EN BANC

G.R. No. 127444               September 13, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. TIRSO D. C. VELASCO in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 88, Quezon City, and
HONORATO GALVEZ, respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This case nudges the Court to revisit the doctrine on double jeopardy, a revered constitutional
safeguard against exposing the accused to the risk of answering twice for the same offense. In this
case, after trial on the merits, the accused was acquitted for insufficiency of the evidence against him in
the cases for murder and frustrated murder (although his co-accused was convicted), and finding in the
illegal carrying of firearm that the act charged did not constitute a violation of law. But the State
through this petition for certiorari would want his acquittal reversed.

We narrate a brief factual backdrop.

The idyllic morning calm in San Ildefonso, Bulacan, a small town north of Manila, was shattered by
gunshots fired in rapid succession. The shooting claimed the life of young Alex Vinculado and seriously
maimed his twin brother Levi who permanently lost his left vision. Their uncle, Miguel Vinculado, Jr.
was also shot. A slug tunneled through his right arm, pierced the right side of his body and burrowed in
his stomach where it remained until extracted by surgical procedure.

As a consequence, three (3) criminal Informations - one (1) for homicide and two (2) for frustrated
homicide - were originally filed before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, against Honorato
Galvez, Mayor of San Ildefonso, and Godofredo Diego, a municipal employee and alleged bodyguard of
the mayor. On 14 December 1993, however, the charges were withdrawn and a new set filed against
the same accused upgrading the crimes to murder (Crim. Case No. 4004-M-93) and frustrated murder
(Crim. Cases Nos. 4005-M-93 and 4006-M-93). Mayor Galvez was charged, in addition, with violation of
PD 1866 (Crim. Case No. 4007-M-94) for unauthorized carrying of firearm outside his residence; hence,
a fourth Information had to be filed.

After a series of legal maneuvers by the parties, venue of the cases was transferred to the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Metro Manila. There the cases were stamped with new docket numbers
(Nos. Q-94-55484, Q-94-55485, Q-94-55486 and Q-94-55487, respectively), and raffled to Branch 103
presided over by Judge Jaime Salazar, Jr. In the course of the proceedings, the judge inhibited himself
and the cases were re-raffled to respondent Judge Tirso D.C. Velasco of Branch 89.
On 8 October 1996 a consolidated decision on the four (4) cases was promulgated. The trial court
found the accused Godofredo Diego guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of murder and
double frustrated murder. However, it acquitted Mayor Honorato Galvez of the same charges due to
insufficiency of evidence. It also absolved him from the charge of illegal carrying of firearm upon its
finding that the act was not a violation of law.

The acquittal of accused Honorato Galvez is now vigorously challenged by the Government before this
Court in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and Sec. 1, Art. VIII, of the
Constitution. It is the submission of petitioner that the exculpation of the accused Galvez from all
criminal responsibility by respondent Judge Tirso Velasco constitutes grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Allegedly, in holding in favor of Galvez, the judge deliberately and
wrongfully disregarded certain facts and evidence on record which, if judiciously considered, would
have led to a finding of guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner proposes that this
patently gross judicial indiscretion and arbitrariness should be rectified by a re-examination of the
evidence by the Court upon a determination that a review of the case will not transgress the
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. It is urged that this is necessary because the
judgment of acquittal should be nullified and substituted with a verdict of guilt.

The main hypothesis of the Government is that elevating the issue of criminal culpability of private
respondent Galvez before this Tribunal despite acquittal by the trial court should not be considered
violative of the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy, for it is now settled
constitutional doctrine in the United States that the Double Jeopardy Clause permits a review of
acquittals decreed by US trial magistrates where, as in this case, no retrial is required should judgment
be overturned.1 Since Philippine concepts on double jeopardy have been sourced from American
constitutional principles, statutes and jurisprudence, particularly the case of Kepner v. United
States,2 and because similarly in this jurisdiction a retrial does not follow in the event an acquittal on
appeal is reversed, double jeopardy should also be allowed to take the same directional course.
Petitioner in this regard urges the Court to take a second look at Kepner, it being the "cornerstone of
the battlement of the Double Jeopardy Clause" in the Philippines3 and seriously examine whether the
precedents it established almost a century ago are still germane and useful today in view of certain
modifications wrought on the doctrine by the succeeding American cases of United States v.
Wilson4 and United States v. Scott.5

Two (2) threshold issues therefore, interlocked as they are, beg to be addressed. One is the propriety
of certiorari as an extraordinary mode of review under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court where the result
actually intended is the reversal of the acquittal of private respondent Galvez. The other is the
permissibility of a review by the Court of a judgment of acquittal in light of the constitutional interdict
against double jeopardy.

The recent untimely demise of respondent Galvez at the hands of alleged assassins (not discounting
too the earlier dismissal of respondent judge from the service) may arguably have rendered these
matters moot and academic, thus calling for a dismissal of the petition on this basis alone. The Court
however is not insensitive to nor oblivious of the paramount nature and object of the pleas forcefully
presented by the Government considering especially the alleged new directions in American
jurisprudence taken by the doctrine of double jeopardy. We are thus impelled to respond to the issues
advanced by petitioner for these bear unquestionably far-reaching contextual significance and
implications in Philippine juristic philosophy and experience, demanding no less, explicit and definitive
rulings.
For it may be argued from a historico-analytical perspective that perhaps none of the constitutionally
ensconced rights of men has followed a more circuitous and tortuous route in the vast sea of
jurisprudence than the right of a person not to be tried or prosecuted a second time for the same
offense.6 This prohibition does not consist merely of one rule but several, each rule applying to a
different situation, each rule marooned in a sea of exceptions.7 It must have been this unique
transpiration that prompted even the redoubtable Mr. Justice Rehnquist of the U.S. Supreme Court to
remark in Albernaz v. United States8 that "the decisional law (in the area of double jeopardy) is a
veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator." It is
therefore necessary that, in forming a correct perspective and full understanding of the doctrine on
double jeopardy and the rules so far established relative to the effect thereon of appeals of judgments
of acquittal, a compendious review of its historical growth and development be undertaken. This
approach is particularly helpful in properly situating and analyzing landmark interpretive applications
of the doctrine in light of the varying legal and factual milieu under which it evolved.

Jeopardy, itself "a fine poetic word,"9 derives from the Latin "jocus" meaning joke, jest or game,10 and
also from the French term "jeu perdre" which denotes a game that one might lose. Similarly, the
Middle English word "iuparti" or "jupartie" means an uncertain game.11 The genesis of the concept
itself however rests deep in the ancient Grecian view of tragedy and suffering and in the old Roman
legal concepts of punishment. Greek law bound prosecutor and judge to the original verdict as can be
seen in the remark of Demosthenes in 355 B. C. that "the laws forbid the same man to be tried twice
on the same issue."12 The Justinian Digest13 providing that "(a) governor should not permit the same
person to be again accused of crime of which he has been acquitted," 14 suggests certain philosophical
underpinnings believed to have been influenced by works of the great Greek tragedians of the 5th
century B.C. reflecting man’s "tragic vision" or the tragic view of life. For the ancient Greeks believed
that man was continuously pitted against a superior force that dictated his own destiny. But this
prevailing view was not to be taken in the sense of man passing from one misfortune to another
without relief, as this idea was repugnant to Greek sensibilities. Rather, it expressed a universal
concept of catharsis or vindication that meant misfortune resolving itself into a final triumph, and
persecution, into freedom and liberation. To suffer twice for the same misfortune was anathema to
ancient thought.

The 18th century B. C. Babylonian king and lawgiver Hammurabi recognized that humans could err in
prosecuting and rendering judgment, thus limits were needed on prosecutors and judges. A gruesome
but effective way of preventing a second trial by the same prosecutor after an acquittal can be found in
the first law of the Hammurabic Code: "If a man has accused a man and has charged him with
manslaughter and then has not proved [it against him], his accuser shall be put to death." 15

The repugnance to double trials strongly expressed by the Catholic Church is consistent with the
interpretation by St. Jerome in 391 A. D. of the promise by God to his people through the prophet
Nahum that "(a)ffliction shall not rise up the second time"16 and "(t)hough I have afflicted thee, I will
afflict thee no more."17 Taken to mean that God does not punish twice for the same act, the maxim
insinuated itself into canon law as early as 847 A. D., succintly phrased as "(n)ot even God judges twice
for the same act."18

The most famous cause célèbre on double jeopardy in the Middle Ages was the dispute between the
English King Henry II and his good friend, Thomas á Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury. Henry wished to
continue the observance of certain customs initiated by his predecessors called "avitae consuetudines,"
one of the known purposes of which was that clerics convicted of crimes before Church courts be
delivered to lay tribunals for punishment. He asserted in the Constitutions of Clarendon that the clergy
were also subject to the king’s punishment. This was met with stinging criticism and stiff opposition by
the Archbishop who believed that allowing this practice would expose the clergy to double jeopardy.
The issue between the two erstwhile friends was never resolved and remained open-ended, for
Thomas was later on mercilessly murdered in his cathedral, allegedly at the instance of his king. 19

It was in England though, a century ago, that double jeopardy was formally institutionalized "as a
maxim of common law"20 based on the universal principles of reason, justice and conscience, about
which the Roman Cicero commented: "Nor is it one thing at Rome and another at Athens, one now and
another in the future, but among all nations, it is the same."21 But even as early as the 15th century, the
English courts already began to use the term "jeopardy" in connection with the doctrine against
multiple trials.22 Thereafter, the principle appeared in the writings of Hale (17th c.), Lord Coke (17th c.)
and Blackstone (18th c.).23 Lord Coke for instance described the protection afforded by the rule as a
function of three (3) related common law pleas: autrefois acquit, autrefois convict and
pardon.24 In Vaux’s Case,25 it was accepted as established that "the life of a man shall not be twice put
in jeopardy for one and the same offense, and that is the reason and cause that autrefois acquitted or
convicted of the same offense is a good plea x x x x" Blackstone likewise observed that the plea
of autrefois acquit or a formal acquittal is grounded on the universal maxim of the common law of
England that "(n)o man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life more than once for the same offense.
And hence, it is allowed as a consequence that when a man is once fairly found not guilty upon any
indictment, or other prosecution before any court having competent jurisdiction of the offense, he may
plead such acquittal in bar of any subsequent accusation for the same crime." 26

The English dogma on double jeopardy, recognized as an "indispensable requirement of a civilized

criminal procedure," became an integral part of the legal system of the English colonies in America. The
Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641, an early compilation of principles drawn from the statutes
and common law of England, grandly proclaimed that "(n)o man shall be twise sentenced by Civill
Justice for one and the same crime, offence or Trespasse" and that "(e)verie Action betweene partie and
partie, and proceedings against delinquents in Criminall causes shall be briefly and destinctly entered on
the Rolles of every Court by the Recorder thereof."27 Ineluctably, this pronouncement became the
springboard for the proposal of the First Congress of the United States that double jeopardy be
included in the Bill of Rights. It acknowledged that the tradition against placing an individual twice in
danger of a second prosecution for the same offense followed ancient precedents in English law and
legislation derived from colonial experiences and necessities. Providing abundant grist for impassioned
debate in the US Congress, the proposal was subsequently ratified as part of the Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution.

In 1817 the Supreme Court of Tennessee dismissed an appeal by the State after an acquittal from
perjury, declaring that: "A writ of error, or appeal in the nature of a writ of error, will not lie for the
State in such a case. It is a rule of common law that no one shall be brought twice into jeopardy for one
and the same offense. Were it not for this salutary rule, one obnoxious to the government might be
harassed and run down by repeated attempts to carry on a prosecution against him. Because of this
rule, a new trial cannot be granted in a criminal case where the defendant is acquitted. A writ of error
will lie for the defendant, but not against him."28 Verily, these concepts were founded upon that great
fundamental rule of common law, "Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa," in substance
expressed in the Constitution of the United States as: "Nor shall any person be subject for the same
offense, to be twice put into jeopardy of life or limb." It is in the spirit of this benign rule of the common
law, embodied in the Federal Constitution - a spirit of liberty and justice, tempered with mercy - that,
in several states of the Union, in criminal cases, a writ of error has been denied to the State. 29
The relationship between the prohibition against second jeopardy and the power to order a new trial
following conviction or dismissal stirred a no small amount of controversy in United States v.
Gibert.30 There, Mr. Justice Story, on circuit, declared that "the court had no power to grant a new trial
when the first trial had been duly had on a valid indictment before a court of competent jurisdiction."
The opinion formulated was that the prohibition against double jeopardy applied equally whether the
defendant had been acquitted or convicted.

But it must be noted that even in those times, the power to grant a new trial in the most serious cases
was already being exercised by many American courts, the practice having been observed from an
early date, in spite of provisions of law against double jeopardy. 31 For this reason, the rule in Gibert was
stoutly resisted.32 As if to taunt Gibert, the 1839 case of United States v. Keen33 declared that the
constitutional provision did not prohibit a new trial on defendant’s motion after a conviction. In Hopt v.
Utah,34 the defendant was retried three (3) times following reversals of his convictions.

Then in 1896 the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Ball35 affirmed that the double jeopardy rule
did not prevent a second trial when, on appeal, a conviction had been set aside. It declared that a
defendant who procured on appeal a reversal of a judgment against him could be tried anew upon the
same indictment or upon another indictment for the same offense of which he had been convicted.
This principle of autrefois convict was expanded nine (9) years later in Trono v. United States36 where
the Court affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippines by holding that "since the
plaintiffs in error had appealed their convictions of the lower offense in order to secure a reversal,
there was no bar to convicting them of the higher offense in proceedings in the appellate court that
were tantamount to a new trial." Mr. Justice Peckham, holding for the Court, concluded that "the
better doctrine is that which does not limit the court or the jury upon a new trial, to a consideration of
the question of guilt of the lower offense of which the accused was convicted on the first trial, but that
the reversal of the judgment of conviction opens up the whole controversy and acts upon the original
judgment as if it had never been."37 It was ratiocinated that the result was justified not only on the
theory that the accused had waived their right not to be retried but also on the ground that "the
constitutional provision was really never intended to x x x cover the case of a judgment x x x which has
been annulled at the request of the accused x x x x"

It must be stressed though that Ball also principally ruled that it had long been settled under the Fifth
Amendment that a verdict of acquittal is final, ending a defendant’s jeopardy, and, even when "not
followed by any judgment, is a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. It is one of the
elemental principles of our criminal law that the Government cannot secure a new trial by means of an
appeal, even though an acquittal may appear to be erroneous."

In 1891 the United States Judiciary Act was passed providing that appeals or writs of error may be
taken from the district court or from the existing circuit courts direct to the Supreme Court in any case
that involved the construction of the Constitution. The following year an issue was raised in United
States v. Sanges38 on whether this Act conferred upon the government the right to sue out a writ of
error in any criminal case. In that case, existing rules on double jeopardy took a significant turn when
the United States Supreme Court observed that while English law was vague on the matter, it had been
settled by overwhelming American authority that the State had no right to sue out a writ of error upon
a judgment in favor of the defendant in a criminal case, except under and in accordance with express
statutes, whether that judgment was rendered upon a verdict of acquittal, or upon the determination
by the court of a question of law. The Court noted that in a few states, decisions denying a writ of error
to the State after a judgment for the defendant on a verdict of acquittal proceeded upon the ground
that to grant it would be to put him twice in jeopardy, in violation of the constitutional
provision.39 Sanges therefore fixed the rule that absent explicit legislative authority, the United States
Government had no right of appeal in criminal cases in case of an acquittal as it would expose the
defendant twice to jeopardy.

Notably, however, in 1892 the Attorneys General of the United States began to recommend the
passage of legislation allowing the Government to appeal in criminal cases. Their primary objective was
to resist the power of a single district judge (under the law then obtaining) by dismissing an indictment
to defeat any criminal prosecution instituted by the Government. No action was taken on the proposal
until 1906 when President Theodore Roosevelt in his annual message to the US Congress demanded
the enactment of legislation on the matter. Consequently, on 2 March 1907 such legislative authority
was provided when the Criminal Appeals Act became a law40 Ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246.40 permitting the
United States to seek a writ of error from the Supreme Court from any decision dismissing all
indictment on the basis of the "invalidity or construction of the statute upon which the indictments is
founded."41 The law narrowed the right to appeal by the Government to cases in which the ground of
the District Court’s decision was invalidity or construction of the statute upon which the charge was
founded, and that a verdict in favor of the defendant based on evidence could not be set aside on
appeal no matter how erroneous the legal theory upon which it may be based. For these purposes, it
made no difference whether the verdict be the result of the jury’s decision or that of the judge. In
other words, Government could appeal from a decision dismissing an indictment or arresting judgment
on the basis of the statutory invalidity or misconstruction of the pertinent criminal statute and from a
decision sustaining a special plea in bar, so long as the defendant would not be put in jeopardy.42

On 10 December 1898 the Philippine Islands was ceded by Spain to the United States by virtue of the
Treaty of Paris of 1898 which was ratified by the State Parties on 11 April 1899. The Islands was placed
under military rule until the establishment of the Philippine Commission in 1902. On 23 April 1900 the
military government issued General Order No. 58 which amended the Code of Criminal Procedure then
in force by, among others, extending to the Islands the double jeopardy provision under the Fifth
Amendment of the US Constitution. This was pursuant to the 7 April 1900 Instructions of President
McKinley issued to the Philippine Commission headed by William Howard Taft. The Instructions read in
part: "x x x the Commission should bear in mind, and the people of the Islands should be made to
understand, that there are certain great principles of government which have been made the basis of
our governmental system, which we deem essential to the rule of law x x x and maintained in their
islands for the sake of their liberty and happiness, however much they may conflict with the customs
or laws of procedure with which they are familiar x x x x Upon every division and branch of the
Government of the Philippines therefore must be imposed these inviolable rules: x x x that x x x no
person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense x x x x"43

General Order No. 58 was amended by Act No. 194 which permitted an appeal by the government
after acquittal. The Philippine Civil Government Act of 1 July 1902 of the U.S. Congress repealed the
Act, adopted and restored the same principle in Gen. Order No. 58 as enunciated in the Fifth
Amendment and in McKinley’s Instructions by providing immunity from second jeopardy for the same
criminal offense. It did not take long however for the meaning and significance of the doctrine held
forth in McKinley’s Instructions to be placed under severe test and scrutiny.

In 1901 Mr. Thomas E. Kepner, a practicing lawyer in Manila, Philippines, was charged with
embezzlement of funds (estafa). He was tried by a court of first instance, minus a jury, and was
acquitted of the crime. The U.S. Government appealed to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands
and judgment was reversed. Kepner was sentenced with imprisonment and suspended from public
office or place of trust.
Questioning his conviction before the US Supreme Court, Kepner argued that the appeal by the US
government to the Philippine Supreme Court of his judgment of acquittal constituted double jeopardy
construed in light of existing US jurisprudence. On the other hand, the Attorney General for the
Philippines and the Solicitor General of the United States jointly contended that the Philippine Bill of 1
July 1902 which included the prohibition against double jeopardy should be construed from the
perspective of the system of laws prevailing in the Philippines prior to its cession to the United States.
Under this system, the Audiencia (Supreme Court) could entertain an appeal of a judgment of acquittal
since the proceedings before it were regarded not as a new trial but an extension of preliminary
proceedings in the court of first instance. The entire proceedings constituted one continuous trial and
the jeopardy that attached in the court of first instance did not terminate until final judgment had been
rendered by the Audiencia. Double jeopardy was described not only in the Spanish law Fuero Real44 as:
"After a man accused of any crime has been acquitted by the court, no one can afterwards accuse him
of the same offense (except in certain specified cases), but also in the Siete Partidas45 which provided
that: "If a man is acquitted by a valid judgment of any offense of which he has been accused, no other
person can afterwards accuse him of the offense x x x x" Under this system of law, a person was not
regarded as jeopardized in the legal sense until there had been a final judgment in the court of last
resort. The lower courts then were deemed examining courts, exercising preliminary jurisdiction only,
and the accused was not finally convicted or acquitted until the case had been passed upon in
the Audiencia or Supreme Court, whose judgment was subject to review by the Supreme Court in
Madrid (Spain) for errors of law, with power to grant a new trial.

The U.S. Supreme Court however threw out the Government’s argument and held that the proceedings
after acquittal had placed the accused Kepner twice in jeopardy. It declared in no uncertain terms that
the appeal of the judgment of conviction was in essence a trial de novo and that, whatever the Spanish
tradition was, the purpose of Congress was to carry some at least of the essential principles of
American constitutional jurisprudence to the Islands and to engraft them upon the law of these people
newly subject to its jurisdiction. There was little question therefore that Kepner soldered into American
jurisprudence the precedent that as to the defendant who had been acquitted by the verdict duly
returned and received, the court could take no other action than to order his discharge. "x x x (I)t is
then the settled law of this court that former jeopardy includes one who has been acquitted by a
verdict duly rendered, although no judgment be entered on the verdict, and it was found upon a
defective indictment. The protection is not x x x against the peril of second punishment, but against
being tried again for the same offense."46

This doctrine was echoed in United States v. Wills47 where the Court further clarified that "jeopardy
implies an exposure to a lawful conviction for an offense of which a person has already been acquitted
x x x x" It was reiterated in 1957 in Green v. United States48 in which Mr. Justice Black, writing for the
Court, professed that the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy was designed to protect
an individual from being subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once for
an alleged offense. Thus, under the Fifth Amendment, a verdict of acquittal was considered final,
ending the accused’s jeopardy and that once a person has been acquitted of an offense, he cannot be
prosecuted again on the same charge.

American jurisprudence on the effect of appealed acquittals on double jeopardy since then sailed on,
following the main sea lanes charted by Kepner, but not without encountering perturbance along the
way. For it may be mentioned, albeit en passant, that the case of Bartkus v. Illinois49 did cause some
amount of judicial soul-shaking in 1959 when it burst into the scene. Alfonse Bartkus was tried before a
federal district court in Illinois and was later acquitted by the jury. Less than a year later, Bartkus was
indicted this time by an Illinois grand jury on facts substantially identical to those of the federal charge
and was subsequently convicted. His conviction was affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court.

On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court, by a close vote of 5 to 4, affirmed the conviction. The Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, declared that the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy
provision was inapplicable to states so that an acquittal of a federal indictment was no bar to a
prosecution by a state based on the same charge. Since there was no proof offered to show that the
participation of the federal authorities in the Illinois state prosecution was of such nature as to render
the state proceedings a mere cover for a federal prosecution to render the state indictment essentially
a constitutionally prohibited second prosecution, no double jeopardy attached.

Mr. Justice Black dissented, joined in by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Douglas, with Mr.
Justice Brennan writing a separate dissenting opinion. Black rued that the Court’s ruling by a majority
of one only resulted in "further limiting the already weakened constitutional guarantees against double
prosecution," citing the earlier case of United States v. Lanza,50 where the Court allowed the federal
conviction and punishment of a man previously convicted and punished for identical acts by a state
court. The dissent called attention to the fact that in Bartkus, for the first time in its history, the Court
allowed the state conviction of a defendant already acquitted of the same offense in the federal court.
This, Mr. Justice Black asserted, was unacceptable, for as the Court previously found in Palko v.
Connecticut,51 "double prosecutions for the same offense are so contrary to the spirit of our free
country that they violate even the prevailing view of the Fourteenth Amendment since some of the
privileges and immunities of the Bill of Rights . . . have been taken over and brought within the
Fourteenth Amendment by process of absorption x x x x One may infer, from the fewness of the cases,
that retrials after acquittal have been considered particularly obnoxious, worse even, in the eyes of
many, than retrials after conviction."

Whether such forceful pronouncements steered back into course meandering views on double
jeopardy is open to question. Nonetheless, the case of Fong Foo v. United States,52 decided per curiam,
reaffirmed the pronouncements in Ball and Kepner that "the verdict of acquittal was final, and could
not be reviewed x x x without putting (the petitioners) twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the
Constitution."

In the meantime, from 1907 up to 1970 the Criminal Appeals Act underwent significant alterations. The
1942 amendment of its Section 682 permitted for the first time appeals to the circuit appeals court
from orders sustaining demurrer to indictment in cases not directly appealable to the Supreme
Court.53 However, due to the many modifications the law was subjected to, construction and
interpretation became more laborious, effectively transforming appeals into highly technical
procedures. As such, the Criminal Appeals Act developed into a judicial "bete noire," for even the U.S.
Supreme Court itself had "to struggle in a number of occasions with the vagaries of the said Act."54 In
one of those unhappy efforts, it concluded that the Act was "a failure x x x a most unruly child that has
not improved with age."55

The U.S. Congress finally got rid of the dismal statute in 1970 and replaced it with a new Criminal
Appeals Act intended to broaden the right of Government to appeal whenever the Constitution would
permit. It was apparent that the legislative body left to the courts the prerogative to draw the
constitutional limits of double jeopardy rather than define them itself. Since then, pronouncements by
the courts on the jouble jeopardy guarantee of the Fifth Amendment focused on three (3) related
protections: against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; against a second
prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and, against multiple punishments for the same
offense.56

In Wilson,57 the Court expressed that the interests underlying these three (3) protections are quite
similar. Thus, when a defendant has been once convicted and punished for a particular crime,
principles of fairness and finality require that he be not subjected to the possibility of further
punishment by being tried or sentenced for the same offense.58 And when a defendant has been
acquitted of an offense, the Clause guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to make repeated
attempts to convict him, "thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the
possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty." 59 It can thus be inferred from these
cases that the policy of avoiding multiple trials has been considered paramount so that exceptions to
the rule have been permitted only in few instances and under rigid conditions.

Accordingly, in United States v. Scott60 the US Supreme Court synthesized two (2) venerable principles
of double jeopardy jurisprudence: first, the successful appeal of a judgment of conviction on any
ground other than the insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict poses no bar to further
prosecution on the same charge; and second, a judgment of acquittal, whether based on a jury verdict
of not guilty or on a ruling by the court that the evidence is insufficient to convict, may not be appealed
and terminates the prosecution when a second trial would be necessitated by a reversal.61 It would
seem that the conditionality of "when a second trial would be necessitated by a reversal" was attached
thereto because ordinarily, the procedure obtaining was that if on appeal a judgment of acquittal
is reversed, i. e., a finding is had against the defendant, a remand of the case for another trial may be
allowed if needed.

At this juncture, it must be explained that under existing American law and jurisprudence, appeals may
be had not only from criminal convictions but also, in some limited instances, from dismissals of
criminal charges, sometimes loosely termed "acquittals." But this is so as long as the judgments of
dismissals do not involve determination of evidence, such as when the judge: (a) issues a post-verdict
acquittal, i.e., acquits the defendant on a matter of law after a verdict of guilty has been entered by a
trier of facts (a jury); (b) orders the dismissal on grounds other than insufficiency of evidence, as when
the statute upon which the indictment was based is defective; (c) conducts a judicial process that is
defective or flawed in some fundamental respect, such as incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence,
incorrect instructions, or prosecutorial misconduct; (d) issues an order arresting judgment, i.e., an act
of a trial judge refusing to enter judgment on the verdict because of an error appearing on the face of
the record that rendered the judgment;62 or, (e) pronounces judgment on a special plea in bar (a non
obstante plea) - one that does not relate to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, but which is set up
as a special defense relating to an outside matter but which may have been connected with the
case.63 Interestingly, the common feature of these instances of dismissal is that they all bear on
questions of law or matters unrelated to a factual resolution of the case which consequently, on
appeal, will not involve a review of evidence. Its logical effect in American law is to render appeals
therefrom non-repugnant to the Double Jeopardy Clause.

This contextual situation in which appeals from dismissals of criminal cases are allowed under
American rules of procedure does not obtain in the Philippines. To be sure, United States v.
Scott positively spelled out that if an acquittal was based on an appreciation of the evidence adduced,
no appeal would lie. Mr. Justice Rehnquist explained that what may seem superficially to be a
"disparity in the rules governing a defendant’s liability to be tried again" refers to the underlying
purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. He elaborated that "(a)s Kepner and Fong Foo illustrate, the
law attaches particular significance to an acquittal. To permit a second trial after an acquittal however
mistaken x x x would present an unacceptably high risk that the Government, with its vastly superior
resources, might wear down the defendant so that even though innocent he may be found guilty. x x x
x On the other hand, to require a criminal defendant to stand trial again after he has successfully
invoked the statutory right of appeal to upset his first conviction is not an act of governmental
oppression of the sort against which the x x x Clause was intended to protect."

In proposing a re-evaluation of Philippine jurisprudence on double jeopardy, petitioner insists

that Wilson and Scott have unquestionably altered the seascape of double jeopardy previously
navigated by Kepner and Ball. Using as its flagship the pronouncement in Wilson that appeals of
acquittal are possible provided the accused will not be subjected to a second trial, it argues that this
should apply to the case at bar because, anyway, a review of the acquittal of private respondent
Honorato Galvez will not result in another trial inasmuch as the Court will only have to examine the
evidence adduced below to pass final judgment on the culpability of the accused.

Petitioner’s own hermeneutic sense of the phrase "another trial" is that which solely adverts to a
proceeding before a competent trial court that rehears the case and receives evidence anew to
establish the facts after the case has been finally disposed of by the Supreme Court. Obviously, it
adheres to the Holmesian hypothesis in Kepner and, for that matter, the concept under Spanish law
then applicable in the Philippines before the American colonization, that a trial consists of one whole
continuing process from reception of evidence by a trier of facts up to its final disposition by the
Supreme Court. But petitioner conveniently forgets that this theory has been consistently spurned by
both American and Philippine jurisprudence that has faithfully adhered to the doctrine that an appeal
of a judgment after the defendant had been acquitted by the court in a bench trial is, quintessentially,
a new trial. In Kepner, the Court regarded the two (2) events, i. e., trial by the lower court and the
appellate proceedings, as equivalent to two (2) separate trials, and the evil that the Court saw in the
procedure was plainly that of multiple prosecutions.64 Although Kepner technically involved only one
proceeding, the Court deemed the second factfinding, that is, the review by the appellate court, as the
equivalent of a second trial. Accordingly, in subsequent cases, the Court has treated the Kepner
principle as being addressed to the evil of successive trials.65

No less than the case of Wilson,66 petitioner’s main anchor for its propositions, affirms this rule. There,
the Court emphasized that it has, up to the present, rejected the theory espoused by the dissenting
Mr. Justice Holmes in Kepner that " a man cannot be said to be more than once in jeopardy in the same
cause however often he may be tried. The jeopardy is one continuing jeopardy, from its beginning to
the end of the cause." It declared unequivocally that "we continue to be of the view that the policies
underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause militate against permitting the Government to appeal after a
verdict of acquittal." Wilson therefore pronounced that if acquittal is declared on the basis of evidence
adduced, double jeopardy attaches for that particular cause.

To explain further, Wilson involved an appeal by Government of a post-verdict ruling of law issued by

the trial judge resulting in the acquittal of the defendant due to pre-indictment delay (a delay between
the offense and the indictment prejudiced the defendant) after a verdict of guilty had been entered by
the jury. But it was not an acquittal that involved "factual resolution." It was one anchored on an
extraneous cause. Factual resolution is defined in United States v. Sorenson67 following the rulings
in Ball, Fong Foo and Sisson as "the finding that government failed to prove all the elements of the
offense." It is clear therefore that the acquittal of Wilson, not being based on evidence, could be
appealed. The rule therefore fixed in Wilson is that where a judge holds for the defendant on a ruling
of law, and not on the basis of evidence, after a jury entered a verdict of guilty, the prosecution may
appeal the acquittal without violating double jeopardy, as this is allowed under the pertinent law. 68 This
is so since no second trial will ensue, as a reversal on appeal would merely reinstate the jury’s
verdict.69 And if the prosecution is upheld, the case simply goes back to the trial court for disposition of
the remaining matters. It bears emphasis that in Wilson, no double jeopardy problem was presented
because the appellate court, upon reviewing the asserted legal errors of the trial judge, could simply
order the jury’s guilty verdict reinstated, no new factfinding would be necessary, and the defendant
would not be put twice in jeopardy.70

The case of Scott, also considerably relied upon by petitioner, involved an accused who, having been
indicted for several offenses, himself moved for the dismissal of two (2) counts of the charges on the
ground that his defense was prejudiced by pre-indictment delay. The trial judge granted the motion.
Government appealed the dismissals but the appellate court rejected the appeal on the basis of double
jeopardy. This time the US Supreme Court reversed, holding that "(w)here a defendant himself seeks to
avoid his trial prior to its conclusion by a motion for a mistrial, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not
offended by a second prosecution. Such a motion by the defendant is deemed to be a deliberate
election on his part to forego his valued right to have his guilt or innocence determined by the first
trier of facts."

The inapplicability of this ruling to the case at bar is at once discernible. The dismissal of the charges
against private respondent Galvez was not upon his own instance; neither did he seek to avoid trial, as
it was in Scott, to be considered as having waived his right to be adjudged guilty or innocent. Here, trial
on the merits was held during which both government and accused had their respective day in court.

We are therefore insufficiently persuaded to adopt petitioner’s concept of "another trial" because, as
discussed above, it disregards the contextual interpretation of the term in light of the legal and factual
morphology of the double jeopardy principle obtaining in Wilson and Scott. To sum up, in the cause
before us, the records show that respondent trial judge based his finding of acquittal, no matter how
erroneous it might seem to petitioner, upon the evidence presented by both parties. The judgment
here was no less than a factual resolution of the case. Thus, to the extent that the post-verdict
acquittal in Wilson was based on a ruling of law and not on a resolution of facts, Wilson is not, to
reiterate, pertinent to nor persuasive in the case at bar. The same observation holds true for Scott.
That it was the defendant who secured the dismissal of the charges against him without any
submission to either judge or jury as to his guilt or innocence, but on a ground totally outside
evidentiary considerations, i.e., pre-indictment delay, definitely forecloses the applicability, if not
relevance, of Scott to the instant case.

Wilson, Scott and all other pertinent American case law considered, it still behooves us to examine if at
this time there is need to rethink our juristic philosophy on double jeopardy vis-à-vis acquittals. In this
respect, it would be instructive to see how Philippine law and jurisprudence have behaved
since Kepner. Has the principle since then beneficially evolved, or has it remained an "unruly child that
has not improved with age?"

The moorings of double jeopardy in the Philippines, as Mr. Justice Manuel Moran observed in People v.
Tarok,71 are not indigenous but are a matter of constitutional or statutory history. Enunciated in the
Constitution of the United States, from there it found its way into this country, first, in the Philippine
Bill of 1902, then in the Jones Law of 1916, and finally, in the 1935 Philippine Constitution. Being thus a
mere recognition of the maxim of the common law, and adopted from the Constitution of the United
States, the principle of double jeopardy followed in this jurisdiction the same line of development - no
narrower nor wider - as in the Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence.
While some reservations may be had about the contemporary validity of this observation considering
the variety of offsprings begotten, at least in the United States, by the mother rule since then, perhaps
it is safer to say that not much deviation has occurred from the general rule laid out in Kepner.
For Kepner may be said to have been the lighthouse for the floundering issues on the effect of
acquittals on jeopardy as they sail safely home. The cases of People v. Bringas,72 People v.
Hernandez,73 People v. Montemayor,74 City Fiscal of Cebu v. Kintanar,75 Republic v. Court of
Appeals,76 and Heirs of Tito Rillorta v. Firme,77 to name a few, are illustrative. Certainly, the reason
behind this has not been due to a stubborn refusal or reluctance to "keep up with the Joneses," in a
manner of speaking, but to maintain fidelity to the principle carefully nurtured by our Constitution,
statutes and jurisprudence. As early as Julia v. Sotto78 the Court warned that without this safeguard
against double jeopardy secured in favor of the accused, his fortune, safety and peace of mind would
be entirely at the mercy of the complaining witness who might repeat his accusation as often as
dismissed by the court and whenever he might see fit, subject to no other limitation or restriction than
his own will and pleasure.

The 1935 Philippine Constitution provided in its Sec. 20, Art. III, that "(n)o person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." The
discussions by the members of the Constitutional Convention of 1934 on the effect on double jeopardy
of an appeal from a judgment of acquittal are enlightening. Foreclosing appeal on a judgment of
acquittal was recognized by the Convention and the proposal to make an appeal from acquittal
permissible even only "on questions of law provided that a verdict in favor of the defendant shall not
be set aside by reason thereof" was strongly voted down. Thus -

MR. GULLAS: Dear Colleagues x x x x I wish to summarize our points. The amendment is commendable,
but we submit that the reason against far outweighs the reason in favor of it. In the first place, it would
tend to multiplicity of suits and thus increase the burden of the Supreme Court. Second, suits will be
expensive if we meet fiscals who have an exaggerated opinion of themselves, who have more ego than
gray matter or more amor propio. In the third place, as has been stated by a certain Gentleman, the
provision would convert the Supreme Court into a sort of academy of consulting body. In the fourth
place, as pointed out by Mr. Sevilla, fights in the Supreme Court would be one-sided. In the fifth place,
as demonstrated by Delegate Labrador, the matter should be procedural rather than constitutional.
And lastly, as explained by Delegate Singson Encarnacion, should the Supreme Court reverse the
judgment of the lower court, the defendant would suffer morally for the rest of his life. He would walk
around under a veil of humiliation, carrying with him a stigma.

For all these reasons, Mr. President, we oppose the amendment.

PRESIDENT: We can vote on the amendment. (Various delegates: YES). Those who are in favor of the
amendment please say YES. (A minority: YES). Those against the amendment say NO. (A majority: NO).
The amendment is rejected x x x x

(1934 Constitutional Convention Record, Journal No. 95, November 24, 1934, p. 361)

The case of People v. Bringas79 was the first case to be decided under this Constitution pertinent to the
matter at hand. There the Supreme Court, guided by Kepner, cited its finding in United States v. Tam
Yung Way80 against the right of appeal by the government from a judgment discharging the defendant
in a criminal case after he has been brought to trial, whether defendant was acquitted on the merits or
whether his discharge was based upon the trial court’s conclusion of law that the trial had failed for
some reason to establish his guilt as charged.

The Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution, specifically Sec. 22, Art. IV thereof, reproduced verbatim the
same double jeopardy provision of the 1935 Constitution. So did the 1987 Freedom Constitution
drafted by the 1986 Constitutional Commission.

Noteworthy is that during the deliberations by the 1986 Constitutional Commission attempts were
made to introduce into the Fundamental Law the right of government to appeal verdicts of acquittal
promulgated by trial courts. The proposed text for Sec. 14, Art. VIII, on the Judicial Department read as
follows -

Sec. 12. - x x x x An appeal by the State and/or offended party from a judgment of acquittal may be
allowed in the discretion of the Supreme Court by a petition for review on certiorari on the ground that
it is manifestly against the evidence with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. 81

This proposal was strongly opposed, the controlling consideration as expressed by Commissioner
Rustico de los Reyes being the "inequality of the parties in power, situation and advantage in criminal
cases where the government, with its unlimited resources, trained detectives, willing officers and
counsel learned in the law, stands arrayed against a defendant unfamiliar with the practice of the
courts, unacquainted with their officers or attorneys, often without means and frequently too terrified
to make a defense, if he had one, while his character and his life, liberty or property rested upon the
result of the trial."82

Commissioner Joaquin Bernas likewise articulated his fear that "we could be subjecting an accused
individual to a very serious danger of harassment from a prosecutor x x x x The harm, however, which
will follow from waving this flag of possibility of appeal x x x could be much more than letting a guilty
person go."83 Put to a vote, the proposal was defeated.84

Then again, during the debates on double jeopardy under Sec. 23, Art. III, on the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution, Commissioner Ambrosio B. Padilla reopened the matter already settled at the
deliberations on the article on the Judiciary. The following exchanges ensued:

MR. PADILLA. x x x On Section 23, on double jeopardy, there was Davide resolution which allowed an
appeal in a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case that states: An acquittal by a trial court is, however,
appealable provided that in such event, the accused shall not be detained or put up bail. This has been
deleted by the Commission x x x x

FR. BERNAS. Yes.

MR. PADILLA. I recall that when this same idea, but in different phraseology, was presented and
approved by the Committee on the Judiciary, the great objection was that it would violate the immunity
against double jeopardy. But I recall, the sponsor admitted, after I had explained the day before, that it
did not violate double jeopardy but it was unnecessary and harmful. What is the real position, Mr.
Presiding Officer? Is it in violation of double jeopardy or is it just because it need not be stated in the Bill
of Rights nor in the Article on the Judiciary?

FR. BERNAS: I explained my position on that, Mr. Presiding Officer, when we considered the matter in
the Article on the Judiciary. The position I took was that it was not a departure from existing
jurisprudence. In fact, it was more strict than existing jurisprudence in that it required not just abuse of
discretion but it also required that the judgment be clearly against the evidence.

MR. PADILLA. That is correct, Mr. Presiding Officer, because we want to make the exercise of that right
by the state or offended party restrictive not only through a petition for review on certiorari in the
discretion of the Supreme Court which may dismiss it outright, but also on certain grounds that are
really covered by "in excess or lack of jurisdiction."

But my common impression, Mr. Presiding Officer, is that most lawyers are of the opinion that when a
judgment of acquittal is rendered by a trial court, that is final, executory and not appealable.

Does not the sponsor think, Mr. Presiding Officer, an appeal from an arbitrary judgment of acquittal
rendered by a few corrupt judges of the offended party or the state will improve the administration of
justice?

FR. BERNAS. Mr. Presiding Officer, I have expressed my position on this when we voted on Third
Reading on the Article on the Judiciary. But if the Commissioner wants to raise the matter for
reconsideration, he can present a motion on the floor.

Padilla did not ask for a reconsideration.85

The Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure relative to double jeopardy and the effect thereon of
acquittals adhere strictly to constitutional provisions. The pertinent portions of Sec. 7 of Rule 117
thereof provide -

Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. - When an accused has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient
in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution
for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information x x x x

From this procedural prescription alone, there can be no mistaking the requisites for invoking double
jeopardy: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) before a competent court before which the same is
filed; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and, (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted,
or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. 86 It bears
repeating that where acquittal is concerned, the rules do not distinguish whether it occurs at the level
of the trial court or on appeal from a judgment of conviction. This firmly establishes the finality-of-
acquittal rule in our jurisdiction. Therefore, as mandated by our Constitution, statutes and cognate
jurisprudence, an acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it
happens at the trial court level or before the Court of Appeals.

In general, the rule is that a remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before the
Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a finding of mistrial, as in Galman v.
Sandiganbayan.87 Condemning the trial before the Sandiganbayan of the murder of former Senator
Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, which resulted in the acquittal of all the accused, as a sham, this Court
minced no words in declaring that "[i]t is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked
against this Court's setting aside of the trial court's judgment of acquittal where the prosecution which
represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process x x x x [T]he sham trial was but
a mock trial where the authoritarian president ordered respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan
to rig the trial, and closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure the predetermined final
outcome of acquittal and absolution as innocent of all the respondent-accused x x x x Manifestly, the
prosecution and the sovereign people were denied due process of law with a partial court and biased
Tanodbayan under the constant and pervasive monitoring and pressure exerted by the authoritarian
president to assure the carrying out of his instructions. A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of
acquittal, such as that in the case at bar, is a void judgment. In legal contemplation, it is no judgment at
all. It neither binds nor bars anyone. Such a judgment is ‘a lawless thing which can be treated as an
outlaw.’ It is a terrible and unspeakable affront to the society and the people. 'To paraphrase Brandeis:
If the authoritarian head of government becomes the lawbreaker, he breeds contempt for the law; he
invites every man to become a law unto himself; he invites anarchy.’ The contention of respondent-
accused that the Sandiganbayan judgment of acquittal ended the case and could not be appealed or
reopened without being put in double jeopardy was forcefully disposed of by the Court in People v.
Court of Appeals:88

x x x x That is the general rule and presupposes a valid judgment. As earlier pointed out, however,
respondent Court's Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued without
jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at
all. By it no rights are divested. Through it, no rights can be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings
founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it
and all claims flowing out of it are void x x x x Private respondents invoke 'justice for the innocent.' For
justice to prevail the scales must balance. It is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests
of the society which they have wronged, must also be equally considered. A judgment of conviction is
not necessarily a denial of justice. A verdict of acquittal neither necessarily spells a triumph of
justice.1âwphi1 To the party wronged, to the society offended, it could also mean injustice. This is
where the Courts play a vital role. They render justice where justice is due.

Thus, the doctrine that "double jeopardy may not be invoked after trial" may apply only when the
Court finds that the "criminal trial was a sham" because the prosecution representing the sovereign
people in the criminal case was denied due process.89 The Court in People v. Bocar90 rationalized that
the "remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts
merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second
jeopardy."91

The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into
"the humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizen, when brought in
unequal contest with the State x x x x"92 Thus Green expressed the concern that "(t)he underlying idea,
one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State
with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an
individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the
possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty."93

It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to
the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying
this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is "part of the paramount importance criminal
justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction." 94 The interest in
the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a
need for "repose," a desire to know the exact extent of one's liability. 95 With this right of repose, the
criminal justice system has built in a protection to insure that the innocent, even those whose
innocence rests upon a jury’s leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding. 96

Related to his right of repose is the defendant’s interest in his right to have his trial completed by a
particular tribunal.97 This interest encompasses his right to have his guilt or innocence determined in a
single proceeding by the initial jury empanelled to try him, for society’s awareness of the heavy
personal strain which the criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the
willingness to limit Government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in
enforcement of criminal laws.98 The ultimate goal is prevention of government oppression; the goal
finds its voice in the finality of the initial proceeding. 99 As observed in Lockhart v. Nelson,100 "(t)he
fundamental tenet animating the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the State should not be able to
oppress individuals through the abuse of the criminal process." Because the innocence of the accused
has been confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial
would be unfair.101

Petitioner resists the applicability of the finality-of-acquittal doctrine to the Philippine adjudicative
process on the ground that the principle is endemic to the American justice system as it has specific
application only to jury verdicts of acquittal, and thus finds no valid use in our jurisdiction since the
"underlying rationale of jury acquittals, a special feature of American constitutional law, has no parallel
nor analogy in the Philippine legal system." This is a rather strained if not facile approach to the issue at
hand, for it attempts to introduce the theory that insofar as the objective of factfinding is concerned,
factfinding forming the core of the philosophy behind double jeopardy, there exists a difference
between a jury acquittal and a "judge acquittal, Philippine version." To support its contention,
petitioner sedulously explains that in the United States there is an "emerging consensus to
differentiate the constitutional impact of jury verdicts of acquittal vis-à-vis judgments of acquittal
rendered by the bench." While this consensus may have emerged in the United States, it is not difficult
to surmise that it must have been so because of countless instances of conflict between jury verdicts
and judgments of trial judges in the same case. Resultantly, procedural statutes and jurisprudence
have been wont to draw lines of distinction between the two, hopefully to keep each other at bay.
Since this phenomenon does not occur in our jurisdiction, as we have no juries to speak of, petitioner’s
hypothesis is inappropriate.

Be that as it may, the invalidity of petitioner’s argument lies in its focus on

the instrumentality empowered to rule against the evidence, i.e., the American jury versus the
Philippine judge, no matter how emphatic it qualifies its proposition with the phrase "underlying
rationale of jury acquittals," rather than on the essential function of factfinding itself which consists of
reception, sifting and evaluation of evidence. Where the main task of factfinding is concerned, there
exists no difference between the American jury and the Philippine trial judge. Both are triers of facts.
This much petitioner has to concede. The attempt therefore to close the door on the applicability of
the finality rule to our legal system abjectly fails when one considers that, universally, the principal
object of double jeopardy is the protection from being tried for the second time, whether by jury or
judge. Thus, "emerging American consensus on jury acquittals" notwithstanding, on solid constitutional
bedrock is well engraved our own doctrine that acquittals by judges on evidentiary considerations
cannot be appealed by government. The jurisprudential metes and bounds of double jeopardy having
been clearly defined by both constitution and statute, the issue of the effect of an appeal of a verdict of
acquittal upon a determination of the evidence on the constitutionally guaranteed right of an accused
against being twice placed in jeopardy should now be finally put to rest.
Petitioner assails the decision rendered by the court a quo as blatantly inconsistent with the material
facts and evidence on record, reason enough to charge respondent judge with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction resulting in a denial of due process. Citing People v.
Pablo,102 it alleges that "respondent aggravated his indiscretion by not x x x reviewing the evidence
already presented for a proper assessment x x x x It is in completely ignoring the evidence already
presented x x x that the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion." It adds that
"discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural due process, i.e.,
after evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any order issued in the absence thereof
is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness." 103

Private respondent remonstrates against the propriety of petitioner’s certiorari as a mode of

impugning the judgment of acquittal not only as a strategy to camouflage the issue of double jeopardy
but also for the fact that, contrary to petitioner’s assertions, evidence in the case at bar was subjected
to scrutiny, review, assessment and evaluation by respondent trial judge. By reason thereof, there
cannot be perceived grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge to warrant issuance of the great
writ of certiorari.

We agree. The office of the common law writ of certiorari is to bring before the court for inspection the
record of the proceedings of an inferior tribunal in order that the superior court may determine from
the face of the record whether the inferior court has exceeded its jurisdiction, or has not proceeded
according to the essential requirements of the law. However, the original function and purpose of the
writ have been so modified by statutes and judicial decisions. It is particularly so in the field of criminal
law when the state is applying for the writ and problems arise concerning the right of the state to
appeal in a criminal case. As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings
from a judgment in favor of the defendant in a criminal case in the absence of a statute clearly
conferring that right. The problem comes into sharper focus when the defendant contends, in effect,
that the prosecution is attempting to accomplish by the writ what it could not do by appeal, and that
his constitutional rights are being thus encroached upon.104

Generally, under modern constitutions and statutes, provisions are available as guides to the court in
determining the standing of the prosecution to secure by certiorari a review of a lower court decision
in a criminal case which has favored the defendant. In most instances, provisions setting forth the
scope and function of certiorari are found together with those relating to the right of the state to
appeal or bring error in criminal matters. There is some indication that courts view the writ
of certiorari as an appeal in itself where the applicant shows that there is no other adequate remedy
available,105 and it is not uncommon to find language in cases to the effect that the state should not be
permitted to accomplish by certiorari what it cannot do by appeal.106 Thus, if a judgment sought to be
reviewed was one entered after an acquittal by a jury or the discharge of the accused on the merits by
the trial court, the standing of the prosecution to review it by certiorari is far more likely to be denied
than if it were such an order as one sustaining a demurrer to, or quashing the indictment, or granting a
motion for arrest of judgment after a verdict of guilty.107

Philippine jurisprudence has been consistent in its application of the Double Jeopardy Clause such that
it has viewed with suspicion, and not without good reason, applications for the extraordinary writ
questioning decisions acquitting an accused on ground of grave abuse of discretion.

The petition at hand which seeks to nullify the decision of respondent judge acquitting the accused
Honorato Galvez goes deeply into the trial court's appreciation and evaluation in esse of the evidence
adduced by the parties. A reading of the questioned decision shows that respondent judge considered
the evidence received at trial. These consisted among others of the testimonies relative to the
positions of the victims vis-à-vis the accused and the trajectory, location and nature of the gunshot
wounds, and the opinion of the expert witness for the prosecution. While the appreciation thereof may
have resulted in possible lapses in evidence evaluation, it nevertheless does not detract from the fact
that the evidence was considered and passed upon. This consequently exempts the act from the writ’s
limiting requirement of excess or lack of jurisdiction. As such, it becomes an improper object of and
therefore non-reviewable by certiorari. To reiterate, errors of judgment are not to be confused with
errors in the exercise of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 172716      November 17, 2010

JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71,
Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:
The Case
1 2
The petition seeks the review  of the Orders  of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City affirming sub-
silencio a lower court’s ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a second
prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property. This, despite the
accused’s previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries arising from
the same incident grounding the second prosecution.

The Facts
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by
respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponce’s
husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his
temporary release in both cases.

On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was
meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the
Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same
offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. 3

After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner
sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the
arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on
petitioner’s motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence,
cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.4 Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying
petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his
arrest.5 Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained
unresolved.

Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of
S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioner’s loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding its ruling on
petitioner’s forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTC’s order to arrest
petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without
reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought
reconsideration but this proved unavailing.6

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him to forego
participation in the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes his case from the
line of jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of appeals for absconding appellants because his appeal
before the RTC was a special civil action seeking a pre-trial relief, not a post-trial appeal of a judgment
of conviction.7

Petitioner laments the RTC’s failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking
jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366, having been
previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same offense of reckless imprudence charged
in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple consequences of such crime are
material only to determine his penalty.

Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTC’s decision forfeiting petitioner’s
standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce calls the Court’s
attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical injuries) cannot be complexed
under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the
prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical
injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to property.

In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor General’s motion not to file a
comment to the petition as the public respondent judge is merely a nominal party and private
respondent is represented by counsel.
 The Issues
Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief
in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the negative, whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the
Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.

The Ruling of the Court

We hold that (1) petitioner’s non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not
divest him of personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection afforded by the
Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for
the same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.

Petitioner’s Non-appearance at the Arraignment in

Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803

Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s escape from custody or violation of the terms of his
bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124,8 in relation to Section 1, Rule
125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also,
upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison
or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." The
"appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions.

The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment
ancillary question on the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural rules and jurisprudence. The RTC’s reliance on People v.
Esparas9 undercuts the cogency of its ruling because Esparas stands for a proposition contrary to the
RTC’s ruling. There, the Court granted review to an appeal by an accused who was sentenced to death
for importing prohibited drugs even though she jumped bail pending trial and was thus tried and
convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the mandatory review of death sentences under
Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8 of Rule 124.10

The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s non-appearance at his arraignment in Criminal Case
No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of
Court’s treatment of a defendant who absents himself from post-arraignment hearings. Under Section
21, Rule 11411 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant’s absence merely renders his
bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce
the accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be
tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the
bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto
convert the accused’s status to that of a fugitive without standing.

Further, the RTC’s observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he failed to attend the
scheduled proceeding"12 at the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the arraignment, petitioner
sought the suspension of the MeTC’s proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of his petition
with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTC’s refusal to defer arraignment (the order for which
was released days after the MeTC ordered petitioner’s arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration. His
motion remained unresolved as of the filing of this petition.
 Petitioner’s Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367
Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366

The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense"13 protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense,
with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information. 14 It is not
disputed that petitioner’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366
and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view,
submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled
otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate
offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter]
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not." 15

We find for petitioner.

Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,

its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty

The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same
provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-
offenses. The text of the provision reads:

Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which,
had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave
felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would
have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum
periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum
period shall be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the
property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the
value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five
pesos.

A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple
imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted
a light felony.

In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to
the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

 1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the
first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower
in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to
apply.

2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of a
person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods.

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which
material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage
impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.

The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the
offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give.

Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1) the penalties
attached to the quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2);

(2) a modified penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a generic
rule for trial courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of "reckless imprudence"
and "simple imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize "the mental attitude
or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia
punible,"16 unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal act. These structural and
conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of intentional crimes under the
first 13 Titles of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime,
separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as
the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v.
Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition that "reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but
simply a way of committing it x x x"17 on three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-
crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct
offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3)
the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes:

The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a
crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal
liability is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be
committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal
negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from
willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act
itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or
condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia
punible. x x x x
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the
penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the
lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory
would require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed
for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be
a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes
the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if
the willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could
range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual
penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to
a whole class, or series, of crimes.18 (Emphasis supplied)

This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their commission
results in damage, either to person or property.19

Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a case for
"Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence," its jurisdiction being limited to trying charges for
Malicious Mischief, an intentional crime conceptually incompatible with the element of imprudence
obtaining in quasi-crimes.

Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative ancestry of our present day penal code) and since
repeatedly reiterated,21 stands on solid conceptual foundation. The contrary doctrinal pronouncement
in People v. Faller22 that "[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself x x x [but] simply a way of
committing it x x x,"23 has long been abandoned when the Court en banc promulgated Quizon in 1955
nearly two decades after the Court decided Faller in 1939. Quizon rejected Faller’s conceptualization of
quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and not
merely methods of committing crimes. Faller found expression in post-Quizon jurisprudence 24 only by
dint of lingering doctrinal confusion arising from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining
Article 365 crimes and the complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
which, as will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian
conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence applying the Double
Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses, barring second prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one
resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging another resulting act but
arising from the same reckless act or omission upon which the second prosecution was based.

Prior Conviction or Acquittal of

Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense

The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not
merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars
subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts,
undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365
starting with People v. Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence"
because a prior case against the same accused for "reckless driving," arising from the same act upon
which the first prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same
legal question was brought before the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless
imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences
alleged for both charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the affirmative in People v.
Belga26 (promulgated in 1957 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero27 (promulgated in 1959,
unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas 28 (promulgated in 1960 by the Court en banc, per
Bengzon J.), People v. Silva29 (promulgated in 1962 by the Court en banc, per Paredes, J.), People v.
Macabuhay30 (promulgated in 1966 by the Court en banc, per Makalintal, J.), People v.
Buan31 (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting C. J.), Buerano v. Court of
Appeals32 (promulgated in 1982 by the Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and People v. City Court of
Manila33 (promulgated in 1983 by the First Division, per Relova, J.). These cases uniformly barred the
second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.

The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the Double
Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in
barring a subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless
imprudence" because of the accused’s prior acquittal of "slight physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence," with both charges grounded on the same act, the Court explained: 34

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi
offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an
imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law
penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is
only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And,
as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons,
the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes
and prosecutions.35 x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its logical conclusion
the reasoning of Quizon.

There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line of authority. Preceding
Diaz by more than a decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona, 36 decided by the pre-war colonial Court
in November 1940, allowed the subsequent prosecution of an accused for reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property despite his previous conviction for multiple physical injuries arising
from the same reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon which the second prosecution was based.
Estipona’s inconsistency with the post-war Diaz chain of jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it.
At any rate, all doubts on this matter were laid to rest in 1982 in Buerano. 37 There, we reviewed the
Court of Appeals’ conviction of an accused for "damage to property for reckless imprudence" despite
his prior conviction for "slight and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," arising from
the same act upon which the second charge was based. The Court of Appeals had relied on Estipona.
We reversed on the strength of Buan:38

Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in the pre-war case of People
vs. Estipona decided on November 14, 1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383
(March 29, 1968), this Court, speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that –

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi
offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an
imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law
penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is
only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And,
as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons,
the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes
and prosecutions.

xxxx

. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal) Court of
Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his
being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First
Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same
vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the
same offense.39 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona.

It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance in Silva, joined
causes with the accused, a fact which did not escape the Court’s attention:

Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated December 12, 1969
(page 82 of the Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining petitioner’s plea of
double jeopardy and submits that "its affirmatory decision dated January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case No.
05123-CR finding petitioner guilty of damage to property through reckless imprudence should be set
aside, without costs." He stressed that "if double jeopardy exists where the reckless act resulted into
homicide and physical injuries. then the same consequence must perforce follow where the same
reckless act caused merely damage to property-not death-and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a
human life lost as a result of a vehicular collision cannot be equated with any amount of damages
caused to a motors vehicle arising from the same mishap." 40 (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, we find merit in petitioner’s submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to extend in his
favor the mantle of protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting jurisprudence
could not be tailored to petitioner’s case than People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny. There, the accused,
who was also involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in two separate Informations with "Slight
Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless
Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the former, the accused sought the quashal of the latter,
invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court initially denied relief, but, on reconsideration,
found merit in the accused’s claim and dismissed the second case. In affirming the trial court, we
quoted with approval its analysis of the issue following Diaz and its progeny People v. Belga: 42

On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed the case,
holding: —

[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double jeopardy enunciated in
People v. Belga, x x x In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were charged in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence arising
from a collision between the two automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without the
aforesaid complaint having been dismissed or otherwise disposed of, two other criminal complaints
were filed in the same justice of the peace court, in connection with the same collision one for damage
to property through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the owner of one of the
vehicles involved in the collision, and another for multiple physical injuries through reckless
imprudence (Crim. Case No. 96) signed by the passengers injured in the accident. Both of these two
complaints were filed against Jose Belga only. After trial, both defendants were acquitted of the charge
against them in Crim. Case No. 88. Following his acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash the complaint for
multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence filed against him by the injured passengers,
contending that the case was just a duplication of the one filed by the Chief of Police wherein he had
just been acquitted. The motion to quash was denied and after trial Jose Belga was convicted,
whereupon he appealed to the Court of First Instance of Albay. In the meantime, the case for damage
to property through reckless imprudence filed by one of the owners of the vehicles involved in the
collision had been remanded to the Court of First Instance of Albay after Jose Belga had waived the
second stage of the preliminary investigation. After such remand, the Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court
of First Instance two informations against Jose Belga, one for physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, and another for damage to property through reckless imprudence. Both cases were
dismissed by the Court of First Instance, upon motion of the defendant Jose Belga who alleged double
jeopardy in a motion to quash. On appeal by the Prov. Fiscal, the order of dismissal was affirmed by the
Supreme Court in the following language: .

The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed by the chief of
police constitutes a bar to his subsequent prosecution for multiple physical injuries and damage to
property through reckless imprudence.

In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused was charged in
the municipal court of Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law,
for having driven an automobile in a ῾fast and reckless manner ... thereby causing an accident.’ After
the accused had pleaded not guilty the case was dismissed in that court ῾for failure of the Government
to prosecute’. But some time thereafter the city attorney filed an information in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, charging the same accused with damage to property thru reckless imprudence. The
amount of the damage was alleged to be ₱249.50. Pleading double jeopardy, the accused filed a
motion, and on appeal by the Government we affirmed the ruling. Among other things we there said
through Mr. Justice Montemayor —

The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of violation of the Motor
Vehicle Law prosecuted before the Pasay City Municipal Court and the offense of damage to property
thru reckless imprudence charged in the Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the tests of double
jeopardy is whether or not the second offense charged necessarily includes or is necessarily included in
the offense charged in the former complaint or information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another test is whether
the evidence which proves one would prove the other that is to say whether the facts alleged in the
first charge if proven, would have been sufficient to support the second charge and vice versa; or
whether one crime is an ingredient of the other. x x x

xxxx

The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of the prosecuting
attorney that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not have been
joined with the charge for homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in this
case, in view of the provisions of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The prosecution’s
contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of
homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the
defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which
acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the
more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which
arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant have been previously
cleared by the inferior court.43

Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz) "for the
purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application." 44 We declined the invitation, thus:

The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case, on the ground of double
jeopardy, upon the basis of the acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight Physical Injuries, thru
Reckless Imprudence. In the same breath said State, thru the Solicitor General, admits that the facts of
the case at bar, fall squarely on the ruling of the Belga case x x x, upon which the order of dismissal of
the lower court was anchored. The Solicitor General, however, urges a re-examination of said ruling,
upon certain considerations for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application. We find,
nevertheless, that further elucidation or disquisition on the ruling in the Belga case, the facts of which
are analogous or similar to those in the present case, will yield no practical advantage to the
government. On one hand, there is nothing which would warrant a delimitation or clarification of the
applicability of the Belga case. It was clear. On the other, this Court has reiterated the views expressed
in the Belga case, in the identical case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30, 1959. 45 (Emphasis
supplied)

Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized

Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code

The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed, stems
from persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and
procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article
48 on complexing of crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural device
allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two categories: (1) when a single
act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation light
felonies46); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The legislature
crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only
serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime.

In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the mental
attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x," 47 a single
mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-
crime resulting in one or more consequences.

Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a single
prosecution multiple intentional crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal Code,
when proper; Article 365 governs the prosecution of imprudent acts and their consequences. However,
the complexities of human interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-offense not falling under either
models – that of a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple non-crime damages to persons and
property with varying penalties corresponding to light, less grave or grave offenses. The ensuing
prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48’s
framework apply to "complex" the single quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences
(excluding those amounting to light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the prosecution
proceed under a single charge, collectively alleging all the consequences of the single quasi-crime, to
be penalized separately following the scheme of penalties under Article 365?

Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved the issue of
double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple
consequences48 unless one consequence amounts to a light felony, in which case charges were split by
grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or less grave felonies and filing the
charge with the second level courts and, on the other hand, resulting acts amounting to light felonies
and filing the charge with the first level courts.49 Expectedly, this is the approach the MeTC impliedly
sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even though under Republic Act No. 7691, 50 the MeTC has
now exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty under Article 365 which is prision
correccional in its medium period.

Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts penalized
under Article 365 involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies because there
will be a single prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue of double jeopardy arises if one of the
resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the other acts are penalized as grave or less grave
offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light offense is tried
separately from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses.

The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all the effects of
the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their number or severity, 51 penalizing
each consequence separately. Thus, in Angeles v. Jose,52 we interpreted paragraph three of Article 365,
in relation to a charge alleging "reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and less serious
physical injuries," as follows:

[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the
property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the
value of said damage to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.

The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property the amount fixed
therein shall be imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there should be an additional penalty for
the latter. The information cannot be split into two; one for the physical injuries, and another for the
damage to property, x x x.53 (Emphasis supplied)

By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365.

Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field demands
choosing one framework over the other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-crime
by breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses (except for light felonies), thus re-conceptualize a
quasi-crime, abandon its present framing under Article 365, discard its conception under the Quizon
and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple consequences of a quasi-crime as separate intentional
felonies defined under Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal code; or (2) we forbid the application of
Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-crimes, require single prosecution of all the
resulting acts regardless of their number and severity, separately penalize each as provided in Article
365, and thus maintain the distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365, articulated in
Quizon and applied to double jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of cases.1avvphi1

A becoming regard of this Court’s place in our scheme of government denying it the power to make
laws constrains us to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional
felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365.
It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more
grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for committing another. This
is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the Solicitor General’s argument that double jeopardy
does not bar a second prosecution for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence allegedly
because the charge for that offense could not be joined with the other charge for serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code:

The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence could not be joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing of grave or less
grave felonies. This same argument was considered and rejected by this Court in the case of People vs.
[Silva] x x x:

[T]he prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first
prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the
more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having
first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan,
Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in
this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant has been
previously cleared by the inferior court.

[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by the Justice of the Peace x x x of
the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province,
where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident,
because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same
offense.54 (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article
365, irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally
impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state resources are
conserved and diverted to proper use.

Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of
the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than
apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be
no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level
court.55

Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection
of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the
beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus
caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects
qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it
is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of
Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all
resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the
distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365,
befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No.
82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.

Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-45129 March 6, 1987

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN RELOVA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Batangas, Second Branch, and MANUEL OPULENCIA, respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:

In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, the People of the Philippines seek to set aside the orders
of the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in Criminal Case No. 266, dated 12
August 1976 and 8 November 1976, respectively, quashing an information for theft filed against private
respondent Manuel Opulencia on the ground of double jeopardy and denying the petitioner's motion
for reconsideration.

On 1 February 1975, members of the Batangas City Police together with personnel of the Batangas
Electric Light System, equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas City, searched
and examined the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned and operated
by the private respondent Manuel Opulencia. The police discovered that electric wiring, devices and
contraptions had been installed, without the necessary authority from the city government, and
"architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building" 1 owned by the private respondent. These
electric devices and contraptions were, in the allegation of the petitioner "designed purposely to lower
or decrease the readings of electric current consumption in the electric meter of the said electric [ice
and cold storage] plant." 2 During the subsequent investigation, Manuel Opulencia admitted in a
written statement that he had caused the installation of the electrical devices "in order to lower or
decrease the readings of his electric meter. 3
On 24 November 1975, an Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the City Court of Batangas
City an information against Manuel Opulencia for violation of Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1974,
Batangas City. A violation of this ordinance was, under its terms, punishable by a fine "ranging from
Five Pesos (P5.00) to Fifty Pesos (P50.00) or imprisonment, which shall not exceed thirty (30) days, or
both, at the discretion of the court." 4 This information reads as follows:

The undersigned, Assistant City Fiscal, accuses Manuel Opulencia y Lat of violation of Sec. 3 (b)
in relation to Sec. 6 (d) and Sec. 10 Article II, Title IV of ordinance No. 1, S. 1974, with damage to
the City Government of Batangas, and penalized by the said ordinance, committed as follows:

That from November, 1974 to February, 1975 at Batangas City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to defraud the City
Government of Batangas, without proper authorization from any lawful and/or permit from the
proper authorities, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make unauthorized
installations of electric wirings and devices to lower or decrease the consumption of electric
fluid at the Opulencia Ice Plant situated at Kumintang, Ibaba, this city and as a result of such
unathorized installations of electric wirings and devices made by the accused, the City
Government of Batangas was damaged and prejudiced in the total amount of FORTY ONE
THOUSAND, SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTEEN CENTAVOS (P41,062.16) Philippine currency,
covering the period from November 1974 to February, 1975, to the damage and prejudice of
the City Government of Batangas in the aforestated amount of P41,062.16, Philippine currency.

The accused Manuel Opulencia pleaded not guilty to the above information. On 2 February 1976, he
filed a motion to dismiss the information upon the grounds that the crime there charged had already
prescribed and that the civil indemnity there sought to be recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of the
Batangas City Court to award. In an order dated 6 April 1976, the Batangas City Court granted the
motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription, it appearing that the offense charged was a light
felony which prescribes two months from the time of discovery thereof, and it appearing further that
the information was filed by the fiscal more than nine months after discovery of the offense charged in
February 1975.

Fourteen (14) days later, on 20 April 1976, the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the Court
of First Instance of Batangas, Branch 11, another information against Manuel Opulencia, this time for
theft of electric power under Article 308 in relation to Article 309, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal
Code. This information read as follows:

The undersigned Acting City Fiscal accuses Manuel Opulencia y Lat of the crime of theft, defined
and penalized by Article 308, in relation to Article 309, paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code,
committed as follows:

That on, during, and between the month of November, 1974, and the 21st day of February,
1975, at Kumintang, lbaba, Batangas City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent of gain and without the knowledge
and consent of the Batangas Electric Light System, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and appropriate electric current valued in the total amount of FORTY
ONE THOUSAND, SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTEEN CENTAVOS (P41,062.16) Philippine Currency,
to the damage and prejudice of the said Batangas Electric Light System, owned and operated by
the City Government of Batangas, in the aforementioned sum of P41,062.16.
The above information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 266 before the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, Branch II. Before he could be arraigned thereon, Manuel Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash,
dated 5 May 1976, alleging that he had been previously acquitted of the offense charged in the second
information and that the filing thereof was violative of his constitutional right against double jeopardy.
By Order dated 16 August 1976, the respondent Judge granted the accused's Motion to Quash and
ordered the case dismissed. The gist of this Order is set forth in the following paragraphs:

The only question here is whether the dismissal of the first case can be properly pleaded by the
accused in the motion to quash.

In the first paragraph of the earlier information, it alleges that the prosecution "accuses Manuel
Opulencia y Lat of violation of Sec. 3(b) in relation to Sec. 6(d) and Sec. 10 Article II, Title IV of
Ordinance No. 1, s. 1974, with damage to the City Government of Batangas, etc. " (Emphasis
supplied). The first case, as it appears, was not simply one of illegal electrical connections. It
also covered an amount of P41,062.16 which the accused, in effect, allegedly with intent to
defraud, deprived the city government of Batangas. If the charge had meant illegal electric
installations only, it could have alleged illegal connections which were done at one instance on
a particular date between November, 1974, to February 21, 1975. But as the information states
"that from November, 1974 to February 1975 at Batangas City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to defraud the City
Government of Batangas, without proper authorization from any lawful and/or permit from the
proper authorities, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make unauthorized
installations of electric wirings and devices, etc." (Emphasis supplied), it was meant to include
the P 41,062.16 which the accused had, in effect, defrauded the city government. The
information could not have meant that from November 1974 to 21 February 1975, he had daily
committed unlawful installations.

When, therefore, he was arraigned and he faced the indictment before the City Court, he had
already been exposed, or he felt he was exposed to consequences of what allegedly happened
between November 1974 to February 21, 1975 which had allegedly resulted in defrauding the
City of Batangas in the amount of P 41,062.16. (Emphases and parentheses in the original)

A Motion for Reconsideration of the above-quoted Order filed by the petitioner was denied by the
respondent Judge in an Order dated 18 November 1976.

On 1 December 1976, the present Petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed in this Court by the
Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City on behalf of the People.

The basic premise of the petitioner's position is that the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy is protection against a second or later jeopardy of conviction for the same offense. The
petitioner stresses that the first information filed before the City Court of Batangas City was one for
unlawful or unauthorized installation of electrical wiring and devices, acts which were in violation of an
ordinance of the City Government of Batangas. Only two elements are needed to constitute an offense
under this City Ordinance: (1) that there was such an installation; and (2) no authority therefor had
been obtained from the Superintendent of the Batangas City Electrical System or the District Engineer.
The petitioner urges that the relevant terms of the City Ordinance — which read as follows:
 Section 3.-Connection and Installation

(a) x x x

(b) The work and installation in the houses and building and their connection with the Electrical
System shall be done either by the employee of the system duly authorized by its
Superintendent or by persons adept in the matter duly authorized by the District Engineer.
Applicants for electrical service permitting the works of installation or connection with the
system to be undertaken by the persons not duly authorized therefor shall be considered guilty
of violation of the ordinance.

would show that:

The principal purpose for (sic) such a provision is to ensure that electrical installations on
residences or buildings be done by persons duly authorized or adept in the matter, to avoid
fires and accidents due to faulty electrical wirings. It is primarily a regulatory measure and not
intended to punish or curb theft of electric fluid which is already covered by the Revised Penal
Code. 5

The gist of the offense under the City Ordinance, the petitioner's argument continues, is the installing
of electric wiring and devices without authority from the proper officials of the city government. To
constitute an offense under the city ordinance, it is not essential to establish any mens rea on the part
of the offender generally speaking, nor, more specifically, an intent to appropriate and steal electric
fluid.

In contrast, the petitioner goes on, the offense of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code
filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas in Criminal Case No. 266 has quite different
essential elements. These elements are:

1. That personal property be taken;

2. That the personal property (taken) belongs to another;
3. That the taking be done with intent of gain;
4. That the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and
5. That the taking be accomplished without violence against or intimidation of persons or force
upon things. 6

The petitioner also alleges, correctly, in our view, that theft of electricity can be effected even without
illegal or unauthorized installations of any kind by, for instance, any of the following means:

1. Turning back the dials of the electric meter;

2. Fixing the electric meter in such a manner that it will not register the actual electrical
consumption;
3. Under-reading of electrical consumption; and
4. By tightening the screw of the rotary blade to slow down the rotation of the same. 7

The petitioner concludes that:

The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance [of Batangas City] is not the same as
theft of electricity [under the Revised Penal Code]; that the second offense is not an attempt to
 commit the first or a frustration thereof and that the second offense is not necessarily included
in the offense charged in the first inforrnation 8

The above arguments made by the petitioner are of course correct. This is clear both from the express
terms of the constitutional provision involved — which reads as follows:

No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar
to another prosecution for the same act. (Emphasis supplied; Article IV (22), 1973
Constitution) 9

and from our case law on this point. 10 The basic difficulty with the petitioner's position is that it must
be examined, not under the terms of the first sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but
rather under the second sentence of the same section. The first sentence of Article IV (22) sets forth the
general rule: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second
prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution,
although both the first and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. The second
sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the general proposition: the constitutional
protection, against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance
be different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal
Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. This was made clear
sometime ago in Yap vs. Lutero. 11

In Yap, petitioner Manuel Yap was charged in Criminal Case No. 16054 of the Municipal Court of Iloilo
City, with violation of Article 14 of Ordinance No. 22, Series of 1951, in relation to Ordinance No. 15,
Series of 1954, of the City of Iloilo. The information charged him with having "wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously drive[n] and operate[d]" an automobile — "recklessly and without reasonable caution
thereby endangering other vehicles and pedestrians passing in said street." Three months later, Yap
was again charged in Criminal Case No. 16443 of the same Municipal Court, this time with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence. The information charged him with violation of the
Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3992 as amended by Republic Act No. 587) committed by driving
and operating an automobile in a reckless and negligent manner and as a result thereof inflicting
injuries upon an unfortunate pedestrian. Yap moved to quash the second information upon the ground
that it placed him twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same act. This motion was denied by the
respondent municipal judge. Meantime, another municipal judge had acquitted Yap in Criminal Case
No. 16054. Yap then instituted a petition for certiorari in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo to set aside
the order of the respondent municipal judge. The Court of First Instance of Iloilo having reversed the
respondent municipal judge and having directed him to desist from continuing with Criminal Case No.
16443, the respondent Judge brought the case to the Supreme Court for review on appeal. In affirming
the decision appealed from and holding that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy was
available to petitioner Yap, then Associate Justice and later Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion wrote:

To begin with, the crime of damage to property through reckless driving — with which Diaz
stood charged in the court of first instance — is a violation of the Revised Penal Code (third
paragraph of Article 365), not the Automobile Law (Act No. 3992, as amended by Republic Act
No. 587). Hence, Diaz was not twice accused of a violation of the same law. Secondly, reckless
driving and certain crimes committed through reckless driving are punishable under different
provisions of said Automobile Law. Hence — from the view point of Criminal Law, as
distinguished from political or Constitutional Law — they constitute, strictly, different offenses,
 although under certain conditions, one offense may include the other, and, accordingly, once
placed in jeopardy for one, the plea of double jeopardy may be in order as regards the other, as
in the Diaz case. (Emphases in the original)

Thirdly, our Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds of double jeopardy. The first sentence of
clause 20, section 1, Article III of the Constitution, ordains that "no person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." (Emphasis in the original) The second sentence
of said clause provides that "if an act is punishable by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." Thus, the
first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, whereas the
second contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. Under the first sentence,
one may be twice put in jeopardy of punishment of the same act provided that he is charged
with different offenses, or the offense charged in one case is not included in or does not include,
the crime charged in the other case. The second sentence applies, even if the offenses charged
are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the
other a violation of a statute. If the two charges are based on one and the same act conviction
or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the
other. 12 Incidentally, such conviction or acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of
double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. So long as jeopardy has attached under
one of the informations charging said offense, the defense may be availed of in the other case
involving the same offense, even if there has been neither conviction nor acquittal in either
case.

The issue in the case at bar hinges, therefore, on whether or not, under the information in case
No. 16443, petitioner could — if he failed to plead double jeopardy — be convicted of the same
act charged in case No. 16054, in which he has already been acquitted. The information in case
No. 16054 alleges, substantially, that on the date and in the place therein stated, petitioner
herein had wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously driven and operated "recklessly and without
reasonable caution" an automobile described in said information. Upon the other hand, the
information in case No. 16443, similarly states that, on the same date and in the same place,
petitioner drove and operated the aforementioned automobile in a "reckless and negligent
manner at an excessive rate of speed and in violation of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No.
3992), as amended by Republic Act No. 587, and existing city ordinances." Thus, if the theories
mentioned in the second information were not established by the evidence, petitioner could be
convicted in case No. 16443 of the very same violation of municipal ordinance charged in case
No. 16054, unless he pleaded double jeopardy.

It is clear, therefore, that the lower court has not erred eventually sustaining the theory of
petitioner herein.

Put a little differently, where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the
same statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses
charge: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only where an Identity is
shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. In contrast, where one
offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute, the critical
inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the accused is said to have committed and which are alleged
to have given rise to the two offenses: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is
available so long as the acts which constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal
ordinance are the same acts which constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a statute.
The question may be raised why one rule should exist where two offenses under two different sections
of the same statute or under different statutes are charged, and another rule for the situation where
one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance and another offense under a national statute. If
the second sentence of the double jeopardy provision had not been written into the Constitution,
conviction or acquittal under a municipal ordinance would never constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act under a national statute. An offense penalized by municipal ordinance is,
by definition, different from an offense under a statute. The two offenses would never constitute the
same offense having been promulgated by different rule-making authorities — though one be
subordinate to the other — and the plea of double jeopardy would never lie. The discussions during
the 1934-1935 Constitutional Convention show that the second sentence was inserted precisely for the
purpose of extending the constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a situation which would
not otherwise be covered by the first sentence. 13

The question of Identity or lack of Identity of offenses is addressed by examining the essential elements
of each of the two offenses charged, as such elements are set out in the respective legislative
definitions of the offenses involved. The question of Identity of the acts which are claimed to have
generated liability both under a municipal ordinance and a national statute must be addressed, in the
first instance, by examining the location of such acts in time and space. When the acts of the accused
as set out in the two informations are so related to each other in time and space as to be reasonably
regarded as having taken place on the same occasion and where those acts have been moved by one
and the same, or a continuing, intent or voluntary design or negligence, such acts may be appropriately
characterized as an integral whole capable of giving rise to penal liability simultaneously under
different legal enactments (a municipal ordinance and a national statute).

In Yap, the Court regarded the offense of reckless driving under the Iloilo City Ordinance and serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence under the Revised Motor Vehicle Law as derived from
the same act or sets of acts — that is, the operation of an automobile in a reckless manner. The
additional technical element of serious physical injuries related to the physical consequences of the
operation of the automobile by the accused, i.e., the impact of the automobile upon the body of the
offended party. Clearly, such consequence occurred in the same occasion that the accused operated
the automobile (recklessly). The moral element of negligence permeated the acts of the accused
throughout that occasion.

In the instant case, the relevant acts took place within the same time frame: from November 1974 to
February 1975. During this period, the accused Manuel Opulencia installed or permitted the
installation of electrical wiring and devices in his ice plant without obtaining the necessary permit or
authorization from the municipal authorities. The accused conceded that he effected or permitted such
unauthorized installation for the very purpose of reducing electric power bill. This corrupt intent was
thus present from the very moment that such unauthorized installation began. The immediate physical
effect of the unauthorized installation was the inward flow of electric current into Opulencia's ice plant
without the corresponding recording thereof in his electric meter. In other words, the "taking" of
electric current was integral with the unauthorized installation of electric wiring and devices.

It is perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense is not to be understood with absolute
literalness. The Identity of offenses that must be shown need not be absolute Identity: the first and
second offenses may be regarded as the "same offense" where the second offense necessarily includes
the first offense or is necessarily included in such first offense or where the second offense is an
attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof. 14 Thus, for the constitutional plea of double
jeopardy to be available, not all the technical elements constituting the first offense need be present in
the technical definition of the second offense. The law here seeks to prevent harrassment of an
accused person by multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different from one another are
nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical elements. As Associate
Justice and later Chief Justice Ricardo Paras cautioned in People vs. del Carmen et al., 88 Phil. 51
(1951):

While the rule against double jeopardy prohibits prosecution for the same offense, it seems
elementary that an accused should be shielded against being prosecuted for several offenses
made out from a single act. Otherwise, an unlawful act or omission may give use to several
prosecutions depending upon the ability of the prosecuting officer to imagine or concoct as
many offenses as can be justified by said act or omission, by simply adding or subtracting
essential elements. Under the theory of appellant, the crime of rape may be converted into a
crime of coercion, by merely alleging that by force and intimidation the accused prevented the
offended girl from remaining a virgin. (88 Phil. at 53; emphases supplied)

By the same token, acts of a person which physically occur on the same occasion and are infused by a
common intent or design or negligence and therefore form a moral unity, should not be segmented
and sliced, as it were, to produce as many different acts as there are offenses under municipal
ordinances or statutes that an enterprising prosecutor can find

It remains to point out that the dismissal by the Batangas City Court of the information for violation of
the Batangas City Ordinance upon the ground that such offense had already prescribed, amounts to an
acquittal of the accused of that offense. Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, "prescription of
the crime" is one of the grounds for "total extinction of criminal liability." Under the Rules of Court, an
order sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense. 15

It is not without reluctance that we deny the people's petition for certiorari and mandamus in this
case. It is difficult to summon any empathy for a businessman who would make or enlarge his profit by
stealing from the community. Manuel Opulencia is able to escape criminal punishment because an
Assistant City Fiscal by inadvertence or otherwise chose to file an information for an offense which he
should have known had already prescribed. We are, however, compelled by the fundamental law to
hold the protection of the right against double jeopardy available even to the private respondent in
this case.

The civil liability aspects of this case are another matter. Because no reservation of the right to file a
separate civil action was made by the Batangas City electric light system, the civil action for recovery of
civil liability arising from the offense charged was impliedly instituted with the criminal action both
before the City Court of Batangas City and the Court of First Instance of Batangas. The extinction of
criminal liability whether by prescription or by the bar of double jeopardy does not carry with it the
extinction of civil liability arising from the offense charged. In the present case, as we noted
earlier, 16 accused Manuel Opulencia freely admitted during the police investigation having stolen
electric current through the installation and use of unauthorized elibctrical connections or devices.
While the accused pleaded not guilty before the City Court of Batangas City, he did not deny having
appropriated electric power. However, there is no evidence in the record as to the amount or value of
the electric power appropriated by Manuel Opulencia, the criminal informations having been dismissed
both by the City Court and by the Court of First Instance (from which dismissals the Batangas City
electric light system could not have appealed 17) before trial could begin. Accordingly, the related civil
action which has not been waived expressly or impliedly, should be remanded to the Court of First
Instance of Batangas City for reception of evidence on the amount or value of the electric power
appropriated and converted by Manuel Opulencia and rendition of judgment conformably with such
evidence.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is DENIED. Let the civil action for related civil
liability be remanded to the Court of First Instance of Batangas City for further proceedings as
indicated above. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
 
G.R. Nos. 115008-09 July 24, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANIEL QUIJADA Y CIRCULADO, accused-appellant.

 DAVIDE, JR., J.:p

Accused-appellant Daniel Quijada appeals from the decision of 30 September 1993 of Branch 1 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol convicting him of the two offenses separately charged in two
informations, viz., murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and illegal possession of firearm
in its aggravated from under P.D. No. 1866, and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for the first crime and an indeterminate penalty ranging from seventeen years, four months,
and one day, as minimum, to twenty years and one day, as maximum, for the second crime. 1

The appeal was originally assigned to the Third Division of the Court but was later referred to the
Court en banc in view of the problematical issue of whether to sustain the trial court's judgment in
conformity with the doctrine laid down in People vs. Tac-an,2 People vs. Tiozon,3 People
vs. Caling,4 People vs. Jumamoy,5 People vs. Deunida,6 People vs. Tiongco,7 People
vs. Fernandez,8 and People vs. Somooc9 or to modify the judgment and convict the appellant only of
illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form pursuant to People vs. Barros, 10 which this Court
(Second Division) decided on 27 June 1995.

The informations read as follows:

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 8178

That on or about the 30th day of December, 1992, in the municipality of Dauis, province of
Bohol, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused, with intent to kill and without any justifiable motive, with treachery and abuse of
superior strength, the accused being then armed with a .38 cal. revolver, while the victim was
unarmed, suddenly attacked the victim without giving the latter the opportunity to defend
himself, and with evident premeditation, the accused having harbored a grudge against the
victim a week prior to the incident of murder, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
 feloniously attack, assault and shoot Diosdado Iroy y Nesnea with the use of the said firearm,
hitting the latter on his head and causing serious injuries which resulted to his death; to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the deceased.

Acts committed contrary to the provision of Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with
aggravating circumstance of nighttime being purposely sought for or taken advantage of by the
accused to facilitate the commission of the crime. 11

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 8179

That on or about the 30th day of December, 1992, in the municipality of Dauis, province of
Bohol, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep, carry and have in his
possession, custody and control a firearm (hand gun) with ammunition, without first obtaining
the necessary permit or license to possess the said firearm from competent authorities which
firearm was carried by the said accused outside of his residence and was used by him in
committing the crime of Murder with Diosdado Iroy y Nesnea as the victim; to the damage and
prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines.

Acts committed contrary to the provisions of PD No. 1866. 12

Having arisen from the same incident, the cases were consolidated, and joint hearings were had. The
witnesses presented by the prosecution were SPO4 Felipe Nigparanon (Acting Chief of Police of Dauis,
Bohol), SPO Gondalino Inte, Dr. Gregg Julius Sodusta, Rosita Iroy, and Teodula Matalinis. The defense
presented as witnesses Alfred Aranzado, Edwin Nistal, Julius Bonao, Saturnino Maglupay, and the
appellant himself.

The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General in the Brief for
the Appellee as follows:

On 25 December 1992, a benefit dance was held at the Basketball Court of Barangay Tinago,
Dauis, Bohol. On this occasion, a fist fight occurred between Diosdado Iroy and appellant Daniel
Quijada as the latter was constantly annoying and pestering the former's sister Rosita Iroy (TSN,
Crim. Cases 8178 & 1879, June 8, 1993, pp. 32-35; August 5, 1993, pp. 14-15).

In the evening of 30 December 1992, another benefit dance/disco was held in the same place.
This benefit dance was attended by Rosita Iroy, Ariel Dano, Teodora Badayos, Ado Aranzado,
Largo Iroy and Diosdado Iroy.

While Rosita Iroy and others were enjoying themselves inside the dancing area, Diosdado Iroy,
Eugene Nesnea and Largo Iroy, who were then sitting at the plaza (the area where they
positioned themselves was duly lighted and was approximately four mete's from the dancing
hall), decided to just watch the activities in the dance hall directly from the plaza.

After dancing, Rosita Iroy decided to leave and went outside the gate of the dance area.
Subsequently, or around 11:30 of the same night, while facing the direction of Diosdado Iroy,
Rosita Iroy saw appellant surreptitiously approach her brother Diosdado Iroy from behind.
Suddenly, appellant fired his revolver at Diosdado Iroy, hitting the latter at the back portion of
 the head. This caused Rosita Iroy to spontaneously shout that appellant shot her brother; while
appellant, after shooting Diosdado Iroy, ran towards the cornfield.

Diosdado Iroy was immediately rushed by Elmer Nigparanon and Largo Iroy to the hospital but
the injury sustained was fatal. In the meantime, Rosita Iroy went home and relayed to her
parents the unfortunate incident (TSN, Crim. Case Nos. 8178 & 8179, June 8, 1993, pp. 9-22,
inclusive of the preceding paragraphs).

At around midnight, the incident was reported to then Acting chief of Police Felipe Nigparanon
by Mrs. Alejandra Iroy and her daughter Teodula Matalinis. The police officer made entries in
the police blotter regarding the shooting and correspondingly, ordered his men to pick up the
appellant. But they were unable to locate appellant on that occasion (TSN, Crim Case Nos. 8178
& 8179, June 9, 1993, pp. 2-6).

In the afternoon of 31 December 1992, appellant, together with his father Teogenes Quijada
went to the police station at Dauis, Bohol. There and then, appellant was pinpointed by Elenito
Nistal and Rosita Iroy as the person who shot Diosdado Iroy. These facts were entered in the
police blotter as Entry No. 1151 (TSN, Crim Case Nos. 8178 & 8179, ibid. p. 14, June 14, 1993,
pp. 4-6).13

The slug was embedded at the midbrain. 14 Diosdado Iroy died of

Cardiorespiratory arrest, secondary to tonsillar herniation, secondary to massive intracranial

hemorrhage, secondary to gunshot wound, 1 cm. left occipital areas, transecting cerebellum up
to midbrain. 15

The firearm used by the appellant in shooting Diosdado Iroy was not licensed. Per certifications issued
on 26 April 1993, the appellant was not a duly licensed firearm holder as verified from a consolidated
list of licensed firearm holders in the province 16 and was not authorized to carry a firearm outside his
residence. 17

The appellant interposed the defense of alibi, which the trial court rejected because he was positively
identified by prosecution witness Rosita Iroy. It summarized his testimony in this wise:

Daniel Quijada y Circulado, the accused in the instant cases, declared that in the afternoon of
December 30, 1992 he was in their house. At 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon he went to
Tagbilaran City together with Julius Bonao in a tricycle No. 250 to solicit passengers. They
transported passengers until 10:30 o'clock in the evening. They then proceeded to the
Tagbilaran wharf waiting for the passenger boat Trans Asia Taiwan. Before the arrival of Trans
Asia Taiwan they had a talk with Saturnino Maglopay. They were able to pick up two passengers
for Graham Avenue near La Roca Hotel. They then returned to the Tagbilaran wharf for the
arrival of MV Cebu City that docked at 12:10 past midnight. They had a talk with Saturnino
Maglopay who was waiting for his auntie scheduled to arrive abroad MV Cebu City. They were
not able to pick up passengers which, as a consequence, they went home. They had on their
way home passengers for the Agors Public Market. They arrived at the house of Julian Bonao at
Bil-isan, Pangalao, Bohol at 3:00 o'clock in the morning of December 31, 1992 where he passed
the night. He went home to Mariveles, Dauis, Bohol at 9:00 o'clock in the morning. 18
The trial court gave full faith and credit to the version of the prosecution and found the appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged and sentenced him accordingly. It appreciated the
presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery considering that the appellant shot the victim at
the back of the head while the latter was watching the dance. The dispositive portion of the decision
dated 30 September 1993 reads as follows:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, in Criminal Case No. 8178, the court finds the accused Daniel Quijada
guilty of the crime of murder punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby
sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua, with the accessories of the law
and to pay the cost.

In Criminal Case No. 8179, the Court finds the accused Daniel Quijada guilty of the crime of
Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition punished under Sec. 1 of RA No. 1866
as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate sentence from Seventeen
(17) years Four (4) months and One (1) day, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years and One (1) day,
as maximum, with the accessories of the law and to pay the cost.

The slug or bullet which was extracted from the brain of the back portion of the head of the
victim Diosdado Iroy is hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the government.

It appearing that the accused Daniel Quijada has undergone preventive imprisonment he is
entitled to the full time he has undergone preventive imprisonment to be deducted from the
term of sentence if he has executed a waiver otherwise he will only be entitled to 4/5 of the
time he has undergone preventive imprisonment to be deducted from his term of sentence if
he has not executed a waiver. 19

On 29 October 1993, after discovering that it had inadvertently omitted in the decision an award of
civil indemnity and other damages in Criminal Case No. 8178, the trial court issued an order directing
the appellant to pay the parents of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of
their son and P10,000.00 for funeral expenses. 20 The order was to form an integral part of the decision.

The decision was promulgated on 29 October 1993.21

The appellant forthwith interposed the present appeal, and in his Brief, he contends that the trial court
erred

I
. . . IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF
PROSECUTION WITNESSES ROSITA IROY AND FELIPE NIGPARANON.
II
. . . IN NOT CONSIDERING THE TESTIMONIES OF DEFENSE WITNESSES EDWIN NISTAL AND
ALFRED ARANSADO, AND IN DISREGARDING THE PICTORIAL EXHIBITS OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT PARTICULARLY THE RELATIVE POSITIONS OF DIOSDADO IROY, ROSITA IROY, EDWIN
NISTAL, AND ALFRED ARANZADO.
III
. . . IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT PROSECUTION WITNESSES ROSITA IROY AND SPO4 FELIPE
NIGPARANON HAD MOTIVES IN FALSELY TESTIFYING AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT. 22
The appellant then submits that the issue in this case boils down to the identity of the killer of
Diosdado Iroy. To support his stand that the killer was not identified, he attacks the credibility of
prosecution witnesses Rosita Iroy and SPO4 Felipe Nigparanon. He claims that the former had a motive
"to put him in a bad light" and calls our attention to her direct testimony that her brother Diosdado,
the victim, boxed him on the night of 25 December 1992 because he allegedly "bothered her." He
further asserts that Rosita could not have seen the person who shot Diosdado considering their
respective positions, particularly Rosita who, according to defense witnesses Nistal and Aranzado, was
still inside the dancing area and ran towards the crime scene only after Diosdado was shot. And, the
appellant considers it as suppression of evidence when the prosecution did not present as witnesses
Diosdado's companions who were allegedly seated with Diosdado when he was shot.

As to SPO4 Nigparanon, the appellant intimates improper motives in that the said witnesses is a
neighbor of the Iroys, and when he testified, a case for arbitrary detention had already been filed
against him by the appellant. The appellant further claims of alleged omissions and unexplained entries
in the police blotter.

Finally, the appellant wants us to favorably consider his defense of alibi which, according to him,
gained strength because of the lack of evidence on the identity of the killer. Furthermore, he stresses
that his conduct in voluntarily going to the police station after having been informed that he, among
many others, was summoned by the police is hardly the actuation of the perpetrator of the killing of
Diosdado Iroy — specially so if Rosita Iroy's claim is to be believed that moments after the shooting she
shouted that Daniel Quijada shot Diosdado Iroy.

In its Appellee's Brief, the People refutes every argument raised by the appellant and recommends that
we affirm in toto the challenged decision.

After a careful scrutiny of the records and evaluation of the evidence adduced by the parties, we find
this appeal to be absolutely without merit.

The imputation of ill-motive on the part of Rosita Iroy and the basis therefor hardly persuade. The
appellant was the one who was boxed by and lost to Diosdado Iroy in their fight on the night of 25
December 1992. It is then logical and consistent with human experience that it would be the appellant
who would have forthwith entertained a grudge, if not hatred, against Diosdado. No convicting
evidence was shown that Rosita had any reason to falsely implicate the appellant in the death of her
brother Diosdado.

The claim that Rosita could not have seen who shot her brother Diosdado because, as testified to by
defense witnesses Nistal and Aranzado, she was inside the dancing hall and rushed to her brother only
after the latter was shot is equally baseless. The following testimony of Rosita shows beyond cavil that
she saw the assailant:

Q You said that you were initially dancing inside the dancing place and you went
out, about what time did you get out?
A 11:00 o'clock.
Q And you were standing about two (2) meters from Diosdado Iroy until 11:30
when the incident happened?
A Yes I was standing.
Q And where did you face, you were facing Diosdado Iroy or the dancing area?
 A I was intending to go near my brother. I was approaching and getting near
going to my brother Diosdado Iroy and while in the process I saw Daniel Quijada
shot my brother Diosdado Iroy. 23
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q And in your estimate, how far was your brother Diosdado Iroy while he was
sitting at the plaza to the dancing place?
A More or less four (4) meters distance.
COURT:
From the dancing hall?
A Yes, your honor.
Q And in your observation, was the place where Diosdado Iroy was sitting lighted
or illuminated?
A Yes, sir.
Q What kind of light illuminated the place?
A I do not know what kind of light but it was lighted.
Q Was it an electric light?
A It is electric light coming from a bulb.
Q Where is that electric bulb that illuminated the place located?
A It was placed at the gate of the dancing place and the light from the house.
Q You said gate of the dancing place, you mean the dancing place was enclosed
at that time and there was a gate, an opening?
A Yes, sir.
Q What material was used to enclose the dancing place?
A Bamboo.
Q And how far was the bulb which was placed near the entrance of the dancing
place to the place where Diosdado Iroy was sitting?
A Five (5) meters.
Q You mentioned also that there was a light coming from the house, now whose
house was that?
A The house of spouses Fe and Berto, I do not know the family name.
Q Was the light coming from the house of spouses Fe and Berto an electric light?
A Yes, sir.
Q And in your estimate, how far was the source of light of the house of Fe and
Berto to the place where Diosdado Iroy was sitting?
A About six (6) meters distance.24
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q What was the color of the electric bulb in the gate of the dancing place?
A The white bulb.25

The trial court disbelieved the testimony of Nistal and Aranzado. It explicitly declared:

The factual findings of the Court in the instant case is anchored principally in ". . .
observing the attitude and deportment of witnesses while listening to them speak"
(People vs. Magaluna, 205, SCRA 266).

thereby indicating that on the basis of the witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying, the
declarations of Nistal and Aranzado failed to convince the trial court that they were telling the
truth. Settled is the rule that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility
of witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect. For, the trial court has the advantage of
 observing the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as
the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous
mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply; 26 or the furtive glance, the
blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere of the flippant or sneering tone, the heat,
the calmness, the yarn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the
solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien. 27 The appellant has miserably failed to convince
us that we must depart from this rule.

Neither are we persuaded by the claimed suppression of evidence occasioned by the non-presentation
as prosecution witnesses any of the companions of Diosdado who were seated with him when he was
shot. In the first place, the said companions could not have seen from their back the person who
suddenly shot Diosdado. In the second place, the testimony of the companions would, at the most,
only corroborate that of Rosita Iroy. Besides, there is no suggestion at all that the said companions
were not available to the appellant. It is settled that the presumption in Section 3 (e), Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced does not apply when
the testimony of the witness is merely corroborative or where the witness is available to the accused. 28

The alleged improper motive on the part of SPO4 Nigparanon simply because he is a neighbor of the
Iroy's remains purely speculative, as no evidence was offered to establish that such a relationship
affected SPO4 Nigparanon's objectivity. As a police officer, he enjoyed in his favor the presumption of
regularity in the performance of his official duty. 29 As to the alleged omissions and unexplained entries
in the police blotter, the same were sufficiently clarified by SPO4 Nigparanon.

The defense of alibi interposed by the appellant deserves scant consideration. He was positively
identified by a credible witness. It is a fundamental judicial dictum that the defense of alibi cannot
prevail over the positive identification of the accused. 30 Besides, for that defense to prosper it is not
enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must also
demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the
time of its commission. 31 As testified to by defense witness Julian Bonao, the Tagbilaran wharf, where
the appellant said he was, is only about eight to nine kilometers away from the crime scene and it
would take only about thirty minutes to traverse the distance with the use of a tricycle. 32 It was,
therefore, not physically impossible for the appellant to have been at the scene of the crime at the
time of its commission.

Finally, the appellant asserts that if he were the killer of Diosdado Iroy, he would not have voluntarily
proceeded to the police station. This argument is plain sophistry. The law does not find unusual the
voluntary surrender of offenders; it even considers such act as a mitigating circumstance. 33 Moreover,
non-flight is not conclusive proof of innocence.34

The evidence for the prosecution further established with moral certainty that the appellant had no
license to possess or carry a firearm. The firearm then that he used in shooting Diosdado Iroy was
unlicensed. He, therefore, committed the crime of aggravated illegal possession of firearm under the
second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, which reads:

Sec. 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms,

Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition — The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire,
 dispose or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument
used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.

If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death
shall be imposed.

In light of the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Tac-an, 35 and reiterated in People vs. Tiozon, 36 People

vs. Caling, 3 7 People vs. Jumamoy, 38 People vs. Deunida, 39 People vs. Tiongco, 40 People
vs. Fernandez, 41 and People vs. Somooc, 42 that one who kills another with the use of an unlicensed
firearm commits two separate offenses of (1) either homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code,
and (2) aggravated illegal possession of firearm under the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No.
1866, we sustain the decision of the trial court finding the appellant guilty of two separate offenses of
murder in Criminal Case No. 8178 and of aggravated illegal possession of firearm in Criminal Case No.
8179.

Although Tac-an and Tiozon relate more to the issue of whether there is a violation of the

constitutional proscription against double jeopardy if an accused is prosecuted for homicide or murder
and for aggravated illegal possession of firearm, they at the same time laid down the rule that these
are separate offenses, with the first punished under the Revised Penal Code and the second under a
special law; hence, the constitutional bar against double jeopardy will not apply. We observed in Tac-
an:

It is elementary that the constitutional right against double jeopardy protects one against a
second or later prosecution for the same offense, and that when the subsequent information
charges another and different offense, although arising from the same act or set of acts, there is
no prohibited double jeopardy. In the case at bar, it appears to us quite clear that the offense
charged in Criminal Case No. 4007 is that of unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm
penalized under a special statute, while the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 4012 was that
of murder punished under the Revised Penal Code. It would appear self-evident that these two
(2) offenses in themselves are quite different one from the other, such that in principle, the
subsequent filing of Criminal Case No. 4012 is not to be regarded as having placed appellant in a
prohibited second jeopardy.

And we stressed that the use of the unlicensed firearm cannot serve to increase the penalty for
homicide or murder; however, the killing of a person with the use of an unlicensed firearm, by express
provision of P.D. No. 1866, shall increase the penalty for illegal possession of firearm.

In Tiozon, we stated:

It may be loosely said that homicide or murder qualifies the offense penalized in said Section 1
because it is a circumstance which increases the penalty. It does not, however, follow that the
homicide or murder is absorbed in the offense; otherwise, an anomalous absurdity results
whereby a more serious crime defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code is absorbed by
a statutory offense, which is just a malum prohibitum. The rationale for the qualification, as
implied from the exordium of the decree, is to effectively deter violations of the laws on
firearms and to stop the "upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public order and safety due to the
proliferation of illegally possessed and manufactured firearms, . . . " In fine then, the killing of a
person with the use of an unlicensed firearm may give rise to separate prosecutions for (a)
violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and (b) violation of either Article 248 (Murder) or Article
 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. The accused cannot plead one as a bar to the other;
or, stated otherwise, the rule against double jeopardy cannot be invoked because the first is
punished by a special law while the second, homicide or murder, is punished by the Revised
Penal Code.

In People vs. Doriguez [24 SCRA 163, 171], We held:

It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked
only for the same offense or identical offenses. A simple act may offend against
two (or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one
provision requires proof of an additional act or element which the other does
not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does
not bar prosecution under the other. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws
(or articles of the same code) defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of
them is not obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise
from the same fact, if each crime involves some important act which is not an
essential element of the other.

In People vs. Bacolod, [89 Phil. 621], from the act of firing a shot from a sub-machine
gun which caused public panic among the people present and physical injuries to one,
informations of physical injuries through reckless imprudence and for serious public
disturbance were filed. Accused pleaded guilty and was convicted in the first and he
sought to dismiss the second on the ground of double jeopardy. We ruled:

The protection against double jeopardy is only for the same offense. A simple act
may be an offense against two different provisions of law and if one provision
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or
conviction under one does not bar prosecution under the other.

Since the informations were for separate offense[s] — the first against a person and the
second against public peace and order — one cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other
under the rule or double jeopardy.

In Caling, we explicitly opined that a person charged with aggravated illegal possession of firearm
under the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 can also be separately charged with and
convicted of homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code and punished accordingly. Thus:

It seems that the Court a quo did indeed err in believing that there is such a thing as
"the special complex crime of Illegal Possession of Unlicensed Firearm Used in Homicide
as provided for and defined under the 2nd paragraph of Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866 as
amended," and declaring Caling guilty thereof. The legal provision invoked, "Sec. 1 of
P.D. 1866, as amended," reads as follows:

Sec. 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of

Firearms [or] Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the
Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. — The penalty of reclusion temporal in
its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person
who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any
 firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or
intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.

If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the

penalty of death shall be imposed.

What is penalized in the first paragraph, insofar as material to the present case is the
sole, simple act of a person who shall, among others, "unlawfully possess any firearm . .
(or) ammunition . . ." Obviously, possession of any firearm is unlawful if the necessary
permit and/or license therefor is not first obtained. To that act is attached the penalty
of reclusion temporal, maximum, to reclusion perpetua. Now, if "with the use of (such)
an unlicensed firearm, a "homicide or murder is committed," the crime is aggravated
and is more heavily punished, with the capital punishment.

The gravamen of the offense in its simplest form is, basically, the fact of possession of a
firearm without license. The crime may be denominated simple illegal possession, to
distinguish it from its aggravated form. It is aggravated if the unlicensed firearm is used
in the commission of a homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code. But the
homicide or murder is not absorbed in the crime of possession of an unlicensed
firearm; neither is the latter absorbed in the former. There are two distinct crimes that
are here spoken of . One is unlawful possession of a firearm, which may be either simple
or aggravated, defined and punished respectively by the first and second paragraphs of
Section 1 of PD 1866. The other is homicide or murder, committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm. The mere possession of a firearm without legal authority
consummates the crime under P.D. 1866, and the liability for illegal possession is made
heavier by the firearm's use in a killing. The killing, whether homicide or murder, is
obviously distinct from the act of possession, and is separately punished and defined
under the Revised Penal Code. (emphasis supplied)

In Jumamoy, we reiterated Caling and amplified the rationale on why an accused who kills another
with an unlicensed firearm can be prosecuted and punished for the two separate offenses of violation
of the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and for homicide or murder under the Revised
Penal Code. Thus:

Coming to the charge of illegal possession of firearms, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866
penalizes, inter alia, the unlawful possession of firearms or ammunition with reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. However, under the second
paragraph thereof, the penalty is increased to death if homicide or murder is committed
with the use of an unlicensed firearm. It may thus be loosely said that homicide or
murder qualifies the offense because both are circumstances which increase the
penalty. It does not, however, follow that the homicide or murder is absorbed in the
offense. If these were to be so, an anomalous absurdity would result whereby a more
serious crime defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code will be absorbed by a
statutory offense, one which is merely malum prohibitum. Hence, the killing of a person
with the use of an unlicensed firearm may give rise to separate prosecutions for (a) the
violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and (b) the violation of either Article 248 (Murder)
or Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. The accused cannot plead one to
bar the other; stated otherwise, the rule against double jeopardy cannot be invoked as
the first is punished by a special law while the second — Murder or Homicide — is
 punished by the Revised Penal Code. [citing People vs. Tiozon, 198 SCRA 368, 379
(1991); People vs. Doriguez, 24 SCRA 163 (1968)]. Considering, however, that the
imposition of the death penalty is prohibited by the Constitution, the proper imposable
penalty would be the penalty next lower in degree, or reclusion perpetua. (emphasis
supplied)

In Deunida, in discussing the propriety of the Government's action in withdrawing an information for
murder and pursuing only the information for "Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm," this Court
categorically declared:

At the outset, it must be stressed that, contrary to the prosecution's legal position in
withdrawing the information for murder, the offense defined in the second paragraph of
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 does not absorb the crime of homicide or murder under the
Revised Penal Code and, therefore, does not bar the simultaneous or subsequent
prosecution of the latter crime. The 1982 decision in Lazaro vs. People, involving the
violation of P.D. No. 9, which the investigating prosecutor invokes to justify the
withdrawal, is no longer controlling in view of our decisions in People vs. Tac-an, People
vs. Tiozon, and People vs. Caling.

In Somooc, we once more ruled:

The offense charged by the Information is clear enough from the terms of that
document, although both the Information and the decision of the trial court used the
term "Illegal Possession of Firearm with Homicide," a phrase which has sometimes been
supposed to connote a "complex crime" as used in the Revised Penal Code. Such
nomenclature is, however, as we have ruled in People vs. Caling, a misnomer since there
is no complex crime of illegal possession of firearm with homicide. The gravamen of the
offense penalized in P.D. No. 1866 is the fact of possession of a firearm without a license
or authority for such possession. This offense is aggravated and the imposable penalty
upgraded if the unlicensed firearm is shown to have been used in the commission of
homicide or murder, offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code. The killing of a
human being, whether characterized as homicide or murder, is patently distinct from
the act of possession of an unlicensed firearm and is separately punished under the
provision of the Revised Penal Code.

The foregoing doctrine suffered a setback when in our decision of 27 June 1995 in People
vs. Barros, 43 we set aside that portion of the appealed decision convicting the appellant of the offense
of murder and affirmed that portion convicting him of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated
form. We therein made the following statement:

[A]ppellant may not in the premises be convicted of two separate offenses [of illegal
possession of firearm in its aggravated form and of murder], but only that of illegal
possession of firearm in its aggravated form, in light of the legal principles and
propositions set forth in the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, to
which the Members of the Division, the ponente included, subscribe.

The pertinent portions of the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado referred to therein
read as follows:
This premise accordingly brings up the second query as to whether or not the crime
should properly be the aggravated illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm through
the use of which a homicide or murder is committed. It is submitted that an accused so
situated should be liable only for the graver offense of aggravated illegal possession of
the firearm punished by death under the second paragraph of Section 1, Presidential
Decree No. 1866, and it is on this point that the writer dissents from the holding which
would impose a separate penalty for the homicide in addition to that for the illegal
possession of the firearm used to commit the former.

If the possession of the unlicensed firearm is the only offense imputable to the accused,
the Court has correctly held that to be the simple possession punished with reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua in the first paragraph of Section 1.
Where, complementarily, the unlicensed firearm is used to commit homicide or murder,
then either of these felonies will convert the erstwhile simple illegal possession into the
graver offense of aggravated illegal possession. In other words, the homicide or murder
constitutes the essential element for integrating into existence the capital offense of the
aggravated form of illegal possession of a firearm. Legally, therefore, it would be illogical
and unjustifiable to use the very same offenses of homicide or murder as integral
elements of and to create the said capital offense, and then treat the former all over
again as independent offenses to be separately punished further, with penalties
immediately following the death penalty to boot.

The situation contemplated in the second query is, from the punitive standpoint,
virtually of the nature of the so-called, "special complex crimes," which should more
appropriately be called composite crimes, punished in Article 294, Article 297 and
Article 335. They are neither of the same legal basis as nor subject to the rules on
complex crimes in Article 48, since they do not consist of a single act giving rise to two
or more grave or less grave felonies nor do they involve an offense being a necessary
means to commit another. However, just like the regular complex crimes and the
present case of aggravated illegal possession of firearms, only a single penalty is
imposed for each of such composite crimes although composed of two or more
offenses.

On the other hand, even if two felonies would otherwise have been covered by the
conceptual definition of a complex crime under Article 48, but the Code imposes a single
definite penalty therefor it cannot also be punished as a complex crime, much less as
separate offense, but with only the single penalty prescribed by law. Thus, even where a
single act results in two less grave felonies of serious physical injuries and serious
slander by deed, the offense will not be punished as a delito compuesto under Article 48
but as less serious physical injuries with ignominy under the second paragraph of Article
265. The serious slander by deed is integrated into and produces a graver offense, and
the former is no longer separately punished.

What is, therefore, sought to be stressed by such alternative illustration, as well as the
discussion on complex and composite crimes, is that when an offense becomes a
component of another, the resultant crime being correspondingly punished as thus
aggravated by the integration of the other, the former is not to be further separately
punished as the majority would want to do with the homicide involved in the case at
bar.
With the foregoing answers to the second question, the third inquiry is more of a
question of classification for purposes of the other provisions of the Code. The theory
in Tac-an that the principal offense is the aggravated form of illegal possession of
firearm and the killing shall merely be included in the particulars or, better still, as an
element of the principal offense, may be conceded. After all, the plurality of crimes here
is actually source from the very provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1866 which sought
to "consolidate, codify and integrate" the "various laws and presidential decrees to
harmonize their provision" which "must be updated and revised in order to more
effectively deter violators" of said laws.

This would be akin to the legislative intendment underlaying the provisions of the Anti-
Carnapping Act of 1972, wherein the principal crime to be charged is still carnapping,
although the penalty therefore is increased when the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped vehicle is killed. The same situation, with escalating punitive provisions when
attended by a killing, are found in the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of
1974 and the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974, wherein the principal crimes still are
piracy, highway robbery and cattle rustling. Also, in the matter of destructive arson, the
principal offense when, inter alia, death results as a consequences of the commission of
any of the acts punished under said article of the Code.

In the present case, the academic value of specifying whether it is a case of illegal
possession of firearm resulting in homicide or murder, or, conversely, homicide or
murder through the illegal possession and use of an unlicensed firearm, would lie in the
possible application of the provision on recidivism. Essentially, it would be in the
theoretical realm since, taken either way, the penalty for aggravated illegal possession
of a firearm is the single indivisible penalty of death, in which case the provision on
recidivism would not apply. If, however, the illegal possession is not established but
either homicide or murder is proved, then the matter of recidivism may have some
significance in the sense that, for purposes thereof, the accused was convicted of a
crime against persons and he becomes a recidivist upon conviction of another crime
under the same title of the Code.

Lastly, on the matter of the offense or offenses to be considered and the penalty to be
imposed when the unlawful killing and the illegal possession are charged in separate
informations, from what has been said the appropriate course of action would be to
consolidate the cases and render a joint decision thereon, imposing a single penalty for
aggravated illegal possession of firearm if such possession and the unlawful taking of life
shall have been proved, or for only the proven offense which may be either simple
illegal possession, homicide or murder per se. The same procedural rule and substantive
disposition should be adopted if one information for each offense was drawn up and
these informations were individually assigned to different courts or branches of the
same court.

Indeed, the practice of charging the offense of illegal possession separately from the
homicide or murder could be susceptible of abuse since it entails undue concentration
of prosecutorial powers and discretion. Prefatorily, the fact that the killing was
committed with a firearm will necessarily be known to the police or prosecutorial
agencies, the only probable problem being the determination and obtention of evidence
to show that the firearm is unlicensed.
 Now, if a separate information for homicide or murder is filed without alleging therein
that the same was committed by means of an unlicensed firearm, the case would not
fall under Presidential Decree No. 1866. Even if the use of a firearm is alleged therein,
but without alleging the lack of a license therefor as where that fact has not yet been
verified, the mere use of a firearm by itself, even if proved in that case, would not affect
the accused either since it is not an aggravating or qualifying circumstance.

Conversely, if the information is only for illegal possession, with the prosecution
intending to file thereafter the charge for homicide or murder but the same is
inexplicably delayed or is not consolidated with the information for illegal possession,
then any conviction that may result from the former would only be for simple illegal
possession. If, on the other hand, the separate and subsequent prosecution for
homicide or murder prospers, the objective of Presidential Decree No. 1866 cannot be
achieved since the penalty imposable in that second prosecution will only be for the
unlawful killing and further subject to such modifying circumstances as may be proved.

In any event, the foregoing contingencies would run counter to the proposition that the
real offense committed by the accused, and for which sole offense he should be
punished, is the aggravated form of illegal possession of a firearm. Further, it is the
writer's position that the possible problems projected herein may be minimized or
obviated if both offenses involved are charged in only one information or that the trial
thereof, if separately charged, be invariably consolidated for joint decision. Conjointly,
this is the course necessarily indicated since only a single composite crime is actually
involved and it is palpable error to deal therewith and dispose thereof by segregated
parts in piecemeal fashion.

If we follow Barros, the conviction of the appellant for murder in Criminal Case No. 8178 must have to
be set aside. He should only suffer the penalty for the aggravated illegal possession of firearm in
Criminal Case No. 8179.

The Court en banc finds in this appeal an opportunity to reexamine the existing conflicting doctrines
applicable to prosecutions for murder or homicide and for aggravated illegal possession of firearm in
instance where an unlicensed firearm is used in the killing of a person. After a lengthy deliberation
thereon, the Court en banc arrived at the conclusion that the rule laid down in Tac-an, reiterated
in Tiozon, Caling, Jumamoy, Deunida, Tiongco, Fernandez, and Somooc is the better rule, for it applies
the laws concerned according to their letter and spirit, thereby steering this Court away from a
dangerous course which could have irretrievably led it to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of
separation of powers through judicial legislation. That rule upholds and enhances the lawmaker's
intent or purpose in aggravating the crime of illegal possession of firearm when an unlicensed firearm
is used in the commission of murder or homicide. Contrary to the view of our esteemed brother, Mr.
Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in the case under
consideration, Tac-an did not enunciated an "unfortunate doctrine" or a "speciously camouflaged
theory" which "constitutes an affront on doctrinal concepts of penal law and assails even the ordinary
notions of common sense."

If Tac-an did in fact enunciated such an "unfortunate doctrine," which this Court has reiterated in a
convincing number of cases and for a convincing number of years, so must the same verdict be made in
our decision in People vs. De Gracia, 44 which was promulgated on 6 July 1994. In the latter case, we
held that unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm in furtherance of rebellion may give rise to
separate prosecution for a violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and also for a violation of Articles 134
and 135 of the Revised Penal Code on rebellion. A distinction between that situation and the case
where an unlicensed firearm is used in homicide or murder would have no basis at all. In De Gracia,
this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, made the following authoritative
pronouncements:

III. As earlier stated, it was stipulated and admitted by both parties that from November
30, 1989 up to and until December 9, 1989, there was a rebellion. Ergo, our next inquiry
is whether or not appellant's possession of the firearms, explosives and ammunition
seized and recovered from him was for the purpose and in furtherance of rebellion.

The trial court found accused guilty of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of
rebellion pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code which states
that "any person merely participating or executing the command of others in a rebellion
shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period." The court below held
that appellant De Gracia, who had been servicing the personal needs of Col. Matillano
(whose active armed opposition against the Government, particularly at the Camelot
Hotel, was well known), is guilty of the act of guarding the explosives and "molotov"
bombs for and in behalf of the latter. We accept this finding of the lower court.

The above provision of the law was, however, erroneously and improperly used by the
court below as a basis in determining the degree of liability of appellant and the penalty
to be imposed on him. It must be made clear that appellant is charged with the qualified
offense of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion under Presidential
Decree No. 1866 which, in law, is distinct from the crime of rebellion punished under
Article 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code. There are two separate statutes
penalizing different offenses with discrete penalties. The Revised Penal Code treats
rebellion as a crime apart from murder, homicide, arson, or other offenses, such as illegal
possession of firearms, that might conceivably be committed in the course of a
rebellion. Presidential Decree No. 1866 defines and punishes, as a specific offense, the
crime of illegal possession of firearms committed in the course or as part of a rebellion.

Missing p. 26

conceptual changes over time," as the concurring and dissenting opinion charges.

The majority now reiterates the doctrine in Tac-an and the subsequent cases not because it has
become hostage to the "inertia of time [which] has always been the obstacle to the virtues of change,"
as the concurring and dissenting opinion finds it to be, but rather because it honestly believes that Tac-
an laid down the correct doctrine. If P.D. No. 1866 as applied in Tac-an is an "affront on doctrinal
concepts of penal laws and assails even the ordinary notions of common sense," the blame must not
be laid at the doorsteps of this Court, but on the lawmaker's. All that the Court did in Tac-an was to
apply the law, for there was nothing in that case that warranted an interpretation or the application of
the niceties of legal hermeneutics. It did not forget that its duty is a merely to apply the law in such a
way that shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such
application or construction it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of
interpretation modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a
construction which is repugnant to its terms. 45
Murder and homicide are defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code 46 as crimes against
persons. They are mala in se because malice or dolo is a necessary ingredient therefor. 4 7 On the other
hand, the offense of illegal possession of firearm is defined and punished by a special penal law, 48 P.D.
No. 1866. It is a malum prohibitum 49 which the lawmaker, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, in the
exercise of his martial law powers, so condemned not only because of its nature but also because of
the larger policy consideration of containing or reducing, if not eliminating, the upsurge of crimes
vitally affecting public order and safety due to the proliferation of illegally possessed and manufactured
firearms, ammunition, and explosives. If intent to commit the crime were required, enforcement of the
decree and its policy or purpose would be difficult to achieve. Hence, there is conceded wisdom in
punishing illegal possession of firearm without taking into account the criminal intent of the possessor.
All that is needed is intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by law, coupled, of course, by animus
possidendi. However, it must be clearly understood that this animus possidendi is without regard to
any other criminal
or felonious intent which an accused may have harbored in possessing the firearm. 50

A long discourse then on the concepts of malum in se and malum prohibitum and their distinctions is
an exercise in futility.

We disagree for lack of basis the following statements of Mr. Justice Regalado in his Concurring and
Dissenting Opinion, to wit:

The second paragraph of the aforestated Section 1 expressly and unequivocally provides
for such illegal possession and resultant killing as a single integrated offense which is
punished as such. The majority not only created two offenses by dividing a single
offense into two but, worse, it resorted to the unprecedented and invalid act of treating
the original offense as a single integrated crime and then creating another offense by
using a component crime which is also an element of the former.

It would already have been a clear case of judicial legislation if the illegal possession
with murder punished with a single penalty have been divided into two separate
offenses of illegal possession and murder with distinct penalties. It is consequently a
compounded infringement of legislative powers for this Court to now, as it has done,
treat that single offense as specifically described by the law and impose reclusion
perpetua therefor (since the death penalty for that offense is still proscribed), but then
proceed further by plucking out therefrom the crime of murder in order to be able to
impose the death sentence. For indeed, on this score, it is beyond cavil that in the
aggravated form of illegal possession, the consequential murder (or homicide) is an
integrated element or integral component since without the accompanying death, the
crime would merely be simple illegal possession of a firearm under the first paragraph of
Section 1.

The second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 does not warrant and support a conclusion that it
intended to treat "illegal possession and resultant killing" (emphasis supplied) "as a single and
integrated offense" of illegal possession with homicide or murder. It does not use the clause as a result
or on the occasion of to evince an intention to create a single integrated crime. By its unequivocal and
explicit language, which we quote to be clearly understood:

If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of
death shall be imposed. (emphasis supplied)
 the crime of either homicide or murder is committed NOT AS A RESULT OR ON THE OCCASION
of the violation of Section 1, but WITH THE USE of an unlicensed firearm, whose possession is
penalized therein. There is a world of difference, which is too obvious, between (a) the
commission of homicide or murder as a result or on the occasion of the violation of Section 1,
and (b) the commission of homicide or murder with the use of an unlicensed firearm. In the
first, homicide or murder is not the original purpose or primary objective of the offender, but a
secondary event or circumstance either resulting from or perpetrated on the occasion of the
commission of that originally or primarily intended. In the second, the killing, which requires
a mens rea is the primary purpose, and to carry that out effectively the offender uses an
unlicensed firearm.

As to the question then of Mr. Justice Regalado of whether this Court should also apply the rule
enunciated here to P.D. No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974), P.D. No. 533
(Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974), and P.D. No. 534 (Defining Illegal Fishing and Prescribing Stiffer
Penalties Therefor), the answer is resoundingly in the negative. In those cases, the lawmaker clearly
intended a single integrated offense or a special complex offense because the death therein occurs as a
result or on the occasion of the commission of the offenses therein penalized or was not the primary
purpose of the offender, unlike in the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866. Thus, (a) Section
3 of P.D. No. 532 provides:

Sec. 3. Penalties. — Any person who commits piracy or highway robbery/brigandage as

herein defined, shall, upon conviction by competent court be punished by:

a. Piracy. — The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods shall
be imposed. If physical injuries or other crimes are committed as a result or on the
occasion thereof, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If rape, murder or
homicide is committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, or when the offenders
abandoned the victims without means of saving themselves, or when the seizure is
accomplished by firing upon or boarding a vessel, the mandatory penalty of death shall
be imposed.

b. Highway Robbery/Brigandage. — The penalty of reclusion temporal in its minimum

period shall be imposed. If physical injuries or other crimes are committed during or on
the occasion of the commission of robbery or brigandage, the penalty of reclusion
temporal in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed. If kidnapping for
ransom or extortion, or murder or homicide, or rape is committed as a result or on the
occasion thereof, the penalty of death shall be imposed. (emphasis supplied)

(b) Section 8 of P.D. No. 533 reads in part as follows:

Sec. 8. Penal provisions. — Any person convicted of cattle rustling as herein defined
shall, irrespective of the value of the large cattle involved, be punished by prision
mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period if the offense is
committed without violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. If
the offense is committed with violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon
things, the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed. If a person is seriously injured or killed as a result or on the
occasion of the commission of cattle rustling, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
shall be imposed. (emphasis supplied)
 and (c) Section 3 of P.D. No. 534 reads as follows:

Sec. 3. Penalties. — Violations of this Decree and the rules and regulations mentioned in
paragraph (f) of Section 1 hereof shall be punished as follows:

a. by imprisonment from 10 to 12 years, if explosives are used: Provided, that if the

explosion results (1) in physical injury to person, the penalty shall be imprisonment from
12 to 20 years, or (2) in the loss of human life, then the penalty shall be imprisonment
from 20 years to life, or death;

b. by imprisonment from 8 to 10 years, if obnoxious or poisonous substances are

used: Provided, that if the use of such substances results (1) in physical injury to any
person, the penalty shall be imprisonment from 10 to 12 years, or (2) in the loss of
human life, then the penalty shall be imprisonment from 20 years to life, or death; . . .
(emphasis supplied)

The unequivocal intent of the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 is to respect and
preserve homicide or murder as a distinct offense penalized under the Revised Penal Code and to
increase the penalty for illegal possession of firearm where such a firearm is used in killing a person. Its
clear language yields no intention of the lawmaker to repeal or modify, pro tanto, Articles 248 and 249
of the Revised Penal Code, in such a way that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of
homicide or murder, either of these crimes, as the case may be, would only serve to aggravate the
offense of illegal possession of firearm and would not anymore be separately punished. Indeed, the
words of the subject provision are palpably clear to exclude any suggestion that either of the crimes of
homicide and murder, as crimes mala in se under the Revised Penal Code, is obliterated as such and
reduced as a mere aggravating circumstance in illegal possession of firearm whenever the unlicensed
firearm is used in killing a person. The only purpose of the provision is to increase the penalty
prescribed in the first paragraph of Section 1 — reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua — to death, seemingly because of the accused's manifest arrogant defiance and contempt of
the law in using an unlicensed weapon to kill another, but never, at the same time, to absolve the
accused from any criminal liability for the death of the victim.

Neither is the second paragraph of Section 1 meant to punish homicide or murder with death if either
crime is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, i.e., to consider such use merely as
a qualifying circumstance and not as an offense. That could not have been the intention of the
lawmaker because the term "penalty" in the subject provision is obviously meant to be the penalty for
illegal possession of firearm and not the penalty for homicide or murder. We explicitly stated in Tac-an:

There is no law which renders the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating

circumstance in homicide or murder. Under an information charging homicide or
murder, the fact that the death weapon was an unlicensed firearm cannot be used to
increase the penalty for the second offense of homicide or murder to death. . . . The
essential point is that the unlicensed character or condition of the instrument used in
destroying human life or committing some other crime, is not included in the inventory
of aggravating circumstances set out in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code.

A law may, of course, be enacted making the use of an unlicensed firearm as a qualifying

circumstance. This would not be without precedent. By analogy, we can cite Section 17 of B.P.
Blg. 179, which amended the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425). The said section
 provides that when an offender commits a crime under a state of addiction, such a state shall
be considered as a qualifying aggravating circumstance in the definition of the crime and the
application of the penalty under the Revised Penal Code.

In short, there is nothing in P.D. No. 1866 that manifests, even vaguely, a legislative intent to
decriminalize homicide or murder if either crime is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, or
to convert the offense of illegal possession of firearm as a qualifying circumstance if the firearm so
illegally possessed is used in the commission of homicide or murder. To charge the lawmaker with that
intent is to impute an absurdity that would defeat the clear intent to preserve the law on homicide and
murder and impose a higher penalty for illegal possession of firearm if such firearm is used in the
commission of homicide or murder.

Evidently, the majority did not, as charged in the concurring and dissenting opinion, create two
offenses by dividing a single offense into two. Neither did it resort to the "unprecedented and invalid
act of treating the original offense as a single integrated crime and then creating another offense by
using a component crime which is also an element of the former." The majority has always maintained
that the killing of a person with the use of an illegally possessed firearm gives rise to two separate
offenses of (a) homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code, and (b) illegal possession of firearm
in its aggravated form.

What then would be a clear case of judicial legislation is an interpretation of the second paragraph of
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 that would make it define and punish a single integrated offense and give to
the words WITH THE USE OF a similar meaning as the words AS A RESULT OR ON THE OCCASION OF, a
meaning which is neither born out by the letter of the law nor supported by its intent. Worth noting is
the rule in statutory construction that if a statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be
given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation, 51 leaving the court no room for
any extended ratiocination or rationalization of the law. 52

Peregrinations into the field of penology such as on the concept of a single integrated crime or
composite crimes, or into the philosophical domain of integration of the essential elements of one
crime to that of another would then be unnecessary in light of the clear language and indubitable
purpose and intent of the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866. The realm of penology, the
determination of what should be criminalized, the definition of crimes, and the prescription of
penalties are the exclusive prerogatives of the legislature. As its wisdom may dictate, the legislature
may even create from a single act or transaction various offenses for different purposes subject only to
the limitations set forth by the Constitution. This Court cannot dictate upon the legislature to respect
the orthodox view concerning a single integrated crime or composite crimes.

The only apparent obstacle to the imposition of cumulative penalties for various acts is the rule on
double jeopardy. This brings us to the proposition in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Regalado that
the majority view offends the constitutional bar against double jeopardy under the "same-evidence"
test enunciated in People vs. Diaz. 53 He then concludes:

In the cases now before us, it is difficult to assume that the evidence for the murder in
the first charge of aggravated illegal possession of firearm with murder would be
different from the evidence to be adduced in the subsequent charge for murder alone.
In the second charge, the illegal possession is not in issue, except peripherally and
inconsequentially since it is not an element or modifying circumstance in the second
charge, hence the evidence therefor is immaterial. But, in both prosecutions, the
 evidence on murder is essential, in the first charge because without it the crime is only
simple illegal possession, and, in the second charge, because murder is the very subject
of the prosecution. Assuming that all the other requirements under Section 7, Rule 117
are present, can it be doubted that double jeopardy is necessarily present and can be
validly raised to bar the second prosecution for murder?

In fact, we can extrapolate the constitutional and reglementary objection to the cases of
the other composite crimes for which a single penalty is imposed, such as the complex,
compound and so-called special complex crimes. Verily, I cannot conceive of how a
person convicted of estafa through falsification under Article 48 can be validly
prosecuted anew for the same offense or either estafa or falsification; or how the
accused convicted of robbery with homicide under Article 294 can be legally charged
again with either of the same component crimes of robbery or homicide; or how the
convict who was found guilty of rape with homicide under Article 335 can be duly haled
before the court again to face charges of either the same rape or homicide. Why, then,
do we now sanction a second prosecution for murder in the cases at bar since the very
same offense was an indispensable component for the other composite offense of illegal
possession of firearm with murder? Why would the objection of non bis in idim as a bar
to a second jeopardy lie in the preceding examples and not apply to the cases now
before us?

We are unable to agree to the proposition. For one, the issue of double jeopardy is not raised in this
case. For another, the so-called "same-evidence" test is not a conclusive, much less exclusive, test in
double jeopardy cases of the first category under the Double Jeopardy Clause which is covered by
Section 21, Article III of the Constitution and which reads as follows:

No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute
a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

Note that the first category speaks of the same offense. The second refers to the same act. This
was explicitly distinguished in Yap vs. Lutero, 54 from where People vs. Relova 55 quotes the
following:

Thirdly, our Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds of double jeopardy. The first sentence
of clause 20, section 1, Article III of the Constitution, ordains that "no person shall be
twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." (emphasis in the original)
The second sentence of said clause provides that "if an act is punishable by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act." Thus, the first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense whereas, the second contemplates double jeopardy of
punishment for the same act. Under the first sentence, one may be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment of the same act, provided that he is charged with different
offenses, or the offense charged in one case is not included in, or does not include, the
crime charged in the other case. The second sentence applies, even if the offenses
charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of an
ordinance and the other a violation of a statute. If the two charges are based on one and
the same act, conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a
prosecution under the other. Incidentally, such conviction or acquittal is not
 indispensable to sustain the plea of double jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. So long as jeopardy has been attached under one of the informations charging
said offense, the defense may be availed of in the other case involving the same offense,
even if there has been neither conviction nor acquittal in either case.

Elsewise stated, where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the
same statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses
charged. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only where an
identity as shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. 56 The
question of identity or lack of identity of offenses is addressed by examining the essential
elements of each of the two offenses charged, as such elements are set out in the respective
legislative definitions of the offenses involved. 57

If may be noted that to determine the "same offense" under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America which reads:

[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb. . .

the rule applicable is the following: "where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation
of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two
offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the
other does not." 58

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution of the United States of America was brought to the
Philippines through the Philippine Bill of 1 July 1902, whose Section 5 provided, inter alia:

[N]o person for the same offense shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment . . . .

This provision was carried over in identical words in Section 3 of the Jones Law of 29 August
1916. 59 Then under the 1935 Constitution, the Jones Law provision was recast with the addition
of a provision referring to the same act. Thus, paragraph 20, Section 1, Article III thereof
provided as follows:

No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute
a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

This was adopted verbatim in Section 22, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution and in Section 21,
Article III of the present Constitution.

This additional-element test in Lutero and Relova and in Blockburger, Gore, and Missouri would safely

bring the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 out of the proscribed double jeopardy
principle. For undeniably, the elements of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form are
different from the elements of homicide or murder, let alone the fact that these crimes are defined
and penalized under different laws and the former is malum prohibitum, while both the latter are mala
in se. Hence, the fear that the majority's construction of the subject provision would violate the
constitutional bar against double jeopardy is unfounded.
The penalty which the trial court imposed in Criminal Case No. 8179 for illegal possession of firearm in
its aggravated form must, however, be modified. The penalty prescribed by P.D. No. 1866 is death.
Since Section 19(1), Article III of the Constitution prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the
penalty next lower in degree, reclusion perpetua, must be imposed.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED, and the challenged decision of 30 September 1993 of
Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Bohol finding accused-appellant DANIEL QUIJADA y CIRCULADO
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. 8178 and of illegal
possession of firearm in its aggravated form in Criminal Case No. 8179 is AFFIRMED. The penalty
imposed in the first case, as amended by the Order of 29 October 1993, is sustained; however, the
penalty imposed in the second case is changed to Reclusion Perpetua from the indeterminate penalty
ranging from Seventeen (17) years, Four (4) months, and One (1) day, as minimum, to Twenty (20)
years and One (1) day, as maximum.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 211933 & 211960, April 15, 2015

ROBERTA S. SALDARIEGA, Petitioner, v. HON. ELVIRA D.C. PANGANIBAN, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH

227, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, QUEZON CITY AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a special civil action for certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, dated April 21, 2014
filed by Roberta S. Saldariega (petitioner), through counsel, assailing the Order dated June 14, 2013
issued by respondent Presiding Judge Elvira D.C. Panganiban, which granted the motion to reopen
Criminal Case Nos. Q-1 1-173055 and Q-1 1-173056, for allegedly having been issued with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:

On November 8, 2011, the Office of the City Prosecutor, Quezon City filed two (2) Informations against
petitioner Roberta S. Saldariega for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article 2, Republic Act No. 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
Q-1 1-173055 and Q-1 1-173056, respectively. 2 Said cases were raffled to Branch 227, Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City, presided by herein respondent Judge Elvira D.C. Panganiban.

Court hearings were set for the subject cases, however, the prosecution's principal witness PO2 Nelson
Villas (PO2 Villas), one of the arresting officers, failed to attend said scheduled hearings, specifically on
October 22, 2012 and October 25, 2012.3 Thus, during the May 16, 2013 hearing, respondent judge
issued an Order provisionally dismissing the cases with the express consent of the accused-
petitioner,4 the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

xxxx

Today is supposedly set for the continuation of the direct testimony of PO2 Nelson Villas. However,
although notified, said witness failed to appear simply on the ground that there is a deceased relative,
the body of whom, he will accompany to the province.

The records show that on December 10, 2012, he testified partially on direct examination and he was
notified of the March 26, 2013 continuation of his testimony, but despite Notice in open Court, he
failed to appear. Likewise, the Court noticed that the other prosecution witness, PO3 Rionaldo
Sabulaan never appeared despite Notice received. It appears from the records that only the Forensic
Chemist testified on September 13, 2012, but the Forensic Chemist does not have any personal
knowledge of the source of the evidence she examined, and also on the facts and circumstances
affecting the arrest of the accused. Thus, the defense counsel invoked the right of the accused to
speedy trial. The Public Prosecutor did not object to the dismissal, provided the dismissal is only
provisional. Hence, let these cases be ordered PROVISIONALLY DISMISSED WITH THE EXPRESS
CONSENT OF THE ACCUSED AND HER COUNSEL.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.5cralawlawlibrary
On June 5, 2013, PO2 Villas filed a Motion to Re-open the Case against petitioner. PO2 Villas explained
that his failure to appear during the hearings of the cases was due to the untimely death of his father-
in-law.6 He further averred that PO3 Rionaldo Sabulaan, one of the arresting officers, is no longer
assigned at the Cubao Police Station and had been transferred at the Batasan Police Station since
November 2012, thus, could not have received his subpoena which is directed at his former place of
assignment.

In the disputed Order7 dated June 14, 2013, respondent Judge granted the motion and ordered the re-
opening of the cases against petitioner and set the cases for continuation of hearing.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She argued that the provisional dismissal of the criminal cases is
considered an acquittal and PO2 Villas had no personality to file the motion to re-open the case. 8

In an Order9 dated February 18, 2014, respondent denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

On April 29, 2014, the Court resolved to require respondents to comment on the instant petition. 10

In their Comment11 dated June 11, 2014, the Office of the Solicitor General, through then Solicitor
General Francis H. Jardeleza,12 maintained that respondent judge committed no grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the assailed Orders dated June 14, 2013 and February 18, 2014. It argued that
petitioner did not expressly object to the motion to revive the criminal cases.

Thus, the instant petition raising the following issues:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

 I
WHETHER OR NOT WITNESS PO2 NELSON VILLAS CAN FILE A MOTION TO REOPEN A PROVISIONALLY
DISMISSED CASE WITHOUT THE PARTICIPATION OF A PUBLIC PROSECUTOR.cralawlawlibrary
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE BRANCH CLERK OF COURT HAS THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE A MOTION TO RE-OPEN
THAT DOES NOT CONTAIN A NOTICE OF HEARING AND A SHOWING THAT THE OTHER PARTY WAS
GIVEN A COPY THEREOF.cralawlawlibrary
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO ACT FAVORABLY UPON SAID
MOTION.cralawlawlibrary
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL OF CRIMINAL CASES NOS. Q-1 1-173055-56 WITH THE
CONSENT OF THE ACCUSED BUT PREDICATED ON FAILURE TO PROSECUTE WHICH VIOLATES THE RIGHT
OF THE ACCUSED TO SPEEDY TRIAL IS NOT EQUIVALENT TO AN ACQUITTAL, SUCH THAT ITS REVIVAL
WOULD CONSTITUTE DOUBLE JEOPARDY.cralawlawlibrary
V
WHETHER OR NOT THE ABSENCE OF PROSECUTION'S PRINCIPAL WITNESS PO2 NELSON VILLAS FOR
FOUR (4) CONSECUTIVE HEARINGS HAD BEEN CONSIDERED WAIVER PURSUANT TO A.M. NO. 11-6-10-
SC.
RULING
We deny the petition.

The Court notes that the instant case suffers from procedural infirmities which this Court cannot
ignore. While this petition is to be treated as one for certiorari under Rule 65, it is still dismissible for
violation of the hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the
RTC and the CA to issue writs of certiorari, this should not be taken as granting parties the absolute and
unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which an application will be directed. Direct resort to
this Court is allowed only if there are special, important and compelling reasons clearly and specifically
spelled out in the petition, which are not present in this case. 13

Moreover, this being a petition on certiorari under Rule 65, the issues raised herein should be confined
solely to questions of jurisdiction. Thus, while in the course of the discussion, it may be necessary to
thresh out pertinent factual issues, the same is limited for the purpose of resolving the issue on
jurisdiction, that is, whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion resulting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction.

When a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case may
be revived by the State within the periods provided under the 2nd paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with
notice to the offended party. Here, a perusal of the Order, dated May 16, 2013, stresses in no
uncertain terms that the dismissal of the case was provisional, i.e., the case could be revived at some
future time. If petitioner believed that the case against her should be dismissed with prejudice, she
should not have agreed to a provisional dismissal. She should have moved for a dismissal with
prejudice so that the court would have no alternative but to require the prosecution to present its
evidence. There was nothing in the records showing the accused's opposition to the provisional
dismissal nor was there any after the Order of provisional dismissal was issued. She cannot claim now
that the dismissal was with prejudice. Thus, if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express
consent of the accused, as in this case, the case may be revived by the State within the periods
provided under the 2nd paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. There is
no violation of due process as long as the revival of a provisionally dismissed complaint was made
within the time-bar provided under the law.

Generally, the prosecutor should have been the one who filed the motion to revive because it is the
prosecutor who controls the trial. But in this particular case, the defect, if there was any, was cured
when the public prosecutor later actively participated in the denial of the accused's motion for
reconsideration when she filed her Comment/Objection thereto. In the Order denying the motion, the
trial court stated that "in her Comment/Objection, the Public Prosecutor begged to disagree primarily
on the ground that double jeopardy has not set in, because the provisional dismissal of the case was
with the express consent of the accused."14 The court even went further when it stated that "although
the Motion to Re-open the case was filed by the witness without securing the conformity of the Public
Prosecutor, in effect, the prosecutor has conformed to the re-opening of the case because she (the
prosecutor) finds that the failure of the witness to appear on two (2) hearings was due to the death of
the father in law on March 23, 2013 and the death of his aunt on May 12, 2013, as substantiated by the
respective Certificates of Death of the said relatives."15

Moreover, in the case at bar, it must be noted that the accused is charged with a public crime, hence, it
is a victim-less crime. Unlike in private crimes where the participation of the private offended party is
generally required for the recovery of civil liability, in the instant case, there is no particular private
offended party who can actually file the motion to revive. Hence, in some instances, as in this case, it is
the arresting officer, PO2 Villas, who filed the motion to revive the case out of his sense of duty as a
police officer and compelled by his sense of obligation considering that he knew his absence was the
cause why the complaint was provisionally dismissed.

We could not entirely blame PO2 Villas in filing the motion to revive since we are aware that in drug-
related cases, the arresting officers are usually required to explain by their superiors when a case is
provisionally dismissed due to their failure to appear during trial. Thus, in order to exonerate
themselves from a possible administrative and criminal liability, the arresting officers would then opt
instead to file the motion to revive on their own.

The provisional dismissal of the case does not operate as an acquittal since its dismissal was made with
the express consent of the accused, thus, there is no double jeopardy.

Further, the proscription against double jeopardy presupposes that an accused has been previously
charged with an offense, and the case against him is terminated either by his acquittal or conviction, or
dismissed in any other manner without his consent. As a general rule, the following requisites must be
present for double jeopardy to attach: (1) a valid indictment, (2) before a court of competent
jurisdiction, (3) the arraignment of the accused, (4) a valid plea entered by him, and (5) the acquittal or
conviction of the accused, or the dismissal or termination of the case against him without his express
consent. However, there are two (2) exceptions to the foregoing rule, and double jeopardy may attach
even if the dismissal of the case was with the consent of the accused: first, when there is insufficiency
of evidence to support the charge against him; and second, where there has been an unreasonable
delay in the proceedings, in violation of the accused's right to speedy trial. 16

In the instant case, while the first four requisites are present, the last requisite is lacking, considering
that here the dismissal was merely provisional and it was done with the express consent of the
accused-petitioner. Petitioner is not in danger of being twice put in jeopardy with the reopening of the
case against her as it is clear that the case was only provisionally dismissed by the trial court. The
requirement that the dismissal of the case must be without the consent of the accused is not present
in this case. Neither does the case fall under any of the aforementioned exceptions because, in fact,
the prosecution had failed to continue the presentation of evidence due to the absence of the
witnesses, thus, the fact of insufficiency of evidence cannot be established. Likewise, we find no
unreasonable delay in the proceedings that would be tantamount to violation of the accused's right to
speedy trial.

This Court has emphasized that "'speedy trial' is a relative term and necessarily a flexible concept." In
determining whether the accused's right to speedy trial was violated, the delay should be considered in
view of the entirety of the proceedings. The factors to balance are the following: (a) duration of the
delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by
such delay. In the instant case, petitioner failed to show any evidence that the alleged delay in the trial
was attended with malice or that the same was made without good cause or justifiable motive on the
part of the prosecution. Mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not suffice as the
realities of everyday life must be regarded in judicial proceedings. 17

Here, the delay in the proceedings, which ran from October 25, 2012 until the provisional dismissal of
the case on May 13, 2013, is not the kind of delay contemplated under the law as to violate the
accused's right to speedy trial. More so, when the cause of the delay is valid, as in the instant case.
Likewise, a perusal of the Order dated May 16, 2013 would show that the order was categorical in
stating that the dismissal of the complaint was provisional with the express consent of the accused and
her counsel. The court merely stated in the Order as to what transpired during the proceedings of the
case and not that the dismissal was based on the accused's right to speedy trial.

While the Court recognizes the accused's right to speedy trial and adheres to a policy of speedy
administration of justice, we cannot, however, deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity to fairly
prosecute criminals. We reiterate that unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an
unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial. 18

In a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, petitioner should establish that the court or tribunal acted in a
capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction.

In view of the foregoing, we, thus, find no basis for issuing the extraordinary writs of certiorari with
injunction, as there was no showing that the alleged error in judgment was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. Nowhere in the petition did petitioner show that the issuance of the assailed orders was
patent and gross that would warrant striking it down through a petition for certiorari. No argument
was shown that the trial court exercised its judgment capriciously, whimsically, arbitrarily or
despotically by reason of passion and hostility.

It is well settled that a petition for certiorari against a court which has jurisdiction over a case will
prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is manifested. The burden is on the part of the petitioner to
prove not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent issuing the impugned order. Mere abuse of discretion
is not enough; it must be grave. The term grave abuse of discretion is defined as a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner because of passion or hostility.19Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of
jurisdiction, and not errors or mistakes in the findings and conclusions of the trial court.cralawred

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Orders dated June 14, 2013 and February 18,
2014 in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-1 1-173055 and Q-1 1-173056 entitled People of the Philippines v.
Roberta Saldariega are AFFIRMED. Let the case be remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 176389               December 14, 2010

ANTONIO LEJANO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 176864

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN, HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ,
MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, PETER ESTRADA and GERARDO BIONG, Appellants.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

Brief Background

On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years old, and Jennifer,
seven, were brutally slain at their home in Parañaque City. Following an intense investigation, the
police arrested a group of suspects, some of whom gave detailed confessions. But the trial court
smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged. Thus, the identities of the real
perpetrators remained a mystery especially to the public whose interests were aroused by the gripping
details of what everybody referred to as the Vizconde massacre.

Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI announced that it had solved the
crime. It presented star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she witnessed
the crime. She pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong"
Ventura, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez,
and Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged accused police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory
after the fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro's testimony, on August 10, 1995 the public prosecutors filed
an information for rape with homicide against Webb, et al.1

The Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 274, presided over by Judge Amelita G. Tolentino,
tried only seven of the accused since Artemio Ventura and Joey Filart remained at large. 2 The
prosecution presented Alfaro as its main witness with the others corroborating her testimony. These
included the medico-legal officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims, the security guards of Pitong
Daan Subdivision, the former laundrywoman of the Webb’s household, police officer Biong’s former
girlfriend, and Lauro G. Vizconde, Estrellita’s husband.

For their part, some of the accused testified, denying any part in the crime and saying they were
elsewhere when it took place. Webb’s alibi appeared the strongest since he claimed that he was then
across the ocean in the United States of America. He presented the testimonies of witnesses as well as
documentary and object evidence to prove this. In addition, the defense presented witnesses to show
Alfaro's bad reputation for truth and the incredible nature of her testimony.

But impressed by Alfaro’s detailed narration of the crime and the events surrounding it, the trial court
found a credible witness in her. It noted her categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank
testimony, undamaged by grueling cross-examinations. The trial court remained unfazed by significant
discrepancies between Alfaro’s April 28 and May 22, 1995 affidavits, accepting her explanation that she
at first wanted to protect her former boyfriend, accused Estrada, and a relative, accused Gatchalian;
that no lawyer assisted her; that she did not trust the investigators who helped her prepare her first
affidavit; and that she felt unsure if she would get the support and security she needed once she
disclosed all about the Vizconde killings.

In contrast, the trial court thought little of the denials and alibis that Webb, Lejano, Rodriguez, and
Gatchalian set up for their defense. They paled, according to the court, compared to Alfaro’s testimony
that other witnesses and the physical evidence corroborated. Thus, on January 4, 2000, after four years
of arduous hearings, the trial court rendered judgment, finding all the accused guilty as charged and
imposing on Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and on Biong, an indeterminate prison term of eleven years, four months, and one day to
twelve years. The trial court also awarded damages to Lauro Vizconde. 3

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, modifying the penalty imposed on
Biong to six years minimum and twelve years maximum and increasing the award of damages to Lauro
Vizconde.4 The appellate court did not agree that the accused were tried by publicity or that the trial
judge was biased. It found sufficient evidence of conspiracy that rendered Rodriguez, Gatchalian,
Fernandez, and Estrada equally guilty with those who had a part in raping and killing Carmela and in
executing her mother and sister.

On motion for reconsideration by the accused, the Court of Appeals' Special Division of five members
voted three against two to deny the motion,5 hence, the present appeal.

On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court issued a Resolution
granting the request of Webb to submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen taken from Carmela’s
cadaver, which specimen was then believed still under the safekeeping of the NBI. The Court granted
the request pursuant to section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence6 to give the accused and the
prosecution access to scientific evidence that they might want to avail themselves of, leading to a
correct decision in the case.

Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the Court that it no longer has custody of the
specimen, the same having been turned over to the trial court. The trial record shows, however, that
the specimen was not among the object evidence that the prosecution offered in evidence in the case.
This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit on the ground that the
government’s failure to preserve such vital evidence has resulted in the denial of his right to due
process.

Issues Presented

Accused Webb’s motion to acquit presents a threshold issue: whether or not the Court should acquit
him outright, given the government’s failure to produce the semen specimen that the NBI found on
Carmela’s cadaver, thus depriving him of evidence that would prove his innocence.

In the main, all the accused raise the central issue of whether or not Webb, acting in conspiracy with
Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, Ventura, and Filart, raped and killed Carmela and
put to death her mother and sister. But, ultimately, the controlling issues are:

1. Whether or not Alfaro’s testimony as eyewitness, describing the crime and identifying Webb,
Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and two others as the persons who
committed it, is entitled to belief; and

2. Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi and rebut Alfaro’s
testimony that he led the others in committing the crime.

The issue respecting accused Biong is whether or not he acted to cover up the crime after its
commission.

The Right to Acquittal

Due to Loss of DNA Evidence

Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland,7 that he is entitled to outright acquittal on the ground of
violation of his right to due process given the State’s failure to produce on order of the Court either by
negligence or willful suppression the semen specimen taken from Carmela.

The medical evidence clearly established that Carmela was raped and, consistent with this, semen
specimen was found in her. It is true that Alfaro identified Webb in her testimony as Carmela’s rapist
and killer but serious questions had been raised about her credibility. At the very least, there exists a
possibility that Alfaro had lied. On the other hand, the semen specimen taken from Carmela cannot
possibly lie. It cannot be coached or allured by a promise of reward or financial support. No two
persons have the same DNA fingerprint, with the exception of identical twins. 8 If, on examination, the
DNA of the subject specimen does not belong to Webb, then he did not rape Carmela. It is that simple.
Thus, the Court would have been able to determine that Alfaro committed perjury in saying that he
did.

Still, Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the failure of the State to produce the semen specimen at this
late stage. For one thing, the ruling in Brady v. Maryland9 that he cites has long be overtaken by the
decision in Arizona v. Youngblood,10 where the U.S. Supreme Court held that due process does not
require the State to preserve the semen specimen although it might be useful to the accused unless
the latter is able to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the police. Here, the State
presented a medical expert who testified on the existence of the specimen and Webb in fact sought to
have the same subjected to DNA test.
For, another, when Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence did not yet exist, the
country did not yet have the technology for conducting the test, and no Philippine precedent had as
yet recognized its admissibility as evidence. Consequently, the idea of keeping the specimen secure
even after the trial court rejected the motion for DNA testing did not come up. Indeed, neither Webb
nor his co-accused brought up the matter of preserving the specimen in the meantime.

Parenthetically, after the trial court denied Webb’s application for DNA testing, he allowed the
proceeding to move on when he had on at least two occasions gone up to the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court to challenge alleged arbitrary actions taken against him and the other accused. 11 They
raised the DNA issue before the Court of Appeals but merely as an error committed by the trial court in
rendering its decision in the case. None of the accused filed a motion with the appeals court to have
the DNA test done pending adjudication of their appeal. This, even when the Supreme Court had in the
meantime passed the rules allowing such test. Considering the accused’s lack of interest in having such
test done, the State cannot be deemed put on reasonable notice that it would be required to produce
the semen specimen at some future time.

Now, to the merit of the case.

Alfaro’s Story

Based on the prosecution’s version, culled from the decisions of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, on June 29, 1991 at around 8:30 in the evening, Jessica Alfaro drove her Mitsubishi Lancer,
with boyfriend Peter Estrada as passenger, to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center parking lot to buy
shabu from Artemio "Dong" Ventura. There, Ventura introduced her to his friends: Hubert Jeffrey P.
Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Michael
Gatchalian, and Joey Filart. Alfaro recalled frequently seeing them at a shabu house in Parañaque in
January 1991, except Ventura whom she had known earlier in December 1990.

As Alfaro smoked her shabu, Webb approached and requested her to relay a message for him to a girl,
whom she later identified as Carmela Vizconde. Alfaro agreed. After using up their shabu, the group
drove to Carmela’s house at 80 Vinzons Street, Pitong Daan Subdivision, BF Homes, Parañaque City.
Riding in her car, Alfaro and Estrada trailed Filart and Rodriguez who rode a Mazda pick-up and Webb,
Lejano, Ventura, Fernandez, and Gatchalian who were on a Nissan Patrol car.

On reaching their destination, Alfaro parked her car on Vinzons Street, alighted, and approached
Carmela’s house. Alfaro pressed the buzzer and a woman came out. Alfaro queried her about Carmela.
Alfaro had met Carmela twice before in January 1991. When Carmela came out, Alfaro gave her
Webb’s message that he was just around. Carmela replied, however, that she could not go out yet
since she had just arrived home. She told Alfaro to return after twenty minutes. Alfaro relayed this to
Webb who then told the group to drive back to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center.

The group had another shabu session at the parking lot. After sometime, they drove back but only
Alfaro proceeded to Vinzons Street where Carmela lived. The Nissan Patrol and the Mazda pick-up,
with their passengers, parked somewhere along Aguirre Avenue. Carmela was at their garden. She
approached Alfaro on seeing her and told the latter that she (Carmela) had to leave the house for a
while. Carmela requested Alfaro to return before midnight and she would leave the pedestrian gate,
the iron grills that led to the kitchen, and the kitchen door unlocked. Carmela also told Alfaro to blink
her car’s headlights twice when she approached the pedestrian gate so Carmela would know that she
had arrived.
Alfaro returned to her car but waited for Carmela to drive out of the house in her own car. Alfaro
trailed Carmela up to Aguirre Avenue where she dropped off a man whom Alfaro believed was
Carmela’s boyfriend. Alfaro looked for her group, found them, and relayed Carmela’s instructions to
Webb. They then all went back to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center. At the parking lot, Alfaro told
the group about her talk with Carmela. When she told Webb of Carmela’s male companion, Webb’s
mood changed for the rest of the evening ("bad trip").

Webb gave out free cocaine. They all used it and some shabu, too. After about 40 to 45 minutes, Webb
decided that it was time for them to leave. He said, "Pipilahan natin siya [Carmela] at ako ang
mauuna." Lejano said, "Ako ang susunod" and the others responded "Okay, okay." They all left the
parking lot in a convoy of three vehicles and drove into Pitong Daan Subdivision for the third time. They
arrived at Carmela’s house shortly before midnight.

Alfaro parked her car between Vizconde’s house and the next. While waiting for the others to alight
from their cars, Fernandez approached Alfaro with a suggestion that they blow up the transformer
near the Vizconde’s residence to cause a brownout ("Pasabugin kaya natin ang transformer na ito").
But Alfaro shrugged off the idea, telling Fernandez, "Malakas lang ang tama mo." When Webb, Lejano,
and Ventura were already before the house, Webb told the others again that they would line up for
Carmela but he would be the first. The others replied, "O sige, dito lang kami, magbabantay lang kami."

Alfaro was the first to pass through the pedestrian gate that had been left open. Webb, Lejano, and
Ventura followed her. On entering the garage, Ventura using a chair mounted the hood of the
Vizcondes’ Nissan Sentra and loosened the electric bulb over it ("para daw walang ilaw"). The small
group went through the open iron grill gate and passed the dirty kitchen. Carmela opened the
aluminum screen door of the kitchen for them. She and Webb looked each other in the eyes for a
moment and, together, headed for the dining area.

As she lost sight of Carmela and Webb, Alfaro decided to go out. Lejano asked her where she was going
and she replied that she was going out to smoke. As she eased her way out through the kitchen door,
she saw Ventura pulling out a kitchen drawer. Alfaro smoked a cigarette at the garden. After about
twenty minutes, she was surprised to hear a woman’s voice ask, "Sino yan?" Alfaro immediately
walked out of the garden to her car. She found her other companions milling around it. Estrada who
sat in the car asked her, "Okay ba?"

After sitting in the car for about ten minutes, Alfaro returned to the Vizconde house, using the same
route. The interior of the house was dark but some light filtered in from outside. In the kitchen, Alfaro
saw Ventura searching a lady’s bag that lay on the dining table. When she asked him what he was
looking for, he said: "Ikaw na nga dito, maghanap ka ng susi." She asked him what key he wanted and
he replied: "Basta maghanap ka ng susi ng main door pati na rin ng susi ng kotse." When she found a
bunch of keys in the bag, she tried them on the main door but none fitted the lock. She also did not
find the car key.

Unable to open the main door, Alfaro returned to the kitchen. While she was at a spot leading to the
dining area, she heard a static noise (like a television that remained on after the station had signed off).
Out of curiosity, she approached the master’s bedroom from where the noise came, opened the door a
little, and peeked inside. The unusual sound grew even louder. As she walked in, she saw Webb on top
of Carmela while she lay with her back on the floor. Two bloodied bodies lay on the bed. Lejano was at
the foot of the bed about to wear his jacket. Carmela was gagged, moaning, and in tears while Webb
raped her, his bare buttocks exposed.
Webb gave Alfaro a meaningful look and she immediately left the room. She met Ventura at the dining
area. He told her, "Prepare an escape. Aalis na tayo." Shocked with what she saw, Alfaro rushed out of
the house to the others who were either sitting in her car or milling on the sidewalk. She entered her
car and turned on the engine but she did not know where to go. Webb, Lejano, and Ventura came out
of the house just then. Webb suddenly picked up a stone and threw it at the main door, breaking its
glass frame.

As the three men approached the pedestrian gate, Webb told Ventura that he forgot his jacket in the
house. But Ventura told him that they could not get in anymore as the iron grills had already locked.
They all rode in their cars and drove away until they reached Aguirre Avenue. As they got near an old
hotel at the Tropical Palace area, Alfaro noticed the Nissan Patrol slow down. Someone threw
something out of the car into the cogonal area.

The convoy of cars went to a large house with high walls, concrete fence, steel gate, and a long
driveway at BF Executive Village. They entered the compound and gathered at the lawn where the
"blaming session" took place. It was here that Alfaro and those who remained outside the Vizconde
house learned of what happened. The first to be killed was Carmela’s mother, then Jennifer, and
finally, Carmella. Ventura blamed Webb, telling him, "Bakit naman pati yung bata?" Webb replied that
the girl woke up and on seeing him molesting Carmela, she jumped on him, bit his shoulders, and
pulled his hair. Webb got mad, grabbed the girl, pushed her to the wall, and repeatedly stabbed her.
Lejano excused himself at this point to use the telephone in the house. Meanwhile, Webb called up
someone on his cellular phone.

At around 2:00 in the morning, accused Gerardo Biong arrived. Webb ordered him to go and clean up
the Vizconde house and said to him, "Pera lang ang katapat nyan." Biong answered, "Okay lang." Webb
spoke to his companions and told them, "We don’t know each other. We haven’t seen each other…
baka maulit yan." Alfaro and Estrada left and they drove to her father’s house. 12

1. The quality of the witness

Was Alfaro an ordinary subdivision girl who showed up at the NBI after four years, bothered by her
conscience or egged on by relatives or friends to come forward and do what was right? No. She was, at
the time she revealed her story, working for the NBI as an "asset," a stool pigeon, one who earned her
living by fraternizing with criminals so she could squeal on them to her NBI handlers. She had to live a
life of lies to get rewards that would pay for her subsistence and vices.

According to Atty. Artemio Sacaguing, former head of the NBI Anti-Kidnapping, Hijacking, and Armed
Robbery Task Force (AKHAR) Section, Alfaro had been hanging around at the NBI since November or
December 1994 as an "asset." She supplied her handlers with information against drug pushers and
other criminal elements. Some of this information led to the capture of notorious drug pushers like
Christopher Cruz Santos and Orlando Bacquir. Alfaro’s tip led to the arrest of the leader of the
"Martilyo gang" that killed a police officer. Because of her talent, the task force gave her "very special
treatment" and she became its "darling," allowed the privilege of spending nights in one of the rooms
at the NBI offices.

When Alfaro seemed unproductive for sometime, however, they teased her about it and she was
piqued. One day, she unexpectedly told Sacaguing that she knew someone who had the real story
behind the Vizconde massacre. Sacaguing showed interest. Alfaro promised to bring that someone to
the NBI to tell his story. When this did not happen and Sacaguing continued to press her, she told him
that she might as well assume the role of her informant. Sacaguing testified thus:

ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. Atty. Sacaguing, how did Jessica Alfaro become a witness in the Vizconde murder case? Will
you tell the Honorable Court?
xxxx
A. She told me. Your Honor, that she knew somebody who related to her the circumstances, I
mean, the details of the massacre of the Vizconde family. That’s what she told me, Your Honor.
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. And what did you say?
xxxx
A. I was quite interested and I tried to persuade her to introduce to me that man and she
promised that in due time, she will bring to me the man, and together with her, we will try to
convince him to act as a state witness and help us in the solution of the case.
xxxx
Q. Atty. Sacaguing, were you able to interview this alleged witness?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. No, sir.
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. Why not?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. Because Jessica Alfaro was never able to comply with her promise to bring the man to me.
She told me later that she could not and the man does not like to testify.
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. All right, and what happened after that?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. She told me, "easy lang kayo, Sir," if I may quote, "easy lang Sir, huwag kayong…"
COURT:
How was that?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. "Easy lang, Sir. Sir, relax lang, Sir, papapelan ko, papapelan ko na lang ‘yan."
xxxx
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. All right, and what was your reaction when Ms. Alfaro stated that "papapelan ko na lang
yan?"
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. I said, "hindi puwede yan, kasi hindi ka naman eye witness."
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. And what was the reply of Ms. Alfaro?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. Hindi siya nakakibo, until she went away.
(TSN, May 28, 1996, pp. 49-50, 58, 77-79)

Quite significantly, Alfaro never refuted Sacaguing’s above testimony.

2. The suspicious details

But was it possible for Alfaro to lie with such abundant details some of which even tallied with the
physical evidence at the scene of the crime? No doubt, yes.

Firstly, the Vizconde massacre had been reported in the media with dizzying details. Everybody was
talking about what the police found at the crime scene and there were lots of speculations about them.

Secondly, the police had arrested some "akyat-bahay" group in Parañaque and charged them with the
crime. The police prepared the confessions of the men they apprehended and filled these up with
details that the evidence of the crime scene provided. Alfaro’s NBI handlers who were doing their own
investigation knew of these details as well. Since Alfaro hanged out at the NBI offices and practically
lived there, it was not too difficult for her to hear of these evidentiary details and gain access to the
documents.

Not surprisingly, the confessions of some members of the Barroso "akyat bahay" gang, condemned by
the Makati RTC as fabricated by the police to pin the crime on them, shows how crime investigators
could make a confession ring true by matching some of its details with the physical evidence at the
crime scene. Consider the following:

a. The Barroso gang members said that they got into Carmela’s house by breaking the glass panel of
the front door using a stone wrapped in cloth to deaden the noise. Alfaro could not use this line since
the core of her story was that Webb was Carmela’s boyfriend. Webb had no reason to smash her front
door to get to see her.

Consequently, to explain the smashed door, Alfaro had to settle for claiming that, on the way out of
the house, Webb picked up some stone and, out of the blue, hurled it at the glass-paneled front door
of the Vizconde residence. His action really made no sense. From Alfaro’s narration, Webb appeared
rational in his decisions. It was past midnight, the house was dark, and they wanted to get away quickly
to avoid detection. Hurling a stone at that glass door and causing a tremendous noise was bizarre, like
inviting the neighbors to come.

b. The crime scene showed that the house had been ransacked. The rejected confessions of the
Barroso "akyat-bahay" gang members said that they tried to rob the house. To explain this physical
evidence, Alfaro claimed that at one point Ventura was pulling a kitchen drawer, and at another point,
going through a handbag on the dining table. He said he was looking for the front-door key and the car
key.

Again, this portion of Alfaro’s story appears tortured to accommodate the physical evidence of the
ransacked house. She never mentioned Ventura having taken some valuables with him when they left
Carmela’s house. And why would Ventura rummage a bag on the table for the front-door key, spilling
the contents, when they had already gotten into the house. It is a story made to fit in with the crime
scene although robbery was supposedly not the reason Webb and his companions entered that house.

c. It is the same thing with the garage light. The police investigators found that the bulb had been
loosened to turn off the light. The confessions of the Barroso gang claimed that one of them climbed
the parked car’s hood to reach up and darken that light. This made sense since they were going to rob
the place and they needed time to work in the dark trying to open the front door. Some passersby
might look in and see what they were doing.
Alfaro had to adjust her testimony to take into account that darkened garage light. So she claimed that
Ventura climbed the car’s hood, using a chair, to turn the light off. But, unlike the Barroso "akyat-
bahay" gang, Webb and his friends did not have anything to do in a darkened garage. They supposedly
knew in advance that Carmela left the doors to the kitchen open for them. It did not make sense for
Ventura to risk standing on the car’s hood and be seen in such an awkward position instead of going
straight into the house.

And, thirdly, Alfaro was the NBI’s star witness, their badge of excellent investigative work.lavvphil After
claiming that they had solved the crime of the decade, the NBI people had a stake in making her sound
credible and, obviously, they gave her all the preparations she needed for the job of becoming a fairly
good substitute witness. She was their "darling" of an asset. And this is not pure speculation. As
pointed out above, Sacaguing of the NBI, a lawyer and a ranking official, confirmed this to be a cold
fact. Why the trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to see this is mystifying.

At any rate, did Alfaro at least have a fine memory for faces that had a strong effect on her, given the
circumstances? Not likely. She named Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez as one of the culprits in the Vizconde
killings. But when the NBI found a certain Michael Rodriguez, a drug dependent from the Bicutan
Rehabilitation Center, initially suspected to be Alfaro’s Miguel Rodriguez and showed him to Alfaro at
the NBI office, she ran berserk, slapping and kicking Michael, exclaiming: "How can I forget your face.
We just saw each other in a disco one month ago and you told me then that you will kill me." As it
turned out, he was not Miguel Rodriguez, the accused in this case.13

Two possibilities exist: Michael was really the one Alfaro wanted to implicate to settle some score with
him but it was too late to change the name she already gave or she had myopic vision, tagging the
wrong people for what they did not do.

3. The quality of the testimony

There is another thing about a lying witness: her story lacks sense or suffers from inherent
inconsistencies. An understanding of the nature of things and the common behavior of people will help
expose a lie. And it has an abundant presence in this case.

One. In her desire to implicate Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart, who were
supposed to be Webb’s co-principals in the crime, Alfaro made it a point to testify that Webb proposed
twice to his friends the gang-rape of Carmela who had hurt him. And twice, they (including, if one
believes Alfaro, her own boyfriend Estrada) agreed in a chorus to his proposal. But when they got to
Carmela’s house, only Webb, Lejano, Ventura, and Alfaro entered the house.

Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez supposedly stayed around Alfaro’s car, which was
parked on the street between Carmela’s house and the next. Some of these men sat on top of the car’s
lid while others milled on the sidewalk, visible under the street light to anyone who cared to watch
them, particularly to the people who were having a drinking party in a nearby house. Obviously, the
behavior of Webb’s companions out on the street did not figure in a planned gang-rape of Carmela.

Two. Ventura, Alfaro’s dope supplier, introduced her for the first time in her life to Webb and his
friends in a parking lot by a mall. So why would she agree to act as Webb’s messenger, using her gas, to
bring his message to Carmela at her home. More inexplicably, what motivated Alfaro to stick it out the
whole night with Webb and his friends?
They were practically strangers to her and her boyfriend Estrada. When it came to a point that Webb
decided with his friends to gang-rape Carmela, clearly, there was nothing in it for Alfaro. Yet, she stuck
it out with them, as a police asset would, hanging in there until she had a crime to report, only she was
not yet an "asset" then. If, on the other hand, Alfaro had been too soaked in drugs to think clearly and
just followed along where the group took her, how could she remember so much details that only a
drug-free mind can?

Three. When Alfaro went to see Carmela at her house for the second time, Carmella told her that she
still had to go out and that Webb and his friends should come back around midnight. Alfaro returned to
her car and waited for Carmela to drive out in her own car. And she trailed her up to Aguirre Avenue
where she supposedly dropped off a man whom she thought was Carmela’s boyfriend. Alfaro’s trailing
Carmela to spy on her unfaithfulness to Webb did not make sense since she was on limited errand. But,
as a critical witness, Alfaro had to provide a reason for Webb to freak out and decide to come with his
friends and harm Carmela.

Four. According to Alfaro, when they returned to Carmela’s house the third time around midnight, she
led Webb, Lejano, and Ventura through the pedestrian gate that Carmela had left open. Now, this is
weird. Webb was the gang leader who decided what they were going to do. He decided and his friends
agreed with him to go to Carmela’s house and gang-rape her. Why would Alfaro, a woman, a stranger
to Webb before that night, and obviously with no role to play in the gang-rape of Carmela, lead him
and the others into her house? It made no sense. It would only make sense if Alfaro wanted to feign
being a witness to something she did not see.

Five. Alfaro went out of the house to smoke at the garden. After about twenty minutes, a woman
exclaimed, "Sino yan?" On hearing this, Alfaro immediately walked out of the garden and went to her
car. Apparently, she did this because she knew they came on a sly. Someone other than Carmela
became conscious of the presence of Webb and others in the house. Alfaro walked away because,
obviously, she did not want to get involved in a potential confrontation. This was supposedly her frame
of mind: fear of getting involved in what was not her business.

But if that were the case, how could she testify based on personal knowledge of what went on in the
house? Alfaro had to change that frame of mind to one of boldness and reckless curiosity. So that is
what she next claimed. She went back into the house to watch as Webb raped Carmela on the floor of
the master’s bedroom. He had apparently stabbed to death Carmela’s mom and her young sister
whose bloodied bodies were sprawled on the bed. Now, Alfaro testified that she got scared (another
shift to fear) for she hurriedly got out of the house after Webb supposedly gave her a meaningful look.

Alfaro quickly went to her car, not minding Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart who
sat on the car or milled on the sidewalk. She did not speak to them, even to Estrada, her boyfriend. She
entered her car and turned on the engine but she testified that she did not know where to go. This
woman who a few minutes back led Webb, Lejano, and Ventura into the house, knowing that they
were decided to rape and harm Carmela, was suddenly too shocked to know where to go! This
emotional pendulum swing indicates a witness who was confused with her own lies.

4. The supposed corroborations

Intending to provide corroboration to Alfaro’s testimony, the prosecution presented six additional
witnesses:
Dr. Prospero A. Cabanayan, the NBI Medico-Legal Officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims,
testified on the stab wounds they sustained14 and the presence of semen in Carmela’s
genitalia,15 indicating that she had been raped.

Normal E. White, Jr., was the security guard on duty at Pitong Daan Subdivision from 7 p.m. of June 29
to 7 a.m. of June 30, 1991. He got a report on the morning of June 30 that something untoward
happened at the Vizconde residence. He went there and saw the dead bodies in the master’s bedroom,
the bag on the dining table, as well as the loud noise emanating from a television set. 16

White claimed that he noticed Gatchalian and his companions, none of whom he could identify, go in
and out of Pitong Daan Subdivision. He also saw them along Vinzons Street. Later, they entered Pitong
Daan Subdivision in a three-car convoy. White could not, however, describe the kind of vehicles they
used or recall the time when he saw the group in those two instances. And he did not notice anything
suspicious about their coming and going.

But White’s testimony cannot be relied on. His initial claim turned out to be inaccurate. He actually saw
Gatchalian and his group enter the Pitong Daan Subdivision only once. They were not going in and out.
Furthermore, Alfaro testified that when the convoy of cars went back the second time in the direction
of Carmela’s house, she alone entered the subdivision and passed the guardhouse without stopping.
Yet, White who supposedly manned that guardhouse did not notice her.

Surprisingly, White failed to note Biong, a police officer, entering or exiting the subdivision on the early
morning of June 30 when he supposedly "cleaned up" Vizconde residence on Webb’s orders. What is
more, White did not notice Carmela arrive with her mom before Alfaro’s first visit that night. Carmela
supposedly left with a male companion in her car at around 10:30 p.m. but White did not notice it. He
also did not notice Carmela reenter the subdivision. White actually discredited Alfaro’s testimony
about the movements of the persons involved.

Further, while Alfaro testified that it was the Mazda pick-up driven by Filart that led the three-vehicle
convoy,17 White claimed it was the Nissan Patrol with Gatchalian on it that led the convoy since he
would not have let the convoy in without ascertaining that Gatchalian, a resident, was in it. Security
guard White did not, therefore, provide corroboration to Alfaro’s testimony.1avvphi1

Justo Cabanacan, the security supervisor at Pitong Daan Subdivision testified that he saw Webb
around the last week of May or the first week of June 1991 to prove his presence in the Philippines
when he claimed to be in the United States. He was manning the guard house at the entrance of the
subdivision of Pitong Daan when he flagged down a car driven by Webb. Webb said that he would see
Lilet Sy. Cabanacan asked him for an ID but he pointed to his United BF Homes sticker and said that he
resided there. Cabanacan replied, however, that Pitong Daan had a local sticker.

Cabanacan testified that, at this point, Webb introduced himself as the son of Congressman Webb.
Still, the supervisor insisted on seeing his ID. Webb grudgingly gave it and after seeing the picture and
the name on it, Cabanacan returned the same and allowed Webb to pass without being logged in as
their Standard Operating Procedure required.18

But Cabanacan's testimony could not be relied on. Although it was not common for a security guard to
challenge a Congressman’s son with such vehemence, Cabanacan did not log the incident on the
guardhouse book. Nor did he, contrary to prescribed procedure, record the visitor’s entry into the
subdivision. It did not make sense that Cabanacan was strict in the matter of seeing Webb’s ID but not
in recording the visit.

Mila Gaviola used to work as laundry woman for the Webbs at their house at BF Homes Executive
Village. She testified that she saw Webb at his parents’ house on the morning of June 30, 1991 when
she got the dirty clothes from the room that he and two brothers occupied at about 4.a.m. She saw
him again pacing the floor at 9 a.m. At about 1 p.m., Webb left the house in t-shirt and shorts, passing
through a secret door near the maid’s quarters on the way out. Finally, she saw Webb at 4 p.m. of the
same day.19

On cross-examination, however, Gaviola could not say what distinguished June 30, 1991 from the other
days she was on service at the Webb household as to enable her to distinctly remember, four years
later, what one of the Webb boys did and at what time. She could not remember any of the details that
happened in the household on the other days. She proved to have a selective photographic memory
and this only damaged her testimony.

Gaviola tried to corroborate Alfaro’'s testimony by claiming that on June 30, 1991 she noticed
bloodstains on Webb's t-shirt.20 She did not call the attention of anybody in the household about it
when it would have been a point of concern that Webb may have been hurt, hence the blood.

Besides, Victoria Ventoso, the Webbs' housemaid from March 1989 to May 1992, and Sgt. Miguel
Muñoz, the Webbs' security aide in 1991, testified that Gaviola worked for the Webbs only from
January 1991 to April 1991. Ventoso further testified that it was not Gaviola's duty to collect the
clothes from the 2nd floor bedrooms, this being the work of the housemaid charged with cleaning the
rooms.

What is more, it was most unlikely for a laundrywoman who had been there for only four months to
collect, as she claimed, the laundry from the rooms of her employers and their grown up children at
four in the morning while they were asleep.

And it did not make sense, if Alfaro’s testimony were to be believed that Webb, who was so careful
and clever that he called Biong to go to the Vizconde residence at 2 a.m. to clean up the evidence
against him and his group, would bring his bloodied shirt home and put it in the hamper for
laundrywoman Gaviola to collect and wash at 4 a.m. as was her supposed habit.

Lolita De Birrer was accused Biong’s girlfriend around the time the Vizconde massacre took place.
Birrer testified that she was with Biong playing mahjong from the evening of June 29, 1991 to the early
morning of June 30, when Biong got a call at around 2 a.m. This prompted him, according to De Birrer,
to leave and go to BF. Someone sitting at the backseat of a taxi picked him up. When Biong returned at
7 a.m. he washed off what looked like dried blood from his fingernails. And he threw away a foul-
smelling handkerchief. She also saw Biong take out a knife with aluminum cover from his drawer and
hid it in his steel cabinet.21

The security guard at Pitong Daan did not notice any police investigator flashing a badge to get into the
village although Biong supposedly came in at the unholy hour of two in the morning. His departure
before 7 a.m. also remained unnoticed by the subdivision guards. Besides, if he had cleaned up the
crime scene shortly after midnight, what was the point of his returning there on the following morning
to dispose of some of the evidence in the presence of other police investigators and on-lookers? In
fact, why would he steal valuable items from the Vizconde residence on his return there hours later if
he had the opportunity to do it earlier?

At most, Birrer’s testimony only established Biong’s theft of certain items from the Vizconde residence
and gross neglect for failing to maintain the sanctity of the crime scene by moving around and altering
the effects of the crime. Birrer’s testimony failed to connect Biong's acts to Webb and the other
accused.

Lauro Vizconde testified about how deeply he was affected by the loss of her wife and two daughters.
Carmella spoke to him of a rejected suitor she called "Bagyo," because he was a Parañaque politician’s
son. Unfortunately, Lauro did not appear curious enough to insist on finding out who the rejected
fellow was. Besides, his testimony contradicts that of Alfaro who testified that Carmela and Webb had
an on-going relation. Indeed, if Alfaro were to be believed, Carmela wanted Webb to come to her
house around midnight. She even left the kitchen door open so he could enter the house.

5. The missing corroboration

There is something truly remarkable about this case: the prosecution’s core theory that Carmela and
Webb had been sweethearts, that she had been unfaithful to him, and that it was for this reason that
Webb brought his friends to her house to gang-rape her is totally uncorroborated!

For instance, normally, if Webb, a Congressman’s son, courted the young Carmela, that would be news
among her circle of friends if not around town. But, here, none of her friends or even those who knew
either of them came forward to affirm this. And if Webb hanged around with her, trying to win her
favors, he would surely be seen with her. And this would all the more be so if they had become
sweethearts, a relation that Alfaro tried to project with her testimony.

But, except for Alfaro, the NBI asset, no one among Carmela’s friends or her friends’ friends would
testify ever hearing of such relationship or ever seeing them together in some popular hangouts in
Parañaque or Makati. Alfaro’s claim of a five-hour drama is like an alien page, rudely and
unconnectedly inserted into Webb and Carmela’s life stories or like a piece of jigsaw puzzle trimmed to
fit into the shape on the board but does not belong because it clashes with the surrounding pieces. It
has neither antecedent nor concomitant support in the verifiable facts of their personal histories. It is
quite unreal.

What is more, Alfaro testified that she saw Carmela drive out of her house with a male passenger, Mr.
X, whom Alfaro thought the way it looked was also Carmela’s lover. This was the all-important reason
Webb supposedly had for wanting to harm her. Again, none of Carmela’s relatives, friends, or people
who knew her ever testified about the existence of Mr.X in her life. Nobody has come forward to
testify having ever seen him with Carmela. And despite the gruesome news about her death and how
Mr. X had played a role in it, he never presented himself like anyone who had lost a special friend
normally would. Obviously, Mr. X did not exist, a mere ghost of the imagination of Alfaro, the woman
who made a living informing on criminals.

Webb’s U.S. Alibi

Among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi.

a. The travel preparations

Webb claims that in 1991 his parents, Senator Freddie Webb and his wife, Elizabeth, sent their son to
the United States (U.S.) to learn the value of independence, hard work, and money. 22 Gloria Webb, his
aunt, accompanied him. Rajah Tours booked their flight to San Francisco via United Airlines. Josefina
Nolasco of Rajah Tours confirmed that Webb and his aunt used their plane tickets.

Webb told his friends, including his neighbor, Jennifer Claire Cabrera, and his basketball buddy, Joselito
Orendain Escobar, of his travel plans. He even invited them to his despedida party on March 8, 1991 at
Faces Disco along Makati Ave.23 On March 8,1991, the eve of his departure, he took girlfriend Milagros
Castillo to a dinner at Bunchums at the Makati Cinema Square. His basketball buddy Rafael Jose with
Tina Calma, a blind date arranged by Webb, joined them. They afterwards went to Faces Disco for
Webb's despedida party. Among those present were his friends Paulo Santos and Jay Ortega. 24

b. The two immigration checks

The following day, March 9, 1991, Webb left for San Francisco, California, with his Aunt Gloria on board
United Airlines Flight 808.25 Before boarding his plane, Webb passed through the Philippine
Immigration booth at the airport to have his passport cleared and stamped. Immigration Officer,
Ferdinand Sampol checked Webb’s visa, stamped, and initialed his passport, and let him pass
through.26 He was listed on the United Airlines Flight’s Passenger Manifest. 27

On arrival at San Francisco, Webb went through the U.S. Immigration where his entry into that country
was recorded. Thus, the U.S. Immigration Naturalization Service, checking with its Non-immigrant
Information System, confirmed Webb's entry into the U.S. on March 9, 1991. Webb presented at the
trial the INS Certification issued by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 28 the computer-
generated print-out of the US-INS indicating Webb's entry on March 9, 1991, 29 and the US-INS
Certification dated August 31, 1995, authenticated by the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs,
correcting an earlier August 10, 1995 Certification. 30

c. Details of U.S. sojourn

In San Francisco, Webb and his aunt Gloria were met by the latter’s daughter, Maria Teresa Keame,
who brought them to Gloria’s house in Daly City, California. During his stay with his aunt, Webb met
Christopher Paul Legaspi Esguerra, Gloria’s grandson. In April 1991, Webb, Christopher, and a certain
Daphne Domingo watched the concert of Deelite Band in San Francisco. 31 In the same month, Dorothy
Wheelock and her family invited Webb to Lake Tahoe to return the Webbs’ hospitality when she was in
the Philippines.32

In May 1991, on invitation of another aunt, Susan Brottman, Webb moved to Anaheim Hills,
California.33 During his stay there, he occupied himself with playing basketball once or twice a week
with Steven Keeler34 and working at his cousin-in-law’s pest control company. 35 Webb presented the
company’s logbook showing the tasks he performed,36 his paycheck,37 his ID, and other employment
papers. On June 14, 1991 he applied for a driver's license 38 and wrote three letters to his friend Jennifer
Cabrera.39

On June 28, 1991, Webb’s parents visited him at Anaheim and stayed with the Brottmans. On the same
day, his father introduced Honesto Aragon to his son when he came to visit.40 On the following day,
June 29, Webb, in the company of his father and Aragon went to Riverside, California, to look for a car.
They bought an MR2 Toyota car.41 Later that day, a visitor at the Brottman’s, Louis Whittacker, saw
Webb looking at the plates of his new car.42 To prove the purchase, Webb presented the Public Records
of California Department of Motor Vehicle43 and a car plate "LEW WEBB."44 In using the car in the U.S.,
Webb even received traffic citations.45

On June 30, 1991 Webb, again accompanied by his father and Aragon, 46 bought a bicycle at Orange
Cycle Center.47 The Center issued Webb a receipt dated June 30, 1991. 48 On July 4, 1991, Independence
Day, the Webbs, the Brottmans, and the Vaca family had a lakeside picnic. 49

Webb stayed with the Brottmans until mid July and rented a place for less than a month. On August 4,
1991 he left for Longwood, Florida, to stay with the spouses Jack and Sonja Rodriguez. 50 There, he met
Armando Rodriguez with whom he spent time, playing basketball on weekends, watching movies, and
playing billiards.51 In November 1991, Webb met performing artist Gary Valenciano, a friend of Jack
Rodriguez, who was invited for a dinner at the Rodriguez’s house.52 He left the Rodriguez’s home in
August 1992, returned to Anaheim and stayed with his aunt Imelda Pagaspas. He stayed there until he
left for the Philippines on October 26, 1992.

d. The second immigration checks

As with his trip going to the U.S., Webb also went through both the U.S. and Philippine immigrations on
his return trip. Thus, his departure from the U.S. was confirmed by the same certifications that
confirmed his entry.53 Furthermore, a Diplomatic Note of the U.S. Department of State with enclosed
letter from Acting Director Debora A. Farmer of the Records Operations, Office of Records of the US-
INS stated that the Certification dated August 31, 1995 is a true and accurate statement. And when he
boarded his plane, the Passenger Manifest of Philippine Airlines Flight No. 103, 54 certified by Agnes
Tabuena55 confirmed his return trip.

When he arrived in Manila, Webb again went through the Philippine Immigration. In fact, the arrival
stamp and initial on his passport indicated his return to Manila on October 27, 1992. This was
authenticated by Carmelita Alipio, the immigration officer who processed Webb’s reentry. 56 Upon his
return, in October 1992, Paolo Santos, Joselito Erondain Escobar, and Rafael Jose once again saw Webb
playing basketball at the BF's Phase III basketball court.

e. Alibi versus positive identification

The trial court and the Court of Appeals are one in rejecting as weak Webb’s alibi. Their reason is
uniform: Webb’s alibi cannot stand against Alfaro’s positive identification of him as the rapist and killer
of Carmela and, apparently, the killer as well of her mother and younger sister. Because of this, to the
lower courts, Webb’s denial and alibi were fabricated.

But not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated. Indeed, if the accused is truly innocent,
he can have no other defense but denial and alibi. So how can such accused penetrate a mind that has
been made cynical by the rule drilled into his head that a defense of alibi is a hangman’s noose in the
face of a witness positively swearing, "I saw him do it."? Most judges believe that such assertion
automatically dooms an alibi which is so easy to fabricate. This quick stereotype thinking, however, is
distressing. For how else can the truth that the accused is really innocent have any chance of prevailing
over such a stone-cast tenet?

There is only one way. A judge must keep an open mind. He must guard against slipping into hasty
conclusion, often arising from a desire to quickly finish the job of deciding a case. A positive declaration
from a witness that he saw the accused commit the crime should not automatically cancel out the
accused’s claim that he did not do it. A lying witness can make as positive an identification as a truthful
witness can. The lying witness can also say as forthrightly and unequivocally, "He did it!" without
blinking an eye.

Rather, to be acceptable, the positive identification must meet at least two criteria:

First, the positive identification of the offender must come from a credible witness. She is credible who
can be trusted to tell the truth, usually based on past experiences with her. Her word has, to one who
knows her, its weight in gold.

And second, the witness’ story of what she personally saw must be believable, not inherently
contrived. A witness who testifies about something she never saw runs into inconsistencies and makes
bewildering claims.

Here, as already fully discussed above, Alfaro and her testimony fail to meet the above criteria.

She did not show up at the NBI as a spontaneous witness bothered by her conscience. She had been
hanging around that agency for sometime as a stool pigeon, one paid for mixing up with criminals and
squealing on them. Police assets are often criminals themselves. She was the prosecution’s worst
possible choice for a witness. Indeed, her superior testified that she volunteered to play the role of a
witness in the Vizconde killings when she could not produce a man she promised to the NBI.

And, although her testimony included details, Alfaro had prior access to the details that the
investigators knew of the case. She took advantage of her familiarity with these details to include in
her testimony the clearly incompatible act of Webb hurling a stone at the front door glass frames even
when they were trying to slip away quietly—just so she can accommodate this crime scene feature.
She also had Ventura rummaging a bag on the dining table for a front door key that nobody needed
just to explain the physical evidence of that bag and its scattered contents. And she had Ventura
climbing the car’s hood, risking being seen in such an awkward position, when they did not need to
darken the garage to force open the front door—just so to explain the darkened light and foot prints
on the car hood.

Further, her testimony was inherently incredible. Her story that Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada,
Rodriguez, and Filart agreed to take their turns raping Carmela is incongruent with their indifference,
exemplified by remaining outside the house, milling under a street light, visible to neighbors and
passersby, and showing no interest in the developments inside the house, like if it was their turn to
rape Carmela. Alfaro’s story that she agreed to serve as Webb’s messenger to Carmela, using up her
gas, and staying with him till the bizarre end when they were practically strangers, also taxes
incredulity.

To provide basis for Webb’s outrage, Alfaro said that she followed Carmela to the main road to watch
her let off a lover on Aguirre Avenue. And, inexplicably, although Alfaro had only played the role of
messenger, she claimed leading Webb, Lejano, and Ventura into the house to gang-rape Carmella, as if
Alfaro was establishing a reason for later on testifying on personal knowledge. Her swing from an
emotion of fear when a woman woke up to their presence in the house and of absolute courage when
she nonetheless returned to become the lone witness to a grim scene is also quite inexplicable.
Ultimately, Alfaro’s quality as a witness and her inconsistent, if not inherently unbelievable, testimony
cannot be the positive identification that jurisprudence acknowledges as sufficient to jettison a denial
and an alibi.

f. A documented alibi

To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence 57 that (a) he was
present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. 58

The courts below held that, despite his evidence, Webb was actually in Parañaque when the Vizconde
killings took place; he was not in the U.S. from March 9, 1991 to October 27, 1992; and if he did leave
on March 9, 1991, he actually returned before June 29, 1991, committed the crime, erased the fact of
his return to the Philippines from the records of the U.S. and Philippine Immigrations, smuggled
himself out of the Philippines and into the U.S., and returned the normal way on October 27, 1992. But
this ruling practically makes the death of Webb and his passage into the next life the only acceptable
alibi in the Philippines. Courts must abandon this unjust and inhuman paradigm.

If one is cynical about the Philippine system, he could probably claim that Webb, with his father’s
connections, can arrange for the local immigration to put a March 9, 1991 departure stamp on his
passport and an October 27, 1992 arrival stamp on the same. But this is pure speculation since there
had been no indication that such arrangement was made. Besides, how could Webb fix a foreign
airlines’ passenger manifest, officially filed in the Philippines and at the airport in the U.S. that had his
name on them? How could Webb fix with the U.S. Immigration’s record system those two dates in its
record of his travels as well as the dates when he supposedly departed in secret from the U.S. to
commit the crime in the Philippines and then return there? No one has come up with a logical and
plausible answer to these questions.

The Court of Appeals rejected the evidence of Webb’s passport since he did not leave the original to be
attached to the record. But, while the best evidence of a document is the original, this means that the
same is exhibited in court for the adverse party to examine and for the judge to see. As Court of
Appeals Justice Tagle said in his dissent,59 the practice when a party does not want to leave an
important document with the trial court is to have a photocopy of it marked as exhibit and stipulated
among the parties as a faithful reproduction of the original. Stipulations in the course of trial are
binding on the parties and on the court.

The U.S. Immigration certification and the computer print-out of Webb’s arrival in and departure from
that country were authenticated by no less than the Office of the U.S. Attorney General and the State
Department. Still the Court of Appeals refused to accept these documents for the reason that Webb
failed to present in court the immigration official who prepared the same. But this was unnecessary.
Webb’s passport is a document issued by the Philippine government, which under international
practice, is the official record of travels of the citizen to whom it is issued. The entries in that passport
are presumed true.60

The U.S. Immigration certification and computer print-out, the official certifications of which have been
authenticated by the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, merely validated the arrival and
departure stamps of the U.S. Immigration office on Webb’s passport. They have the same evidentiary
value. The officers who issued these certifications need not be presented in court to testify on them.
Their trustworthiness arises from the sense of official duty and the penalty attached to a breached
duty, in the routine and disinterested origin of such statement and in the publicity of the record. 61

The Court of Appeals of course makes capital of the fact that an earlier certification from the U.S.
Immigration office said that it had no record of Webb entering the U.S. But that erroneous first
certification was amply explained by the U.S. Government and Court of Appeals Justice Tagle stated it
in his dissenting opinion, thus:

While it is true that an earlier Certification was issued by the U.S. INS on August 16, 1995 finding "no
evidence of lawful admission of Webb," this was already clarified and deemed erroneous by no less
than the US INS Officials. As explained by witness Leo Herrera-Lim, Consul and Second Secretary of the
Philippine Embassy in Washington D.C., said Certification did not pass through proper diplomatic
channels and was obtained in violation of the rules on protocol and standard procedure governing such
request.

The initial request was merely initiated by BID Commissioner Verceles who directly communicated with
the Philippine Consulate in San Francisco, USA, bypassing the Secretary of Foreign Affairs which is the
proper protocol procedure. Mr. Steven Bucher, the acting Chief of the Records Services Board of US-
INS Washington D.C. in his letter addressed to Philip Antweiler, Philippine Desk Officer, State
Department, declared the earlier Certification as incorrect and erroneous as it was "not exhaustive and
did not reflect all available information." Also, Richard L. Huff, Co-Director of the Office of Information
and privacy, US Department of Justice, in response to the appeal raised by Consul General Teresita V.
Marzan, explained that "the INS normally does not maintain records on individuals who are entering
the country as visitors rather than as immigrants: and that a notation concerning the entry of a visitor
may be made at the Nonimmigrant Information system. Since appellant Webb entered the U.S. on a
mere tourist visa, obviously, the initial search could not have produced the desired result inasmuch as
the data base that was looked into contained entries of the names of IMMIGRANTS and not that of
NON-IMMIGRANT visitors of the U.S..62

The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked cynicism over the accuracy of travel
documents like the passport as well as the domestic and foreign records of departures and arrivals
from airports. They claim that it would not have been impossible for Webb to secretly return to the
Philippines after he supposedly left it on March 9, 1991, commit the crime, go back to the U.S., and
openly return to the Philippines again on October 26, 1992. Travel between the U.S. and the
Philippines, said the lower courts took only about twelve to fourteen hours.

If the Court were to subscribe to this extremely skeptical view, it might as well tear the rules of
evidence out of the law books and regard suspicions, surmises, or speculations as reasons for
impeaching evidence. It is not that official records, which carry the presumption of truth of what they
state, are immune to attack. They are not. That presumption can be overcome by evidence. Here,
however, the prosecution did not bother to present evidence to impeach the entries in Webb’s
passport and the certifications of the Philippine and U.S.’ immigration services regarding his travel to
the U.S. and back. The prosecution’s rebuttal evidence is the fear of the unknown that it planted in the
lower court’s minds.

7. Effect of Webb’s alibi to others

Webb’s documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not only with respect to him, but
also with respect to Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if the Court
accepts the proposition that Webb was in the U.S. when the crime took place, Alfaro’s testimony will
not hold together. Webb’s participation is the anchor of Alfaro’s story. Without it, the evidence against
the others must necessarily fall.

CONCLUSION

In our criminal justice system, what is important is, not whether the court entertains doubts about the
innocence of the accused since an open mind is willing to explore all possibilities, but whether it
entertains a reasonable, lingering doubt as to his guilt. For, it would be a serious mistake to send an
innocent man to jail where such kind of doubt hangs on to one’s inner being, like a piece of meat
lodged immovable between teeth.

Will the Court send the accused to spend the rest of their lives in prison on the testimony of an NBI
asset who proposed to her handlers that she take the role of the witness to the Vizconde massacre
that she could not produce?

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated December 15, 2005 and
Resolution dated January 26, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 00336 and ACQUITS
accused-appellants Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio
Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada and Gerardo Biong of the crimes of which they were
charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They are ordered
immediately RELEASED from detention unless they are confined for another lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for
immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to report the action
he has taken to this Court within five days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
April 18, 2017
G.R. No. 220598
GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN, (First Division), Respondents
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN,, J.:

On July 19, 2016, the Court promulgated its decision, disposing:

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions for certiorari; ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the resolutions

issued in Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 by the Sandiganbayan on April 6, 2015 and September 10,
2015; GRANTS the petitioners' respective demurrers to evidence; DISMISSES Criminal Case No. SB-12-
CRM-0174 as to the petitioners GLORIAMACAPAGAL-ARROYO and BENIGNOAGUAS for insufficiency
of evidence; ORDERS the immediate release from detention of said petitioners; and MAKES no
pronouncements on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED. 1

On August 3, 2016, the State, through the Office of the Ombudsman, has moved for the
reconsideration of the decision, submitting that:

I. THIS HONORABLE COURT'S GIVING DUE COURSE TO A CERTIORARI ACTION ASSAILING AN

INTERLOCUTORY ORDER DENYING DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE VIOLA TES RULE 119, SECTION 23 OF
THE RULES OF COURT, WHICH PROVIDES THAT AN ORDER DENYING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
SHALL NOT BE REVIEWABLE BY APPEAL OR BY CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERRORS WHICH AMOUNT TO A VIOLATION OR
DEPRIVATION OF THE STATE'S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

A. THE DECISION REQUIRES ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS IN THE PROSECUTION OF

PLUNDER, VIZ. IDENTIFICATION OF THE MAIN PLUNDERER AND PERSONAL BENEFIT TO
HIM/HER, BOTH OF WHICH ARE NOT PROVIDED IN THE TEXT OF REPUBLIC ACT (R.A.) NO.
7080.

B. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION WAS NOT FULLY TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE IRREGULARITIES IN THE CONFIDENTIAL/INTELLIGENCE
FUND (CIF) DISBURSEMENT PROCESS, QUESTIONABLE PRACTICE OF CO-MINGLING OF
FUNDS AND AGUAS' REPORTS TO THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA) THAT BULK OF THE
PHP365,997,915.00 WITHDRAWN FROM THE PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE'S
(PCSO) CIF WERE DIVERTED TO THE ARROYO-HEADED OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT.

C. ARROYO AND AGUAS, BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION, IN CONSPIRACY WITH THEIR

COACCUSED IN SB-12-CRM-0174, COMMITTED PLUNDER VIA· A COMPLEX ILLEGAL SCHEME
WHICH DEFRAUDED PCSO IN HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF PESOS.

D. EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE ELEMENTS OF PLUNDER WERE NOT PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT, THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PEOPLE SHOWS, BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT, THAT ARROYO, AGUAS AND THEIR COACCUSED IN SB-12-CRM-0174
ARE GUILTY OF MALVERSATION.2

In contrast, the petitioners submit that the decision has effectively barred the consideration and
granting of the motion for reconsideration of the State because doing so would amount to the re-
prosecution or revival of the charge against them despite their acquittal, and would thereby violate the
constitutional proscription against double jeopardy.

Petitioner Gloria M. Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) points out that the State miserably failed to prove
the corpus delicti of plunder; that the Court correctly required the identification of the main plunderer
as well as personal benefit on the part of the raider of the public treasury to enable the successful
prosecution of the crime of plunder; that the State did not prove the conspiracy that justified her
inclusion in the charge; that to sustain the case for malversation against her, in lieu of plunder, would
violate her right to be informed of the accusation against her because the information did not
necessarily include the crime of malversation; and that even if the information did so, the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy already barred the re-opening of the case for that
purpose.

Petitioner Benigno B. Aguas echoes the contentions of Arroyo in urging the Com1 to deny the motion
for reconsideration.

In reply, the State avers that the prohibition against double jeopardy does not apply because it was
denied its day in court, thereby rendering the decision void; that the Court should re-examine the facts
and pieces of evidence in order to find the petitioners guilty as charged; and that the allegations of the
information sufficiently included all that was necessary to fully inform the petitioners of the
accusations against them.

Ruling of the Court

The Court DENIES the motion for reconsideration for its lack of merit.

To start with, the State argues' that the consolidated petitions for certiorari were improper remedies in
light of Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibiting the review of the denial of their
demurrer prior to the judgment in the case either by appeal or by certiorari; that the Court has thereby
limited its own power, which should necessarily prevent the giving of due course to the petitions
for certiorari, as well as the undoing of the order denying the petitioners' demurrer to evidence; that
the proper remedy under the Rules of Court was for the petitioners to proceed to trial and to present
their evidence-in-chief thereat; and that even if there had been grave abuse of discretion attending the
denial, the Court's certiorari powers should be exercised only upon the petitioners' compliance with
the stringent requirements of Rule 65, particularly with the requirement that there be no plain, speedy
or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, which they did not establish.

Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, pertinently provides:

Section 23. Demurrer to evidence. – xxx

xxxx

The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself
shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment. (n)

The argument of the State, which is really a repetition of its earlier submission, was squarely resolved
in the decision, as follows:

The Court holds that it should take cognizance of the petitions for certiorari because
the Sandiganbayan, as shall shortly be demonstrated, gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.

The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an interlocutory order issued
by the trial court because of the availability of another remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that "the order denying the
motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by
appeal or by certiorari before judgment." It is not an insuperable obstacle to this action, however, that
the denial of the demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was an interlocutory order that did not
terminate the proceedings, and the proper recourse of the demurring accused was to go to trial, and
that in case of their conviction they may then appeal the conviction, and assign the denial as among
the errors to be reviewed. Indeed, it is doctrinal that the situations in which the writ of certiorari may
issue should not be limited, because to do so -

x x x would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the discretion of the com1
that authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition
or mandamus. In the exercise of oursuperintending control over other courts, we are to be guided by
all the circumstances of each particular case 'as the ends of justice may require.' So it is that the writ
will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.

The Constitution itself has imposed upon the Court and the other courts of justice the duty to correct
errors of jurisdiction as a result of capricious, arbitrary, whimsical and despotic exercise of discretion by
expressly incorporating in Section 1 of Article VIII the following provision:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure to the contrary or for the sake of the
convenience of one side. This is because the Court has the bounden constitutional duty to strike
down grave abuse of discretion whenever and wherever it is committed. Thus, notwithstanding the
interlocutory character and effect of the denial of the demurrers to evidence, the petitioners as the
accused could avail themselves of the remedy of certiorari when the denial was tainted with grave
abuse of discretion. As we shall soon show, the Sandiganbayan as the trial court was guilty of grave
abuse of discretion when it capriciously denied the demurrers to evidence despite the absence of
competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment for plunder, and despite the absence of
the factual bases to expect a guilty verdict.3

We reiterate the foregoing resolution, and stress that the prohibition contained in Section 23, Rule 119
of the Rules of Court is not an insuperable obstacle to the review by the Court of the denial of the
demurrer to evidence through certiorari. We have had many rulings to that effect in the past. For
instance, in Nicolas v. Sandiganbayan,4the Court expressly ruled that the petition for certiorari was the
proper remedy to assail the denial of the demurrer to evidence that was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion or excess of jurisdiction, or oppressive exercise of judicial authority.

Secondly, the State submits that its right to due process was violated because the decision imposed
additional elements for plunder that neither ' Republic Act No. 7080 nor jurisprudence had theretofore
required, i.e., the identification of the main plunderer, and personal benefit on the part of the accused
committing the predicate crime of raid on the public treasury. The State complains that it was not
given the opportunity to establish such additional elements; that the imposition of new elements
fu1iher amounted to judicial legislation in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; that the
Court nitpicked on the different infirmities of the information despite the issue revolving only around
the sufficiency of the evidence; and that it established all the elements of plunder beyond reasonable
doubt.
The State cites the plain meaning rule to highlight that the crime of plunder did not require personal
benefit on the part of the raider of the public treasury. It insists that the definition of raids on the
public treasury, conformably with the plain meaning rule, is the taking of public money through
fraudulent or unlawful means, and such definition does not require enjoyment or personal benefit on
the part of plunderer or on the part of any of his co-conspirators for them to be convicted for plunder.

The submissions of the State are unfounded.

The requirements for the identification of the main plunderer and for personal benefit in the predicate
act of raids on the public treasury have been written in R.A. No. 7080 itself as well as embedded in
pertinent jurisprudence. This we made clear in the decision, as follows:

A perusal of the information suggests that what the Prosecution sought to show was an implied
conspiracy to commit plunder among all of the accused on the basis of their collective actions prior to,
during and after the implied agreement. It is notable that the Prosecution did not allege that the
conspiracy among all of the accused was by express agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or a chain
conspiracy.

This was another fatal flaw of the Prosecution.

In its present version, under which the petitioners were charged, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080
(Plunder Law) states:

Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder: Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate
amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (₱50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of
plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the
said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be
punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the
attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall
be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and
other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or
investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State. [As Amended by Section 12, Republic Act No. 7659
(The Death Penalty Law)]

Section l(d) of Republic Act No. 7080 provides:

Section 1. Definition of terms. - As used in this Act, the term:

xxxx

d. "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any
person within the purview of Section two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through
dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of
the following means or similar schemes:
 1. Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on
the public treasury;

2. By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or

any/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office
or position of the public officer concerned;

3. By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National

Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;

4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any
other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any
business enterprise or undertaking;

5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations

and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special
interests; or

6. By taking undue advantage of official positi0n, authority, relationship, connection or

influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and
prejudice

The law on plunder requires that a particular public officer must be identified as the one who
amassed, acquired or accumulated ill-gotten wealth because it plainly states that plunder is
committed by any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of at least
₱50,000,000.00 through a combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in Section l(d)
hereof. Surely, the law requires in the criminal charge for plunder against several individuals that
there must be a main plunderer and her co-conspirators, who may be members of her family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordim1tes or other persons. In other
words, the allegation of the wheel conspiracy or express conspiracy in the information was
appropriate because the main plunderer would then be identified in either manner. Of course,
implied conspiracy could also identify the main plunderer, but that fact must be properly alleged and
duly proven by the Prosecution.

This interpretation is supported by Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, where the Court explained the nature of
the conspiracy charge and the necessity for the main plunderer for whose benefit the amassment,
accumulation and acquisition was made, thus:

There is no denying the fact that the "plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the
national economy" is made up of a complex and manifold network of crimes. In the crime of plunder,
therefore, different parties may be united by a common purpose. In the case at bar, the different
accused and their different criminal acts have a commonality - to help the former President amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged
the different participation of each accused in the conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy charge,
therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive protection money from illegal gambling, that
each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS
to purchase shares of Belle Corporation and receive commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly
enriched himself from commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their
individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and
acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former President Estrada. 5 [bold underscoring supplied
for emphasis]

Indeed, because plunder is a crime that only a public official can commit by amassing, accumulating, or
acquiring ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of at least ₱50,000,000.00, the
identification in the information of such public official as the main plunderer among the several
individuals thus charged is logically necessary under the law itself. In particular reference to Criminal
Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174, the individuals charged therein - including the petitioners - were 10 public
officials; hence, it was only proper to identify the main plunderer or plunderers among the 10
accused who herself or himself had amassed, accumulated, or acquired ill-gotten wealth with the total
value of at least ₱50,000,000.00.

The phrase raids on the public treasury as used in Section 1 (d) of R. A. No. 7080 is itself ambiguous. In
order to ascertain the objective meaning of the phrase, the act of raiding the public treasury cannot be
divided into parts. This is to differentiate the predicate act of raids on the public treasury from other
offenses involving property, like robbery, theft, or estafa. Considering that R.A. No. 7080 does not
expressly define this predicate act, the Court has necessarily resorted to statutory construction. In so
doing, the Court did not adopt the State's submission that personal benefit on the part of the accused
need not be alleged and shown because doing so would have defeated the clear intent of the law
itself,6 which was to punish the amassing, accumulating, or acquiring of ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount or total value of at least ₱150,000,000.00 by any combination or series of acts of
misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury.

As the decision has observed, the rules of statutory construction as well as the deliberations of
Congress indicated the intent of Congress to require personal benefit for the predicate act of raids on
the public treasury, viz.:

The phrase raids on the public treasury is found in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080, which provides:

Section l .Definition of Terms. – xxx

xxxx
d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, prope1iy, business enterprise or material possession of any
person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through
dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of
the following means or similar schemes:
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public
treasury;
xxxx
To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public treasury, the key is to look at the
accompanying words: misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds. This
process is conformable with the maxim of statutory construction noscitur a sociis, by which the
correct construction of a particular word or phrase that is ambiguous in itself or is equally
susceptible of various meanings may be made by considering the company of the words in which the
word or phrase is found or with which it is associated. Verily, a word or phrase in a statute is always
used in association with other words or phrases, and its meaning may, therefore, be modified or
restricted by the latter.
To convert connotes the act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own; to
misappropriate means to own, to take something for one's own benefit; misuse means "a good,
substance, privilege, or right used improperly, unforcsccably, or not as intended;"
and malversation occurs when "any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is
accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or
shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public
funds, or property, wholly or partially." The common thread that binds all the four terms together is
that the public officer used the property taken. Considering that raids on the public treasury is in the
company of the four other terms that require the use of the property taken, the phrase raids on the
public treasury similarly requires such use of the property taken. Accordingly,
the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in contending that the mere accumulation and gathering constituted
the forbidden act of raids on the public treasury. Pursuant to the maxim of noscitur a sociis, raids on
the public treasury requires the raider to use the property taken impliedly for his personal benefit. 7

The Prosecution asserts that the Senate deliberations removed personal benefit as a requirement for
plunder. In not requiring personal benefit, the Sandiganbayan quoted the following exchanges
between Senator Enrile and Senator Tafiada, viz.:

Senator Enrile. The word here, Mr. President, "such public officer or person who conspired or
knowingly benefited". One does not have to conspire or rescheme. The only element needed is that
he "knowingly benefited". A candidate for the Senate for instance, who received a political
contribution from a plunderer, knowing that the contributor is a plunderer and therefore, he knowingly
benefited from the plunder, would he also suffer the penalty, Mr. President, for life imprisonment?

Senator Tafiada. In the committee amendments, Mr. President, we have deleted these lines 1 to 4 and
part of line 5, on page 3. But, in a way, Mr. President, it is good that the Gentleman is bringing out
these questions, I believe that under the examples he has given, the Court will have to...

Senator Enrile. How about the wife, Mr. President, he may not agree with the plunderer to plunder the
country but because she is a dutiful wife or a faithful husband, she has to keep her or his vow of fidelity
to the spouse. And, of course, she enjoys the benefits out of the plunder. Would the Gentleman now
impute to her or him the crime of plunder simply because she or he knowingly benefited out of the
fruits of the plunder and, therefore, he must suffer or he must suffer the penalty of life imprisonment?

The President. That was stricken out already in the Committee amendment.

Senator Tañada. Yes, Mr. President. Lines 1 to 4 and part of line 5 were stricken out in the Committee
amendment. But, as I said, the examples of the Minority Floor Leader are still worth spreading
the Record. And, I believe that in those examples, the Court will have just to take into consideration all
the other circumstances prevailing in the case and the evidence that will be submitted.

The President. In any event, 'knowingly benefited' has already been stricken off."

The exchanges between Senator Enrile and Senator Tañada reveal, therefore, that what was removed
from the coverage of the bill and the final version that eventually became the law was a person who
was not the main plunderer or a co-conspirator, but one who personally benefited from the
plunderers' action. The requirement of personal benefit on the part of the main plunderer or his co-
conspirators by virtue of their plunder was not removed.
As a result, not only did the Prosecution fail to show where the money went but, more importantly,
that GMA and Aguas had personally benefited from the same. Hence, the Prosecution did not prove
the predicate act of raids on the public treasury beyond reasonable doubt. 8

Thirdly, the State contends that the Court did not appreciate the totality of its evidence, particularly
the different irregularities committed in the disbursement of the PCSO funds, i.e., the commingling of
funds, the non-compliance with LOI No. 1282, and the unilateral approval of the disbursements. Such
totality, coupled with the fact of the petitioners' indispensable cooperation in the pilfering of public
funds, showed the existence of the conspiracy to commit plunder among all of the accused.

The contention lacks basis.

As can be readily seen from the decision, the Court expressly granted the petitioners' respective
demurrers to evidence and dismissed the plunder case against them for insufficiency of evidence
because:

x x x the Sandiganbayan as the trial court was guilty of grave abuse of discretion when it capriciously
denied the demurrers to evidence despite the absence of competent and sufficient evidence to
sustain the indictment for plunder, and despite the absence of the factual bases to expect a guilty
verdict. 9

Such disposition of the Court fully took into consideration all the evidence adduced against the
petitioners. We need not rehash our review of the evidence thus adduced, for it is enough simply to
stress that the Prosecution failed to establish the corpus delicti of plunder - that any or all of the
accused public officials, particularly petitioner Arroyo, had amassed, accumulated, or acquired ill-
gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of at least ₱50,000,000.00.

Fourthly, in accenting certain inadequacies of the allegations of the information, the Court did not
engage in purposeless nitpicking, and did not digress from the primary task of determining the
sufficiency of the evidence presented by the State against the petitioners. What the Court thereby
intended to achieve was to highlight what would have been relevant in the proper prosecution of
plunder and thus enable itself to discern and determine whether the evidence of guilt was sufficient or
not. In fact, the Court categorically clarified that in discussing the essential need for the identification
of the main plunderer it was not harping on the sufficiency of the information, but was only enabling
itself to search for and to find the relevant proof that unequivocally showed petitioner Arroyo as the
"mastermind" - which was how the Sandiganbayan had characterized her participation - in the context
of the implied conspiracy alleged in the information. But the search came to naught, for the
information contained nothing that averred her commission of the overt act necessary to implicate her
in the supposed conspiracy to commit the crime of plunder. Indeed, the Court assiduously searched for
but did not find the sufficient incriminatory evidence against the petitioners. Hence, the
Sandiganbayan capriciously and oppressively denied their demurrers to evidence.

Fifthly, the State posits that it established at least a case for malversation against the petitioners.

Malversation is defined and punished under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads thusly:

Article 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. - Any public officer
who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate
the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall
permit any other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise
be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:

1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount
involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos.

2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is
more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos.

3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum
period, if the amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand
pesos.

4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount
involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the
amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua.

In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special
disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the
property embezzled.

The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put
such missing funds or property to personal use. (As amended by RA 1060).

The elements of malversation are that: (a) the offender is an accountable public officer; (b) he/she is
responsible for the misappropriation of public funds or property through intent or negligence; and (c)
he/she has custody of and received such funds and property by reason of his/her office. 10

The information in Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-017411 avers:

The undersigned Assistant Ombudsman and Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer III, Office of the
Ombudsman, hereby accuse GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ROSARIO C. URIARTE, SERGIO O.
VALENCIA, MANUEL L. MORATO, JOSE R. TARUC V, RAYMUNDO T. ROQUERO, MA. FATIMA AS. VALDES,
BENIGNO B. AGUAS, REYNALDO A. VILLAR and NILDA B. PLARAS, of the crime of PLUNDER, as defined
by, and penalized under Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659,
committed, as follows:

That during the period from January 2008 to June 2010 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, then the President of the Philippines, ROSARIO C. URIARTE, then General
Manager and Vice Chairman, SERGIO 0. VALENCIA, then Chairman of the Board of Directors, MANUEL
L. MORA TO, JOSE R. TARUC V, RAYMUNDO T. ROQUERO, MA. FATIMA AS. VALDES, then members of
the Board of Directors, BENIGNO B. AGUAS, then Budget and Accounts Manager, all of the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), REYNALDO A. VILLAR, then Chairman, and NILDA B. PLARAS, then
Head of Intelligence/Confidential Fund Fraud Audit Unit, both of the Commission on Audit, all public
officers committing the offense in relation to their respective offices and taking undue advantage of
their respective official positions, authority, relationships, connections or influence, conniving,
conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
'amass,, accumulate and/or acquire directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or
total value of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED FIFTEEN PESOS (PHP365,997,915.00), more or less, through any or a combination or a series
of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means, described as follows:

(a) diverting in several instances, funds from the operating budget of PCSO to its
Confidential/Intelligence Fund that could be accessed and withdrawn at any time with minimal
restrictions, and converting, misusing, and/or illegally conveying or transferring the proceeds
drawn from said fund in the aforementioned sum, also in several instances, to themselves, in
the guise of fictitious expenditures, for their personal gain and benefit;

(b) raiding the public treasury by withdrawing and receiving, in several instances, the above-
mentioned amount from the Confidential/Intelligence Fund from PCSO's accounts, and or
unlawfully transferring or conveying the same into their possession and control through
irregularly issued disbursement vouchers and fictitious expenditures; and

(c) taking advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships, connections
or influence, in several instances, to unjustly enrich themselves in the aforementioned sum, at
the expense of, and the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

In thereby averring the predicate act of malversation, the State did not sufficiently allege the
aforementioned essential elements of malversation in the information. The omission from the
information of factual details descriptive of the aforementioned elements of malversation highlighted
the insufficiency of the allegations. Consequently, the State's position is entirely unfounded.

Lastly, the petitioners insist that the consideration and granting of the motion for reconsideration of
the State can amount to a violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy because
their acquittal under the decision was a prior jeopardy within the context of Section 21, Article III (Bill
of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act.

The insistence of the petitioners is fully warranted. Indeed, the consideration and granting of the
motion for reconsideration of the State will amount to the violation of the constitutional guarantee
against double jeopardy.

The Court's consequential dismissal of Criminal Case No. SB-12- CRM-0174 as to the petitioners for
insufficiency of evidence amounted to their acquittal of the crime of plunder charged against them.
In People v. Tan, 12the Court shows why:

In People v. Sandiganbayan, this Com1 explained the general rule that the grant of a demurrer to
evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and unappealable, to wit:
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is ''filed after tile prosecution had
rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced
by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in
a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a
criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to
place the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.
xxxx
The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions. In People v. Laguio, Jr., this Court
stated that the only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the RTC acted with grave
abuse of discretion, thus:

... The only instance when double ,jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was
denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham. However,
while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an
extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to
a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. 13

The constitutional prohibition against placing a person under double jeopardy for the same offense
bars not only a new and independent prosecution but also an appeal in the same action after jeopardy
had attached. 14 As such, every acquittal becomes final immediately upon promulgation and cannot be
recalled for correction or amendment. With the acquittal being immediately final, granting the State's
motion for reconsideration in this case would violate the Constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy because it would effectively reopen the prosecution and subject the petitioners to a second
jeopardy despite their acquittal.

It is cogent to remind in this regard that the Constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy
provides to the accused three related protections, specifically: protection against a second prosecution
for the same offense after acquittal; protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after
conviction; and protection against multiple punishments for the same offense. 15The rationale for the
three protections is expounded in United States v. Wilson: 16

The interests underlying these three protections arc quite similar. When a defendant has been once
convicted and punished for a particular crime, principles of fairness and finality require that he not
be subjected to the possibility of further punishment by being again tried or sentenced for the same
offense. Ex pa rte Lange, 18 Wall 163 (1874); In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889). When a defendant has
been acquitted of an offense, the Clause guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to make
repeated attempts to convict him,

"thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal, and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that, even though
innocent, he may be found guilty."

Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-188 (1957).

The policy of avoiding multiple trials has been regarded as so important that exceptions to the
principle have been only grudgingly allowed. Initially, a new trial was thought to be unavailable after
appeal, whether requested by the prosecution or the defendant. See United States v. Gibert, 25 F.
Cas. 1287 (No. 15,204) (CCD Mass. 1834) (Story, J.). It was not until 1896 that it was made clear that a
defendant could seek a new trial after conviction, even though the Government enjoyed no similar
right. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662. (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 172777               October 19, 2011

BENJAMIN B. BANGAYAN, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
SALLY GO BANGAYAN, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 172792

RESALLY DE ASIS DELFIN, Petitioner,

vs.
SALLY GO BANGAYAN, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

These are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure assailing the March 14, 2006 Decision 1 and the May 22, 2006 Resolution2 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 83704 entitled "Sally Go-Bangayan v. Hon. Luisito C. Sardillo, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC-Caloocan City, Branch 126, Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr. and Resally de
Asis Delfin."

The Facts
This case stemmed from a complaint-affidavit filed by respondent Sally Go-Bangayan (Sally Go)
accusing petitioners Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin, Jr.) and Resally de Asis Delfin (Resally) of having
committed the crime of bigamy.3

On March 7, 1982, Benjamin, Jr. married Sally Go in Pasig City and they had two children. 4 Later, Sally
Go learned that Benjamin, Jr. had taken Resally as his concubine whom he subsequently married on
January 5, 2001 under the false name, "Benjamin Z. Sojayco." 5 Benjamin, Jr. fathered two children with
Resally. Furthermore, Sally Go discovered that on September 10, 1973, Benjamin, Jr. also married a
certain Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City.

The City Prosecutor of Caloocan City conducted a preliminary investigation and thereafter issued a
Resolution dated June 5, 2002 recommending the filing of an information for bigamy against Benjamin,
Jr. and Resally for having contracted a marriage despite knowing fully well that he was still legally
married to Sally Go.6 The information was duly filed on November 15, 2002 and was raffled to the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 126 (RTC) where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. C-
66783.7

After the arraignment, during which petitioners both pleaded not guilty to the charge against them, the
prosecution presented and offered its evidence.8 On September 8, 2003, Benjamin, Jr. and Resally
separately filed their respective motions for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. 9 This was granted by
the RTC in its Order dated September 29, 2003.10

On October 20, 2003, Benjamin, Jr. filed his Demurrer to Evidence, praying that the criminal case for
bigamy against him be dismissed for failure of the prosecution to present sufficient evidence of his
guilt.11 His plea was anchored on two main arguments: (1) he was not legally married to Sally Go
because of the existence of his prior marriage to Azucena; and (2) the prosecution was unable to show
that he and the "Benjamin Z. Sojayco Jr.," who married Resally, were one and the same person. 12

In its December 3, 2003 Order,13 the RTC dismissed the criminal case against Benjamin, Jr. and Resally
for insufficiency of evidence.14 It reasoned out that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that Benjamin, Jr. used the fictitious name, Benjamin Z. Sojayco Jr., in contracting his marriage
with Resally.15 Corollarily, Resally cannot be convicted of bigamy because the prosecution failed to
establish that Resally married Benjamin, Jr.16

Aggrieved, Sally Go elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari. On March 14, 2006, the CA
promulgated its Decision17 granting her petition and ordering the remand of the case to the RTC for
further proceedings. The CA held that the following pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution
were sufficient to deny the demurrer to evidence: (1) the existence of three marriages of Benjamin, Jr.
to Azucena, Sally Go and Resally; (2) the letters and love notes from Resally to Benjamin, Jr.; (3) the
admission of Benjamin, Jr. as regards his marriage to Sally Go and Azucena; and (4) Benjamin, Jr.’s
admission that he and Resally were in some kind of a relationship. 18 The CA further stated that
Benjamin, Jr. was mistaken in claiming that he could not be guilty of bigamy because his marriage to
Sally Go was null and void in light of the fact that he was already married to Azucena. A judicial
declaration of nullity was required in order for him to be able to use the nullity of his marriage as a
defense in a bigamy charge.19

Petitioners’ motions for reconsideration were both denied by the CA in a Resolution dated May 22,
2006.20

Hence, these petitions.

The Issues
Petitioner Benjamin, Jr. raises the following issues:

1. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals in a certiorari proceedings may inquire into
the factual matters presented by the parties in the lower court, without violating the
constitutional right of herein petitioner (as accused in the lower court) against double jeopardy
as enshrined in Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

2. Whether or not the order of the trial court that granted the Demurrer to Evidence filed by
the petitioners as accused therein was issued with grave abuse of discretion that is tantamount
to lack of jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction as to warrant the grant of the relief as prayed for
in the Petition for Certiorari filed by respondent Sally [Go-Bangayan].
 3. Whether or not the prosecution was indeed denied due process when the trial court
allegedly ignored the existence [of the] pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution. 21

On the other hand, petitioner Resally poses the following questions:

1. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in giving due
course to the petition for certiorari notwithstanding the lack of legal standing of the herein
respondent (petitioner therein) as the said petition was filed without the prior conformity
and/or imprimatur of the Office of the Solicitor General, or even the City Prosecutor’s Office of
Caloocan City

2. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in ordering
the further proceedings of the case as it would violate the right of the accused against double
jeopardy.22

Essentially, the issues which must be resolved by this Court are:

1. Whether Sally Go had the legal standing to file a petition for certiorari before the CA despite
the lack of consent of either the Office of the Solicitor General or the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) of Caloocan.

2. Whether petitioners’ right against double jeopardy was violated by the CA when it reversed
the December 3, 2003 RTC Order dismissing the criminal case against them.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court finds merit in the petitions.

Only the OSG, and not the private offended party, has the authority to question the order granting the
demurrer to evidence in a criminal case.

Petitioner Resally argues that Sally Go had no personality to file the petition for certiorari before the CA
because the case against them (Resally and Benjamin, Jr.) is criminal in nature. It being so, only the
OSG or the OCP of Caloocan may question the RTC Order dismissing the case against
them.23 Respondent’s intervention as the offended party in the prosecution of the criminal case is only
limited to the enforcement of the civil liability. 24

Sally Go counters that as the offended party, she has an interest in the maintenance of the criminal
prosecution against petitioners and quotes Merciales v. Court of Appeals25 to support her position:
"The right of offended parties to appeal an order of the trial court which deprives them of due process
has always been recognized, the only limitation being that they cannot appeal any adverse ruling if to
do so would place the accused in double jeopardy." Moreover, the OSG and the OCP had impliedly
consented to the filing of the petition before the CA because they did not interpose any objection. 26

This Court leans toward Resally’s contention that Sally Go had no personality to file the petition for
certiorari before the CA. It has been consistently held that in criminal cases, the acquittal of the
accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting
on behalf of the State.27 The private complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or
dismissal only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned. 28 As explained in the case
of People v. Santiago:291awphil
It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the
private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the
prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If
a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the
criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor
General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or
complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal
the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.

In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is
alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or
on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved.
In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The
complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action
questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing,
complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may
be prosecuted in name of said complainant. [Emphases Supplied]

A perusal of the petition for certiorari filed by Sally Go before the CA discloses that she sought
reconsideration of the criminal aspect of the case. Specifically, she prayed for the reversal of the trial
court’s order granting petitioners’ demurrer to evidence and the conduct of a full blown trial of the
criminal case. Nowhere in her petition did she even briefly discuss the civil liability of petitioners. It is
apparent that her only desire was to appeal the dismissal of the criminal case against the petitioners.
Because bigamy is a criminal offense, only the OSG is authorized to prosecute the case on appeal. Thus,
Sally Go did not have the requisite legal standing to appeal the acquittal of the petitioners.

Sally Go was mistaken in her reading of the ruling in Merciales. First, in the said case, the OSG joined
the cause of the petitioner, thereby meeting the requirement that criminal actions be prosecuted
under the direction and control of the public prosecutor.30 Second, the acquittal of the accused was
done without due process and was declared null and void because of the nonfeasance on the part of
the public prosecutor and the trial court.31 There being no valid acquittal, the accused therein could not
invoke the protection of double jeopardy.

In this case, however, neither the Solicitor General nor the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City joined the
cause of Sally Go, much less consented to the filing of a petition for certiorari with the appellate court.
Furthermore, she cannot claim to have been denied due process because the records show that the
trial court heard all the evidence against the accused and that the prosecution had formally offered the
evidence before the court granted the demurrer to evidence. Thus, the petitioners’ acquittal was valid,
entitling them to invoke their right against double jeopardy.

Double jeopardy had already set-in

Petitioners contend that the December 3, 2003 Order of dismissal issued by the RTC on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence is a judgment of acquittal. The prosecution is, thus, barred from appealing the
RTC Order because to allow such an appeal would violate petitioners’ right against double
jeopardy.32 They insist that the CA erred in ordering the remand of the case to the lower court for
further proceedings because it disregarded the constitutional proscription on the prosecution of the
accused for the same offense.33
On the other hand, Sally Go counters that the petitioners cannot invoke their right against double
jeopardy because the RTC decision acquitting them was issued with grave abuse of discretion,
rendering the same null and void.34

A demurrer to evidence is filed after the prosecution has rested its case and the trial court is required
to evaluate whether the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient enough to warrant the
conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. If the court finds that the evidence is not sufficient
and grants the demurrer to evidence, such dismissal of the case is one on the merits, which is
equivalent to the acquittal of the accused.35 Well-established is the rule that the Court cannot review
an order granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence because to do so will place the accused in double jeopardy. 36

The right of the accused against double jeopardy is protected by no less than the Bill of Rights (Article
III) contained in the 1987 Constitution, to wit:

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act.

Double jeopardy attaches if the following elements are present: (1) a valid complaint or information;
(2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (4) the
defendant was acquitted, or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.37 However, jurisprudence allows for certain exceptions when the dismissal
is considered final even if it was made on motion of the accused, to wit:

(1) Where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused after the
prosecution has rested, which has the effect of a judgment on the merits and operates as an
acquittal.

(2) Where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused, because of the denial of his
right to a speedy trial which is in effect a failure to prosecute. 38

The only instance when the accused can be barred from invoking his right against double jeopardy is
when it can be demonstrated that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was not allowed the opportunity to make
its case against the accused or where the trial was a sham.39 For instance, there is no double jeopardy
(1) where the trial court prematurely terminated the presentation of the prosecution's evidence and
forthwith dismissed the information for insufficiency of evidence; 40 and (2) where the case was
dismissed at a time when the case was not ready for trial and adjudication. 41

In this case, all four elements of double jeopardy are doubtless present. A valid information for the
crime of bigamy was filed against the petitioners, resulting in the institution of a criminal case against
them before the proper court. They pleaded not guilty to the charges against them and subsequently,
the case was dismissed after the prosecution had rested its case. Therefore, the CA erred in reversing
the trial court’s order dismissing the case against the petitioners because it placed them in double
jeopardy.

As previously discussed, an acquittal by virtue of a demurrer to evidence is not appealable because it

will place the accused in double jeopardy. However, it may be subject to review only by a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process. 42

Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as that capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which
is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. "The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
of passion and hostility."43 The party questioning the acquittal of an accused should be able to clearly
establish that the trial court blatantly abused its discretion such that it was deprived of its authority to
dispense justice.44

The CA determined that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in ignoring the evidence
presented by the prosecution and granting petitioners’ demurrer to evidence on the ground that the
prosecution failed to establish by sufficient evidence the existence of the crime. 45 An examination of
the decision of the trial court, however, yields the conclusion that there was no grave abuse of
discretion on its part. Even if the trial court had incorrectly overlooked the evidence against the
petitioners, it only committed an error of judgment, and not one of jurisdiction, which could not be
rectified by a petition for certiorari because double jeopardy had already set in. 46

As regards Sally Go’s assertion that she had been denied due process, an evaluation of the records of
the case proves that nothing can be further from the truth. Jurisprudence dictates that in order for a
decision of the trial court to be declared null and void for lack of due process, it must be shown that a
party was deprived of his opportunity to be heard.47 Sally Go cannot deny that she was given ample
opportunity to present her witnesses and her evidence against petitioners. Thus, her claim that she
was denied due process is unavailing.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The March 14, 2006 Decision and the May 22, 2006
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The December 3, 2003 Order of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 126, Caloocan City, in Criminal Case No. C-66783, granting the Demurrer to
Evidence of petitioners Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr. and Resally de Asis Delfin and dismissing the case
against them is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 185267               September 17, 2014

CESAR T. QUIAMBAO and ERIC C. PILAPIL, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ADERITO Z. YUJUICO and BONIFACIO C. SUMBILLA, Respondents.

DECISION
BRION, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by Cesar T. Quiambao and Eric C. Pilapil
(collectively the "petitioners") assailing the decision 2 dated June 26, 2008 and the order3 dated October
23, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 161 (RTC-Branch 161). These challenged RTC
rulings dismissed the petitioners' petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in SCA Case No.
3193 for lack of merit.

The Factual Antecedents

Petioners Quiambao and Pilapil are the President and the Corporate Secretary, respectively, of
Strategic Alliance Development Corporation (STRADEC), a domestic corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines.4

● Criminal Case Nos. 89723-24

On August 12, 2005, the private respondents, Bonifacio C. Sumbilla and Aderito Z. Yujuico, both
directors and officers of STRADEC, filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Pasig City a
criminal complaint for violation of Section 74 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68 (B.P. 68), 5 against the
petitioners and a certain Giovanni Casanova, then accountant of STRADEC.

After preliminary investigation, the petitioners were charged under two (2) Informations 6 for violation
of Section 74of B.P. 68. The first criminal information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 89723; while
the second, was docketed as CriminalCase No. 89724. These cases were raffled to Branch 69 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Pasig City, presided by Judge Jacqueline J. Ongpauco-Cortel.

On the same date, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause
and to Defer the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest Pending Determination 7 with the MTC. The petitioners
asserted that the private respondents failed to adduce evidence to support a finding of probable cause
against them. They also alleged that their act of refusing to turn over STRADEC’s stock and transfer
books to the private respondents was not punishable under the Corporation Code.

● The MTC’s Orders dated May 8, 2006 and August 16, 2006

On May 8, 2006, the MTC denied the motion insofar as it prayed for the dismissal of Criminal Case No.
89724. Criminal Case No. 89723 was, however, dismissed. 8
The petitioners moved for partial reconsideration 9 , but the MTC denied the motion in its Order dated
August 16, 2006.10 In the same Order, the court set the arraignment of the petitioners on October 9,
2006.

Subsequently, the petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari 11 (with application for issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction) docketed as SCA No. 3047 with the
RTC of Pasig, Branch 154 (RTC-Branch 154), seeking the partial annulment of the MTC’s Orders dated
May 8, 2006 and August 16, 2006.

The petitioners were arraigned on January 29, 2007.

● The RTC Branch-154’s Order dated June 4, 2007 (SCA No. 3047)

In an Order dated June 4, 2007 (RTC-Branch 154’s Order), the RTC-Branch 154, through Judge Abraham
B. Borreta granted the Petition12 holding that there was no probable cause to hold the petitioners for
trial. Consequently, it directed the MTC to dismiss Criminal Case No. 89724 for want of probable cause.

The private respondents thereafter sought reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC-Branch 154.
Thus, they brought an appeal to this Court viaa petition for review on certiorari (docketed as G.R. No.
180416) raising pure questions of law.

● The MTC’s Orders dated June 18, 2007 and September 17, 2007

While G.R. No. 180416 remains pending before this Court, the MTC dismissed Criminal Case No. 89724
on June 18, 2007 (Order of Dismissal), pursuant to the RTC-Branch 154’s Order which reads:

Considering the Order of the Regional Trial Court Branch 154, reversing the Order of thisCourt dated
August 16, 2006, and considering further that the private prosecutor is not armed with a written
authority to actively prosecutethe case, this case is hereby ordered DISMISSED.

The private respondents thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration, which the MTC granted. Upon
learning that a petition for certiorari had been filed before this court, the MTC issued an Order dated
September 17, 2007 (Order of Revival) recalling the Order of Dismissal and reinstating the criminal
information in Criminal Case No. 89724. It further ordered the suspension of the proceedings in G.R.
No. 180416 to await the final outcome of the pending case.

The petitioners moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. They thereafter filed a Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus13 docketed as SCA Case No. 3193 with the RTC-Branch 161.

● The RTC’s Decision dated June26, 2008 (SCA Case No. 3193)

The RTC-Branch 161, in a decision dated June 26, 2008, dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It found
that the MTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion whenit revived and archived Criminal Case No.
89724. Since the RTC-Branch 154’s Order dated June 4, 2007 has not yet attained finality in viewof the
pendency of G.R. No. 180416, the MTC cannot be considered to have acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it issued the assailed orders.
Likewise, the RTC ruled that the Order of Revival was pursuant to Section 5(g) of Rule 135 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which provides for the inherent power of the courts to amend and control its
process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice.

The motion for reconsideration that followed was denied in an Order dated October 23, 2008. Hence,
the petitioners filed the present petition.

The Petition

The petitioners mainly argued that the RTC-Branch 161 had gravely erred in upholding the MTC’s
departure from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings. They maintain that in dismissing
their Rule 65 petition (SCA Case No. 3193), the RTC-Branch 161 had refused to consider that the MTC’s
Order of Revival necessarily placed them in double jeopardy.

The petitioners also asserted that the RTC-Branch 161 had sanctioned the MTC’s departure from the
well-established rule that the power to prosecute and appeal from the order or judgment of the courts
in a criminal action lies solely withthe State, acting through a public prosecutor. Since the private
respondents acted independently of and without the authority of the public prosecutor, the MTC
gravely abused its discretion when it entertained the private respondents’ motion.

The Case for the Respondents

● The Private Respondents’ Comment

In their comment, the private respondents accused the petitioners of resorting to willful and deliberate
act of forum shopping, manifested by their filing of the present petition for certiorari. They contended
that as the RTC-Branch 154’s Order isstill pending review by the First Division of this Court, the instant
petition was totally unnecessary and superfluous.

The private respondents also contended that contrary to the petitioners’ claim, double jeopardy had
not yet attached. Since the dismissal of the case was made provisionally and upon the express request
of the petitioners, the revival of the criminal information, according to the respondents, did notgive
rise to double jeopardy.

Lastly, on the issue of the respondents’ legal personality to move for reconsideration, the private
respondents maintain that the public prosecutor’s failure to subscribe to the Motion for
Reconsideration was not fatal.

● The Public Respondent’s Manifestation and Motion

Required to comment in the petition, the Solicitor General, representing the public respondent,
maintained that the MTC’s Order of Revival had placed the petitioners indouble jeopardy. It alleged
that herein private respondents did not havethe legal personality to move for the reconsideration of
the MTC’s orders. Since there was no showing that the private respondents acted by virtue of the
public prosecutor’s authority, the filing of the motion for reconsideration did not effectively stop the
running of the reglementary period to appeal from the MTC’s Order of Dismissal. Consequently, the
Order of Dismissal had attained finality and can no longer berevived by the MTC.
 The Issue Before the Court

The parties’ arguments, properly joined, present to us the following issues:

1. Did the RTC-Branch 161 correctlydetermine whether the MTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Case No. 89724?

2. Did the MTC’s dismissal of Criminal Case No. 89724 operate as an acquittal of the petitioners
for the crime charged?

3. Did the reinstatement or revival of Criminal Case No. 89724 place the petitioners in double
jeopardy?

Our Ruling

We find the petition meritorious.

We note, at the outset, that the legal question before us revolves around the MTC’s Order of Revival
dated September 17, 2007. However, after going deeply into the roots of the controversy, we find that
the real root of the issue stems back to the jurisdictional faux pas committed early on by the MTC
whenit issued its prior Order of Dismissal dated June 18, 2007.

The MTC acted without jurisdiction when it issued the Order of Dismissal dated June 18, 2007

To recall, the petition for review on certiorari (docketed as G.R. No. 180416) filed by the private
respondents to question the RTC Branch 154’s Order, remains pending before this Court. Being the
subject of a pending review, the RTC Order – directing the MTC to dismiss Criminal Case No. 89724 for
want of probable cause – was therefore not yet final and executory.

Nonetheless, despite the pendency of the petition for review before us, the MTC, by virtue of the RTC’s
"non-final" Order, dismissed Criminal Case No. 89724. Thus, we find that the MTC acted without
jurisdiction when it issued its Order of Dismissal dated June 18, 2007.

We held in PAA v. Court of Appeals14 that an appeal to this Court via a Petition for Review on
Certioraristays the judgment, award or order appealed from. Thus, until after the appeal of the
defendant shall have been resolved by this Court with finality, and its records transmitted to the court
of origin, the judgment, award or order appealed from cannot be executed, enforced, much less,
modified by the court of origin. Once the case has been appealed and given due course by this Court,
the lower court or the court of origin could no longer take cognizance of the issue under review. It
cannot execute the judgment appealed from because to do so would constitute encroachment on the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of this Court.

In Heirs of the Late Justice Jose B. L. Reyes v. CA,15 this Court emphasized that:

A judgment of the Court of Appeals cannot be executed pending appeal.Once final and executory, the
judgment must be remanded to the lower court, where a motion for its execution may be filed only
after its entry. In other words, before its finality, the judgment cannot be executed. There can be no
discretionary execution of a decision of the Court of Appeals.In the second place, even in discretionary
executions, the same must be firmly founded upon good reasons. The court must state in a special
order the "good reasons" justifying the issuance of the writ. The good reasons allowing execution
pending appeal must constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency thatwill outweigh the
injuries or damages to the adverse party if the decision is reversed.

In the third place, on September 14, 1998, petitioners elevated the decision of the Court of Appeals to
the Supreme Court by petition for review.By the mere fact of the filing of the petition, the finality of
the Court of Appeals' decisionwas stayed, and there could be no entry of judgment therein, and,
hence, no premature execution could be had.The Court of Appeals adopted its resolution granting
execution pending appeal on September 18, 1998, after the petition for review was already filed in the
Supreme Court. It thereby encroached on the hallowed grounds of the Supreme Court.

In the present case, the MTC’s Order of Dismissal is a jurisdictional error that must be struck down as
flawed for having been issued without jurisdiction. It amounts to a premature execution which tended
to render moot the issue raised in the order appealed from and would render ineffective any decision
which might eventually be made by this Court.

Moreover, the jurisdiction over the issue of probable cause in Criminal Case No. 89724 had already
been acquired by this Court. From the moment the case had been elevated to us, the MTC no longer
had authority to further act on the issue which was pending review. In fact, at the time the MTC issued
the Order of Dismissal, even the RTC had lost jurisdiction. Thus, inasmuch as the case had already come
under our exclusive appellate jurisdiction, the MTC acted without jurisdiction when it issued the Order
of Dismissal.

As explained in Vda. de Syquia v. Judge of First Instance et al.: 16

x x x the perfecting(sic) of an appeal taken from said judgment deprives the trial court of its jurisdiction
over said judgment and said jurisdiction is transferred to the appellate court, and the trial court cannot
modify or revoke any order of execution of the said judgment after the appeal taken therefrom is
perfected.

Similarly, in Desbarats v. De Vera17 we held that:

A modifying order allowing defendant to occupy the portion of the building he is actually holding which
was not for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties is conspicuously null and void;
having been entered after the records on appeal had been approved and, accordingly, after the Court
of First Instance had lost jurisdiction over the case.

The MTC’s Order of Revival is also void

Like the Order of Dismissal, the Order of Revival that followed should be declared null and void. While
said order merely sought to correct the previous Order of Dismissal, it suffers from the same infirmity
of having been issued without jurisdiction.

As discussed above, the MTC no longer had the authority to dismiss Criminal Case No. 89724 because
the jurisdiction to act on and entertain the case had already been acquired by this Court. Hence, it
naturally follows that all the issuances and/or orders issued by the lower court relative to the issue
pending review will become null and void.
There is no double jeopardy because the MTC, which ordered the dismissal of the criminal case, is not
a court of competent jurisdiction.

Since the MTC clearly had no jurisdiction to issue the Order of Dismissal and the Order of Revival,there
can be no double jeopardy.

Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended provides:

SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. – When an accused has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient
in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution
for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information. x x x

Thus, double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached
prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for
the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a
competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the
accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent.18

In this case, there is no question that the first four requisites are present in the case at bar. However, in
view of the nullity of the Order of Dismissal and the Order of Revival, the fifth requisite – that the
accused be acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent – is absent.

As held in Paulin v. Gimenez:19

Void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the
creator of any obligation. No legal rights can emanate from a resolution that is null and void.

In the subsequent case of People v. Albano (163 SCRA 511 [1988]), this Court reiterated its previous
ruling in the Bocar case, holding that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction and acted with grave
abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, when it pre-emptively dismissed the case and as
a consequence thereof, deprived the prosecution of its right to prosecute and prove its case, thereby
violating its fundamental right to due process. With such

violation, its orders are, therefore null and void and cannot constitute a proper basis for a claim of
double jeopardy.1âwphi1 (Citations Omitted; Emphasis Supplied)

Since the MTC did not have jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case pending this Court's review of
the RTC Order, its order of dismissal was a total nullity and did not produce any legal effect. Thus, the
dismissal neither terminated the action on the merits, nor amounted to an acquittal.
The same can be said of the Order of Revival. Since both orders cannot be the source of any right nor
create any obligation, the dismissal and the subsequent reinstatement of Criminal Case No. 89724 did
not effectively place the petitioners in double jeopardy.

WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the present petition. The decision dated June 26, 2008 and the order
dated October 23, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court Pasig City, Branch 161 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Orders dated June 18, 2007 and September 17, 2007 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Pasig City are hereby declared NULL AND VOID; it is hereby DIRECTED to await the resolution of G .R.
No. 180416 before taking any action on the criminal proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 189850               September 22, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
REYNALDO TORRES, JAY TORRES, BOBBY TORRES @ ROBERTO TORRES y NAVA, and RONNIE
TORRES, Accused,

BOBBY TORRES @ ROBERTO TORRES y NAVA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This is an appeal from the July 23, 2009 Decision1 ofthe Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
02925, which modified the December 5, 2006 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Manila,
Branch 27 in Criminal Case No. 02-200171. The RTC found appellant Bobby Torres @Roberto Torres y
Nava (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder but on appeal, the CA found
appellant guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.

Factual Antecedents

On January 28, 2004, an Amended lnformation3 was filed before the charging siblings Reynaldo Torres
(Reynaldo), Jay Torres (Jay), Ronnie Torres (Ronnie) and appellant with the special complex crime
ofrobbery withhomicide committed against Jaime M. Espino (Espino). The Amended Information
contained the following accusatory allegations:

That on or about September 21, 2001, inthe City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, armed with
bladed weapons, conspiring and confederating together with one malefactor whose true name, real
identity and present whereabouts [is] still unknown and helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and by means of force, violence, and
intimidation,to wit: while one JAIME M. ESPINO was on board his car and travelling along C.M. Recto
Avenue corner Ylaya St., Tondo , this City, by blocking his path and forcibly grabbing from the latter his
belt-bag; that on the occasion of the said robbery and by reason thereof, the herein accused, in
pursuance of their conspiracy, did thenand there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill,
attack, assault, use personal violence and abuse of superior strength upon the said JAIME M.ESPINO
and that when the latter resisted, by then and there stabbing the latter with bladed weapons on x x x
different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple stab wounds which were the
direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter, and afterwhich, divest, take, rob and carry away a
belt-bag, wallet, necklace, watch and ring of undetermined amount, belonging to said JAIME M.
ESPINO.

Contrary to law.4

Only appellant was arrested. Reynaldo, Jay and Ronnie remain at-large to date. During arraignment,
appellantentered a plea of "not guilty".5 After the termination of the pre-trial conference, trial ensued.6

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented as eyewitnesses Eduardo Umali (Umali), a butcher, and MerlitoMacapar
(Macapar), a cigarette vendor. Also presented were Dr. Romeo T. Salen (Dr. Salen), who testified on the
cause of death of Espino. From their testimonies,7 the following facts emerged:

At around 10:00 p.m. of September 21,2001, Espino was driving his car along C.M. Recto Avenue in
Divisoria, Manila when Ronnie suddenly blocked his path. Espino alighted from his vehicle and
approached Ronnie, who tried to grab his belt-bag. Espino resisted and struggled with Ronnie for the
possession of his belt-bag but the latter’s brothers, Jay, Rey, appellant, and an unidentified companion
suddenly appeared. With all of them brandishing bladed weapons, appellant and his brothers took
turns in stabbing Espino in different parts of his body while the unidentified companion held him by the
neck. When Espino was already sprawled on the ground, they took his belt-bag, wallet and jewelries
and immediately fled.

Espino was rushed to the hospital butwas pronounced dead on arrival. In his Medico-Legal Report No.
W-658-2001,8 Dr. Salen concluded that Espino died of multiple stab wounds caused by sharp
bladedinstruments. The back portion of his head bore two stab wounds while his body suffered four
stab wounds which proved fatal. Considering the number and varying measurements of the wounds,
Dr. Salen opined that there weremore than one assailant.

To prove the civil aspect of the case, Espino’s daughter, Winnie EspinoFajardo (Winnie) testified that
the pieces of jewelry stolen from her father consisted of a necklace worth ₱35,000.00, bracelet worth
₱15,000.00, wristwatch worth ₱10,000.00 and two rings worth ₱10,000.00 each. As for their expenses,
Winnie said that ₱25,000.00 was spent for the burial lot and ₱37,000.00 for the funeral services. She
stated further that Espino was 51 years old at the time of his death and was earning ₱3,000.00 a day
asa meat vendor.9

Version of the Defense

Appellant denied any participation in the crime. He testified that at around 10:00 p.m. of September
21, 2001, he was with his girlfriend, Merlita Hilario (Merlita). They proceeded to the house oftheir
friend, Marilou Garcia (Marilou), in Villaruel, Tayuman, Manila where they had a drinking session which
lasted until they fell asleep. They did not leave their friend’s house until the following morning when
they went home. Thereupon, he was told that policemen were looking for him because his brothers
got involved in an altercation that resulted in the death of someone.10 Merlita and Marilou
corroborated appellant’s alibi in their respective testimonies.11

From the testimony of another defense witness, Jorna Yabut-Torres (Jorna), wife of Ronnie, the
defense’s version of the incidentemerged as follows:

In the evening of September 21, 2001, Jorna and Ronnie were sharing jokes with other vendors in
Divisoria when a car stopped a few meters from their stall. The driver alighted and asked why they
were laughing. Ronnie replied that it had nothing to do with him. The driver seemed drunk since he
walked back to his vehicle in an unsteady manner. Moments later, the driver returned and stabbed
Ronnie on the wrist with a knife. Jay saw the assault on his brother, Ronnie, and got a bolo which he
used to hack the driver repeatedly. Thereafter, Ronnie and Jay fled. 12 Ditas Biescas-Mangilya, a
vegetable vendor in Divisoria, corroborated Jorna’s version of the incident in her testimony. 13

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its December 5, 2006 Decision,14 the RTC held that appellant could not have committed robbery. It
ratiocinated, viz:

Prosecution witness Merlito D. Macapar testified that Ronnie took the belt bag of the deceased while
Bobby and the rest took his wristwatch, ring and necklace. However, on cross-examination, witness
admitted that he did not see who took the ring, wristwatch and necklace because as soon as the
deceased fell on the ground, accused and companions surrounded him. Merlito’s testimony was
contradicted by Eduardo Umali on a vital point. Thus, Merlito testified that there was an exchange of
heated words. There was no intimation whatsoever what the altercation was about. He was ten meters
away. No such altercation, however, took place according to Eduardo who was barely five meters
away. This tainted the testimony of Merlitoand Eduardo with suspicion. When material witnesses
contradict themselves on vital points, the element of doubt is injected and cannot be lightly
disregarded. That was not all though. Merlito testified [that] several people witnessed the incident. The
stall of the victim’s daughter was about ten meters from the crime scene, which was a few meters from
the stall of Ronnie. They both had been in their respective stalls for quite sometime. The principal
prosecution witnesses are familiar with the deceased and the accused except for the unidentified
companion as they often see them at the vicinity. Thus, in all likelihood, accused and the victim are
familiar if not know each other very well. The perpetration of robbery at the place was thus unlikely.

Even granting that the element of taking is present, still, accused cannot be held liable for the complex
crime of robbery with homicide for the reason that it was not indubitably shown that the mainpurpose
of the accused was to rob the victim. To the mind of the Court, this is precisely the reason why the
prosecution skipped the utterances made by the protagonist[s] during the attack. To sustain a
[conviction] for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the
culprit must be robbery and the homicide is perpetrated with a view to the consummation of the
robbery, or by reason or on the occasion of the robbery (People vs. Ponciano, 204 SCRA 627).

xxxx

The crime of robbery not having been indubitably established, the accused cannot be convicted of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide.15
The RTC thus concluded that appellant can only be liable for the killing of Espino. It held him guilty of
murder after it found the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, which was alleged in
the Information and duly established by the prosecution. Moreover, the RTC ruled that conspiracy
among the accused attended the crime.

Anent the civil aspect of the case, the RTC granted civil indemnity, actual and moral damages to the
heirs of Espino,but denied the claim for loss of earning capacity for lack of documentary evidence.

The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds accused Bobby Torres y Nava, "Guilty"
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior
strength attended the commission of the crime and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of ₱50,000.00, the additional sum of
₱50,000.00 as moral damages, actual damages in the amount of ₱62,000.00 and to pay the costs.

Let alias warrant of arrest issue against accused Reynaldo Torres, Jay Torres and Ronnie Torres.

SO ORDERED.16

Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration17which was denied in an Order18 dated April 10, 2007.

Hence, appellant appealed to the CA.19

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In modifying the ruling of the RTC, i.e., finding appellant guilty of robbery with homicide instead of
murder, the CA found that the primary intention of appellant and his co-accusedwas to rob Espino and
his killing was only incidental to the robbery. The blocking of Espino’s car and the struggle for
possession of his belt-bag after he alighted are clear manifestations of the intent to commit robbery.
The dispositive portion of the July 23, 2009 Decision20 of the CA reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of foregoing, the appealed decision of the RTC Manila, Branch 27 dated
December 5, 2006 is hereby MODIFIED in that appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of ROBBERY with HOMICIDE and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The trial court’s award to the heirs of the victim, Jaime Espino, of civil indemnity in the
amount of ₱50,000.00, moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00, and actual damages in the
amount of ₱62,000.00 as well as its order to appellant to pay the costs of suit, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.21

Hence, this present appeal.

Assignment of Errors

Appellant imputes upon the CA the following errorsin his Supplemental Brief. 22
The acquittal of the accused-appellant in the robbery charge should be left undisturbed as being final
and executory which cannot be overturned without violating the proscription against double
jeopardy.23

The appellate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it reviewed the entire case despite the fact that the
accused-appellant only appealed his conviction for murder. 24

It was an error to convict the accused-appellant of the crimes charged considering that his guilt was
notproven beyond reasonable doubt.25

Our Ruling
The appeal is unmeritorious.

In an appeal by an accused, he waives his right not to be subject to double jeopardy.

Appellant maintains thatthe CA erred in finding him liable for robbery with homicide as charged in the
Amended Information. He argues that his appeal to the CA was limited to his conviction for murder and
excluded his acquittal for robbery. And by appealing his conviction for murder, he does not waive his
constitutional right not to be subject to double jeopardy for the crime of robbery. He claims that even
assuming that the RTC erred in acquitting him of the robbery charge, such error can no longer be
questioned on appeal.

We cannot give credence to appellant’s contentions. "An appeal in [a] criminal case opens the entire
case for review on any question including one not raised by the parties." 26 "[W]hen an accused appeals
from the sentence of the trial court, he waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy
and throws the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to
render such judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the
appellant."27 In other words, when appellant appealed the RTC’s judgment of conviction for murder, he
is deemed to have abandoned his right to invoke the prohibition on double jeopardy since it became
the duty of the appellate court to correct errors as may be found in the appealed judgment. Thus,
appellant could not have been placed twice in jeopardy when the CA modified the ruling of the RTC by
finding him guilty of robbery with homicide as charged in the Information instead of murder.

Appellant is guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide.

"Robbery with homicide exists ‘when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on occasion, of the
robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the following
elements: (1) the taking of personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent togain; (3) with the
use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery,
the crime of homicide, as usedin its generic sense, was committed. A conviction requires certitude that
the robbery is the main purpose and objective of the malefactor and the killing ismerely incidental to
the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur before,
during or after the robbery’."28

In this case, the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the primary intention of
appellant and his companions was to rob Espino. Umali and Macapar, the eyewitnesses presented by
the prosecution, testified that at around 10:00 p.m. of September 21, 2001, appellant’s brother and co-
accused, Ronnie, blocked Espino’s car at the corner of C.M. Recto Avenue and Ylaya Street. When
Espino alighted from his vehicle, Ronnie attempted to grab his beltbag. A struggle for possession of the
belt-bag ensued. It was at this juncture that appellant and the other co-accused joined the fray and
stabbed Espino several times in the head and body. When Espino fell to the pavement from his stab
wounds, appellant, Ronnie and their cohorts got hold of the victim’s wallet, beltbag, wristwatch and
jewelry then fled together.29

From the foregoing, it is clear that the primordial intention of appellant and his companions was to rob
Espino. Had they primarily intended to kill Espino, they would have immediately stabbed him to death.
However, the fact that Ronnie initially wrestled with appellant for possession of the belt-bag clearly
shows that the central aim was to commit robbery against Espino.This intention was confirmed by the
accused’s taking of Espino’s belt-bag, wallet, wrist-watch and jewelries after he was stabbed to death.
The killing was therefore merely incidental, resulting by reason oron occasion of the robbery.

The testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses are worthy of credence.

Appellant attempts to discredit Umali and Macapar by asserting that there are glaring contradictions in
their testimonies. He calls attention to the RTC’s observation that Macapar gave conflicting testimonies
on whether he actually witnessed who among appellant and his cohorts took Espino’s valuables after
he fell to the ground. Appellant asserts further that Umali’s testimony that an altercation did not
precede the commission of the crime contradicts the testimony of Macapar that a heated exchange of
words occurred prior to the incident. He also claims that it is contrary to human nature for Espino to
alight from his car at 10:00 p.m. while in possession of a large amount of money without fear of an
impending hold-up.

We are not persuaded. The inconsistencies attributed to the prosecution’s eyewitnesses involve minor
details, too trivial to adversely affect their credibility. Said inconsistencies do not depart from the fact
that these eyewitnesses saw the robbery and the fatal stabbing of Espino by appellant and his cohorts.
"[T]o the extent that inconsistencies were in fact shown, they appear to the Court to relate to details of
peripheral significance which do not negate or dissolve the positive identification by [Umali and
Macapar of appellant] as the perpetrator of the crime."30 "Inaccuracies may in fact suggest that the
witnesses are telling the truth and have not been rehearsed. Witnesses are not expected to remember
every single detail of an incident with perfect or total recall." 31

Moreover, it is unlikely that Espino feared alighting from his vehicle at a late hour while in possessionof
a huge amount of money since he was a vendor doing business in the vicinity where the incident
occurred. He was familiar with the people and their activities in the premises. In view of the above, the
Court finds that the CA properly lent full credence to the testimonies of Umali and Macapar.

The weapons are not the corpus delicti.

Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient for his conviction since the weapons used in the
stabbing of Espino were not presented. In other words, he asserts that it was improper to convict him
because the corpus delictihad not been established.

We disagree. ‘"[C]orpus delictirefers to the fact of the commission of the crime charged or to the body
or substance of the crime. In its legal sense, it does not refer to the ransom money in the crime of
kidnapping for ransom or to the body of the person murdered’ or, in this case, [the weapons used in
the commission of robbery with homicide]. ‘Since the corpus delictiis the fact of the commission of the
crime, this Court has ruled that even a single witness’ uncorroborated testimony, if credible may suffice
to prove it and warrant a conviction therefor. Corpus delictimay even be established by circumstantial
evidence.’"32

In this case, the corpus delictiwas established by the evidence on record. The prosecution eyewitnesses
testified that appellant and his cohorts used knives to perpetrate the crime. Their testimonies on the
existence and use of weapons in committing the offense was supported by the medical findings of Dr.
Salen who conducted the post-mortem examination. Dr. Salen found that Espino sustained several stab
wounds with varying measurements which were caused by sharp bladed instruments. Appellant is
therefore mistaken in arguing that the failure to present the weapons used in killing Espino was fatal to
the cause of the prosecution.

The defenses of denial and alibi cannot prosper.

We are in complete agreement with the RTC and the CA in finding lack of merit in appellant’s defenses
of denialand alibi.

Appellant claims that he was in a drinking session in his friend’s house in Villaruel, Tayuman,Manila,
from 10:00 p.m. of September 21, 2001 until 1:00 a.m. of the following day. He alleges to have slept
atthe place and went home at around 7:00 a.m. of September 22, 2001. According to appellant, he did
not depart from his friend’s house from the time they started drinking until he went home the
following morning.

Appellant’s alibi is unworthy of credence. Appellant himself testified that Villaruel is less than two
kilometers awayfrom Divisoria and that it would only take a few minutes to go toDivisoria from
Villaruel.33 Clearly, it was not impossible for appellant to be physicallypresent at the crime scene during
its commission. "For alibi to prosper, it muststrictly meet the requirements of time and place. It is not
enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but it must
also be demonstrated that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the crime scene at the
time the crime was committed."34

The fact that appellant presented witnesses to corroborate his alibi deserves scant consideration. Their
testimonies are viewed with skepticism due to the very nature of alibi the witnesses affirm. 35 Appellant
can easily fabricate an alibi and ask relatives and friends to corroborate it. 36

We have always ruled that alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and must be brushed aside
when the prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the identity of the accused. Moreover,
it is only axiomatic thatpositive testimony prevails over negative testimony. 37

The evidence was sufficient to establish the presence of abuse of superior strength.

Appellant argues that mere superiority in numbers does not indicate the presence of abuse of superior
strength. In the samemanner, appellant claims that the number of wounds inflicted on the victim is not
the criterion for the appreciation of this circumstance.

"There is abuse of superior strength when the offenders took advantage of their combined strength in
order to consummate the offense."38 Here, appellant and his four companions not only took advantage
of their numerical superiority, they were also armed with knives. Espino, on the other hand, was
unarmed and defenseless. While Ronnie was wrestling with Espino, appellant and his coaccused
simultaneously assaulted the latter. The unidentified companion locked his arm around the neck of
Espino while appellant and his co-accused stabbed and hacked him several times. While Espino was
lying defenseless on the ground, they divested him of all his valuables. Thereafter, they immediately
fled the scene of the crime.39 It is clear that they executed the criminal act by employing physical
superiorityover Espino.

The Proper Penalty

Nonetheless, the presence of abuse of superiorstrength should not result in qualifying the offense to
murder.1âwphi1 When abuse of superior strength obtains in the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, it is to be regarded as a generic circumstance, robbery withhomicide being a composite
crime with its own definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code. With the penalty of
reclusion perpetuato death imposed for committing robbery with homicide, 40 "[t]he generic
aggravating circumstance of[abuse of superior strength] attending the killing of the victim qualifies the
imposition of the death penalty on [appellant]."41 In view, however, of Republic Act No. 9346, entitled
"An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines," the penalty that must be
imposed on appellant is reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. 42
The Civil Liabilities
In robbery with homicide, civil indemnity and moral damages are awarded automatically without need
ofallegation and evidence other than the death of the victim owing to the commission of the
crime.43 Here, the RTC and CA granted civil indemnity and moral damages to Espino’s heirs in the
amount of ₱50,000.00 each. These courts were correct in granting the awards, but the awards should
have been ₱100,000.00 each.Recent jurisprudence44 declares that when the imposable penalty is
death, the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages shall be ₱100,000.00 each.

In granting compensatory damages, the prosecution must "prove the actual amount of loss with a
reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and the best evidence obtainable to
the injured party."45 ‘"Receipts should support claims of actual damages.’ Thus, as correctly held by the
[RTC] and affirmed by the CA, the amount of [₱62,000.00] incurred as funeral expenses can be
sustained since these are expenditures supported by receipts."46 The existence of one aggravating
circumstance also merits the grant of exemplary damages under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code.
Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, we likewiseaward ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages to the
victim’s heirs.47 An interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on all awards of damages from the
finality of this judgment until fully paid should likewise be granted to the heirs of Espino. 48

Lastly, the RTC did not err in refusing to award indemnity for loss of earning capacity of Espino despite
the testimony of his daughter that he earned ₱3,000.00 a day as a meat dealer. "Such indemnity is not
awarded in the absence of documentary evidence except where the victim was either self-employed or
was a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws. Since it was
neither alleged nor proved that the victim was either selfemployed or was a daily wage earner,
indemnity for loss of earning capacity cannot be awarded to the heirs of the victim." 49

WHEREFORE, the July 23, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02925 that
affirmed with modifications the December 5, 2006 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 02-200171 is AFFIRMED with further MODIFICATIONS. Appellant Bobby
Torres@ Roberto Torres y Nava is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Jaime M. Espino, ₱100,000.00
as civil indemnity; ₱100,000.00 as moral damages, and Pl00,000.00 as exemplary damages. The
interest rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all damages awarded from the finality of this Decision
until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.