Hence the statements that it
was gross ignorance of the law for the Honorable Court to have held that it has no jurisdiction, as well as, the grossness
of the Honorable Courts ignorance of the law is matched only by the unequivocal expression of this Honorable Courts
jurisdiction over the instant case were an honest and frank articulation of undersigned counsels perception that was
influenced by its failure to understand why the Honorable Court totally ignored Section 7(a)(3) in ruling on its lack of
jurisdiction. (emphasis supplied)

We might have been more understanding of the milieu in which the petitioners made the statements had they
convinced us that the CTA First Division truly erred in holding itself bereft of jurisdiction over the appeal of their client.
But our review of the text of the legal provisions involved reveals that the error was committed by them, not by the CTA
First Division. This result became immediately evident from a reading of Section 7(a)(3) and Section 7(a)(5) of Republic
Act No. 9282, the former being the anchor for their claim that the CTA really had jurisdiction, to wit:

Section 7. Jurisdiction. The CTA shall exercise:

(a) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:

xxx
(3) Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by
them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction; (emphasis supplied)
xxx
(5) Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases
involving the assessment and taxation of real property originally decided by the provincial or city board of assessment
appeals; (emphasis supplied)
xxx

As can be read and seen, Section 7(a)(3) covers only appeals of the (d)ecisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial
Courts in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction.
4
The provision is clearly limited to local tax disputes decided by the Regional Trial Courts. In contrast, Section 7(a)(5)
grants the CTA cognizance of appeals of the (d)ecisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and taxation of real property originally decided by the
provincial or city board of assessment appeals. In its resolution of March 15, 2006, therefore, the CTA First Division
forthrightly explained why, contrary to the petitioners urging, Section 7(a)(3) was not applicable by clarifying that a real
property tax, being an ad valorem tax, could not be treated as a local tax.

It would have been ethically better for the petitioners to have then retreated and simply admitted their blatant error
upon being so informed by the CTA First Division about the untenability of their legal position on the matter, but they
still persisted by going on in their compliance dated March 27, 2006 to also blame the CTA First Division for their
perception about the CTA First Divisions being totally oblivious of Section 7(a)(3) due to the terseness of the Decision
dated 05 January 2006, viz:

12. Undersigned counsel regrets having bluntly argued that this Honorable Court was grossly ignorant of Section
7(a)(3) because from the terseness of the Decision dated 05 January 2006, the undersigned counsel perceived the
Honorable Court as being totally oblivious of Section 7(a)(3). Had the reasons discussed in the Resolution dated 15
March 2006 been articulated in the 05 January 2006 decision, there would have been no basis for undersigned
counsels to have formed the above-mentioned perception. (emphasis supplied)

The foregoing circumstances do not give cause for the Court to excuse the petitioners contemptuous and offensive
language. No attorney, no matter his great fame or high prestige, should ever brand a court or judge as grossly ignorant
of the law, especially if there was no sincere or legitimate reason for doing so. Every attorney must use only fair and
temperate language in arguing a worthy position on the law, and must eschew harsh and intemperate language that has
no place in the educated ranks of the Legal Profession. Truly, the Bar should strive to win arguments through civility and
fairness, not by heated and acrimonious tone, as the Court aptly instructed in Slade Perkins v. Perkins, to wit:

The court notices with considerable regret the heated and acrimonious tone of the remarks of the counsel for
appellant, in his brief, in speaking of the action of the trial judge. We desire to express our opinion that excessive
language weakens rather than strengthens the persuasive force of legal reasoning. We have noticed a growing
tendency to use language that experience has shown not to be conducive to the orderly and proper administration of
justice. We therefore bespeak the attorneys of this court to desist from such practices, and to treat their opposing
attorneys, and the judges who have decided their cases in the lower court adversely to their contentions with that
courtesy all have a right to expect. (emphasis supplied)

We do not hesitate to punish the petitioners for the direct contempt of court. They threw out self-restraint and
courtesy, traits that in the most trying occasions equate to rare virtues that all members of the Legal Profession should
possess and cherish. They shunted aside the nobility of their profession. They wittingly banished the ideal that even the
highest degree of zealousness in defending the causes of clients did not permit them to cross the line between liberty
and license. Indeed, the Court has not lacked in frequently reminding the Bar that language, though forceful, must still
be dignified; and though emphatic, must remain respectful as befitting advocates and in keeping with the dignity of the
Legal Profession. It is always worthwhile to bear in mind, too, that the language vehicle did not run short of expressions
that were emphatic, yet respectful; convincing, yet not derogatory; and illuminating, yet not offensive. No attorney
worthy of the title should forget that his first and foremost status as an officer of the Court calls upon him to be
respectful and restrained in his dealings with a court or its judge. Clearly, the petitioners criticism of the CTA First
Division was not bona fide or done in good faith, and spilled over the walls of propriety.

The power to punish contempt of court is exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, and only
occasionally should a court invoke its inherent power to punish contempt of court in order to retain that respect without
which the administration of justice must falter or fail. We reiterate that the sanction the CTA First Division has visited
upon the petitioners was preservative, for the sanction maintained and promoted the proper respect that attorneys and
their clients should bear towards the courts of justice.

Inasmuch as the circumstances indicate that the petitioners tone of apology was probably feigned, for they did not
relent but continued to justify their contemptuous language, they do not merit any leniency. Nonetheless, the penalty of
imprisonment for ten days and a fine of P2,000.00 is excessive punishment of the direct contempt of court for using
contemptuous and offensive language and verges on the vindictive. The Court foregoes the imprisonment.

The Courts treatment of contemptuous and offensive language used by counsel in pleadings and other written
submissions to the courts of law, including this Court, has not been uniform. The treatment has dealt with
contemptuous and offensive language either as contempt of court or administrative or ethical misconduct, or as both.
The sanction has ranged from a warning (to be more circumspect), a reprimand with stern warning against a repetition
of the misconduct, a fine of P2,000.00, a fine of P5,000.00, and even indefinite suspension from the practice of law.

5
The sanction has usually been set depending on whether the offensive language is viewed as contempt of court or as
ethical misconduct. In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, the errant lawyer who made baseless
accusations of manipulation in his letters and compliance to this Court was indefinitely suspended from the practice of
law. Although he was further declared guilty of contempt of court, the Court prescribed no separate penalty on him,
notwithstanding that he evinced no remorse and did not apologize for his actions that resulted from cases that were
decided against his clients for valid reasons. In Re: Conviction of Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, the complaining State
Prosecutor, despite his strong statements to support his position not being considered as direct contempt of court, was
warned to be more circumspect in language. In contrast, Judge Angeles was reprimanded and handed a stern warning
for the disrespectful language she used in her pleadings filed in this Court, which declared such language to be below the
standard expected of a judicial officer. In Nuez v. Atty. Arturo B. Astorga, Atty. Astorga was meted a P2,000.00 fine for
conduct unbecoming of a lawyer for hurling insulting language against the opposing counsel. Obviously, the language
was dealt with administratively, not as contempt of court. In Ng v. Atty. Benjamin C. Alar, the Court prescribed a higher
fine of P5,000.00 coupled with a stern warning against Atty. Alar who, in his motion for reconsideration and to inhibit,
cast insults and diatribes against the NLRC First Division and its members. Yet again, the fine was a disciplinary sanction.

Despite having earlier directed the petitioners through its resolution of March 15, 2006 that they should explain within
five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution why (they) should not be held for indirect contempt and/or subject to
disciplinary action, the CTA First Division was content with punishing them for direct contempt under Section 1, Rule 71
of the Rules of Court, and did not anymore pursue the disciplinary aspect. The Court concurs with the offended courts
treatment of the offensive language as direct contempt. Thus, we impose on each of them a fine of P2,000.00, the
maximum imposable fine under Section 1 of Rule 71, taking into consideration the fact that the CTA is a superior court of
the same level as the Court of Appeals, the second highest court of the land. The penalty of imprisonment, as earlier
clarified, is deleted. Yet, they are warned against using offensive or intemperate language towards a court or its judge in
the future, for they may not be as lightly treated as they now are.

ACCORDINGLY, we DISMISS the petition for certiorari; UPHOLD the resolutions dated May 16, 2006 and July 26, 2006;
and MODIFY the penalty imposed on Attorney Denis B. Habawel and Attorney Alexis F. Medina by deleting the penalty
of imprisonment and sentencing them only to pay the fine of P2,000.00 each.

SO ORDERED.

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Case No. 2
A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-3740-RTJ], February 04, 2015
JILL M. TORMIS, Complainant, v. JUDGE MEINRADO P. PAREDES, Respondent.

For consideration is the Report and Recommendation of Justice Maria Elisa Sempio Diy (Justice Diy), Court of Appeals,
Cebu City, submitted to this Court pursuant to its January 14, 2013 Resolution, referring the complaint filed by Jill M.
Tormis (Jill) against respondent Judge Meinrado P. Paredes (Judge Paredes), Presiding Judge, Branch 13, Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Cebu City, for investigation, report and recommendation.

The Facts

In her Affidavit/Complaint, dated September 5, 2011, Jill charged Judge Paredes with grave misconduct. Jill was a
student of Judge Paredes in Political Law Review during the first semester of school year 2010-2011 at the Southwestern
University, Cebu City. She averred that sometime in August 2010, in his class discussions, Judge Paredes named her
mother, Judge Rosabella Tormis (Judge Tormis), then Presiding Judge of Branch 4, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Cebu City, as one of the judges involved in the marriage scams in Cebu City. Judge Paredes also mentioned in his class
that Judge Tormis was abusive of her position as a judge, corrupt, and ignorant of the law.

Jill added that Judge Paredes included Judge Tormis in his discussions not only once but several times. In one session,
Judge Paredes was even said to have included in his discussion Francis Mondragon Tormis (Francis), son of Judge Tormis,
stating that he was a court-noted addict. She was absent from class at that time, but one of her classmates who was
present, Rhoda L. Litang (Rhoda), informed her about the inclusion of her brother. To avoid humiliation in school, Jill
decided to drop the class under Judge Paredes and transfer to another law school in Tacloban City.

Jill also disclosed that in the case entitled Trinidad O. Lachica v. Judge Tormis(Lachica v. Tormis), her mother was
suspended from the service for six (6) months for allegedly receiving payment of a cash bail bond for the temporary
release of an accused for the warrant she had issued in a case then pending before her sala. Judge Paredes was the one
who reviewed the findings conducted therein and he recommended that the penalty be reduced to severe reprimand.

Jill, however, claimed that Judge Paredes committed an offense worse than that committed by her mother. She averred
that on March 13, 2011, Judge Paredes accepted a cash bail bond in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) for
the temporary release of one Lita Guioguio in a case entitled, People of the Philippines v. Lita Guioguio, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 148434-R, then pending before Branch 8, MTCC, Cebu City (Guioguio case).

Thus, she prayed that Judge Paredes be administratively sanctioned for his actuations.

Comment of Judge Paredes

In his Comment, dated October 28, 2011, Judge Paredes denied the accusations of Jill. He stated that Judge Tormis had
several administrative cases, some of which he had investigated; that as a result of the investigations, he recommended
sanctions against Judge Tormis; that Judge Tormis used Jill, her daughter, to get back at him; that he discussed in his
class the case of Lachica v. Tormis, but never Judge Tormis involvement in the marriage scams nor her sanctions as a
result of the investigation conducted by the Court; that he never personally attacked Judge Tormis dignity and
credibility; that the marriage scams in Cebu City constituted a negative experience for all the judges and should be
discussed so that other judges, court employees and aspiring lawyers would not emulate such misdeeds; that the
marriage scams were also discussed during meetings of RTC judges and in schools where remedial law and legal ethics
were taught; that he talked about past and resolved cases, but not the negative tendencies of Judge Tormis; that there
was nothing wrong in discussing the administrative cases involving Judge Tormis because these cases were known to the
legal community and some were even published in the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and other legal
publications; and that when he was the executive judge tasked to investigate Judge Tormis, he told her to mend her
ways, but she resented his advice.

Judge Paredes further stated that when Jill was still his student, she did not complain about or dispute his discussions in
class regarding the administrative liabilities of her mother; that the matter was not also brought to the attention of the
Dean of Southwestern University or of the local authorities; that he admitted saying that Judge Tormis had a son named
Francis who was a drug addict and that drug dependents had no place in the judiciary; and that he suggested that
Francis should be removed from the judiciary.

He denied, however, having stated that Francis was appointed as court employee as a result of the influence of Judge
Tormis. She is not an influential person and it is the Supreme Court who determines the persons to be appointed as
court employees. Judge Tormis, however, allowed her drug dependent son to apply for a position in the judiciary.

Regarding the specific act being complained of, Judge Paredes admitted that he personally accepted a cash bail bond of
7
P6,000.00 for the temporary release of Lita Guioguio on March 13, 2011. He claimed though that the approval of the
bail bond was in accordance with Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-62-SC which allowed executive judges to act on
petitions for bail and other urgent matters on weekends, official holidays and special days. Judge Paredes explained that
he merely followed the procedure. As Executive Judge, he issued a temporary receipt and on the following business day,
a Monday, he instructed the Branch Clerk of Court to remit the cash bond to the Clerk of Court. The Clerk of Court
acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond and issued an official receipt. It was not his fault that the Clerk of Court
acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond only in the afternoon of March 21, 2011.

Lastly, Judge Paredes averred that the discussions relative to the administrative cases of Judge Tormis could not be the
subject of an administrative complaint because it was not done in the performance of his judicial duties.

Reply of the Complainant

In her Verified-Reply, dated November 23, 2011, Jill countered that her mother had nothing to do with the filing of the
present complaint; that she was forced to leave her family in Cebu City to continue her law studies elsewhere because
she could no longer bear the discriminating and judgmental eyes of her classmates brought about by Judge Paredes
frequent discussions in class of her mothers administrative cases; that her mother was indeed one of the judges
implicated in the marriage scams, but when Judge Paredes discussed the matter in his classes, the case of her mother
was not yet resolved by the Court and, thus, in 2010, it was still premature; and that Judge Paredes was aware that
administrative cases were confidential in nature.

Jill claimed that the intention to humiliate her family was evident when Judge Paredes branded her brother, Francis, as a
drug addict.

Rejoinder of Judge Paredes

In his Rejoinder, dated December 2, 2011, Judge Paredes asserted that it was not premature to discuss the marriage
scams in class because the scandal was already disclosed by Atty. Rullyn Garcia and was also written in many legal
publications, and that the drug addiction of Francis was known in the Palace of Justice of Cebu City.

In its Report, dated September 12, 2012, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) stated that the conflicting
allegations by the parties presented factual issues that could not be resolved based on the evidence on record
then. Considering the gravity and the sensitive nature of the charges, a full-blown investigation should be conducted by
the CA.

On January 14, 2013, pursuant to the recommendation of the OCA, the Court referred the administrative complaint to
the Executive Justice of the CA, Cebu Station, for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from
receipt of the records.

On March 26, 2013, the case was raffled to, and the records were received by, Justice Diy. Thereafter, the appropriate
notices were issued and the confidential hearings were conducted. Afterwards, Justice Diy received the respective
memoranda of the parties.

In her memorandum, Jill contended that Judge Paredes act of discussing Judge Tormis cases in class where she was
present was an open display of insensitivity, impropriety and lack of delicadeza bordering on oppressive and abusive
conduct, which fell short of the exacting standards of behavior demanded of magistrates. She asserted that the defense
of Judge Paredes that he could not be made administratively liable as the act was not made in the performance of his
official duties did not hold water because a judge should be the embodiment of what was just and fair not only in the
performance of his official duties but also in his everyday life.

Jill also averred that Judge Paredes violated the subjudice rule when he discussed the marriage scam involving Judge
Tormis in 2010 because at that time, the case was still being investigated; that the administrative case relative to the
marriage scam was decided only on April 2, 2013; that Judge Paredes was not the Executive Judge of the MTCC when he
received the cash bail bond in the Guiguio case; that he could not prove that the executive judge of the MTCC was
unavailable before accepting the cash bail bond; and that the assertion of Judge Paredes of his being an anti-corruption
judge and a lone nominee of the IBP Cebu City Chapter to the Foundation of Judicial Excellence did not exculpate him
from committing the acts complained of.

In his Reply-Memorandum, Judge Paredes reiterated the allegations contained in his previous pleadings. He added that
the marriage scams scandalized the Judiciary and became public knowledge when Atty. Rullyn Garcia of the OCA held a
press conference on the matter; that, hence, every citizen, including him, may comment thereon; that in the hierarchy
of rights, freedom of speech and expression ranked high; that Judge Tormis never intervened in the present case; that if
he indeed made derogatory remarks against Judge Tormis, she should have filed a criminal action for oral defamation;
8
and that calling for the ouster of drug addicts could not be considered an abuse, but was meant for the protection of the
Judiciary.

In her Report and Recommendation, Justice Diy found Judge Paredes guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge. She
opined that his use of intemperate language during class discussions was inappropriate. His statements in class, tending
to project Judge Tormis as corrupt and ignorant of the laws and procedure, were obviously and clearly insensitive and
inexcusable.

Justice Diy disregarded the defense of Judge Paredes that his discussions of the administrative case of Judge Tormis in
class was an exercise of his right to freedom of expression. She cited the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary15 which urged members of the Judiciary to be models of propriety at all times. She quoted with emphasis
Section 6 which stated that Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and
assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity
of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.

Justice Diy likewise rejected Judge Paredes position that he could not be held administratively liable for his comments
against Judge Tormis and Francis as these were uttered while he was not in the exercise of his judicial
functions. Jurisprudence, as well as the New Code of Judicial Conduct, required that he conduct himself beyond
reproach, not only in the discharge of his judicial functions, but also in his other professional endeavors and everyday
activities.

Justice Diy found merit in Jills allegation that Judge Paredes violated the subjudice rule when the latter discussed the
marriage scams involving Judge Tormis in 2010 when the said issue was still being investigated. She cited, as basis for
Judge Paredes liability, Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

As regards Judge Paredes receipt of the cash bail bond in relation to the Guioguio case, Justice Diy absolved him of any
liability as the charge of grave misconduct was not supported by sufficient evidence. She accepted Judge Paredes
explanation that he merely followed the procedure laid down in Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC when he
approved the bail bond.

Based on these findings, Justice Diy came up with the following recommendations, thus:

The undersigned Investigating Justice finds that indeed Judge Paredes is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a
judge. Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of
Court, penalized under Section 11 (c) thereof by any of the following: (1) a Fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not
exceeding P10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with warning.

Inasmuch as this is Judge Paredes first offense and considering the factual milieu and the peculiar circumstances
attendant thereto, it is respectfully recommended that Judge Paredes be meted out with the penalty of REPRIMAND
with a warning that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

The Courts Ruling

The Court adopts the findings and recommendations of Justice Diy except as to the penalty.

Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of
corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial
evidence. As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or
flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct. Corruption, as an element of
grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or
character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.

To constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of his
official duties. Considering that the acts complained of, the remarks against Judge Tormis and Francis, were made by
Judge Paredes in his class discussions, they cannot be considered as misconduct. They are simply not related to the
discharge of his official functions as a judge. Thus, Judge Paredes cannot be held liable for misconduct, much less for
grave misconduct.

Discussion of a subjudice matter, however, is another thing.

On subjudice matters, Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct provides:

9
CANON 3

IMPARTIALITY

SEC. 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or could come before them, make any comment that
might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the
process. Nor shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or
issue. (Emphasis supplied)

The subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order to avoid prejudging
the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. The rationale for the rule was spelled out in
Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Sanchez, where it was stated that it is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere
that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that
facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be
uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.

Notably, when Judge Paredes discussed the marriage scams involving Judge Tormis in 2010, the investigation relative to
the said case had not yet been concluded. In fact, the decision on the case was promulgated by the Court only on April
2, 2013. In 2010, he still could not make comments on the administrative case to prevent any undue influence in its
resolution. Commenting on the marriage scams, where Judge Tormis was one of the judges involved, was in
contravention of the subjudice rule. Justice Diy was, therefore, correct in finding that Judge Paredes violated Section 4,
Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

The Court shares the view of Justice Diy that although the reasons of Judge Paredes for discussing the marriage scams in
his classes seemed noble, his objectives were carried out insensitively and in bad taste. The pendency of the
administrative case of Judge Tormis and the publicity of the marriage scams did not give Judge Paredes unrestrained
license to criticize Judge Tormis in his class discussions. The publicity given to the investigation of the said scams and the
fact that it was widely discussed in legal circles let people expressed critical opinions on the issue. There was no need
for Judge Paredes to rub salt to the wound, as Justice Diy put it.

Judge Paredes in using intemperate language and unnecessary comments tending to project Judge Tormis as a corrupt
and ignorant judge in his class discussions, was correctly found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge by Justice Dy.

Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to exemplify propriety at all
times. Canon 4 instructs:

CANON 4

PROPRIETY

SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

xxx

SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves
in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity, independence and respect for
himself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety
and self-restraint. He should choose his words and exercise more caution and control in expressing himself. In other
words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas. Furthermore, a magistrate should not descend to the level of a
sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide remarks and sarcastic comments. He is
required to always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and in language.

In this case, records show that Judge Paredes failed to observe the propriety required by the Code and to use temperate
and courteous language befitting a magistrate. Indeed, Judge Paredes demonstrated conduct unbecoming of a judge.

When Judge Paredes failed to restrain himself and included Francis, whose condition and personal circumstances, as
properly observed by Justice Diy, had no relevance to the topic that was then being discussed in class, it strongly
indicated his intention to taint their reputations.

The inclusion of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions was never denied by Judge Paredes who merely
10
justified his action by invoking his right to freedom of expression. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression. Such right, however, is not
without limitation. Section 6, Canon 4 of the Code also imposes a correlative restriction on judges: in the exercise of
their freedom of expression, they should always conduct themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of the
judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary. In the exercise of his right to freedom of
expression, Judge Paredes should uphold the good image of the Judiciary of which he is a part. He should have avoided
unnecessary and uncalled for remarks in his discussions and should have been more circumspect in his language. Being
a judge, he is expected to act with greater circumspection and to speak with self-restraint. Verily, Judge Paredes fell
short of this standard.

The Court cannot sustain the assertion of Judge Paredes that he cannot be held administratively liable for his negative
portrayal of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions. Judge Paredes should be reminded of the ethical conduct
expected of him as a judge not only in the performance of his judicial duties, but in his professional and private activities
as well. Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 of the Code mandates:

CANON 2

INTEGRITY

Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of
judges.

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the
view of a reasonable observer.

SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice
must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
(Emphases supplied)

Any impropriety on the part of Judge Paredes, whether committed in or out of the court, should not be tolerated for he
is not a judge only occasionally. It should be emphasized that the Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a
judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his
behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality, a public official is also judged by
his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. A judges official life cannot simply be detached or
separated from his personal existence. Thus, being a subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and
willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. He should
personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the
performance of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion.

Regarding the act of receiving the cash bail bond in the Guioguio case, Justice Diy correctly found that it cannot be
regarded as grave misconduct. The Court finds merit in the position of Judge Paredes that the approval, as well as the
receipt, of the cash bail bond, was in accordance with the rules. Thus:

Finally, the Investigating Officer disagrees with Jills allegation that Judge Paredes committed grave misconduct when he
personally received cash bail bond in relation to the Guioguio case. Judge Paredes justified his action by stating that he
was merely following the procedure set forth in Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-02-SC, which authorizes executive
judges to act on petitions for bail on Saturdays after 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, Sundays, official holidays, and special
days. Said rule also provides that should the accused deposit cash bail, the executive judge shall acknowledge receipt of
the cash bail bond in writing and issue a temporary receipt therefor. Considering that Judge Paredes merely followed
said procedure, he cannot be held administratively liable for his act of receiving the cash bail bond in the Guioguio case.

Moreover, respondent judge is authorized to receive the cash bail bond under Section 17 (a), Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under said provision, the bail bond may be filed either with the court where the case is
pending, or with any Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the place of arrest, or with any judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court
or the Municipal Trial Court of the place of arrest.

Lastly, Section 1 (h), Chapter 4 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC provides that executive judges are authorized to exercise other
powers and prerogatives which are necessary or incidental to the performance of their functions in relation to court
administration. In the instant case, Judge Paredes was merely exercising powers incidental to his functions as an
Executive Judge since he was the only judge available when Lita Guioguio posted bail. Notably, Lita Guioguios payment
for cash bail bond was made on a Sunday. In addition, the judge assigned to the court where the Guioguio case was
then pending and the executive judge of the MTCC, Cebu City were not available to receive the bail bond. Judge Paredes
11
was the only judge available since the practice was for one judge to be present on Saturdays. However, there was no
judge assigned for duty during Sundays.

Relative to the matter above-discussed, the insinuation made by complainant Jill of any irregularity reflected in the
issuance of the two (2) orders of release of different dates is not backed up by sufficient evidence.

Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court and
penalized under Section 11(C) thereof by any of the following: (1) A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding
P10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with warning.

Considering that this is the first offense of Judge Paredes, the appropriate penalty under the circumstances is
admonition.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Meinrado P. Paredes, Presiding Judge of Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, administratively liable for conduct unbecoming of a judge and ADMONISHES him therefor.

SO ORDERED.

12
Case No. 3
A.C. No. 7158, March 09, 2015
YOLANDA A. ANDRES, MINETTE A. MERCADO, AND ELITO P. ANDRES , Complainants, v. ATTY. SALIMATHAR V. NAMBI,
Respondent.

This is a Complaint for Disbarment filed against then Labor Arbiter Salimathar V. Nambi (respondent) on the ground of
gross ignorance of the law in issuing an Amended Alias Writ of Execution against M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. and its
incorporators, the herein complainants, who are not parties to the case.
Factual Antecedents
On December 10, 2003, respondent rendered a Decision in a consolidated labor case against M.A. Mercado Construction
and spouses Maximo and Aida Mercado (spouses Mercado), the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents, M.A. Mercado Construction and
Maximo and Aida Mercado to reinstate the complainants to their former position[s] without loss of seniority rights and
to pay jointly and severally, their full backwages from October 28, 2000 up to the date of this decision plus ten (10%)
percent attorneys fees of the total monetary award. The Research and Information Unit of this Office is hereby directed
to compute complainants[] monetary award which shall form part of this decision. The complaint for damages is
dismissed. The complaint against Shoemart, Inc., is likewise DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
The respondents in the labor case, namely the Spouses Mercado, doing business under the name and style of M.A.
Mercado Construction, interposed an appeal which was dismissed for failure to post an appeal bond. Thus, an Alias Writ
of Execution was issued to implement the Decision. Thereafter, the complainants in the labor case filed an Ex Parte
Motion for Amendment of an Alias Writ of Execution. They claimed that they could hardly collect the judgment award
from M.A. Mercado Construction because it allegedly transferred its assets to M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. They thus prayed
that the Alias Writ of Execution be amended to include M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. and all its incorporators/stockholders as
additional entity/personalities against which the writ of execution shall be enforced. In an Order dated February 10,
2006, respondent granted the motion to amend the alias writ of execution. Accordingly, on February 17, 2006 an
Amended Alias Writ of Execution was issued to enforce the monetary judgment amounting to P19,527,623.55 against
M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. and all its incorporators. By way of special appearance, M.A. Blocks Work, Inc., together with
three of its stockholders who are the complainants in this administrative case, namely Yolanda A. Andres, Minette A.
Mercado and Elito P. Andres, filed an Urgent Motion to Quash the Amended Alias Writ of Execution, contending that
they are not bound by the judgment as they were not parties to the labor case. In an Order dated March 13, 2006,
however, respondent denied the Urgent Motion to Quash. Aggrieved, herein complainants filed the instant Complaint
for Disbarment, which we referred to the IBP on March 4, 2007 for investigation, report and recommendation.
IBPs Report and Recommendation
In his Report and Recommendation dated September 6, 2010, the Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty
of gross ignorance of the law and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six
months. This was adopted and approved with modification by the IBP Board of Governors in an April 12, 2011
Resolution, to wit:
RESOLUTION NO. XIX-2011-110 Adm. Case No. 7158 Yolanda A. Andres, et al. vs. Atty. Salimathar V. Nambi
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case herein made part of this Resolution
as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, considering respondent[s] contumacious disregard of the lawful Order of Supreme Court and the Commission on
Bar Discipline of the IBP, and for his failure to appear despite due notices, Atty. Salimathar V. Nambi is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months. (Emphasis in the original).
Issue
Whether respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Our Ruling
At the outset, it must be emphasized that in this administrative proceeding, our discussion should be limited only on the
issue of whether respondent acted in gross ignorance of the law when he granted the motion to amend the alias writ of
execution; when he issued an Amended Alias Writ of Execution to enforce the monetary judgment against M.A. Blocks
Work, Inc. and all its incorporators; and when he denied complainants Urgent Motion to Quash. As a rule, for one to be
held administratively accountable for gross ignorance of the law, there must be a showing that the error was gross and
patent as to support a conclusion that the actor was so moved with malice, bad faith, corruption, fraud, and dishonesty.
As such, our discussion should be focused primarily on whether respondent grossly erred in issuing the above orders as
to amount to malice, bad faith, corruption, fraud and dishonesty. On the other hand, we need not delve into the issue of
whether there is an apparent misapplication of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction when respondent
issued the Amended Alias Writ of Execution. For one, it is outside the ambit of this administrative proceeding. Moreover,
the issue of whether the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction applies is the subject of an appeal brought by
complainants before the National Labor Relations Commission and eventually to the Court of Appeals. We perused the
records of the case particularly respondents Order dated March 13, 2006 denying complainants Urgent Motion to
Quash. Therein, we note that respondents ruling was not arrived at arbitrarily; on the contrary, he cited grounds based
on his personal assessment of the facts at hand, viz:
As culled from the case record, there is substantial evidence that respondents Maximo A. Mercado and Aida A. Mercado,
13
who are doing business under the name and style of M.A. Mercado Construction put up a corporation in the name of
M.A. Block Works, Inc. where individual movants are one of the incorporators. We give credence to the argument of the
complainants that the incorporators therein are relatives of Maximo A. Mercado and Aida Mercado as shown by the
Articles of Incorporation adduced by the former. The incorporators listed have similar family names of the Mercados and
the Andreses and common address at Gen. Hizon, Quezon City and 50 Daisy St., Quezon City, and Maximo A. Mercado is
the biggest stockholder. Aside from the Articles of Incorporation, complainants also submitted a Letter of Intent/Notice
To Proceed where respondents, despite their representation that they have already ceased their business operation, are
still continuing their business operation. The documents submitted by the complainants were corroborated by
certification issued by Maggie T. Jao, AVP-Assistant Controller of SM Prime Holdings, Inc. that based on their records, an
amount of P3,291,300.00 representing a sum total of all goods, effects, money and credit that was garnished belong to
M.A. Mercado Construction and/or Maximo Mercado and/or Aida Mercado and/or M.A. Block Works, Inc. and/or
Gertrudes Casilda A. Mercado, Yolanda A. Andres, Minette A. Mercado and/or Elito P. Andres. This Office has therefore,
enough reason to conclude that respondents Maximo A. Mercado and Aida Mercado and the movants herein are one
and the same. Movants are alter egos or business conduits to defraud the complainants and to consequently evade
payment of judgment award. x x x As respondents are duly notified and aware of the execution proceedings, the
argument of denial of due process is untenable.
It is apparent from the foregoing disquisition that respondents conclusion had some bases and was not plucked from
thin air, so to speak. Clearly, respondent did not act whimsically or arbitrarily; his ruling could not in any manner be
characterized as imbued with malice, fraud or bad faith. To reiterate what we have already stated above, we are not
here to judge in this present administrative proceeding whether respondents ratiocination on the application of the
piercing of corporate veil is correct; our only concern here is to decide whether respondents error was so gross as to
amount to fraud and dishonesty. Based on the above-quoted disquisition, it cannot be said, by any stretch of
imagination, that respondents error, if any, was so gross or that he was actuated by malice when he issued the above
orders. His conclusion was reached after an examination of the documents presented and evaluation and assessment of
the arguments raised by the parties. He did not capriciously rule on the issues presented; on the contrary, he exerted
efforts to weigh the positions of the contending parties. In any event, we hold that respondent should not be held
accountable for committing an honest mistake or an error in the appreciation of the facts of the case before
him. Otherwise every labor arbiter or any judicial or quasi-judicial officer for that matter, would be continually plagued
with the possibility of being administratively sanctioned for every honest mistake or error he commits. For sure, this
would not augur well to the administration of justice as a whole. Pertinently, the Court ruled in Andrada v. Judge
Banzon, viz:
Well-settled is the rule that unless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will, bad
faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice, respondent judge may not be held administratively liable for gross
misconduct, ignorance of the law or incompetence of official acts in the exercise of judicial functions and duties,
particularly in the adjudication of cases. Further, to hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous rule
or decision he renders would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position doubly unbearable. To hold
otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the
process of the administration of justice can be infallible in his judgment.
Based on the foregoing, we have no basis to hold respondent administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law.
However, we note that respondent had consistently and obstinately disregarded the Courts and IBPs orders. It is on
record that respondent totally ignored the Courts June 7, 2006 Resolution directing him to file his Comment. He also
failed to attend the mandatory conference before the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline despite notice. Neither did he
file his Position Paper. As a former Labor Arbiter, respondent should know that orders of the court are not mere
requests but directives which should have been complied with promptly and completely. He disregarded the oath he
took when he was accepted to the legal profession to obey the laws and the legal orders of the duly constituted legal
authorities. x x x His conduct was unbecoming of a lawyer who is called upon to obey court orders and processes and is
expected to stand foremost in complying with court directives as an officer of the court. Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)
Considering that this appears to be respondents first infraction, we find it proper to impose on him the penalty of
reprimand with warning that commission of the same or similar infraction will be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, the Court REPRIMANDS respondent Atty. Salimathar V. Nambi for obstinately and unjustifiably refusing to
obey lawful orders of the Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act or offense shall be dealt with more severely. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant and noted in Atty. Nambis record as a member of the Bar.
SO ORDERED.

14
Case No. 4
OCA IPI NO. 14-220-CA-J, March 17, 2015
RE: COMPLAINT DATED JANUARY 28, 2014 OF WENEFREDO PARREO, ET AL., AGAINST HON. CELIA C. LIBREA-
LEAGOGO, HON. ELIHU A. YBAEZ AND HON. AMY C. LAZARO-JAVIER, ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS, RELATIVE TO CA G.R. SP NO. 108807

We hereby resolve the administrative complaint brought against Court of Appeals (CA) Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-
Leagogo, Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybaez and Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro- Javier for their undue delay in rendering
the decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 entitled Susan Enriquez and Alma Rodriguez v. Wenefredo Parreno, Ronnie
Cuevas and Joseph Denamarca.

Antecedents

Complainants Wenefredo Parreo and Ronnie Cuevas, with Joseph Denamarca, filed a protest in the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources of the National Capital Region (DENR-NCR) against the issuance of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 14391 and TCT No. 14188 in favor of Susan Enriquez and Alma Rodriguez covering two lots
inside the Signal Village, Taguig. The DENR-NCR dismissed the protest, but the dismissal was subsequently reversed by
the DENR. Aggrieved, Enriquez and Rodriguez appealed to the Office of the President (OP), which denied their appeal.
With their motion for reconsideration having been similarly denied, Enriquez and Rodriguez appealed to the CA by
petition for review, and it is such appeal from which this administrative complaint arose.

It appears that on June 26, 2012, the Special Sixteenth (16th) Division of the CA issued its resolution submitting C.A.-G.R.
SP No. 108807 for decision. However, the complainants lament that from the issuance of the resolution until the filing of
their complaint on February 8, 2014, the respondents, who comprised the Special 16th Division of the CA, had not
rendered the decision, which the complainants insist was in patent violation of the mandatory period within which the
respondents should decide under Section 15(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

The Court required the respondents to submit their comments on the administrative complaint.

In her comment, Justice Librea-Leagogo narrated that she became the Chairperson of the CA 16th Division effective June
4, 2012 conformably with CA Office Order No. 220-12-ABR, and she served as such until July 5, 2012 in accordance with
the successive reorganizations implemented in the CA under CA Office Order No. 198-12-ABR and CA Office Order No.
220-12-ABR, respectively. Citing Section 1, Rule VI of the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (2009 IRCA), Justice
Librea-Leagogo denied liability for incurring any undue delay because of her short stint as the Chairperson of the 16th
Division, and considering further that C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 followed Justice Ybaez as the assigned ponente in his
transfer to the Fourteenth (14th) Division pursuant to CA Office Order No. 220-12-ABR, and eventually to the Thirteenth
(13th) Division, the Division that ultimately promulgated the awaited decision on February 28, 2014.

Justice Ybaez admitted in his comment that C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 was part of his initial caseload following his
transfer to Manila in December 2009. He stated that he had conscientiously complied with the Zero Backlog Project
(ZBP) initiated by Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. by giving utmost priority to the older cases assigned to him; that
he had already assigned C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 to a member of his legal staff, but the latter had meanwhile fallen
seriously ill; that due to lack of personnel and a heavy caseload, he had hired a contractual-lawyer who later resigned
upon being offered a permanent position in another agency of the Government; that after disposing of the older cases
assigned to him, he had rendered the decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 on February 28, 2014 before becoming aware
of the administrative complaint; and that he had not been remiss in his duty and responsibility to promptly administer
justice by virtue of his disposing a monthly average of 15 cases.

Justice Lazaro-Javier explained her participation in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 as limited to the adoption and promulgation
on June 26, 2012 of the resolution submitting the case for decision because only filled in the brief vacancy occasioned by
the temporary absence of Justice Victoria Isabel Paredes, then the regular Member of the 16 th Division. She pointed out,
however, that she had nothing more to do with the case upon the return of Justice Paredes; hence, she could not be
administratively liable for any delay in deciding the case.

Issue

Are the respondents liable for undue delay in deciding C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807?

Ruling

The administrative complaint is without merit.

The Constitution mandates a lower collegiate court like the CA to resolve a case within 12 months from the submission
15
of the last required pleading or as set by the court itself. This is clear from paragraphs (1) and (2), Section 15 of Article
VIII of the Constitution, to wit:

Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within
twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve
months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all lower courts.

(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.

xxxx

Did the respondents incur any administrative liability for the delay?

Although C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 was submitted for decision by the Special 16th Division on June 26, 2012 after the
parties did not file their memoranda, it was the 13th Division of the CA (composed of Justice Ybaez as the ponente,
Justice Japar B. Dimaampao as the Chairman, and Justice Melchor Quirino C. Sadang) that promulgated the decision on
February 28, 2014, or nearly 20 months later. Accordingly, the Court answers the query in the negative, for, pursuant to
Section 1, Rule VI of the 2009 IRCA, the adjudication of cases was the responsibility of the assigned Justice and the
Members of the Division to which he or she then belonged. Determining who should be administratively accountable
must consider the specific role each of the respondents played leading to the resolution of C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807.
Under the applicable rule of the 2009 IRCA, the liability for undue delay in resolving C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 might
devolve only on the Members of the 13th Division who actually promulgated the decision.

Justice Librea-Leagogo and Justice Lazaro-Javier were not accountable for the delay in rendering the judgment. Justice
Librea-Leagogo had a limited participation in respect of C.A.- G.R. SP No. 108807 because the reorganization of the CA
ensuing after the promulgation of the resolution by the Special 16th Division on June 26, 2012 caused her transfer to the
15th Division through CA Office Order No. 220-12-ABR, terminating her responsibility in C.A.- G.R. SP No. 108807. Justice
Lazaro-Javier should also be exculpated because her participation was limited to her acting as a special Member of the
16th Division in lieu of Justice Paredes. Such substitution prevented a vacuum in the regular 16th Division, and
conformed to the procedure stated in Section 6(d), Rule I of the 2009 IRCA. The constitution of the Special 16 th Division
was by virtue of CA Office Order No. 220-12-ABR.

Justice Ybaez, as the ponente for C.A. G.R. SP No. 108807, carried the case with him when he was transferred to the
13th Division. But whether or not he was administratively liable for the delay of eight months should depend on the
relevant circumstances. Although often holding that a heavy caseload is insufficient reason to excuse a Judge from
disposing his cases within the reglementary period, the Court has applied this rule by considering the causes of the
delay. In Marquez v. Manigbas, the Court relieved the respondent judge from liability because the delay had been
caused by the sudden deluge of cases brought about by the expansion of the jurisdiction of the municipal trial courts. In
Santos v. Lorenzo, the Court held that a delay of seven months in deciding a case could be excused because of the heavy
caseload of the trial courts in the National Capital Judicial Region. In Lubaton v. Lazaro, the Court, in sparing the
respondent from the sanctions earlier imposed for undue delay, cited the good faith of the judge, the motivation of the
complainant for bringing the charge, and the excessively heavy caseload of 3,500 cases, 1,800 of which involved
detainees, leaving her only Fridays for the study of her cases and the resolution of pending incidents and issuance of the
proper orders. The Court, in reversing the sanctions, observed that "it would be unkind and inconsiderate on the part of
the Court to disregard respondent Judge's limitations and exact a rigid and literal compliance with the rule."

The delay in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 could not be said to have been incurred by Justice Ybaez with malice or deliberate
attempt to impede the dispensation of justice. He assigned C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 to a member of his legal staff, but
the latter had fallen seriously ill in the meantime, forcing him to hire a contractual-lawyer for the purpose. The latter
subsequently joined another agency of the Government on a permanent basis. Thus, Justice Ybaez could promulgate
the decision only on February 28, 2014. His explanation for the delay, being entirely plausible, is accepted.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES for lack of merit the administrative complaint against Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo,
Justice Elihu A. Ybanez and Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier.

SO ORDERED.

16
Case No. 5
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2290 November 18, 2014[Formerly OCA IPI No. 08-2954-RTJ]
MARILOU T. RIVERA, Complainant, vs. JUDGE JAIME C. BLANCAFLOR, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 26, STA. CRUZ,
LAGUNA, Respondent.

Before the Court is the administrative matter that stemmed from the complaint-affidavit filed on July 16, 2008 by
Marilou T. Rivera (Rivera) with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), charging Judge Jaime C. Blancaflor [Judge
Blancaflor, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 26, Sta. Cruz, Laguna] with Bribery, Gross Misconduct, Immorality and
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act [Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019].
The Antecedents
The facts as set out in the final report and recommendation of Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando
(Justice Fernando) of the Court of Appeals are summarized below.
Rivera alleged that she had been engaged in assisting litigants to obtain judicial bonds since year 2000. Sometime in
February 2008, she asked her daughter Shiela T. De Mata (De Mata), who was also a bondsman, to help her secure a bail
bond for accused Ricardo Catuday (Catuday). Catuday was charged of violating Section 11 of R. A. No. 9165 (the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (OPP) of Laguna.
On February 27, 2008, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dan B. Rodrigo (Prosecutor Rodrigo) recommended a bail of
200,000.00 for Catuday who moved to reduce his bail to120,000.00 before the Office of the Executive Judge, RTC, Sta.
Cruz, Laguna. De Mata brought a copy of the motion to Prosecutor Rodrigo who did not object to the motion and who
signified his conformity by writing "no objection" and affixing his signature and the date "4/14/08" on the face of the
motion.
De Mata thereafter brought the document to the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC), RTC, Sta. Cruz, Laguna for the
approval of Judge Blancaflor who was then the Executive Judge. De Mata failed to see Judge Blancaflor; she was told by
Dennis Trinidad (Trinidad), a member of the OCC staff, that Judge Blancaflor was not in the court. Trinidad volunteered
to bring the motion to Judge Blancaflor at Tagpuan Restaurant (in Pila, Laguna that the judge allegedly owned) for the
judges approval. Trinidad, however, returned without securing the requested approval. De Mata was told to come back
the next day.
De Mata went back to the OCC the following morning and was advised this time by Gemma Gallardo (Gemma), another
OCC personnel, to personally approach Judge Blancaflor about Catudays motion. De Mata acted as advised, but Judge
Blancaflor simply told De Mata that it was not her job to ask for the motions approval and that she should return it to
the OCC. De Mata at that point approached a Kuya Moring, the process server of Branch 27, about her predicament.
Kuya Moring introduced her to Judge Blancaflors driver who tried to help, but the judge still refused to act on the
motion. De Mata next approached Manuel Bugain (Bugain), a court employee at Branch 26. Bugain offered to bring the
motion to Judge Blancaflor who was then in Barangay Layugan, Pagsanjan, Laguna. When Bugain returned, he told De
Mata that Judge Blancaflor refused to sign the motion because it did not bear the signature of Prosecutor Rodrigo.
De Mata went back to Branch 26, together with Councilor Cecil Magana (Magana), whose assistance she sought upon
Bugains advice, to secure the requested approval. Whilethe motion was being handed to Judge Blancaflor, he blurted
out: "Hindi granted yan! Magbayad siya ng P200,000.00. Ayaw ko ng drugs! Hindi granted yan!" Frustrated by the turn of
events, De Mata returned the unapproved motion to Rivera.
On May 27, 2008, Rivera brought the motion to Branch 91, RTC, Sta. Cruz, Laguna as Judge Blancaflor was then out on a
seminar. The following day, Judge Divinagracia Ongkeko (Judge Ongkeko), the Presiding Judge of Branch 91 and Vice-
Executive Judge of RTC, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, issued an order granting Catudays motion to reduce bond. Rivera
immediately secured a bail bond for Catuday from the Industrial Insurance Company and presented it to Branch 26 for
Catudays provisional release.
Still, Judge Blancaflor refused to issue a release order, saying that he never approved Catudays reduced bailbond of
P120,000.00. Rivera then learned from one Teresa Mirasol (Mirasol) that Judge Blancaflor refused to approve Catudays
motion because it was Rivera who was working for it. According to Mirasol, the information was given to her over the
phone by Noralyn Villamar (Villamar), a.k.a.Macky, allegedly Judge Blancaflors live-in partner.
Rivera further alleged that she experienced the same treatment from Judge Blancaflor when she worked for the
approval of the bail of Roel Namplata (Namplata) who was charged with violation of Section 15 of R.A. No. 9165, also by
the OPP, Laguna. Namplatas recommended bail was P60,000.00. After securing Prosecutor Rodrigos consent and with
the help of Gemma, she succeeded in securing Judge Blancaflors approval with the handwritten notation: "Approved
P40,000.00 for surety bond. 3-27-08 (SGD.) Judge Blancaflor."
After obtaining a bail bond for Namplata, Rivera tried to secure a release order from Judge Blancaflor who refused to
honor the bond as it had been belatedly filed. He even brought back the cost of the bond to P60,000.00. In the
afternoon of June 12, 2008, Rivera learned that Judge Blancaflor declared that he would not release Namplata unless a
criminal case is filed against her by Rina Tranilla (Tranilla), a sister of Namplata. True enough, Tranilla filed a complaint
for estafa against Rivera at around 4:00 oclock that afternoon. The following day, Judge Blancaflors order was issued,
dated June 10, 2008, for Namplatas release.
Explaining her difficulties with Judge Blancaflor in relation with her work as a bondsman, Rivera claimed that the judge
harbored ill will against her because of her involvement in Special Proceeding No. 4605 entitled Arsenio S. Leron, et al. v.
Benjamin S. Leron, et al.,then pending before Judge Blancaflors sala. Rivera alleged that she was the attorney-in-fact of
one of the defendants in the case, Dr. Emelita R. Leron (Dr. Leron) who filed on March 2, 2007 a motion for inhibition
17
against Judge Blancaflor. The motion allegedly recited in detail Judge Blancaflors misdeeds and gross misconduct,
manifest partiality and indiscretion in fraternizing with clients and litigants in connection with the case.
Rivera further alleged that Judge Blancaflor inhibited himself from the case after she executed an affidavit attesting to
(1) the judges recommendation to the plaintiff, Normita Leron, to secure the services of Atty. Ricardo Pilares, Jr. (Atty.
Pilares); (2) the rigging of the raffle of the case to Judge Blancaflor; and (3) the irregular service of summons to the
defendants in the case. Moreover, her son Byron Torres (Byron) and son-inlaw Ricel De Mata (Ricel)) also executed a
joint affidavit stating that Judge Blancaflor "bribed" them not to testify in connection with the motion for inhibition.
Lastly, Rivera maintained that Judge Blancaflor should be charged with immorality for maintaining an illicit relationship
with Villamar, who is not his wife.
In a Supplemental Affidavit, dated July 29, 2008, Rivera reiterated her charge that Judge Blancaflor committed gross
misconduct in (1) fraternizing with litigants;(2) maintaining an illicit affair with a woman not his wife; and (3) exhibiting
personal bias and prejudice against her in her efforts to obtain bail bonds for Catuday and Namplata.
Judge Blancaflors Comment
In his Comment dated August 26, 2008, Judge Blancaflor denied Riveras accusations and dismissed them as "mere
concoctions" of her "fertile imagination."
Judge Blancaflor claimed that neither Rivera nor her daughter approached him regarding Catudays and Namplatas bail
bonds. Even assuming that they did, he refused their requests because they were not authorized bondsmen or agents of
any duly accredited surety company. They were acting as fixers, he explained; thus, he was justified in denying their
requests. Further, Judge Blancaflor claimed that he strictly observes a policy of refusing to reduce the required bail in
drug-related cases even if approval is recommended by the investigating prosecutor. He could not also order Catudays
release because it was Judge Ongkeko who granted his motion to reduce bail; in his view, Judge Ongkeko should also
order Catudays release.
Judge Blancaflor considered as "fantastic" Riveras account that she and De Mata brought the motions to reduce bail of
Catuday and Namplata to Tagpuan Restaurant in Pila, Laguna for his approval. He maintained that Riveras account was
simply untrue because as a matter of policy, he does not allow court personnel or any other person for that matter, to
bring the case records or any part thereof outside the court premises. Moreover, he does not own a restaurant in Pila,
Laguna, nor a house, chapel and resort in Pagsanjan, Laguna.
In the Leron case, Judge Blancaflor recalled that Rivera asked him to extend assistance to her boss, Dr. Leron, a
defendant in the case. He denied her request and since then, she started harassing and blackmailing him and even filed
an administrative case against him.
Shortly thereafter, the Lerons (defendants in Special Proceeding No. 4605), with Riveras active participation, started
circulating stories against him, which culminated in the filing of a letter-complaint before Executive Judge Mary Ann E.
Corpus-Maalac (Judge Corpus-Maalac) accusing him of bias, partiality and bribery. The Lerons however eventually
withdrew the complaint after being enlightened about the raffle of cases. Also, he had absolutely no involvement in the
engagement of Atty. Pilares as a lawyer in the case as he does not entertain fixers.
Judge Blancaflor brushed off the immorality charge against him. He branded it as malicious and a mere fabrication of
Rivera. He alleged that Rivera even hired a Solomon Ondevilla (Ondevilla) to execute an affidavit against him, but
Ondevilla subsequently denied that he executed and signed the affidavit.
Judge Blancaflor questioned Riveras credibility, claiming that she is known for filing fabricated charges and malicious
complaints against lawyers, judges and other public officials, among them, an Atty. Cayetano Santos. Further, she has
also been charged with numerous criminal offenses, mostly swindling or estafa cases and violations of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22, and is known to have an illicit relationship with different men.
In his Comment to Riveras supplemental affidavit, Judge Blancaflor reiterated his denial of Riveras charges against him.
In particular, he took exception to Annex "B" of the supplemental affidavit, which referred to Namplatas motion to
reduce bail bond and which allegedly carried his marginal note of approval. Judge Blancaflor claimed that the document
was manufactured and was not on file with the court. He added that the marginal note approving a reduced bail of
P40,000.00 was forged; even assuming that it was genuine, it was not a formal order and he still had the discretion on
whether toreduce the P60,000.00 recommended bail. By way of a reply-affidavit, Rivera countered that she is a
legitimate bondsman as she is an agent of Genric Insurance and that she is also a swimming instructor and in business
through her "Rivera Swimming Lessons." With respect to Tagpuan Restaurant, she clarified that the property is
registered in the name of Villamar, Judge Blancaflors live-in partner, and that the two also purchased and co-owned
several parcels of land in Layugan, Pagsanjan, Laguna.
Rivera also claimed that Ondevilla withdrew his affidavit relating Judge Blancaflors illicit relationship with Villamar
because the two of them threatened to file a case against him and would have him imprisoned. She stressed that Judge
Blancaflors attack on her person has nothing to do with the case she filed against him.
Justice Fernandos Investigation/Findings/Recommendation
In compliance with the Courts resolution of August 17, 2011, Justice Fernando conducted a thorough investigation of
the complaint, in the course of which, she conducted several hearings, received affidavits and documentary evidence,
heard testimonies of witnesses, and even conducted an ocular inspection.
Justice Fernando found Judge Blancaflor guilty of (1) bribery, gross misconduct and violation of R.A. 3019; and (2)
immorality. She recommended that the judge be dismissed from the service, with prejudice to his reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, and likewise recommended the forfeiture of the judges retirement benefits, if any.
The OCA Report and Recommendation
18
On July 24, 2013, the Court referred Justice Fernandos final report to the OCA for evaluation, report and
recommendation. In its memorandum of February 25, 2014, the OCA submitted its report to the Court, adopting the
findings and recommendations of Justice Fernando.
The Courts Ruling
After considering Justice Fernandos report and the records of the case, we note that she conducted a very thorough
investigation. We uphold her findings and recommendation as we find sufficient basis to dismiss respondent Judge
Blancaflor from the service.
Re: charge of bribery, gross misconduct and violation of R.A. No. 3019
The first count against Judge Blancaflor regarding this charge involved his alleged: (1) refusal to approve Catudays
motion to reduce bail bond, despite a "no objection" from the prosecutor; (2) refusal to order Catudays release, despite
Judge Ongkekos grant of the motion; (3) refusal to order Namplatas release, despite his own approval of the motion to
reduce bail bond; and (4) offer of money to Byron and Ricel to prevent them from testifying in the motion for his
inhibition in the Leron case.
While Judge Blancaflor has the discretion to approve or disapprove a motion to reduce bail, it appears from the records
that he abused this prerogative in the cases of Catuday and Namplata. Through Judge Blancaflors inaccessibility (he was
usually not in the court in the afternoon) and refusal to take action on their pleas for provisional liberty, Catuday and
Namplata and the people working for the approval of their motions (Rivera and De Mata) suffered inordinate delay and
frustrations in securing the motions approval. In more ways than one, Judge Blancaflor gave De Mata and Rivera a run-
around in Catudays and Namplatas cases for no plausible reason other than the judges strong antipathy towards
Rivera.
This is serious misconduct and a violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which
mandates that "judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor, bias or prejudice," and that they "shall ensure
that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal
profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary."
For instance, when De Mata learned that Judge Blancaflor said that he did not approve Catudays motion for reduction
of his bail because Prosecutor Rodrigo was against the motion, she went to see the prosecutor about it. Prosecutor
Rodrigo told her that there was no problem with the motion, so he signed it, but he did not know why Judge Blancaflor
would not approve the motion. De Mata then asked the help of Magana, yet even with Maganas intercession, Judge
Blancaflor refused to sign the motion, saying that he did not like drugs. Magana wondered why Catudays motion was
not approved when all the other surety bonds were approved. The following testimony of De Mata confirmed the
difficulties De Mata and her mother experienced in their work as bondsmen in Judge Blancaflors sala:
xxxx
Q: After Mr. Bugain told you that Judge Blancaflor refuses to sign for the reason that Fiscal Rodrigo also does not
approve of the said motion, what did you do?
A. I went to Fiscal Rodrigo and asked him what was the problem with the motion?
Q: What did Fiscal Rodrigo [tell] you?
A: He said there was really no problem with the motion so he signed it. He did not know why the motion of Catuday was
left pending.
xxxx
Q: During this time, this Mayora was also in branch 26?
A: Yes, mam, and she was also wondering why our application cannot be approved while all the other surety bonds
were approved.
Q: Can you tell us who this Mayora is, what is her occupation?
A: She was a councilor, the wife of the previous mayor. If there are people who cannot afford to pay bail, they ask her
for help and she helps people.
xxxx
Judge Blancaflor denied the allegations, contending that Catudays motion was not filed with the OCC and never reached
him.27 Justice Fernando found otherwise, citing the Order dated May 28, 2008 of Judge Ongkeko, Vice-Executive Judge
of the RTC, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, granting the motion when Judge Blancaflor was attending a seminar in Tagaytay City.
Judge Ongkeko could not have issued the order had it not been filed with the OCC. But what was more surprising was
Judge Blancaflors refusal to acknowledge and to act on the order of approval. This belies Judge Blancaflors excuses for
not acting on Catudays motion and lends credence to Riveras submission that the judges refusal was to spite her.
The same thing happened when Rivera processed Namplatas bail bond. As the records show, Judge Blancaflor approved
Namplatas motion for reduction of bail. The judge admitted his approval during the investigation. When he was asked:
"Do you clearly remember Judge that you reduced it as shown by your signature from P60,000,00 to P40,000.00 bail?,"
he answered: "That is correct sir, that day," referring to March 27, 2008. Yet, he refused to approve Namplatas
temporary release. In fact, in his Comment to Riveras supplemental complaint, he disowned the marginal note he made
on a copy of Namplatas motion reducing his bail bond to P40,000.00.
The following exchanges during the investigation further indicate that Judge Blancaflor overstepped and abused his
authority as a judge when he took time to release Namplata, despite his approval of Namplatas bail bond at its original
amount which he earlier reduced to P40.000.00:
J. Fernando:
But you admit you issued a March 27 Order reducing it to P40,000.00?
19
Judge Blancaflor:
The marginal note I admit, Your Honor.
J. Fernando:
Yes, thats fine.
Atty. Aguirre (Riveras, counsel):
Q: The reason Judge Blancaflor why you did not anymore honor your marginal note reducing the amount from 60 to 40
is that you came to know that it was Waling, the complainant, and her daughter Shiela who was (sic) following it up with
you?
A: That is not correct, sir. What you claim that I did not honor the original marginal note is because I did not see it in the
original file of the case.
Q: But the more important reason Judge is that you came to know that it was the complainant and her daughter who
were following up this bail bond case and when you came to know that follow up of the complainant and her daughter,
you wanted it returned back to 60 because you said it was too long in coming, the P40,000.00 bond, is that correct?
A: That is not correct sir:
Q: And another condition of yours before the bail could be approved by you is that the sister or Namplata must file a
case of estafa against the complainant which she did and one day after, the case against the complainant for estafa was
filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor, you issued the Order of Release, is that correct?
A: That is not correct. That is your own language, sir.
Q: That is the testimony of the witnesses.
In an effort to justify his errors and omissions in relation to Catudays and Namplatas motions, Judge Blancaflor argued
that he refused to act on the motions because he hates drugs and,in the case of Namplata, there was a delay in the
processing of the bail bond.
We are not at all convinced by Judge Blancaflors explanations. His excuses which were marked by inconsistencies and
typified by his initial denial that he approved Namplatas motion, only to admit the approval before Justice Fernando
cannotjustify his failure to act. Action by the judge was clearly called for by the urgency of the matter before him the
plea for provisional liberty of Catuday and Namplata who enjoy the right to bail despite the serious offenses they were
charged with. His unexplained refusal in these cases can only support Riveras claim that his inaction was due to Riveras
intervention in the approval of the motions, a clear sign of his personal bias and prejudice against her. This, in our view,
ispatently a gross misconduct on the part of Judge Blancaflor.
It appears from the records that Judge Blancaflors antipathy towards Rivera arose from her involvement in the Leron
case when she testified against the judge in a motion for his inhibition from the case. The motion must have caused
considerable anxiety and concern for the judge so that he even exerted efforts to neutralize Rivera, to the extent of
offering cash to Byron (Riveras son) and Ricel (Riveras son-in-law) who executed a joint Affidavit that Judge Blancaflor
and Villamar offered them P10,000.00 each and even warned them not to testify at the hearing on the motion. The two
showed the cash to Rivera and they had the incident entered in the police blotter. In this regard, Torres and Ricel
deposed:
xxxx
1. x x x Kami ay namamasukan kay Armando Q. Torres ("ARMANDO") na tatay ni BYRON at biyenan na lalaki ni RICEL.
Kami ay laging nagkakaroon ng komunikasyon kay Noralyn M. Villamar a.k.a. Macky ("Macky") dahil may mga
transaksiyon silang pinag-uusapan ng aming tatay na si Armando.
2. Noong ika-02 Marso 2007, araw ng Biyernes, mga 5:00 5:30 ng hapon, tumawag si Macky kay Byron at sinabi na
gusto daw siya makausap nito tungkol sa pagtetestigo nila laban kay Judge Jaime C. Blancaflor ("Judge Blancaflor"), at
sinabihan na pumunta sa bahay nila.
3. Pagdating ni Byron sa bahay nila Macky at Judge Blancaflor sa Brgy. Layugan ng mga bandang 6:00 ng gabi, tinanong ni
Macky si Byron "Bakit natin kailangang maglaban?"Nagkunwari akong walang alam at tumahimik na lang ako.
4. Nilapitan ako (Byron) ni Judge Blancflor at sinabi na: "Byron, ayaw ko tayong mag-kabanggaan. Kung lilitaw kayo sa
hearing sa petsa 6 ay ipapakulongko kayo. Ito ang ten thousand (P10,000.00), ito ay hindi suhol. Wag ka lang tumistigo.
Kung tetestigo ka, mapipilitan kaming lumaban. Kayang-kaya kitang gawan ng kaso tulad ng rape at anumang kaso na
puwedeng isaksak sa iyo.
5. Pinahabol pa ni Macky na: "Kahit patayan pwede kami."
6. Noong 03 ng Marso 2007, araw ng Sabado, bandang 5:10 ng hapon, pumunta si Macky at si Guillen Almonte sa bahay
ng tatay namin na si Armando sa Brgy. Duhat kung saan kami ay nagtratrabaho.
7. Galit na galit si Macky at sinabi nito kay Armando ngunit nakatingin sa amin: "Pare, bakit ganito? Ano ang ginawa ng
mga bata? Kayong dalawa, tinanggap namin kayo nang maayos sa Layugan."
8. Hindi na kami umimik at hinayaan naming magsalita na lamang si Macky.
9. Sinabi pa ni Macky na: "Huwag na nating patagalin ito. Ayaw kong tayo ang magkabanggaan. Kung lalaban kayo,
lalaban kami hanggang patayan."
10. Nagtangkang umalis si Byron kaya sumigaw si Macky na: "Byron! Huwag kang umiwas. Problema natin to. Huwag
kang umalis!"
11. Nag-isip si Byron ng dahilan upang maka-alis. Bago siya nakaalis, pahabol na sinabi ni Macky na: "Mag-aabot ako ng
tulong, huwag lang kayong sumali."
12. Nang nakaalis na si Byron mga bandang 6:00 pm, naglabas ng pera si Macky at inaabot ito kay Ricel, ngunit hindi niya
ito kinuha. Kaya ang ginawa ni Macky ay kinausap si Armando at inilagay ang pera sa mesa at sinabi na: "Pare, kung ayaw
20
magtiwala ng anak mo sa amin, ito ang P20,000.00 para kay Byron at para kay Ricel. Ikaw na ang bahala. Meron pang
kasunod yan kung pipirma sila ng Affidavit of Desistance."
In his comment on Riveras complaint, Judge Blancaflor denied the alleged offer, claiming that the alleged sums did not
come from him but from Armando Torres (Torres) and were "given as support to his son Byron and son-in-law Ricel."
When Rivera saw the P20,000.00, she grabbed it from Byron and proceeded to the police station and made a false story
of bribery against him. Judge Blancaflor offered in evidence two affidavits Armando executed dated March 6, 2007 and
August 22, 2008.
Again, the explanation fails to persuade us. Armando is Riveras estranged husband. Their union produced Byron and De
Mata, the wife of Ricel. Rivera and Armando separated in 1983. It was a case of a marriage turned sour where the
spouses filed cases against one another, as Armando himself stated in his affidavit of August 22, 2008. We should not be
too quick therefore to admit Armandos statements as unvarnished truth, especially when he did not even appear during
the investigation to affirm the statements attributed to him, despite several subpoenas for him to testify, the last one
being on December 6, 2012.
On the other hand, Rivera and Byron reported the bribery incident to the police. The following exchanges on what
transpired in the police station significantly shed light on this incident and bolstered Riveras claim that Judge Blancaflor
committed a serious misconduct in relation with the Leron case, thus:
Q: Now, do you remember what this is all about, the incident reported by Byron Torres?
A: It was a threat.
Q. Will you please read it again to refresh your memory?
(Witness reading the blotter)
Q: What you read, the entry in the blotter is in your handwriting?
A. Yes sir.
Q: What do you remember about this P10,000.00?
J. Fernando: 10 or 20?
A: P10,000.00
J. Fernando: 10 lang?
A: Yes, P10,000.00.
Wag siyang aatend sa hearing saa-sais kung hindi sila ang magkakabangga ni Judge Blancaflor. Q: What is that
P10,000.00 there?
A: Ang akin pong pagkakaintindi ito ay suhol dahil nakalagay dito hindi ito suhol. Wag kang tumestigo dahil kung
tetestigo ka ay mapipilitan lumaban gawan ka ng kaso. Pag tumestigo siya gagawa siya ng kaso.
Translation:
If he testified, he would have a case filed against him.
xxxx
Q: But the signature here of Byron, did he sign it in your presence?
A: Yes sir.
Q: And the witness also signed it in your presence?
A: Yes, sir, in my presence.
The root cause of the Leron case, as Justice Fernando established and stressed, was the irregular assignment of the case
which was directly brought to Judge Blancaflors sala without going through a raffle. Atty. Arthur Trinidad, Jr. (Atty.
Trinidad), then RTC Clerk of Court, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, testified that the case, Special Proceeding No. 4605, which was
filed on November 15, 2006 was not included in the schedule of raffle of cases for the period November 10 to 30, 2006
and was brought to the judges sala even before the case was supposed to be raffled on November 30, 2006 because he
was made to understand, based on the judges letter to him, that the case a settlement of estate dispute belonged
to the Family Court then handled by Judge Blancaflor. Due to the judges letter, he assumed that the case was within the
jurisdiction of the Family Court so that it was his ministerial duty to forward the case to Judge Blancaflors sala.
Not only does it appear that Judge Blancaflor intervened in the assignment of the Leron case, he also had a hand in
ensuring who would represent the disputants, by suggesting, in the presence of and with the active participation of
Villamar, that the lawyers for the parties would be Atty. Pilares for the plaintiffs and Atty. Stephen David (Atty. David)
for the defendants. He even went to the extent of voicing out how the case should turn out.
Thus, Dr. Leron deposed: "Tinanong ko si Judge Blancaflor kung matatalo ako kahit sabihin ko na wala naman talaga ang
lahat ng hinahanap nila. Sagot ni Judge Blancaflor Pwede, depende sa presentasyon ng abogado mo. Tinanong ko kung
sino yong abogado na sinasabi ni Macky. Sagot ni Judge Blancaflor[,] si [Atty. David] at dinagdag pa niya kumpare ko
yan,magaling yan, at taga-Tektite, madali nating maayos ang kaso. Nabanggit din niya na kumpare ni Atty. David si
Atty. Pilares. Sinabi niya pa mas lamang kayo kasi mas alam niyo nangyayari kaysa sa kabila."
Also, Ricel, Riveras son-in-law, stated under oath that he saw Judge Blancaflor and plaintiff Gilbert Leron (Gilbert) during
the blessing of the chapel inside the compound of the judges house on January 16, 2007 and he overheard Judge
Blancaflor assuring Gilbert not to worry about the case saying: "Pare wag na kayo mag-alala, ayos na ang kaso nyo nina
Dr. Leron," while they were drinking beer.
Judge Blancaflor argued that he had no interest whatsoever in the Leron case as it was forwarded to Branch 26 in the
ordinary course of business since cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Court are directly forwarded
to Branch 26, his branch. His letter to Atty. Trinidad should not be considered against him because he was then a new
family court judge. He further argued that he did not refer Atty. Pilares to the plaintiffs; he even dismissed the case for
21
prematurity and inhibited himself from the case after it was re-raffled.
We do not find Judge Blancaflors explanations convincing. The circumstances of the Leron case left Judge Blancaflor no
other recourse but to inhibit. As Justice Fernando aptly observed, it was more prudent for the judge to inhibit than to be
placed under a cloud of distrust by the parties. On the matter of the parties legal representation alone, we find credible
the statements of Rivera, Dr. Leron and Ricel that not only did Judge Blancaflor refer lawyers to the parties but, more
seriously, he gave them hints that they would prevail in the case.
Judge Blancaflors interference in the case in the way just described is not only gross misconduct; it also constitutes a
violation of R.A. No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, particularly Section 3(e) which provides: "In addition
to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of
any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: x x x Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence
x x x."
To be sure, even if Judge Blancaflor inhibited himself from the Leron case, he cannot extricate himself from the legal
mess he brought upon himself. His interference in the case caused an undue injury to the party who should have
prevailed had the case pushed through; and an unwarranted benefit to the party who should have lost had the case
been decided on the merits. Worse, he exhibited evident bad faith when he gave both parties expectations of winning
the case. Thus, there is every reason to find probable cause against him for violation of R.A. No. 3019.
It is unfortunate that Judge Blancaflor lost sight of the exacting standards demanded of the office of a judge in the Leron
case. Time and again, judges have been reminded that as magistrates, they must comport themselves in such a manner
that their conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to them as the
epitome of integrity and justice. Sad to state, Judge Blancaflor failed to pass this "searching scrutiny."
Re: charge of immorality
On the charge of immorality for allegedly maintaining an illicit relationship with Villamar who is not his wife Justice
Fernando aptly observed that Judge Blancaflor offered no evidence, except general denials to disprove his moral
indiscretion, which appeared to be widely known in the community at the time material to the case. As the records
show, statements made here and there by witnesses and personalities drawn into the case confirm the special
relationship between Judge Blancaflor and Villamar such that Villamar had no hesitation in speaking for the judge on
matters concerning him and his work.
The community, it seemed, had accepted them as man and wife, given that they stayed in Layugan, Pagsanjan, Laguna
and owned Tagpuan Restaurant in Pila, Laguna. This restaurant, incidentally, even became Judge Blancaflors extension
office, usually in the afternoons, as deposed by Rivera, De Mata, Byron, Ricel and Judge Blancaflors staff whose
assistance Rivera and De Mata sought in their effort to secure the provisional liberty for their clients Catuday and
Namplata. The depositions were backed up by pictures of (1) the places where Tagpuan Restaurant used to stand and
where the two were residing, and (2) the events in the life of the live-in partners. Notably, Exhs. "N," "N-1," and "N-2"49
were separate camera shots of the place where Tagpuan Restaurant used to stand; Exh. "A-15-C" was a picture of
Gilbert, a party in the Leron case, attending the blessing of the chapel inside the compound of Judge Blancaflors house;
Exh. "E" was a picture of Judge Blancaflor and Villamar together in a hut located inside the compound of their house in
Layugan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, apparently relaxing; and Exhs. "F," "G," and "H" were pictures of Villamar picking up Judge
Blancaflor from his office at the RTC, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, using her Pajero with plate no. XHF 887.
Judge Blancaflor belittled the immorality charge, dismissing it as merely a fabrication and a product of Riveras fertile
imagination. To substantiate his claim, he cited the withdrawal of Ondevillas affidavit confirming Riveras charge that he
was maintaining an illicit liaison with Villamar.
Again, we are not persuaded by the judges response. Given the fact that Judge Blancaflor is a person of authority and
his involvement in the "bribery" incident (as revealed by Byron and Ricel whom the judge even threatened if they would
testify against him), we find more credibility in Riveras submission that Ondevilla withdrew his affidavit on the
immorality charge because the judge likewise threatened him.
The confluence of the statements of Rivera and the others (Byron, De Mata, Ricel and Mirasol), the information provided
by Judge Blancaflors staff, and the exhibits described above, constitute more than enough support for the immorality
charge against Judge Blancaflor. These interwoven pieces of evidence pointing to the relationship between the judge
and Villamar, several of which materialized over a period of time, could not conceivably have been the result of Riveras
fabrications. As De Mata testified during the investigation:
ATTY. SHALIM:
Q: Ms. Witness, you mentioned that Noralyn Villamar is the live-in partner of Judge Blancaflor. How do you know this?
A: Because Tita Macky herself was the one who told me that Judge Blancaflor is her live-in partner.
xxxx
J. FERNANDO:
Q: If you know, how long have Judge Blancaflor and Noralyn been living together as live-in partners?
A: 2006, your Honor.
Q: So they started as live-in partners since 2006?
A: June of 2006, Your Honor, because that was when I came back from Manila.
Q: As far as you are concerned, you only learned about it in 2006?
A. Yes , Your Honor.
22
Q: Have you seen them really living together as live-in partners?
A: No, Your Honor. It was my husband because they were still at Layugan because my husband was the driver of my
father at that time.
xxxx
Q: Are you saying that Judge and Macky are living in Layugan?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
xxxx
Q: Are you sure that Macky told you that Judge Blancaflor is her live-in partner?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: How did she tell you?
A: It was just in a casual way that she told me that Judge is her current live-in partner because previously it was a
Colonel.
Q: So despite the fact that you are not close to Macky, Macky intimidated (sic) to you that Judge Blancaflor is her live-in-
partner?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Fernando stressed that Judge Blancaflor did not categorically deny the allegations of an illicit relationship with
Villamar. While he stated that his marriage to his wife Nora Lopez was already annulled, the annulment became final
only on July 18, 2012 by virtue of an entry of judgment from the RTC, Br. 199, Las Pias City. Thus, he was still a married
man at the time of his liaison with Villamar.
For maintaining a relationship with Villamar, Judge Blancaflor crossed the line of a proper and acceptable conduct as a
magistrate and a private person. In Re: Complaint of Mrs. Rotilla A. Marcos and her children against Judge Ferdinand J.
Marcos, we said: "x x x The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his official duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as
a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also judged by his private morals. The code
dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must
behave with propriety at all times. x x x."
In sum, we find substantial evidence to hold Judge Blancaflor guilty as charged. This conclusion, as correctly observed by
Justice Fernando:
x x x jibes with the affidavits and testimonies of complainant Rivera and her witnesses. His acts of fraternizing with
lawyers and litigants, his partiality in the performance of his duties, his act of giving bribe money to two (2) witnesses to
a case in order for them to withdraw, and maintaining an illicit affair with a woman not his wife tarnished the image of
the judiciary. Respondent judge demonstrated himself to be wanting of moral integrity x x x He is therefore unfit to
remain in office and discharge his functions and duties as judge. (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, as observed by the OCA, it has been established that "[t]he findings of investigating magistrates on the
credibility of witnesses are given great weight by reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the
witnesses as they testified."
Gross misconduct, bribery, violation of R.A. No. 3019 and immorality, all of them constituting violations of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, are serious charges under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court punishable under Section 11 of the
same Rule by any of the following: (1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of the benefits as the Court may determine,
and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled
corporations; forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; (2) suspension from office without
salary and other benefits for more than three (3) months but not exceeding six (6) months; or (3) a fine of more than
P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
Considering the gravity of the offenses committed by Judge Blancaflor, we approve and adopt the recommendations of
Justice Fernando and the OCA for his dismissal from the service, with the accessory penalties.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Presiding Judge Jaime C. Blancaflor, Branch 26, Regional Trial Court, Sta. Cruz,
Laguna, is found GUILTY of gross misconduct, violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and
immorality, constituting serious violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court.
Judge Blancaflor is DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of his retirement and other monetary benefits, except
accrued leave credits. He is DISQUALIFIED from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
This ruling shall be without prejudice to any disciplinary action that may be brought against Judge Blancaflor as a lawyer
under A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC. Accordingly, Judge Blancaflor is directed to COMMENT within ten (10) days from receipt of
this decision and to show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinarily sanctioned as
a member of the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.

23
Case No. 6
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200 April 2, 2014(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2834-RTJ)
ANTONIO M. LORENZANA, Complainant, vs. JUDGE MA. CECILIA I. AUSTRIA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Batangas
City, Respondent.

We resolve in this Decision the administrative complaints filed by Antonio M. Lorenzana (complainant) against Judge
Ma. Cecilia I. Austria (respondent), Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 2, Batangas City.
The records show that the administrative complaints arose from the case "In the Matter of the Petition to have Steel
Corporation of the Philippines Placed under Corporate Rehabilitation with Prayer for the Approval of the Proposed
Rehabilitation Plan," docketed as SP. Proc. No. 06-7993, where the respondent was the presiding judge. The
complainant was the Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of Steel Corporation of the Philippines (SCP), a
company then under rehabilitation proceedings.
i. Complaint
In his verified complaint dated January 21, 2008, the complainant alleged that in the course of SP. Proc. No. 06-7993, the
respondent committed Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority, Gross Misconduct, Grave Incompetence,
Irregularity in the Performance of Duty, Grave Bias and Partiality, Lack of Circumspection, Conduct Unbecoming of a
Judge, Failure to Observe the Reglementary Period and Violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as shown by
the following instances:
1. The respondent appointed Atty. Santiago T. Gabionza, Jr. as rehabilitation receiver over SCPs objections and despite
serious conflict of interest in being the duly appointed rehabilitation receiver for SCP and, at the same time, the external
legal counsel of most of SCPs creditors; he is also a partner of the law firm that he engaged as legal adviser.
2. The respondent conducted informal meetings (which she termed as "consultative meetings" in her Order dated May
11, 2007) in places outside her official jurisdiction (i.e., a first class golf club, a hotel and sports club facilities in Metro
Manila) and where she arbitrarily dictated the terms, parameters and features of the rehabilitation plan she wanted to
approve for SCP. She also announced in the meetings that she would prepare the rehabilitation plan for SCP.
3. The modified rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza is a replica of what the respondent dictated to him.
Thus, the respondent exceeded the limits of her authority and effectively usurped and pre-empted the rehabilitation
receivers exercise of functions.
4. The respondent ordered that the proceedings of the informal meetings be off-record so that there would be no
record that she had favored Equitable-PCI Bank (EPCIB).
5. The respondent had secret meetings and communications with EPCIB to discuss the case without the knowledge and
presence of SCP and its creditors.
6. The respondent appointed Gerardo Anonas (Anonas) as Atty. Gabionzas financial adviser and, at the same time, as
her financial adviser to guide her in the formulation and development of the rehabilitation plan, for a fee of P3.5M at
SCPs expense. Anonas is also the cousin-in-law of the managing partner of Atty. Gabionzas law firm.
7. The respondent encouraged EPCIB to raise complaints or accusations against SCP, leading to EPCIBs filing of a motion
to create a management committee.
8. When requested to conduct an evidentiary meeting and to issue a subpoena (so that SCP could confront EPCIBs
witnesses to prove the allegation that there was a need for the creation of a management committee), the respondent
denied SCPs requests and delayed the issuance of the order until the last minute.
9. At the hearing of September 14, 2007, the respondent intimidated SCPs counsel, Atty. Ferdinand Topacio; blocked his
every attempt to speak; refused to recognize his appearances in court; and made condescending and snide remarks.
10. The respondent failed to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the Interim Rules of Procedure on
Corporate Rehabilitation (Rules). She approved the rehabilitation plan beyond the 180 days given to her in the Rules,
without asking for permission to extend the period from the Supreme Court (SC).
11. The respondent erroneously interpreted and applied Section 23, Rule 4 of the Rules (the courts power to approve
the rehabilitation plan) to include the power to amend, modify and alter it.
12. The respondent took a personal interest and commitment to decide the matter in EPCIBs favor and made comments
and rulings in the proceedings that raised concerns regarding her impartiality.
13. The respondent adamantly refused to inhibit herself and showed special interest and personal involvement in the
case.
ii. Supplemental Complaint
The complainant likewise filed a supplemental complaint dated April 14, 2008 where he alleged that the respondent
committed an act of impropriety when she displayed her photographs in a social networking website called "Friendster"
and posted her personal details as an RTC Judge, allegedly for the purpose of finding a compatible partner. She also
posed with her upper body barely covered by a shawl, allegedly suggesting that nothing was worn underneath except
probably a brassiere.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in its 1st Indorsement dated March 18, 2008, referred the complaints to the
respondent for comment.
a. Comment to January 21, 2008 Complaint
The respondent vehemently denied the allegations against her. While she admitted that she crafted a workable, feasible
rehabilitation plan best suited for SCP, she maintained that she did so only to render fairness and equity to all the parties
to the rehabilitation proceedings. She also submitted that if indeed she erred in modifying the rehabilitation plan, hers
24
was a mere error of judgment that does not call for an administrative disciplinary action. Accordingly, she claimed that
the administrative complaints were premature because judicial remedies were still available.
The respondent also argued that the rules do not prohibit informal meetings and conferences. On the contrary, she
argued that informal meetings are even encouraged in view of the summary and non-adversarial nature of rehabilitation
proceedings. Since Section 21, Rule 4 of the Rules gives the rehabilitation receiver the power to meet with the creditors,
then there is all the more reason for the rehabilitation judge, who has the authority to approve the plan, to call and hold
meetings with the parties. She also pointed out that it was SCP which suggested that informal meetings be called and
that she only agreed to hold these meetings on the condition that all the parties would attend.
As to her alleged failure to observe the reglementary period, she contended that she approved the rehabilitation plan
within the period prescribed by law. She argued that the matter of granting extension of time under Section 11, Rule 4
of the Rules pertains not to the SC, but to the rehabilitation court.
The respondent likewise refuted the allegations of bias and partiality. First, she claimed that her denial of the
complainants motion for inhibition was not due to any bias or prejudice on her part but due to lack of basis. Second, she
argued that her decision was not orchestrated to favor EPCIB, as evidenced by the fact that EPCIP itself (as some other
creditors did) promptly appealed her decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). Third, she did not remove Atty. Gabionza as
SCPs rehabilitation receiver because she disagreed that the grounds the complainant raised warranted his removal.
She also found no merit to the allegation of conflict of interest. Lastly, she maintained that the rest of the complainants
allegations were not substantiated and corroborated by evidence.
The respondent further alleged that she did not gravely abuse her authority in not issuing a subpoena as Section 1, Rule
3 of the Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation of the Rules specifically states that the court may decide matters on
the basis of affidavits and other documentary evidence.
On the allegation of conflict of interest, she maintained that the allegations were not proven and substantiated by
evidence. Finally, the respondent also believed that there was nothing improper in expressing her ideas during the
informal meetings.
b. Comment to April 14, 2008 Supplemental Complaint
In her comment on the supplemental complaint, the respondent submitted that the photos she posted in the social
networking website "Friendster" could hardly be considered vulgar or lewd. She added that an "off-shouldered" attire is
an acceptable social outfit under contemporary standards and is not forbidden. She further stated that there is no
prohibition against attractive ladies being judges; she is proud of her photo for having been aesthetically made. Lastly,
she submitted that the ruling of the Court in the case of Impao v. Judge Makilala should not be applied to her case since
the facts are different.
On July 4, 2008, the complainant filed a reply, insisting that the respondents acts of posting "seductive" pictures and
maintaining a "Friendster" account constituted acts of impropriety, in violation of Rules 2.01, 2.02 and 2.03, Canon 2 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct.
In a Resolution dated September 9, 2009, the Court re-docketed the complaints as regular administrative matters, and
referred them to the CA for investigation, report and recommendation.
The CAs Report and Recommendation
On November 13, 2009, Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, the Investigating Justice, conducted a hearing, followed by the
submission of memoranda by both parties. In her January 4, 2010 Report and Recommendation, Justice Gonzales-Sison
ruled that the complaints were partly meritorious. She found that the issues raised were judicial in nature since these
involved the respondents appreciation of evidence.
She also added that while the CA resolved to set aside the respondents decision in the rehabilitation proceedings, it was
not by reason of her ignorance of the law or abuse of authority, but because the rehabilitation plan could no longer be
implemented in view of SCPs financial predicament.
On the allegation of grave bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation proceedings, Justice Gonzales-Sison ruled that
the complainant failed to present any clear and convincing proof that the respondent intentionally and deliberately
acted against SCPs interests; the complaint merely relied on his opinions and surmises.
On the matter of the respondents inhibition, she noted that in cases not covered by the rule on mandatory inhibition,
the decision to inhibit lies within the discretion of the sitting judge and is primarily a matter of conscience.
With respect to the respondents informal meetings, Justice Gonzales-Sison found nothing irregular despite the out-of-
court meetings as these were agreed upon by all the parties, including SCPs creditors. She also found satisfactory the
respondents explanation in approving the rehabilitation plan beyond the 180-day period prescribed by the Rules.
The foregoing notwithstanding, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the respondents unnecessary bickering with SCPs legal
counsel and ruled that her exchanges and utterances were reflective of arrogance and superiority. In the words of the
Justice Gonzales-Sison:
Rather than rule on the manifestations of counsels, she instead brushed off the matter with what would appear to be a
conceited show of a prerogative of her office, a conduct that falls below the standard of decorum expected of a judge.
Her statements appear to be done recklessly and were uncalled for. xxx. Section 6[,] Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that: judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the
court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others whom the judge
deals in an official capacity. Judicial decorum requires judges to be temperate in their language at all times. Failure on
this regard amounts to a conduct unbecoming of a judge, for which Judge Austria should be held liable.

25
On the respondents Friendster account, she believes that her act of maintaining a personal social networking account
(displaying photos of herself and disclosing personal details as a magistrate in the account) even during these changing
times when social networking websites seem to be the trend constitutes an act of impropriety which cannot be legally
justified by the publics acceptance of this type of conduct. She explained that propriety and the appearance of propriety
are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge and that judges shall conduct themselves in a manner
consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
Finally, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the CAs May 16, 2006 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 100941 finding that the
respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the creation of a management committee without first
conducting an evidentiary hearing in accordance with the procedures prescribed under the Rules. She ruled that such
professional incompetence was tantamount to gross ignorance of the law and procedure, and recommended a fine of
P20,000.00. She also recommended that the respondent be admonished for failing to observe strict propriety and
judicial decorum required by her office.
The Action and Recommendation of the OCA
In its Memorandum dated September 4, 2013, the OCA recommended the following:
RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended for the consideration of the Honorable Court that:
1) the Report dated January 4, 2010 of Investigating Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison be NOTED;
2) respondent Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, Branch 2, Regional Trial Court, Batangas City, Batangas, be found GUILTY of
conduct unbecoming a judge and for violation of Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct;
3) respondent Judge Austria be FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (Php20,000.00); and
4) respondent Judge Austria be ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of impropriety with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or any similar act will be dealt with more severely.
In arriving at its recommendation the OCA found that the respondent was not guilty of gross ignorance of the law as the
complainant failed to prove that her orders were motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.
The OCA also found that the charges of bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation proceedings were not supported
by evidence. It accepted the respondents explanation in the charge of failure to observe the reglementary period.
Lastly, the OCA maintained that the allegations of grave abuse of authority and gross incompetence are judicial in
nature, hence, they should not be the subject of disciplinary action. On the other hand, on allegations of conduct
unbecoming of a judge, violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), lack of circumspection and
impropriety, the OCA shared Justice Gonzales-Sisons observations that the respondents act of posting seductive photos
in her Friendster account contravened the standard of propriety set forth by the Code.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the recommendation of both Justice Gonzales-Sison and the OCA for the imposition of a fine on the
respondent but modify the amount as indicated below. We sustain Justice Gonzales-Sisons finding of gross ignorance of
the law in so far as the respondent ordered the creation of a management committee without conducting an evidentiary
hearing. The absence of a hearing was a matter of basic due process that no magistrate should be forgetful or careless
about.
On the Charges of Grave Abuse of Authority;Irregularity in the Performance of Duty; GraveBias and Partiality; and Lack
of Circumspection
It is well settled that in administrative cases, the complainant bears the onus of proving the averments of his complaint
by substantial evidence. In the present case, the allegations of grave abuse of authority, irregularity in the performance
of duty, grave bias and partiality, and lack of circumspection are devoid of merit because the complainant failed to
establish the respondents bad faith, malice or ill will. The complainant merely pointed to circumstances based on mere
conjectures and suppositions. These, by themselves, however, are not sufficient to prove the accusations. "[M]ere
allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof."
"[U]nless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will, bad faith, or deliberate intent to
do an injustice, [the] respondent judge may not be held administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the
law or incompetence of official acts in the exercise of judicial functions and duties, particularly in the adjudication of
cases."
Even granting that the respondent indeed erred in the exercise of her judicial functions, these are, at best, legal errors
correctible not by a disciplinary action, but by judicial remedies that are readily available to the complainant. "An
administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a
judge where a judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration or an appeal." Errors committed by
him/her in the exercise of adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings but should be
assailed instead through judicial remedies.
On the Charges of Grave Bias and Partiality
We likewise find the allegations of bias and partiality on the part of the respondent baseless. The truth about the
respondents alleged partiality cannot be determined by simply relying on the complainants verified complaint. Bias and
prejudice cannot be presumed, in light especially of a judges sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer
justice without respect to the person, and to give equal right to the poor and rich. There should be clear and convincing
evidence to prove the charge; mere suspicion of partiality is not enough.
In the present case, aside from being speculative and judicial in character, the circumstances cited by the complainant
were grounded on mere opinion and surmises. The complainant, too, failed to adduce proof indicating the respondents
predisposition to decide the case in favor of one party. This kind of evidence would have helped its cause. The bare
26
allegations of the complainant cannot overturn the presumption that the respondent acted regularly and impartially.
We thus conclude that due to the complainants failure to establish with clear, solid, and convincing proof, the
allegations of bias and partiality must fail.
On the Charges of Grave Incompetenceand Gross Ignorance of the Law
We agree with the findings of the OCA that not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his official duties
renders him liable. "[A]s a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his
judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous."
In the present case, what was involved was the respondents application of Section 23, Rule 4 of the Rules, which
provides:
Sec. 23. Approval of the Rehabilitation Plan. - The court may approve a rehabilitation plan even over the opposition of
creditors holding a majority of the total liabilities of the debtor if, in its judgment, the rehabilitation of the debtor is
feasible and the opposition of the creditors is manifestly unreasonable.
The respondent approved the rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza, subject to the modifications she found
necessary to make the plan viable. The complainant alleged that in modifying the plan, she exceeded her authority and
effectively usurped the functions of a rehabilitation receiver. We find, however, that in failing to show that the
respondent was motivated by bad faith or ill motives in rendering the assailed decision, the charge of gross ignorance of
the law against her should be dismissed. "To [rule] otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one
called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment."
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the decision, order or actuation of the judge in the
performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence. It must also be proven that he was
moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption or had committed an error so egregious that it amounted to bad
faith.
In the present case, nothing in the records suggests that the respondent was motivated by bad faith, fraud, corruption,
dishonesty or egregious error in rendering her decision approving the modified rehabilitation plan. Besides his bare
accusations, the complainant failed to substantiate his allegations with competent proof. Bad faith cannot be presumed
and this Court cannot conclude that bad faith intervened when none was actually proven.
With respect to the action of the respondent in ordering the creation of a management committee without first
conducting an evidentiary hearing for the purpose, however, we find the error to be so egregious as to amount to bad
faith, leading to the conclusion of gross ignorance of the law, as charged.
Due process and fair play are basic requirements that no less than the Constitution demands. In rehabilitation
proceedings, the parties must first be given an opportunity to prove (or disprove) the existence of an imminent danger
of dissipation, loss, wastage or destruction of the debtor-companys assets and properties that are or may be prejudicial
to the interest of minority stockholders, parties-litigants or the general public. The rehabilitation court should hear both
sides, allow them to present proof and conscientiously deliberate, based on their submissions, on whether the
appointment of a management receiver is justified. This is a very basic requirement in every adversarial proceeding that
no judge or magistrate can disregard.
In SCPs rehabilitation proceedings, SCP was not given at all the opportunity to present its evidence, nor to confront the
EPCIB witnesses. Significantly, the CA, in its May 16, 2006 decision, found that the respondents act of denying SCP the
opportunity to disprove the grounds for the appointment of a management committee was tantamount to grave abuse
of discretion. As aptly observed by Justice Gonzales-Sison:
[T]he acts of the respondent judge (Judge Austria) in creating a MANCOM without observing the procedures prescribed
under the IRPGICC clearly constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
Indeed, while a judge may not be held liable for gross ignorance of the law for every erroneous order that he renders,
this does not mean that a judge need not observe due care in the performance of his/her official functions. When a
basic principle of law is involved and when an error is so gross and patent, error can produce an inference of bad faith,
making the judge liable for gross ignorance of the law. On this basis, we conclude that the respondents act of promptly
ordering the creation of a management committee, without the benefit of a hearing and despite the demand for one,
was tantamount to punishable professional incompetence and gross ignorance of the law.
On the Ground of Failure to Observethe Reglementary Period
On the respondents failure to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the Rules, we find the respondents
explanation to be satisfactory.
Section 11, Rule 4 of the previous Rules provides:
Sec. 11. Period of the Stay Order. xxx
The petition shall be dismissed if no rehabilitation plan is approved by the court upon the lapse of one hundred eighty
(180) days from the date of the initial hearing. The court may grant an extension beyond this period only if it appears by
convincing and compelling evidence that the debtor may successfully be rehabilitated. In no instance, however, shall the
period for approving or disapproving a rehabilitation plan exceed eighteen (18) months from the date of filing of the
petition.37
Under this provision, the matter of who would grant the extension beyond the 180-day period carried a good measure
of ambiguity as it did not indicate with particularity whether the rehabilitation court could act by itself or whether
Supreme Court approval was still required. Only recently was this uncertainty clarified when A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC, the
2008 Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation, took effect.
Section 12, Rule 4 of the Rules provides:
27
Section 12. Period to Decide Petition. - The court shall decide the petition within one (1) year from the date of filing of
the petition, unless the court, for good cause shown, is able to secure an extension of the period from the Supreme
Court.
Since the new Rules only took effect on January 16, 2009 (long after the respondents approval of the rehabilitation plan
on December 3, 2007), we find no basis to hold the respondent liable for the extension she granted and for the
consequent delay.
On the Ground of ConductUnbecoming of a Judge
On the allegation of conduct unbecoming of a judge, Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that:
SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and
courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges
shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction or
control.
A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity, independence and respect for
himself/herself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost
sobriety and self-restraint. He should choose his words and exercise more caution and control in expressing himself. In
other words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas.
As held in De la Cruz (Concerned Citizen of Legazpi City) v. Judge Carretas, a judge should be considerate, courteous and
civil to all persons who come to his court; he should always keep his passion guarded. He can never allow it to run loose
and overcome his reason. Furthermore, a magistrate should not descend to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered
petty tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide remarks and sarcastic comments.
Similarly in Attys. Guanzon and Montesino v. Judge Rufon, the Court declared that "although respondent judge may
attribute his intemperate language to human frailty, his noble position in the bench nevertheless demands from him
courteous speech in and out of court.
Judges are required to always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and in language."
Accordingly, the respondents unnecessary bickering with SCPs legal counsel, her expressions of exasperation over
trivial procedural and negligible lapses, her snide remarks, as well as her condescending attitude, are conduct that the
Court cannot allow. They are displays of arrogance and air of superiority that the Code abhors.
Records and transcripts of the proceedings bear out that the respondent failed to observe judicial temperament and to
conduct herself irreproachably. She also failed to maintain the decorum required by the Code and to use temperate
language befitting a magistrate. "As a judge, [she] should ensure that [her] conduct is always above reproach and
perceived to be so by a reasonable observer. [She] must never show conceit or even an appearance thereof, or any kind
of impropriety."
Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that:
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view
of a reasonable observer.
In these lights, the respondent exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge and thus violated Section 6, Canon 6 and
Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
On the Ground of Impropriety
We are not unaware of the increasing prevalence of social networking sites in the Internet a new medium through
which more and more Filipinos communicate with each other. While judges are not prohibited from becoming members
of and from taking part in social networking activities, we remind them that they do not thereby shed off their status as
judges. They carry with them in cyberspace the same ethical responsibilities and duties that every judge is expected to
follow in his/her everyday activities. It is in this light that we judge the respondent in the charge of impropriety when
she posted her pictures in a manner viewable by the public.
Lest this rule be misunderstood, the New Code of Judicial Conduct does not prohibit a judge from joining or maintaining
an account in a social networking site such as Friendster. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
recognizes that judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression. This right "includes the freedom to
hold opinions without interference and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers." Joining
a social networking site is an exercise of ones freedom of expression. The respondent judges act of joining Friendster is,
therefore, per se not violative of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, however, also imposes a correlative restriction on judges: in the
exercise of their freedom of expression, they should always conduct themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity
of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary.
This rule reflects the general principle of propriety expected of judges in all of their activities, whether it be in the course
of their judicial office or in their personal lives. In particular, Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct prohibit impropriety and even the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities:
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves
in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
Based on this provision, we hold that the respondent disregarded the propriety and appearance of propriety required of
her when she posted Friendster photos of herself wearing an "off-shouldered" suggestive dress and made this available
for public viewing.
28
To restate the rule: in communicating and socializing through social networks, judges must bear in mind that what they
communicate regardless of whether it is a personal matter or part of his or her judicial duties creates and contributes
to the peoples opinion not just of the judge but of the entire Judiciary of which he or she is a part. This is especially true
when the posts the judge makes are viewable not only by his or her family and close friends, but by acquaintances and
the general public.
Thus, it may be acceptable for the respondent to show a picture of herself in the attire she wore to her family and close
friends, but when she made this picture available for public consumption, she placed herself in a situation where she,
and the status she holds as a judge, may be the object of the publics criticism and ridicule. The nature of cyber
communications, particularly its speedy and wide-scale character, renders this rule necessary.
We are not also unaware that the respondents act of posting her photos would seem harmless and inoffensive had this
act been done by an ordinary member of the public. As the visible personification of law and justice, however, judges
are held to higher standards of conduct and thus must accordingly comport themselves.
This exacting standard applies both to acts involving the judicial office and personal matters. The very nature of their
functions requires behavior under exacting standards of morality, decency and propriety; both in the performance of
their duties and their daily personal lives, they should be beyond reproach. Judges necessarily accept this standard of
conduct when they take their oath of office as magistrates.
Imposable Penalty
Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the law or
procedure is classified as a serious charge. Under Section 11(A) of the same Rule, a serious charge merits any of the
following sanctions:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification
from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations;
provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3), but not exceeding six (6), months;
or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00, but not exceeding P40,000.00.
On the other hand, conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Rules
of Court. It is penalized under Section 11(C) thereof by any of the following: (1) A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not
exceeding P10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and ( 4) Admonition with warning.
Judge Austria's record shows that she had never been administratively charged or found liable for any wrongdoing in the
past. Since this is her first offense, the Court finds it fair and proper to temper the penalty for her offenses.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria guilty of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW for which she is FINED
Twenty-One Thousand Pesos (P21,000,00). Judge Austria is likewise hereby ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of
IMPROPRIETY and to refrain from CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A JUDGE, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

29
Case No. 7
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2426 [Formerly A.M. No. 05-3-83-MTC], June 16, 2015
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, v. JUDGE ALEXANDER BALUT, Respondent.

On October 9, 2007, the Court partially resolved this case by disposing it as follows:

WHEREFORE the Court finds and declares:

1. Judge Alexander S. Balut GUILTY of undue delay in deciding 33 cases submitted for decision and in failing to resolve
101 motions within the 90-day reglementary period. He is FINED twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely.

2. Judith En. Salimpade GUILTY of gross neglect of duty, dishonesty and grave misconduct. She is DISMISSED from the
service. She is DIRECTED to RESTITUTE the amount of P1,817,378.59 representing the amount of shortages in her
collections. Her withheld salaries are to be applied to her accountabilities. The Office of Administrative Services, OCA is
DIRECTED to compute Ms. Salimpade's leave credits and forward the same to the Finance Division, Fiscal Management
Office-OCA which shall compute the money value of the same, the amount to be deducted from the shortages to be
restituted.

3. Eduardo Esconde GUILTY of gross neglect of duty. He is DISMISSED from the service. He is also ORDERED to restitute
his accountabilities in the amount of P58,100.00

4. Lydia O. Ramos GUILTY of neglect of duty. She is FINED P5,000, which should be deducted from her retirement
benefits.

The Office of the Court Administrator Legal Office is DIRECTED to file appropriate criminal charges against Judge
Alexander Balut, Judith En. Salimpade and Eduardo Esconde.

SO ORDERED.
As stated in the October 9, 2007 Resolution, the facts of the case are as follows:
On May 3, 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) conducted a judicial audit and physical inventory of cases at
the Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs) of Bayombong and Solano, Nueva Vizcaya. Judge Alexander S. Balut was the acting
presiding judge in both courts.

xxx xxx xxx

Aside from the judicial audit, a financial audit was also conducted in the MTCs of Bayombong and Solano as well as the
MCTC of Aritao-Sta. Fe.

In the MTC, Bayombong, where Judith En. Salimpade was Clerk of Court II, the audit team found an unremitted amount
of P18,702.00 representing the court's collection from August 3, 2003 to August 18, 2003. Said amount was deposited
only on August 18, 2003, upon advise by the audit team, in the Land Bank of the Philippines account. Furthermore, 31
booklets of accountable forms issued to Ms. Salimpade by the Property Division, SC and OCA were not accounted for.
Also, the court had a total Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) collection of P348,993.60 from January 1990 to August
2003. However, only P186,330.98 was remitted by Ms. Salimpade leaving a balance of P162,662.62; the total Clerk of
Court General Fund (CCGF) collections from January 1996 to August 2003 (audit scope) showed an unremitted amount
of P30,411.70; and as of August 31, 2003 the Fiduciary Fund had a total cash shortage of P1,864,304.27 which covered
the collections from 1995 to August 2003.

In sum, the shortages in the various funds incurred by Salimpade as of August 31, 2003 totalled P2,057,378.59.

Salimpade, when asked about the shortages, explained that Judge Balut, since 1995 had been getting money from the
JDF collections. She had given in to the requests of Judge Balut out of fear of him. She also admitted that she lent her
co-employees money which she took from her collections.

Parenthetically, in September 2003, Judge Balut turned over P240,000.00 to Salimpade and the latter issued a
certification stating that the former had completely settled his monetary accountability to the MTC, Bayombong.
Judge Balut delivered to the Fiscal Monitoring Division, Court Management Office (CMO) OCA the certification and
deposit slip evidencing the turnover of the P240,000.00.

The audit team also found that Salimpade failed to regularly submit her monthly report of collections, as required in
Supreme Court Circular No. 32-93. Consequently, Salimpade's salaries were withheld effective August 2003 to the
present.

30
In the MTC, Solano, the spot cash count on the court's collection disclosed that Eduardo Esconde, Clerk of Court, had an
unremitted/undeposited cash on hand amounting to P59,545.00. However, the Official Receipts issued to cover said
amounts were not accounted for. The said cash amount was deposited on August 21, 2003 to Land Bank JDF Account
No. 0591-0116-34.

A review of the receipts on file from May 2001 to July 2003 also showed a total cash shortage of P106,527.80. However,
on August 29, 2003, Esconde deposited in the CCGF and JDF bank accounts sums corresponding to the said shortage.
Esconde explained to the audit team that Judge Balut borrowed various amounts from the collections. He stated that
Judge Balut started borrowing funds when the former was still the Clerk of Court of MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe. He transferred
to MTC, Solano, to get out of the shadow of Judge Balut. But, much to his dismay, Judge Balut was designated Acting
Presiding Judge of MTC, Solano and continued the practice of borrowing money from the collections of the court.

In the MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe, the audit team found that Lydia Ramos, Clerk of Court, succeeded Eduardo S. Esconde on
July 16, 2000, without proper turnover of accountabilities. The team also found that the amount of P540.00, part of the
JDF collections from August 1, 2003 to August 21, 2003, remained undeposited at the time of audit. Said amount was
remitted to the Chief Accountant, Supreme Court on September 10, 2003. Also, Mrs. Ramos opened an account at the
Rural Bank of Aritao, Inc. for the Fiduciary Fund of the court instead of maintaining an account with Landbank. Said
account was closed on September 11, 2003 and an account was opened at Landbank, Bambang, on the same date. A
comparison of the court's CCGF collections and remittances for the period of November 1995 to July 2003 revealed a
shortage of P510.00. Mr. Esconde incurred during his incumbency a cash shortage of P430.00 while Mrs. Ramos incurred
a shortage of P80.00 as of July 31, 2003. From August 2003 to June 5, 2004, Mrs. Ramos incurred a shortage of P430.00.
She deposited the amount of P400.00 on August 23, 2004 leaving a shortage of P30.00. Withdrawals from the Fiduciary
Fund account on various dates, totalling P243,900.00 for the refund and return of cash bonds to 20 litigants, were not
supported by any official court orders. Of the 20 litigants 15 did not acknowledge receipt of the amount refunded. The
Fiduciary Fund collection of the court from April 1996 to August 31, 2003 amounted to P2,064,978.00. As of August 31,
2003, however, the amount of P846,710.00 was unaccounted for by Mr. Esconde and Mrs. Ramos. Both denied that the
shortages incurred were of their own doing and they instead pointed to Judge Balut as the offender.

Ramos related to the audit team the constant requests/orders of Judge Balut to hand over to him money from the
Fiduciary Fund collections. In these instances, she requested Judge Balut to affix his signature at the back portion of the
withdrawal slips as the cash recipient. However, not all of the transactions were evidenced by an acknowledgement
receipt. Ramos further stated that Judge Balut also collected the money through Salvador Briones, Court Interpreter of
MCTC-Aritao-Sta. Fe, whose signature also appeared at the back portion of withdrawal slips as cash recipient. The total
withdrawals from the Fiduciary Fund Account given to Judge Balut, as evidenced by withdrawal slips bearing the
signatures of Judge Balut and Briones, for the benefit of the former, as cash recipients, amounted to P193,500.00.

Aside from these, withdrawals from the Fiduciary Fund account totalling P90,500.00 were also given to Judge Balut. On
the face of the slips of this class of withdrawals were notations such as "Judge," "for Judge," "taken by Judge xxx" and
"given to Judge" written by Ramos.

On May 9, 2002, Judge Balut issued a Certification stating that his accountability with the Fiduciary Fund collection of
MCTC Aritao-Sta. Fe as of April 2002 amounted to P207,774.42.

However, before the final report on the court's shortages was completed, various amounts totalling P802,299.82 were
deposited by Judge Balut, Esconde and Ramos in the court's LBP Account No. 3251-0544-51, as restitution/payment of
part of the shortage of P846,710.00.

As of August, 2004, Ramos had fully settled the balance of her accountability. On the other hand, Esconde still had a
balance of accountability in MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe of P58,100.00 which, as of the time this case was submitted by the OCA
for the Court's consideration, has remained unsettled. (Emphases supplied)
In its Resolution, the Court ordered Respondent Judge Alexander Balut (Judge Balut) to pay a fine for his failure to
decide 33 cases and 101 motions without properly requesting for an extension. The Court, however, did not rule on the
administrative liability of Judge Balut with respect to the result of the financial audit for the reason that he was not given
a chance to present his side on the matter.

Consequently, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in its Memorandum, sought reconsideration of the Court's
decision stating that although Judge Balut was not formally required to comment on the findings of the audit team
regarding the shortage in the court collections, he was not denied due process of law. The OCA explained that Judge
Balut was able to present his side in his Letter to OCA, dated December 9, 2006. The OCA, thus, asked for the re-opening
of the case or in the alternative, that Judge Balut be required to comment on the findings of the financial audit.

In its Resolution, dated December 16, 2008, the Court directed Judge Balut to comment on the audit report and, upon
the recommendation of the OCA, referred the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) for investigation, report and
31
recommendation.

Thereafter, the CA, in its Report and Recommendation, recommended the dismissal of the charges against Judge Balut
for failure of the OCA to clearly substantiate and prove the participation of Judge Balut in the financial transactions of
the courts. On his admission that he borrowed money from the judiciary fund, the CA opined that Judge Balut could no
longer be penalized as he was previously fined by the Court in its October 9, 2007 Resolution.

The Court finds itself unable to agree with the recommendation of the CA.

In administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The standard of substantial evidence is justified when
there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such
evidence is not overwhelming or even preponderant.

A review of the records shows that Judge Balut actually messed with the court collections. The three clerks of court of
MTC Bayombong, MTC Solano and MCTC Aritao-Sta Fe categorically stated that Judge Balut borrowed money from the
court funds and executed certifications to that effect. They separately reported that Judge Balut had been borrowing
money from the various funds of the court collections. In fact, Lydia Ramos (Ramos), the Clerk of Court of MCTC-Antao-
Sta. Fe, presented several withdrawal slips where the back portions were signed either by Judge Balut or his court
interpreter, Salvador Briones, as the recipient of the cash withdrawn from the funds of the court. These withdrawal
slips likewise bore the notations of Ramos such as "Judge," "for Judge," "taken by Judge," and "given to Judge" to serve
as her reminder that the money withdrawn were given to Judge Balut.

Significantly, Judge Balut himself issued the Certification stating that his cash accountability as of April 2002 with the
Fiduciary Fund was P207,774.42 and there were certifications issued by the clerks of court attesting that he had
settled his accountabilities with the court funds.

The CA opinion that Judge Balut could no longer be penalized for his admission that he had borrowed money from the
judiciary fund because the Court already fined him in its October 9, 2007 resolution is erroneous. In the said resolution,
the Court categorically stated that Judge Balut was fined for undue delay in deciding 33 cases submitted for decision and
for failing to resolve 101 motions within the 90-day reglementary period.

Once again, the Court stresses that judges must adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct. Because of the
sensitivity of his position, a judge is required to exhibit, at all times, the highest degree of honesty and integrity and to
observe exacting standards of morality, decency and competence. He should adhere to the highest standards of public
accountability lest his action erode the public faith in the Judiciary.

Judge Balut fell short of this standard for borrowing money from the collections of the court. He knowingly and
deliberately made the clerks of court violate the circulars on the proper administration of court funds. He miserably
failed to become a role model of his staff and other court personnel in the observance of the standards of morality and
decency, both in his official and personal conduct.

The act of misappropriating court funds constitutes dishonesty and grave misconduct, punishable by dismissal from the
service even on the first offense. For said reason, the respondent deserves a penalty no lighter than dismissal. This Court
has never tolerated and will never condone any conduct which violates the norms of public accountability, and diminish,
or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice system.

The Court has considered the recommendation of imposing the penalty of suspension. That, however, would be unfair
to Clerk of Court Judith En. Salimpade, Municipal Trial Courts of Bayombong and Solano; and Clerk of Court Eduardo
Esconde of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Arita-Sta. Fe, who were both dismissed from the service for the same
offense. Clerk of Court Lydia Ramos was fined but only because she had already retired from the service. And it would
send a wrong message to the public that the Court has different standards - one for the magistrates and another for the
rank-and-file.

The fact that Judge Balut fully paid his cash liabilities will not shield him from the consequences of his wrongdoings. His
unwarranted interference in the Court collections deserves administrative sanction and not even the full payment of his
accountabilities will exempt him from liability. "It matters not that these personal borrowings were paid as what
counts is the fact that these funds were used outside of official business."

Similarly, his nearly 22 years in the service would not serve to mitigate his liability. His offense was not a single or
isolated act but it constituted a series of acts committed in a span of several years. In other words, he was a repeated
offender, perpetrating his misdeeds with impunity not once, not twice, but several times in three (3) different
stations. In the case of In Re: Report on the Judicial and Financial Audit Conducted in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
32
Koronadal City, it was written:
For misappropriating court funds in concert with Ines, Judge Sardido has been charged with grave misconduct. Admitting
that he indeed "borrowed" money from court funds, the latter recounted that on four occasions in 1994, he had
borrowed P130,000 to be able to purchase a car and thereafter borrowed intermittently through the years, for reasons
ranging from the schooling needs of his children to the illness of his parents. That he intended to repay the amounts
"borrowed" is immaterial. These funds should never be used outside of official business. Rule 5.04 of Canon 5 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct states:
"A judge or any immediate member of the family shall not accept a gift, bequest, favor or loan from anyone except as
may be allowed by law."
Time and time again, this Court has emphasized that "the judge is the visible representation of the law, and more
importantly, of justice. It is from him that the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. For the judge to
return that regard, he must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for others to follow."

Sadly, the foregoing facts clearly show that Judge Sardido has not only miserably failed to present himself as an example
to his staff and to others, but has also shown no compunction in violating the law, as well as the rules and regulations.
His dishonesty, gross misconduct, and gross ignorance of the law tarnish the image of the judiciary and would have
warranted the maximum penalty of dismissal, were it not for the fact that he had already been dismissed from the
service in another administrative case. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, finding Judge Alexander Balut GUILTY of gross misconduct, the Court hereby imposes upon him the
penalty of DISMISSAL from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in
any branch of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations, except the money value of
accrued earned leave credits.

Judge Balut is hereby ORDERED to cease and desist immediately from rendering any order or decision, or from
continuing any proceedings, in any case whatsoever, effective upon receipt of a copy of this resolution.

This disposition is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

The Office of the Court Administrator shall see to it that a copy of this resolution be immediately served on the
respondent.

SO ORDERED.

33
Case No. 8
A.M. No. SB-14-21-J September 23, 2014[Formerly A.M. No. 13-10-06-SB]
RE: ALLEGATIONS MADE UNDER OATH AT THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE HEARING HELD ON SEPTEMBER 26,
2013 AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG, SANDIGANBAYAN

The character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.
- Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
This administrative complaint was filed by the Court En Banc after investigation into certain allegations that surfaced
during the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing indicated prima facie violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct by an
Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. The investigation was conducted motu proprio pursuant to the Court's power of
administrative supervision over members of the Judiciary.
Factual Antecedents
In the middle of 2013, the local media ran an expose involving billions of government funds channeled through bogus
foundations. Dubbed as the "pork barrel scam," as the money was sourced from the Priority Development Assistance
Fund allotted to members of the House of Representatives and Senate, the controversy spawned massive protest
actions all over the country. In the course of the investigation conducted by the Senate Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon Committee), the names of certain government officials and other
individuals were mentioned by "whistle-blowers" who are former employees of the alleged mastermind, Janet Lim-
Napoles (Mrs. Napoles), wife of an ex-military officer. These personalities identified by the whistle-blowers allegedly
transacted with or attended Mrs. Napoles' parties and events, among whom is incumbent Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice Gregory S. Ong, herein respondent.
Benhur Luy (Luy), a cousin of Mrs. Napoles who had worked for several years with the Napoleses, filed illegal detention
charges against Mrs. Napoles who accused him of double-dealing. When Luy went public with his story about Mrs.
Napoles' anomalous transactions and before the warrant of arrest was issued by the court, she reportedly tried to reach
out to the other whistle-blowers for them not to testify against her but instead point to Luy as the one receiving and
distributing the money.
Marina Sula (Sula) executed a Sworn Statement before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on August 29, 2013,
part of which reads:
32. In the sixteen (16) years that I worked with Ms. Napoles, I witnessed several personalities visit our offices and join us
as our special guests during our parties and other special occasions. 33. These personalities who would either visit our
office or join our events and affairs are: Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Jinggoy Estrada and family, Senator Bong
Revilla, Lani Mercado-Revilla, Bryan Revilla, Secretary Rene Villa, Congressman Pichay and Wife, Congressman Plaza,
Congressman Ducut, DAR Director Theresita Panlilio, Catherine Mae Canlas Santos, Pauline Labayen, Jen Corpuz (Staff of
Senator Sotto), Mayor Rene Maglanque, Atty. Dequina, Justice Gregory Ong, x x x.
34. Before the warrant of arrest was issued against Ms. Napoles, she told us that that case could take four to five years
to clear. She said, "Antayin niyo munang ma-clear pangalan ko para makakilos ako at matulungan ko kayo". Sinabi niya
na meron na siyang kausap sa Ombudsman at sa Sandiganbayan.
35. On 28 August 2013 while me and my companions were at the NBI, Janet Lim Napoles called me. She was crying and
asking me not to turn my back on her, that we should stay together. She said "kahit maubos lahat ng pera ko,
susuportahan ko kayo. Hintay[i]n nyo kasi lalabas na ang TRO ko."
xxxx
38. Attorney Tan instructed us to implicate Benhur in case we were asked by the NBI. He said "wala naman ipinakita sa
inyong masama si Madam (Janet Lim Napoles). Siguro wala naman kayong sama ng loob kay madam, kaya nga idiin
ninyo si Benhur na siya ang nag-utos at saka sa kanya ninyo ibinibigay ang pera." (Emphasis supplied.)
The following day, the social news network Rappler published an article by Aries Rufo entitled "Exclusive: Napoles
Parties with Anti-Graft Court Justice" showing a photograph of Senator Jinggoy Estrada (Senator Estrada), one of the
main public figures involved in the pork barrel scam, together with Mrs. Napoles and respondent. The reporter had
interviewed respondent who quickly denied knowing Mrs. Napoles and recalled that the photograph was probably taken
in one of the parties frequently hosted by Senator Estrada who is his longtime friend. Respondent also supposedly
admitted that given the ongoing pork barrel controversy, the picture gains a different context; nevertheless, he insisted
that he has untainted service in the judiciary, and further denied he was the one advising Mrs. Napoles on legal
strategies in connection with the Kevlar helmet cases where she was acquitted by a Division of the Sandiganbayan of
which respondent is the Chairman and the then Acting Presiding Justice.
On September 12, 2013, Sula executed a "Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay " wherein she gave details regarding those
persons named in her sworn statement, alleged to have visited their office or attended their events, thus:
63) T: Ayon sa paragraph Nos. 32 at 33 ng iyong sinumpaang salaysay na may petsang 29 Agosto 2013, nabanggit mo ang
mga personalidad na nakikita mong bumibisita sa inyong opisina o di kaya naman sa tuwing may party o special
occacions si JANET NAPOLES ay may mga special guests kayo na kinabibilangan ng mga malalaking pulitiko at ang iba
naman ay may mga katungkulan sa gobyerno. Maari mo bang ilahad ang mga pangyayari sa mga bawat pagkakataon na
nakita mo sila sa iyong pagkaka-alala?
S : Opo, iisa-isahin ko po ang mga pangyayari sa mga pagkakataon na nakita ko po ang mga taong nabanggit ko:
xxxx

34
w) Justice GREGORY ONG - Isang beses ko po siyang nakitang nagpunta sa office sa 2501 Discovery Centre, Ortigas at
nakita ko po silang magkausap ni Madam JANET NAPOLES sa conference room.
xxxx
In her testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee on September 26, 2013, Sula was asked to confirm her
statement regarding Justice Ong, thus:
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Grace.
Isang tanong lang kay Ms. Sula.
Sinabi niyo kanina may tinawagan si Ms. Napoles at sinabi niya, "Malapit na lumabas yung TRO galing sa korte." May
kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa ltuwes sa korte sa Sandiganbayan? MS. SULA. Hindi ko po alam.
THE CHAIRMAN. Your attention is called sa page
MS. SULA. Sandiganbayan po, sorry. Mayroon po siyang binanggit na ano po
THE CHAIRMAN. Nandito sa page 20.
MS. SULA. Si Mr. Ong, po, Justice Ong po.
THE CHAIRMAN. Gregory Ong.
MS. SULA Opo.
THE CHAIRMAN. Sa Sandiganbayan?
MS. SULA. Opo.
x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
In a letter dated September 26, 2013 addressed to Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, respondent meticulously
explained the controversial photograph which raised questions on his integrity as a magistrate, particularly in
connection with the decision rendered by the Sandiganbayan' s Fourth Division in the Kevlar helmet cases, which
convicted some of the accused but acquitted Mrs. Napoles.
Respondent surmised that the photograph was taken during the birthday of Senator Estrada in February, either in the
year 2012 or 2013, but definitely not in 2010 or earlier. He explained that he could vaguely remember the circumstances
but it would have been rude for him to prevent any guest from posing with him and Senator Estrada during the party.
On the nature of his association with Mrs. Napoles, respondent asserted:
(4) I can categorically state, on the other hand, that I have never attended any party or social event hosted by Mrs.
Napoles or her family, either before she had a case with our court, or while she already had a pending case with our
court, or at any time afterwards. I have never, to use the term of Mr. Rufo in his article, "partied" with the Napoleses.
(Emphasis supplied.)
As to the Kevlar helmet cases, respondent said it was impossible for him to have been advising Mrs. Napoles, as claimed
by Mr. Rufo, as even the article itself noted that Mrs. Napoles' own brother, Reynald L. Lim, ( a.k.a. Reynaldo L.
Francisco), a co-accused in the case, was convicted by the Sandiganbayan. He stressed that these cases were decided on
the merits by the Sandiganbayan, acting as a collegial body and he was not even the ponente of the decision.
Respondent thus submitted himself to the discretion of the Chief Justice such that even without being required to
submit an explanation, he voluntarily did so "to defend [his] reputation as a judge and protect the Sandiganbayan as an
institution from unfair and malicious innuendos."
On October 7, 2013, Chief Justice Sereno wrote the Members of this Court, citing the testimonies of Luy and Sula before
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee "[t]hat the malversation case involving Mrs. Janet Lim-Napoles, Major Jaime G.
Napoles, Jenny Lim Napoles, Reynaldo L. Francisco and other perpetrators was 'fixed' (inayos) through the intervention
of Justice Gregory S. Ong of the Sandiganbayan", to wit:
SEN. ANGARA. Sa inyo, hindi niyo a/am kung inayos iyong kaso na iyon? Kasi napakaraming koneksiyon, 'di ba?
xxxx Sige, huwag kang matakot, Benhur.
MR. LUY. Alam ko, inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa Sandiganbayan
SEN. ANGARA. Okay.
xxxx
THE CHAIRMAN. xxx Sinabi niyo kanina na may tinawagan si Ms. Napoles at sinabi niya "Malapit na lumabas yung TRO
galing sa korte." May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa huwes sa korte sa Sandiganbayan?
xxxx
MS. SULA. Si Mr. Ong po, Justice Ong po.
THE CHAIRMAN. Gregory Ong.
MS. SULA. Opo.
THE CHAIRMAN. Sa Sandiganbayan?
MS. SULA. Opo.
Xxxx
Chief Justice Sereno then requested the Court En Banc to conduct an investigation motu proprio under this Court's
power of administrative supervision over members of the judiciary and members of the legal profession (referring to
notaries public who were alleged to have purposely left their specimen signatures, dry seals and notarial books with
Mrs. Napoles to facilitate the incorporation of non-governmental organizations [NGOs] involved in the scam).
Under our Resolution dated October 17, 2013, the Court En Banc required respondent to submit his comment and
directed the NBI to furnish the Court with certified copies of the affidavit of Luy. On November 21, 2013, the Court
received respondent's Comment. Respondent categorically denied any irregularity in the Kevlar helmet cases and
explained the visit he had made to Mrs. Napoles as testified by Sula.
35
On Sula's statement, respondent points out that Sula never really had personal knowledge whether respondent is
indeed the alleged "contact" of Mrs. Napoles at the Sandiganbayan; what she supposedly "knows" was what Mrs.
Napoles merely told her. Hence, Sula's testimony on the matter is based purely on hearsay. Assuming that Mrs. Napoles
actually made the statement, respondent believes it was given in the context of massive media coverage of the pork
barrel scam exploding at the time. With the consciousness of a looming criminal prosecution before the Office of the
Ombudsman and later before the Sandiganbayan, it was only natural for Mrs. Napoles to assure Sula and others
involved in their business operation that she would not leave or abandon them and that she would do all that she can to
help them just so they would not turn their backs on her and become whistle-blowers. Thus, even if Mrs. Napoles made
misrepresentations to Sula regarding respondent as her "connection", she only had to do so in order to convince Sula
and her co-employees that the cases to be filed against them would be "fixed."
As to Sula's statement that she personally witnessed respondent at one time visiting Mrs. Napoles at her office and
having a meeting with her at the conference room, respondent said that at the birthday party of Senator Estrada where
the controversial photograph was taken, Mrs. Napoles engaged him in a casual conversation during which the
miraculous healing power of the robe or clothing of the Black Nazarene of Quiapo was mentioned. When Mrs. Napoles
told respondent that she is a close friend of the Quiapo Church's parish priest, he requested her help to gain access to
the Black Nazarene icon. Eventually, respondent, who is himself a Black Nazarene devotee and was undergoing
treatment for his prostate cancer, was given special permission and was able to drape the Black Nazarene's robe or
clothing for a brief moment over his body and also receive a fragrant ball of cotton taken or exposed to the holy image,
which article he keeps to this day and uses to wipe any ailing part of his body in order to receive healing. Because of
such favor, respondent out of courtesy went to see Mrs. Napoles and personally thank her. Respondent stressed that
that was the single occasion Sula was talking about in her supplemental affidavit when she said she saw respondent
talking with Mrs. Napoles at the conference room of their office in Discovery Suites.
Respondent maintains that there was nothing improper or irregular for him to have personally seen Mrs. Napoles at the
time in order to thank her, considering that she no longer had any pending case with his court, and to his knowledge,
with any other division of the Sandiganbayan at the time and even until the date of the preparation of his Comment. He
thus prays that this Court duly note his Comment and accept the same as sufficient compliance with the Court's
Resolution dated October 17, 2013.
This Court upon evaluation of the factual circumstances found possible transgressions of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct committed by respondent. Accordingly, a Resolution was issued on January 21, 2014 stating that:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby resolves to have the instant administrative matter RE-DOCKETED as A.M. No. SB-14-21-J
(Re: Allegations Made Under Oath at tlze Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing held on September 26, 2013 against
Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, Sandiganbayan), and ASSIGNS the same to retired Supreme Court Justice Angelina
Sandoval-Gutierrez for investigation, report and recommendation within a period of sixty (60) days from notice hereof.
The Court further resolves to NOTE the letter dated January 7, 2014 of Atty. Joffre Gil C. Zapata, Executive Clerk of Court
III, Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in compliance with the resolution of the Court En Banc dated December 3, 2013,
transmitting the original records of Criminal Case Nos. 26768 and 26769. Atty. Zapata is INFORMED that there is no
more need to transmit to this Court the post-sentence investigation reports and other reports on the supervisory history
of the accused-probationers in Criminal Case Nos. 26768 and 26769.
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Justice
Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, a retired Member of this Court, submitted her report with the following findings
and conclusions:
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
1. THE KEVLAR CASE
Two criminal cases were filed with the Sandiganbayan sometime in 2001 - Criminal Case No. 26768 for Falsification of
Public Documents and Criminal Case No. 26769 for Violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law. Charged were several
members of Philippine Marine Corps and civilian employees including Ms. Janet L. Napoles (Napoles), her mother
Magdalena Francisco (now deceased), her brother Reynaldo Francisco and wife Anna Marie Dulguime, and her
(Napoles') three employees.
These cases are referred to as the Kevlar case because the issue involved is the same - the questionable purchase of 500
Kevlar helmets by the Philippine Marine Corps in the amount of P3,865,310.00 from five suppliers or companies owned
by Napoles.
The prosecution alleged inter alia that the accused, acting in conspiracy, released the payment although there was yet
no delivery of the Kevlar helmets; that the suppliers are mere dummies of Napoles; and that the helmets were made in
Taiwan, not in the U.S.A.
Napoles' husband, Major Jaime Napoles, was dropped from the two Informations in an Order issued by the Ombudsman
on March 18, 2002.
Napoles' mother, brother, and sister-in-law were among those convicted for the lesser crime of Falsification of Public
Documents and sentenced to suffer the penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional to 8 years and 1 day of
prision mayor and each to pay PS,000.00. They all underwent probation.
Napoles and six members of the Philippine Marine Corps were acquitted in both cases.
The court ruled that Napoles "was not one of the dealer-payees in the transaction in question. Even if she owns the bank
account where the 14 checks were later deposited, this does not in itself translate to her conspiracy in the crimes
charged x x x."
36
xxxx
THE INVESTIGATION
xxxx
I. During the investigation, Benhur testified that he and Napoles are second cousins. After passing the Medical
Technology Licensure Examination in 2002, he was employed in the JLN (Janet Lim Napoles) Corporation as Napoles'
personal assistant. As such, he was in charge of disbursements of her personal funds and those of her office. He was also
in charge of government transactions of the corporation and kept records of its daily business activities.
In the course of Benhur's employment at the JLN Corporation, Napoles mentioned to him the Kevlar case, then pending
in the Sandiganbayan, saying she has a "connect" in that court who would help her.
When asked about his testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee concerning the Kevlar case, Benhur declared
that Napoles' "connect" with the Sandiganbayan is respondent, thus:
Q The question was, Mr. Witness, this is coming from Senator Angara, and I quote, "Kailan ho lumabas yung decision ng
Court sa Kevlar?" And just to refresh your memory, Mr. Witness, then Ms. Sula answered, "I think 2010. Yun po yung
lumabas po." And then going forward, Senator Angara referred to both of you this question: "Sa inyo, hindi ninyo alam
kung inayos yung kaso na iyon kasi napakaraming koneksyon, di ba? Baka alam ng ibang whistleblowers kung nagka-
ayusan sa kaso na iyon. Sige, huwag kang matakot, Benhur." Do you remember that question being asked from you?
xxxx
A Yes po.
Q And now Mr. Witness, about this statement of yours at the Blue Ribbon Committee that Ms. Napoles has a certain
connect sa Sandiganbayan, who was this connect you were talking about, if you remember?
Witness Luy
A Si Justice Gregory Ong po.
Q How do you know that Justice Gregory Ong was the connect of Ms. Napoles at the Sandiganbayan?
A Ang sinabi po ... Si Ms. Napoles, pinsan ko po kasi we are second cousins. So kinuwento talaga sa akin ni Madam kung
ano ang mga developments sa mga cases, kung ano ang mga nangyayari. Tapos po, sinabi niya sa akin mismo na
nakakausap niya si Justice Gregory Ong at ang nagpakilala raw sa kanya po ay si Senator Jinggoy Estrada.
Benhur further testified that even before the decision in the Kevlar case was promulgated, Napoles and respondent
were already communicating with each other (nag-uusap na po si!a). Therefore, she was sure the decision would be in
her favor:
Q Do you remember the date when the decision (in Kevlar case) was promulgated?
A Ano po, the year 2010 po ma' am.
Q And you met him (Justice Ong) in 2012?
A 2012 po, pero prior to that decision, madam, naririnig ko na po kay madam (Ms. Napoles) kasi kinukwento na po ni
madam sa akin na nag-uusap na po sila ni Justice Gregory Ong.
Q That was after the decision was promulgated?
A Bago po nailabas yung decision, ikinwento po m Ms. Napoles sa akin na nag-uusap na po sila ni Justice Gregory Ong.
Kaya kampante po si Ms. Napoles. Noong lumabas po yung decision, alam niya na po. Yung ang sabi sa akin ni Ms.
Napoles.
Going back to the hearing before the Blue Ribbon Committee, Benhur told Senator Angara that Napoles fixed the Kevlar
case because she has a "connect" in the Sandiganbayan:
"Baka alam ng ibang whistle blowers kung nagkaka-ayusan sa kaso na iyon (Kevlar case). Sige huwag kang matakot
Benhur."
Benhur Luy: "Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa Sandiganbayan."
On how Napoles "inayos" or fixed the Kevlar case, Benhur said that he kept a ledger of the Sandiganbayan case wherein
he listed all her expenses in the sum of P 100 million pesos. He was surprised why she would spend such amount
considering that what was involved in the Kevlar case was only P3.8 million. She explained that she gave various
amounts to different people during the pendency of the case which lasted up to ten years. And before the decision in
the Kevlar case was released, she also gave money to respondent but she did not mention the amount. Thus, she knew
she would be acquitted.
Q You answered Senator Angara this way which we already quoted a while ago, "Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon
dahil may connect nga siya sa Sandiganbayan." You stated that the connect is Justice Ong. Can you explain before us
what you mean, "Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon." What do you mean by that "inayos"?
A Kasi po ma' am meron kaming ledger ng Sandiganbayan case sa lahat ng nagastos ni Ms. Janet Napoles, nilista ko po
yon lahat. Kasi naririnig ko po kay Janet Napoles, parang pinsan ko po si Janet Napoles, "Paano nagkaroon ng kaso ang
ate ko? So nadiscover ko na Jang po na yun pala yung Kevlar. So, mahigit one hundred million na nagastos po ni Ms.
Napoles kasi di Jang naman po si sir Justice Gregory Ong ...
xxx
Q Did you come to know to whom she gave all the money?
A Wala po siyang ... basta ang sabi niya inayos na niya si ... binaggit niya po si ... kasi si madam hindi kasi nagki-keep kasi
ako pinsan niya po kasi ako, nabanggit niya po si Justice Gregory Ong. Sinabi niya nagbigay daw po siya ng pera kay
Justice Ong pero she never mentioned kung magkano yung amount.
xxx
Q Nagbigay ng pera kay Justice Gregory Ong?
37
A Opo, yung ang sabi niya (referring to Ms. Napoles).
Q To you?
A Yes, madam.
Q Do you remember when she made that kind of statement?
A Bago po ano madam, bago po lumabas yung decision kaya kampante na po si Ms. Napoles bago lumabas yung decision
na acquitted siya. Alam na niya. Sa Kevlar case.
xxx
Justice Gutierrez
Continue counsel.
Witness Luy
Kasi naikwento po madam ni Ms. Napoles na almost PlOO million na ang nagastos niya. Tapos ang sabi ko nga po sa
kanya: "Madam, P 100 million na sa halagang P3.8 lang na PO (purchase order) sa Kevlar helmet, tapos P 100 million na
ang nagastos mo?"
Q Did she tell you or explain to you to whom this P 100 million was paid? How was it spent?
A Basta ang natatandaan ko ... di ko na po matandaan ang mga dates kasi parang staggered. May P5 million sa ibang tao
ang kausap niya. Tapos ito naman tutulong ng ganito. lba-iba kasi madam, eh.
Q But there was no showing the money was given to Justice Ong?
A Wala po pero nabanggit lang po niya (Ms. Napoles) sa akin na nagbigay po siya kay Justice Ong, but she never
mentioned the amount.
Continuing with his testimony, Benhur declared that in 2012, respondent went twice to Napoles' office at the Discovery
Suites Center, 25 ADB Avenue, Ortigas, Pasig City. On the first visit, Napoles introduced Justice Ong to Benhur and her
other employees.
Benhur narrated what transpired during that visit. According to him, Napoles has so much money being placed at the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and Police Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) which offered 13% interest
annually. Napoles called Benhur telling him that respondent would like to avail of such interest for his BDO check of
P25.5 million. To arrange this, Napoles informed Benhur that she would just deposit respondent's P25.5 million in her
personal account with Metro bank. Then she would issue to respondent in advance eleven (11) checks, each amounting
to P282,000.00 as monthly interest, or a total of P3,102,000.00 equivalent to 13% interest. Upon Justice Ong's
suggestion, the checks should be paid to cash. So, Benhur prepared the corresponding eleven (11) checks, thus:
Q With respect to the Kevlar case, what participation did you have, if there was any?
Witness Luy
A Noon 2012 po kasi si Justice Gregory Ong po nasa unit 2501, yung office (of Ms. Napoles), so kami ni Janet Napoles,
nandito sa 2502 kasi yun po talaga ang office namin. Si Ms. Napoles po sinabi niya sa akin, Ben, kasi si Ms. Napoles, may
pera siyang madarni na pine-place niya po sa AFPSLAI at yung AFPSLAI po ay nagbibigay po sa kanya o nagooffer ng 13%
interest annually po. So, ang nangyari po <loon, sabi ni Janet Napoles, si Justice Ong ho raw, gustong magkaroon din ng
interest parang ganoon. So tutulungan niya. So ang ginawa po namin x x x. Q Meaning to say, Justice Ong would like to
deposit money?
A Opo.
Q So he could get 13% interest?
A Opo, kasi tapos madam ang nangyari po pumunta na po si Ms. Napoles sa kanyang opisina. Tinawag po niya ako kasi
pinasulat na niya sa akin ang checke. So, ang ginawa po ni Ms. Napoles, yung checke ni .. BDO check po kasi yun. Ang
sabi sa akin ni Ms. Napoles, checke daw po yun ni Justice Gregory Ong. Sa, BDO. So, di ko naman din po nakita Madam
yung nakalagay sa ...
Q So it is the check of Justice Ong, not the check of Ms. Napoles?
A Opo, ang amount po ng check madam ay P25.5 million ang amount noong BDO check na inissue ...
Q That belongs to Justice Ong?
A Opo. Tapos madam, so ang ginawa po namin ni Ms. Napoles, dahil po 13% interest ang ino-offer ng AFPSLAI, sabi ni
Madam ganito na lang, Ben, ipasok na lang muna natin yung check niya sa personal account ko. Ako na lang muna for
the meantime, mag-iissue ng check sa kanya para maavail ni Justice Ong yung interest. So, ang ginawa nan1in madam,
P25.5 million times 13% interest, tapos divided by 12, lumalabas P282,000.00 or P283,000.00 or P281,000.00 po madam
kasi naground off kami sa P282,000.00. So, ang ginawa ni Madam, baga monthly. So eleven (11) checks ang prinepare
namin. Kung hindi po ako nagkakamali po, JLN Corporation check ang ... Ako pa nga po ang nagsulat at saka bago po
namin isinulat yung payee, inalam pa po namin. x x x So, pumunta na naman si madam sa 2501 kasi nandoon si Justice
Gregory Ong. Noong bumalik siya, pay to cash na lang daw. So, makikita po sa records namin ni Ms. Napoles na pumasok
ang P25.5 million na amount sa kanyang account at the same time nag-issue siya ng checke na P282,000.00 na eleven
checks. Nagstart kami madam 2012, siguro sometime July or August or mga ganoong buwan po. Basta 11 checks, hindi
nalalayo doon. So, siguro tapos na.
Q But what actually turned out was that the money of Justice Ong was deposited at the bank but the interest was paid in
advance by Ms. Napoles, and actually the bank will pay Ms. Napoles the advanced interest she paid to Justice Ong, is
that clear? Is that the arrangement? Do you understand me?
A Kasi ang nangyari po ma'am ganito e: yung P25.5 million ipinasok sa personal account ni Ms. Napoles dito sa
Metrobank. Metrobank kasi po yun e.

38
On the second visit of respondent to Napoles' office, they just engaged in conversation. She ordered Chinese food for
him which, according to Benhur, is his (respondent's) favorite.
On cross-examination, Benhur claimed that in his affidavits executed in the NBI, he did not mention respondent's name.
However, in his reply-affidavit filed with the Sandiganbayan, he alleged that Napoles issued P282,000.00 (the amount
stated in each of the 11 checks) but he did not mention the name of the payee upon instruction of his lawyer, Atty.
Baligod. Nonetheless, he knew that the checks were issued to respondent.
II. Sula, also a whistle blower, testified that she was an employee of JLN Corporation. Her duties included the formation
of corporations by making use of the forms, applying for business licenses, transfer of properties, purchase of cars, and
others.
Sula corroborated Benhur's testimony that respondent visited the office of Napoles twice sometime in 2012.
Sula was asked to explain her testimony before the Blue Ribbon Committee during the hearing on September 26, 2013,
quoted as follows:
The Chairman (Senator Teofisto Guingona III)
Sinabi ninyo na may tinawagan si Mrs. Napoles at sinabi niya, Malapit nang lumabas yung TRO galing sa korte. May kilala
pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa huwes sa korte sa Sandiganbayan?
xxx
Ms. Sula
Si Mr. Ong po. Justice Ong po.
The Chairman
Gregory Ong?
Ms. Sula
Opo.
The Chairman
Sa Sandiganbayan?
Ms. Sula
Opo.
The Chairman
Okay. With that, I will just have a closing statement before we leave the hearing.
Sula explained that the TRO mentioned by Napoles refers to the TRO to be issued by the Sandiganbayan in the event the
case involving the PIO billion PDAF scam against her is filed with that court; and that Napoles told Sula and the other
employees not to worry because she has contact with the Sandiganbayan - respondent Justice Ong, thus:
Q Not the illegal detention case?
Witness Sula
A Hindi po, pag nakasuhan na po kami sa Sandiganbayan.
Q Okay, again?
A Sa pagkakaintindi po namin, ang sabi po ni Madam na it takes 4 to 5 years, so hihintayin niya na maacquit, sabi niyang
ganoon, ang pangalan niya para maluwag na tulungan kami. Ito po ang pagkakaintindi namin na sa Sandiganbayan.
Q Yung PDAF?
A Opo, yung PDAF sa Sandiganbayan.
Q Pagdating ng kaso sa Sandiganbayan?
A Opo, kasi po ina-ano po niya, siya po tinitira na ni Benhur - si Madam tungkol sa PlO billion scam. So, pinag-uusapan
namin sa bahay niya sa South Garden Unit na, Madam, paano po yan, pag lahat ng kaso na iyan dadaan sa lawmakers,
dadaan yon sa Ombudsman at saka sa Sandiganbayan? Sabi niya, "Huwag kayong mag-alala. Meron naman akong mga
contact doon." Sabi niyang ganoon sa Ombudsman at sa Sandiganbayan.
Q Is that in your affidavit?
A Wala po. Pero sinabi ko po doon sa part na yon (her testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee) na meron
na siyang kilala sa Ombudsman, pero hindi niya nabanggit ang pangalan. Pero sa Sandiganbayan, ang alam namin kilala
niya si Justice Ong.
Q Yun ang sagot niya kay Chairman Guingona. Di ba I read it a while ago?
A Opo, doon sa Sandiganbayan.
Sula also testified that every time Napoles talked to her and the other employees, she would say that Justice Ong will
help her in the Kevlar case. Sula's testimony is as follows:
Q x x x you told me that somebody will help in the Kevlar case?
A Opo. Sinabi po niya sa amin every time po pag nagkukwento siya, sinasabi niya na si Justice Ong ang tumulong sa
kanya para ma-clear po yung Kevlar case niya.
Sula likewise testified that Napoles told her and the other employees that she will fix (aayusin) the "PDAF case" in the
Sandiganbayan. Then they replied in jest that her acquaintance in that court is respondent. Napoles retorted, "Ay huag
na iyon kasi masyadong mataas ang talent fee."
xxxx
III. Aries Rufo, a Reporter of Rappler, testified that he cannot reveal who gave him the photograph [of respondent beside
Napoles and Senator Jinggoy Estrada] because he is shielded by law and he has to protect his source.
When asked about his comment upon seeing the picture, Rufo said:

39
Initially, when I saw the picture, since I knew that Justice Ong was one of the members of the division that handled the
Kevlar case, it aroused my curiosity why he was in that picture. Second, because in journalism, we also get to practice
ethical standards, I immediately sensed though that a Justice or a lawyer, that he should not be seen or be going to a
party or be in an event where respondent (Ms. Napoles) was in a case under his Division. He should not be in a situation
that would compromise the integrity of his office.
Rufo further testified that on August 27, 2013, he faxed a letter to respondent to "get his side about the photo." The
next day, he went to respondent's office and showed it to him. Respondent was shocked. He explained that it must have
been taken during one of the parties hosted by his friend Senator Jinggoy Estrada; that he did not know that the woman
in the picture is Napoles because she did not appear during the hearing of the Kevlar case; and that such picture must
have been taken in one of those instances when a guest would like to pose with celebrities or public figures.
xxxx
Respondent, in his defense, vehemently denied the imputations hurled against him.
1. He asserted that he could not be the contact or "connect" of Napoles at the Sandiganbayan for he never met or came
to know her during the pendency of the Kevlar case;
2. Challenging Benhur's testimony that he fixed or "inayos" the Kevlar case, respondent claimed that it was decided
based on the merits by the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division as a collegial body. The two other members of the court,
Justice Jose R. Hernandez (ponente) and Justice Maria Cristina J. Cornejo, are independent-minded jurists who could not
be pressured or influenced by anybody, not even by their peers;
3. On Benhur's allegation that respondent received an amount of money from Napoles prior to the promulgation of the
decision in the Kevlar case, respondent deplored the fact that Benhur was attempting to tarnish his reputation without
any proof. And that it is unthinkable for him to have received money from Napoles considering that her mother, brother,
and sister-in-law were convicted;
4. Respondent admitted he went to Napoles' office twice, sometime in March 2012, after the decision in the Kevlar case
was promulgated in 2010 and narrated what prompted him to do so, thus:
At the birthday party of Senator Jinggoy Estrada on February 17, 2012, Napoles approached him and introduced herself.
She engaged him in a casual conversation and thanked him for her acquittal in the Kevlar case. Respondent replied she
should thank her "evidence" instead, adding that had the court found enough evidence against her, she would have
been convicted. She talked about her charity works like supporting Chinese priests, building churches and chapels in
China, and sponsoring Chinese Catholic priests. He was not interested though in what she was saying until she
mentioned the name of Msgr. Ramirez, former Parish Priest of Quiapo Church.
Respondent became interested because he has been a devotee of the Holy Black Nazarene since he was a little boy.
Napoles told him that Msgr. Ramirez has with him the robe of the Holy Black Nazarene which has a healing power if one
wears it. Then respondent asked if he can have access to the robe so he can be cured of his ailment (prostate cancer)
which he keeps only to himself and to the immediate members of his family. Napoles made arrangement with Msgr.
Ramirez until respondent was able to drape the robe over his body for about one or two minutes in Quiapo Church. He
also received a fragrant ball of cotton which he keeps until now to heal any ailing part of his body. That was a great deal
for him. So out of courtesy, he visited Napoles in her office and thanked her. That was his first visit.
Thereafter, Napoles kept on calling respondent, inviting him to her office, but he kept on declining. Then finally after
two weeks, he acceded for she might think he is "walang kwentang tao." They just engaged in a small talk for about 30
minutes and had coffee.

5. Concerning Benhur's testimony that Napoles paid respondent an advanced interest consisting of eleven (11) checks in
the amount of P282,000.00 each and that he issued to her his BDO check of P25.5 million which she deposited in her
account, he claimed that "he never issued that check as he did not intend to invest in AFPSLAI. In fact, he does not have
any money deposited there. Inasmuch as he did not issue any BDO check, it follows that Napoles could not have given
him those eleven (11) checks representing advanced interest. He further explained that he found from the internet that
in AFPSLAI, an investor can only make an initial deposit of P30,000.00 every quarter or Pl20,000.00 per year. The limit or
ceiling is P3 million with an interest of 15% or 16% per annum.
6. The whistle blower's testimony are conflicting and therefore lack credibility. While Sula testified that Napoles told her
that she did not want to approach respondent (should a case involving the pork barrel scam be filed with the
Sandiganbayan) because his talent fee is too high, however, both whistle blowers claimed that he is Napoles' contact in
the Sandiganbayan.
With respect to the Rappler Report, according to respondent, Rufo was insinuating four things: 1. That there was
irregularity in the manner the Kevlar case was decided;
2. That respondent was close to Napoles even during the pendency of the Kevlar case;
3. That respondent was attending parties of the Napoleses; and
4. That respondent was advising Napoles about legal strategies relative to the Kevlar case. Respondent "dismissed all the
above insinuations as false and without factual basis." As to the last insinuation that he advised Napoles about legal
strategies to be pursued in the Kevlar case, respondent stressed that the case was decided by a collegial body and that
he never interceded on her behalf.
EVALUATION
xxxx

40
It bears stressing that before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, Benhur initially testified that Napoles fixed or "inayos"
the Kevlar case because she has a contact at the Sandiganbayan, referring to respondent. Sula corroborated Benhur's
testimony.
Testifying before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is certainly an ordeal. The witnesses and everything they say are
open to the public. They are subjected to difficult questions propounded by the Senators, supposedly intelligent and
knowledgeable of the subject and issues under inquiry. And they can easily detect whether a person under investigation
is telling the truth or not. Considering this challenging and difficult setting, it is indubitably improbable that the two
whistle blowers would testify false! y against respondent.
Moreover, during the investigation of this case, Benhur and Sula testified in a candid, straightforward, and categorical
manner. Their testimonies were instantaneous, clear, unequivocal, and carried with it the ring of truth.
In fact, their answers to the undersigned's probing questions were consistent with their testimonies before the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee. During cross-examination, they did not waver or falter. The undersigned found the two whistle
blowers as credible witnesses and their story untainted with bias and contradiction, reflective of honest and trustworthy
witnesses.
The undersigned therefore finds unmeritorious respondent's claim that Benhur and Sula were lying.
. . . respondent insisted he could not have intervened in the disposition of the Kevlar case considering that Napoles'
mother, brother and sister-in-law were convicted.
Respondent must have forgotten that Napoles' natural instinct was self-preservation. Hence, she would avail of every
possible means to be exonerated. Besides, respondent's belief that the two members of his Division are independent-
minded Jurists remains to be a mere allegation.
xxxx
With the undersigned's finding that there is credence in the testimonies of Benhur and Sula, there is no need to stretch
one's imagination to arrive at the inevitable conclusion that in "fixing" Kevlar case, money could be the consideration ...
Benhur testified he kept a ledger (already shredded) of expenses amounting to P 100 million incurred by Napoles for the
Sandiganbayan during the pendency of the Kevlar case which extended up to ten years; and that Napoles told him she
gave respondent an undetermined sum of money.
Respondent maintains that the testimonies of Benhur and Sula are pure hearsay, inadmissible in evidence:
Justice Ong
Your honor, since these are all accusations against me by Luy and Sula, and according to Luy and Sula, these were only
told to them by Napoles, always their statements were ... they do not have personal knowledge, it was only told to them
by Napoles, is it possible that we subpoena Napoles so that the truth will come out? If. ..
xxxx
Justice Gutierrez
That is your prerogative.
Justice Ong
I am willing to take the risk although I know I am not an acquaintance of Napoles. Just to clear my name whether I
should be hung or I should not be hung.
xxxx
Atty. Geronilla
I don't think it would be necessary, your honor.
Justice Gutierrez (to Atty. Geronilla)
Discuss this matter with your client, file a motion, then we will see.
However, respondent and his counsel did not take any action on the undersigned's suggestion. They did not present
Napoles to rebut the testimonies of Benhur and Sula. Significantly, respondent failed to consider that his testimony is
likewise hearsay. He should have presented Msgr. Ramirez and Napoles as witnesses to support his claim regarding their
role which enabled him to wear the robe of the Holy Black Nazarene.
x x xx
Respondent's acts of allowing himself to be Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan, resulting in the fixing of the Kevlar
case, and of accepting money from her, constitute gross misconduct, a violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary.
xxxx
That Benhur personally prepared the eleven (11) checks which Napoles handed to respondent led the undersigned to
conclude without hesitation that this charge is true. It is highly inconceivable that Benhur could devise or concoct his
story. He gave a detailed and lucid narration of the events, concluding that actually Napoles gave respondent P3,
102,000.00 as advanced interest.
According to respondent, the purpose of his first visit was to thank Napoles for making it possible for him to wear the
Holy Black Nazarene's robe. Even assuming it is true, nonetheless it is equally true that during that visit, respondent
could have transacted business with Napoles. Why should Napoles pay respondent an advanced interest of P3,102,000.0
with her own money if it were not a consideration for a favor?
Respondent's transgression pertains to his personal life and no direct relation to his judicial function. It is not
misconduct but plain dishonesty. His act is unquestionably disgraceful and renders him morally unfit as a member of the
Judiciary and unworthy of the privileges the law confers on him. Furthermore, respondent's conduct supports Benhur's
assertion that he received money from Napoles.
41
Dishonesty likewise violates Canon 2 (1 and 2) on Integrity of the same Code providing in part that judges must ensure
that their conduct is above reproach and must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the Judiciary.
Indeed, respondent should not stay in his position even for a moment.
xxxx
...From respondent's end, there was nothing wrong when he visited Napoles twice in her office considering that the
visits took place long after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case.
Contrary to respondent's submission, such acts also constitute gross misconduct in violation of Canon 4 on Propriety of
the same Code. Section 1 provides that judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities .
. . . respondent's reason for his first visit was to thank Napoles for her help in making it possible for him to wear the robe
of the Holy Black Nazarene. Instead of visiting her, respondent could have extended his gratitude by simply calling her by
phone. Worse, he visited her again because she may think he is an unworthy person. This is an extremely frail reason. He
was seen by the whistle blowers and their co-workers who, without doubt, readily confirmed that he was Napoles'
contact at the Sandiganbayan and that he "fixed" the decision in the Kevlar case.
Respondent cannot be excused for his unconcern for the position he holds. Being aptly perceived as the visible
personification of law and justice, his personal behavior, not only while in the performance of official duties but also
outside the court, must be beyond reproach. A judicial office circumscribes a personal conduct and imposes a number of
inhibitions, whose faithful observance is the price one has to pay for holding an exalted position.
xxxx
On the photograph showing respondent
with Senator Jinggoy Estrada and Napoles.
xxxx
This incident manifests respondent's disregard of the dictum that propriety and the appearance of propriety are
essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge. This exacting standard of decorum is demanded from judges
to promote public confidence in the integrity of the Judiciary.
In joining Senator Estrada and Napoles in a picture taking, respondent gave a ground for reproach by reason of
impropriety. It bears reiterating Canon 4 (1) on Propriety of the same Code which provides that judges shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
Respondent maintained that he did not know Napoles at that time because she was not present before the
Sandiganbayan during the hearing of the Kevlar case for she must have waived her appearance. Respondent's
explanation lacks merit. That court could not have acquired jurisdiction over her if she did not appear personally for
arraignment.
Of utmost significance is the fact that this is not the first time that respondent has been charged administratively. In
"Assistant Special Prosecutor Ill Rohermina J Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justices Gregory S. Ong, Jose R. Hernandez and
Rodolfo A. Ponferrada, Sandiganbayan,'' the Supreme Court found respondent Justice Ong guilty of violation of PD 1606
and The Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan for nonobservance of collegiality in hearing criminal cases in the
Hall of Justice, Davao City. Instead of siting as a collegial body, the members of the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division
adopted a different procedure. The Division was divided into two. As then Chairperson of the Division, respondent was
ordered to pay a fine of P15,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt
with more severely.
xxxx
...the undersigned cannot hold back her skepticism regarding the acquittal of Napoles. The Sandiganbayan Fourth
Division, of which respondent was the Chairman, held that Napoles did not conspire with the suppliers in the
questionable purchase of the Kevlar helmets as she was not one of the "dealer-payees" in the transaction in question
and that there was no proof of an overt act on her part. How could the Fourth Division arrive at such conclusion? The
Decision itself indicates clearly that ( 1) Napoles was following up the processing of the documents; (2) that she was in
charge of the delivery of the helmets; and (3) the checks amounting to P3,864,310.00 as payment for the helmets were
deposited and cleared in only one bank account, Security Bank Account No. 512-000-2200, in the name of Napoles.
Considering this glaring irregularity, it is safe to conclude that indeed respondent has a hand in the acquittal of Napoles.
All along, the whistle blowers were telling the truth.
xxxx
RECOMMENDATION
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, It is respectfully recommended, for consideration of the Honorable Court, that respondent
Justice Gregory S. Ong be found GUILTY of gross misconduct, dishonesty, and impropriety, all in violations of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and be meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service WITH
FORFEITURE of all retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, and WITH PREJUDICE to reemployment to any
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
xxxx
The Court's Ruling
This Court adopts the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Investigating Justice which are well-supported
by the evidence on record.
Based on the testimonies of Luy, Sula and Rufo, the Investigating Justice formulated the charges against the respondent,
as follows:
42
1. Respondent acted as contact of Napoles in connection with the Kevlar case while it was pending in the Sandiganbayan
Fourth Division wherein he is the Chairman;
2. Respondent, being Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan, fixed the Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal;
3. Respondent received an undetermined amount of money from Napoles prior to the promulgation of the decision in
the Kevlar case thus, she was sure ("kampante") of her acquittal; 4. Respondent visited Napoles in her office where she
handed to him eleven (ll) checks, each amounting to P282,000.00 or a total of P3,102,000.00, as advanced interest for
his P25.5 million BDO check she deposited in her personal account; and
5. Respondent attended Napoles' parties and was photographed with Senator Estrada and Napoles.
Respondent thus stands accused of gross misconduct, partiality and corruption or bribery during the pendency of the
Kevlar case, and impropriety on account of his dealing and socializing with Napoles after her acquittal in the said case.
Additionally, respondent failed to disclose in his September 26, 2013 letter to Chief Justice Sereno that he had actually
visited Napoles at her office in 2012, as he vehemently denied having partied with or attended any social event hosted
by her.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty,
unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior; while "gross" has been defined as "out of all
measure beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused." We agree with Justice Sandoval-
Gutierrez that respondent's association with Napoles during the pendency and after the promulgation of the decision in
the Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal, constitutes gross misconduct notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence
of corruption or bribery in the rendition of the said judgment.
We cannot overemphasize that in administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required. The standard of
substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the
misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant.
The testimonies of Luy and Sula established that Napoles had been in contact with respondent ("nag-uusap sila") during
the pendency of the Kevlar case. As Napoles' trusted staff, they (especially Luy who is a cousin) were privy to her daily
business and personal activities. Napoles constantly updated them of developments regarding the case. She revealed to
them that she has a "connect" or "contact" in the Sandiganbayan who will help "fix" the case involving her, her mother,
brother and some employees. Having closely observed and heard Napoles being confident that she will be acquitted
even prior to the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case, they were convinced she was indeed in contact with
respondent, whose identity was earlier divulged by Napoles to Luy. Luy categorically testified that Napoles told him she
gave money to respondent but did not disclose the amount. There was no reason for them to doubt Napoles' statement
as they even keep a ledger detailing her expenses for the "Sandiganbayan," which reached Pl 00 million. Napoles'
information about her association with respondent was confirmed when she was eventually acquitted in 2010 and when
they saw respondent visit her office and given the eleven checks issued by Napoles in 2012.
Respondent maintains that the testimonies of Luy and Sula were hearsay as they have no personal knowledge of the
matters they were testifying, which were merely told to them by Napoles. Specifically, he points to portions of Sula's
testimony indicating that Napoles had not just one but "contact persons" in Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan; hence, it
could have been other individuals, not him, who could help Napoles "fix" the Kevlar case, especially since Napoles never
really disclosed to Sula who was her (Napoles) contact at the Sandiganbayan and at one of their conversations Napoles
even supposedly said that respondent's "talent fee" was too high. Bribery is committed when a public officer agrees to
perform an act in connection with the performance of official duties in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or
present received. Ajudge who extorts money from a party-litigant who has a case before the court commits a serious
misconduct and this Court has condemned such act in the strongest possible terms. Particularly because it has been
committed by one charged with the responsibility of administering the law and rendering justice, it quickly and surely
corrodes respect for law and the courts.
An accusation of bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. The complainant must present a panoply of
evidence in support of such an accusation. Inasmuch as what is imputed against the respondent judge connotes a grave
misconduct, the quantum of proof required should be more than substantial. Concededly, the evidence in this case is
insufficient to sustain the bribery and corruption charges against the respondent. Both Luy and Sula have not witnessed
respondent actually receiving money from Napoles in exchange for her acquittal in the Kevlar case. Napoles had
confided to Luy her alleged bribe to respondent.
Notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of any corrupt act by the respondent, we find credible evidence of his
association with Napoles after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case. The totality of the circumstances of
such association strongly indicates respondent's corrupt inclinations that only heightened the public's perception of
anomaly in the decision-making process. By his act of going to respondent at her office on two occasions, respondent
exposed himself to the suspicion that he was partial to Napoles. That respondent was not the ponente of the decision
which was rendered by a collegial body did not forestall such suspicion of partiality, as evident from the public disgust
generated by the publication of a photograph of respondent together with Napoles and Senator Jinggoy Estrada. Indeed,
the context of the declarations under oath by Luy and Sula before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, taking place at
the height of the "Pork Barrel" controversy, made all the difference as respondent himself acknowledged. Thus, even in
the present administrative proceeding, their declarations are taken in the light of the public revelations of what they
know of that government corruption controversy, and how it has tainted the image of the Judiciary.

43
The hearsay testimonies of Luy and Sula generated intense public interest because of their close relationship to Napoles
and their crucial participation in her transactions with government officials, dubbed by media as the "Pork Barrel
Queen." But as aptly observed by Justice SandovalGutierrez, the "challenging and difficult setting" of the Senate
hearings where they first testified, made it highly improbable that these whistle blowers would testify against the
respondent. During the investigation of this case, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez described their manner of testifying as
"candid, straightforward and categorical." She likewise found their testimonies as "instantaneous, clear, unequivocal,
and carried with it the ring of truth," and more important, these are consistent with their previous testimonies before
the Senate; they never wavered or faltered even during cross-examination.
It is a settled rule that the findings of investigating magistrates are generally given great weight by the Court by reason
of their unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified. The rule which concedes due
respect, and even finality, to the assessment of credibility of witnesses by trial judges in civil and criminal cases applies a
fortiori to administrative cases.18 In particular, we concur with Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez's assessment on the credibility
of Luy and Sula, and disagree with respondent's claim that these witnesses are simply telling lies about his association
with Napoles.
Contrary to respondent's submission, Sula in her testimony said that whenever Napoles talked about her contacts in the
Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan, they knew that insofar as the Sandiganbayan was concerned, it was understood that
she was referring to respondent even as she may have initially contacted some persons to get to respondent, and also
because they have seen him meeting with Napoles at her office. It appears that Napoles made statements regarding the
Kevlar case not just to Luy but also to the other employees of JLN Corporation. The following are excerpts from Sula's
testimony on direct examination, where she even hinted at their expected outcome of the Kevlar case:
Atty. Benipayo
Q So, Ms. Sula, what were the statements being made by Ms. Janet Lim Napoles regarding her involvement in the Kevlar
case, or how she was trying to address the problem with the Kevlar case pending before the Sandiganbayan?
Witness Sula
A Ang alam ko po kasi marami po siyang kinaka-usap na mga lawyers na binabayaran niya para tulungan siya kay
Gregory Ong sa Kevlar case. Tapos, sa kalaunan po, nasabi na niya sa amin na mcron na po siyang nakilala sa
Sandiganbayan na nagngangalang Justice Gregory Ong. Tapos, sabi niya, siya po ang tutulong sa amin para ma-clear
kami. Pero hindi niya sinabi na meron din pong ma ... sasagot sa kaso. Hindi po lahat, kasi po dalawa sa mga empleyado
niya, bale apat, dalawang empleyado niya, isang kapatid niya at sister-in-law ang mag-aano sa kaso pati yung mother
niya na namatay na ay sasagot din sa kaso. Siya Jang at saka yung asawa niya ang bale makli-clear sa kaso.
Q So, she told you that two (2) employees, one (1) sister-in-law and one brother will answer for the case and Janet Lim
Napoles and her husband will be acquitted, is that right?
A Yun po ang aking pagkaka-alam kasi po, nag-petition po kasi sila eh, yung mga officemates ko. Nagkaroon ng
probation. Noong lumabas ang hatol, meron silang probation period.
xxxx
Q Which you told me that somebody will help in the Kevlar case?
A Opo. Sinabi po niya sa amin everytime po pag nagkukwento siya, sinasabi niya na si Justice Ong ang tutulong sa kanya
para ma-clear po yung Kevlar case niya.
x x x x19 (Emphasis supplied.)
As it turned out, Napoles' husband was dropped from the two informations while her mother, brother and sister-in-law
were convicted in the lesser charge of falsification of public documents. Apparently, after her acquittal, Napoles helped
those convicted secure a probation. But as stated in our earlier resolution, the Court will no longer delve into the merits
of the Kevlar case as the investigation will focus on respondent's administrative liability.
Respondent's act of voluntarily meeting with Napoles at her office on two occasions was grossly improper and violated
Section 1, Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, which took effect on June 1, 2004.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial and that fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this
appearance. Public confidence in the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges. A judge must
avoid all impropriety and the appearance thereof. Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely
and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
In Caneda v. Alaan, we held that:
Judges are required not only to be impartial but also to appear to be so, for appearance is an essential manifestation of
reality. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to avoid not just impropriety in their conduct but even
the mere appearance of impropriety.
They must conduct themselves in such a manner that they give no ground for reproach. [Respondent's] acts have been
less than circumspect. He should have kept himself free from any appearance of impropriety and endeavored to
distance himself from any act liable to create an impression of indecorum.
xxxx
Indeed, respondent must always bear in mind that:
"A judicial office traces a line around his official as well as personal conduct, a price one has to pay for o ccupying an
exalted position in the judiciary, beyond which he may not freely venture. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
enjoins a judge to avoid not just impropriety in the performance of judicial duties but in all his activities whether in his
public or private life. He must conduct himself in a manner that gives no ground for reproach." (Emphasis supplied.)
44
On this score, our previous pronouncements have enjoined judges to avoid association or socializing with persons who
have pending cases before their court. Respondent cites the case of Abundo v. Mania, Jr. where this Court did not find
fault with a judge who was charged with fraternizing with his lawyer-friend. In that case, we said:
Respondent admits that he and Atty. Pajarillo became close friends in 1989 when they were both RTC judges stationed
in Naga City. Since they both resided in Camarines Norte, Atty. Pajarillo hitched rides with respondent to Daet,
Camarines Norte in the latter's car.
In his Comment, respondent claims that he leaves the door to his chambers open to lawyers or parties with official court
business, whose requests and complaints regarding their cases he listens to in full view of his staff, who are witnesses to
his transparency and honesty in conducting such dialogues. He also admits that Atty. Pajarillo has been to his house on
several occasions, but only to make emergency long-distance calls to his children in Metro Manila. He, however, denies
that he and Atty. Pajarillo were frequently seen eating and drinking together in public places.
We agree with Justice Buzon's finding that the evidence against respondent on this point was insufficient, viz.:
"On the other hand, the admission of respondent that he attended two public functions where Atty. Pajarillo was also
present; that Atty. Pajarillo had been in his house twice or thrice and used his telephone; and that he receives lawyers,
including Atty. Pajarillo, and litigants inside his chambers, the door to which is always open so that [the] staff could see
that no under the table transactions are taking place, is not proof that he is fraternizing with Atty. Pajarillo. A judge need
not ignore a former colleague and friend whenever they meet each other or when the latter makes requests which are
not in any manner connected with cases pending in his court. Thus, Canon 30 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics provides:
It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial duty that judges should live in retirement or seclusion; it is
desirable that, so far as the reasonable attention to the completion of their work will permit, they continue to mingle in
social intercourse, and that they should not discontinue their interests in or appearance at meetings of members at the
bar. A judge should, however, in pending or prospective litigation before him be scrupulously careful to avoid such
action as may reasonably tend to waken the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships constitute an
element in determining his judicial course.'"
The factual setting in Abundo v. Mania, Jr. is not similar to the present case because Napoles was not a colleague or
lawyer-friend but an accused in a former case before the Sandiganbayan's Fourth Division chaired by respondent and
which acquitted her from malversation charge. What respondent perhaps want to underscore is the caveat for judges, in
pending or prospective litigation before them, to avoid such action as may raise suspicion on their partiality in resolving
or deciding the case. Thus, he emphasized in his Memorandum that he "never knew Napoles on a personal level while
she was still on trial as an accused in Kevlar helmet case." Respondent even quoted Sula's testimony expressing her
opinion that she finds nothing wrong with respondent going to Napoles' office because at that time, the Kevlar case had
already been terminated.
We do not share the view that the rule on propriety was intended to cover only pending and prospective litigations.
Judges must, at all times, be beyond reproach and should avoid even the mere suggestion of partiality and impropriety.
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that "[p ]ropriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to
the performance of all the activities of a judge." Section 2 further provides:
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves
in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
As we held in Sibayan-Joaquin v. Javellana
... Judges, indeed, should be extra prudent in associating with litigants and counsel appearing before them so as to avoid
even a mere perception of possible bias or partiality. It is not expected, of course, that judges should live in retirement
or seclusion from any social intercourse. Indeed, it may be desirable, for instance, that they continue, time and work
commitments permitting, to relate to members of the bar in worthwhile endeavors and in such fields of interest, in
general, as are in keeping with the noble aims and objectives of the legal profession. In pending or prospective litigations
before them, however, judges should be scrupulously careful to avoid anything that may tend to awaken the suspicion
that their personal, social or sundry relations could influence their objectivity, for not only must judges possess
proficiency in law but that also they must act and behave in such manner that would assure, with great comfort, litigants
and their counsel of the judges' competence, integrity and independence.
In this light, it does not matter that the case is no longer pending when improper acts were committed by the judge.
Because magistrates are under constant public scrutiny, the termination of a case will not deter public criticisms for acts
which may cast suspicion on its disposition or resolution. As what transpired in this case, respondent's association with
Napoles has unfortunately dragged the Judiciary into the "Pork Barrel" controversy which initially involved only
legislative and executive officials. Worse, Napoles' much-flaunted "contact" in the judiciary is no less than a Justice of
the Sandiganbayan, our special court tasked with hearing graft cases. We cannot, by any stretch of indulgence and
compassion, consider respondent's transgression as a simple misconduct.
During his testimony, respondent acknowledged his violation of judicial ethics and its serious repercussions, as shown by
his answers to the questions from the Investigation Justice, viz: Justice Gutierrez
What I am thinking Justice, as a Justice holding a very high position, could it not be possible for you to just go to the
Church of Quiapo and ask the priest there to help you or assist you, no longer through Ms. Napoles?
Justice Ong
You cannot do that, your honor. Ever since when I was a small boy, I never got near the image of the Mahal na Poon.
Nobody can do that, your honor.
45
Justice Gutierrez
No, no. What I mean is that you can just go to the priest in Quiapo and make the proper request. Why did you not do
that?
Justice Ong
I don't know, your honor.
Justice Gutierrez
Because you have been suffering from that ailment, mass or whatever, and that you are a devotee of the Black
Nazarene. You could have gone to the Office of the priest there and had that request for you to wear that robe of the
Black Nazarene?
Justice Ong
Hindi ko po alam na may ganyan, your honor. I was only told by Napoles during that conversation. Had I known that,
siguro po pwede ko pong gawin. Had I known that there is such a robe, maybe I will do that.
Justice Gutierrez
Okay. It happened already. But just to thank Ms. Napoles, I think Justice you should have been very, very careful about
your actuations. You should not have been seen in public, you know, with a woman like her who was an accused before.
You could have thanked her simply by calling her. You could have relayed to her your true feelings that you are so
grateful because of her assistance. Were it not for her, you could not have worn that Holy Robe of the Black Nazarene.
You could have simply called her instead of going to her office; instead of, you know, going to the Church of Santuario de
San Antonio in Forbes Park. And you should have been more careful not to be seen by the public with her considering
that she was a former accused in that case.
Justice Ong
I will heed to that advice, your honor.
Justice Gutierrez
Q And you admitted a while ago, during the interview conducted by Mr. Aries Rufo that. "That is a lesson for me; that I
should not have associated, you know, with a former respondent or accused in a case before me." You admitted that?
You said you learned you lesson. Was that the first time you learned that kind of lesson, Mr. Justice? Or even before you
took your oath as a member of the Judiciary, you already knew that lesson, isn't it or was that the first time? That is why
you associated yourself with Senator Jinggoy Estrada who was accused before of plunder?
Justice Ong
Your honor, talking about ....
Justice Gutierrez
Q Do you admit you committed a lapse along that line?
Justice Ong
A Yes, your honor. You have to forgive me for that. (Emphasis supplied.)
In her report, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez noted that respondent's purported reason for visiting Napoles in her office
remains uncorroborated, as Napoles and the Quiapo parish priest were not presented as witnesses despite her
suggestion to respondent and his counsel. On the other hand, Luy's testimony on what transpired in one of respondent's
meeting with Napoles at her office appears to be the more plausible and truthful version. Expectedly, respondent
denied having issued a BDO check for P25 .5 million as claimed by Luy, and asserted he (respondent) did not deposit any
money to AFPSLAI. Unfortunately, Luy is unable to present documentary evidence saying that, as previously testified by
him before the Senate, most of the documents in their office were shredded upon orders of Napoles when the "Pork
Barrel Scam" controversy came out.
Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez stated that the eleven checks of P282,000.00 supposed advance interest for respondent's
check deposit to AFPSLAI were given to respondent as consideration for the favorable ruling in the Kevlar case. Such
finding is consistent with Luy's testimony that Napoles spent a staggering PlOO million just to "fix" the said case. Under
the circumstances, it is difficult to believe that respondent went to Napoles office the second time just to have coffee.
Respondent's act of again visiting Napoles at her office, after he had supposedly merely thanked her during the first visit,
tends to support Luy's claim that respondent had a financial deal with Napoles regarding advance interest for AFPSLAI
deposit. The question inevitably arises as to why would Napoles extend such an accommodation to respondent if not as
consideration for her acquittal in the Kevlar case? Respondent's controversial photograph alone had raised adverse
public opinion, with the media speculating on pay-offs taking place in the courts.
Regrettably, the conduct of respondent gave cause for the public in general to doubt the honesty and fairness of his
participation in the Kevlar case and the integrity of our courts of justice. Before this Court, even prior to the
commencement of administrative investigation, respondent was less than candid. In his letter to the Chief Justice where
he vehemently denied having attended parties or social events hosted by Napoles, he failed to mention that he had in
fact visited Napoles at her office. Far from being a plain omission, we find that respondent deliberately did not disclose
his social calls to Napoles. It was only when Luy and Sula testified before the Senate and named him as the "contact" of
Napoles in the Sandiganbayan, that respondent mentioned of only one instance he visited Napoles ("This is the single
occasion that Sula was talking about in her supplemental affidavit x x x.").
The Court finds that respondent, in not being truthful on crucial matters even before the administrative complaint was
filed against him motu proprio, is guilty of Dishonesty, a violation of Canon 3 (Integrity) of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct.

46
Dishonesty is a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty,
probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray."
Dishonesty, being a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement
benefits except accrued leave credits, and with perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government service.
Indeed, dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no place in the Judiciary.
Under Section 11(A), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, a respondent found guilty of a serious charge may be penalized as
follows:
SEC. 11. Sanctions. - A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification
from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including governmentowned or -controlled corporations.
Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. Considering that respondent is not a first time offender
and the charges of gross misconduct and dishonesty are both grave offenses showing his unfitness to remain as a
magistrate of the special graft court, we deem it proper to impose the supreme penalty of dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong GUILTY of GROSS
MISCONDUCT, DISHONESTY and IMPROPRIETY, all in violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary, for which he is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued
leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the government
including government-owned or -controlled corporations.
This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.

47
Case No. 9
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2388 June 10, 2014[Formerly OCA IPI No. 10-3554-RTJ]
EMILIE SISON-BARIAS, Complainant, vs. JUDGE MARINO E. RUBIA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT [RTC], BRANCH 24, BIAN,
LAGUNA and EILEEN A. PECAA, DATA ENCODER II, RTC, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, BIAN, LAGUNA,
Respondents.

Public trust requires that we exact strict integrity from judges and court employees. This case emphasizes the need for
members of the judiciary and those within its employ to exhibit the impartiality, prudence, and propriety that the New
Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel require when dealing with parties in pending
cases.
Complainant Emilie Sison-Barias is involved in three cases pending before the sala of respondent Judge Marino Rubia.
The first case is an intestate proceeding. Complainant filed a petition for letters of administration over the intestate
estate of her late husband, Ramon A. Barias. This was opposed by her mother-in-law, Romelias Almeda-Barias.
The second case is a guardianship proceeding over Romelias Almeda-Barias. Evelyn Tanael, the guardian appointed by
the court, submitted a property inventory report that included not only the properties of Romelias Almeda-Barias but
also properties forming part of the estate of complainants late husband.
The third case is a civil action for annulment of contracts and reconveyance of real properties filed by Romelias Almeda-
Barias, represented by Evelyn Tanael, against complainant, among others.
In all these cases, a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-510712 and part of the estate of
complainants husband was involved.
Complainant alleged that there was delay in the publication of the notice in the petition for issuance of letters of
administration filed. She was then informed by her brother, Enrique "Ike" Sison, that respondent Eileen Pecaa, the
daughter of his good friend, was a data encoder in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Bian,
Laguna.
Complainant, together with her two brothers, Enrique and Perlito "Jun" Sison, Jr., met with respondent Pecaa on
February 20, 2010. During this meeting, complainant informed respondent Pecaa of the delay in the publication of the
notice in the petition for issuance of letters of administration. She then asked respondent Pecaa to check the status of
the publication of the notice. Respondent Pecaa asked for complainants number so that she could inform her as soon
as any development takes place in the case. Enrique and Perlito executed affidavits to corroborate these allegations.
Respondent Pecaa asked complainant to meet her again at her house in Bian, Laguna. Complainant went there with
Enrique. Respondent Pecaa then informed complainant that she could no longer assist her since respondent Judge
Rubia had already given administration of the properties to Evelyn Tanael.
Complainant stated that she was not interested in the grant of administration to Tanael because these concerned the
properties of her mother-in-law, Romelias Almeda-Barias. She was only concerned with the administration of the
properties of her late husband, to which respondent Pecaa replied, "Ah ganun ba? Iba pala ung kaso mo."
Complainant alleged that respondent Pecaa sent her a text message on March 2, 2010 asking complainant to call her.
Complainant called respondent Pecaa who informed her that respondent Judge Rubia wanted to talk to her.
Complainant agreed to meet with respondent Judge Rubia over dinner, on the condition that respondent Pecaa would
be present as well.
On March 3, 2010 at around 7:00 p.m, complainant picked up respondent Pecaa at 6750 Ayala Avenuein Makati City.
They proceeded to Caf Juanita in The Fort, Bonifacio Global City. Respondent Pecaa said that respondent Judge Rubia
would arrive late as he would be coming from a Rotary Club meeting held at the Mandarin Hotel.
Respondent Judge Rubia arrived at Caf Juanita around 8:30 p.m. During the dinner meeting, respondents allegedly
asked complainant inappropriate questions. Respondent Judge Rubia allegedly asked whether she was still connected
with Philippine Airlines, which she still was at that time. Complainant was then informed that respondent Judge Rubia
knew of this fact through Atty. Noe Zarate, counsel of Romelias Almeda-Barias. This disclosure surprised complainant, as
she was under the impression that opposing counsel and respondent JudgeRubia had no business discussing matters
that were not relevant to their pending cases.
Respondent Judge Rubia also allegedly asked her questions about her supposed involvement with another man and
other accusations made by Romelias Almeda-Barias. She was asked about the hospital where she brought her husband
at the time of his cardiac arrest.
These details, according to complainant, were never discussed in the pleadings or in the course of the trial. Thus, she
inferred that respondent Judge Rubia had been talking to the opposing counsel regarding these matters outside of the
court proceedings. The impression of complainant was that respondent Judge Rubia was actively taking a position in
favor of Atty. Zarate.
To confirm her suspicion, respondents then allegedly "told complainant to just talk to Atty. Zarate, counsel for the
oppositor, claiming that he is a nice person. Complainant was appalled by such suggestion and replied[,] Why will I talk
to him? Judge di ko yata kaya gawin un."
After dinner, complainant stayed behind to settle the bill. Even before he left, she alleged that respondent Judge Rubia
had made insinuations that she was awaiting the company of another man.
From then on, complainant and respondents did not communicate and/or meet outside the courtroom until August 8,
2010.

48
In the meantime, complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia acted in a manner that showed manifest partiality in
favor of the opposing parties, namely, Romelias Almeda-Barias and Evelyn Tanael, as represented by their counsel, Atty.
Noe Zarate.
On June 15, 2010, counsel for complainant was personally handed a copy of a motion for consolidation filed by the
oppositor, Romelias Almeda-Barias, despite the date of the hearing on such motion being set on June 18, 2010.
Complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia did not even consider the comment/opposition to the motion for
consolidation filed by her counsel, which stated that since two of these cases were special proceedings, they could not
be consolidated with an ordinary civil action. Respondent Judge Rubia insisted on discussing the totality of the different
issues involved in the three distinct cases under one court proceeding. As such, complainant alleged that the main issues
of the special proceedings were consolidated with matters that were properly the subject of a separate civil action.
Complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia refused to issue Orders that would have allowed her to comply with
her duties as the special administrator of her late husbands estate. This included the order to conduct an inventory of
the properties, rights, and credits of the deceased, subject to the authority of the administrator.
In addition, complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia refused to grant her request for subpoena duces tecum
and ad testificandum that she had prayed for to compel Evelyn Tanael to produce the documents showing the accrued
rentals of the parcel of land belonging toher late husband. As such, complainant raised that respondent Judge Rubias
refusal emboldened Evelyn Tanael and oppositor Romelias Almeda-Barias to interfere in the management of the estate
of complainants late husband. Because of this refusal, she asserted that respondent Judge Rubia failed to adhere to the
duty of the court to ensure a proper inventory of the estate.
Complainant enumerated occasions that alleged manifest partiality on the part of respondent Judge Rubia. She alleged
that respondent Judge Rubia failed to require a timely filing of the pre-trial brief on the part of Evelyn Tanael and
Romelias Almeda-Barias, and despite their noncompliance on four (4) separate pre-trials that were postponed, Tanael
and Almeda-Barias were not declared in default.44 She also alleged that respondent Judge Rubia stated that the burden
to prove ownership of the property was on complainant, when in fact it was the oppositor, or Tanael and Almeda-Barias,
who had the burden of proof to show that the land was fraudulently transferred to her late husband.
Complainant admitted that she did not inform her counsel of the dinner meeting she had with respondents. It was
Enrique who allegedly told complainants lawyers about it when he went to the lawyers office to pay some bills.
Complainant said that her lawyer immediately admonished her for agreeing to meet with respondent Judge Rubia.
Complainant then texted respondent Pecaa on August 8, 2010 on her lawyers reaction concerning the March 3, 2010
meeting. The following exchanges took place via text message:
COMPLAINANT:
Hi Aileen! Sorry jz feeling bad. . my lawyer jz called me at galit n galit. My brother went to hm today to pay som bills. Sa
kakadaldal na mention s lawyr my meeting wid u n judge rubia. My lawyr ws mad dat m nt suppose to do dat w/out hs
knowledge. I cnt understand anymore wat he ws sayng kanina kse nga galit. He wil file yata somtng abt dat n I dnt
knwwat? Pls. Help me. (August 8, 2010, 2:31 p.m.)
AILEEN PECAA [sic]:
Ha? Anong ififile? Bkt xa galit? Bka lalo tayo mapahamak? (August 8, 2010, 3:48 p.m.)
COMPLAINANT
M nt very sure bt he mentioned abt administrative or administratn something. I hav to talk to hm n person para mas
claro. Hirap kse by fon tlaga. He ws mad bcoz f our meetng nga, dats wat struck hm. Sorry, daldal kse ni kuya. M going to
col kuya tomorrow na. Its 1am na hr, I have to buy foncard pa. (August 8, 2010, 4:18 p.m.)
AILEEN PECAA [sic]
Admin? Nku d mapapahamak nga kaming 2 ni juj. Pati ikaw mapapahamak pa dn. (August 8, 2010, 4:28 p.m.)
AILEEN PECAA [sic]
Bkt xa galit kng mkpg kta ka smin widout his knowledge. I cnt fathom y wil it end up filing an admin case. (August 8,
2010, 4:29 p.m.)
AILEEN PECAA [sic]
Pls Emily do something 2 pacify ur lawyer, juj rubia will definitely get mad wid us. (August 8, 2010, 4:30 p.m.) (Emphasis
supplied)
On September 15, 2010, complainant moved for respondent Judge Rubias inhibition. This was denied on October 6,
2010. Complainant then filed a motion for reconsideration denied in an order dated November 15, 2010.
On November 11, 2010, complainant filed a complaint affidavit before the Office of the Court Administrator charging
respondent Pecaa for gross misconduct and respondent Judge Rubia for conduct unbecoming of a judge, partiality,
gross ignorance of the law or procedure, incompetence, and gross misconduct.
The Office of the Court Administrator referred the complaint to respondents for comment.
In her comment, respondent Pecaa did not deny meeting complainant on February 20, 2010 through the introduction
of Enrique Sison. However, she claimed that the alleged meeting between complainant and respondent Judge Rubia was
merely a chance encounter.
Respondent Pecaa alleged that "sometime [in the] second week of March 2010," when she was on her way to Makati
City to meet her sisters for coffee, complainant invited her for dinner. Respondent Pecaa hesitantly agreed after
complainant had insisted. Complainant picked her up at Starbucks 6750 in Makati City, and they proceeded to Caf
Juanita in Burgos Circle for dinner. Upon passing by Burgos Circle, respondent Pecaa saw respondent Judge Rubias car
parked near Caf Juanita.
49
At about past 10:00 p.m., respondent Pecaa said that she saw respondent Judge Rubia together with some companions
walking toward his car. She stepped out of the restaurant and greeted him. Complainant allegedly followed respondent
Pecaa and so the latter was constrained to introduce complainant as an employee of Philippine Airlines to respondent
Judge Rubia. After the introduction, respondent Judge Rubia went to his car and left. Complainant and respondent
Pecaa returned to the restaurant to finish their food and pay the bill.
Complainant drove respondent Pecaa back to Makati City. During the drive, complainant allegedly asked her help
regarding the cases filed in court and inquired as to what she could give to respondent Judge Rubia because her lawyers
instructed her to bribe him. Respondent Pecaa only said that respondent Judge Rubia does not accept money and that
he is financially stable.
After the dinner, complainant allegedly kept on sending text messages to respondent Pecaa concerning her case filed in
court. Respondent Pecaa admitted to the exchanges through text messages she had with complainant on August 8,
2010 regarding the filing of administrative case against her and respondent Judge Rubia.
Respondent Pecaa denied being an advocate of Atty. Zarate. She maintained the position that she should not be held
administratively liable for what she construed to be primarily judicial matters, such as the bases for respondent Judge
Rubias decisions and orders in court.
Respondent Judge Rubia filed his comment on January 17, 2011.
Respondent Judge Rubia claimed that the alleged meeting between him and his co-respondent Pecaa together with
complainant was a mere chance encounter. He denied any pre-arranged dinner meeting, stating that after the brief
encounter with complainant, he had to rush home to attend to his ailing wife. He stated that he was only introduced to
complainant because she was an employee of Philippine Airlines where he was a former executive. Respondent Judge
Rubia argued that if the alleged meeting with complainant did take place, it should have been mentioned in the first
motion for inhibition. Further, he emphasized that it took complainant eight (8) months since the alleged dinner meeting
to file a motion for inhibition and an administrative case.
Respondent Judge Rubia surmised that complainant and her counsel, hoping for a favorable outcome of the cases filed,
initiated contact with respondent Pecaa. The filing of the administrative case against him was only to compel him to
inhibit from the cases to seek a friendlier forum.
Moreover, respondent Judge Rubia denied knowledge of any text messages exchanged between complainant and
respondent Pecaa as well as any active advocacy in favor of opposing counsel, Atty. Zarate.
As to the allegations of partiality concerning the orders he issued for the cases filed, respondent Judge Rubia argued that
the best forum to ventilate complainants allegations was not through an administrative proceeding but through judicial
recourse.
Due to the gravity of the charges and the conflicting facts presented by the parties, the Office of the Court Administrator
recommended the referral of the administrative complaint to a Court of Appeals Justice for investigation, report, and
recommendation.
On September 12, 2011, this court issued a resolution referring the administrative complaint to a Justice of the Court of
Appeals for investigation, report, and recommendation. The complaint was assigned to Court of Appeals Associate
Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan.
On December 5, 2011, Atty. Noe Zarate filed a motion for Intervention allegedly due to the implication of his name in
the administrative complaint.
Atty. Zarate argued that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of forum shopping because the orders issued
by respondent Judge Rubia and mentioned in the complaint were assailed in a petition for certiorari.
Further, Atty. Zarate alleged that he did not know respondents personally, and he was not closely associated with them.
He asserted that the records were replete with incidents where he and respondent Judge Rubia engaged in heated
discussions on legal matters. He maintained that he did not foster any closeness or personal affinity with respondent
Judge Rubia that would substantiate complainants allegations.
In addition, Atty. Zarate expressed his agreement with respondents narration of the events on the alleged dinner
meeting. He argued that if the dinner meeting did take place, this incident should have been the ground for the motion
for inhibition filed.
Atty. Zarate stated that, granting arguendo that the dinner meeting happened, there was nothing "wrong, improper or
illegal" about it. It could have been reasonably interpreted as an extrajudicial means initiated by respondent Judge Rubia
to assuage the parties in the contentious litigation.
The motion for intervention was noted without action by Justice Gaerlan.
On December 15, 2011, the parties, together with their counsels, appeared before Justice Gaerlan. It was agreed that
respondents would file their respective supplemental comments and complainant her reply to the comment.
Complainant manifested that she would present three (3) witnesses: herself and her two brothers. Respondent Pecaa
would testify for herself and present Semenidad Pecaa, her aunt, as witness. Respondent Judge Rubia manifested that
he would testify on his behalf and present respondent Pecaa as witness.
Respondents Judge Rubia and Pecaa filed their respective supplemental comments dated December 15, 2011 and
December 16, 2011, respectively. Complainant filed her consolidated reply on January 17, 2012.
A second hearing on the administrative complaint ensued on January 10, 2012 where complainant testified on the
dinner meeting on March 3, 2010.

50
During the hearing, complainant identified a document containing a list of phone calls showing that she called
respondent Pecaa on March 2 and 3, 2010. Counsel for respondent Pecaa stipulated that these calls were made to
her.
The hearing of the administrative complaint continued on January 12, 17, and 24, 2012.
In the January 17, 2012 hearing, respondent Pecaa testified to the allegations in her comment and judicial affidavit. She
alleged for the first time that the dinner meeting with complainant happened on March 10, not March 3, 2010.
On January 24, 2012, Mr. Rodel Cortez, secretariat of the Rotary Club of Makati Southwest Chapter, was presented as
witness for respondent Judge Rubia. Rodel testified that the Rotary Club of Makati Southwest Chapter had a meeting on
March 10, 2010 at Numa Restaurant in Bonifacio Global City. Respondent Judge Rubia attended the meeting as shown in
the attendance sheet identified by Rodel.
Rodel testified that after the meeting, he, Billy Francisco, and respondent Judge Rubia walked together toward the
parking area. When they were nearing Burgos Circle where their cars were parked, Rodel allegedly saw complainant and
respondent Pecaa approaching them. He then saw respondent Pecaa introduce complainant to respondent Judge
Rubia. After the introduction, he saw respondent Judge Rubia go to his car and drive away.
Respondent Judge Rubia testified for himself. He identified the comment and judicial affidavit filed. He alleged that the
encounter with complainant at Burgos Circle was on March 10, not March 3, 2010.
Complying with the order dated January 31, 2012, the parties filed their respective memoranda.
Justice Gaerlan submitted his investigation report dated March 13, 2012. In his report, Justice Gaerlan recommended
that no penalty be imposed against respondents. He was "convinced that the meeting at Burgos Circle was just a chance
encounter" and found that complainant failed to prove her claim with substantial evidence that would justify the
imposition of a penalty on respondents.
Justice Gaerlan relied on the testimony of Rodel Cortez as against the uncorroborated testimony of complainant.
Justice Gaerlan emphasized the fact that it had taken complainant eight (8) months before she filed the administrative
complaint. He stated that the deliberate concealment of the meeting was inconsistent with her resolve to prove
respondent Judge Rubias alleged partiality toward the counsel of the opposing party.
As to the other charges against respondent Judge Rubia, Justice Gaerlan stated that the administrative case was not the
proper recourse for complainant. The proper action for her was to pursue remedial action through the courts "to rectify
the purported error" in the court proceedings.
The Office of the Court Administrator referred the report to this court.
The issue in this case is whether respondents Judge Rubia and Pecaa should be held administratively liable.
This court must set aside the findings of fact and reject the report of Justice Samuel Gaerlan. Respondents Judge Rubia
and Pecaa should be held administratively liable for their actions. The findings of fact of an investigating justice must be
accorded great weight and finality similar with the weight given to a trial court judges since an investigating justice
personally assessed the witnesses credibility. However, this rule admits of exceptions.
In J. King & Sons Company, Inc. v. Judge Hontanosas, Jr., this court held:
Such findings may be reviewed if there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight which the lower court
may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and which, if properly considered, would alter the result of the
case. Among the circumstances which had been held to be justifiable reasons for the Court to re-examine the trial court
or appellate courts findings of facts are, when the interference made is manifestly mistaken; when the judgment is
based on misapprehension of facts; and when the finding of fact of the trial court or appellate court is premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by evidence on record. (Citations omitted)
These exceptions are applicable in this case. In disregarding the complainants testimony and relying on the testimony of
Cortez, respondent Judge Rubias witness, Justice Gaerlan said:
While respondents were able to present a witness to corroborate their version of the incident on all material points,
complainant miserably failed on this regard. The Investigating Justice who had the untrammeled opportunity to observe
the deportment and demeanor of the respondents witness, Rodel Cortez (Cortez) during the hearing finds his forthright
narration of facts credible and rang with truth. The clear, candid and unmistakable declaration of Cortez that the
incident that transpired along the sidewalk of Burgos Circle was just a chance encounter, absent any ulterior motive for
him to perjure, swayed this Investigating Justice to believe that the dinner meeting between Judge Rubia and Barias did
not [take] place. A testimony is credible if it bears the earmarks of truth and sincerity and has been delivered in a
spontaneous, natural, and straightforward manner.
Not only that. Cortez[s] testimony was likewise corroborated by other pieces of evidence, such as the Program of
Meeting and the Attendance Sheet of the Rotary Club of Makati Southwest which tend to prove that at that particular
date and time Judge Rubia was in a rotary meeting and was not dining with Rubia and Pecaa. These evidence, when
taken together, debase the uncorroborated version of incident as narrated by Barias. Barias[] self-serving declarations
have no evidentiary value when ranged against the testimony of a credible witness on affirmative matters. (Emphasis
supplied)
We cannot agree with Justice Gaerlans assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight given to their
testimonies.
Justice Gaerlan placed too much importance on the testimony of Rodel Cortez, the Secretariat of the Rotary Club of
Makati, Southwest Chapter, and qualified him as a "disinterested" witness.
A disinterested witness testimony is afforded evidentiary weight by his or her lack of interest in the outcome of the
case. This lack of stake makes the disinterested witness testimony more believable. To actively take part in litigation as
51
a party or a witness entails willingness to commit to the arduous and exacting nature of most judicial proceedings. The
disinterested witness candor and submission to the proceedings before the court add credibility and believability to the
content of his or her testimony.
To qualify a witness as truly disinterested, courts should analyze the circumstances that surround his or her testimony.
The record shows that the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter, employed Rodel in 1989. He was appointed
Secretariat in 1994 where respondent Judge Rubia was a former President and remains an active member.
The finding that respondent Judge Rubia is administratively liable could taint the reputation of the organization that the
witness has been serving for more than 20 years. It would be a definite blow to the reputation of the Rotary Club of
Makati, Southwest Chapter, if its former President were to be found guilty of the offenses that complainant imputed
upon respondent Judge Rubia. The possibility of Rodel testifying in favor of respondent Judge Rubia as a result of his
loyalty to the latter and the Rotary Club puts into question the characterization that he is disinterested. The substance of
Rodels narration of events should also be scrutinized.
Complainant alleged that the dinner meeting set among her, respondent Pecaa, and respondent Judge Rubia took
place on March 3, 2010, as indicated in the investigation report of Justice Gaerlan. The record shows that the
Investigating Justice accepted the formal offer of Exhibit A, which was complainants judicial affidavit establishing the
date of the dinner as March 3, 2010 in Caf Juanita. Complainant also alleged in her complaint that respondent Judge
Rubia came from Mandarin Hotel in Makati from the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter meeting.
The testimony of Rodel and the evidence submitted by respondents alleged that the chance meeting of respondent
Judge Rubia with complainant and respondent Pecaa took place on March 10, 2010 on the side street of Burgos Circle
in Bonifacio Global City, after the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter meeting and dinner at Numa Restaurant, on
their way to the parking lot. This means that the testimony of and the evidence presented by Rodel do not disprove the
occurrence of the dinner meeting as alleged by complainant, since the meeting of the Rotary Club and the dinner
meeting alleged by complainant took place on different dates. Assuming that the alleged chance meeting between
complainant and respondent Judge Rubia took place on March 10, 2010 as alleged by respondents, this does not
discount the veracity of complainants allegations. Both the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter dinner and the
dinner meeting alleged by complainant took place in the vicinity of Bonifacio Global City. This could have allowed
respondent Judge Rubia ample time to travel to the dinner meeting after the meeting of the Rotary Club of Makati.
The investigation report stated that the attendance sheet and the program of meeting that Rodel submitted
corroborated his testimony. The date indicated on the attendance sheet and on the program of meeting was March 10,
2010, not March 3, 2010. However, there was nothing to indicate the time of arrival or departure of the attendees.
Neither was there an indication of the time when the meeting began or ended. The attendance sheet and the program
of meeting, by themselves or taken as corroborative evidence of Rodels testimony, do not discount the distinct and
tangible possibility that the dinner meeting as narrated by complainant took place. On the other hand, we find the
allegation that the dinner meeting took place on March 3, 2010 more credible.
Complainant presented a document containing a list of calls she made from January to March 2010. She identified her
cellular phone number as well as respondent Pecaas Respondent Pecaa admitted that the number identified by
complainant was her number. On March 2 and 3, 2010, calls were made to respondent Pecaas number. Respondent
Pecaa admitted that she had received a call from complainant before the latter picked her up at 6750 Makati City.
However, no calls to respondent Pecaa were recorded on March 10, 2010 in the document presented. On the other
hand, the calls made to respondent Pecaa as shown in the document coincided with complainants allegations.
Finally, during the December 15, 2011 hearing, respondent Judge only manifested that he would testify for himself and
present respondent Pecaa as witness. He did not manifest that he would be presenting Rodel or any participant in the
Rotary Club meeting as his witness.
The totality of these circumstances places doubt on the alibi of respondent Judge Rubia and Rodels narration of events.
The differing accounts on the dates and the venues were not addressed in the investigation report of Justice Gaerlan.
The report failed to mention that complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia arrived late precisely because he
came from a meeting of the Rotary Club of Makati. These glaring inconsistencies did not add evidentiary weight to
respondents claims. They only put into question the veracity of the exculpatory evidence.
This court has held:
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required to establish a respondents malfeasance is not proof
beyond reasonable doubt but substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required. Faced with conflicting versions of complainant and respondent,
the Court gives more weight to the allegations and testimony of the complainant and her witnesses who testified clearly
and consistently before the Investigating Judge. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
After scrutinizing the testimony of complainant and the evidence she presented to support her allegations, we find her
account of the event to be genuine and believable.
Complainants narration of the dinner meeting held on March 3, 2010 and her account of events leading up to the
dinner meeting were detailed and comprehensive. The conversation alleged by complainant that took place with
respondents during the meeting was replete with details.
The strongest corroborative evidence to support complainants allegations was the exchange of text messages between
complainant and respondent Pecaa regarding the dinner meeting. These text messages were admitted by respondent
Pecaa. However, Justice Gaerlan failed to give any weight to the exchange of text messages. This fact was not included
in his investigation report.129
52
The content of the text messages of respondent Pecaa belied respondents claim that the alleged dinner meeting in
Burgos Circle was only a chance encounter.
AILEEN PECAA [sic]
Bkt xa galit kng mkpg kta ka smin widout his knowledge. I cnt fathom y wil it end up filing an admin case. (August 8,
2010, 4:29 p.m.)
AILEEN PECAA [sic]
Pls Emily do something 2 pacify ur lawyer, juj rubia will definitely get mad wid us. (August 8, 2010, 4:30 p.m.) (Emphasis
supplied)
Respondent Pecaa used the phrase, "mkpg kta," which may be translated to "have a meeting." "Mkpg kta" can in no
way mean a chance encounter.
Further, respondent Pecaas text messages sent to complainant belied her claim of an innocent chance encounter. She
said that respondent Judge Rubia would get angry after complainant had informed her that her lawyer might file an
administrative case against them. Respondent Judge Rubia would not have had a reason to get upset because of the
possibility of administrative liability if an innocent and coincidental encounter happened and not a dinner meeting.
However, if the meeting took place as alleged by complainant, this would have logically led to a hostile reaction from
respondents, particularly respondent Judge Rubia.
In her testimony before Justice Gaerlan, respondent Pecaa gave the following testimony:
ATTY FERNANDEZ:
In August 2010, you admitted in your comment and your supplemental comment that you received a text coming from
Emilie Barias saying her lawyer is mad with her because of that meeting, isnt it?
EILEEN PECAA:
Yes, sir.
ATTY FERNANDEZ:
In fact you admitted that there were text messages coming from you and Judge Rubia in March 2010, isnt it?
EILEEN PECAA:
Yes, sir.
ATTY FERNANDEZ:
And in fact, you admitted that there were [sic] indeed a text message coming from you and this is: ["]ha anong ipafile
baka lalo tayong mapapahamk?["] And another message says "bakit siya...another...did you do something to pacify her
lawyer...so you affirm these message [sic]? EILEEN PECAA:
Yes, sir.
ATTY FERNANDEZ:
Based on those messages of yours, is it correct that you fear....?
EILEEN PECAA:
I am not afraid in a way na pinalalabas nila.
ATTY. FERNANDEZ:
And in fact in your comment and in your supplemental comment you were explaining the context of these messages?
EILEEN PECAA:
Alin po doon?
ATTY. FERNANDEZ
The first one? "bakit sya galit baka lalo tayong mapahamak"
EILEEN PECAA:
Ang ipinapaliwanag ko chance meeting outside the street.
ATTY. FERNANDEZ
How about the part where "administrative[. . . .]"
EILEEN PECAA:
The reason why I said that is because as employees of the court, whenever an administrative case is filed against us[,]
we will be investigated like this, and our benefits and promotion chances we will be disqualified.
ATTY. FERNANDEZ
In your text messages you never mentioned to Emilie that it would end up in an administrative case because you simply
thought that it was a chance meeting?
EILEEN PECAA:
Ano po sir?
ATTY. FERNANDEZ:
You cannot fathom why it will end up as an administrative case because it was only a chance meeting?
EILEEN PECAA:
Immediately on the text messages she knows already what happened why should I have to explain?
....
ATTY. FERNANDEZ:
Did you tell her while exchanging text messages that it was just a chance meeting?
EILEEN PECAA:
No more, sir.
ATTY. FERNANDEZ:
53
So you no longer took it upon you to tell Emilie to advise her lawyer not to get mad becauseit was only a chance
meeting? (No answer from the witness.)131
Respondents also alleged that the chance encounter happened because respondent Pecaa, while having dinner with
complainant, stepped out of the restaurant to greet respondent Judge Rubia on the side street of Burgos Circle. Since
complainant allegedly followed respondent Pecaa out of the restaurant, the latter introduced complainant to
respondent Judge Rubia.
This allegation is quite implausible after taking into account the following admissions:
1. Respondent Pecaa described her relationship with Judge Rubia as "[w]ala naman po masyado. My dealing with the
Judge is only in relation with my work because during flag ceremonies he always reminds us not to act as go between or
not to be involved in the cases filed in the court."
2. Respondent Judge Rubia is not the immediate superior of respondent Pecaa as the latter is in the Office of the Clerk
of Court.
3. Respondent Pecaa was having dinner with complainant whom she knew had a pending case before respondent
Judge Rubia.
4. Respondent Judge Rubia always reminded court employees not to have dealings with litigants.
There was clearly no reason for respondent Pecaa to go out of her way to greet respondent Judge Rubia. In fact, after
allegedly being repeatedly reminded that court employees should not have any dealings with litigants, respondent
Pecaa should not have gone out to greet respondent Judge Rubia since she was dining with a litigant.
The odds that complainant and respondent Pecaa would meet respondent Judge Rubia by pure coincidence are highly
improbable. Granted, chance meetings between persons may take place, but a chance meeting between a litigant in the
company of a court employee who acceded to assisting the litigant in a case and the judge deciding that case is outside
the realm of common experience. The odds of such an occurrence are, indeed, one in a million. The sheer improbability
of such an occurrence already puts into question the truth of respondents allegations.
Based on these considerations, the narrative of complainant is more believable and must be afforded greater
evidentiary weight.
Delay in filing of administrative complaint is not a defense
The investigation report placed particular emphasis on the eight-month period between the alleged dinner meeting and
the filing of the administrative complaint. The eight-month delay in the filing of the administrative complaint is of no
consequence.
Delay in filing an administrative complaint should not be construed as basis to question its veracity or credibility. There
are considerations that a litigant must think about before filing an administrative case against judges and court
personnel. This is more so for lawyers where the possibility of appearing before the judge where an administrative
complaint has been filed is high.
Here, respondent Judge Rubia presided over three cases that involved complainant and her late husbands estate. He
wielded an unmistakable amount of control over the proceedings.
Filing an administrative case against respondents is a time-consuming ordeal, and it would require additional time and
resources that litigants would rather not expend in the interest of preserving their rights in the suit. Complainant might
have decided to tread with caution so as not to incur the ire of respondent Judge Rubia for fear of the reprisal that could
take place after the filing of an administrative complaint.
Judges and court personnel wield extraordinary control over court proceedings of cases filed. Thus, litigants are always
cautious in filing administrative cases against judges and court personnel.
In any case, administrative offenses, including those committed by members of the bench and bar, are not subject to a
fixed period within which they must be reported. In Heck v. Judge Santos, this court held that:
Pursuant to the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that an administrative complaint against an erring
lawyer who was thereafter appointed as a judge, albeit filed only after twenty-four years after the offending act was
committed, is not barred by prescription. If the rule were otherwise, members of the bar would be emboldened to
disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant would
immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability
they ought to answer for. It is the duty of this Court to protect the integrity of the practice of law as well as the
administration of justice. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act complained
of and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining
arm of the Court. This categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members of the bench and bar, to deter
them from committing acts which violate the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Code of Judicial Conduct, or the
Lawyers Oath. (Emphasis supplied)
If this court saw fit to penalize a member of the bench for an offense committed more than twenty years prior to the
filing of the complaint, then the eight-month period cannot prejudice the complainant.
The interval between the time when the offense was committed and the time when the offense was officially reported
cannot serve as a basis to doubt the veracity of complainants allegations. This courts mandate to discipline members of
the judiciary and its personnel is implemented by pertinent rules and statutes. Judges are disciplined based on whether
their actions violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct. Court personnel are also governed by the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel and are appointed in accordance with the Civil Service Law, as provided for in Section 5, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution. None of these rules for administrative discipline mandates a period within which a complaint
must be filed after the commission or discovery of the offense. This court determines with finality the liability of erring
54
members of the judiciary and its employees. The gravity of an administrative offense cannot be diminished by a delay in
the filing of a complaint.
To dismiss the commission of the offense based on this eight-month period is to ignore the distinct and tangible
possibility that the offense was actually committed. The commission of the offense is not contingent on the period of
revelation or disclosure. To dismiss the complaint on this ground is tantamount to attaching a period of prescription to
the offense, which does not apply in administrative charges.
Respondent Pecaas actions amount to violations of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
"Court personnel, regardless of position or rank, are expected to conduct themselves in accordance with the strict
standards of integrity and morality."
The complaint states that respondents were allegedly acting in favor of Atty. Noe Zarate, counsel for the opposing
parties in the three cases pending in the sala of respondent Judge Rubia. Because of respondents actions, complainant
and all who will be made aware of the events of this case will harbor distrust toward the judiciary and its processes. For
this alone, respondents should be held administratively liable.
For respondent Pecaa, the fact that she allowed herself to be placed in a position that could cause suspicion toward
her work as a court personnel is disconcerting.
As a court employee, respondent Pecaa should have known better than to interact with litigants in a way that could
compromise the confidence that the general public places in the judiciary. Respondent Pecaa should have refused to
meet with complainant in her home. She should have refused any other form of extended communication with
complainant, save for those in her official capacity as a Data Encoder of the court. This continued communication
between complainant and respondent Pecaa makes her culpable for failure to adhere to the strict standard of
propriety mandated of court personnel.
Respondent Pecaa admitted to meeting with complainant several times, despite the formers knowledge of the
pendency of cases in the court where she is employed and in addition to the text messages exchanged between them.
She had a duty to sever all forms of communication with complainant or to inform her superiors or the proper authority
of complainants attempts to communicate with her. Respondent Pecaa failed to do so. Instead, she continued to
communicate with complainant, even to the extent of advising complainant against filing an administrative case against
her and respondent Judge Rubia.
Respondent Pecaa violated Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel:
CANON I
FIDELITY TO DUTY
....
SECTION 3. Court personnel shall not discriminate by dispensing special favors to anyone. They shall not allow kinship,
rank, position or favors from any party to influence their official acts or duties.
....
SECTION 5. Court personnel shall use the resources, property and funds under their official custody in a judicious
manner and solely in accordance with the prescribed statutory and regulatory guidelines or procedures.
Respondent Pecaas actions constitute a clear violation of the requirement that all court personnel uphold integrity and
prudence in all their actions. As stated in Villaros v. Orpiano:
Time and time again, we have stressed that the behavior of all employees and officials involved in the administration of
justice, from judges to the most junior clerks, is circumscribed with a heavy responsibility. Their conduct must be guided
by strict propriety and decorum at all times in order to merit and maintain the publics respect for and trust in the
judiciary. Needless to say, all court personnel must conduct themselves in a manner exemplifying integrity, honesty and
uprightness.
Respondent Pecaa should, thus, be held administratively liable for her actions.
Respondent Judge Rubia committed gross violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
By meeting a litigant and advising her to talk to opposing counsel, respondent Judge Rubia violated several canons of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Respondent Judge Rubia failed to act in a manner that upholds the dignity mandated by his office. He was already made
aware of the impropriety of respondent Pecaas actions by virtue of her admissions in her comment. At the time of the
referral of the complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent Judge Rubia was already the Executive
Judge of Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna. As a judge, he had the authority to ensure that all court
employees, whether or not they were under his direct supervision, act in accordance with the esteem of their office.
Respondent Pecaa even alleged that respondent Judge Rubia made several warnings to all court employees not to
intercede in any case pending before any court under his jurisdiction as Executive Judge. However, nothing in the record
shows that respondent Judge Rubia took action after being informed of respondent Pecaas interactions with a litigant,
such as ascertaining her actions, conducting an inquiry to admonish or discipline her, or at least reporting her actions to
the Office of the Court Administrator.
For this failure alone, respondent Judge Rubia should be held administratively liable. Furthermore, the evidence on
record supports the allegations that a meeting with complainant, a litigant with several cases pending before his sala,
took place. Respondent Judge Rubias mere presence in the dinner meeting provides a ground for administrative
liability.
In Gandeza Jr. v. Tabin, this court reminded judges:

55
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to avoid not only impropriety but also the mere appearance of
impropriety in all activities.
To stress how the law frowns upon even any appearance of impropriety in a magistrates activities, it has often been
held that a judge must be like Caesars wife - above suspicion and beyond reproach. Respondents act discloses a
deficiency in prudence and discretion that a member of the Judiciary must exercise in the performance of his official
functions and of his activities as a private individual. It is never trite to caution respondent to be prudent and
circumspect in both speech and action, keeping in mind that her conduct in and outside the courtroom is always under
constant observation. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) Respondent Judge Rubia clearly failed to live up to the
standards of his office. By participating in the dinner meeting and by failing to admonish respondent Pecaa for her
admitted impropriety, respondent Judge Rubia violated Canons 1 and 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Canon 1 INDEPENDECE
Judicial Independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. A judge shall
therefore uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its individual and institutional aspects.
Section 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of their assessment of the facts and in
accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law, free of any extraneous influence, inducement, pressure,
threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.
Section 6. Judges shall be independent in relation to society in general and in relation to the particular parties to a
dispute which he or she has to adjudicate.
Section 8. Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in order to reinforce public confidence in
the judiciary, which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence.
Canon 2 INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.
Section 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in view of a
reasonable observer.
Section 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice
must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
Section 3. Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or court personnel for
unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have become aware.
In De la Cruz v. Judge Bersamira, this court explained the necessity of a judges integrity:
By the very nature of the bench, judges, more than the average man, are required to observe an exacting standard of
morality and decency. The character of a judge is perceived by the people not only through his official acts but also
through his private morals as reflected in his external behavior. It is therefore paramount that a judges personal
behavior both in the performance of his duties and his daily life, be free from the appearance of impropriety as to be
beyond reproach. Only recently, in Magarang v. Judge Galdino B. Jardin, Sr., the Court pointedly stated that:
While every public office in the government is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral
righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary. Hence, judges are strictly mandated to abide
by the law, the Code of Judicial Conduct and with existing administrative policies in order to maintain the faith of the
people in the administration of justice.
In Castillo v. Judge Calanog, Jr., this court held:
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with
respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala as a private individual. There is
no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As
we have recently explained, a judges official life cannot simply be detached or separated from his personal existence.
Thus:
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in
the performance of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion. (Citations omitted)
In De la Cruz, this court emphasized the need for impartiality of judges:
. . . [A] judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities. A judge is not only required
to be impartial; he must also appear to be impartial. x x x Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or
improper conduct of judges.
. . . In this connection, the Court pointed out in Joselito Rallos, et al. v. Judge Ireneo Lee Gako Jr., RTC Branch 5, Cebu
City, that:
Well-known is the judicial norm that "judges should not only be impartial but should also appear impartial."
Jurisprudence repeatedly teaches that litigants are entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
The other elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would become meaningless if the ultimate decision is
rendered by a partial or biased judge. Judges must not only render just, correct and impartial decisions, but must do so
in a manner free of any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and integrity.
This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal, metropolitan and regional trial court judges like herein
respondent, because they are judicial front-liners who have direct contact with the litigating parties.

56
They are the intermediaries between conflicting interests and the embodiments of the peoples sense of justice. Thus,
their official conduct should be beyond reproach. (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
In the motion for intervention filed by Atty. Zarate before Justice Gaerlan, Atty. Zarate stated that even if respondent
Judge Rubia was present at the dinner meeting, it was merely an attempt to reconcile the parties and reach an
extrajudicial solution.
This is telling of a culture of tolerance that has led to the decay of the exacting nature of judicial propriety. Instead of
being outraged by respondent Judge Rubias meeting an opposing party, Atty. Zarate defended respondent Judge
Rubias actions.
Had it been true that a settlement was being brokered by respondent Judge Rubia, it should have been done in open
court with the record reflecting such an initiative.
As to complainants questioning of respondent Judge Rubias actions in the issuance of the orders in her pending cases
and the exercise of his judgment, this court agrees that complainant should resort to the appropriate judicial remedies.
This, however, does not negate the administrative liability of respondent Judge Rubia. His actions failed to assure
complainant and other litigants before his court of the required "cold neutrality of an impartial judge." Because of this,
respondent Judge Rubia also violated Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct on Impartiality:
CANON 3. IMPARTIALITY
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the decision itself but also to
the process by which the decision is made.
Section 1. Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor, bias, or prejudice.
Section 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence
of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.
Section 3. Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize the occasions on which it will be
necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing or deciding cases.
Section 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before, or could come before them, make any comment that
might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the process.
Nor shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or issue.
Complainant correctly cited Pascual v. Judge Bonifacio151 where this court held:
Upon assumption of office, a judge becomes the visible representation of the law and of justice. Membership in the
judiciary circumscribes one's personal conduct and imposes upon him a number of inhibitions, whose faithful
observance is the price one has to pay for holding such an exalted position. Thus, a magistrate of the law must comport
himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can withstand the most searching public
scrutiny, for the ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation of the people's faith
in the judicial system. This Court does not require of judges that they measure up to the standards of conduct of the
saints and martyrs, but we do expect them to be like Caesar's wife in all their activities. Hence, we require them to abide
strictly by the Code of Judicial Conduct.
It appears now that respondent has failed to live up to those rigorous standards. Whether or not he purposely went to
the Manila Hotel on November 25, 1998 to meet complainant or only had a chance meeting with him, his act of trying to
convince complainant to agree to his proposal is an act of impropriety. It is improper and highly unethical for a judge to
suggest to a litigant what to do to resolve his case for such would generate the suspicion that the judge is in collusion
with one party. A litigant in a case is entitled to no less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Judges are not only
required to be impartial, but also to appear to be so, for appearance is an essential manifestation of reality. Hence, not
only must a judge render a just decision, he is also duty bound to render it in a manner completely free from suspicion
as to its fairness and its integrity. Respondent's conduct in the instant case inevitably invites doubts about respondent's
probity and integrity. It gives ground for a valid reproach. In the judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue,
it is a necessity. Moreover, a judge's lack of impartiality or the mere appearance of bias would cause resentment if the
party who refused the judge's proposal subsequently lost his case. It would give rise to suspicion that the judgment was
"fixed" beforehand. Such circumstance tarnishes the image of the judiciary and brings to it public contempt, disrepute,
and ridicule. Thus, we are constrained to rule that respondent violated Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. His
misconduct is not excused but rather made more glaring by the fact that the controversy involving complainant was
pending in his own sala. (Citations omitted)
The totality of the actions of respondent Judge Rubia is a clear manifestation of a lack of integrity and impartiality
essential to a judge.
By meeting with complainant, respondent Judge Rubia also violated Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct:
CANON 4. PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.
Section 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
Section 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves
in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
Section 3. Judges shall, in their personal relations with individual members of the legal profession who practice regularly
in their court, avoid situations which might reasonably give rise to the suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality.

57
On propriety, this court held in Atty. Raul L. Correa v. Judge Medel Arnaldo Belen that: Indeed, the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary exhorts members of the judiciary, in the discharge of their duties, to be models of
propriety at all times.
....
A judge is the visible representation of the law. Thus, he must behave, at all times, in such a manner that his conduct,
official or otherwise, can withstand the most searching public scrutiny. The ethical principles and sense of propriety of a
judge are essential to the preservation of the people's faith in the judicial system.
Because of the meeting, and the subsequent orders issued after the meeting, respondent Judge Rubia violated the
notions of propriety required of his office. Respondents have relentlessly stood by their position that the meeting was a
chance encounter, and, thus, no impropriety could be attributed to the meeting itself.
Respondent Judge Rubias actions belittled the integrity required of judges in all their dealings inside and outside the
courts. For these actions, respondent Judge Rubia now lost the requisite integrity, impartiality, and propriety
fundamental to his office. He cannot be allowed to remain a member of the judiciary.
Respondents in this case failed to subscribe to the highest moral fiber mandated of the judiciary and its personnel. Their
actions tainted their office and besmirched its integrity. In effect, both respondents are guilty of gross misconduct. This
court defined misconduct as "a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by a public officer." In Camus v. The Civil Service Board of Appeals, this court held that
"[m]isconduct has been defined as wrong or improper conduct and gross has been held to mean flagrant; shameful. .
. . This Court once held that the word misconduct implies a wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment."
Both respondents are indeed guilty of gross misconduct. However, respondent Judge Rubia is also guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a judge for violating Canons 2, 3, and 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
This is not to say that complainant comes to these proceedings with clean hands either. As a litigant, she is enjoined to
act in such a way that will not place the integrity of the proceedings in jeopardy. Her liability, however, is not the subject
of these proceedings. To ensure that these actions will no longer be committed by any party, respondents must be
sanctioned accordingly, in keeping with the courts mandate to uphold a character of trust and integrity in society.
WHEREFORE, the court resolved tore docket the case as a regular administrative matter. Respondent Judge Marino
Rubia is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with corresponding forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued
leave credits, and disqualified from reinstatement or appointment in any public office, including government owned or -
controlled corporations. Respondent Eileen Pecaa is SUSPENDED for one (1) year for gross misconduct. This decision is
immediately executory. Respondent Judge Rubia is further ordered to cease and desist from discharging the functions of
his office upon receipt of this decision. Let a copy hereof be entered in the personal records of respondents.
SO ORDERED.

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Case No. 10
G.R. No. 179914 June 16, 2014
SPOUSES REYNALDO AND HILLY G. SOMBILON, Petitioners, vs. ATTY. REY FERDINAND GARAY AND PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000
ATTY. REY FERDINAND T. GARAY, Petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROLANDO S. VENADAS, SR., Respondent.

A judge owes the public and the court the duty to know the law by heart and to have the basic rules of procedure at the
palm of his hands.
Before us are two consolidated cases: (1) a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the June 13, 2007 Decision and the August 8, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 00477-MIN;
and (2) an Administrative Complaint against Judge Rolando S. Venadas, Sr. (Judge Venadas, Sr.) of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, Branch 8, for Grave Abuse of Authority and Grave Misconduct.
Factual Antecedents
Spouses Reynaldo and Hilly G. Sombilon (spouses Sombilon) were the previous owners of a 601-square meter property,
with two buildings constructed on it, in South Poblacion, Maramag, Bukidnon. The said property, which they mortgaged
to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) as security for their loan, was foreclosed and sold at public auction on July 15,
1998, where PNB emerged as the winning bidder in the amount of P2,355,000.00. Consequently, on August 20, 1998, a
Certificate of Sale was issued in PNBs name, which was duly registered with the Registry of Deeds for Bukidnon on
August 25, 1999. The one-year redemption period lapsed but spouses Sombilon failed to redeem the property.
In 2005, spouses Sombilon sought the help of Atty. Rey Ferdinand T. Garay (Atty. Garay), a Public Attorneys Office (PAO)
lawyer, who was once appointed by the court as counsel de officio for Hilly Sombilon in a criminal case and who
happens to be the owner of a lot adjacent to the property. Spouses Sombilon told Atty. Garay that they wanted to
reacquire the property from PNB, but had no money to repurchase it. Thus, they were hoping that he would agree to
advance the money and, in exchange, they promised to sell him the 331-square meter portion of the property, where
one of the buildings is located, for P5 million.
On February 9, 2005, Atty. Garay together with spouses Sombilon went to PNB to inquire about the status of the
property. They were informed by the bank that the property could be purchased at the fair market value of
P2,938,000.00. The following day, Atty. Garay went to the bank alone and offered to buy the property by making a down
payment of P587,600.00 or 20% of the purchase price.
On February 14, 2005, upon learning that Atty. Garay intended to purchase the entire property for himself, spouses
Sombilon offered to buy back the property from PNB. The bank advised them to make a 10% down payment of the
banks total claim to formalize their offer.
On February 15, 2005, a Final Deed of Conveyance was issued in favor of PNB.
On April 14, 2005, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 94384 was issued in the name of PNB.
On the same date, PNB decided to approve the purchase offer of Atty. Garay since spouses Sombilon failed to make the
required down payment.
G.R. No. 179914
On May 9, 2005, PNB filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession before the RTC of Malaybalay City,
Bukidnon. The case was docketed as Special Civil Case No. 375-05 and raffled to Branch 8, presided over by Judge
Venadas, Sr.
On June 10, 2005, Judge Venadas, Sr. issued an Order granting the Petition and, on June27, 2005, he issued a Writ of
Possession in favor of PNB.
On June 22, 2005, PNB informed spouses Sombilon that Atty. Garays offer to purchase the property had been approved
due to their failure to pay the full down payment.
On July 10, 2005, spouses Sombilon moved for a reconsideration of the issuance of the Writ of Possession arguing that
Atty. Garay, who was the former counsel of Hilly, was barred from purchasing the property pursuant to paragraph 5,
Article 1491 of the Civil Code.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 14, 2005, Judge Venadas, Sr. issued an Order holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession,
a portion of which reads:
Although, ordinarily a writ of possession is issued by the court because it is a mandatory and ministerial duty under Act
3135, x x x there is x x x an exception to this rule that if the implementation and enforcement of the writ of possession
would work [great] injustice to the registered owner because the petitioner PNB or in this case Atty. Garay counsel for
the Sombilon[s] is not entitled thereto. There is much to be said about the conduct of Atty. Garay in manipulating that
the property in question was finally bought by him from the PNB not to mention the possible violation of the [canon] of
legal and judicial ethics. However, the court cannot ignore the version of Mrs. Sombilon. The court will give Atty. Garay
[the opportunity] to rebut the evidence presented by spouses Sombilon and he is directed to appear on August 2, 2005,
at 8:30 in the morning. And if this case cannot be accommodated in the morning [,] it will proceed in the afternoon.
Send proper notice to Atty. Rey Ferdinand Garay for him to appear on said date.

59
In the meantime, the full implementation x x x of the Writ of Possession is hereby held in abeyance. Sheriff Claudio C.
Bugahod is hereby directed to return all items to the house of Spouses Sombilon and to restore them in full possession
of the property, if already implemented and enforced.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, Atty. Garay and PNB elevated the case to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Initially, on August 2, 2005, the CA dismissed the Petition for Certiorari for several procedural defects. However, on
reconsideration, the CA reinstated the Petition.
On July 25, 2006, the CA issued a Resolution granting the PNB and Atty. Garays application for a TRO. Thus:
Accordingly, let a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) be issued upon the posting of a Five Thousand Peso (P5,000.00)
bond within five (5) days from receipt hereof ordering, [petitioners] to:
1. Cease and desist from doing any act which is destructive of, or involves danger to, or alters the nature and condition
of the property;
2. Cease and desist from collecting rent or income [for the use of] the said property;
3. To deposit any rent or income arising from the said property which they may have already received to the Clerk of
Court of the Regional Trial Court of the Tenth Judicial Region, Malaybalay City; and
Furthermore, all tenants are hereby ordered to deposit any rentals arising from the disputed property to the said Clerk
of Court.
SO ORDERED.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On June 13, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision granting the Petition for Certiorari. The CA found grave abuse of discretion
on the part of Judge Venadas, Sr. in holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED and the assailed July 14, 2005 Order of the court a quo is
hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Spouses Sombilon moved for reconsideration but the CA denied the same in its August 8, 2007 Resolution.
Hence, spouses Sombilon filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari contending that:
THE [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR AND GRAVELY ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITIONFOR CERTIORARI OF
[ATTY. GARAY AND PNB] AND IN DECLARING THAT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNT[ING] TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION COMMITTED BYTHE [RTC], BRANCH [8], MALAYBALAY CITY, WHICH IS CONTRARY [TO] LAW
AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.
Spouses Sombilons Arguments
Spouses Sombilon insist that the CA should have dismissed the Petition for Certioraridue to the failure of PNB and Atty.
Garay to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed Order.
They also allege that PNB and Atty. Garay engaged in forum-shopping when they filed a Motion to Recall Order with the
RTC, in addition to the Petition for Certiorari they earlier filed with the CA.
As to the assailed Order, they contend that Judge Venadas, Sr. did not commit grave abuse of discretion in holding in
abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession because PNB no longer has the legal personality to apply for a
Writ of Possession considering that the subject property had already been sold to Atty. Garay, who they claim is also not
entitled to the Writ of Possession as he is disqualified from purchasing the subject property pursuant to paragraph 5,
Article 1491 of the Civil Code.
Atty. Garays and PNBs Arguments
Atty. Garay, on the other hand, argues that the CA did not err in granting the Petition for Certiorari as Judge Venadas, Sr.
acted with grave abuse of discretion when he recalled the Writ of Possession without notice to him and PNB. He also
emphasizes that it is a ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of possession after the redemption period has lapsed.
PNB, for its part, asserts that as the registered owner of the subject property, it is entitled to the Writ of Possession.
Thus, it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Venadas, Sr. in holding in abeyance the implementation of
the Writ of Possession, which he had earlier issued.
PNB further avers that it is not privy to the arrangement or relationship between Atty. Garay and spouses Sombilon. In
any case, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code does not apply to the instant case as Atty. Garay
purchased the subject property from PNB and not from spouses Sombilon.
Anent its failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration prior to filing a Petition for Certiorari, PNB explains that in this case
the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration may be dispensed with as the issue involved is purely one of law, which is an
exception under prevailing jurisprudence.
Besides, there was no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available at the time considering that Judge Venadas, Sr.
issued the assailed Order, holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession, without affording PNB the
opportunity to be heard.
Lastly, PNB denies that it committed forum-shopping claiming that it did not institute another action simultaneously
with the Petition for Certiorari it filed with the CA.
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000
Meanwhile, on November15, 2005, Atty. Garay filed a Verified Complaint against Judge Venadas, Sr., charging him with
Grave Abuse of Authority and Grave Misconduct when he proceeded with the hearing of spouses Sombilons motion for
60
reconsideration of the Order granting the issuance of the Writ of Possession despite lack of notice to PNB and for
holding in abeyance the Writ of Possession he issued in Special Civil Case No. 375-05.
Atty. Garays Arguments
Atty. Garay claims that Judge Venadas, Sr. should be administratively sanctioned for holding in abeyance the Writ of
Possession he earlier issued and for ignoring Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court as he proceeded to
hear the motion despite lack of notice to PNB.
Judge Venadas, Sr.s Arguments
In his defense, Judge Venadas, Sr. denies the charges against him arguing that he did not annul the Writ of Possession
but merely stayed its execution and implementation to prevent any injustice. He insists there was no violation of due
process because he immediately scheduled a hearing for PNB to present its evidence.
Report and Recommendation of the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
The OCA, in its Report, found Judge Venadas, Sr. administratively liable for grave abuse of authority bordering on gross
ignorance of procedure. Although the OCA did not touch on the issue of whether Judge Venadas, Sr. should be
administratively sanctioned for holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession as it was still pending
with the CA at that time, it nevertheless found Judge Venadas, Sr. guilty of blatantly disregarding Sections 4, 5, and 6 of
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court when he acted on the defective motion filed by spouses Sombilon. It also pointed out that
PNB and Atty. Garay were deprived of their rights to due process as no proper notice was sent to them. Thus, the OCA
recommended that:
a) the instant administrative complaint be DOCKETED as a regular administrative complaint;
b) respondent Judge Rolando S. Venadas,Sr. be found guilty of gross ignorance of procedure; and
c) respondent Judge Rolando S. Venadas, Sr. be ordered to pay a FINE of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) with a
WARNING that a similar transgression x x x will be dealt with more severely.
On November 26, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000 with G.R. No. 179914.
Issues
Stripped of the non-essentials, the issues boil down to: (1) whether Judge Venadas, Sr. committed grave abuse of
discretion in holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession; and (2) whether he should be
administratively sanctioned for holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession and for disregarding
Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
Our Ruling
G.R. No. 179914
The issuance of a writ of possession is ministerial upon the court.
A debtor has one year from the date the Certificate of Sale is registered with the Register of Deeds within which to
redeem his property. During the one-year redemption period, the purchaser may possess the property by filing a
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession before the court, upon the posting of a bond. But after the one-year
period, the purchaser has a right to consolidate the title and to possess the property, without need of a bond. And once
title is consolidated under the name of the purchaser, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial on the
part of the court; thus, no discretion is left to the court. Questions regarding the regularity and validity of the mortgage
or the foreclosure sale may not be raised as a ground to oppose or hold in abeyance the issuance of the writ of
possession as these must be raised in a separate action for the annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure sale. The
pendency of such action is also not a ground to stay the issuance of a writ of possession.
In this case, the redemption period had long lapsed when PNB applied for the issuance of the Writ of Possession. In fact,
the title over the subject property had already been consolidated in PNBs name. Thus, it was ministerial upon Judge
Venadas, Sr. to issue the Writ of Possession in favor of PNB, the registered owner of the subject property.
Though there are instances when the issuance of the Writ of Possession may be deferred, we find none of these
recognized exceptions present in the instant case. Spouses Sombilon claim that the sale between PNB and Atty. Garay
was invalid as it was done in violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code. However, the alleged invalidity of
the sale is not a ground to oppose or defer the issuance of the Writ of Possession as this does not affect PNBs right to
possess the subject property. Thus, there was no reason for Judge Venadas, Sr. to hold in abeyance the implementation
of the Writ of Possession. Clearly, he committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Order holding in
abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession because PNB, as the registered owner, is entitled to the
possession of the subject property as a matter of right.
Regarding the failure of PNB and Atty. Garay to move for a reconsideration of the assailed Order prior to the availment
of a special civil action for certiorari, we agree with PNB that the filing of a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed
with where the decision is a patent nullity or where there is violation of due process, such as in the instant case.
All told, we find no error on the part of the CA in granting the Petition for Certiorari.
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000
As to the Administrative Complaint filed against Judge Venadas, Sr., we agree with the findings and recommendations of
the OCA.
Records show that spouses Sombilon failed to comply with the three-day notice rule and the required proof of service
embodied in Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, thereby rendering the motion fatally defective. Despite
this, Judge Venadas, Sr. still took cognizance of the motion filed by spouses Sombilon, depriving PNB and Atty. Garay of
their right to due process.
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To exculpate himself from the charges against him, Judge Venadas, Sr. claims that the motion was personally served on
PNB and its counsel on July 12, 2005 but they refused to receive the same. However, as aptly pointed out by the OCA, no
affidavit was submitted to substantiate such allegation. Thus, we agree with the Court Administrator that Judge
Venadas, Sr. is guilty of grave abuse of authority bordering on gross ignorance of procedure for blatantly disregarding
Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
Blatant disregard of basic, elementary, and well-known rules of procedure and law is gross ignorance of the law, which is
classified as a serious charge under Rule 140, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC,
punishable by either dismissal from service, suspension for more than three months but not exceeding six months, or a
fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
Thus, in view of his blatant disregard of the rules and his grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Order, and
considering that this is his first offense, we find Judge Venadas, Sr. guilty of grave abuse of authority bordering on gross
ignorance of the law and is hereby fined the amount of P20,000.00. Incidentally, in the April 18, 2007 Resolution in A.M.
No. 12600-Ret., the Court approved the application of Judge Venadas, Sr. for disability retirement but withheld the
amount of P100,000.00 pending the final resolution of this case. In view thereof, the fine of P20,000.00 herein imposed
on Judge Venadas, Sr. is to be deducted from the withheld amount of P100,000.00.
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 179914, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The June 13, 2007 Decision and the August 8, 2007
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00477-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.
In Administrative Matter No. RTJ-06-2000, Judge Rolando S. Venadas, Sr. of the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay City,
Bukidnon, Branch 8, is hereby found guilty of grave abuse of authority bordering on gross ignorance of the law and is
ordered to pay a FINE of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) to be deducted from the withheld amount of
P100,000.00 from his retirement benefits pursuant to the April 18, 2007 Resolution in A.M. No. 12600-Ret.
SO ORDERED.

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Case No. 11
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that the Court en bane issued a Resolution dated AUGUST 12, 2014, which reads as follows:
"A.M. No. 13-11-09-SC (Re: Interview with Atty. Lorna Kapunan on Corruption in the Judiciary.) - Submitted to the
Court for disposition is the Compliance, dated December 12, 2013, of Atty. Loma Patajo-Kapunan (Atty. Kapunan),
pursuant to the directive of the Court in its November 26, 2013 Resolution.
In the said Resolution, the Court directed Atty. Kapunan to explain her answers in an interview by Anthony Tabema
(Taberna) in his show "Umagang Kay Ganda" on November 21, 2013 regarding corruption in the judiciary, within ten (10)
days from notice.
The Court required Atty. Kapunan to submit an explanation because, in an interview before a nationwide television
audience, she made unwarranted remarks which tended to erode public trust and confidence in the judiciary. She made
unfounded insinuations that some members of the judiciary can easily be bribed at the expense of justice.
Attached to her Compliance, as Annex "A," is the verbatim transcript of the subject interview by Tabema, and, as Annex
"B," the reproduction in CD form of the said interview.
In the said Compliance, Atty. Kapunan avers that, generally, the topic in the one hour face-to-face interview was her life
as a lawyer, which started with her family background and flowed into a discussion of her law practice and her
experiences with the courts and the justice system. In the course of the discussion, she made certain statements
pertaining to corruption in the judiciary.
Atty. Kapunan, however, claims that, mindful of a lawyer's duty to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts
and judicial officers, she refrained from using grossly disrespectful, contemptuous and derogatory language against the
courts and individual judges. This can be noted, according to her, from the replies she gave during the interview as
shown in the transcript, the relevant portions of which she quoted as follows:
A: Paano niyo po sasabihin na ang isang abugado ay mahina?
L: Mahina in the sense na-Kasi ang duty ng abugado tatlo e. First of all your duty is to the courts. Because we are all
officers of the court. And of course your duty is also to your client, fidelity to client. And the third duty is duty to the bar,
to your legal profession. Sino ang hindi magaling na abugado, number one, yung has total disrespect to the courts.
Meaning, nambabayad ng judge, 'di ba? That is disrespect because it shows you na you can buy justice in this country
and that disrespects the integrity of the judicial system. Yung kliyente, your duty to your client. Kung lagi mong sinasabi
sa kliyente, mananalo ka bayaran natin si ganoon, what skills did you give your client? Or you do not advise your client
well. Or you just don't know the law. Disservice yun sa kliyente. Hindi magaling na abugado yun. xxx (Annex "A" at page
2-3)
A: Meron na po ba kayong nakalaban na nagbayad po sa judge, talo kayo?
L: Ah, yes. Actually, wala namang natatalong kaso e. Nadadaya. (Laughs) Parang candidate. Hindi naman natatalo 'yung
kandidato. Nadadaya. No, sadly there are quite a number still. Although the clean up has started from the time of
former CJ Puno. At na- identify niya lahat ng mga kailangang tanggalin. There was not enough time. Or 'yung mga
notorious ay may kanya-kanyang padrino. (Annex "A" at page 3-4)
A: May kilala po kayong justice ng SC na nababayaran?
L:Oo.
A: Kwan po, sitting justice?
L: Ah, sitting justice? Mas lalong hindi ko sasabihin kung sitting justice, ano. (Laughs) That means may kaso kami doon.
No. Yes. Some justice both in the CA and the SC have been known to receive. Known to receive. Because sometimes,
hindi mo naman alam kung totoo 'yun o hindi e. Kasi that's the problem with bribery, wala namang resibo ang bribe. At
wala namang mag-aamin na nagbigay at walang mag-aamin na tumanggap. That's why the SC is having such a difficult
time to remove-anong tawag doon? Thieves in robes. (T: Hoodlums in robes.) Hoodlums in robes. Because walang
gustong mag-testify, whether kliyente or lawyer because babalikan ka e.
A: Sa pagkakaalam niyo, magkano na ang bayaran ngayon diyan? Pagdating sa CA saka sa SC.
L: Well, I am told ah, na ang restraining order daw sa CA can be as much as 5 million. (T: Hmm?) And sa level naman ng
prosecution, I am told that 'yung whether to file a case- whether for the fiscal to file a case or not to file a case, that's
half a million. Five hundred thousand. I am told.
A: Sa SC po? Hindi niyo binanggit.
L: Ah sa SC hindi ko po alam. Kung minsan retirement na e. Retirement fee na 'yan. (T: Nako, ang laki ho noon.)
A: Kung sa bagay meron pong justice ng SC, hinabol pa naka-retire na.
L: 'Di ba nag-midnight decision.
A: Si Justice Reyes ba 'yun?
L: Ay hindi ko alam. (Laughs) (Transcript, Annex "A" at pp. 4-5) 1/ 2
At any rate with reference to the above quoted responses, Atty. Kapunan explains that she made no personal accusation
against any court or judge. She adds that when imparting information on corruption and bribe money based on hearsay
and/or general knowledge within the legal circles, she, in the interest of candor and transparency, would use the
appropriate caveats - "known to receive," "I am told' and "hindi ko po alam."
Nonetheless, Atty. Kapunan cites the pronouncement of the Court in the case of In re Almacen on the obligations and
duties of the members of the Bar as officers of the court, thus:
xxx

63
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is not
diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a authority, nor that it is articulated by a lawyer." xxx Judicial
officers, like other public servants, must answer for their official actions before the chancery of public opinion.
xxx
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations. For courageous and
fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officers of the
court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings
and indiscretions of courts and judges.
Atty. Kapunan goes further to quote Justice Fred Ruiz Castro that "criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important
part of the traditional work of the lawyer."
Hence, as a citizen and officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his
duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the
official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen.
Atty. Kapunan further states that no less than the Honorable Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno, in a speech
delivered on September 25, 2013 in celebration of Law Day by the Philippine Bar Association, had urged lawyers to help
the Court in its effort to eliminate the so-called "hoodlums in robes" in the judiciary. The Chief Justice also challenged
lawyers to expose cases of bribery or extortion involving judges and vowed to support "whistleblowers."
Atty. Kapunan, thus, claims that the remarks made in the subject interview were not intended to insult, malign,
embarrass, or bring the Court into disrepute. She is not unmindful, she said, of the admonition of this Court that "a
lawyer is entitled to voice his criticism within the context of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech which
must be exercised responsibly. After all, every right carries with it the corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom
from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility."

The Court's Disposition

In sum, Atty. Kapunan admits to have made remarks with reference to corruption in the judiciary, but denies to have
uttered the same to degrade the court and bring it to disrepute. In invoking her constitutional guarantee to freedom of
speech, she explains though that she js not unaware of the corresponding obligation to exercise said right responsibly.
True, well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize the courts or any
of its officers. This right, however, is not without limitations. Atty. Kapunan should be reminded that comments made
against the courts must not go beyond the bounds of courtesy and fairness in order not to destroy the people's trust in
the judicial system. As held in In re Almacen:

Citing Re: Letter dated September 21, 2005 ofAtty. Noel S. Sorreda, 464 SCRA 32, 4205] sic.
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency
and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the
judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is
such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
Likewise, in Spouses Tiangco v. Aguilar, the Court wrote:
The right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of expression in the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution, must be exercised responsibly, for every right carries with it a corresponding obligation. Freedom is not
freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. In Zaldivar vs. Gonzales (166 SCRA 316, 353-354 [1988]), it
was held:
Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to deny him that right,
least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all
constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests
is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy
between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of
freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing
justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted
by the general community.
Moreover, it is well to remind Atty. Kapunan that, as a member ofthe Bar, she is under the obligation to maintain at all
times a respectful attitude toward the courts. This responsibility of a lawyer in relation to the court is imposed under the
Code ofProfessional Responsibility. Specifically, Canon 10 and 11 provide:
CANON 10 -A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS
AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
This responsibility under the said Code is closely entwined with her vow in the attorney's oath, to conduct herself as a
lawyer with all good fidelity to the courts, as well as her duties under Section 20 (b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and
the first canon of the Canons of Professional Ethics, thus:
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux and ferment. His
investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more
64
imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good
fidelity xxx to the courts; and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to
courts of justice and judicial officers." The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a
respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its
supreme importance."
These rules of courteous demeanor must, according to the Court, be observed not only in open court, but also out of
court.
While it appears that, at the moment, there is no solid basis to proceed against her, the Court is not disposed to shelve
the matter in the meantime. Justice Brion is ofthe view that the matter should be dealt with appropriately given the
extent and gravity of the substance of her disclosure on the alleged corruption in the judiciary and the public perception
her statements represent. In his Reflections, he said, that the Court should "proactively react to the smoke that Atty.
Kapunan has raised" as a fire must have existed somewhere behind her statements which, according to him, should not
be left unattended to.
As also pointed out by Justice Brion, Atty. Kapunan's disclosures as to the presence and prevalence of corruption in the
judiciary were made in one of the most watched program in the country before millions of televiewers, an audience that
largely does not appreciate what hearsay means. Hence, according to him, the Court's inaction on this case would
certainly place in question the integrity of the justice system in the public's eyes. He, thus, suggests as an alternative that
the matter be referred for further investigation as done in the "Ma'am Arlene" inquiry.
Justice Leonen concurs with Justice Brion's proposal. He adds that the Court needs to proactively address alleged
corruption in the judiciary. To accomplish this purpose, he specifically proposes the creation of its own active
investigation unit (Internal Affairs Unit) that answers to a committee ofthe Supreme Court.
Justice Leonen in his Concurring Opinion also expresses his support on the ponencia's recognition that lawyers do enjoy
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression. For this reason, he does not fault Atty. Kapunan for her
statements on national television. He, however, finds Atty. Kapunan liable for acknowledging that she has heard and
probably experienced acts ofcorruption and for admitting that she has done nothing to make the perpetrators
answerable.
WHEREFORE, the Compliance submitted by Atty. Loma Patajo- Kapunan, dated December 12, 2013, is NOTED."

65
Case No. 12
A.M. No. MTJ-11-1778 June 5, 2013(Formerly OCA IPI No. 08-1966-MTJ)
MARICOR L. GARADO, Complainant, vs. JUDGE LIZABETH GUTIERREZ-TORRES, Respondent.

Before us is a Verified Complaint-Affidavit, filed by complainant Maricor L. Garado charging respondent Judge Lizabeth
Gutierrez-Torres, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 60, Mandaluyong City, with violation of the Rule
3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct in connection with Civil Case No. 20129 entitled "Maricor Garado v. Rose
Virgie Estor."
Complainant alleges that she is the plaintiff in the aforesaid civil case for sum of money and damages. She complaints
that the case is covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and only involves a claim for the payment of a
loan amounting to P50,000 plus interest and a claim for damages amounting to P30,000, but the case has remained
unresolved for more than 20 months from the time it was filed.
Complainant narrates that her complaint against defendant Rose Virgie Estor was filed on August 22, 2005. After
respondent judge denied defendant Estors motion to dismiss on July 3, 2006, Estor thereafter filed an Urgent Ex-parte
Motion for Extension of Time (To File Responsive Pleading) followed by a second motion to dismiss on November 16,
2006. Complainant, meanwhile, filed a motion to render judgment with an opposition to the second motion to dismiss
on November 27, 2006. The two motions were submitted for resolution on November 27, 2006 and January 15, 2007,
respectively, but both motions remained unresolved as of the date of the filing of the complaint on May 9, 2007.
In a 1st Indorsement dated May 17, 2007, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) directed Judge Torres to file her
Comment on the complaint within ten days. Respondent judge received the 1st Tracer against respondent judge on July
24, 2007 requiring her to file the May 25, 2007, but failed to comply with the directive. Thus, the OCA issued required
Comment within five days from notice. Respondent judge also received the 1st Indorsement on Tracer on August 3,
2007, but still failed to comply.
On March 10, 2008, this Courts Third Division issued a Resolution directing respondent judge to: (1) show cause why
she should not be administratively sanctioned in view of her refusal to submit her Comment despite the two directives,
and (2) file her Comment within five days from receipt of notice, otherwise, an administrative case will be filed against
her. Respondent judge received a copy of the Resolution on April 16, 2008, but again ignored the same. Consequently,
the Court issued another Resolution6 on July 14, 2008 imposing upon Judge Torres a fine of P1,000, to be paid within ten
days from receipt, or imprisonment of five days if the fine is not paid within the period of ten days. The July 14, 2008
Resolution also directed respondent judge to comply with the Courts Show Cause Resolution dated March 10, 2008.
Despite receipt of the Resolution, however, Judge Torres neither complied with the Resolution nor paid the fine.
Thus, on April 21, 2010, the Court issued a Resolution and resolved to await the payment of the fine by respondent
judge; to consider the filing of her Comment as waived; and to refer this administrative matter to the OCA for final
evaluation, report and recommendation.
On November 11, 2010, the OCA submitted its Memorandum to the Court finding respondent judge administratively
liable and recommending that the Court:
1. RE-DOCKET the case as a regular administrative matter against respondent Judge Lizabeth G. Torres;
2. DISMISS respondent Judge Lizabeth G. Torres from the service and impose upon her all the attendant penalties; and
3. IMPOSE upon respondent Judge Lizabeth G. Torres the penalty of FIVE (5) days imprisonment for her failure to pay the
FINE of P1,000.00 within the required period, pursuant to the Courts Resolution dated 14 July 2008.
In recommending the penalty of dismissal, the OCA noted that in five previous administrative cases, respondent was
found liable for undue delay in rendering a decision, resolution or order, and sternly warned that the commission of the
same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. The OCA also noted eight other pending administrative cases
filed by different litigants against respondent judge involving offenses of similar nature. As well, the OCA noted the four
instances under the present administrative case where respondent judge failed to comply with directives/orders issued
by this Court.
We agree with the OCA that respondent judge should be held administratively liable.
At the outset, the Court notes that respondent had been given ample opportunity to address the complaint against her.
The OCA sent and respondent judge received the 1st Indorsement dated May 17, 2007 and 1st Tracer dated July 24,
2007, both of which explicitly required her to file her Comment on the complaint. However, up until her dismissal from
the service by the Court on November 23, 2010, respondent had not complied with the OCA directives. Moreover,
respondent also failed to comply, despite due notice, with the Resolutions dated March 10, 2008 and July 14, 2008 of
the Court itself.
Respondents failure to submit her Comment and compliance as required by the OCA and this Court is tantamount to
insubordination, inefficiency, and neglect of duty. It was respondents duty then not only to obey the lawful orders of
her superiors, but also to defend herself against complainants charges and prove her fitness to remain a member of the
bench. By her failure to comply with the OCA and this Courts directives, respondent judge has completely lost her
chance to defend herself.
As to the merits of the administrative complaint, the pleadings and evidence on record clearly establish respondents
liability for undue delay in resolving Civil Case No. 20129.
Section 15(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, mandates that cases or matters filed with the lower courts must be
decided or resolved within three months from the date they are submitted for decision or resolution. With respect to
cases falling under the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, first level courts are only allowed 30 days following
66
the receipt of the last affidavit and position paper, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, within which to
render judgment. Section 6 of the said Rule also requires first level courts to render judgment motu proprio or upon
motion of the plaintiff if the defendant fails to file an answer to the complaint within the allowable period.
Judges are oft-reminded of their duty to act promptly upon cases and matters pending before their courts. Rule 3.05,
Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct directs judges to "dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases
within the required periods." Canons 6 and 7 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics further exhort judges to be prompt and
punctual in the disposition and resolution of cases and matters pending before their courts:
6. PROMPTNESS
He should be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him, remembering that justice delayed is often justice
denied.
7. PUNCTUALITY
He should be punctual in the performance of his judicial duties, recognizing that the time of litigants, witnesses, and
attorneys is of value and that if the judge is unpunctual in his habits, he sets a bad example to the bar and tends to
create dissatisfaction with the administration of justice.
Administrative Circular No. 1 dated January 28, 1988 likewise reminds all judges to observe scrupulously the periods
prescribed in Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and to act promptly on all motions and interlocutory
matters pending before their courts.
Prompt disposition of cases is attained basically through the efficiency and dedication to duty of judges. If judges do not
possess those traits, delay in the disposition of cases is inevitable to the prejudice of litigants. Accordingly, judges should
be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of their obligation to administer justice
promptly. In this case, respondent judge failed to live up to the exacting standards of duty and responsibility that her
position required. Upon the failure of the defendant Estor to file her Answer in Civil Case No. 20129, respondent was
then required under Section 6 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure to render judgment in Civil Case No.
20129 within 30 days. She failed to do so contrary to the rationale behind the said Rule, which was precisely adopted to
promote a more expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of litigants
to the speedy disposition of cases.
Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, classifies undue delay in rendering a decision and violation of
Supreme Court directives as less serious charges which are punishable with the penalty of suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for one month to three months, or a fine of P10,000 to P20,000. Given that
respondent had been previously dismissed from the service in Lugares v. Gutierrez-Torres, however, the penalty of
suspension is already inapplicable. Thus, the Court imposes upon respondent for her undue delay in resolving Civil Case
No. 20129 a fine in the maximum amount of P20,000, and another fine of P10,000 for her repeated failure to obey this
Courts directives, both amounts to be deducted from her accrued leave credits.
WHEREFORE, respondent Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres is found LIABLE of the less serious charges of undue delay in
resolving Civil Case No. No. 20129 and violation or Supreme Court directives. She is FINED the amount or P20,000 for the
first offense and another P10,000 for the second offense, both amounts to be deducted from her accrued leave credits.
To effect the penalties imposed, the Employee's Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services-OCA, is DIRECTED to
ascertain respondent Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres's total earned leave credits. Thereafter, the Finance Division, Fiscal
Management Office-OCA, is DIRECTED to compute the monetary value or respondent Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres's total
accrued leave credits and deduct therefrom the amount of the fines imposed, without prejudice to whatever penalty the
Court may impose on other remaining and/or pending administrative cases against her, if any.
SO ORDERED.

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Case No. 13
[AM No. RTJ-02-1669. April 14, 2004]
HON. JULIETA A. DECENA, HON. VIRGILIO D. PONTANAL, HON. AMELITA A. IBASCO, HON. GERRY D. RAA, HON. PEDRO
N. MORA. JR., and HON. FERDINAND T. AGUILAR, complainants, vs. JUDGE NILO A. MALANYAON, Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32, Pili, Camarines Sur, respondent.

The regular session of a municipal council was interrupted by a heckler in the audience hurling various accusatory
remarks and insults at the council members. The heckler is a judge, the incident, the subject of this case.
On 26 May 2000, the Office of the Court Administrator received a Joint Affidavit-Complaint executed by various
municipal officials of Bula, Camarines Sur. The affiants-complainants, Mayor Julieta A. Decena (Decena), Vice-mayor
Virgilio D. Pontanal (Pontanal), and Councilors Amelita A. Ibasco (Ibasco), Gerry D. Raa (Raa), Pedro N. Mora, Jr. (Mora),
and Ferdinand T. Aguila (Aguilar) sought the dismissal from the service and the disbarment of respondent Judge Nilo A.
Malanyaon (Judge Malanyaon), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32, of Pili, Camarines Sur, on
account of his conduct during the 21 February 2000 session of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula.
In a Resolution dated 19 June 2002, the Court referred the matter for investigation, report and recommendation to
Court of Appeals Justice Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. After Justice Rosario sought to be excused owing to his forthcoming
retirement then, the Court referred the matter to the Court of Appeals for assignment to a Justice by court-wide raffle.
The case was raffled to Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. After conducting several hearings on the case, Justice Reyes, Jr.
rendered a Report and Recommendation (Report), which was received by this Court on 22 July 2003. From the Report,
we draw the following antecedent facts:
On 21 February 2000, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula, Camarines Sur convened its regular session, with Vice-mayor
Pontanal presiding. Among the matters on the agenda was the revocation of two previous council resolutions
authorizing Rolando N. Canet (Canet) to operate a cockpit in the municipality. A former vice-mayor of Bula, Canet is also
the nephew-in-law of Judge Malanyaon. Both Judge Malanyaon and Canet attended the 21 February 2000 session of the
Sangguniang Bayan. Canet, however, came along with many supporters. Noticing his presence, the Sanggunian offered
to recognize Judge Malanyaon; but he declined, saying that he merely wanted to be an observer.
From that point on, the episode during the Sanggunian session as culled in the Report on the basis of the submitted
affidavits transpired in this wise:
Subsequently, during the deliberations, the vice mayor attested that respondent interrupted the session by shouting
comments in their vernacular such as: Ambog, Ambog iyan (lies, they are lies); Butig! Caya mo yan? Maski Butig! Maski
Piglalado Camo! (Lies! Can you do that? Even if they are lies? Even if you are being deceived?) and Dale Sana Camong
Dale! (You do things recklessly). During the deliberations relative to the authority of Mr. Rolando N. Canet to operate a
cockpit, the respondent judge, with blazing eyes and a red face further interrupted the session by lambasting the
municipal councilors with disparaging and insulting remarks, which left the whole proceedings in confusion.
In the heat of respondents outbursts, he uttered the following remarks to the vice mayor:
Ika Bondying (the vice mayors nickname),. So kag-igin MO BUKO ADTONG MADAYA, Di adto nag gagamit kana kuwa kan
municipyo, o camo ginagamit mo si Revo mo! Mag adal kamo, a biente uno mil, susmareosep kamo. Sabi co ka ninyo
mig-lecture aco pero abo man kamo, o taono, basta camo matugaan ni alkalde? Mga uda ugali! (You Bodying, your
father was not deceitful. He was not using the property of the municipality, now you are using your Revo. You all
study! You are receiving twenty one thousand pesos, my god, I told you I will lecture you, but you did not want me to.
Why? As long as you were promised by the mayor? You have no etiquette!)
O Bondying ika, maski ambugan camo kana alkalde, tutubudon ninyo? Urgent na ono? Din a kamo pwendeng butigan.
Pigbubutigan camo. Amo yan sabihon ko ka ninyo! (You Bondying, even if the mayor is telling you lies, will you follow
her? What urgent? You could not be lied upon again! You are being deceived, thats what I will tell you!)
Pedro N. Mora, former municipal councilor of Bula, Camarines Sur, in his affidavit also conformed that he heard the
respondent judge utter: Ambog, Ambog iyan (lies, they are lies); Butig! Caya mo yan? Maski Butig! Maski Piglalado
Camo! (Lies! Can you do that? Even if they are lies? Even if you are being deceived?) and Dale Sana Camong Dale! (You
do things recklessly) during the session of Sangguniang Bayan of Bula, held on 21 February 2000. xxx
Ferdinand T. Aguilar, another former councilor of Bula, Camarines Sur, likewise attested to the intemperate language
used by the respondent during the regular session of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula on 21 February 2000. Aguilar
however adds that he too became the object of respondents ire when the latter publicly told him the following:
O, Aguilar, ono pigsusunod mo? Ilinga, ilinga tolos ninyo, ono regal, o ono regal ninyo? You cannot suspend the rule
without 2/3 votes! Ono, magbasa kamo! Saying kito sweldo ninyo! (You Aguilar, What are you following? Look, look at
this, what is the regulation, what are your regulations? You cannot suspend the rule without the 2/3 votes! You read!
Your salary is just a waste!);
O, ika (pointing at Aguilar) O ono pigsusunod mo? O, kua raw, basaha ninyo! Onong klaseng Sanggunian adi? Di
nagsusunod sa regal a, Ferdinand? Di ninyo piggagamit to mga payo ninyo! O, ilinga! Basaha Ferdinand. (You, [pointing
at Aguilar] what are you following? You get [the rules] and read them! What kind of Sanggunian is this? You not
following the rules a, Ferdinand? You are not using your head! You look and read it, Ferdinand.);
Ika sana Ferdinand saying kito alintak mo! Uray ni ina nya, onong urgent na nakakaptan ninyo? Kon pig-gagamit ya mga
gamit kot munisipyo, di ninyo pigaactibaran! (You Ferdinand you what is in your head is such a waste. Ass of your
mother! To what urgent matter that you are holding on? If it is the property of this municipality is the one being used,
you are not acting on it.);
68
Ika Ferdinand nag-aadal ka kin abugasiya, nagpapabuta man ika, ining, pigbubutigan na kamo? (You Ferdinand, you are
studying law and yet you were blinded even though you are cheated);
Ika, Ferdinand basahon ko, kon gusto mo bikolon ko, di san sinasabing bago magtaong permit agko Ordinansa. Si isay ya
nagsasabi? Ya tinatawam kin poder ngowan uya Sangguniang Bayan ya mig-taong lisensya! Tinawan na kin lisensa o ono
pa? (You Ferdinand, I will read to you, if you want I will read it to you in our dialect. That it is never stated there that
before issuing permit, there should be an ordinance first. Who said that? The one that is given the power is the
Sangguniang Bayan the one that will issue the license! He [Rolando Canet] was already given a license, what else?);
Ika Aguilar, basahon mo iton a! da siton nagsasabing bago tawan kin lisensya, kumasta ngona kin ordinansa! O sa
cockfighting o kon sa demonyo! Ining sa bulangan na ini 1964 pa ako, a! ngani ninyong maintindihan. Ngowan, si
Rolando Canet agko lisensiya, huli ta abo ni Decena, natugon man kamo gusto ninyong anularan! Ngowan, gusting
bumayad abong pabayadon. Magbasa kamo, 21 mil, buray ni ina niya! Ako, nag-absent akong kabangang aldow para
magatender kading session, sangribo ana nauda kanako! Gusto ko sanang porbaran kamo adding osipon na kon
talagang nakastahan na kamo! Magbasa kamo, 21 mil, buray ni ina niya, 21 mil. (You Aguilar, read that [referring to
the rules], it is never stated here that before you issue a license, you have to pass first an ordinance, in the
cockfighting or whatever devil is that! This law about the cockfighting this has been the law since 1964 so that you will
understand. Now, Rolando Canet has a license, just because Decena does not want to give permit you want the same
annulled. Now, he wants to pay but does not want to accept the same. You read, 21 thousand [referring to our salary]
ass of your mother! I did not report for half a day just to attend this session and I lost P1,000.00 in the process in the
form of salary just so I will be able to prove for myself about the rumors that you have been bought [or to that
effect]! You read! Twenty one thousand! Ass of your mother, twenty one thousand!)
Sayang Ferdinand, kun arog ya naturan mo, di ida makakapasar, amo yan sasabihon ko kanimo! Kon arog kito ya studio
mo, babaliktaron mo to demonyong iton, a, maski ton butig, amo tutuboron mo a, tibaad di ika maka-abogado, kon
maka-abogado man, makakarsel ka! (What a waste Ferdinand, if thats what you learned, you will not pass [the Bar
exams] thats what I will tell you. What are you going to tell them, if that is how you understand, that you will reverse
this kind of devil even if it is a lie and yet you will follow the same. You might not become a lawyer, and if you become
one you will go to jail.)
Ernesto B. Ballaber, who is the incumbent Barangay Captain of Salvacion, Bula, Camarines Sur, testified through his
affidavit that he was present and seated beside the respondent judge on the date in question. He noticed that the
respondent judge was drunk as the latter gave off a strong alcoholic scent. Moreover, Ballebar observed that the
respondents eyes were watery and red.
Ballebars deduction that Judge Malanyaon was drunk was reinforced when the respondent stood up, banged the table
and shouted in the vernacular: Butig!, Butig! Butig! (Lies! Lies! Lies!) and Ambog! Ambog iyan! (Lie! Its a lie!) during the
session. Ballebar further testified that the respondent also verbally abused the members of the Sangguniang.
xxx
Gerry D. Raa asseverated that when the issue on the resolutions affecting the operation of the cockpit arena by Rolando
N. Canet was being taken up by the council, Judge Malanyaon suddenly pushed the table in front of him, bolted from his
chair and fiercely castigated the members of the Sangguniang Bayan with every personal attacks. In fact, Raa attested
that the respondent publicly discredited and humiliated him during the session by imputing that he was operating an
illegal cockpit in the municipality. (Emphasis not ours.)
Mora and Raa, as well as two other witnesses for the complainants confirmed that Judge Malanyaon reeked of liquor as
he proceeded with his tirade.
According to Bartolome D. Parro, the Sangguniang Bayan OIC Secretary, because of the outbursts of Judge Malanyaon
the session was suspended. Meanwhile, the Sanggunian members were involuntarily detained at the session hall. They
were unable to leave as the entrance and exits were blocked by supporters of Canet. Meanwhile, Judge Malanyaon
continued his outbursts against the councilors.
Admitting his presence during the Sanggunian session, Judge Malanyaon explained, however, that he was there not as a
judge but in his private capacity as a taxpayer. He denied he was drunk, even as he admitted he was enraged and furious
over the proceedings at the Sanggunian. He did not deny delivering a diatribe, but he claimed his actions were
appropriate since the proposed revocation of his nephew-in-laws cockpit license was illegal in his estimation.
All told, Judge Malanyaon did not dispute the facts as laid down by the complainants and the latters witnesses. He
justified his behavior though as the fulminations of a righteously outraged citizen which according to him should be
segregated from his function as a judge.
Judge Malanyaon deserves to be taken to task for his outrageous behavior as it clearly violates the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
First. The remarks uttered are patently defamatory and even vulgar. Indeed, such utterances should not be expected of
a public official worthy of his office. At fault is not the sentiment harbored, but the impolitic choice of words employed
to express such sentiment. It is not even particularly relevant if Judge Malanyaon was inebriated at that time, for the
reckless character of his remarks are in themselves palpable, whether they were delivered in a drunken or sober state.
Second. Judge Malanyaons harangue was directed at the members of the Sangguniang Bayan in the course of a regular
session of the body. The members of the Sanggunian are, by reason of their public office, entitled to the respect of other
people, especially their fellow public officers. Judge Malanyaons diatribe indicates his inability to accord his fellow public
officials their due.

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Third. Judge Malanyaon made his remarks in a public forum. Obviously, however, he forgot or even failed to realize that
he is a representative of the judicial branch of government, the judge being the visible representation of the law and,
more importantly, of justice. The judiciary is loathe to interfere with the due exercise by co-equal branches of
government of their official functions, absent any justiciable action brought in due course.
Fourth. It must be understood that Judge Malanyaons remarks were aimed at preventing the Sanggunian from revoking
the cockpit license of Canet. In doing so, he was attempting to interfere with the will of the Sanggunian as an
independent legislative body. As observed by Investigating Justice Reyes, Jr., the awkward situation was aggravated
when Judge Malanyaon publicly humiliated the councilors in front of their constituents, making them look witless and
obtuse, and thereby creating a mockery of the proceedings. The disruptive presence of several supporters of Canet, a
local town politician, porated the protest against the plan to revoke the cockpit license with political color. Judge
Malanyaons active participation in apparent concert with Canets supporters exposed him as nothing but a common
lobbyist, as he forgot to act as a judge with the standard judicial temperament and prudence.
Fifth. Judge Malanyaon obstructed the Sangguniang members from performing their official duties. As Investigating
Justice Reyes, Jr. pointed out, the acts complained of Judge Malanyaon is no less a crime under Article 144 of the
Revised Penal Code. As a judge, respondent should very well know how deleterious it would be to the discharge of his
functions if the court hearings he presides over would be rudely interrupted by fulsome tirades delivered by a spectator
in the audience. If such a situation arise in his courtroom, Judge Manlayaon would have every right to take offense to
the disruption in the proceedings. A legislative session is no less an official proceeding as a court session and any one
who disrupts either proceedings deserves to be sanctioned.
Sixth. The Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge shall neither allow family relationships to influence judicial
conduct or judgment, nor allow the prestige of judicial office to be used or lent to advance the private interests of
others. It does not escape our attention that Judge Malanyaon was agitated during the Sanggunian session because the
interests of his nephew-in-law were under attack. Perhaps, Judge Malanyaon honestly believed that the revocation of
Canets cockpit license was illegal. Yet, it would not justify his undisguised attempt to prevent the threatened
detrimental action against his relative with his influence. We agree with the conclusion of Investigating Justice Reyes, Jr.
that Judge Malanyaon allowed himself to be used by his nephew-in-law to promote the latters private interests, in
contravention of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Judge Malanyaon needs to be reminded that his judicial identity does not terminate at the end of the day when he takes
off his judicial robes. Even when garbed in casual wear outside of the halls of justice, a judge retains the air of authority
and moral ascendancy that he or she wields inside the sala. As the Court once held:
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in
the performance of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion.
It may strike perhaps as a poetically tragic notion, but for very good reasons, a judge's official life cannot simply be
detached or separated from his personal existence. Indeed, the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2 in particular,
mandates that a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities, as well as behave at
all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Thus, the Court has to dismiss
outright Judge Malanyaons suggestion that his actions be evaluated as one of a taxpayer or ordinary citizen and not as
that of a judge. In fact, his utterances were not made under a cloak of anonymity, for the members of the council, as
well as some of the people in the gallery knew very well that he was a judge. It is highly probable that his invectives took
on a greater imperative on the listeners precisely because he was a judge, with all the authority attendant to the office.
The conduct of Judge Malanyaon relative to the 21 February 2000 legislative session of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula is
inexcusable and simply cannot be condoned. His actuations constitute palpable violations of the Code of Judicial
Conduct:
CANON 2 A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.
Rule 2.01. A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary
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Rule 2.03. A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The
prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others
to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends that respondent be fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). In his
seventeen (17) years in the judiciary, Judge Malanyaon has not been sanctioned, except once by reprimand. With the
comparative seriousness of the offense, a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) would serve as an appropriate
penalty.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Nilo A. Malanyaon is hereby found GUILTY of conduct unbecoming of a judge, in
violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.01 and Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is ordered to pay a FINE of TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) with a STERN WARNING that the commission of the same or a similar act or omission in
the future will be dealt with more severely.

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Case No. 14
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691 April 2, 2013(Formerly A.M. No. 07-7-04-SC)
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner, vs. JUDGE ANATALIO S. NECESSARIO, Branch 2; JUDGE GIL R.
ACOSTA, Branch 3; JUDGE ROSABELLA M. TORMIS, Branch 4; and JUDGE EDGEMELO C. ROSALES, Branch 8; all of
MTCC-Cebu City; CELESTE P. RETUYA, Clerk III, MTCC Branch 6, Cebu City; CORAZON P. RETUYA, Court Stenographer,
MTCC, Branch 6, Cebu City; RHONA F. RODRIGUEZ, Administrative Officer I, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial
Court (RTC) Cebu City; EMMA D. VALENCIA, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Branch 18, Cebu City; MARILOU CABANEZ,
Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City; DESIDERIO S. ARANAS, Process Server, MTCC, Branch 3, Cebu City;
REBECCA ALESNA, Court Interpreter, MTCC, Branch 1, Cebu City; and HELEN MONGGAYA, Court Stenographer, MTCC,
Branch 4, Cebu City. Respondents.

This Court has long held that "[the] administration of justice is circumscribed with a heavy burden of responsibility. It
requires that everyone involved in its dispensation from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk live up to the
strictest standards of competence, honesty, and integrity in the public service."
THE CASE
This is an administrative case that stemmed from the 6 July 2007 Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA). The judicial audit team created by the OCA reported alleged irregularities in the solemnization of marriages in
several branches of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) and Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City. Certain
package fees were offered to interested parties by "fixers" or "facilitators" for instant marriages.
THE FACTS
On 3 July 2007, Atty. Rullyn Garcia, Region 7 Judicial Supervisor, proceeded to Cebu City and headed the audit team
created by OCA in investigating Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8 of the MTCC in Cebu City. A female and male lawyer of the audit
team went undercover as a couple looking to get married. They went to the Palace of Justice and were directed by the
guard on duty to go to Branch 4 and look for a certain "Meloy". The male lawyer feared that he would be recognized by
other court personnel, specifically the Clerk of Court of Branch 4 who was a former law school classmate. The two
lawyers then agreed that only the female lawyer would go inside and inquire about the marriage application process.
Inside Branch 4, a woman named Helen approached and assisted the female lawyer. When the female lawyer asked if
the marriage process could be rushed, Helen assured the lawyer that the marriage could be solemnized the next day,
but the marriage certificate would only be dated the day the marriage license becomes available. Helen also guaranteed
the regularity of the process for a fee of three thousand pesos (P3,000) only.
In its 10 July 2007 Resolution, this Court treated the Memorandum dated 6 July 2007 of the judicial audit team as a
formal administrative complaint and directed Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, Judge Gil R. Acosta, Judge Rosabella M.
Tormis, and Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales to submit their respective comments. The Court also suspended the judges
pending resolution of the cases against them.
On 24 August 2007, the OCA through Senior Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao submitted its
Memorandum dated 29 August 2007 and Supplemental Report. Six hundred forty-three (643) marriage certificates were
examined by the judicial audit team. The team reported that out of the 643 marriage certificates examined, 280
marriages were solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code. The logbooks of the MTCC Branches indicate a higher
number of solemnized marriages than the number of marriage certificates in the courts custody. There is also an
unusual number of marriage licenses obtained from the local civil registrars of the towns of Barili and Liloan, Cebu.
There were even marriages solemnized at 9 a.m. with marriage licenses obtained on the same day. The town of Barili,
Cebu is more than sixty (60) kilometers away from Cebu City and entails a travel time of almost two (2) hours. Liloan,
Cebu, on the other hand, is more than ten (10) kilometers away from Cebu City.
The judicial audit team, after tape-recording interviews with other court and government personnel, also reported the
following:
1) Celeste P. Retuya admitted that she assisted couples who wanted to get married by checking whether their
documents were complete and referred them to Judges Tormis, Necessario, and Rosales afterwards;
2) Corazon P. Retuya referred couples who wanted to get married to Judge Necessario. There were also "assistants" who
would go over the couples documents before these couples would be referred to Judge Necessario. Retuya also
narrated several anomalies involving foreign nationals and their acquisition of marriage licenses from the local civil
registrar of Barili, Cebu despite the fact that parties were not residents of Barili. Those anomalous marriages were
solemnized by Judge Tormis;
3) Rhona F. Rodriguez assisted couples and referred them to any of the available judges. She admitted that after the
payment of the solemnization fee of three hundred pesos (P300), a different amount, as agreed upon by the parties and
the judge, was paid to the latter. She admitted that she accepted four thousand pesos (P4,000) for facilitating the
irregular marriage of Moreil Baranggan Sebial and Maricel Albater although she gave the payment to a certain "Mang
Boy";
4) Emma D. Valencia admitted that she assisted couples seeking to get married and that most of the marriage licenses
were obtained from the local civil registrar of Barili and Liloan, Cebu because the registrars in those towns were not
strict about couples attendance in the family planning seminar. She also admitted that couples gave her food while the
judge received five hundred pesos (P500) if the marriage was solemnized inside the chambers. Foreigners were said to
have given twice the said amount. The judge accepted one thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500) for gasoline expenses
if the marriage was celebrated outside the chambers;
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5) Marilou Cabaez admitted that she assisted couples and referred them to Judges Tormis, Necessario, or Rosales.
However, she denied receiving any amount from these couples. She told the audit team that during the 8th, 18th, and
28th of the month, seven (7) to eight (8) couples would go directly to Judge Rosabella M. Tormis for a fifteen-minute
marriage solemnization;
6) Desiderio S. Aranas admitted that he started assisting couples in 2003. He told the investigating team that Judge Gil
Acosta would talk to couples wishing to get married without a license. He would produce a joint affidavit of cohabitation
form on which he or the clerk of court would type the entries. The judge would then receive an envelope containing
money from the couple. Aranas also confirmed the existence of "open-dated" marriage certificates;
7) Antonio Flores, Branch 9 Process Server of RTC Cebu City, told the investigating team that couples looked for Judge
Geraldine Faith A. Econg, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Cebu City, "para menos ang bayad." The excess
of three hundred pesos (P300) that couples paid to Judge Econg as solemnization fee went to a certain "sinking fund" of
Branch 9;
8) Rebecca L. Alesna admitted that she usually referred couples to Judges Necessario or Tormis. Couples who wanted to
get married under Article 34 of the Family Code were advised to buy a pro-forma affidavit of joint cohabitation for ten
pesos (P10);
9) Arvin Oca, Branch 1 Process Server of the MTCC of Cebu City, admitted that he referred couples to Branch 2, Clerk of
Court, Harrish Co. Oca declared that on 28 June 2007, he accompanied a couple to the chambers of Judge Necessario.
He informed the judge that the couple only had birth certificates. The respondent judge then inquired about their ages
and asked them if they had been previously married then proceeded to solemnize the marriage; and
10) Filomena C. Lopez, local civil registrar of Barili, Cebu, declared that she does not scrutinize marriage applications.
Couples who are non-Barili residents are able to obtain marriage licenses from her Barili office because these couples
have relatives residing in Barili, Cebu. She also added that while couples still need to submit a certificate of attendance
in the family planning seminar, they may attend it before or after the filing of the application for marriage license.
Affidavits of private persons were also attached to the records. Jacqui Lou Baguio-Manera was a resident of Panagdait,
Mabolo, Cebu and on 21 May 2007, she and her then fianc wanted to set a marriage date. Her younger sister who was
married in a civil wedding last year gave her the number of a certain "Meloy". After talking to Meloy on the phone, the
wedding was scheduled at 2 p.m. on 23 May 2007 and the couple were asked to bring their birth certificates. No
marriage license was required from them. Meloy asked for a fee of one thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500). According
to Baguio-Manera, their marriage certificate was marked as "No marriage license was necessary, the marriage being
solemnized under Art. 34 of Executive Order No. 209". Their marriage was solemnized that day by Judge Rosabella M.
Tormis. Baguio-Manera claimed that they did not understand what that statement meant at that time. However, in her
affidavit, she declared that the situation premised under Article 34 did not apply to her and her fianc.
Mary Anne Flores-Patoc was a resident of Barrio Luz, Cebu City. In her 5 July 2007 affidavit, she recounted how she and
her boyfriend went to the Provincial Capitol to get married in February 2006. While logging in at the entrance, they were
offered assistance by the guards for a fee of one thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500). The guard also offered to
become "Ninong" or a witness to the wedding. The couple became suspicious and did not push through with the civil
wedding at that time.
On 27 November 2007, the Court En Banc issued a resolution: a) requiring Judges Anatalio S. Necessario, Gil R. Acosta,
Rosabella M. Tormis, and Edgemelo C. Rosales of the MTCC, Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8, respectively, of Cebu City, to
comment on the findings of the 14 August 2007 Supplemental Report of the OCA, within fifteen (15) days from notice; b)
directing the Process Servicing Unit to furnish the judges with a copy of the Supplemental Report; c) requiring the court
personnel listed below to show cause within fifteen (15) days from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken
against them for their alleged grave misconduct and dishonesty and impleading them in this administrative matter:
1) Celeste P. Retuya, Clerk III, MTCC, Branch 6, Cebu City;
2) Corazon P. Retuya, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 6, Cebu City;
3) Rhona F. Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I, Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Cebu City;
4) Emma D. Valencia, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Branch 18, Cebu City;
5) Marilou Cabaez, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City;
6) Desiderio S. Aranas, Process Server, MTCC, Branch 3, Cebu City;
7) Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter, MTCC, Branch 1, Cebu City;
8) Helen Mongaya, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City.
The Court in the same resolution also: a) ordered the referral to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas for
appropriate action on the administrative matter involving the violation of the law on marriage by Ms. Filomena C. Lopez,
Local Civil Registrar of Barili, Cebu, and one Ms. Veronica S. Longakit, former Local Civil Registrar of Liloan, Cebu; b)
directed the Process Serving Unit to furnish the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas with a copy of the
Supplemental Report of the OCA; and c) required Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg, RTC, Branch 9, Cebu City, to comment
within fifteen (15) days from notice on the statement of staff member Antonio Flores saying that Branch 9s court
personnel received an amount in excess of the P300 solemnization fee paid by couples whose marriages were
solemnized by her. This amount goes to the courts "sinking fund".
In their Comments and/or Answers to the Memorandum dated 5 July 2007 of the OCA and its Supplemental Report, the
respondent judges argued the following:
Judge Anatalio S. Necessario relies on the presumption of regularity regarding the documents presented to him by
contracting parties. He claims that marriages he solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code had the required
72
affidavit of cohabitation. He claims that pro forma affidavits of cohabitation have been used by other judges even before
he became a judge. He avers that he ascertains the ages of the parties, their relationship, and the existence of an
impediment to marry. He also asks the parties searching questions and clarifies whether they understood the contents
of the affidavit and the legal consequences of its execution. The judge also denies knowledge of the payment of
solemnization fees in batches. In addition, he argues that it was a process server who was in-charge of recording
marriages on the logbook, keeping the marriage certificates, and reporting the total number of marriages monthly.
Judge Gil R. Acosta argues that the law only requires a marriage license and that he is not required to inquire whether
the license was obtained from a location where one of the parties is an actual resident. The judge believes that it is not
his duty to verify the signature on the marriage license to determine its authenticity because he relies on the
presumption of regularity of public documents. The judge also outlines his own procedure in solemnizing marriages
which involves: first, the determination whether the solemnization fee was paid; second, the presentation of the
affidavit of cohabitation and birth certificates to ascertain identity and age of the parties; third, if one of the parties is a
foreigner, the judge asks for a certificate of legal capacity to marry, passport picture, date of arrival, and divorce papers
when the party is divorced; fourth, he then asks the parties and their witnesses questions regarding cohabitation and
interviews the children of the parties, if any.
Judge Rosabella M. Tormis denies the charges brought by the OCA. She calls the actions of the judicial audit team during
the investigation an "entrapment". She also claims that there is nothing wrong with solemnizing marriages on the date
of the issuance of the marriage license and with the fact that the issued marriage license was obtained from a place
where neither of the parties resided. As to the pro forma affidavits of cohabitation, she argues that she cannot be
faulted for accepting it as genuine as she and the other judges are not handwriting experts. The affidavits also enjoy the
presumption of regularity. Judge Tormis also discredits the affidavit of Baguio-Manera as hearsay. The respondent said
that when Baguio-Manera and her husband were confronted with the affidavit they executed, they affirmed the veracity
of the statements, particularly the fact that they have been living together for five years. The judge also attributes the
irregularity in the number of marriages solemnized in her sala to the filing clerks.
Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales denies violating the law on marriage. He maintains that it is the local civil registrar who
evaluates the documents submitted by the parties, and he presumes the regularity of the license issued. It is only when
there is no marriage license given that he ascertains the qualifications of the parties and the lack of legal impediment to
marry. As to the affidavits of cohabitation, the judge believes there is nothing wrong with the fact that these are pro
forma. He states that marriage certificates are required with the marriage license attached or the affidavit of
cohabitation only and the other documents fall under the responsibility of the local civil registrar. He surmises that if the
marriage certificate did not come with the marriage license or affidavit of cohabitation, the missing document might
have been inadvertently detached, and it can be checked with the proper local civil registrar. As to the payment of the
docket fee, he contends that it should be paid after the solemnization of the marriage and not before because judges
will be pre-empted from ascertaining the qualifications of the couple. Besides, the task of collecting the fee belongs to
the Clerk of Court. The judge also argues that solemnization of marriage is not a judicial duty.
On 12 November 2007, Judges Tormis and Rosales filed a Memorandum of Law with Plea for Early Resolution, Lifting of
Suspension and Dismissal of Case. This Court in a Resolution dated 11 December 2007 lifted the suspension of the
respondent judges but prohibited them from solemnizing marriages until further ordered.
On 7 December 2007, Judges Tormis and Rosales filed a Motion for Early Resolution with Waiver of Formal and/or
Further Investigation and Motion to Dismiss. In a Resolution dated 15 January 2008, the Court noted the motion and
granted the prayer of Judges Tormis and Rosales for the payment of their unpaid salaries, allowances and all other
economic benefits from 9 July 2007.
THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE OCA
In its Memorandum dated 15 June 2010, the OCA recommended the dismissal of the respondent judges and some court
employees, and the suspension or admonition of others. The OCA summarized the liabilities of the respondents, to wit:
JUDGE ANATALIO S. NECESSARIO is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages with
questionable documents and wherein one of the contracting parties is a foreigner who submitted a mere affidavit of his
capacity to marry in lieu of the required certificate from his embassy. He is also guilty of gross ignorance of the law for
solemnizing marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code wherein one or both of the contracting parties were minors
during the cohabitation.
xxx
JUDGE GIL R. ACOSTA is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for failure to make sure that the solemnization fee
has been paid. He is also guilty of gross ignorance of the law for solemnizing marriages under Article 34 of the Family
Code wherein one or both of the contracting parties were minors during the cohabitation.
JUDGE EDGEMELO C. ROSALES is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages with
questionable documents, for failure to make sure that the solemnization fee has been paid and for solemnizing
marriages wherein one of the contracting parties is a foreigner who submitted a mere affidavit of his capacity to marry
in lieu of the required certificate from his embassy. He is also guilty of gross ignorance of the law for solemnizing a
marriage without the requisite marriage license.
JUDGE ROSEBELLA M. TORMIS is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages with
questionable documents, for failure to make sure that the solemnization fee has been paid, for solemnizing marriages
wherein one of the contracting parties is a foreigner who submitted a mere affidavit of his capacity to marry in lieu of
the required certificate from the embassy and for solemnizing a marriage with an expired license.
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HELEN MONGGAYA is guilty of grave misconduct for violating Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel that prohibits court personnel from soliciting or accepting any gift, favor or benefit based on any or explicit or
implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions and for giving false information
for the purpose of perpetrating an irregular marriage.
RHONA RODRIGUEZ is guilty of gross misconduct for violating Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel and for inducing Maricel Albater to falsify the application for marriage license by instructing her to indicate
her residence as Barili, Cebu.
DESIDERIO ARANAS and REBECCA ALESNA are guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for
providing couples who are to be married under Article 34 of the Family Code with the required affidavit of cohabitation.
CELESTE RETUYA, EMMA VALENCIA and REBECCA ALESNA are guilty of violating Section 2(b), Canon III of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel which prohibits court personnel from receiving tips or other remuneration for assisting or
attending to parties engaged in transactions or involved in actions or proceedings with the Judiciary.
The OCA, however, recommended the DISMISSAL of the complaints against Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg, Corazon P.
Retuya, and Marilou Cabaez, for lack of merit.
THE ISSUE
The issue now before this Court is whether the judges and personnel of the MTCC and RTC in Cebu City are guilty of
gross ignorance of the law, gross neglect of duty or gross inefficiency and gross misconduct, and in turn, warrant the
most severe penalty of dismissal from service.
THE COURTS RULING
The findings in the 2010 Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator are supported by the evidence on record
and applicable law and jurisprudence.
This Court has long held that court officials and employees are placed with a heavy burden and responsibility of keeping
the faith of the public. In Obaana, Jr. v. Ricafort, we said that:
Any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official functions must be avoided. This
Court shall not countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of
justice which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary.
The OCA described accurately the Palace of Justice in Cebu City as a hub of swift marriages. The respondent judges and
court personnel disregarded laws and procedure to the prejudice of the parties and the proper administration of justice.
The OCA found that Judges Anatalio S. Necessario, Gil R. Acosta, Rosabella M. Tormis, and Edgemelo C. Rosales are all
guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty when they solemnized marriages without following the proper procedure
laid down by law, particularly the Family Code of the Philippines and existing jurisprudence. The OCA listed down
aspects of the solemnization process which were disregarded by the judges. The Court will now discuss the individual
liabilities of the respondent judges and court personnel vis--vis the evidence presented by the OCA against them.
Liability of Judge Anatalio S. Necessario
The OCA reported that Judge Necessario solemnized a total of one thousand one hundred twenty-three (1,123)
marriages from 2005 to 2007. However, only one hundred eighty-four (184) marriage certificates were actually
examined by the judicial audit team. Out of the 184 marriages, only seventy-nine (79) were solemnized with a marriage
license while one hundred five (105) were solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code. Out of the 79 marriages with
license, forty-seven (47) of these licenses were issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Liloan, Cebu. This translates to
42.93% of the marriages he solemnized with marriage license coming from Liloan for over a period of years. There were
also twenty-two (22) marriages solemnized by the judge with incomplete documents such missing as marriage license,
certificate of legal capacity to marry, and the joint affidavit of cohabitation.
Judge Necessario solemnized nine (9) marriages that had questionable supporting documents such as marriage licenses.
The OCA found that the place of residence of the contracting parties appearing in the supporting documents differ from
the place where they obtained their marriage license. The documents invited suspicion because of erasures and
superimpositions in the entries of residence. Likewise, in lieu of the required certificate of legal capacity to marry, a
mere affidavit was submitted by the parties. Variations in the signatures of the contracting parties were also apparent in
the documents.
The respondent judge solemnized forty-three (43) marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code. These marriages
appeared dubious since the joint affidavit of cohabitation of the parties show minority of one or both of them during
cohabitation. For example, he solemnized on 14 May 2004 the marriage of 22-year-old Harol D. Amorin and 19-year-old
Dinalyn S. Paraiso who are residents of Lapu-Lapu City.
There are also sixteen (16) marriage licenses with attached official receipts of the solemnization fee but the
corresponding marriage certificates cannot be found. The presence of the receipts implies that these marriages were
solemnized.
Liability of Judge Gil R. Acosta
Judge Acosta solemnized a total of eighty-seven (87) marriages from 2003 to 2007. However, the logbook showed that
he solemnized two hundred seventy-two (272) marriages while the monthly reports of cases showed that he solemnized
five hundred twelve (512) marriages over the same period. Out of the 87 marriages, he solemnized seventy-five (75)
under
Article 34 of the Family Code. This is equivalent to 86.21% of the marriages solemnized under Article 34 in a four-year
period.
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There were forty-one (41) marriage certificates signed by Judge Tormis or Judge Necessario as solemnizing officers
found in his custody. There were also ten (10) marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code where one or both of the
contracting parties were minors during cohabitation. To illustrate, respondent judge solemnized on 4 May 2004 the
marriage of Julieto W. Baga, 22 years old, and Esterlita P. Anlangit, 18 years old.
There were seventeen (17) marriages under Article 34 where neither of the contracting parties were residents of Cebu
City. The judge solemnized three (3) marriages without the foreign partys required certificate of legal capacity to marry.
Lastly, there was no proof of payment of the solemnization fee in almost all of the marriages the judge officiated.
Liability of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis
Judge Tormis solemnized a total of one hundred eighty-one (181) marriages from 2003 to 2007 based on the marriage
certificates actually examined. However, the monthly report of cases showed that she solemnized three hundred five
(305) marriages instead for the years 2004 to 2007. The OCA report also noted that it was only in July 2007 that her
court started to use a logbook to keep track of marriages.
Respondent judge solemnized thirty-seven (37) marriages with incomplete or missing documents such as the marriage
license, certificate of legal capacity to marry, and the joint affidavit of cohabitation. In several instances, only affidavits
were submitted by the foreign parties in lieu of the certificate of legal capacity to marry.
Judge Tormis solemnized thirteen (13) marriages despite the questionable character of the validity of the required
documents particularly the marriage license. The judicial audit team found numerous erasures and superimpositions on
entries with regard to the parties place of residence.
In one instance, the judge solemnized the marriage of Rex Randy E. Cujardo and Anselma B. Laranio on 28 December
2006 despite the marriage license containing a rubberstamp mark saying, "THIS LICENSE EXPIRES ON" and a handwritten
note saying "12/28/06" under it.
The judge solemnized a total of forty-seven (47) marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code wherein the marriage
requirements authenticity was doubtful due to the circumstances of the cohabitation of the parties and the given
address of the parties. These irregularities were evident in the case of 22-year-old John Rey R. Tibalan and Ana Liza
Secuya who were married on 25 May 2007. The residential address of the couple in the marriage certificate is "Sitio
Bamboo, Buhisan, Cebu City." However, there was an application for marriage license attached to the marriage
certificate showing that Secuyas address is "F. Lopez Comp. Morga St., Cebu City."
Liability of Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales
Judge Rosales solemnized a total of one hundred twenty-one (121) marriages from 2006 to 2007 based on the marriage
certificates examined by the judicial audit team. However, only three (3) marriages were reported for the same period.
Out of the 121 marriages the judge solemnized, fifty-two (52) or 42.98% fall under Article 34 of the Family Code. Thirty-
eight (38) marriage licenses out of the sixty-six (66) obtained or 57.57% were from the local civil registrar of Barili, Cebu.
Nineteen (19) or 28.79% were from the local civil registrar of Liloan, Cebu. Nine (9) or 13.64% were from other local civil
registrars.
There were marriage documents found in his court such as marriage licenses, applications for marriage license,
certificates of legal capacity to contract marriage, affidavits in lieu of certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage,
joint affidavits of cohabitation, and other documents referring to the solemnization of one hundred thirty-two (132)
marriages, with no corresponding marriage certificates. He solemnized two marriages of Buddy Gayland Weaver, an
American citizen, to two different persons within nine (9) months. No copy of the required certificate of legal capacity to
contract marriage or the divorce decree was presented.
The judge solemnized thirty-seven (37) marriages without or with incomplete supporting documents such as the
certificate of legal capacity to marry and the joint affidavit of cohabitation. He solemnized nine (9) marriages under
questionable circumstances such as the submission of an affidavit or affirmation of freedom to marry in lieu of the
certificate of legal capacity to marry, the discrepancies in the residence of the contracting parties as appearing in the
marriage documents, and the solemnization of the marriage on the same day the marriage license was issued.
Judge Rosales also solemnized forty-three (43) marriages with no proof that the solemnization fee of P300 was paid. On
the other hand, there were twenty-six (26) marriages whose solemnization fees were paid late.
To summarize, the liabilities of the judges are the following:
First, Judges Necessario, Tormis and Rosales solemnized marriages even if the requirements submitted by the couples
were incomplete and of questionable character. Most of these documents showed visible signs of tampering, erasures,
corrections or superimpositions of entries related to the parties place of residence. These included indistinguishable
features such as the font, font size, and ink of the computer-printed entries in the marriage certificate and marriage
license. These actions of the respondent judges constitute gross inefficiency. In Vega v. Asdala, the Court held that
inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance, and carelessness.
Second, the judges were also found guilty of neglect of duty regarding the payment of solemnization fees. The Court, in
Rodrigo-Ebron v. Adolfo, defined neglect of duty as the failure to give ones attention to a task expected of him and it is
gross when, from the gravity of the offense or the frequency of instances, the offense is so serious in its character as to
endanger or threaten public welfare. The marriage documents examined by the audit team show that corresponding
official receipts for the solemnization fee were missing or payment by batches was made for marriages performed on
different dates. The OCA emphasizes that the payment of the solemnization fee starts off the whole marriage
application process and even puts a "stamp of regularity" on the process.
Third, Judges Necessario, Tormis, and Rosales also solemnized marriages where a contracting party is a foreigner who
did not submit a certificate of legal capacity to marry from his or her embassy. What the foreigners submitted were
75
mere affidavits stating their capacity to marry. The irregularity in the certificates of legal capacity that are required
under Article 21 of the Family Code displayed the gross neglect of duty of the judges. They should have been diligent in
scrutinizing the documents required for the marriage license issuance. Any irregularities would have been prevented in
the qualifications of parties to contract marriage.
Fourth, Judges Necessario, Acosta, and Tormis are likewise guilty of gross ignorance of the law under Article 34 of the
Family Code with respect to the marriages they solemnized where legal impediments existed during cohabitation such
as the minority status of one party. The audit team cites in their Supplemental Report that there were parties whose
ages ranged from eighteen (18) to twenty-two (22) years old who were married by mere submission of a pro forma joint
affidavit of cohabitation. These affidavits were notarized by the solemnizing judge himself or herself.
Finally, positive testimonies were also given regarding the solemnization of marriages of some couples where no
marriage license was previously issued. The contracting parties were made to fill up the application for a license on the
same day the marriage was solemnized.
The Court does not accept the arguments of the respondent judges that the ascertainment of the validity of the
marriage license is beyond the scope of the duty of a solemnizing officer especially when there are glaring pieces of
evidence that point to the contrary. As correctly observed by the OCA, the presumption of regularity accorded to a
marriage license disappears the moment the marriage documents do not appear regular on its face.
In People v. Jansen, this Court held that:
the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly
issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the
competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to
ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.
However, this Court also said in Sevilla v. Cardenas, that "the presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted
by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." The visible superimpositions on the marriage
licenses should have alerted the solemnizing judges to the irregularity of the issuance.
It follows also that although Article 21 of the Family Code requires the submission of the certificate from the embassy of
the foreign party to the local registrar for acquiring a marriage license, the judges should have been more diligent in
reviewing the parties documents and qualifications. As noted by the OCA, the absence of the required certificates
coupled with the presence of mere affidavits should have aroused suspicion as to the regularity of the marriage license
issuance.
The judges gross ignorance of the law is also evident when they solemnized marriages under Article 34 of the Family
Code without the required qualifications and with the existence of legal impediments such as minority of a party.
Marriages of exceptional character such as those made under Article 34 are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the
indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions as a
general rule should be strictly but reasonably construed. The affidavits of cohabitation should not be issued and
accepted pro forma particularly in view of the settled rulings of the Court on this matter. The five-year period of
cohabitation should be one of a perfect union valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the
marriage contract. The parties should have been capacitated to marry each other during the entire period and not only
at the time of the marriage.
To elaborate further on the gravity of the acts and omissions of the respondents, the Family Code provides the
requisites for a valid marriage:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer
and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age. (53a, 55a)
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated
in Article 35 (2). A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n)
The absence of a marriage license will clearly render a marriage void ab initio. The actions of the judges have raised a
very alarming issue regarding the validity of the marriages they solemnized since they did not follow the proper
procedure or check the required documents and qualifications. In Aranes v. Judge Salvador Occiano, the Court said that
a marriage solemnized without a marriage license is void and the subsequent issuance of the license cannot render valid
or add even an iota of validity to the marriage. It is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority
to solemnize a marriage and the act of solemnizing the marriage without a license constitutes gross ignorance of the
law.
As held by this Court in Navarro v. Domagtoy:
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts are at least proficient in the law they are sworn to
apply, more than the ordinary layman. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is
imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in the instant case. It is not too
much to expect them to know and apply the law intelligently.
It is important to note that the audit team found out that Judge Rosabella M. Tormis ordered Celerina Plaza, a personal
employee of the judge, to wait for couples outside the Hall of Justice and offer services. Crisanto Dela Cerna also stated
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in his affidavit that Judge Tormis instructed him to get all marriage certificates and bring them to her house when she
found out about the judicial audit. In the language of the OCA, Judge Tormis considered the solemnization of marriages
not as a duty but as a business. The respondent judge was suspended for six (6) months in A.M. No. MTJ-071-962 for
repeatedly disregarding the directives of this Court to furnish the complainant a copy of her comment. She was also
fined the amount of five thousand pesos (P5,000) in A.M. Nos. 04-7-373-RTC and 04-7-374 RTC. She was reprimanded
twice in A.M. No. MTJ-05-1609 and in A.M. No. MTJ-001337. Finally, in the very recent case of Office of the Court
Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817, promulgated last 12
March 2013, Judge Tormis was found guilty of gross inefficiency, violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and
circulars and gross ignorance of the law by this Court. She was dismissed from service, with forfeiture of all benefits and
privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
The respondent judges violated Canons 2 and 6 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which exact competence, integrity and
probity in the performance of their duties. This Court previously said that "Ignorance of the law is a mark of
incompetence, and where the law involved is elementary, ignorance thereof is considered as an indication of lack of
integrity." In connection with this, the administration of justice is considered a sacred task and upon assumption to
office, a judge ceases to be an ordinary mortal. He or she becomes the visible representation of the law and more
importantly of justice.
The actuations of these judges are not only condemnable, it is outright shameful.
Liability of Other Court Personnel
The Court agrees with the recommendations of the OCA on the liability of the following employees:
Helen Mongaya, Court Interpreter of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City, is guilty of grave
misconduct when she informed the female lawyer of the judicial audit team that she can facilitate the marriage and the
requirements on the same day of the lawyers visit.
What Monggaya was proposing was an open-dated marriage in exchange for a fee of P3,000. Section 2, Canon I of the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel prohibits court personnel from soliciting or accepting gifts, favor or benefit based
on any explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions.
Mongayas claim that she was merely relating to the lady lawyer what she knew from other offices as the usual practice
is inexcusable. As found by the OCA in its Memorandum, "Monggaya deliberately gave false information for the purpose
of perpetrating an illegal scheme. This, in itself, constitutes grave misconduct." Sec. 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service defines grave misconduct as "a grave offense that carries the extreme penalty of
dismissal from the service even on a first offense.
In Villaceran v. Rosete, this Court held that:
Court personnel, from the lowliest employee, are involved in the dispensation of justice; parties seeking redress from
the courts for grievances look upon court personnel, irrespective of rank or position, as part of the Judiciary. In
performing their duties and responsibilities, these court personnel serve as sentinels of justice and any act of
impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the peoples trust and
confidence in this institution. Therefore, they are expected to act and behave in a manner that should uphold the honor
and dignity of the Judiciary, if only to maintain the people's confidence in the Judiciary.
Mongaya acted improperly and in a manner opposite of what is expected of court personnel. Her actions placed doubts
on the integrity of the courts.
Rhona Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the MTCC, Cebu City, is guilty of gross
misconduct. She assisted the couple, Moreil Sebial and Maricel Albater, and demanded and accepted P4,000 from
them.146 The act was a violation of Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel. As found by the OCA
and adopted by this Court, Rodriguez induced Albater to falsify the application for marriage license by instructing her to
indicate her residence as Barili, Cebu. The claim that she gave the amount to a certain Borces who was allegedly the real
facilitator belies her participation in facilitating the marriage. According to the OCA, when the couple went back for their
marriage certificate, they approached Rodriguez and not Borces. When Borces told Rodriguez that the marriage
certificate had been misplaced, it was Rodriguez who instructed Sebial to fill up another marriage certificate.
This Court has held that improper solicitations prohibited by Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel, merits a grave penalty. Such penalty can be dismissal from service.
Desiderio Aranas, Branch 3 Process Server, MTCC, Cebu City and Rebecca Alesna are guilty of conduct prejudicial to the
best of interest of the service. Aranas provided couples who were to be married under Article 34 of the Family Code with
the required affidavit of cohabitation. On the other hand, Alesna refers such couples to Aranas to acquire the said
affidavit which according to Alesna costs P10. As aptly put by the OCA, even if the amount involved in the transaction is
minimal, the act of soliciting money still gives the public the wrong impression that court personnel are making money
out of judicial transactions.
The Court said in Roque v. Grimaldo that acts of court personnel outside their official functions constitute conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service because these acts violate what is prescribed for court personnel. The
purpose of this is to maintain the integrity of the Court and free court personnel from suspicion of any misconduct.
Celeste P. Retuya, Clerk III of Branch 6 of the MTCC, Cebu City, Emma Valencia, Stenographer III of Branch 18, RTC, Cebu
City, and Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter of Branch 1, MTCC, Cebu City, admitted to the audit team that they received
food from couples they assisted. This is in violation of Section 2(b), Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
which prohibits court personnel from receiving tips or other remuneration for assisting or attending to parties engaged
77
in transactions or involved in actions or proceedings with the Judiciary. As recommended by the OCA, they are
admonished considering that this is their first offense and the tips were of minimal value. In Reyes-Domingo v. Morales,
this Court held that commission of an administrative offense for the first time is an extenuating circumstance.
The Court finds that there is insufficient evidence against Corazon P. Retuya. The OCA reports that Corazon Retuya
admitted initially that she received P5,000 from spouses Ichiro Kamiaya and Mary Grace Gabiana to secure necessary
documents. The information was volunteered by Corazon Retuya with no supporting sworn statement from the couple.
However, she denies this fact later on in her Comment. Finding the earlier statement of Corazon Retuya as unclear and
lacking support from evidence, the Court adopts the findings of the OCA and decides to give her the benefit of the
doubt.
The Court also finds insufficient evidence to support the claims against Marilou Cabaez. Cabaez was only implicated in
this case through the sworn statement of Jacqui Lou Baguio-Manera who attested that they paid a certain "Meloy"
P1,200 for the wedding under Article 34 of the Family through the assistance of Cabaez. Cabaez denies that she was
the one who assisted the couple and explained that it may have been Celerina Plaza, the personal assistant of Judge
Rosabella M. Tormis. Baguio-Manera got the nickname "Meloy" not from Cabaez herself but from Baguio-Maneras
younger sister. When Baguio-Manera met the said "Meloy" at the Hall of Justice, she did not obtain confirmation that
the said "Meloy" is Cabaez. The Court adopts the findings of the OCA that there is lack of positive identification of
Cabaez and finds merit in her denial.
The Court accepts the recommendation of the OCA as to the dismissal of the case against Judge Geraldine Faith A.
Econg. The judge was only implicated through the statement of Process Server Antonio Flores about an "alleged sinking
fund". No evidence was presented as to the collection of an excess of the solemnization fee. Neither was it proven that
Judge Econg or her staff had knowledge of such fund.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondents:
1. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Cebu City, GUILTY of gross
inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that he be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with
forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that he be disqualified from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation;
2. Judge Gil R. Acosta, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3, Cebu City, GUILTY of gross inefficiency or
neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that he be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of his
retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that he be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation;
3. Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cebu City, GUILTY of gross
inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that she would have been DISMISSED FROM THE
SERVICE with forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and disqualified from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation, had she not been previously
dismissed from service in A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817 (Formerly A.M. No. 09-2-30-MTCC);
4. Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 8, Cebu City, GUILTY of gross
inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that he be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with
forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that he be disqualified from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation;
5. Helen Mongaya, Court Interpreter, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Cebu City, GUILTY of violating Section 2,
Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and that she be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of her
retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that she be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation;
6. Rhona F. Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, GUILTY of
gross misconduct for Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and for inducing Maricel Albater to
falsify the application for marriage and that she be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of her retirement
benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that she be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public
office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation;
7. Desiderio S. Aranas, Process Server, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3, Cebu City, GUILTY of conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service and that he be SUSPENDED without pay for a period of six (6) months with a warning
that a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely;
8. Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, Cebu City, GUILTY of conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service and of violating Section 2(b), Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and
that she be SUSPENDED without pay for a period of six (6) months with a warning that a similar offense shall be dealt
with more severely;
9. Celeste Retuya, Clerk III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 6, Cebu City, and Emma Valencia, Stenographer III,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Cebu City, GUILTY of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and of
violating Section 2(b), Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and that they be ADMONISHED with a
warning that a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely;
The complaints against Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Cebu City;
Corazon P. Retuya, Court Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 6, Cebu City; and Marilou Cabaez, Court
Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

78
The case against Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, including the sworn statements of Celerina Plaza and Crisanto dela Cerna,
should be REFERRED to the Office of the Bar Confidant for the purpose of initiating disbarment proceedings against the
judge.
The Honorable Mayors of Barili, Cebu and Liloan, Cebu, are to be furnished copies of the Supplemental Report dated 14
August 2007 and are ADVISED to conduct an investigation with respect to the statements of Filomena C. Lopez, Civil
Registrar of Barili, Cebu, and Bonita I. Pilones, Civil Registrar of Liloan, Cebu, regarding the processing of marriage
licenses and to take the necessary action as the findings of the investigation may warrant.
Let a copy of this Decision be included in the respondents files that are with the Office of the Bar Confidant and
distributed to all courts and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

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Case No. 15
A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 11-2438 MTJ) February 27, 2013
ANONYMOUS, Complainant, vs. JUDGE RIO C. ACHAS, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Ozamiz City, Misamis
Occidental, Respondent.

Before the Court is an anonymous letter-complaint, dated August 2, 2010, alleging immorality and conduct unbecoming
of a judge against respondent Judge Rio C. Achas (Judge Achas), Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch
2, Ozamiz City, Misamis Occidental.
The letter calls on the Court to look into the morality of respondent Judge Achas and alleges that: (1) it is of public
knowledge in the city that Judge Achas is living scandalously with a woman who is not his wife; (2) he lives beyond his
means; (3) he is involved with illegal activities through his connection with bad elements, the kuratongs; ( 4) he comes
to court very untidy and dirty; (5) he decides his cases unfairly in exchange for material and monetary consideration; and
(6) he is involved with cockfighting/gambling.
In the Indorsement, dated September 30, 2010, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) referred the matter to
Executive Judge Miriam Orquieza-Angot (Judge Angot) for Discreet Investigation and Report.
In her Report, dated November 26, 2010, Judge Angot found that Judge Achas had been separated from his legal wife
for quite some time and they are living apart; and that he found for himself a young woman with whom he would
occasionally go out with in public and it was not a secret around town. Anent the allegations that Judge Achas was living
beyond his means and was involved in illegal activities, Judge Angot reported that she could not be certain whether such
were true, and only ascertained that he had established friendships or alliances with people of different social standings
from around the city. Judge Angot opined that the allegation that Judge Achas would come to court untidy and dirty was
a matter of personal hygiene and in the eye of the beholder. Lastly, she found the charge that Judge Achas decided cases
unfairly in exchange for consideration to be vague and unsubstantiated.
In his Comment, dated February 4, 2011, Judge Achas denied all the allegations against him and claimed that they were
hatched to harass him, pointing to disgruntled professionals, supporters and local candidates who lost during the May
2010 elections. He asserted that after 28 years in the government service, he had remained loyal to his work and
conducted himself in a righteous manner.
In the Resolution, dated December 14, 2011, the Court resolved to redocket the case as a regular administrative matter
and to refer the same to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Ozamiz City for investigation, report and
recommendation.
In her Report, dated April 4, 2012, Executive Judge Salome P. Dungog (Judge Dungog) stated that an investigation was
conducted. Judge Achas and his two witnesses testified in his defense, namely, his Branch Clerk of Court, Renato
Zapatos; and his Process Server, Michael Del Rosario. The anonymous complainant never appeared to testify. During the
investigation, Judge Achas again denied all the charges but admitted that he was married and only separated de facto
from his legal wife for 26 years, and that he reared game cocks for leisure and extra income, having inherited such from
his forefathers. Judge Dungog found that "it is not commendable, proper or moral per Canons of Judicial Ethics to be
perceived as going out with a woman not his wife," and for him to be involved in rearing game cocks.
In its Memorandum, dated December 17, 2012, the OCA recommended that Judge Achas be reprimanded as to the
charge of immorality. It was further recommended that he be ordered to refrain from going to cockpits or avoid such
places altogether, with a warning that the same or similar complaint in the future shall be dealt with more severely. The
other charges were recommended to be dismissed for lack of merit.
The Court agrees, with modification.
Under Section 1 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, anonymous complaints may be filed against judges, but they must be
supported by public records of indubitable integrity. Courts have acted in such instances needing no corroboration by
evidence to be offered by the complainant. Thus, for anonymous complaints, the burden of proof in administrative
proceedings which usually rests with the complainant, must be buttressed by indubitable public records and by what is
sufficiently proven during the investigation. If the burden of proof is not overcome, the respondent is under no
obligation to prove his defense.
In the present case, no evidence was attached to the letter-complaint. The complainant never appeared, and no public
records were brought forth during the investigation. Respondent Judge Achas denied all the charges made against him,
only admitting that he was separated de facto from his wife and that he reared fighting cocks.
The charges that he (1) lives beyond his means, (2) is involved with illegal activities through his connection with the
kuratongs, (3) comes to court very untidy and dirty, and (4) decides his cases unfairly in exchange for material and
monetary consideration were, therefore, properly recommended dismissed by the OCA for lack of evidence.
The charges that (1) it is of public knowledge that he is living scandalously with a woman not his wife and that (2) he is
involved with cockfighting/gambling are, however, another matter.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary pertinently provides:
CANON 2
INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.
SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a
reasonable observer.

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SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must
not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves
in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Angots discreet investigation revealed that the respondent judge found "for himself a suitable young lass whom
he occasionally goes out with in public and such a fact is not a secret around town." Judge Achas denied this and no
evidence was presented to prove the contrary. He did admit, however, that he had been estranged from his wife for the
last 26 years. Notwithstanding his admission, the fact remains that he is still legally married to his wife. The Court,
therefore, agrees with Judge Dungog in finding that it is not commendable, proper or moral for a judge to be perceived
as going out with a woman not his wife. Such is a blemish to his integrity and propriety, as well as to that of the
Judiciary.
For going out in public with a woman not his wife, Judge Achas has clearly failed to abide by the above-cited Canons of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for Philippine Judiciary.
Regarding his involvement in cockfighting, however, there is no clear evidence. Judge Achas denied engaging in
cockfighting and betting. He admitted, however, that he reared fighting cocks for leisure, having inherited the practice
from his forefathers. While gamecocks are bred and kept primarily for gambling, there is no proof that he goes to
cockpits and gambles. While rearing fighting cocks is not illegal, Judge Achas should avoid mingling with a crowd of
cockfighting enthusiasts and bettors as it undoubtedly impairs the respect due him. As a judge, he must impose upon
himself personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and
willingly.
The Court further notes that in A.M. No. MTJ-04-1564, Judge Achas was charged with immorality for cohabiting with a
woman not his wife, and with gross misconduct and dishonesty for personally accepting a cash bond in relation to a case
and not depositing it with the clerk of court, and for maintaining a flock of fighting cocks and actively participating in
cockfights. The Court, in 2005, found him guilty of gross misconduct for personally receiving the cash bond and fined him
in the amount of P15,000.00 with a stern warning. The charge of immorality was dismissed for lack of evidence.
Although the Court, at the same time, noted that the charge of maintaining a flock of fighting cocks and participating in
cockfights was denied by the respondent judge, it made no ruling on the charge.
Seven years later, similar charges of immoral cohabitation and cockfighting have again been levelled against Judge
Achas. Considering that his immoral behaviour is not a secret around town, it is apparent that respondent judge has
failed to ensure that his conduct is perceived to be above reproach by the reasonable observer, and has failed to avoid
the appearance of impropriety in his activities, to the detriment of the judiciary as a whole.
No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its occupant than does the judicial office.
Judges in particular must be individuals of competence, honesty and probity, charged as they are with safeguarding the
integrity of the court and its proceedings. He should behave at all times so as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, and avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities.
His personal behaviour outside the court, and not only while in the performance of his official duties, must be beyond
reproach, for he is perceived to be the personification of law and justice. Thus, any demeaning act of a judge degrades
the institution he represents.
Under Section 10 in relation to Section 11 C (1) of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, "unbecoming conduct" is
classified as a light charge, punishable by any of the following sanctions: (1) a fine of not less than Pl,000.00 but not
exceeding P10,000.00; and/or (2) censure; (3) reprimand; ( 4) admonition with warning. The Court, thus, finds that the
penalty of a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 and reprimand are proper under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, for violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, respondent Judge Rio Concepcion Achas is
REPRlMANDED and FINED in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00), ADMONISHED not to socially mingle
with cockfighting enthusiasts and bettors, and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

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Case No. 16
A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC February 8, 2011
IN THE MATTER OF THE CHARGES OF PLAGIARISM, ETC., AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO.

Petitioners Isabelita C. Vinuya, et al., all members of the Malaya Lolas Organization, seek reconsideration of the decision
of the Court dated October 12, 2010 that dismissed their charges of plagiarism, twisting of cited materials, and gross
neglect against Justice Mariano Del Castillo in connection with the decision he wrote for the Court in G.R. No. 162230,
entitled Vinuya v. Romulo.
Mainly, petitioners claim that the Court has by its decision legalized or approved of the commission of plagiarism in the
Philippines. This claim is absurd. The Court, like everyone else, condemns plagiarism as the world in general understands
and uses the term.
Plagiarism, a term not defined by statute, has a popular or common definition. To plagiarize, says Webster, is "to steal
and pass off as ones own" the ideas or words of another. Stealing implies malicious taking. Blacks Law Dictionary, the
worlds leading English law dictionary quoted by the Court in its decision, defines plagiarism as the "deliberate and
knowing presentation of another person's original ideas or creative expressions as ones own." The presentation of
another persons ideas as ones own must be deliberate or premeditateda taking with ill intent.
There is no commonly-used dictionary in the world that embraces in the meaning of plagiarism errors in attribution by
mere accident or in good faith.
Certain educational institutions of course assume different norms in its application. For instance, the Loyola Schools
Code of Academic Integrity ordains that "plagiarism is identified not through intent but through the act itself. The
objective act of falsely attributing to ones self what is not ones work, whether intentional or out of neglect, is sufficient
to conclude that plagiarism has occurred. Students who plead ignorance or appeal to lack of malice are not excused."
But the Courts decision in the present case does not set aside such norm. The decision makes this clear, thus:
To paraphrase Bast and Samuels, while the academic publishing model is based on the originality of the writers thesis,
the judicial system is based on the doctrine of stare decisis, which encourages courts to cite historical legal data,
precedents, and related studies in their decisions. The judge is not expected to produce original scholarship in every
respect. The strength of a decision lies in the soundness and general acceptance of the precedents and long held legal
opinions it draws from.
Original scholarship is highly valued in the academe and rightly so. A college thesis, for instance, should contain
dissertations embodying results of original research, substantiating a specific view. This must be so since the writing is
intended to earn for the student an academic degree, honor, or distinction. He earns no credit nor deserves it who takes
the research of others, copies their dissertations, and proclaims these as his own. There should be no question that a
cheat deserves neither reward nor sympathy.
But the policy adopted by schools of disregarding the element of malicious intent found in dictionaries is evidently more
in the nature of establishing what evidence is sufficient to prove the commission of such dishonest conduct than in
rewriting the meaning of plagiarism. Since it would be easy enough for a student to plead ignorance or lack of malice
even as he has copied the work of others, certain schools have adopted the policy of treating the mere presence of such
copied work in his paper sufficient objective evidence of plagiarism. Surely, however, if on its face the students work
shows as a whole that he has but committed an obvious mistake or a clerical error in one of hundreds of citations in his
thesis, the school will not be so unreasonable as to cancel his diploma.
In contrast, decisions of courts are not written to earn merit, accolade, or prize as an original piece of work or art.
Deciding disputes is a service rendered by the government for the public good. Judges issue decisions to resolve
everyday conflicts involving people of flesh and blood who ache for speedy justice or juridical beings which have rights
and obligations in law that need to be protected. The interest of society in written decisions is not that they are
originally crafted but that they are fair and correct in the context of the particular disputes involved. Justice, not
originality, form, and style, is the object of every decision of a court of law.
There is a basic reason for individual judges of whatever level of courts, including the Supreme Court, not to use original
or unique language when reinstating the laws involved in the cases they decide. Their duty is to apply the laws as these
are written. But laws include, under the doctrine of stare decisis, judicial interpretations of such laws as are applied to
specific situations. Under this doctrine, Courts are "to stand by precedent and not to disturb settled point." Once the
Court has "laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply
it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the same; regardless of whether the parties or property are the
same."
And because judicial precedents are not always clearly delineated, they are quite often entangled in apparent
inconsistencies or even in contradictions, prompting experts in the law to build up regarding such matters a large body
of commentaries or annotations that, in themselves, often become part of legal writings upon which lawyers and judges
draw materials for their theories or solutions in particular cases. And, because of the need to be precise and correct,
judges and practitioners alike, by practice and tradition, usually lift passages from such precedents and writings, at times
omitting, without malicious intent, attributions to the originators.
Is this dishonest? No. Duncan Webb, writing for the International Bar Association puts it succinctly. When practicing
lawyers (which include judges) write about the law, they effectively place their ideas, their language, and their work in
the public domain, to be affirmed, adopted, criticized, or rejected. Being in the public domain, other lawyers can thus
freely use these without fear of committing some wrong or incurring some liability. Thus:
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The tendency to copy in law is readily explicable. In law accuracy of words is everything. Legal disputes often centre
round the way in which obligations have been expressed in legal documents and how the facts of the real world fit the
meaning of the words in which the obligation is contained. This, in conjunction with the risk-aversion of lawyers means
that refuge will often be sought in articulations that have been tried and tested. In a sense therefore the community of
lawyers have together contributed to this body of knowledge, language, and expression which is common property and
may be utilized, developed and bettered by anyone.
The implicit right of judges to use legal materials regarded as belonging to the public domain is not unique to the
Philippines. As Joyce C. George, whom Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno cites in her dissenting opinion, observed in her
Judicial Opinion Writing Handbook:
A judge writing to resolve a dispute, whether trial or appellate, is exempted from a charge of plagiarism even if ideas,
words or phrases from a law review article, novel thoughts published in a legal periodical or language from a partys
brief are used without giving attribution. Thus judges are free to use whatever sources they deem appropriate to resolve
the matter before them, without fear of reprisal. This exemption applies to judicial writings intended to decide cases for
two reasons: the judge is not writing a literary work and, more importantly, the purpose of the writing is to resolve a
dispute. As a result, judges adjudicating cases are not subject to a claim of legal plagiarism.
If the Court were to inquire into the issue of plagiarism respecting its past decisions from the time of Chief Justice
Cayetano S. Arellano to the present, it is likely to discover that it has not on occasion acknowledged the originators of
passages and views found in its decisions. These omissions are true for many of the decisions that have been penned
and are being penned daily by magistrates from the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the
Regional Trial Courts nationwide and with them, the municipal trial courts and other first level courts. Never in the
judiciarys more than 100 years of history has the lack of attribution been regarded and demeaned as plagiarism.
This is not to say that the magistrates of our courts are mere copycats. They are not. Their decisions analyze the often
conflicting facts of each case and sort out the relevant from the irrelevant. They identify and formulate the issue or
issues that need to be resolved and evaluate each of the laws, rulings, principles, or authorities that the parties to the
case invoke. The decisions then draw their apt conclusions regarding whether or not such laws, rulings, principles, or
authorities apply to the particular cases before the Court. These efforts, reduced in writing, are the product of the
judges creativity. It is hereactually the substance of their decisionsthat their genius, originality, and honest labor
can be found, of which they should be proud.
In Vinuya, Justice Del Castillo examined and summarized the facts as seen by the opposing sides in a way that no one has
ever done. He identified and formulated the core of the issues that the parties raised. And when he had done this, he
discussed the state of the law relevant to their resolution. It was here that he drew materials from various sources,
including the three foreign authors cited in the charges against him. He compared the divergent views these present as
they developed in history. He then explained why the Court must reject some views in light of the peculiar facts of the
case and applied those that suit such facts. Finally, he drew from his discussions of the facts and the law the right
solution to the dispute in the case. On the whole, his work was original. He had but done an honest work.
The Court will not, therefore, consistent with established practice in the Philippines and elsewhere, dare permit the
filing of actions to annul the decisions promulgated by its judges or expose them to charges of plagiarism for honest
work done.
This rule should apply to practicing lawyers as well. Counsels for the petitioners, like all lawyers handling cases before
courts and administrative tribunals, cannot object to this. Although as a rule they receive compensation for every
pleading or paper they file in court or for every opinion they render to clients, lawyers also need to strive for technical
accuracy in their writings. They should not be exposed to charges of plagiarism in what they write so long as they do not
depart, as officers of the court, from the objective of assisting the Court in the administration of justice.
As Duncan Webb said:
In presenting legal argument most lawyers will have recourse to either previous decisions of the courts, frequently lifting
whole sections of a judges words to lend weight to a particular point either with or without attribution. The words of
scholars are also sometimes given weight, depending on reputation. Some encyclopaedic works are given particular
authority. In England this place is given to Halsburys Laws of England which is widely considered authoritative. A lawyer
can do little better than to frame an argument or claim to fit with the articulation of the law in Halsburys. While in many
cases the very purpose of the citation is to claim the authority of the author, this is not always the case. Frequently
commentary or dicta of lesser standing will be adopted by legal authors, largely without attribution.
xxxx
The converse point is that originality in the law is viewed with skepticism. It is only the arrogant fool or the truly gifted
who will depart entirely from the established template and reformulate an existing idea in the belief that in doing so
they will improve it. While over time incremental changes occur, the wholesale abandonment of established expression
is generally considered foolhardy.
The Court probably should not have entertained at all the charges of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, coming from
the losing party. But it is a case of first impression and petitioners, joined by some faculty members of the University of
the Philippines school of law, have unfairly maligned him with the charges of plagiarism, twisting of cited materials, and
gross neglect for failing to attribute lifted passages from three foreign authors. These charges as already stated are false,
applying the meaning of plagiarism as the world in general knows it.
True, Justice Del Castillo failed to attribute to the foreign authors materials that he lifted from their works and used in
writing the decision for the Court in the Vinuya case. But, as the Court said, the evidence as found by its Ethics
83
Committee shows that the attribution to these authors appeared in the beginning drafts of the decision. Unfortunately,
as testified to by a highly qualified and experienced court-employed researcher, she accidentally deleted the same at the
time she was cleaning up the final draft. The Court believed her since, among other reasons, she had no motive for
omitting the attribution. The foreign authors concerned, like the dozens of other sources she cited in her research, had
high reputations in international law.
Notably, those foreign authors expressly attributed the controversial passages found in their works to earlier writings by
others. The authors concerned were not themselves the originators. As it happened, although the ponencia of Justice
Del Castillo accidentally deleted the attribution to them, there remained in the final draft of the decision attributions of
the same passages to the earlier writings from which those authors borrowed their ideas in the first place. In short, with
the remaining attributions after the erroneous clean-up, the passages as it finally appeared in the Vinuya decision still
showed on their face that the lifted ideas did not belong to Justice Del Castillo but to others. He did not pass them off as
his own.
With our ruling, the Court need not dwell long on petitioners allegations that Justice Del Castillo had also committed
plagiarism in writing for the Court his decision in another case, Ang Ladlad v. Commission on Elections. Petitioners are
nit-picking. Upon close examination and as Justice Del Castillo amply demonstrated in his comment to the motion for
reconsideration, he in fact made attributions to passages in such decision that he borrowed from his sources although
they at times suffered in formatting lapses.
Considering its above ruling, the Court sees no point in further passing upon the motion of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for leave to file and admit motion for reconsideration-in-intervention dated January 5, 2011 and Dr. Peter
Payoyos claim of other instances of alleged plagiarism in the Vinuya decision.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

84
Case No. 18
IPI No. 12-205-CA-J December 10, 2013
RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF THOMAS S. MERDEGIA AGAINST HON. VICENTE S.E. VELOSO, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS, RELATIVE TO CA G.R. SP No. 119461.
x---------------x
A.C. No.: 10300
RE: RESOLUTION DATED OCTOBER 8, 2013 IN OCA IPI No. 12-205-CA-J AGAINST ATTY. HOMOBONO ADAZA II.

On October 8, 2013, we issued a Resolution dismissing the administrative complaint of Tomas S. Merdegia against Court
of Appeals Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso. In this same Resolution, we also directed Atty. Homobono Adaza II,
Merdegias counsel, to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt.
After considering Atty. Adazas explanation, we find his account insufficient, and find him guilty of indirect contempt.
According to Atty. Adaza, he should not bepunished for indirect contemptas he was merely performing his duty as
Merdegias counsel when he assisted him in preparing the administrative complaint against Justice Veloso. Atty. Adaza
asserted that both he and his client observed Justice Velosos partiality during the oral arguments, but instead of
immediately filing an administrative complaint against him, he counseled Merdegia to first file a Motion to Inhibit Justice
Veloso from the case. However, upon finding that Justice Veloso refused to inhibit himself, Merdegia repeated his
request to file an administrative complaint against Justice Veloso, to which Atty. Adaza acceded. Thus, Atty. Adaza
pleaded that he should not be faulted for assisting his client, especially when heal so believes in the merits of his clients
case.
Atty. Adazas explanation, read together with the totality of the facts of the case, fails to convince us of his innocence
from the contempt charge.
As Atty. Adaza himself admitted, he prepared the administrative complaint after Justice Veloso refused to inhibit himself
from a case he was handling. The complaint and the motion for inhibition were both based on the same main cause: the
alleged partiality of Justice Veloso during the oral arguments of Merdegias case. The resolution dismissing the motion
for inhibition should have disposed of the issue of Justice Velosos bias. While we do not discount the fact that it was
Justice Veloso who penned the resolution denying the motion for inhibition, we note that he was allowed to do this
under the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals. Had Merdegia and Atty. Adaza doubted the legality of this
resolution, the proper remedy would have been to file a petition for certiorari assailing the order denying the motion for
inhibition. The settled rule is that administrative complaints against justices cannot and should not substitute for appeal
and other judicial remedies against an assailed decision or ruling. While a lawyer has a duty to represent his client with
zeal, he must do so within the bounds provided by law. He is also duty-bound to impress upon his client the propriety of
the legal action the latter wants to undertake, and to encourage compliance with the law and legal processes.
A reading of Merdegias administrative complaint shows an apparent failure to understand that cases are not always
decided in ones favor, and that an allegation of bias must stem from an extrajudicial source other than those attendant
to the merits and the developments in the case. In this light, we cannot but attribute to Atty. Adaza the failure to
impress upon his client the features of our adversarial system, the substance of the law on ethics and respect for the
judicial system, and his own failure to heed what his duties as a professional and as an officer of the Court demand of
him in acting for his client before our courts.
To be sure, deciding administrative cases against erring judges is not an easy task. We have to strike a balance between
the need for accountability and integrity in the Judiciary, on the one hand, with the need to protect the independence
and efficiency of the Judiciary from vindictive and enterprising litigants, on the other. Courts should not be made to bow
down to the wiles of litigants who bully judges into inhibiting from cases or deciding cases in their favor, but neither
should we shut our doors from litigants brave enough to call out the corrupt practices of people who decide the
outcome of their cases. Indeed, litigants who feel unjustly injured by malicious and corrupt acts of erring judges and
officials should not be punished for filing administrative cases against them; neither should these litigants be unjustly
deterred from doing sobya wrong signal from this Court that they would be made to explain why they should not be
cited for contempt when the complaints they filed prove to be without sufficient cause.
What tipped the balance against Atty. Adaza, in this case, is the totality of the facts of the case that, when read together
with the administrative complaint heprepared, shows that his complaint is merelyan attempt to malign the
administration of justice. We note Atty. Adazas penchantfor filingmotions for inhibition throughout the case: first,
against Judge Ma. Theresa Dolores C. Gomez Estoesta of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, who issued an order
unfavorable to his client; and second, against all the justices of the Court of Appeals division hearing his appeal, for
alleged bias during the oral arguments onhiscase. Theseindicators, taken together with the baseless administrative
complaint against Justice Veloso after he penned an order adverseto Atty. Adazas client, disclosethat there was more to
the administrative complaint than the report of legitimate grievances against members of the Judiciary.
In Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, etc., we cited a litigant in indirect contempt of court for his
predisposition to indiscriminately file administrative complaints against members of the Judiciary. We held that this
conduct degrades the judicial office, interferes with the due performance of their work for the Judiciary, and thus
constitutes indirect contempt of court. Applying this principle to the present case, we hold that Atty. Adazas acts
constitute an improper conduct that tends to degrade the administration of justice, and is thus punishable for indirect
contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

85
As a final note, Atty. Adazas contemptuous conduct may also be subject to disciplinary sanction as a member of the bar.
If we do not now proceed at all against Atty. Adaza to discipline him, we are prevented from doing so by our concern for
his due process rights. Our Resolution of October 8, 2013 only asked him to show cause why he should not be cited in
contempt, and not why he should not be administratively penalized. To our mind, imposing a disciplinary sanction
against Atty. Adaza through a contempt proceeding violates the basic tenets of due process as a disciplinary action is
independent and separate from a proceeding for contempt. A person charged of an offense, whether in an
administrative or criminal proceeding, must be informed of the nature of the charge against him, and given ample
opportunity to explain his side.
While the two proceedings can proceed simultaneously with each other, a contempt proceeding cannot substitute for a
disciplinary proceeding for erring lawyers, and vice versa. There can be no substitution between the two proceedings, as
contempt proceedings against lawyers, as officers of the Court, are different in nature and purpose from the discipline of
lawyers as legal professionals. The two proceedings spring from two different powers of the Court. The Court, in
exercising its power of contempt, exercises an implied and inherent power granted to courts in general.14 Its existence is
essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings; to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of
courts; and, consequently, in the administration of justice; thus, it may be instituted against any person guilty of acts
that constitute contempt of court. Further, jurisprudence describes a contempt proceeding as penal and summary in
nature; hence, legal principles applicable to criminal proceedings also apply to contempt proceedings. A judgment
dismissing the charge of contempt, for instance, may no longer be appealed in the same manner that the prohibition
against double jeopardy bars the appeal of an accuseds acquittal.
In contrast, a disciplinary proceeding against an erring lawyer is sui generis in nature; it is neither purely civil nor purely
criminal. Unlike a criminal prosecution, a disciplinary proceeding is not intended to inflict punishment, but to determine
whether a lawyer is still fit to be allowed the privilege of practicing law. It involves an investigation by the Court of the
conduct of its officers, and has, for its primary objective, public interest. Thus, unlike a contempt proceeding, the
acquittal of the lawyer from a disciplinary proceeding cannot bar an interested party from seeking reconsideration of the
ruling. Neither does the imposition of a penalty for contempt operate as res judicata to a subsequent charge for
unprofessional conduct.
Contempt proceedings and disciplinary actions are also governed by different procedures. Contempt of court is
governed by the procedures under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas disciplinary actions in the practice of law are
governed by Rules 138 and 139 thereof.

IN THESE LIGHTS, the Court finds Atty. Homobomo Adaza II GUILTY OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT for filing a frivolous suit
against Court of Appeals Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso, and hereby sentences him to pay, within the period of
fifteen days from the promulgation of this judgment, a fine of P5,000.00. The respondent is also WARNED that further
similar misbehavior on his part may be a ground for the institution of disciplinary proceedings against him.
SO ORDERED.

86
Case No. 19
A.M. No. MTJ-13-1834 October 2, 2013(Formerly OCA l.P.l. No. 12-2541)
JESUS D. CARBAJOSA, Complainant, vs. JUDGE HANNIBAL R. PATRICIO, Presiding Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
President Roxas, Capiz, Respondent.

This is an administrative case for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Manifest Bias and Partiality against Judge Hannibal R.
Patricio (Judge Patricio), commenced thru a verified Complaint filed before the Office of Court of Administrator (OCA) by
Jesus D. Carbajosa (Carbajosa).
Carbajosa is the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 2540 for grave coercion against accused Dolores Bieles
(Bieles), heard and tried before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of President Roxas-Pilar, President Roxas, Capiz,
in the sala of then Presiding Judge Geomer C. Delfin. The charge stemmed from Bieles menacing and intimidating
attitude in preventing Carbajosa from bringing to Iloilo City fifteen (15) sacks of milled corn by removing and unloading
the same out of the latters Efren Bus Liner.
In a Decision dated August 6, 2002, the MCTC convicted Bieles of the crime charged and sentenced her to imprisonment
of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum to six (6) months of arresto mayor as maximum, and
ordered her to pay: (1) a fine of P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and (2) the amount of
P20,000.00 representing the fifteen (15) sacks of milled corn or its equivalent value as the first lien on judgment.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City, Branch 18,affirmed Bieles conviction but modified her sentence
by increasing the maximum penalty imposed to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional.
This modified judgment was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) in a Decision dated October 26, 2006 and
eventually by this Court when Bieles petition for review on certiorari was denied in a Resolution dated August 13, 2008
for late filing and for absence of reversible error in the appealed judgment. Likewise denied was Bieles ensuing motion
for reconsideration. The Court thereafter issued an Entry of Judgment stating that the Resolution of August 13, 2008 has
become final and executory on January 15, 2009. Undeterred, Bieles filed a Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgment but
the same was denied in the Resolution dated June 1, 2009.
Meanwhile, Carbajosa filed a motion before the RTC for the remand of the case to the court of origin for proper
execution. The motion was granted in the RTCs Order dated December 21, 2009. Carbajosa thereafter filed a Motion for
Execution of Judgment before the MCTC presided by herein respondent Judge Patricio. Bieles opposed the motion
stating that she sent a letter addressed to the Chief Justice, Honorable Reynato S. Puno asking for a review of her case
on the merits. She claimed that the letter was favorably acted upon as evidenced by the first endorsement dated
January 25, 2010 requesting the Clerk of Court of the Third Division to include the case in its agenda.
Judge Patricio resolved the conflict by issuing an Order dated April 7, 2010 wherein he reckoned that it will be best to
hold in abeyance the resolution of Carbajosas Motion for Execution of Judgment and await the result of the
referral/endorsement made by the Chief Justice before a ruling on the propriety of the issuance of a writ of execution is
made, viz:
It is the honest belief of the undersigned, that the resolution of the issuance of the writ of execution, opposition, and
objection of the parties in the above-entitled case be held in abeyance, considering that the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court had referred to the Clerk of Court of the Third Division the letter of [Bieles].
The holding in abeyance of the resolution is in [deference] to the first endorsement made by the Chief Justice. The
undersigned deemed it proper to first wait the result of the referral of the Chief Justice before it will rule on the
propriety of the issuance of the writ of execution.
On April 19, 2010, Carbajosa manifested his objection to the foregoing order and insisted on the issuance of a writ of
execution averring that in the absence of any restraining order, its issuance is imperative so as not to unduly delay the
administration of justice.
On May 24, 2010, Judge Patricio issued an Order reiterating his previous stance that there is a necessity to await the
result of the referral made by the Chief Justice to the Third Division Clerk of Court, thus:
Wherefore, the previous order of this Court granting the holding in abeyance of the issuance of a writ of execution still
stands.
Furnish copy of this order to the offended party, the private prosecutor, as well as [Bieles] and their counsel for their
information.
SO ORDERED.
Bieles thereafter moved that the property bond she initially posted be substituted by a cash bond because the former
was already needed by her bondsman. The motion was vehemently opposed by Carbajosa. On May31, 2011, Judge
Patricio issued an Order16 granting Bieles motion explaining that the same is not covered by Section 4, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court prohibiting an accused to put up a bail bond when there is already a final and executory judgment. Judge
Patricio clarified that this is not a case for the posting of a bond but rather, the substitution of one posted at the
beginning stage of the case.
In the same Order, Judge Patricio disclosed that he sent a query to the OCA regarding the effect of the Chief Justices
endorsement of Bieles letter to the implementation of the final judgment of her conviction. In an endorsement dated
September 29, 2010, Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Raul Villanueva referred his query to Atty. Wilhelmina Geronga
(Atty.Geronga), Chief of the OCA-Legal Office for comment.
In a letter dated September 5, 2011, Atty. Geronga informed Judge Patricio that the subject matter of his query is
judicial in nature hence, beyond the mandate of the OCA. Also, as a matter of policy, the OCA refrains from rendering an
87
opinion on matters that may later on be brought to the Court for judicial determination. Atty. Geronga suggested that
the issue be resolved based on pertinent jurisprudence and relevant laws.
In the meantime, two (2) motions were awaiting Judge Patricios ruling, viz: (a) Carbajosas motion to recall the Order
dated May 31, 2011approving the substitution of Bieles property bond by a cash bond; and (b) motion to suspend
proceedings filed by Bieles.
Both motions were resolved in an Order dated January 6, 2012.Carbajosas motion was denied for being filed out of time
while Bieles motion to suspend proceedings was granted.
In so ruling, Judge Patricio ratiocinated that the motion to recall the Order dated May 31, 2011 can be likened to a
motion for reconsideration that must be filed within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Order sought to be reviewed.
Having been filed two (2) months after June 17, 2011, the date Carbajosa received the Order dated May 31, 2011, the
motion to recall is considered filed out of time.
Anent the granting of Bieles motion to suspend proceedings, Judge Patricio again reasoned that any action on the
issuance of the writ of execution should await the resolution by the Third Division of the Supreme Court on Bieles letter
as endorsed by the Chief Justice, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court hereby grants the instant motion to suspend proceedings filed by [Bieles]
until the indorsement made by the then Chief Justice Reynato Puno for the review of this case had been resolved by said
Division.
Furnish copy of this order to the parties and counsels.
SO ORDERED.
These circumstances prompted Carbajosa to institute the herein administrative complaint imputing gross ignorance of
the law, manifest partiality and evident bad faith against Judge Patricio in continuously deferring the issuance of a writ
of execution for the final and executory judgment in Criminal Case No. 2540.
In his Comment, Judge Patricio admitted postponing the resolution of Carbajosas motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution but he denied that he acted in bad faith and/or with partiality. He claimed that he was merely abiding by the
endorsement made by the Chief Justice that the letter of accused Bieles be referred to the Third Division for action.
The administrative case was referred to the OCA for evaluation. In its Report dated July 24, 2013, the OCA accorded
merit to the complaint. The OCA found Judge Patricio guilty of gross ignorance of the law and recommended that he
should be fined in the amount of P21,000.00.
We agree with the OCAs findings and recommendation.
Any delay in the full execution of a final and executory decision is repugnant to the ideal administration of justice. Hence
the rule that once a judgment attains finality, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The enforcement of such
judgment should not be hampered or evaded; for the immediate enforcement of the parties rights, confirmed by final
judgment, is a major component of the ideal administration of justice. Our penal laws and rules of procedure, in
particular, enjoin that when the judgment of conviction is already final and executory its execution is ministerial.
Respondent Judge Patricio, however, demonstrated ignorance of the above rule by repeatedly refusing to execute the
final and executory judgment of conviction against Bieles.
The justification proffered by Judge Patricio is not well-taken. As correctly observed by the OCA, the Courts Resolution
dated August 13,2008 in G.R. No. 182956 affirming the conviction of Bieles and the Entry of Judgment dated January 15,
2009 evidently carried more legal and procedural significance and effect in Criminal Case No. 2540, as against the
endorsement referring the letter of Bieles to the Third Division for Agenda. The endorsement did not result in a definite
action on the part of the Court as it did not even remotely suggest that G.R. No. 182956 will be re-opened. Hence, there
was absolutely no justifiable reason for Judge Patricio to rely on the latter and thereby thwart the basic rules on
execution of judgment.
The rules on execution are comprehensive enough for a judge not to know how to apply them or to be confused by any
auxiliary incidents. The issuance of a writ of execution for a final and executory judgment is ministerial. In other words, a
judge is not given the discretion whether or not to implement the judgment. He is to effect execution without delay and
supervise implementation strictly in accordance with the judgment. Judge Patricios actuations unmistakably exhibit
gross ignorance of the law.
Apropos are the following pronouncements in Spouses Monterola v. Judge Caoibes, Jr. where the Court found a judge
administratively liablefor gross ignorance of the law when he unreasonably delayed and refused the issuance of a writ of
execution for a final judgment, viz:
Observance of the law, which respondent ought to know, is required of every judge. When the law is sufficiently basic, a
judge owe sit to his office to simply apply it; anything less than that is either deliberate disregard thereof or gross
ignorance of the law. It is a continuing pressing responsibility of judges to keep abreast with the law and changes
therein. Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses no one not even judges from compliance
therewith. We cannot expect a judge to deliberately disregard an unequivocal rule on execution and a doctrine laid
down by the Supreme Court. Canon 4 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics requires that the judge should be studious of the
principles of law. Canon18 mandates that he should administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system
of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law.
Indeed, it has been said that when the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider a basic and elemental rule, a law or
principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and the title he
holds or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial
authority x x x.
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While judges should not be disciplined for inefficiency on account merely of occasional mistakes or errors of judgments,
it is highly imperative that they should be conversant with fundamental and basic legal principles in order to merit the
confidence of the citizenry. Respondent Judge has shown lack of familiarity with our laws, rules and regulations as to
undermine the public confidence in the integrity of the courts x x x. (Citations omitted)
Under A.M. No. 01-8-1 0-SC or the Amendment to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court Re: Discipline of Justices and Judges,
gross ignorance of the law is a serious charge, punishable by a tine of more than P20,000.00, but not exceeding
P40,000.00, suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) months but not exceeding
six ( 6) months, or dismissal from the service. Based on the attendant circumstances of this case, a fine of P21,000.00 is
the appropriate penalty.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Judge Hannibal R. Patricio, Presiding Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
President Roxas-Pilar, President Roxas, Capiz is hereby FOUND GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and FINED in the
amount of P21 ,000.00, with a stern WARNING that a repetition of the same will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

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