Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. 193636               July 24, 2012
MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA, Petitioner,
vs.
P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, in his capacity as the PNP-Provincial Director of Ilocos Norte, and
P/SUPT. WILLIAM 0. FANG, in his capacity as Chief, Intelligence Division, PNP Provincial Office, Ilocos
Norte, Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

Before this Court is an Appeal by Certiorari (Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court) filed pursuant to Rule
191 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data,2 seeking a review of the 9 September 2010 Decision in
Special Proc. No. 14979 of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Laoag City, Branch 13 (RTC Br.
13).3 The questioned Decision denied petitioner the privilege of the writ of habeas data. 4

At the time the present Petition was filed, petitioner Marynette R. Gamboa (Gamboa) was the Mayor
of Dingras, Ilocos Norte.5 Meanwhile, respondent Police Senior Superintendent (P/SSUPT.) Marlou C.
Chan was the Officer-in-Charge, and respondent Police Superintendent (P/SUPT.) William O. Fang was
the Chief of the Provincial Investigation and Detective Management Branch, both of the Ilocos Norte
Police Provincial Office.6

On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative Order No. 275
(A.O. 275), "Creating an Independent Commission to Address the Alleged Existence of Private Armies in
the Country."7 The body, which was later on referred to as the Zeñarosa Commission, 8 was formed to
investigate the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to eliminating them
before the 10 May 2010 elections and dismantling them permanently in the future. 9 Upon the
conclusion of its investigation, the Zeñarosa Commission released and submitted to the Office of the
President a confidential report entitled "A Journey Towards H.O.P.E.: The Independent Commission
Against Private Armies’ Report to the President" (the Report). 10

Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte) conducted a
series of surveillance operations against her and her aides,11 and classified her as someone who keeps a
PAG.12 Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the
information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission,13 thereby causing her inclusion in the
Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs.14 More specifically, she pointed out the
following items reflected therein:

(a) The Report cited the PNP as its source for the portion regarding the status of PAGs in the
Philippines.15

(b) The Report stated that "x x x the PNP organized one dedicated Special Task Group (STG) for
each private armed group (PAG) to monitor and counteract their activities." 16
 (c) Attached as Appendix "F" of the Report is a tabulation generated by the PNP and captioned
as "Status of PAGs Monitoring by STGs as of April 19, 2010," which classifies PAGs in the country
according to region, indicates their identity, and lists the prominent personalities with whom
these groups are associated.17 The first entry in the table names a PAG, known as the Gamboa
Group, linked to herein petitioner Gamboa.18

(d) Statistics on the status of PAGs were based on data from the PNP, to wit:

The resolutions were the subject of a national press conference held in Malacañang on March
24, 2010 at which time, the Commission was also asked to comment on the PNP report that out
of one hundred seventeen (117) partisan armed groups validated, twenty-four (24) had been
dismantled with sixty-seven (67) members apprehended and more than eighty-six (86) firearms
confiscated.

Commissioner Herman Basbaño qualified that said statistics were based on PNP data but that
the more significant fact from his report is that the PNP has been vigilant in monitoring the
activities of these armed groups and this vigilance is largely due to the existence of the
Commission which has continued communicating with the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) and PNP personnel in the field to constantly provide data on the activities of the PAGs.
Commissioner Basbaño stressed that the Commission’s efforts have preempted the formation
of the PAGs because now everyone is aware that there is a body monitoring the PAGs
movement through the PNP. Commissioner Lieutenant General Edilberto Pardo Adan also
clarified that the PAGs are being destabilized so that their ability to threaten and sow fear
during the election has been considerably weakened. 19

(e) The Report briefly touched upon the validation system of the PNP:

Also, in order to provide the Commission with accurate data which is truly reflective of the situation in
the field, the PNP complied with the Commission’s recommendation that they revise their validation
system to include those PAGs previously listed as dormant. In the most recent briefing provided by the
PNP on April 26, 2010, there are one hundred seven (107) existing PAGs. Of these groups, the PNP
reported that seven (7) PAGs have been reorganized.20

On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news program the portion of the Report
naming Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG.21 Gamboa averred that her
association with a PAG also appeared on print media.22 Thus, she was publicly tagged as someone who
maintains a PAG on the basis of the unverified information that the PNP-Ilocos Norte gathered and
forwarded to the Zeñarosa Commission.23 As a result, she claimed that her malicious or reckless
inclusion in the enumeration of personalities maintaining a PAG as published in the Report also made
her, as well as her supporters and other people identified with her, susceptible to harassment and
police surveillance operations.24

Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa
filed a Petition dated 9 July 2010 for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their
capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.25 In her Petition, she prayed for the following reliefs: (a)
destruction of the unverified reports from the PNP-Ilocos Norte database; (b) withdrawal of all
information forwarded to higher PNP officials; (c) rectification of the damage done to her honor; (d)
ordering respondents to refrain from forwarding unverified reports against her; and (e) restraining
respondents from making baseless reports.26
The case was docketed as Special Proc. No. 14979 and was raffled to RTC Br. 13, which issued the
corresponding writ on 14 July 2010 after finding the Petition meritorious on its face. 27 Thus, the trial
court (a) instructed respondents to submit all information and reports forwarded to and used by the
Zeñarosa Commission as basis to include her in the list of persons maintaining PAGs; (b) directed
respondents, and any person acting on their behalf, to cease and desist from forwarding to the
Zeñarosa Commission, or to any other government entity, information that they may have gathered
against her without the approval of the court; (c) ordered respondents to make a written return of the
writ together with supporting affidavits; and (d) scheduled the summary hearing of the case on 23 July
2010.28

In their Return of the Writ, respondents alleged that they had acted within the bounds of their
mandate in conducting the investigation and surveillance of Gamboa. 29 The information stored in their
database supposedly pertained to two criminal cases in which she was implicated, namely: (a) a
Complaint for murder and frustrated murder docketed as NPS DOC No. 1-04-INQ-091-00077, and (b) a
Complaint for murder, frustrated murder and direct assault upon a person in authority, as well as
indirect assault and multiple attempted murder, docketed as NPS DOCKET No. 1-04-INV-10-A-00009. 30

Respondents likewise asserted that the Petition was incomplete for failing to comply with the following
requisites under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data: (a) the manner in which the right to privacy was
violated or threatened with violation and how it affected the right to life, liberty or security of Gamboa;
(b) the actions and recourses she took to secure the data or information; and (c) the location of the
files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in possession or in
control of the data or information.31 They also contended that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Data,
being limited to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, was not the proper remedy
to address the alleged besmirching of the reputation of Gamboa. 32

RTC Br. 13, in its assailed Decision dated 9 September 2010, dismissed the Petition. 33 The trial court
categorically ruled that the inclusion of Gamboa in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, as published in
the Report, constituted a violation of her right to privacy, to wit:

In this light, it cannot also be disputed that by her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs,
Gamboa’s right to privacy indubitably has been violated. The violation understandably affects her life,
liberty and security enormously. The untold misery that comes with the tag of having a PAG could even
be insurmountable. As she essentially alleged in her petition, she fears for her security that at any time
of the day the unlimited powers of respondents may likely be exercised to further malign and destroy
her reputation and to transgress her right to life.

By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, it is likewise undisputed that there was
certainly intrusion into Gamboa’s activities. It cannot be denied that information was gathered as basis
therefor. After all, under Administrative Order No. 275, the Zeñarosa Commission was tasked to
investigate the existence of private armies in the country, with all the powers of an investigative body
under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987.
x x x           x x x          x x x
By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, Gamboa alleged as she accused respondents,
who are public officials, of having gathered and provided information that made the Zeñarosa
Commission to include her in the list. Obviously, it was this gathering and forwarding of information
supposedly by respondents that petitioner barks at as unlawful. x x x.34
Despite the foregoing findings, RTC Br. 13 nevertheless dismissed the Petition on the ground that
Gamboa failed to prove through substantial evidence that the subject information originated from
respondents, and that they forwarded this database to the Zeñarosa Commission without the benefit
of prior verification.35 The trial court also ruled that even before respondents assumed their official
positions, information on her may have already been acquired. 36 Finally, it held that the Zeñarosa
Commission, as the body tasked to gather information on PAGs and authorized to disclose information
on her, should have been impleaded as a necessary if not a compulsory party to the Petition. 37

Gamboa then filed the instant Appeal by Certiorari dated 24 September 2010, 38 raising the following
assignment of errors:

1. The trial court erred in ruling that the Zeñarosa Commission be impleaded as either a
necessary or indispensable party;
2. The trial court erred in declaring that Gamboa failed to present sufficient proof to link
respondents as the informant to [sic] the Zeñarosa Commission;
3. The trial court failed to satisfy the spirit of Habeas Data;
4. The trial court erred in pronouncing that the reliance of the Zeñarosa Commission to [sic] the
PNP as alleged by Gamboa is an assumption;
5. The trial court erred in making a point that respondents are distinct to PNP as an agency. 39

On the other hand, respondents maintain the following arguments: (a) Gamboa failed to present
substantial evidence to show that her right to privacy in life, liberty or security was violated, and (b) the
trial court correctly dismissed the Petition on the ground that she had failed to present sufficient proof
showing that respondents were the source of the report naming her as one who maintains a PAG. 40

Meanwhile, Gamboa argues that although A.O. 275 was a lawful order, fulfilling the mandate to
dismantle PAGs in the country should be done in accordance with due process, such that the gathering
and forwarding of unverified information on her must be considered unlawful. 41 She also reiterates that
she was able to present sufficient evidence showing that the subject information originated from
respondents.42

In determining whether Gamboa should be granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data, this Court
is called upon to, first, unpack the concept of the right to privacy; second, explain the writ of habeas
data as an extraordinary remedy that seeks to protect the right to informational privacy; and finally,
contextualize the right to privacy vis-à-vis the state interest involved in the case at bar.

The Right to Privacy

The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty, has long been recognized as a constitutional
right. This Court, in Morfe v. Mutuc,43 thus enunciated:

The due process question touching on an alleged deprivation of liberty as thus resolved goes a long
way in disposing of the objections raised by plaintiff that the provision on the periodical submission of
a sworn statement of assets and liabilities is violative of the constitutional right to privacy. There is
much to be said for this view of Justice Douglas: "Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more
than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a
repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom." As a matter of
fact, this right to be let alone is, to quote from Mr. Justice Brandeis "the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men."
The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for his personality
as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect. xxx.
x x x           x x x          x x x
x x x In the leading case of Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Douglas, speaking for five members of the
Court, stated: "Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the
penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition
against the quartering of soldiers ‘in any house’ in time of peace without the consent of the owner is
another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the ‘right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.’ The
Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which
government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: ‘The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people." After referring to various American Supreme Court decisions, Justice Douglas
continued: "These cases bear witness that the right of privacy which presses for recognition is a
legitimate one."
x x x           x x x          x x x
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of
its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language of
Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of limited government has always included the idea that
governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed
one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control
of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of
limited government, safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing
it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector — protection, in
other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual — has become increasingly important as
modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological age — industrialization, urbanization,
and organization — operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern
terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a
democratic and a totalitarian society."44 (Emphases supplied)

In Ople v. Torres,45 this Court traced the constitutional and statutory bases of the right to privacy in
Philippine jurisdiction, to wit:

Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is recognized and enshrined
in several provisions of our Constitution. It is expressly recognized in section 3 (1) of the Bill of Rights:

Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.

Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of Rights, viz:

Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in
the interest of national security, public safety, or public health as may be provided by law.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form
unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that "every
person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the
privacy of another. It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for
damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of
letters and other private communications. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of
secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of
privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act
and the Intellectual Property Code. The Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise recognize
the privacy of certain information.

Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right
guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is
justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. x x x. 46 (Emphases supplied)

Clearly, the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be protected from intrusion or
constraint. However, in Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks, 47 this Court
underscored that the right to privacy is not absolute, viz:

With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has violated, suffice it to state
that privacy is not an absolute right. While it is true that Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution,
guarantees respect for the rights of persons affected by the legislative investigation, not every
invocation of the right to privacy should be allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry. In
Sabio v. Gordon, we have held that the right of the people to access information on matters of public
concern generally prevails over the right to privacy of ordinary financial transactions. In that case, we
declared that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest.
Employing the rational basis relationship test, as laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, there is no infringement
of the individual’s right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, in
this case, to ensure that the government agencies involved in regulating banking transactions
adequately protect the public who invest in foreign securities. Suffice it to state that this purpose
constitutes a reason compelling enough to proceed with the assailed legislative investigation. 48

Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state objective, the courts are
required to weigh both notions. In these cases, although considered a fundamental right, the right to
privacy may nevertheless succumb to an opposing or overriding state interest deemed legitimate and
compelling.
The Writ of Habeas Data

The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image,
privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to
enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. 49 It seeks to protect a person’s right to
control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being
collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.50 It must be emphasized that in
order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy
on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ
of Habeas Data reads:

Habeas data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in
life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.

The notion of informational privacy is still developing in Philippine law and jurisprudence. Considering
that even the Latin American habeas data, on which our own Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data is
rooted, finds its origins from the European tradition of data protection, 51 this Court can be guided by
cases on the protection of personal data decided by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Of
particular note is Leander v. Sweden,52 in which the ECHR balanced the right of citizens to be free from
interference in their private affairs with the right of the state to protect its national security. In this
case, Torsten Leander (Leander), a Swedish citizen, worked as a temporary replacement museum
technician at the Naval Museum, which was adjacent to a restricted military security zone. 53 He was
refused employment when the requisite personnel control resulted in an unfavorable outcome on the
basis of information in the secret police register, which was kept in accordance with the Personnel
Control Ordinance and to which he was prevented access.54 He claimed, among others, that this
procedure of security control violated Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights 55 on the
right to privacy, as nothing in his personal or political background would warrant his classification in
the register as a security risk.56

The ECHR ruled that the storage in the secret police register of information relating to the private life
of Leander, coupled with the refusal to allow him the opportunity to refute the same, amounted to an
interference in his right to respect for private life.57 However, the ECHR held that the interference was
justified on the following grounds: (a) the personnel control system had a legitimate aim, which was
the protection of national security,58 and (b) the Personnel Control Ordinance gave the citizens
adequate indication as to the scope and the manner of exercising discretion in the collection, recording
and release of information by the authorities.59 The following statements of the ECHR must be
emphasized:

58. The notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing social need
and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (see, inter alia, the
Gillow judgment of 24 November 1986, Series A no. 109, p. 22, § 55).

59. However, the Court recognises that the national authorities enjoy a margin of appreciation,
the scope of which will depend not only on the nature of the legitimate aim pursued but also on
the particular nature of the interference involved. In the instant case, the interest of the
respondent State in protecting its national security must be balanced against the seriousness of
the interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life.
There can be no doubt as to the necessity, for the purpose of protecting national security, for the
Contracting States to have laws granting the competent domestic authorities power, firstly, to collect
and store in registers not accessible to the public information on persons and, secondly, to use this
information when assessing the suitability of candidates for employment in posts of importance for
national security.

Admittedly, the contested interference adversely affected Mr. Leander’s legitimate interests through
the consequences it had on his possibilities of access to certain sensitive posts within the public
service. On the other hand, the right of access to public service is not as such enshrined in the
Convention (see, inter alia, the Kosiek judgment of 28 August 1986, Series A no. 105, p. 20, §§ 34-35),
and, apart from those consequences, the interference did not constitute an obstacle to his leading a
private life of his own choosing.

In these circumstances, the Court accepts that the margin of appreciation available to the respondent
State in assessing the pressing social need in the present case, and in particular in choosing the means
for achieving the legitimate aim of protecting national security, was a wide one.
x x x           x x x          x x x
66. The fact that the information released to the military authorities was not communicated to Mr.
Leander cannot by itself warrant the conclusion that the interference was not "necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security", as it is the very absence of such
communication which, at least partly, ensures the efficacy of the personnel control procedure (see,
mutatis mutandis, the above-mentioned Klass and Others judgment, Series A no. 28, p. 27, § 58).

The Court notes, however, that various authorities consulted before the issue of the Ordinance of
1969, including the Chancellor of Justice and the Parliamentary Ombudsman, considered it desirable
that the rule of communication to the person concerned, as contained in section 13 of the Ordinance,
should be effectively applied in so far as it did not jeopardise the purpose of the control (see paragraph
31 above).

67. The Court, like the Commission, thus reaches the conclusion that the safeguards contained in the
Swedish personnel control system meet the requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2). Having
regard to the wide margin of appreciation available to it, the respondent State was entitled to consider
that in the present case the interests of national security prevailed over the individual interests of the
applicant (see paragraph 59 above). The interference to which Mr. Leander was subjected cannot
therefore be said to have been disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. (Emphases supplied)

Leander illustrates how the right to informational privacy, as a specific component of the right to
privacy, may yield to an overriding legitimate state interest. In similar fashion, the determination of
whether the privilege of the writ of habeas data, being an extraordinary remedy, may be granted in
this case entails a delicate balancing of the alleged intrusion upon the private life of Gamboa and the
relevant state interest involved.

The collection and forwarding of information by the PNP vis-à-vis the interest of the state to dismantle
private armies.

The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed groups not
recognized by the duly constituted authority.60 It also provides for the establishment of one police force
that is national in scope and civilian in character, and is controlled and administered by a national
police commission.61
Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a
legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of
dismantling them permanently.

To enable the Zeñarosa Commission to achieve its goals, A.O. 275 clothed it with the powers of an
investigative body, including the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony or
evidence relevant to the investigation and use compulsory processes to produce documents, books,
and records.62 A.O. 275 likewise authorized the Zeñarosa Commission to deputize the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, the National Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, the PNP, and any
other law enforcement agency to assist the commission in the performance of its functions. 63

Meanwhile, the PNP, as the national police force, is empowered by law to (a) enforce all laws and
ordinances relative to the protection of lives and properties; (b) maintain peace and order and take all
necessary steps to ensure public safety; and (c) investigate and prevent crimes. 64

Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the foregoing powers and functions
accorded to the Zeñarosa Commission and the PNP, the latter collected information on individuals
suspected of maintaining PAGs, monitored them and counteracted their activities. 65 One of those
individuals is herein petitioner Gamboa.

This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained in the Report
listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, however, the
forwarding of information by the PNP to the Zeñarosa Commission was not an unlawful act that
violated or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security.

The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with the body
specifically created for the purpose of investigating the existence of these notorious groups. Moreover,
the Zeñarosa Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the
former’s mandate, and thus had the power to request assistance from the latter.

Following the pronouncements of the ECHR in Leander, the fact that the PNP released information to
the Zeñarosa Commission without prior communication to Gamboa and without affording her the
opportunity to refute the same cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy
since that act is an inherent and crucial component of intelligence-gathering and
investigation.1âwphi1 Additionally, Gamboa herself admitted that the PNP had a validation system,
which was used to update information on individuals associated with PAGs and to ensure that the data
mirrored the situation on the field.66 Thus, safeguards were put in place to make sure that the
information collected maintained its integrity and accuracy.

Pending the enactment of legislation on data protection, this Court declines to make any further
determination as to the propriety of sharing information during specific stages of intelligence
gathering. To do otherwise would supplant the discretion of investigative bodies in the
accomplishment of their functions, resulting in an undue encroachment on their competence.

However, to accord the right to privacy with the kind of protection established in existing law and
jurisprudence, this Court nonetheless deems it necessary to caution these investigating entities that
information-sharing must observe strict confidentiality. Intelligence gathered must be released
exclusively to the authorities empowered to receive the relevant information. After all, inherent to the
right to privacy is the freedom from "unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into
one’s private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities." 67

In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the Report, but emphasized its confidential
nature.1âwphi1 That it was leaked to third parties and the media was regrettable, even warranting
reproach. But it must be stressed that Gamboa failed to establish that respondents were responsible
for this unintended disclosure. In any event, there are other reliefs available to her to address the
purported damage to her reputation, making a resort to the extraordinary remedy of the writ of
habeas data unnecessary and improper.

Finally, this Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that her
inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to
harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently explained that
the investigations conducted against her were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was
implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome.

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the
alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the
PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ
of habeas data must be denied.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed Decision in Special Proc. No. 14979
dated 9 September 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Laoag City, Br. 13, insofar as it denies Gamboa the
privilege of the writ of habeas data, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. 193652               August 5, 2014
Infant JULIAN YUSA Y CARAM, represented by his mother, MA. CHRISTINA YUSAY CARAM, Petitioner,
vs.
Atty. MARIJOY D. SEGUI, Atty. SALLY D. ESCUTIN, VILMA B. CABRERA, and CELIA C.
YANGCO, Respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, and Section 191 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo2 seeking to set aside the August 17,
20103 and September 6, 20104 Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 106 of Quezon City, in
Sp. Proc. Case No. Q-10-67604. The RTC had dismissed petitioner’s petition for the issuance ofa writ of
amparo which petitioner filed in order for her to regain parental authority and custody of Julian Yusay
Caram (Baby Julian), her biological child, from the respondent officers of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD). The factual antecedents as gleaned from the records follow:
Petitioner Ma. Christina Yusay Caram(Christina) had an amorous relationship with Marcelino Gicano
Constantino III (Marcelino) and eventually became pregnant with the latter’s child without the benefit
of marriage. After getting pregnant, Christina mislead Marcelino into believing that she had an abortion
when in fact she proceeded to complete the term of her pregnancy. During this time, she intended to
have the child adopted through Sun and Moon Home for Children (Sun and Moon) in Parañaque City to
avoid placing her family ina potentially embarrassing situation for having a second illegitimate son. 5

On July 26, 2009, Christina gavebirth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez Memorial MedicalCenter,
Marikina City.6 Sun and Moon shouldered all the hospital and medical expenses. On August 13, 2009,
Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment 7 to the
DSWD.

On November 26, 2009, Marcelino suffered a heart attack and died 8 without knowing about the birth
of his son. Thereafter, during the wake, Christina disclosed to Marcelino’s family that she and the
deceased had a son that she gave up for adoption due to financial distress and initial embarrassment.
Marcelino’s family was taken aback by the revelation and sympathized with Christina. After the
emotional revelation, they vowed to help her recover and raise the baby. 9 On November 27, 2009, the
DSWD, through Secretary Esperanza I. Cabral issued a certificate 10 declaring Baby Julian as "Legally
Available for Adoption." A local matching conference was held on January 27, 2010 and on February 5,
2010, Baby Julian was "matched" with the spouses Vergel and Filomina Medina (Medina Spouses) of
the Kaisahang Bahay Foundation. Supervised trial custody then commenced.11

On May 5, 2010, Christina who had changed her mind about the adoption, wrote a letter to the
DSWDasking for the suspension of Baby Julian’s adoption proceedings. She alsosaid she wanted her
family back together.12

On May 28, 2010, the DSWD, through respondent Atty. Marijoy D. Segui, sent a Memorandum 13 to
DSWD Assistant Secretary Vilma B. Cabrera informing her that the certificate declaring Baby Julian
legally available for adoption had attained finality on November 13, 2009, or three months after
Christina signed the Deed of Voluntary Commitment which terminated her parental authority and
effectively made Baby Julian a ward of the State. The said Memorandum was noted by respondent
Atty. Sally D. Escutin, Director IV of the Legal Service, DSWD.

On July 12, 2010, Noel Gicano Constantino, Marcelino’s brother, sent a letter to Atty. Escutin informing
her that a DNA testing was scheduled on July 16, 2010 at the DNA Analysis Laboratory at the University
of the Philippines.14

On July 16, 2010, Assistant Secretary Cabrera sent a letter 15 to Noel Constantino stating that it would
not allow Baby Julian to undergo DNA testing. Assistant Secretary Cabrera informed Noel Constantino
that the procedures followed relative to the certification on the availability of the child for adoption
and the child’s subsequent placement to prospective adoptive parents were proper, and that the
DSWD was no longer in the position to stop the adoption process. Assistant Secretary Cabrera further
stated that should Christina wish to reacquire her parental authority over Baby Julian or halt the
adoption process, she may bring the matter to the regular courts as the reglementary period for her to
regain her parental rights had already lapsed under Section 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9523. 16

On July 27, 2010, Christina filed a petition 17 for the issuance of a writ of amparo before the RTC of
Quezon City seeking to obtain custody of Baby Julian from Atty. Segui, Atty. Escutin, Assistant Secretary
Cabrera and Acting Secretary Celia C. Yangco, all of the DSWD.
In her petition, Christina accused respondents of "blackmailing" her into surrendering custody of her
childto the DSWD utilizing what she claims to be an invalid certificate of availability for adoption which
respondents allegedly used as basis to misrepresent that all legal requisites for adoption of the minor
child had been complied with.

Christina argued that by making these misrepresentations, the respondents had acted beyond the
scope of their legal authority thereby causing the enforced disappearance of the said child and
depriving her of her custodial rights and parental authority over him.

On the basis of the said petition,the RTC, Branch 106 of Quezon City, through its Presiding Judge, the
Honorable Angelene Mary W. Quimpo-Sale, issued a Writ of Amparo 18 on July 28, 2010 commanding
the four respondents to produce the body of Baby Julian at a hearing scheduled on August 4, 2010.
Respondents were alsorequired to file their verified written return to the writ pursuant to Section
919 of the Amparo Rule, within five working days from the service of the writ.

The respondents complied with the writ and filed their Return20 on August 2, 2010 praying that the
petition be denied for being the improper remedy to avail of in a case relating toa biological parent’s
custodial rights over her child.

On August 4, 2010, respondents appeared before the RTC but respondents did not bring the child,
stating that threats of kidnapping were made on the child and his caregivers. To give respondents
another chance, the RTC reset the hearing to August 5, 2010.

At the August 5, 2010 hearing, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance as
representative of the State and prayed that its lawyers be given time to file their memorandum or
position paper in this case. In turn, the RTC acknowledged the appearance of the OSG and allowed its
representatives to actively participate in the arguments raised during the said hearing. Relative to the
matter of the parties submitting additional pleadings, Judge Sale narrowed the issues to be discussed
by providing for the following guidelines, thus:

To abbreviate the proceedings, in view of all the manifestations and counter-manifestations made by
the counsels, the court enjoined the parties to file their respective position papers on the following
issues:

1. Whether or not this court has jurisdiction over the instant case;
2. Whether or not this petition isthe proper remedy based on the facts of the case and prayer in the
petition; and
3. Whether or not the prayer in the petition should be granted and custody of the child be given to his
biological mother.

The parties were given five (5) days from today to file their respective position papers based on these
three main issues. They may include other related issues they deem essential for the resolution of this
case. Set this case for further hearing, if necessary, on August 18, 2010 at 9:00 a.m. 21

In the same order, Judge Sale alsoacknowledged that the child subject of the case was brought before
the court and the petitioner was allowed to see him and take photographs of him.

On August 17, 2010, the RTC dismissed the petition for issuance of a writ of amparo without prejudice
to the filing of the appropriate action in court. The RTC held that Christina availed of the wrong remedy
to regain custody of her child Baby Julian.22 The RTC further stated that Christina should have filed a
civil case for custody of her child as laid down in the Family Code and the Rule on Custody of Minors
and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. If there is extreme urgency to secure
custody of a minor who has been illegallydetained by another, a petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus may be availed of, either as a principal or ancillary remedy, pursuant to the Rule on
Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus inRelation to Custody of Minors. 23

On August 20, 2010, Christina filed a motion for reconsideration 24 arguing that since the RTC assumed
jurisdiction of the petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo, the latter is duty-bound to dispose the
case on the merits.25 The RTC, however, deniedChristina’s motion for reconsideration on September 6,
2010 maintaining that the latter availed of the wrong remedy and that the Supreme Court intended the
writ of amparo to address the problem of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. 26

On September 28, 2010, Christina directly elevated the case before this Court, via a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, in relation to Section 19
of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. In her petition, Christina prayed that the Court (1) set aside the
August 17, 2010 and September 6, 2010 Orders of the RTC, (2) declare R.A. No. 9523 unconstitutional
for being contrary to A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC,27 which was promulgated by the Supreme Court, and for
violating the doctrine of separation of powers, (3) declare the "enforced separation" between her and
Baby Julian as violative of her rights to life, liberty and security, and (4) grant her the privilege of
availing the benefits of a writ of amparo so she could be reunited with her son. 28

The only relevant issue presented before the Court worthy of attention is whether a petition for a writ
of amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining parental authority and custody of a minor child. This
Court will not belabor to discuss Christina’s argumentsrelating to the supposedunconstitutionality or
R.A. No. 9523 as Congress has the plenary power to repeal, alter and modify existing laws 29 and A.M.
No. 02-6-02-SC functions only as a means to enforce the provisions of all adoption and adoption-
related statutes before the courts.

Now, in her petition, Christina argues that the life, liberty and security of Baby Julian is being violated
or threatened by the respondent DSWD officers’ enforcement of an illegal Deed of Voluntary
Commitment between her and Sun and Moon. She claims thatshe had been "blackmailed" through the
said Deed by the DSWD officers and Sun and Moon’s representatives into surrendering her child
thereby causing the "forced separation" of the said infant from his mother. Furthermore, she also
reiterates that the respondent DSWD officers acted beyond the scope of their authority when they
deprived her of Baby Julian’s custody.30

The Court rejects petitioner’s contentions and denies the petition.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides as follows:

SECTION 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparois a remedy available to any person whose right
to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful actor omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

In the landmark case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et al., 31 this Court held:
[T]he AmparoRule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and
"enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to
threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without
legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended
by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official
or organized groupsor private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the
government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of
law.

This pronouncement on the coverage of the writ was further cemented in the latter case of Lozada, Jr.
v. Macapagal-Arroyo32 where this Court explicitly declared that as it stands, the writ of amparo is
confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof. As to
what constitutes "enforced disappearance," the Court in Navia v. Pardico 33 enumerated the
elementsconstituting "enforced disappearances" as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of
R.A. No. 985134 to wit:

(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State ora
political organization;

(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparopetition; and,

(d) that the intention for such refusal isto remove subject person from the protection of the law
for a prolonged period of time.1âwphi1

In this case, Christina alleged that the respondent DSWD officers caused her "enforced separation"
from Baby Julian and that their action amounted to an "enforced disappearance" within the context of
the Amparo rule. Contrary to her position, however, the respondent DSWD officers never concealed
Baby Julian's whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD's May 28, 2010
Memorandum35 explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina Spouses when she
filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition for review on certiorari
that the respondent DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing held in the
afternoon of August 5, 2010.36 There is therefore, no "enforced disappearance" as used in the context
of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth elements are missing.

Christina's directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and placing the
latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify the
child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental
authority over the child and contesting custody over him.37 Since it is extant from the pleadings filed
that what is involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who,
for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot
be properly applied.

To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial killings
and enforced disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of
the unlawful act or omission is a public official or employee or a private individual. It is envisioned
basically to protect and guarantee the right to life, liberty and security of persons, free from fears and
threats that vitiate the quality of life.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 17, 2010 and September 6, 2010 Orders of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 106, Quezon City in Sp. Proc. Case No. Q-10-67604 are AFFIRMED without
prejudice to petitioner's right to avail of proper legal remedies afforded to her by law and related rules.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. 182161               December 3, 2009
Reverend Father ROBERT P. REYES, Petitioner,
vs.
RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as the secretary of the COURT OF APPEALS, secretary
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND COMMISSIONER MARCELINO C. LIBANAN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE
COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

For resolution is the petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the February 4,
2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. 00011 which dismissed the petition for the
issuance of the writ of amparo under A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, as amended. It also assails the CA’s
Resolution dated March 25, 2008, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid
February 4, 2008 Decision.

The undisputed facts as found by the CA are as follows:

Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on November 30, 2007. In the
morning of November 30, 2007, petitioner together with fifty (50) others, were brought to Camp
Crame to await inquest proceedings. In the evening of the same day, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
Panel of Prosecutors, composed of Emmanuel Y. Velasco, Phillip L. Dela Cruz and Aristotle M. Reyes,
conducted inquest proceedings to ascertain whether or not there was probable cause to hold
petitioner and the others for trial on charges of Rebellion and/or Inciting to Rebellion.

On December 1, 2007, upon the request of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG),
respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales issued Hold Departure Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering
respondent Commissioner of Immigration to include in the Hold Departure List of the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID) the name of petitioner and 49 others relative to the
aforementioned case in the interest of national security and public safety.
On December 2, 2007, after finding probable cause against petitioner and 36 others for the crime of
Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors filed an
Information docketed as I.S. No. 2007-1045 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 150 of Makati City.

On December 7, 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and
Release of the Accused Fr. Reyes Upon Recognizance asserting that the DOJ panel failed to produce any
evidence indicating his specific participation in the crime charged; and that under the Constitution, the
determination of probable cause must be made personally by a judge.

On December 13, 2007, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the charge for Rebellion against petitioner
and 17 others for lack of probable cause. The trial court ratiocinated that the evidence submitted by
the DOJ Panel of Investigating Prosecutors failed to show that petitioner and the other accused-
civilians conspired and confederated with the accused-soldiers in taking arms against the government;
that petitioner and other accused-civilians were arrested because they ignored the call of the police
despite the deadline given to them to come out from the 2nd Floor of the Hotel and submit themselves
to the police authorities; that mere presence at the scene of the crime and expressing one’s sentiments
on electoral and political reforms did not make them conspirators absent concrete evidence that the
accused-civilians knew beforehand the intent of the accused-soldiers to commit rebellion; and that the
cooperation which the law penalizes must be one that is knowingly and intentionally rendered.

On December 18, 2007, petitioner’s counsel Atty. Francisco L. Chavez wrote the DOJ Secretary
requesting the lifting of HDO No. 45 in view of the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 07-3126.

On even date, Secretary Gonzales replied to petitioner’s letter stating that the DOJ could not act on
petitioner’s request until Atty. Chavez’s right to represent petitioner is settled in view of the fact that a
certain Atty. J. V. Bautista representing himself as counsel of petitioner had also written a letter to the
DOJ.

On January 3, 2008, petitioner filed the instant petition claiming that despite the dismissal of the
rebellion case against petitioner, HDO No. 45 still subsists; that on December 19, 2007, petitioner was
held by BID officials at the NAIA as his name is included in the Hold Departure List; that had it not been
for the timely intervention of petitioner’s counsel, petitioner would not have been able to take his
scheduled flight to Hong Kong; that on December 26, 2007, petitioner was able to fly back to the
Philippines from Hong Kong but every time petitioner would present himself at the NAIA for his flights
abroad, he stands to be detained and interrogated by BID officers because of the continued inclusion
of his name in the Hold Departure List; and that the Secretary of Justice has not acted on his request
for the lifting of HDO No. 45. Petitioner further maintained that immediate recourse to the Supreme
Court for the availment of the writ is exigent as the continued restraint on petitioner’s right to travel is
illegal.

On January 24, 2008, respondents represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed the
Return of the Writ raising the following affirmative defenses: 1) that the Secretary of Justice is
authorized to issue Hold Departure Orders under the DOJ Circulars No. 17, Series of 1998 2 and No. 18
Series of 20073 pursuant to his mandate under the Administrative Code of 1987 as ahead of the
principal law agency of the government; 2) that HDO No. 45 dated December 1, 2007 was issued by the
Sec. Gonzales in the course of the preliminary investigation of the case against herein petitioner upon
the request of the DILG; 3) that the lifting of HDO No. 45 is premature in view of public respondent’s
pending Motion for Reconsideration dated January 3, 2008 filed by the respondents of the Order dated
December 13, 2007 of the RTC dismissing Criminal Case No. 07-3126 for Rebellion for lack of probable
cause; 4) that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies by filing a motion to lift HDO No. 45
before the DOJ; and 5) that the constitutionality of Circulars No. 17 and 18 can not be attacked
collaterally in an amparo proceeding.

During the hearing on January 25, 2008 at 10:00 a.m. at the Paras Hall of the Court of Appeals,
counsels for both parties appeared. Petitioner’s counsel Atty. Francisco Chavez manifested that
petitioner is currently in Hong Kong; that every time petitioner would leave and return to the country,
the immigration officers at the NAIA detain and interrogate him for several minutes because of the
existing HDO; that the power of the DOJ Secretary to issue HDO has no legal basis; and that petitioner
did not file a motion to lift the HDO before the RTC nor the DOJ because to do so would be tantamount
to recognizing the power of the DOJ Secretary to issue HDO.

For respondents’ part, the Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG) maintained that the Secretary of the
DOJ’s power to issue HDO springs from its mandate under the Administrative Code to investigate and
prosecute offenders as the principal law agency of the government; that in its ten-year existence, the
constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 17 has not been challenged except now; and that on January 3,
2008, the DOJ Panel of Investigating Prosecutors had filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of
Dismissal of the trial court.

On February 1, 2008, petitioner filed a Manifestation attaching thereto a copy of the Order dated
January 31, 2008 of the trial court denying respondent DOJ’s Motion for Reconsideration for utter lack
of merit. The trial court also observed that the said Motion should be dismissed outright for being filed
out of time. 4

The petition for a writ of amparo is anchored on the ground that respondents violated petitioner’s
constitutional right to travel. Petitioner argues that the DOJ Secretary has no power to issue a Hold
Departure Order (HDO) and the subject HDO No. 45 has no legal basis since Criminal Case No. 07-3126
has already been dismissed.

On February 4, 2008, the CA rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the petition and denying the
privilege of the writ of amparo.

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration5 thereon was also denied in the assailed Resolution6 dated
March 25, 2008.

Hence, the present petition which is based on the following grounds:

I.
THE DOJ SECRETARY’S ARROGATION OF POWER AND USURPATION OF AUTHORITY TO ISSUE A HOLD
DEPARTURE ORDER CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED THROUGH A RATIONALE THAT IT HAS SUPPOSEDLY BEEN
"REGULARLY EXERCISED IN THE PAST" OR HAS "NEVER BEEN QUESTIONED (IN THE PAST).
II.
THE DOJ HAS CLAIMED A POWER TO ISSUE AN HDO INDEPENDENT OF THAT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURTS, HENCE, PETITIONER CANNOT MERELY RELY ON THE RESIDUAL POWER OF THE RTC MAKATI IN
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 07-3126 TO ASSAIL SUCH CLAIMED POWER.
III.
THE UTMOST EXIGENCY OF THE PETITION IS EXEMPLIFIED BY THE CONTINUING ACTUAL RESTRAINT ON
PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO TRAVEL THROUGH THE MAINTENANCE OF HIS NAME IN THE HDO LIST AND
DOES NOT SIMPLY HINGE ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO TRAVEL
DESPITE SUCH A RESTRAINT.
IV.
DOJ CIRCULAR 17 SERIES OF 1998 PROVIDES NO STATUTORY BASIS FOR THE DOJ SECRETARY’S
CLAIMED POWER TO ISSUE AN HDO FOR IT IS NOT A STATUTE. THE CIRCULAR ITSELF APPEARS NOT TO
BE BASED ON ANY STATUTE, HENCE, IT DOES NOT HAVE THE FORCE OF LAW AND NEED NOT BE
ATTACKED IN A DIRECT PROCEEDING.7

Petitioner maintains that the writ of amparo does not only exclusively apply to situations of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances but encompasses the whole gamut of liberties
protected by the Constitution. Petitioner argues that "[liberty] includes the right to exist and the right
to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude and includes the right of the citizens to be free
to use his faculties in all lawful ways." Part of the right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution is the
right of a person to travel.

In their Comment,8 both respondents Secretary Gonzalez and Commissioner Libanan argue that: 1)
HDO No. 45 was validly issued by the Secretary of Justice in accordance with Department of Justice
Circular No. 17, Series of 1998,9 and Circular No. 18, Series of 2007,10 which were issued pursuant to
said Secretary’s mandate under the Administrative Code of 1987, as head of the principal law agency of
the government, to investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders, and provide
immigration regulatory services; and; 2) the issue of the constitutionality of the DOJ Secretary’s
authority to issue hold departure orders under DOJ Circulars Nos. 17 and 18 is not within the ambit of a
writ of amparo.

The case hinges on the issue as to whether or not petitioner’s right to liberty has been violated or
threatened with violation by the issuance of the subject HDO, which would entitle him to the privilege
of the writ of amparo.

The petition must fail.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:

Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right
to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

The Court, in Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al., 11 made a categorical pronouncement
that the Amparo Rule in its present form is confined to these two instances of "extralegal killings" and
"enforced disappearances," or to threats thereof, thus:

x x x As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and
"enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to
threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without
legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended
by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official
or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the
government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of
law."12

In Tapuz v. Del Rosario,13 the Court laid down the basic principle regarding the rule on the writ of
amparo as follows:

To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of
available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address
violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent
remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these
Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a
writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo – in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its
issuance demands – requires that every petition for the issuance of the writ must be supported by
justifying allegations of fact, to wit:

"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;

(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or
omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an
assumed appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is
committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and
addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the
investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of
the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission;
and
(f) The relief prayed for.

The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs." 14

The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate
facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what
extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is
being committed. (Emphasis supplied)

Here, petitioner invokes this extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo for the protection of his right
to travel. He insists that he is entitled to the protection covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo

because the HDO is a continuing actual restraint on his right to travel. The Court is thus called upon to
rule whether or not the right to travel is covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under Section 1 of the Rules
thereon are the following: (1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right to security.
In Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.,15 the Court explained the concept of right to life
in this wise:

While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 guarantees essentially the right to be alive- upon
which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee
of the secure quality of this life, viz: "The life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear
that his person and property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived
with the assurance that the government he established and consented to, will protect the security of
his person and property. The ideal of security in life and property… pervades the whole history of man.
It touches every aspect of man’s existence." In a broad sense, the right to security of person "emanates
in a person’s legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his
reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is
invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment
of life according to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual." 16

The right to liberty, on the other hand, was defined in the City of Manila, et al. v. Hon. Laguio, Jr., 17 in
this manner:

Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist
and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere
freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of
man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such
restraint as are necessary for the common welfare." x x x

Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.18 thoroughly expounded on the import of the right
to security, thus:

A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise of this
right.

First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear." In its "whereas" clauses, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that "a world in which human beings shall enjoy
freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest
aspiration of the common people." (emphasis supplied) Some scholars postulate that "freedom from
fear" is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an individual international human right. It is
the "right to security of person" as the word "security" itself means "freedom from fear." Article 3 of
the UDHR provides, viz:

Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

xxx
The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.

In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, "freedom from fear" is the right and any threat to the
rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a
stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-
founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the
variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past experience with the
stimulus. Thus, in the amparo context, it is more correct to say that the "right to security" is actually
the "freedom from threat." Viewed in this light, the "threatened with violation" Clause in the latter
part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the
earlier part of the provision.

Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security.
Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, one’s body cannot be
searched or invaded without a search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may
constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of
physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries
constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a
person.
xxx
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one’s rights by the government. In
the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty
under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from
threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to
security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full respect
for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief
guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of
person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when
they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the
government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances
(or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. x x x (emphasis
supplied) 19

The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another. 20 As we have stated in Marcos
v. Sandiganbayan,21 "xxx a person’s right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the
very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases, whether the accused should be
permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a matter of the court’s sound
discretion." 22

Here, the restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal
case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to travel
was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right to life,
liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy.

In Canlas et al. v. Napico Homeowners Association I – XIII, Inc. et al., 23 this Court ruled that:

This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court is intended for the protection
of the highest possible rights of any person, which is his or her right to life, liberty and security. The
Court will not spare any time or effort on its part in order to give priority to petitions of this nature.
However, the Court will also not waste its precious time and effort on matters not covered by the writ.

We find the direct recourse to this Court inappropriate, considering the provision of Section 22 of the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo which reads:

Section 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. – When a criminal action has been commenced, no
separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The reliefs under the writ shall be available by motion in
the criminal case.1avvphi1
The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under the writ of
amparo.

Pursuant to the aforementioned Section 22, petitioner should have filed with the RTC-Makati a motion
to lift HDO No. 45 in Criminal Case No. 07-3126. Petitioner, however, did not file in the RTC-Makati a
motion to lift the DOJ’s HDO, as his co-accused did in the same criminal case. Petitioner argues that it
was not the RTC-Makati but the DOJ that issued the said HDO, and that it is his intention not to limit his
remedy to the lifting of the HDO but also to question before this Court the constitutionality of the
power of the DOJ Secretary to issue an HDO.24 We quote with approval the CA’s ruling on this matter:

The said provision [Section 22] is an affirmation by the Supreme Court of its pronouncement in Crespo
v. Mogul25 that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case such as its
dismissal or its continuation rests on the sound discretion of the court. Despite the denial of
respondent’s MR of the dismissal of the case against petitioner, the trial court has not lost control over
Criminal Case No. 07-3126 which is still pending before it. By virtue of its residual power, the court a
quo retains the authority to entertain incidents in the instant case to the exclusion of even this Court.
The relief petitioner seeks which is the lifting of the HDO was and is available by motion in the criminal
case. (Sec. 22, Rule on the Writ of amparo, supra). 26

Even in civil cases pending before the trial courts, the Court has no authority to separately and directly
intervene through the writ of amparo, as elucidated in Tapuz v. Del Rosario, 27 thus:

Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the possessory dispute and
the reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no point in separately and directly intervening
through a writ of amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty
or securitythe personal concern that the writ is intended to protectis immediately in danger or
threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an application
for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari,
applying by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal case.

Additionally, petitioner is seeking the extraordinary writ of amparo due to his apprehension that the
DOJ may deny his motion to lift the HDO.28 Petitioner’s apprehension is at best merely speculative.
Thus, he has failed to show any clear threat to his right to liberty actionable through a petition for
a writ of amparo. The absence of an actual controversy also renders it unnecessary for us on this
occasion to pass upon the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 17, Series of 1998 (Prescribing Rules and
Regulations Governing the Issuance of Hold Departure Orders); and Circular No. 18, Series of 2007
(Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance and Implementation of Watchlist Orders
and for Other Purposes).

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the CA dated February 4, 2008 in CA-
G.R. No. 00011 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. 180906             October 7, 2008
THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO, respondents.

DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:

While victims of enforced disappearances are separated from the rest of the world behind secret walls,
they are not separated from the constitutional protection of their basic rights. The constitution is an
overarching sky that covers all in its protection. The case at bar involves the rights to life, liberty and
security in the first petition for a writ of Amparo filed before this Court.

This is an appeal via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 19 1 of
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, seeking to reverse and set aside on both questions of fact and law, the
Decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. AMPARO No. 00001, entitled "Raymond
Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo, petitioners, versus The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff,
Armed Forces of the Philippines, respondents."

This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO)2 filed before this Court by herein respondents (therein petitioners) on August 23, 2007 to stop
herein petitioners (therein respondents) and/or their officers and agents from depriving them of their
right to liberty and other basic rights. Therein petitioners also sought ancillary remedies, Protective
Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders, and all other legal and
equitable reliefs under Article VIII, Section 5(5) 3 of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the
Rules of Court. In our Resolution dated August 24, 2007, we (1) ordered the Secretary of the
Department of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP, their agents, representatives, or
persons acting in their stead, including but not limited to the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit
(CAFGU) to submit their Comment; and (2) enjoined them from causing the arrest of therein
petitioners, or otherwise restricting, curtailing, abridging, or depriving them of their right to life, liberty,
and other basic rights as guaranteed under Article III, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution.5

While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on
October 24, 2007. Forthwith, therein petitioners filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat
Existing Petition as Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and
Final Amparo Reliefs. They prayed that: (1) the petition be considered a Petition for the Writ
of Amparo under Sec. 266 of the Amparo Rule; (2) the Court issue the writ commanding therein
respondents to make a verified return within the period provided by law and containing the specific
matter required by law; (3) they be granted the interim reliefs allowed by the Amparo Rule and all
other reliefs prayed for in the petition but not covered by the Amparo Rule; (4) the Court, after
hearing, render judgment as required in Sec. 187 of the Amparo Rule; and (5) all other just and
equitable reliefs.8

On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23, 2007 Petition as a petition under
the Amparo Rule and further resolved, viz:

WHEREFORE, let a WRIT OF AMPARO be issued to respondents requiring them to file with the
CA (Court of Appeals) a verified written return within five (5) working days from service of the
 writ. We REMAND the petition to the CA and designate the Division of Associate Justice Lucas P.
Bersamin to conduct the summary hearing on the petition on November 8, 2007 at 2:00 p.m.
and decide the petition in accordance with the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.9

On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of therein petitioners (herein
respondents), the dispositive portion of which reads, viz:

ACCORDINGLY, the PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO is GRANTED.

The respondents SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and AFP CHIEF OF STAFF are hereby

REQUIRED:

1. To furnish to the petitioners and to this Court within five days from notice of this
decision all official and unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken in connection
with their case, except those already on file herein;

2. To confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt Hilario aka
Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas within five days from notice of this decision.

3. To cause to be produced to this Court all medical reports, records and charts, reports
of any treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the
petitioners, to include a list of medical and (sic) personnel (military and civilian) who
attended to them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007 within five days from
notice of this decision.

The compliance with this decision shall be made under the signature and oath of respondent
AFP Chief of Staff or his duly authorized deputy, the latter's authority to be express and made
apparent on the face of the sworn compliance with this directive.

SO ORDERED.10

Hence, this appeal. In resolving this appeal, we first unfurl the facts as alleged by herein respondents:

Respondent Raymond Manalo recounted that about one or two weeks before February 14, 2006,
several uniformed and armed soldiers and members of the CAFGU summoned to a meeting all the
residents of their barangay in San Idelfonso, Bulacan. Respondents were not able to attend as they
were not informed of the gathering, but Raymond saw some of the soldiers when he passed by
the barangay hall.11

On February 14, 2006, Raymond was sleeping in their house in Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan. At past noon, several armed soldiers wearing white shirts, fatigue pants and army boots,
entered their house and roused him. They asked him if he was Bestre, but his mother, Ester Manalo,
replied that he was Raymond, not Bestre. The armed soldier slapped him on both cheeks and nudged
him in the stomach. He was then handcuffed, brought to the rear of his house, and forced to the
ground face down. He was kicked on the hip, ordered to stand and face up to the light, then forcibly
brought near the road. He told his mother to follow him, but three soldiers stopped her and told her to
stay.12
Among the men who came to take him, Raymond recognized brothers Michael de la Cruz, Madning de
la Cruz, "Puti" de la Cruz, and "Pula" de la Cruz, who all acted as lookout. They were all members of the
CAFGU and residing in Manuzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. He also recognized brothers Randy Mendoza
and Rudy Mendoza, also members of the CAFGU. While he was being forcibly taken, he also saw
outside of his house two barangay councilors, Pablo Cunanan and Bernardo Lingasa, with some
soldiers and armed men.13

The men forced Raymond into a white L300 van. Once inside, he was blindfolded. Before being
blindfolded, he saw the faces of the soldiers who took him. Later, in his 18 months of captivity, he
learned their names. The one who drove the van was Rizal Hilario alias Rollie Castillo, whom he
estimated was about 40 years of age or older. The leader of the team who entered his house and
abducted him was "Ganata." He was tall, thin, curly-haired and a bit old. Another one of his abductors
was "George" who was tall, thin, white-skinned and about 30 years old. 14

The van drove off, then came to a stop. A person was brought inside the van and made to sit beside
Raymond. Both of them were beaten up. On the road, he recognized the voice of the person beside
him as his brother Reynaldo's. The van stopped several times until they finally arrived at a house.
Raymond and Reynaldo were each brought to a different room. With the doors of their rooms left
open, Raymond saw several soldiers continuously hitting his brother Reynaldo on the head and other
parts of his body with the butt of their guns for about 15 minutes. After which, Reynaldo was brought
to his (Raymond's) room and it was his (Raymond's) turn to be beaten up in the other room. The
soldiers asked him if he was a member of the New People's Army. Each time he said he was not, he
was hit with the butt of their guns. He was questioned where his comrades were, how many soldiers he
had killed, and how many NPA members he had helped. Each time he answered none, they hit him. 15

In the next days, Raymond's interrogators appeared to be high officials as the soldiers who beat him up
would salute them, call them "sir," and treat them with respect. He was in blindfolds when
interrogated by the high officials, but he saw their faces when they arrived and before the blindfold
was put on. He noticed that the uniform of the high officials was different from those of the other
soldiers. One of those officials was tall and thin, wore white pants, tie, and leather shoes, instead of
combat boots. He spoke in Tagalog and knew much about his parents and family, and a habeas
corpus case filed in connection with the respondents' abduction.16 While these officials interrogated
him, Raymond was not manhandled. But once they had left, the soldier guards beat him up. When the
guards got drunk, they also manhandled respondents. During this time, Raymond was fed only at night,
usually with left-over and rotten food.17

On the third week of respondents' detention, two men arrived while Raymond was sleeping and beat
him up. They doused him with urine and hot water, hit his stomach with a piece of wood, slapped his
forehead twice with a .45 pistol, punched him on the mouth, and burnt some parts of his body with a
burning wood. When he could no longer endure the torture and could hardly breathe, they stopped.
They then subjected Reynaldo to the same ordeal in another room. Before their torturers left, they
warned Raymond that they would come back the next day and kill him.18

The following night, Raymond attempted to escape. He waited for the guards to get drunk, then made
noise with the chains put on him to see if they were still awake. When none of them came to check on
him, he managed to free his hand from the chains and jumped through the window. He passed through
a helipad and firing range and stopped near a fishpond where he used stones to break his chains. After
walking through a forested area, he came near a river and an Iglesia ni Kristo church. He talked to some
women who were doing the laundry, asked where he was and the road to Gapan. He was told that he
was in Fort Magsaysay.19 He reached the highway, but some soldiers spotted him, forcing him to run
away. The soldiers chased him and caught up with him. They brought him to another place near the
entrance of what he saw was Fort Magsaysay. He was boxed repeatedly, kicked, and hit with chains
until his back bled. They poured gasoline on him. Then a so-called "Mam" or "Madam" suddenly called,
saying that she wanted to see Raymond before he was killed. The soldiers ceased the torture and he
was returned inside Fort Magsaysay where Reynaldo was detained.20

For some weeks, the respondents had a respite from all the torture. Their wounds were treated. When
the wounds were almost healed, the torture resumed, particularly when respondents' guards got
drunk.21

Raymond recalled that sometime in April until May 2006, he was detained in a room enclosed by steel
bars. He stayed all the time in that small room measuring 1 x 2 meters, and did everything there,
including urinating, removing his bowels, bathing, eating and sleeping. He counted that eighteen
people22 had been detained in that bartolina, including his brother Reynaldo and himself.23

For about three and a half months, the respondents were detained in Fort Magsaysay. They were kept
in a small house with two rooms and a kitchen. One room was made into the bartolina. The house was
near the firing range, helipad and mango trees. At dawn, soldiers marched by their house. They were
also sometimes detained in what he only knew as the "DTU." 24

At the DTU, a male doctor came to examine respondents. He checked their body and eyes, took their
urine samples and marked them. When asked how they were feeling, they replied that they had a hard
time urinating, their stomachs were aching, and they felt other pains in their body. The next day, two
ladies in white arrived. They also examined respondents and gave them medicines, including orasol,
amoxicillin and mefenamic acid. They brought with them the results of respondents' urine test and
advised them to drink plenty of water and take their medicine. The two ladies returned a few more
times. Thereafter, medicines were sent through the "master" of the DTU, "Master" Del Rosario alias
Carinyoso at Puti. Respondents were kept in the DTU for about two weeks. While there, he met a
soldier named Efren who said that Gen. Palparan ordered him to monitor and take care of them. 25

One day, Rizal Hilario fetched respondents in a Revo vehicle. They, along with Efren and several other
armed men wearing fatigue suits, went to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan.
Respondents were detained for one or two weeks in a big two-storey house. Hilario and Efren stayed
with them. While there, Raymond was beaten up by Hilario's men.26

From Pinaud, Hilario and Efren brought respondents to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the
Revo. They were detained in a big unfinished house inside the compound of "Kapitan" for about three
months. When they arrived in Sapang, Gen. Palparan talked to them. They were brought out of the
house to a basketball court in the center of the compound and made to sit. Gen. Palparan was already
waiting, seated. He was about two arms' length away from respondents. He began by asking if
respondents felt well already, to which Raymond replied in the affirmative. He asked Raymond if he
knew him. Raymond lied that he did not. He then asked Raymond if he would be scared if he were
made to face Gen. Palparan. Raymond responded that he would not be because he did not believe that
Gen. Palparan was an evil man.27

Raymond narrated his conversation with Gen. Palparan in his affidavit, viz:

Tinanong ako ni Gen. Palparan, "Ngayon na kaharap mo na ako, di ka ba natatakot sa akin?"

 Sumagot akong, "Siyempre po, natatakot din..."

Sabi ni Gen. Palparan: "Sige, bibigyan ko kayo ng isang pagkakataon na mabuhay, basta't sundin
n'yo ang lahat ng sasabihin ko... sabihin mo sa magulang mo - huwag pumunta sa mga rali, sa
hearing, sa Karapatan at sa Human Right dahil niloloko lang kayo. Sabihin sa magulang at lahat
sa bahay na huwag paloko doon. Tulungan kami na kausapin si Bestre na sumuko na sa
gobyerno."28

Respondents agreed to do as Gen. Palparan told them as they felt they could not do otherwise. At
about 3:00 in the morning, Hilario, Efren and the former's men - the same group that abducted them -
brought them to their parents' house. Raymond was shown to his parents while Reynaldo stayed in the
Revo because he still could not walk. In the presence of Hilario and other soldiers, Raymond relayed to
his parents what Gen. Palparan told him. As they were afraid, Raymond's parents acceded. Hilario
threatened Raymond's parents that if they continued to join human rights rallies, they would never see
their children again. The respondents were then brought back to Sapang. 29

When respondents arrived back in Sapang, Gen. Palparan was about to leave. He was talking with the
four "masters" who were there: Arman, Ganata, Hilario and Cabalse. 30 When Gen. Palparan saw
Raymond, he called for him. He was in a big white vehicle. Raymond stood outside the vehicle as Gen.
Palparan told him to gain back his strength and be healthy and to take the medicine he left for him and
Reynaldo. He said the medicine was expensive at Php35.00 each, and would make them strong. He also
said that they should prove that they are on the side of the military and warned that they would not be
given another chance.31 During his testimony, Raymond identified Gen. Palparan by his picture.32

One of the soldiers named Arman made Raymond take the medicine left by Gen. Palparan. The
medicine, named "Alive," was green and yellow. Raymond and Reynaldo were each given a box of this
medicine and instructed to take one capsule a day. Arman checked if they were getting their dose of
the medicine. The "Alive" made them sleep each time they took it, and they felt heavy upon waking
up.33

After a few days, Hilario arrived again. He took Reynaldo and left Raymond at Sapang. Arman
instructed Raymond that while in Sapang, he should introduce himself as "Oscar," a military trainee
from Sariaya, Quezon, assigned in Bulacan. While there, he saw again Ganata, one of the men who
abducted him from his house, and got acquainted with other military men and civilians. 34

After about three months in Sapang, Raymond was brought to Camp Tecson under the 24th Infantry
Battalion. He was fetched by three unidentified men in a big white vehicle. Efren went with them.
Raymond was then blindfolded. After a 30-minute ride, his blindfold was removed. Chains were put on
him and he was kept in the barracks.35

The next day, Raymond's chains were removed and he was ordered to clean outside the barracks. It
was then he learned that he was in a detachment of the Rangers. There were many soldiers, hundreds
of them were training. He was also ordered to clean inside the barracks. In one of the rooms therein,
he met Sherlyn Cadapan from Laguna. She told him that she was a student of the University of the
Philippines and was abducted in Hagonoy, Bulacan. She confided that she had been subjected to
severe torture and raped. She was crying and longing to go home and be with her parents. During the
day, her chains were removed and she was made to do the laundry. 36
After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his arrival, two other
captives, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen and Manuel were put in the room with
"Allan" whose name they later came to know as Donald Caigas, called "master" or "commander" by his
men in the 24th Infantry Battalion. Raymond and Reynaldo were put in the adjoining room. At times,
Raymond and Reynaldo were threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten up. In the daytime, their chains
were removed, but were put back on at night. They were threatened that if they escaped, their families
would all be killed.37

On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told the detainees that they should be
thankful they were still alive and should continue along their "renewed life." Before the hearing of
November 6 or 8, 2006, respondents were brought to their parents to instruct them not to attend the
hearing. However, their parents had already left for Manila. Respondents were brought back to Camp
Tecson. They stayed in that camp from September 2006 to November 2006, and Raymond was
instructed to continue using the name "Oscar" and holding himself out as a military trainee. He got
acquainted with soldiers of the 24th Infantry Battalion whose names and descriptions he stated in his
affidavit.38

On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel, were transferred to a
camp of the 24th Infantry Battalion in Limay, Bataan. There were many huts in the camp. They stayed in
that camp until May 8, 2007. Some soldiers of the battalion stayed with them. While there, battalion
soldiers whom Raymond knew as "Mar" and "Billy" beat him up and hit him in the stomach with their
guns. Sherlyn and Karen also suffered enormous torture in the camp. They were all made to clean,
cook, and help in raising livestock.39

Raymond recalled that when "Operation Lubog" was launched, Caigas and some other soldiers brought
him and Manuel with them to take and kill all sympathizers of the NPA. They were brought to Barangay
Bayan-bayanan, Bataan where he witnessed the killing of an old man doing kaingin. The soldiers said
he was killed because he had a son who was a member of the NPA and he coddled NPA members in his
house.40 Another time, in another "Operation Lubog," Raymond was brought to Barangay Orion in a
house where NPA men stayed. When they arrived, only the old man of the house who was sick was
there. They spared him and killed only his son right before Raymond's eyes.41

From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel were transferred to Zambales, in a
safehouse near the sea. Caigas and some of his men stayed with them. A retired army soldier was in
charge of the house. Like in Limay, the five detainees were made to do errands and chores. They
stayed in Zambales from May 8 or 9, 2007 until June 2007. 42

In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay. Raymond, Reynaldo, and Manuel were
tasked to bring food to detainees brought to the camp. Raymond narrated what he witnessed and
experienced in the camp, viz:

Isang gabi, sinabihan kami ni Donald (Caigas) na matulog na kami. Nakita ko si Donald na
inaayos ang kanyang baril, at nilagyan ng silenser. Sabi ni Donald na kung mayroon man kaming
makita o marinig, walang nangyari. Kinaumagahan, nakita naming ang bangkay ng isa sa mga
bihag na dinala sa kampo. Mayroong binuhos sa kanyang katawan at ito'y sinunog. Masansang
ang amoy.
 Makaraan ang isang lingo, dalawang bangkay and ibinaba ng mga unipormadong sundalo mula
sa 6 x 6 na trak at dinala sa loob ng kampo. May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila
nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas.

Makalipas ang isa o dalawang lingo, may dinukot sila na dalawang Ita. Itinali sila sa labas ng
kubo, piniringan, ikinadena at labis na binugbog. Nakita kong nakatakas ang isa sa kanila at
binaril siya ng sundalo ngunit hindi siya tinamaan. Iyong gabi nakita kong pinatay nila iyong
isang Ita malapit sa Post 3; sinilaban ang bangkay at ibinaon ito.

Pagkalipas ng halos 1 buwan, 2 pang bangkay ang dinala sa kampo. Ibinaba ang mga bangkay
mula sa pick up trak, dinala ang mga bangkay sa labas ng bakod. Kinaumagahan nakita kong
mayroong sinilaban, at napakamasangsang ang amoy.

May nakilala rin akong 1 retiradong koronel at 1 kasama niya. Pinakain ko sila. Sabi nila sa akin
na dinukot sila sa Bataan. Iyong gabi, inilabas sila at hindi ko na sila nakita.

xxx xxx xxx

Ikinadena kami ng 3 araw. Sa ikatlong araw, nilabas ni Lat si Manuel dahil kakausapin daw siya
ni Gen. Palparan. Nakapiring si Manuel, wala siyang suot pang-itaas, pinosasan. Nilakasan ng
mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o
ungol ni Manuel. Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel.

Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas.
Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung
papatayin kami o hindi.

Tinanggal ang aming kadena. Kinausap kami ni Donald. Tinanong kami kung ano ang sabi ni
Manuel sa amin. Sabi ni Donald huwag na raw naming hanapin ang dalawang babae at si
Manuel, dahil magkakasama na yung tatlo. Sabi pa ni Donald na kami ni Reynaldo ay
magbagong buhay at ituloy namin ni Reynaldo ang trabaho. Sa gabi, hindi na kami kinakadena. 43

On or about June 13, 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo were brought to Pangasinan, ostensibly to raise
poultry for Donald (Caigas). Caigas told respondents to also farm his land, in exchange for which, he
would take care of the food of their family. They were also told that they could farm a small plot
adjoining his land and sell their produce. They were no longer put in chains and were instructed to use
the names Rommel (for Raymond) and Rod (for Reynaldo) and represent themselves as cousins from
Rizal, Laguna.44

Respondents started to plan their escape. They could see the highway from where they stayed. They
helped farm adjoining lands for which they were paid Php200.00 or Php400.00 and they saved their
earnings. When they had saved Php1,000.00 each, Raymond asked a neighbor how he could get a
cellular phone as he wanted to exchange text messages with a girl who lived nearby. A phone was
pawned to him, but he kept it first and did not use it. They earned some more until they had saved
Php1,400.00 between them.

There were four houses in the compound. Raymond and Reynaldo were housed in one of them while
their guards lived in the other three. Caigas entrusted respondents to Nonong, the head of the guards.
Respondents' house did not have electricity. They used a lamp. There was no television, but they had a
radio. In the evening of August 13, 2007, Nonong and his cohorts had a drinking session. At about 1:00
a.m., Raymond turned up the volume of the radio. When none of the guards awoke and took notice,
Raymond and Reynaldo proceeded towards the highway, leaving behind their sleeping guards and
barking dogs. They boarded a bus bound for Manila and were thus freed from captivity. 45

Reynaldo also executed an affidavit affirming the contents of Raymond's affidavit insofar as they
related to matters they witnessed together. Reynaldo added that when they were taken from their
house on February 14, 2006, he saw the faces of his abductors before he was blindfolded with his shirt.
He also named the soldiers he got acquainted with in the 18 months he was detained. When Raymond
attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay, Reynaldo was severely beaten up and told that they were
indeed members of the NPA because Raymond escaped. With a .45 caliber pistol, Reynaldo was hit on
the back and punched in the face until he could no longer bear the pain.

At one point during their detention, when Raymond and Reynaldo were in Sapang, Reynaldo was
separated from Raymond and brought to Pinaud by Rizal Hilario. He was kept in the house of Kapitan, a
friend of Hilario, in a mountainous area. He was instructed to use the name "Rodel" and to represent
himself as a military trainee from Meycauayan, Bulacan. Sometimes, Hilario brought along Reynaldo in
his trips. One time, he was brought to a market in San Jose, del Monte, Bulacan and made to wait in
the vehicle while Hilario was buying. He was also brought to Tondo, Manila where Hilario delivered
boxes of "Alive" in different houses. In these trips, Hilario drove a black and red vehicle. Reynaldo was
blindfolded while still in Bulacan, but allowed to remove the blindfold once outside the province. In
one of their trips, they passed by Fort Magsaysay and Camp Tecson where Reynaldo saw the sign
board, "Welcome to Camp Tecson."46

Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo.
Dr. Molino specialized in forensic medicine and was connected with the Medical Action Group, an
organization handling cases of human rights violations, particularly cases where torture was involved.
He was requested by an NGO to conduct medical examinations on the respondents after their escape.
He first asked them about their ordeal, then proceeded with the physical examination. His findings
showed that the scars borne by respondents were consistent with their account of physical injuries
inflicted upon them. The examination was conducted on August 15, 2007, two days after respondents'
escape, and the results thereof were reduced into writing. Dr. Molino took photographs of the scars.
He testified that he followed the Istanbul Protocol in conducting the examination. 47

Petitioners dispute respondents' account of their alleged abduction and torture. In compliance with the
October 25, 2007 Resolution of the Court, they filed a Return of the Writ of Amparo admitting the
abduction but denying any involvement therein, viz:

13. Petitioners Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were not at any time arrested, forcibly
abducted, detained, held incommunicado, disappeared or under the custody by the military.
This is a settled issue laid to rest in the habeas corpus case filed in their behalf by petitioners'
parents before the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 94431 against M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka
Rollie Castillo, as head of the 24th Infantry Battalion; Maj. Gen. Jovito Palparan, as Commander
of the 7th Infantry Division in Luzon; Lt. Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, in his capacity as the
Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and members of the Citizens Armed Forces
Geographical Unit (CAFGU), namely: Michael dela Cruz, Puti dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Pula
dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza. The respondents therein submitted a return of
the writ... On July 4, 2006, the Court of Appeals dropped as party respondents Lt. Gen.
Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr., then Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and on
 September 19, 2006, Maj. (sic) Jovito S. Palparan, then Commanding General, 7 th Infantry
Division, Philippine Army, stationed at Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, upon a finding
that no evidence was introduced to establish their personal involvement in the taking of the
Manalo brothers. In a Decision dated June 27, 2007..., it exonerated M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka
Rollie Castillo for lack of evidence establishing his involvement in any capacity in the
disappearance of the Manalo brothers, although it held that the remaining respondents were
illegally detaining the Manalo brothers and ordered them to release the latter. 48

Attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of therein respondent (herein petitioner) Secretary
of National Defense, which attested that he assumed office only on August 8, 2007 and was thus
unaware of the Manalo brothers' alleged abduction. He also claimed that:

7. The Secretary of National Defense does not engage in actual military directional operations,
neither does he undertake command directions of the AFP units in the field, nor in any way
micromanage the AFP operations. The principal responsibility of the Secretary of National
Defense is focused in providing strategic policy direction to the Department (bureaus and
agencies) including the Armed Forces of the Philippines;

8. In connection with the Writ of Amparo issued by the Honorable Supreme Court in this case, I
have directed the Chief of Staff, AFP to institute immediate action in compliance with Section
9(d) of the Amparo Rule and to submit report of such compliance... Likewise, in a Memorandum
Directive also dated October 31, 2007, I have issued a policy directive addressed to the Chief of
Staff, AFP that the AFP should adopt the following rules of action in the event the Writ
of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of the AFP:

(1) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;

(2) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the
person identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or
persons responsible;
(3) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or
disappearance;
(4) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well
as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance;
(5) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or
disappearance; and
(6) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.49

Therein respondent AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit, attached to the Return of the
Writ, attesting that he received the above directive of therein respondent Secretary of National
Defense and that acting on this directive, he did the following:

3.1. As currently designated Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), I have caused
to be issued directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances
of the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the petitioners.

3.2. I have caused the immediate investigation and submission of the result thereof to Higher
headquarters and/or direct the immediate conduct of the investigation on the matter by the
concerned unit/s, dispatching Radio Message on November 05, 2007, addressed to the
 Commanding General, Philippine Army (Info: COMNOLCOM, CG, 71D PA and CO 24 IB PA). A
Copy of the Radio Message is attached as ANNEX "3" of this Affidavit.

3.3. We undertake to provide result of the investigations conducted or to be conducted by the

concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the persons in
whose favor the Writ of Amparo has been sought for as soon as the same has been furnished
Higher headquarters.

3.4. A parallel investigation has been directed to the same units relative to another Petition for
the Writ of Amparo (G.R. No. 179994) filed at the instance of relatives of a certain Cadapan and
Empeño pending before the Supreme Court.

3.5. On the part of the Armed Forces, this respondent will exert earnest efforts to establish the
surrounding circumstances of the disappearances of the petitioners and to bring those
responsible, including any military personnel if shown to have participated or had complicity in
the commission of the complained acts, to the bar of justice, when warranted by the findings
and the competent evidence that may be gathered in the process.50

Also attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of Lt. Col. Felipe Anontado, INF (GSC) PA,
earlier filed in G.R. No. 179994, another Amparo case in this Court, involving Cadapan, Empeño and
Merino, which averred among others, viz:

10) Upon reading the allegations in the Petition implicating the 24 th Infantry Batallion
detachment as detention area, I immediately went to the 24 th IB detachment in Limay, Bataan
and found no untoward incidents in the area nor any detainees by the name of Sherlyn
Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino being held captive;

11) There was neither any reports of any death of Manuel Merino in the 24 th IB in Limay,
Bataan;

12) After going to the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan, we made further inquiries with the Philippine
National Police, Limay, Bataan regarding the alleged detentions or deaths and were informed
that none was reported to their good office;

13) I also directed Company Commander 1st Lt. Romeo Publico to inquire into the alleged
beachhouse in Iba, Zambales also alleged to be a detention place where Sherlyn Cadapan,
Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino were detained. As per the inquiry, however, no such
beachhouse was used as a detention place found to have been used by armed men to detain
Cadapan, Empeño and Merino.51

It was explained in the Return of the Writ that for lack of sufficient time, the affidavits of Maj. Gen
Jovito S. Palparan (Ret.), M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, and other persons implicated by therein
petitioners could not be secured in time for the submission of the Return and would be subsequently
submitted.52

Herein petitioners presented a lone witness in the summary hearings, Lt. Col. Ruben U. Jimenez,
Provost Marshall, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, based in Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva
Ecija. The territorial jurisdiction of this Division covers Nueva Ecija, Aurora, Bataan, Bulacan, Pampanga,
Tarlac and a portion of Pangasinan.53 The 24th Infantry Battalion is part of the 7th Infantry Division.54
On May 26, 2006, Lt. Col. Jimenez was directed by the Commanding General of the 7 th Infantry Division,
Maj. Gen. Jovito Palaran,55 through his Assistant Chief of Staff,56 to investigate the alleged abduction of
the respondents by CAFGU auxiliaries under his unit, namely: CAA Michael de la Cruz; CAA Roman de la
Cruz, aka Puti; CAA Maximo de la Cruz, aka Pula; CAA Randy Mendoza; ex-CAA Marcelo de la Cruz aka
Madning; and a civilian named Rudy Mendoza. He was directed to determine: (1) the veracity of the
abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo by the alleged elements of the CAFGU auxiliaries; and (2)
the administrative liability of said auxiliaries, if any. 57 Jimenez testified that this particular investigation
was initiated not by a complaint as was the usual procedure, but because the Commanding General
saw news about the abduction of the Manalo brothers on the television, and he was concerned about
what was happening within his territorial jurisdiction.58

Jimenez summoned all six implicated persons for the purpose of having them execute sworn
statements and conducting an investigation on May 29, 2006. 59 The investigation started at 8:00 in the
morning and finished at 10:00 in the evening.60 The investigating officer, Technical Sgt. Eduardo Lingad,
took the individual sworn statements of all six persons on that day. There were no other sworn
statements taken, not even of the Manalo family, nor were there other witnesses summoned and
investigated61 as according to Jimenez, the directive to him was only to investigate the six persons. 62

Jimenez was beside Lingad when the latter took the statements.63 The six persons were not known to
Jimenez as it was in fact his first time to meet them.64 During the entire time that he was beside Lingad,
a subordinate of his in the Office of the Provost Marshall, Jimenez did not propound a single question
to the six persons.65

Jimenez testified that all six statements were taken on May 29, 2006, but Marcelo Mendoza and Rudy
Mendoza had to come back the next day to sign their statements as the printing of their statements
was interrupted by a power failure. Jimenez testified that the two signed on May 30, 2006, but the
jurats of their statements indicated that they were signed on May 29, 2006. 66 When the Sworn
Statements were turned over to Jimenez, he personally wrote his investigation report. He began
writing it in the afternoon of May 30, 2006 and finished it on June 1, 2006. 67 He then gave his report to
the Office of the Chief of Personnel.68

As petitioners largely rely on Jimenez's Investigation Report dated June 1, 2006 for their evidence, the
report is herein substantially quoted:

III. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

4. This pertains to the abduction of RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO who were
forcibly taken from their respective homes in Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on
14 February 2006 by unidentified armed men and thereafter were forcibly disappeared. After
the said incident, relatives of the victims filed a case for Abduction in the civil court against the
herein suspects: Michael dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Puti Dela Cruz, Pula Dela Cruz, Randy
Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza as alleged members of the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical
Unit (CAFGU).

a) Sworn statement of CAA Maximo F. dela Cruz, aka Pula dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "B")
states that he was at Sitio Mozon, Brgy. Bohol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan doing the
concrete building of a church located nearby his residence, together with some neighbor
thereat. He claims that on 15 February 2006, he was being informed by Brgy. Kagawad Pablo
Umayan about the abduction of the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. As to the
allegation that he was one of the suspects, he claims that they only implicated him because he
was a CAFGU and that they claimed that those who abducted the Manalo brothers are
members of the Military and CAFGU. Subject vehemently denied any participation or
involvement on the abduction of said victims.

b) Sworn statement of CAA Roman dela Cruz y Faustino Aka Puti dtd 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit
"C") states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan
and a CAA member based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that
Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo being his neighbors are active members/sympathizers of the
CPP/NPA and he also knows their elder Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE of being an NPA Leader
operating in their province. That at the time of the alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers
and for accusing him to be one of the suspects, he claims that on February 14, 2006, he was
one of those working at the concrete chapel being constructed nearby his residence. He claims
further that he just came only to know about the incident on other day (15 Feb 06) when he
was being informed by Kagawad Pablo Kunanan. That subject CAA vehemently denied any
participation about the incident and claimed that they only implicated him because he is a
member of the CAFGU.

c) Sworn Statement of CAA Randy Mendoza y Lingas dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "O") states
that he is a resident of Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a member of CAFGU
based at Biak na Bato Detachment. That being a neighbor, he was very much aware about the
background of the two (2) brothers Raymond and Reynaldo as active supporters of the CPP NPA
in their Brgy. and he also knew their elder brother "KUMANDER BESTRE" TN: Rolando Manalo.
Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was at Brgy. Magmarate, San
Miguel, Bulacan in the house of his aunt and he learned only about the incident when he
arrived home in their place. He claims further that the only reason why they implicated him was
due to the fact that his mother has filed a criminal charge against their brother Rolando Manalo
@ KA BESTRE who is an NPA Commander who killed his father and for that reason they
implicated him in support of their brother. Subject CAA vehemently denied any involvement on
the abduction of said Manalo brothers.

d) Sworn Statement of Rudy Mendoza y Lingasa dated May 29, 2006 in (Exhibit "E") states that
he is a resident of Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo
Manalo are familiar to him being his barriomate when he was still unmarried and he knew them
since childhood. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was at his
residence in Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that he was being informed only about
the incident lately and he was not aware of any reason why the two (2) brothers were being
abducted by alleged members of the military and CAFGU. The only reason he knows why they
implicated him was because there are those people who are angry with their family particularly
victims of summary execution (killing) done by their brother @ KA Bestre Rolando Manalo who
is an NPA leader. He claims further that it was their brother @ KA BESTRE who killed his father
and he was living witness to that incident. Subject civilian vehemently denied any involvement
on the abduction of the Manalo brothers.

e) Sworn statement of Ex-CAA Marcelo dala Cruz dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "F") states that
he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, a farmer and a
former CAA based at Biak na Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo
Manalo are familiar to him being their barrio mate. He claims further that they are active
supporters of CPP/NPA and that their brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA leader.
Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was in his residence at Sitio
Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. That he vehemently denied any
participation of the alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers and learned only about the
incident when rumors reached him by his barrio mates. He claims that his implication is merely
fabricated because of his relationship to Roman and Maximo who are his brothers.

f) Sworn statement of Michael dela Cruz y Faustino dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "G") states
that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, the Chief of
Brgy. Tanod and a CAFGU member based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He
claims that he knew very well the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in their barangay for
having been the Tanod Chief for twenty (20) years. He alleged further that they are active
supporters or sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and whose elder brother Rolando Manalo @ KA
BESTRE is an NPA leader operating within the area. Being one of the accused, he claims that on
14 Feb 2006 he was helping in the construction of their concrete chapel in their place and he
learned only about the incident which is the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo when
one of the Brgy. Kagawad in the person of Pablo Cunanan informed him about the matter. He
claims further that he is truly innocent of the allegation against him as being one of the
abductors and he considers everything fabricated in order to destroy his name that remains
loyal to his service to the government as a CAA member.

IV. DISCUSSION

5. Based on the foregoing statements of respondents in this particular case, the proof of linking
them to the alleged abduction and disappearance of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo that
transpired on 14 February 2006 at Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan,
is unsubstantiated. Their alleged involvement theretofore to that incident is considered
doubtful, hence, no basis to indict them as charged in this investigation.

Though there are previous grudges between each families (sic) in the past to quote: the killing
of the father of Randy and Rudy Mendoza by @ KA BESTRE TN: Rolando Manalo, this will not
suffice to establish a fact that they were the ones who did the abduction as a form of revenge.
As it was also stated in the testimony of other accused claiming that the Manalos are active
sympathizers/supporters of the CPP/NPA, this would not also mean, however, that in the first
place, they were in connivance with the abductors. Being their neighbors and as members of
CAFGU's, they ought to be vigilant in protecting their village from any intervention by the leftist
group, hence inside their village, they were fully aware of the activities of Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo in so far as their connection with the CPP/NPA is concerned.

V. CONCLUSION

6. Premises considered surrounding this case shows that the alleged charges of abduction
committed by the above named respondents has not been established in this investigation.
Hence, it lacks merit to indict them for any administrative punishment and/or criminal liability.
It is therefore concluded that they are innocent of the charge.
 VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

7. That CAAs Michael F. dela Cruz, Maximo F. Dela Cruz, Roman dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza, and
two (2) civilians Maximo F. Dela Cruz and Rudy L. Mendoza be exonerated from the case.

8. Upon approval, this case can be dropped and closed.69

In this appeal under Rule 45, petitioners question the appellate court's assessment of the foregoing
evidence and assail the December 26, 2007 Decision on the following grounds, viz:

I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN BELIEVING AND GIVING FULL
FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE INCREDIBLE, UNCORROBORATED, CONTRADICTED, AND OBVIOUSLY
SCRIPTED, REHEARSED AND SELF-SERVING AFFIDAVIT/TESTIMONY OF HEREIN RESPONDENT
RAYMOND MANALO.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN REQUIRING RESPONDENTS
(HEREIN PETITIONERS) TO: (A) FURNISH TO THE MANALO BROTHER(S) AND TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS ALL OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE INVESTIGATION UNDERTAKEN IN
CONNECTION WITH THEIR CASE, EXCEPT THOSE ALREADY IN FILE WITH THE COURT; (B)
CONFIRM IN WRITING THE PRESENT PLACES OF OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF M/SGT. HILARIO aka
ROLLIE CASTILLO AND DONALD CAIGAS; AND (C) CAUSE TO BE PRODUCED TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS ALL MEDICAL REPORTS, RECORDS AND CHARTS, AND REPORTS OF ANY TREATMENT
GIVEN OR RECOMMENDED AND MEDICINES PRESCRIBED, IF ANY, TO THE MANALO BROTHERS,
TO INCLUDE A LIST OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL (MILITARY AND CIVILIAN) WHO ATTENDED TO
THEM FROM FEBRUARY 14, 2006 UNTIL AUGUST 12, 2007.70

The case at bar is the first decision on the application of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo (Amparo Rule). Let us hearken to its beginning.

The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring proposition in the recommendations that

resulted from a two-day National Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced
Disappearances sponsored by the Court on July 16-17, 2007. The Summit was "envisioned to provide a
broad and fact-based perspective on the issue of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances,"71 hence "representatives from all sides of the political and social spectrum, as well as
all the stakeholders in the justice system"72 participated in mapping out ways to resolve the crisis.

On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule "in light of the prevalence of extralegal
killing and enforced disappearances."73 It was an exercise for the first time of the Court's expanded
power to promulgate rules to protect our people's constitutional rights, which made its maiden
appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law
regime.74 As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings"
and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or
to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without
legal safeguards or judicial proceedings."75 On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are
"attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a
government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect
acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the
person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons
outside the protection of law."76

The writ of Amparo originated in Mexico. "Amparo" literally means "protection" in Spanish.77 In 1837,
de Tocqueville's Democracy in America became available in Mexico and stirred great interest. Its
description of the practice of judicial review in the U.S. appealed to many Mexican jurists. 78 One of
them, Manuel Crescencio Rejón, drafted a constitutional provision for his native state, Yucatan, 79 which
granted judges the power to protect all persons in the enjoyment of their constitutional and legal
rights. This idea was incorporated into the national constitution in 1847, viz:

The federal courts shall protect any inhabitant of the Republic in the exercise and preservation
of those rights granted to him by this Constitution and by laws enacted pursuant hereto, against
attacks by the Legislative and Executive powers of the federal or state governments, limiting
themselves to granting protection in the specific case in litigation, making no general
declaration concerning the statute or regulation that motivated the violation. 80

Since then, the protection has been an important part of Mexican constitutionalism. 81 If, after hearing,
the judge determines that a constitutional right of the petitioner is being violated, he orders the
official, or the official's superiors, to cease the violation and to take the necessary measures to restore
the petitioner to the full enjoyment of the right in question. Amparo thus combines the principles of
judicial review derived from the U.S. with the limitations on judicial power characteristic of the civil law
tradition which prevails in Mexico. It enables courts to enforce the constitution by protecting individual
rights in particular cases, but prevents them from using this power to make law for the entire nation. 82

The writ of Amparo then spread throughout the Western Hemisphere, gradually evolving into various
forms, in response to the particular needs of each country.83 It became, in the words of a justice of the
Mexican Federal Supreme Court, one piece of Mexico's self-attributed "task of conveying to the world's
legal heritage that institution which, as a shield of human dignity, her own painful history
conceived."84 What began as a protection against acts or omissions of public authorities in violation of
constitutional rights later evolved for several purposes: (1) Amparo libertad for the protection of
personal freedom, equivalent to the habeas corpus writ; (2) Amparo contra leyes for the judicial review
of the constitutionality of statutes; (3) Amparo casacion for the judicial review of the constitutionality
and legality of a judicial decision; (4) Amparo administrativo for the judicial review of administrative
actions; and (5) Amparo agrario for the protection of peasants' rights derived from the agrarian reform
process.85

In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of Amparo has been constitutionally adopted to
protect against human rights abuses especially committed in countries under military juntas. In
general, these countries adopted an all-encompassing writ to protect the whole gamut of
constitutional rights, including socio-economic rights.86 Other countries like Colombia, Chile, Germany
and Spain, however, have chosen to limit the protection of the writ of Amparo only to some
constitutional guarantees or fundamental rights.87

In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide for the writ of Amparo,
several of the above Amparo protections are guaranteed by our charter. The second paragraph of
Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, the Grave Abuse Clause, provides for the judicial power
"to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." The Clause accords a
similar general protection to human rights extended by the Amparo contra leyes, Amparo casacion,
and Amparo administrativo. Amparo libertad is comparable to the remedy of habeas corpus found in
several provisions of the 1987 Constitution.88 The Clause is an offspring of the U.S. common law
tradition of judicial review, which finds its roots in the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison.89

While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave Abuse Clause through remedies of
injunction or prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and a petition for habeas corpus under
Rule 102,90 these remedies may not be adequate to address the pestering problem of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances. However, with the swiftness required to resolve a petition for a writ
of Amparo through summary proceedings and the availability of appropriate interim and permanent
reliefs under the Amparo Rule, this hybrid writ of the common law and civil law traditions - borne out
of the Latin American and Philippine experience of human rights abuses - offers a better remedy to
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances and threats thereof. The remedy provides rapid judicial
relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the
appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring
proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or
administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive
proceedings.91

The writ of Amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in
the commission of these offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of
perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and action. In the long run, the
goal of both the preventive and curative roles is to deter the further commission of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances.

In the case at bar, respondents initially filed an action for "Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary
Restraining Order"92 to stop petitioners and/or their officers and agents from depriving the
respondents of their right to liberty and other basic rights on August 23, 2007, 93 prior to the
promulgation of the Amparo Rule. They also sought ancillary remedies including Protective Custody
Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders and other legal and equitable
remedies under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules
of Court. When the Amparo Rule came into effect on October 24, 2007, they moved to have their
petition treated as an Amparo petition as it would be more effective and suitable to the circumstances
of the Manalo brothers' enforced disappearance. The Court granted their motion.

With this backdrop, we now come to the arguments of the petitioner. Petitioners' first argument in
disputing the Decision of the Court of Appeals states, viz:

The Court of Appeals seriously and grievously erred in believing and giving full faith and credit
to the incredible uncorroborated, contradicted, and obviously scripted, rehearsed and self-
serving affidavit/testimony of herein respondent Raymond Manalo. 94

In delving into the veracity of the evidence, we need to mine and refine the ore of petitioners' cause of
action, to determine whether the evidence presented is metal-strong to satisfy the degree of proof
required.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following causes of action, viz:
 Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
(emphasis supplied)

Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof required, viz:

Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish their
claims by substantial evidence.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 18. Judgment. - ... If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the
court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and
appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. (emphases supplied)

Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.95

After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that
respondents were abducted from their houses in Sito Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan on February 14, 2006 and were continuously detained until they escaped on August 13, 2007.
The abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were narrated by respondent
Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing manner. His account is dotted with countless candid details
of respondents' harrowing experience and tenacious will to escape, captured through his different
senses and etched in his memory. A few examples are the following: "Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng
kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel."96 "(N)ilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa
istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel." 97 "May naiwang mga bakas
ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas." 98 "Tumigil ako
sa may palaisdaan kung saan ginamit ko ang bato para tanggalin ang mga kadena." 99 "Tinanong ko sa
isang kapit-bahay kung paano ako makakakuha ng cell phone; sabi ko gusto kong i-text ang isang babae
na nakatira sa malapit na lugar."100

We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on respondent Raymond Manalo's
affidavit and testimony, viz:

...the abduction was perpetrated by armed men who were sufficiently identified by the
petitioners (herein respondents) to be military personnel and CAFGU auxiliaries. Raymond
recalled that the six armed men who barged into his house through the rear door were military
men based on their attire of fatigue pants and army boots, and the CAFGU auxiliaries, namely:
Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, Puti de la Cruz and Pula de la Cruz, all members of the
CAFGU and residents of Muzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and the brothers Randy Mendoza and
Rudy Mendoza, also CAFGU members, served as lookouts during the abduction. Raymond was
sure that three of the six military men were Ganata, who headed the abducting team, Hilario,
who drove the van, and George. Subsequent incidents of their long captivity, as narrated by the
petitioners, validated their assertion of the participation of the elements of the 7 th Infantry
Division, Philippine Army, and their CAFGU auxiliaries.
We are convinced, too, that the reason for the abduction was the suspicion that the petitioners
were either members or sympathizers of the NPA, considering that the abductors were looking
for Ka Bestre, who turned out to be Rolando, the brother of petitioners.

The efforts exerted by the Military Command to look into the abduction were, at best, merely
superficial. The investigation of the Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division focused on the
one-sided version of the CAFGU auxiliaries involved. This one-sidedness might be due to the
fact that the Provost Marshall could delve only into the participation of military personnel, but
even then the Provost Marshall should have refrained from outrightly exculpating the CAFGU
auxiliaries he perfunctorily investigated...

Gen. Palparan's participation in the abduction was also established. At the very least, he was
aware of the petitioners' captivity at the hands of men in uniform assigned to his command. In
fact, he or any other officer tendered no controversion to the firm claim of Raymond that he
(Gen. Palparan) met them in person in a safehouse in Bulacan and told them what he wanted
them and their parents to do or not to be doing. Gen. Palparan's direct and personal role in the
abduction might not have been shown but his knowledge of the dire situation of the petitioners
during their long captivity at the hands of military personnel under his command bespoke of his
indubitable command policy that unavoidably encouraged and not merely tolerated the
abduction of civilians without due process of law and without probable cause.

In the habeas proceedings, the Court, through the Former Special Sixth Division (Justices Buzon,
chairman; Santiago-Lagman, Sr., member; and Romilla-Lontok, Jr., member/ponente.) found no
clear and convincing evidence to establish that M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario had anything to do with the
abduction or the detention. Hilario's involvement could not, indeed, be then established after
Evangeline Francisco, who allegedly saw Hilario drive the van in which the petitioners were
boarded and ferried following the abduction, did not testify. (See the decision of the habeas
proceedings at rollo, p. 52)

However, in this case, Raymond attested that Hilario drove the white L-300 van in which the
petitioners were brought away from their houses on February 14, 2006. Raymond also attested
that Hilario participated in subsequent incidents during the captivity of the petitioners, one of
which was when Hilario fetched them from Fort Magsaysay on board a Revo and conveyed
them to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan where they were detained for at least
a week in a house of strong materials (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) and then Hilario (along with
Efren) brought them to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo, to an unfinished house
inside the compound of Kapitan where they were kept for more or less three months. (Exhibit
D, rollo, p. 205) It was there where the petitioners came face to face with Gen. Palparan. Hilario
and Efren also brought the petitioners one early morning to the house of the petitioners'
parents, where only Raymond was presented to the parents to relay the message from Gen.
Palparan not to join anymore rallies. On that occasion, Hilario warned the parents that they
would not again see their sons should they join any rallies to denounce human rights violations.
(Exhibit D, rollo, pp. 205-206) Hilario was also among four Master Sergeants (the others being
Arman, Ganata and Cabalse) with whom Gen. Palparan conversed on the occasion when Gen.
Palparan required Raymond to take the medicines for his health. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 206) There
were other occasions when the petitioners saw that Hilario had a direct hand in their torture.
 It is clear, therefore, that the participation of Hilario in the abduction and forced disappearance
of the petitioners was established. The participation of other military personnel like Arman,
Ganata, Cabalse and Caigas, among others, was similarly established.

xxx xxx xxx

As to the CAFGU auxiliaries, the habeas Court found them personally involved in the abduction.
We also do, for, indeed, the evidence of their participation is overwhelming. 101

We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalo's statements were not
corroborated by other independent and credible pieces of evidence. 102 Raymond's affidavit and
testimony were corroborated by the affidavit of respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and
medical reports prepared by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by the
physical injuries inflicted on respondents,103 also corroborate respondents' accounts of the torture they
endured while in detention. Respondent Raymond Manalo's familiarity with the facilities in Fort
Magsaysay such as the "DTU," as shown in his testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the
"Division Training Unit,"104 firms up respondents' story that they were detained for some time in said
military facility.

In Ortiz v. Guatemala,105 a case decided by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the
Commission considered similar evidence, among others, in finding that complainant Sister Diana Ortiz
was abducted and tortured by agents of the Guatemalan government. In this case, Sister Ortiz was
kidnapped and tortured in early November 1989. The Commission's findings of fact were mostly based
on the consistent and credible statements, written and oral, made by Sister Ortiz regarding her
ordeal.106 These statements were supported by her recognition of portions of the route they took when
she was being driven out of the military installation where she was detained. 107 She was also examined
by a medical doctor whose findings showed that the 111 circular second degree burns on her back and
abrasions on her cheek coincided with her account of cigarette burning and torture she suffered while
in detention.108

With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the victim during
detention, it logically holds that much of the information and evidence of the ordeal will come from
the victims themselves, and the veracity of their account will depend on their credibility and
candidness in their written and/or oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated by other
evidence such as physical evidence left by the torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify in
the places where they were detained. Where powerful military officers are implicated, the hesitation of
witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as no surprise.

We now come to the right of the respondents to the privilege of the writ of Amparo. There is no
quarrel that the enforced disappearance of both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo has now
passed as they have escaped from captivity and surfaced. But while respondents admit that they are
no longer in detention and are physically free, they assert that they are not "free in every sense of the
word"109 as their "movements continue to be restricted for fear that people they have named in their
Judicial Affidavits and testified against (in the case of Raymond) are still at large and have not been
held accountable in any way. These people are directly connected to the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and are, thus, in a position to threaten respondents' rights to life, liberty and
security."110 (emphasis supplied) Respondents claim that they are under threat of being once again
abducted, kept captive or even killed, which constitute a direct violation of their right to security of
person.111
Elaborating on the "right to security, in general," respondents point out that this right is "often
associated with liberty;" it is also seen as an "expansion of rights based on the prohibition against
torture and cruel and unusual punishment." Conceding that there is no right to security expressly
mentioned in Article III of the 1987 Constitution, they submit that their rights "to be kept free from
torture and from incommunicado detention and solitary detention places112 fall under the general
coverage of the right to security of person under the writ of Amparo." They submit that the Court
ought to give an expansive recognition of the right to security of person in view of the State Policy
under Article II of the 1987 Constitution which enunciates that, "The State values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." Finally, to justify a liberal interpretation
of the right to security of person, respondents cite the teaching in Moncupa v. Enrile113 that "the right
to liberty may be made more meaningful only if there is no undue restraint by the State on the exercise
of that liberty"114 such as a requirement to "report under unreasonable restrictions that amounted to a
deprivation of liberty"115 or being put under "monitoring and surveillance."116

In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the threat to their right to life and
liberty, and a violation of their right to security.

Let us put this right to security under the lens to determine if it has indeed been violated as
respondents assert. The right to security or the right to security of person finds a textual hook in
Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution which provides, viz:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge...

At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of one's person, including the extensions of his/her
person - houses, papers, and effects - against government intrusion. Section 2 not only limits the
state's power over a person's home and possessions, but more importantly, protects the privacy and
sanctity of the person himself.117 The purpose of this provision was enunciated by the Court in People
v. CFI of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, viz: 118

The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is to
prevent violations of private security in person and property and unlawful invasion of the
security of the home by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to
give remedy against such usurpation when attempted. (Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 858;
Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637 [1946]). The right to privacy is an essential condition to the dignity
and happiness and to the peace and security of every individual, whether it be of home or of
persons and correspondence. (Tañada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines, Vol. 2, 139
[1962]). The constitutional inviolability of this great fundamental right against unreasonable
searches and seizures must be deemed absolute as nothing is closer to a man's soul than the
serenity of his privacy and the assurance of his personal security. Any interference allowable
can only be for the best causes and reasons.119 (emphases supplied)

While the right to life under Article III, Section 1120 guarantees essentially the right to be alive121 - upon
which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee
of the secure quality of this life, viz: "The life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear
that his person and property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived
with the assurance that the government he established and consented to, will protect the security of
his person and property. The ideal of security in life and property... pervades the whole history of man.
It touches every aspect of man's existence."122 In a broad sense, the right to security of person
"emanates in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health,
and his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it
is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those things which are necessary to the
enjoyment of life according to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual." 123

A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise of this
right.

First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear." In its "whereas" clauses, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that "a world in which human beings shall enjoy
freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest
aspiration of the common people." (emphasis supplied) Some scholars postulate that "freedom from
fear" is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an individual international human right. 124 It is
the "right to security of person" as the word "security" itself means "freedom from fear." 125 Article 3 of
the UDHR provides, viz:

Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.126 (emphasis supplied)

In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) also provides for the right to security of person, viz:

1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to
arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and
in accordance with such procedure as are established by law. (emphasis supplied)

The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.

In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, "freedom from fear" is the right and any threat to the
rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a
stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-
founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the
variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past experience with the
stimulus. Thus, in the Amparo context, it is more correct to say that the "right to security" is actually
the "freedom from threat." Viewed in this light, the "threatened with violation" Clause in the latter
part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the
earlier part of the provision.127

Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security.
Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, one's body cannot be
searched or invaded without a search warrant.128 Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may
constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of
physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries
constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a
person.129
Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily integrity. When employed to vitiate
the free will such as to force the victim to admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating information, it
constitutes an invasion of both bodily and psychological integrity as the dignity of the human person
includes the exercise of free will. Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution more specifically
proscribes bodily and psychological invasion, viz:

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free
will shall be used against him (any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense). Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms of detention
are prohibited.

Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free will - although not
involving invasion of bodily integrity - nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security in the
sense of "freedom from threat" as afore-discussed.

Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from dehumanizing abuses of persons under investigation for
the commission of an offense. Victims of enforced disappearances who are not even under such
investigation should all the more be protected from these degradations.

An overture to an interpretation of the right to security of person as a right against torture was made
by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in the recent case of Popov v. Russia.130 In this
case, the claimant, who was lawfully detained, alleged that the state authorities had physically abused
him in prison, thereby violating his right to security of person. Article 5(1) of the European Convention
on Human Rights provides, viz: "Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall
be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by
law ..." (emphases supplied) Article 3, on the other hand, provides that "(n)o one shall be subjected to
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Although the application failed on the
facts as the alleged ill-treatment was found baseless, the ECHR relied heavily on the concept of security
in holding, viz:

...the applicant did not bring his allegations to the attention of domestic authorities at the time
when they could reasonably have been expected to take measures in order to ensure
his security and to investigate the circumstances in question.

xxx xxx xxx

... the authorities failed to ensure his security in custody or to comply with the procedural
obligation under Art.3 to conduct an effective investigation into his allegations. 131 (emphasis
supplied)

The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has also made a statement
that the protection of the bodily integrity of women may also be related to the right to security and
liberty, viz:

...gender-based violence which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human rights
and fundamental freedoms under general international law or under specific human rights
conventions is discrimination within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention (on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women). These rights and freedoms
include . . . the right to liberty and security of person.132
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the government.
In the context of the writ of Amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and
liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as
freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2.
The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees
full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. 133 As the
government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to
life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to
these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective
investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal
killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to
the bar of justice. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of investigation
in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case,134 viz:

(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality
preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the
State as its own legal duty, not as a step taken by private interests that depends upon the
initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer of proof, without an effective search for
the truth by the government.135

This third sense of the right to security of person as a guarantee of government protection has been
interpreted by the United Nations' Human Rights Committee136 in not a few cases involving Article
9137 of the ICCPR. While the right to security of person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty
under Article 9, the Committee has ruled that the right to security of person can exist independently
of the right to liberty. In other words, there need not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the
right to security of person to be invoked. In Delgado Paez v. Colombia,138 a case involving death threats
to a religion teacher at a secondary school in Leticia, Colombia, whose social views differed from those
of the Apostolic Prefect of Leticia, the Committee held, viz:

The first sentence of article 9 does not stand as a separate paragraph. Its location as a part of
paragraph one could lead to the view that the right to security arises only in the context of
arrest and detention. The travaux préparatoires indicate that the discussions of the first
sentence did indeed focus on matters dealt with in the other provisions of article 9. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in article 3, refers to the right to life, the right to
liberty and the right to security of the person. These elements have been dealt with in
separate clauses in the Covenant. Although in the Covenant the only reference to the right of
security of person is to be found in article 9, there is no evidence that it was intended to
narrow the concept of the right to security only to situations of formal deprivation of liberty.
At the same time, States parties have undertaken to guarantee the rights enshrined in the
Covenant. It cannot be the case that, as a matter of law, States can ignore known threats to
the life of persons under their jurisdiction, just because that he or she is not arrested or
otherwise detained. States parties are under an obligation to take reasonable and
appropriate measures to protect them. An interpretation of article 9 which would allow a
State party to ignore threats to the personal security of non-detained persons within its
jurisdiction would render totally ineffective the guarantees of the Covenant.139 (emphasis
supplied)

The Paez ruling was reiterated in Bwalya v. Zambia,140 which involved a political activist and prisoner of
conscience who continued to be intimidated, harassed, and restricted in his movements following his
release from detention. In a catena of cases, the ruling of the Committee was of a similar
import: Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea,141 involving discrimination, intimidation and persecution of
opponents of the ruling party in that state; Tshishimbi v. Zaire,142 involving the abduction of the
complainant's husband who was a supporter of democratic reform in Zaire; Dias v. Angola,143 involving
the murder of the complainant's partner and the harassment he (complainant) suffered because of
his investigation of the murder; and Chongwe v. Zambia,144 involving an assassination attempt on the
chairman of an opposition alliance.

Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the "right to security" not only
as prohibiting the State from arbitrarily depriving liberty, but imposing a positive duty on the State to
afford protection of the right to liberty.145 The ECHR interpreted the "right to security of person" under
Article 5(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights in the leading case on disappearance of
persons, Kurt v. Turkey.146 In this case, the claimant's son had been arrested by state authorities and
had not been seen since. The family's requests for information and investigation regarding his
whereabouts proved futile. The claimant suggested that this was a violation of her son's right to
security of person. The ECHR ruled, viz:

... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the
substantive and procedural rules of national law but must equally be in keeping with the very
purpose of Article 5, namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness... Having assumed
control over that individual it is incumbent on the authorities to account for his or her
whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring the authorities to take
effective measures to safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a prompt
effective investigation into an arguable claim that a person has been taken into custody and
has not been seen since.147 (emphasis supplied)

Applying the foregoing concept of the right to security of person to the case at bar, we now determine
whether there is a continuing violation of respondents' right to security.

First, the violation of the right to security as freedom from threat to respondents' life, liberty and
security.

While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if they escaped, their families, including
them, would be killed. In Raymond's narration, he was tortured and poured with gasoline after he was
caught the first time he attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay. A call from a certain "Mam," who
wanted to see him before he was killed, spared him.

This time, respondents have finally escaped. The condition of the threat to be killed has come to pass.
It should be stressed that they are now free from captivity not because they were released by virtue of
a lawful order or voluntarily freed by their abductors. It ought to be recalled that towards the end of
their ordeal, sometime in June 2007 when respondents were detained in a camp in Limay, Bataan,
respondents' captors even told them that they were still deciding whether they should be executed.
Respondent Raymond Manalo attested in his affidavit, viz:

Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas.
Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung
papatayin kami o hindi.148
The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the eye while they were in detention.
With their escape, this continuing threat to their life is apparent, moreso now that they have surfaced
and implicated specific officers in the military not only in their own abduction and torture, but also in
those of other persons known to have disappeared such as Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño, and
Manuel Merino, among others.

Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and protection by
private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty and security. The threat vitiates their free will
as they are forced to limit their movements or activities.149 Precisely because respondents are being
shielded from the perpetrators of their abduction, they cannot be expected to show evidence of overt
acts of threat such as face-to-face intimidation or written threats to their life, liberty and security.
Nonetheless, the circumstances of respondents' abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably
support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and
this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through
a petition for a writ of Amparo.

Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by the government. Apart from the failure of
military elements to provide protection to respondents by themselves perpetrating the abduction,
detention, and torture, they also miserably failed in conducting an effective investigation of
respondents' abduction as revealed by the testimony and investigation report of petitioners' own
witness, Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division.

The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited, superficial, and one-sided. He
merely relied on the Sworn Statements of the six implicated members of the CAFGU and civilians
whom he met in the investigation for the first time. He was present at the investigation when his
subordinate Lingad was taking the sworn statements, but he did not propound a single question to
ascertain the veracity of their statements or their credibility. He did not call for other witnesses to test
the alibis given by the six implicated persons nor for the family or neighbors of the respondents.

In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of National Defense attested that in a Memorandum Directive
dated October 31, 2007, he issued a policy directive addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff, that the AFP
should adopt rules of action in the event the writ of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any
members of the AFP, which should essentially include verification of the identity of the aggrieved
party; recovery and preservation of relevant evidence; identification of witnesses and securing
statements from them; determination of the cause, manner, location and time of death or
disappearance; identification and apprehension of the person or persons involved in the death or
disappearance; and bringing of the suspected offenders before a competent court. 150 Petitioner AFP
Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit attesting that he received the above directive of
respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on this directive, he immediately caused to
be issued a directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of the
alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the respondents, and undertook to provide
results of the investigations to respondents.151 To this day, however, almost a year after the policy
directive was issued by petitioner Secretary of National Defense on October 31, 2007, respondents
have not been furnished the results of the investigation which they now seek through the instant
petition for a writ of Amparo.

Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to warrant the conclusion that there is a
violation of respondents' right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government.
In sum, we conclude that respondents' right to security as "freedom from threat" is violated by the
apparent threat to their life, liberty and security of person. Their right to security as a guarantee of
protection by the government is likewise violated by the ineffective investigation and protection on the
part of the military.

Finally, we come to the reliefs granted by the Court of Appeals, which petitioners question.

First, that petitioners furnish respondents all official and unofficial reports of the
investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except those already in file with the court.

Second, that petitioners confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario
aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas.

Third, that petitioners cause to be produced to the Court of Appeals all medical reports, records and
charts, and reports of any treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the
Manalo brothers, to include a list of medical personnel (military and civilian) who attended to
them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007.

With respect to the first and second reliefs, petitioners argue that the production order sought by
respondents partakes of the characteristics of a search warrant. Thus, they claim that the requisites for
the issuance of a search warrant must be complied with prior to the grant of the production order,
namely: (1) the application must be under oath or affirmation; (2) the search warrant must particularly
describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized; (3) there exists probable cause with one
specific offense; and (4) the probable cause must be personally determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. 152 In the
case at bar, however, petitioners point out that other than the bare, self-serving and vague allegations
made by respondent Raymond Manalo in his unverified declaration and affidavit, the documents
respondents seek to be produced are only mentioned generally by name, with no other supporting
details. They also argue that the relevancy of the documents to be produced must be apparent, but
this is not true in the present case as the involvement of petitioners in the abduction has not been
shown.

Petitioners' arguments do not hold water. The production order under the Amparo Rule should not be
confused with a search warrant for law enforcement under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution. This Constitutional provision is a protection of the people from the unreasonable
intrusion of the government, not a protection of the government from the demand of the people such
as respondents.

Instead, the Amparo production order may be likened to the production of documents or things under
Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which provides in relevant part, viz:

Section 1. Motion for production or inspection order.

Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is
pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or
photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents,
papers, books of accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not
privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the
action and which are in his possession, custody or control...
In Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. v. Judge Natividad,153 the respondent judge, under authority of
Rule 27, issued a subpoena duces tecum for the production and inspection of among others, the books
and papers of Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. The company questioned the issuance of the subpoena
on the ground that it violated the search and seizure clause. The Court struck down the argument and
held that the subpoena pertained to a civil procedure that "cannot be identified or confused with
unreasonable searches prohibited by the Constitution..."

Moreover, in his affidavit, petitioner AFP Chief of Staff himself undertook "to provide results of the
investigations conducted or to be conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the
alleged disappearance of the persons in whose favor the Writ of Amparo has been sought for as soon
as the same has been furnished Higher headquarters."

With respect to the second and third reliefs, petitioners assert that the disclosure of the present
places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, as well as the submission
of a list of medical personnel, is irrelevant, improper, immaterial, and unnecessary in the resolution of
the petition for a writ of Amparo. They add that it will unnecessarily compromise and jeopardize the
exercise of official functions and duties of military officers and even unwittingly and unnecessarily
expose them to threat of personal injury or even death.

On the contrary, the disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo
and Donald Caigas, whom respondents both directly implicated as perpetrators behind their abduction
and detention, is relevant in ensuring the safety of respondents by avoiding their areas of territorial
jurisdiction. Such disclosure would also help ensure that these military officers can be served with
notices and court processes in relation to any investigation and action for violation of the respondents'
rights. The list of medical personnel is also relevant in securing information to create the medical
history of respondents and make appropriate medical interventions, when applicable and necessary.

In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and security, these rights are snuffed out
from victims of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. The writ of Amparo is a tool that gives
voice to preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret walls.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated December 26, 2007 is affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. 210759               June 23, 2015

CHAIRPERSON SIEGFRED B. MISON, in his capacity as Chairperson1 of Bureau of Immigration and

Deportation,2 Petitioner,
vs.
HON. PAULINO Q. GALLEGOS, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court-Manila,
Branch 47 and JA HOON KU, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 211403

CHAIRPERSON SIEGFRED B. MISON, as the Chairperson of Bureau of Immigration and

Deportation, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. PAULINO Q. GALLEGOS, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court-Manila, Branch 47 and
JAHOONKU, Respondents.

x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 211590

CHAIRPERSON SIEGFRED B. MISON, in his capacity as the Chairperson of Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation, Petitioner,
vs.
JA HOON KU, Respondent.

DECISION
PEREZ, J.:

The privilege of the writ of amparo is .an extraordinary remedy adopted to address the special
concerns of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be
resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and
undermined by the indiscriminate filing of Amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure
amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations. 3

For the consideration of the Court are three consolidated petitions assailing the Orders dated 28
January 2014,4 29 January 2014,5 and 18 February 2014,6 as well as the Resolution dated 14 March
2014,7 all issued by respondent Presiding Judge Paulino Gallegos (Judge Gallegos) of the Regional Trial
Court-Manila, Branch 47 in SP. PROC. No. 14-131282.

The records show that on 23 December 2013, the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol)
of Seoul, Republic of Korea sent a Notice8 to Interpol Manila requesting assistance in the location and
deportation of respondent Ja Hoon Ku (Ku) for arbitrarily spending money allotted as reserve fund of
Phildip Korea Co., Ltd. Consequently, the Embassy of the Republic of Korea wrote a Letter-Request 9 to
petitioner, Hon. Siegfred Mison, Chairperson of the Bureau of Immigration (BI), for the immediate
arrest and deportatio n of Ku to Korea for being an undesirable alien.

Meanwhile, on 1 January 2014, Ku’s visa expired.10

On 3 January 2014, Special Prosecutor Maria Antonette Bucasas-Mangrobang charged Ku for being a
risk to public interest pursuant to Sec. 69, Act No. 2711.11This finding was approved by the BI Board of
Commissioners which, on 16 January 2014, issued a Summary Deportation Order. 12

On the same day, 16 January 2014, BI officers, with the assistance of the Manila Police District-Warrant
and Subpoena Section, arrested Ku. Upon arrival at the BI detention center, Ku was detained. 13

On 17 January 2014, the Republic of Korea voided Ku’s passport. 14

Also on 17 January 2014, Ku filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with Interim
Remedies, docketed as SP PROC. No. 14- 131282.15 On 22 January 2014, he also filed a Supplemental
Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo. 16

Finding said supple mental petition to be sufficient in form and substance, Judge Gallegos, in an Order
dated 22 January 2014, issued a Writ of Amparo. 17 On 24 January 2014, Ku filed a Motion for the
Issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO).18 Judge Gallegos then set the hearing on the TPO on
27 January 2014 at 8:30 a.m.,19 while he set the hearing on the petition for the issuance of a writ of
amparo on 29 January 2014 at 8:30 a.m.20

In the afternoon of 27 January 2014, petitioner filed his Return of the Writ. 21 He was then notified that
a hearing on the TPO was held earlier in the morning and that the same was already submitted for
resolution.22

Petitioner then filed an Opposition to the Motion for Issuance of TPO on 28 January 2014. 23

On 28 January 2014, Judge Gallegos issued the first assailed Order granting the motion for issuance of
TPO, entrusting Ku’s custody to the Philippine National Red Cross and/or its Chairman CEO Richard
Gordon, and directing the Philippine National Police-Police Security and Protection Group (PNP-PSPG)
to protect Ku and his immediate family.24 On 29 January 2014, Judge Gallegos issued the second
assailed Order directing the transfer of custody and protection of Ku to the PNP-PSPG. 25 Petitioner
challenged these orders before the Court via a Petition for Certiorari 26 docketed as G.R. No. 210759.

On 4 February 2014, the Court issued a Resolution in G.R. No. 210759 issuing a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) enjoining the enforcement of the Orders dated 28 and 29 January 2014 and directing the
BI to retain custody of Ku, as well as requiring Ku to comment on the petition.27 In issuing this
resolution, the Court intimated the possibility of misuse by Ku of the writ of amparo given that he was
validly arrested and placed under the jurisdiction and custody of the BI; thus the case cannot be
categorized as one of extralegal killing or enforced disappearance. 28

Owing to the Court’s Resolution dated 4 February 2014, in the hearing set on 11 February 2014 before
the trial court, petitioner verbally moved for the dismissal of the amparo petition. 29On 18 February
2014, however, Judge Gallegos issued the third assailed order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of
merit.30Thus, petitioner appealed the matter to the Court via the Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition31 docketed as G.R. No. 211403.

On 25 February 2014, Ku filed an appeal memorandum on his deportation order addressed to the
Office of the President (OP).32
On 14 March 2014, Judge Gallegos issued the assailed Resolution granting the privilege of the writ of
amparo, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the privilege of the Writ of Amparo is hereby GRANTED. [Ku] is ordered immediately
released from [petitioner’s] custody without prejudice to the institution of the proper remedy to
extradition. Moreover, the [petitioner] and/or agents are ordered to cease and desist from further
violating the right to liberty of [Ku] and the members of his family by filing cases to legitimize his
detention.33

Meanwhile, in the Resolution dated 18 March 2014 in G.R. No. 211403, the Court issued a TRO
enjoining the RTC from enforcing the Order dated 18 February 2014 and from further proceeding with
the case.34

On 19 March 2014, the OP granted Ku provisional liberty only until 31 August 2014 or until his appeal
was resolved, whichever came first.35Ku then moved for the release of his passport before the RTC,
which petitioner opposed and to which he filed a counter-motion for the RTC to release said passport
to the BI, given that such was one of the conditions for the OP’s grant of provisional liberty to Ku. 36 In
the Order dated 26 March 2014, however, Judge Gallegos merely noted petitioner’s motion for being
moot, considering that he already released Ku’s passport on 20 March 2014, upon the personal request
of Ku.37

Due to the complexities involved, petitioner filed the Petition for Review on Certiorari in G.R. No.
211590, essentially assailing the Resolution dated 14 March 2014.

Condensing the various issues raised in these petitions,38 we come to the central question of whether
or not the privilege of the writ of amparo was properly granted in the case at bar.

We rule in the negative.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule)39 provides:

SECTION 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right
to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

On 25 September 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule "in light of the prevalence of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances." It was an exercise for the first time of the Court’s
expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our people’ s constitutional rights, which made its
maiden appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law
regime. As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings"
and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or
to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are ‘killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without
legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended
by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official
or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the
government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or where about s of the person concerned or a
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of
law."40

This pronouncement on the coverage of the writ was further cemented in the latter case of Lozada, Jr.
v. Macapagal-Arroyo41 where this Court explicitly declared that as it stands, the writ of amparo is
confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof. As to
what constitutes "enforced disappearance," the Court in Navia v. Pardico 42 enumerated the elements
constituting "enforced disappearances" as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9851,43 to wit:

(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or
a political organization;

(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and

(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove the subject person from the protection of
the law for a prolonged period of time.44

As clarified in Navia, with the enactment of R.A. No. 9851, the Amparo Rule is now a procedural law
anchored, not only on the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security, but on a concrete statutory
definition as well of what an ‘enforced or involuntary disappearance’ is. Therefore, A.M. No. 07-9-12-
SC’s reference to enforced disappearances should be construed to mean the enforced or involuntary
disappearance of persons contemplated in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851. Meaning, in probing enforced
disappearance cases, courts should read A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to R.A. No. 9851. 45

Guided by the parameters of R.A. No. 9851, we can readily discern that Ku’s circumstance does not
come under the statutory definition of an enforced or involuntary disappearance. Indeed, Ku was
arrested by agents of the BI, but there was no refusal on the part of the BI to acknowledge such arrest
nor was there any refusal to give information on the whereabouts of Ku. Neither can it be said that the
BI had any intention to remove Ku from the protection of the law for a prolonged time.

Although Ku claims that he was arbitrarily arrested and detained by agents of the BI, that he was not
read his rights under the constitution and was not informed of the reason for hi s arrest, nor provided a
copy of any document leading to his arrest and detention,46 the arresting officers are all consistent in
testifying that, upon Ku’s arrest, they introduced themselves as agents of the BI, presented to Ku the
Warrant of Deportation, and informed him of his constitutional rights as well as the expiration of his
visa.47

More importantly, there was no attempt on the part of the BI to conceal Ku or his whereabouts. Within
the Bureau, Ku’s arrest and the fact that he was in their custody was not obscured as, in fact, these
were well-documented as evidenced by the Return of Warrant of Deportation dated 20 January
201448 and the After-Mission Report dated 17 January 2014.49

More importantly, in the Return of the Writ, petitioner readily disclosed to the trial court that Ku was
in the custody of the BI pursuant to a Warrant of Deportation and a Summary Deportation Order. 50
These documents and pleading show that there was never any intention on the part of the BI to re
move Ku from the protection of the law for a prolonged time. Besides, when Ku was arrested at 9:30
p.m. on 16 January 2014, and received at the BI Detention Center at 11:30 p.m. also on 16 January
2014,51 the following day or on 17 January 2014, Ku’s counsel was immediately able to file his Entry of
Appearance with Motion for Reconsideration before the BI,52 thereby showing that Ku’s legal rights
were amply guarded and that he was never removed from the protection of the law.

Section 5 of the Amparo Rule enumerates what an amparo petition should contain, among which is the
right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the
attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits, to wit:

SEC. 5. Contents of Petition. – The petition shall be signed and verified and shall allege the following:

(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;

(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or
omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an
assumed appellation;

(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is
committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;

(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and
addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the
investigation, together with any report;

(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of
the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission;
and

(f) The relief prayed for.

The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs.

Ku claims that he fears for his life and feels the serious danger of being detained for a long period of
time without any cause, and that he fears that the BI will fabricate criminal cases against him to hold
him under detention.53

According to Ku, what he seeks to obtain in filing an amparo petition is the protection it will give to his
person against the actions of some government officials who will likely take advantage of their
positions and use the power of the government at their command. Ku adds that the longer he stays in
confinement the more he is exposed to life-threatening situations and the further the violation of his
guaranteed rights.54

The allegations of Ku, though, are specious. It is to be noted that the Amparo Rule requires the parties
to establish their claims by substantial evidence.55 Other than making unfounded claims, however, Ku
was not able to present evidence that he was exposed to "life-threatening situations" while confined at
the BI Detention Center. On the contrary, the records show that he is afforded visitorial rights and that
he has access to his counsel.

Moreover, his primary fear, which prompted him to file the amparo petition, was that the BI would
trump up charges against him so as to justify his detention. The fact remains, however, that even
before his arrest, deportation charges against him were already duly filed and ruled upon by the BI.

As such, it can readily be discerned that the RTC’s grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo was
improper in this case as Ku and his whereabouts were never concealed, and as the alleged threats to
his life, liberty and security were unfounded and unsubstantiated. It is to be emphasized that the
fundamental function of the writ of amparo is to cause the disclosure of details concerning the
extrajudicial killing or the enforced disappearance of an aggrieved party. As Ku and his whereabouts
were never hidden, there was no need for the issuance of the privilege of the writ of amparo in the
case at bar.

It is to be additionally observed that Ku is guilty of forum shopping. Being the subject of a Warrant of
Deportation and a Summary Deportation Order, Ku’s proper recourse is with the BI and, thereafter,
with the DOJ and the OP.56

Ku knows this and, in fact, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the BI and an Appeal before
the OP. When Ku, however, injudiciously filed a Petition and a Supplemental Petition for the Issuance
of a Writ of Amparo, he committed forum shopping by seeking a remedy which he had already solicited
from another tribunal.

In Kiani v. BID,57 where petitioner therein file d before the trial court a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus seeking to have the detention of her husband declared as illegal and to order the latter’s
release, and where her husband filed before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) an
omnibus motion seeking to question the summary deportation order issued against him, the Court
held that petitioner indulged in forum shopping.

The Court clarified that under Section 8, Chapter 3, Title I, Book III of Executive Order No. 292, the
power to deport aliens is vested in the President of the Philippines, subject to the requirements of due
process. The Immigration Commissioner is vested with authority to deport aliens under Section 37 of
the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. Thus, a party aggrieved by a Deportation Order
issued by the BOC is proscribed from assailing said Order in the RTC even via a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus . Conformably with ruling of the Court in Domingo v. Scheer , such party may file a
motion for the reconsideration thereof before the BOC. 58

Citing Balite v. Court of Appeals,59 the Court held that there is forum shopping when a party seeks to
obtain remedies in an action in one court, which had already been solicited, and in other courts and
other proceedings in other tribunals. While a party may avail of the remedies prescribed by the Rules
of Court, such party is not free to resort to them simultaneously or at his/her pleasure or caprice. A
party should not be allowed to present simultaneous remedies in two different forums, for it degrades
and wreaks havoc to the rule on orderly procedure. A party must follow the sequence and hierarchical
order in availing of such remedies and not resort to shortcuts in procedure or playing fast and loose
with the said rules. Forum shopping, an act of malpractice, is considered as trifling with the courts and
abusing their processes. It is improper conduct and degrades the administration of justice.
On a final note, the Court observes that Judge Gallegos knowingly disregarded the Court’s directives as
regards this case. The records show that the Court’s Resolution dated 4 February 2014, wherein we
issued a TRO enjoining the enforcement of the Orders dated 28 and 29 January 2014 and intimated the
impropriety of the amparo petition, was received by the RTC on 5 February 2014. 60 This should have
alerted Judge Gallegos to proceed with caution and restraint in granting the privilege of the writ of
amparo. And yet, despite having knowledge of the Court’s pronouncements, Judge Gallegos proceeded
to grant the said privilege.

Also, the records show that the Court’s Resolution dated 18 March 2014, wherein we issued a TRO
enjoining the enforcement of the Order dated 18 February 2014 and enjoining the RTC from further
proceeding with the case, was received by the RTC on 20 March 2014 at 9:00 a.m. 61

Although by then, Judge Gallegos already issued the Resolution dated 14 March 2014 which granted
the privilege of the writ of amparo, his receipt of the Court’s Resolution dated 18 Marc h 2014 should
have forewarned him against releasing Ku’s passport. That he did so demonstrates his resistance and
unwillingness to follow the Court’s edicts.

It is well to note that a resolution of the Supreme Court should not be construed as a mere request,
and should be complied with promptly and completely.1âwphi1 Such failure to comply accordingly
betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in character, but al so disrespect for the Court’s lawful order and
directive.62

Judge Gallegos should know that judges must respect the orders and decisions of higher tribunals,
especially the Supreme Court from which all other courts take their bearings. A resolution of the
Supreme Court is not to be construed as a mere request nor should it be complied with partially,
inadequately or selectively.63

In the Judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue, it is a necessity. The exacting standards
of conduct demanded from judges are designed to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary. When the judge himself becomes the transgressor of the law which he is
sworn to apply, he places his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary itself.64

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby resolves to:

a) GRANT the present petitions, and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Resolution dated 14 March
2014 of the Regional Trial Court which granted the privilege of the Writ of Amparo;

b) DENY the privilege of the Writ of Amparo sought via the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Amparo and the Supplemental Petition for the Issuance of Writ of Amparo in SP. PROC.No.
14131282 before the Regional Trial of Manila, Branch 47; and

c) DIRECT the Office of the Court Administrator to file the appropriate administrative charge/s
against Judge Paulino Q. Gallegos in accordance with the tenor of this Decision, and to
forthwith submit to the Court its report and recommendation thereon.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 182498               December 3, 2009

GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Police Chief Superintendent
RAUL CASTAÑEDA, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG); Police Senior
Superintendent LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response (PACER);
and GEN. JOEL R. GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM, PNP, Petitioners,
vs.
MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein represented by ATTY. FELIPE P. ARCILLA, JR., Attorney-in-
Fact, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review in this petition for review on certiorari1 the decision dated March 7, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in C.A-G.R. AMPARO No. 00009.2 This CA decision confirmed the enforced disappearance
of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis) and granted the Writ of Amparo at the petition of his wife, Mary
Jean B. Tagitis (respondent). The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court hereby FINDS that this is an
"enforced disappearance" within the meaning of the United Nations instruments, as used in the
Amparo Rules. The privileges of the writ of amparo are hereby extended to Engr. Morced Tagitis.

Consequently: (1) respondent GEN. EDGARDO M. DOROMAL, Chief, Criminal Investigation and
Detention Group (CIDG) who should order COL. JOSE VOLPANE PANTE, CIDG-9 Chief, Zamboanga City,
to aid him; (2) respondent GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, Chief, PNP, who should order his men, namely: (a)
respondent GEN. JOEL GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM PNP, (b) COL. AHIRON AJIRIM, both head
of TASK FORCE TAGITIS, and (c) respondent SR. SUPERINTENDENT LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police
Anti-Crime and Emergency Response, to aid him as their superior- are hereby DIRECTED to
exert extraordinary diligence and efforts, not only to protect the life, liberty and security of Engr.
Morced Tagitis, but also to extend the privileges of the writ of amparo to Engr. Morced Tagitis and his
family, and to submit a monthly report of their actions to this Court, as a way of PERIODIC REVIEW to
enable this Court to monitor the action of respondents.

This amparo case is hereby DISMISSED as to respondent LT. GEN. ALEXANDER YANO, Commanding
General, Philippine Army, and as to respondent GEN. RUBEN RAFAEL, Chief Anti-Terror Task Force
Comet, Zamboanga City, both being with the military, which is a separate and distinct organization
from the police and the CIDG, in terms of operations, chain of command and budget.

This Decision reflects the nature of the Writ of Amparo – a protective remedy against violations or
threats of violation against the rights to life, liberty and security. 3 It embodies, as a remedy, the court’s
directive to police agencies to undertake specified courses of action to address the disappearance of an
individual, in this case, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal
culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the
enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the
disappearance. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial
evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as
a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate
criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the
other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited
involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to
discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. In
all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing the
disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored.

We highlight this nature of a Writ of Amparo case at the outset to stress that the unique situations that
call for the issuance of the writ, as well as the considerations and measures necessary to address these
situations, may not at all be the same as the standard measures and procedures in ordinary court
actions and proceedings. In this sense, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo 4 (Amparo Rule) issued by this
Court is unique. The Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a work in progress, as its directions and finer
points remain to evolve through time and jurisprudence and through the substantive laws that
Congress may promulgate.

THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

The background facts, based on the petition and the records of the case, are summarized below.

The established facts show that Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary
Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu.
Together with Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB scholar, Tagitis arrived in Jolo by boat in the early
morning of October 31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in at ASY
Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip the following day to
Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no longer around. 5 The receptionist
related that Tagitis went out to buy food at around 12:30 in the afternoon and even left his room key
with the desk.6 Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even sent a text message to the latter’s Manila-based
secretary who did not know of Tagitis’ whereabouts and activities either; she advised Kunnong to
simply wait.7

On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim

studies and Tagitis’ fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the Jolo
Police Station.8 On November 7, 2007, Kunnong executed a sworn affidavit attesting to what he knew
of the circumstances surrounding Tagitis’ disappearance. 9

More than a month later (on December 28, 2007), the respondent filed a Petition for the Writ of
Amparo (petition) with the CA through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla. 10 The petition was
directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I.
Razon, Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation
and Detention Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency
Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror
Task Force Comet [collectively referred to as petitioners]. After reciting Tagitis’ personal circumstances
and the facts outlined above, the petition went on to state:
xxxx

7. Soon after the student left the room, Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension house to take his early
lunch but while out on the street, a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives,
forcibly took him and boarded the latter on a motor vehicle then sped away without the knowledge of
his student, Arsimin Kunnong;

8. As instructed, in the late afternoon of the same day, Kunnong returned to the pension house, and
was surprised to find out that subject Engr. Tagitis cannot [sic] be contacted by phone and was not also
around and his room was closed and locked;

9. Kunnong requested for the key from the desk of the pension house who [sic] assisted him to open
the room of Engr. Tagitis, where they discovered that the personal belongings of Engr. Tagitis, including
cell phones, documents and other personal belongings were all intact inside the room;

10. When Kunnong could not locate Engr. Tagitis, the former sought the help of another IDB scholar
and reported the matter to the local police agency;

11. Arsimin Kunnong including his friends and companions in Jolo, exerted efforts in trying to locate the
whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and when he reported the matter to the police authorities in Jolo, he was
immediately given a ready answer that Engr. Tagitis could have been abducted by the Abu Sayyaf
group and other groups known to be fighting against the government;

12. Being scared with [sic] these suggestions and insinuations of the police officers, Kunnong reported
the matter to the [respondent, wife of Engr. Tagitis] by phone and other responsible officers and
coordinators of the IDB Scholarship Programme in the Philippines, who alerted the office of the
Governor of ARMM who was then preparing to attend the OIC meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia;

13. [Respondent], on the other hand, approached some of her co-employees with the Land Bank in
Digos branch, Digos City, Davao del Sur who likewise sought help from some of their friends in the
military who could help them find/locate the whereabouts of her husband;

14. All of these efforts of the [respondent] did not produce any positive results except the information
from persons in the military who do not want to be identified that Engr. Tagitis is in the hands of the
uniformed men;

15. According to reliable information received by the [respondent], subject Engr. Tagitis is in the
custody of police intelligence operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held
against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the
different terrorist groups;
xxxx
17. [Respondent] filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station in the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo,
as suggested by her friends, seeking their help to find her husband, but [respondent’s] request and
pleadings failed to produce any positive results;

18. Instead of helping the [respondent], she [sic] was told of an intriguing tale by the police that her
husband, subject of the petition, was not missing but was with another woman having good time
somewhere, which is a clear indication of the [petitioners’] refusal to help and provide police
assistance in locating her missing husband;
19. The continued failure and refusal of the [petitioners] to release and/or turn-over subject Engr.
Tagitis to his family or even to provide truthful information to [the respondent] of the subject’s
whereabouts, and/or allow [the respondent] to visit her husband Engr. Morced Tagitis, caused so much
sleepless nights and serious anxieties;

20. Lately, [the respondent] was again advised by one of the [petitioners] to go to the ARMM Police
Headquarters again in Cotobato City and also to the different Police Headquarters including [those] in
Davao City, in Zamboanga City, in Jolo, and in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and all these places have
been visited by the [respondent] in search for her husband, which entailed expenses for her trips to
these places thereby resorting her to borrowings and beggings [sic] for financial help from friends and
relatives only to try complying [sic] to the different suggestions of these police officers, despite of
which, her efforts produced no positive results up to the present time;

21. In fact at times, some police officers, who [sympathized with] the sufferings undergone by the
[respondent], informed her that they are not the proper persons that she should approach, but
assured her not to worry because her husband is [sic] in good hands;

22. The unexplained uncooperative behavior of the [petitioners] to the [respondent’s] request for help
and failure and refusal of the [petitioners] to extend the needed help, support and assistance in
locating the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis who had been declared missing since October 30, 2007 which
is almost two (2) months now, clearly indicates that the [petitioners] are actually in physical possession
and custody of [respondent’s] husband, Engr. Tagitis;
xxxx
25. [The respondent] has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and under
the circumstances, [the respondent] has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect and
get the release of subject Engr. Morced Tagitis from the illegal clutches of the [petitioners], their
intelligence operatives and the like which are in total violation of the subject’s human and
constitutional rights, except the issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO. [Emphasis supplied]

On the same day the petition was filed, the CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo, set the case for
hearing on January 7, 2008, and directed the petitioners to file their verified return within seventy-two
(72) hours from service of the writ.11

In their verified Return filed during the hearing of January 27, 2008, the petitioners denied any
involvement in or knowledge of Tagitis’ alleged abduction. They argued that the allegations of the
petition were incomplete and did not constitute a cause of action against them; were baseless, or at
best speculative; and were merely based on hearsay evidence. 12

The affidavit of PNP Chief Gen. Avelino I. Razon, attached to the Return, stated that: he did not have
any personal knowledge of, or any participation in, the alleged disappearance; that he had been
designated by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as the head of a special body called TASK FORCE
USIG, to address concerns about extralegal killings and enforced disappearances; the Task Force, inter
alia, coordinated with the investigators and local police, held case conferences, rendered legal advice
in connection to these cases; and gave the following summary: 13
xxxx
4.
a) On November 5, 2007, the Regional Director, Police Regional Office ARMM submitted a
report on the alleged disappearance of one Engr. Morced Tagitis. According to the said report,
the victim checked-in at ASY Pension House on October 30, 2007 at about 6:00 in the morning
 and then roamed around Jolo, Sulu with an unidentified companion. It was only after a few days
when the said victim did not return that the matter was reported to Jolo MPS. Afterwards,
elements of Sulu PPO conducted a thorough investigation to trace and locate the whereabouts
of the said missing person, but to no avail. The said PPO is still conducting investigation that will
lead to the immediate findings of the whereabouts of the person.

b) Likewise, the Regional Chief, 9RCIDU submitted a Progress Report to the Director, CIDG. The
said report stated among others that: subject person attended an Education Development
Seminar set on October 28, 2007 conducted at Ateneo de Zamboanga, Zamboanga City
together with a Prof. Matli. On October 30, 2007, at around 5:00 o’clock in the morning, Engr.
Tagitis reportedly arrived at Jolo Sulu wharf aboard M/V Bounty Cruise, he was then billeted at
ASY Pension House. At about 6:15 o’clock in the morning of the same date, he instructed his
student to purchase a fast craft ticket bound for Zamboanga City and will depart from Jolo, Sulu
on October 31, 2007. That on or about 10:00 o’clock in the morning, Engr. Tagitis left the
premises of ASY Pension House as stated by the cashier of the said pension house. Later in the
afternoon, the student instructed to purchase the ticket arrived at the pension house and
waited for Engr. Tagitis, but the latter did not return. On its part, the elements of 9RCIDU is now
conducting a continuous case build up and information gathering to locate the whereabouts of
Engr. Tagitis.

c) That the Director, CIDG directed the conduct of the search in all divisions of the CIDG to find
Engr. Tagitis who was allegedly abducted or illegally detained by covert CIDG-PNP Intelligence
Operatives since October 30, 2007, but after diligent and thorough search, records show that
no such person is being detained in CIDG or any of its department or divisions.

5. On this particular case, the Philippine National Police exhausted all possible efforts, steps and actions
available under the circumstances and continuously search and investigate [sic] the instant case. This
immense mandate, however, necessitates the indispensable role of the citizenry, as the PNP cannot
stand alone without the cooperation of the victims and witnesses to identify the perpetrators to bring
them before the bar of justice and secure their conviction in court.

The petitioner PNP-CIDG Chief, Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, submitted as well his affidavit, also attached
to the Return of the Writ, attesting that upon receipt of the Writ of Amparo, he caused the following: 14
xxxx
That immediately upon receipt on December 29, 2007 of the Resolution of the Honorable Special
Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals, I immediately directed the Investigation Division of this Group
[CIDG] to conduct urgent investigation on the alleged enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced
Tagitis.

That based on record, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis attended an Education Development Seminar on
October 28, 2007 at Ateneo de Zamboanga at Zamboanga City together with Prof. Abdulnasser Matli.
On October 30, 2007, at around six o’clock in the morning he arrived at Jolo, Sulu. He was assisted by
his student identified as Arsimin Kunnong of the Islamic Development Bank who was also one of the
participants of the said seminar. He checked in at ASY pension house located [sic] Kakuyagan, Patikul,
Sulu on October 30, 2007 with [sic] unidentified companion. At around six o’clock in the morning of
even date, Engr. Tagitis instructed his student to purchase a fast craft ticket for Zamboanga City. In the
afternoon of the same date, Kunnong arrived at the pension house carrying the ticket he purchased for
Engr. Tagitis, but the latter was nowhere to be found anymore. Kunnong immediately informed Prof.
Abdulnasser Matli who reported the incident to the police. The CIDG is not involved in the
disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis to make out a case of an enforced disappearance which
presupposes a direct or indirect involvement of the government.

That herein [petitioner] searched all divisions and departments for a person named Engr. Morced N.
Tagitis, who was allegedly abducted or illegally detained by covert CIDG-PNP Intelligence Operatives
since October 30, 2007 and after a diligent and thorough research records show that no such person is
being detained in CIDG or any of its department or divisions.

That nevertheless, in order to determine the circumstances surrounding Engr. Morced Tagitis [sic]
alleged enforced disappearance, the undersigned had undertaken immediate investigation and will
pursue investigations up to its full completion in order to aid in the prosecution of the person or
persons responsible therefore.

Likewise attached to the Return of the Writ was PNP-PACER15 Chief PS Supt. Leonardo A. Espina’s
affidavit which alleged that:16
xxxx
That, I and our men and women in PACER vehemently deny any participation in the alleged abduction
or illegally [sic] detention of ENGR. MORCED N. TAGITS on October 30, 2007. As a matter of fact,
nowhere in the writ was mentioned that the alleged abduction was perpetrated by elements of PACER
nor was there any indication that the alleged abduction or illegal detention of ENGR. TAGITIS was
undertaken jointly by our men and by the alleged covert CIDG-PNP intelligence operatives alleged to
have abducted or illegally detained ENGR. TAGITIS.

That I was shocked when I learned that I was implicated in the alleged disappearance of ENGR.
MORCED in my capacity as the chief PACER [sic] considering that our office, the Police Anti-Crime and
Emergency Response (PACER), a special task force created for the purpose of neutralizing or
eradicating kidnap-for-ransom groups which until now continue to be one of the menace of our society
is a respondent in kidnapping or illegal detention case. Simply put, our task is to go after kidnappers
and charge them in court and to abduct or illegally detain or kidnap anyone is anathema to our
mission.

That right after I learned of the receipt of the WRIT OF AMPARO, I directed the Chief of PACER
Mindanao Oriental (PACER-MOR) to conduct pro-active measures to investigate, locate/search the
subject, identify and apprehend the persons responsible, to recover and preserve evidence related to
the disappearance of ENGR. MORCED TAGITIS, which may aid in the prosecution of the person or
persons responsible, to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the
disappearance and to determine the cause, manner, location and time of disappearance as well as any
pattern or practice that may have brought about the disappearance.

That I further directed the chief of PACER-MOR, Police Superintendent JOSE ARNALDO BRIONES JR., to
submit a written report regarding the disappearance of ENGR. MORCED.

That in compliance with my directive, the chief of PACER-MOR sent through fax his written report.

That the investigation and measures being undertaken to locate/search the subject in coordination
with Police Regional Office, Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (PRO-ARMM) and Jolo Police
Provincial Office (PPO) and other AFP and PNP units/agencies in the area are ongoing with the
instruction not to leave any stone unturned so to speak in the investigation until the perpetrators in
the instant case are brought to the bar of justice.
That I have exercised EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE in dealing with the WRIT OF AMPARO just issued.

Finally, the PNP PRO ARMM Regional Director PC Supt. Joel R. Goltiao (Gen. Goltiao), also submitted his
affidavit detailing the actions that he had taken upon receipt of the report on Tagitis’ disappearance,
viz:17
xxxx
3) For the record:

1. I am the Regional Director of Police Regional Office ARMM now and during the time of the incident;
xxxx
4. It is my duty to look into and take appropriate measures on any cases of reported enforced
disappearances and when they are being alluded to my office;

5. On November 5, 2007, the Provincial Director of Sulu Police Provincial Office reported to me through
Radio Message Cite No. SPNP3-1105-07-2007 that on November 4, 2007 at around 3:30 p.m., a certain
Abdulnasser Matli, an employee of Islamic Development Bank, appeared before the Office of the Chief
of Police, Jolo Police Station, and reported the disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis, scholarship
coordinator of Islamic Development Bank, Manila;

6. There was no report that Engr. Tagibis was last seen in the company of or taken by any member of
the Philippine National Police but rather he just disappeared from ASY Pension House situated at
Kakuyagan Village, Village, Patikul, Sulu, on October 30, 2007, without any trace of forcible abduction
or arrest;

7. The last known instance of communication with him was when Arsimin Kunnong, a student scholar,
was requested by him to purchase a vessel ticket at the Office of Weezam Express, however, when the
student returned back to ASY Pension House, he no longer found Engr. Tagitis there and when he
immediately inquired at the information counter regarding his whereabouts [sic], the person in charge
in the counter informed him that Engr. Tagitis had left the premises on October 30, 2007 around 1
o’clock p.m. and never returned back to his room;

8. Immediately after learning the incident, I called and directed the Provincial Director of Sulu Police
Provincial Office and other units through phone call and text messages to conduct investigation [sic] to
determine the whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for the
threat, act or omission, to recover and preserve evidence related to the disappearance of Engr. Tagitis,
to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning his disappearance, to determine
the cause and manner of his disappearance, to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved
in the disappearance so that they shall be brought before a competent court;

9. Thereafter, through my Chief of the Regional Investigation and Detection Management Division, I
have caused the following directives:

a) Radio Message Cite No. RIDMD-1122-07-358 dated November 22, 2007 directing PD Sulu
PPO to conduct joint investigation with CIDG and CIDU ARMM on the matter;

b) Radio Message Cite No. RIDMD-1128-07-361 dated November 28, 2007 directing PD Sulu
PPO to expedite compliance to my previous directive;
 c) Memorandum dated December 14, 2007 addressed to PD Sulu PPO reiterating our series of
directives for investigation and directing him to undertake exhaustive coordination efforts with
the owner of ASY Pension House and student scholars of IDB in order to secure corroborative
statements regarding the disappearance and whereabouts of said personality;

d) Memorandum dated December 24, 2007 addressed to PD Sulu PPO directing him to
maximize efforts to establish clues on the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis by seeking the
cooperation of Prof. Abdulnasser Matli and Arsimin Kunnong and/or whenever necessary, for
them to voluntarily submit for polygraph examination with the NBI so as to expunge all clouds
of doubt that they may somehow have knowledge or idea to his disappearance;

e) Memorandum dated December 27, 2007 addressed to the Regional Chief, Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group, Police Regional Office 9, Zamboanga City, requesting
assistance to investigate the cause and unknown disappearance of Engr. Tagitis considering that
it is within their area of operational jurisdiction;

f) Memorandum from Chief, Intelligence Division, PRO ARMM dated December 30, 2007
addressed to PD Sulu PPO requiring them to submit complete investigation report regarding the
case of Engr. Tagitis;

10. In compliance to our directives, PD Sulu PPO has exerted his [sic] efforts to conduct investigation
[sic] on the matter to determine the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and the circumstances related to his
disappearance and submitted the following:

a) Progress Report dated November 6, 2007 through Radio Message Cite No. SPNP3-1106-10-
2007;

b) Radio Message Cite No. SPIDMS-1205-47-07 informing this office that they are still
monitoring the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis;

c) Investigation Report dated December 31, 2007 from the Chief of Police, Jolo Police Station,
Sulu PPO;

11. This incident was properly reported to the PNP Higher Headquarters as shown in the following:

a) Memorandum dated November 6, 2007 addressed to the Chief, PNP informing him of the
facts of the disappearance and the action being taken by our office;

b) Memorandum dated November 6, 2007 addressed to the Director, Directorate for

Investigation and Detection Management, NHQ PNP;

c) Memorandum dated December 30, 2007 addressed to the Director, DIDM;

4) In spite of our exhaustive efforts, the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis cannot be determined but our
office is continuously intensifying the conduct of information gathering, monitoring and coordination
for the immediate solution of the case.
Since the disappearance of Tagistis was practically admitted and taking note of favorable actions so far
taken on the disappearance, the CA directed Gen. Goltiao – as the officer in command of the area of
disappearance – to form TASK FORCE TAGITIS. 18

Task Force Tagitis

On January 11, 2008, Gen. Goltiao designated PS Supt. Ahiron Ajirim (PS Supt. Ajirim) to head TASK
FORCE TAGITIS.19 The CA subsequently set three hearings to monitor whether TASK FORCE TAGITIS was
exerting "extraordinary efforts" in handling the disappearance of Tagitis. 20 As planned, (1) the first
hearing would be to mobilize the CIDG, Zamboanga City; (2) the second hearing would be to mobilize
intelligence with Abu Sayyaf and ARMM; and (3) the third hearing would be to mobilize the Chief of
Police of Jolo, Sulu and the Chief of Police of Zamboanga City and other police operatives. 21

In the hearing on January 17, 2008, TASK FORCE TAGITIS submitted to the CA an intelligence report
from PSL Usman S. Pingay, the Chief of Police of the Jolo Police Station, stating a possible motive for
Tagitis’ disappearance.22 The intelligence report was apparently based on the sworn affidavit dated
January 4, 2008 of Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli (Prof. Matli), Professor of Islamic Studies at the
University of the Philippines and an Honorary Student Counselor of the IDB Scholarship Program in the
Philippines, who told the Provincial Governor of Sulu that: 23

[Based] on reliable information from the Office of Muslim Affairs in Manila, Tagitis has reportedly taken
and carried away… more or less Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) deposited and entrusted to his …
[personal] bank accounts by the Central Office of IDB, Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which [was]
intended for the … IDB Scholarship Fund.

In the same hearing, PS Supt. Ajirim testified that since the CIDG was alleged to be responsible, he
personally went to the CIDG office in Zamboanga City to conduct an ocular inspection/investigation,
particularly of their detention cells.24 PS Supt. Ajirim stated that the CIDG, while helping TASK FORCE
TAGITIS investigate the disappearance of Tagitis, persistently denied any knowledge or complicity in
any abduction.25 He further testified that prior to the hearing, he had already mobilized and given
specific instructions to their supporting units to perform their respective tasks; that they even talked
to, but failed to get any lead from the respondent in Jolo.26 In his submitted investigation report dated
January 16, 2008, PS Supt. Ajirim concluded:27

9. Gleaned from the undersigned inspection and observation at the Headquarters 9 RCIDU and the
documents at hand, it is my own initial conclusion that the 9RCIDU and other PNP units in the area had
no participation neither [sic] something to do with [sic] mysterious disappearance of Engr. Morced
Tagitis last October 30, 2007. Since doubt has been raised regarding the emolument on the Islamic
Development Bank Scholar program of IDB that was reportedly deposited in the personal account of
Engr. Tagitis by the IDB central office in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Secondly, it could might [sic]
be done by resentment or sour grape among students who are applying for the scholar [sic] and were
denied which was allegedly conducted/screened by the subject being the coordinator of said program.

20. It is also premature to conclude but it does or it may and [sic] presumed that the motive behind the
disappearance of the subject might be due to the funds he maliciously spent for his personal interest
and wanted to elude responsibilities from the institution where he belong as well as to the Islamic
student scholars should the statement of Prof. Matli be true or there might be a professional jealousy
among them.
xxxx
It is recommended that the Writ of Amparo filed against the respondents be dropped and dismissed
considering on [sic] the police and military actions in the area particularly the CIDG are exerting their
efforts and religiously doing their tasked [sic] in the conduct of its intelligence monitoring and
investigation for the early resolution of this instant case. But rest assured, our office, in coordination
with other law-enforcement agencies in the area, are continuously and religiously conducting our
investigation for the resolution of this case.

On February 4, 2008, the CA issued an ALARM WARNING that Task Force Tagitis did not appear to be
exerting extraordinary efforts in resolving Tagitis’ disappearance on the following grounds: 28

(1) This Court FOUND that it was only as late as January 28, 2008, after the hearing, that GEN.
JOEL GOLTIAO and COL. AHIRON AJIRIM had requested for clear photographs when it should
have been standard operating procedure in kidnappings or disappearances that the first agenda
was for the police to secure clear pictures of the missing person, Engr. Morced Tagitis, for
dissemination to all parts of the country and to neighboring countries. It had been three (3)
months since GEN. JOEL GOLTIAO admitted having been informed on November 5, 2007 of the
alleged abduction of Engr. Morced Tagitis by alleged bad elements of the CIDG. It had been
more than one (1) month since the Writ of Amparo had been issued on December 28, 2007. It
had been three (3) weeks when battle formation was ordered through Task Force Tagitis, on
January 17, 2008. It was only on January 28, 2008 when the Task Force Tagitis requested for
clear and recent photographs of the missing person, Engr. Morced Tagitis, despite the Task
Force Tagitis’ claim that they already had an "all points bulletin", since November 5, 2007, on
the missing person, Engr. Morced Tagitis. How could the police look for someone who
disappeared if no clear photograph had been disseminated?

(2) Furthermore, Task Force Tagitis’ COL. AHIROM AJIRIM informed this Court that P/Supt
KASIM was designated as Col. Ahirom Ajirim’s replacement in the latter’s official designated
post. Yet, P/Supt KASIM’s subpoena was returned to this Court unserved. Since this Court was
made to understand that it was P/Supt KASIM who was the petitioner’s unofficial source of the
military intelligence information that Engr. Morced Tagitis was abducted by bad elements of the
CIDG (par. 15 of the Petition), the close contact between P/Supt KASIM and Col. Ahirom Ajirim
of TASK FORCE TAGITIS should have ensured the appearance of Col. KASIM in response to this
court’s subpoena and COL. KASIM could have confirmed the military intelligence information
that bad elements of the CIDG had abducted Engr. Morced Tagitis.

Testimonies for the Respondent

On January 7, 2008, the respondent, Mary Jean B. Tagitis, testified on direct examination that she went
to Jolo and Zamboanga in her efforts to locate her husband. She said that a friend from Zamboanga
holding a high position in the military (whom she did not then identify) gave her information that
allowed her to "specify" her allegations, "particularly paragraph 15 of the petition." 29 This friend also
told her that her husband "[was] in good hands."30 The respondent also testified that she sought the
assistance of her former boss in Davao City, Land Bank Bajada Branch Manager Rudy Salvador, who
told her that "PNP CIDG is holding [her husband], Engineer Morced Tagitis." 31 The respondent
recounted that she went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City where she met Col. Julasirim Ahadin Kasim
(Col. Kasim/Sr. Supt Kasim) who read to her and her friends (who were then with her) a "highly
confidential report" that contained the "alleged activities of Engineer Tagitis" and informed her that
her husband was abducted because "he is under custodial investigation" for being a liaison for "J.I. or
Jema’ah Islamiah."32

On January 17, 2008, the respondent on cross-examination testified that she is Tagitis’ second wife,
and they have been married for thirteen years; Tagitis was divorced from his first wife. 33 She last
communicated with her husband on October 29, 2007 at around 7:31 p.m. through text messaging;
Tagitis was then on his way to Jolo, Sulu, from Zamboanga City. 34

The respondent narrated that she learned of her husband’s disappearance on October 30, 2007 when
her stepdaughter, Zaynah Tagitis (Zaynah), informed her that she had not heard from her father since
the time they arranged to meet in Manila on October 31, 2007.35 The respondent explained that it took
her a few days (or on November 5, 2007) to personally ask Kunnong to report her husband’s
disappearance to the Jolo Police Station, since she had the impression that her husband could not
communicate with her because his cellular phone’s battery did not have enough power, and that he
would call her when he had fully-charged his cellular phone’s battery. 36

The respondent also identified the high-ranking military friend, who gave her the information found in
paragraph 15 of her petition, as Lt. Col. Pedro L. Ancanan, Jr (Col. Ancanan). She met him in Camp
Karingal, Zamboanga through her boss.37 She also testified that she was with three other people,
namely, Mrs. Marydel Martin Talbin and her two friends from Mati City, Davao Oriental, when Col.
Kasim read to them the contents of the "highly confidential report" at Camp Katitipan, Davao City. The
respondent further narrated that the report indicated that her husband met with people belonging to
a terrorist group and that he was under custodial investigation. She then told Col. Kasim that her
husband was a diabetic taking maintenance medication, and asked that the Colonel relay to the
persons holding him the need to give him his medication.38

On February 11, 2008, TASK FORCE TAGITIS submitted two narrative reports, 39 signed by the
respondent, detailing her efforts to locate her husband which led to her meetings with Col. Ancanan of
the Philippine Army and Col. Kasim of the PNP. In her narrative report concerning her meeting with Col.
Ancanan, the respondent recounted, viz:40

On November 11, 2007, we went to Zamboanga City with my friend Mrs. Marydel Talbin. Our flight
from Davao City is 9:00 o’clock in the morning; we arrived at Zamboanga Airport at around 10:00
o’clock. We [were] fetched by the two staffs of Col. Ancanan. We immediately proceed [sic] to West
Mindanao Command (WESTMINCOM).

On that same day, we had private conversation with Col. Ancanan. He interviewed me and got
information about the personal background of Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. After he gathered all
information, he revealed to us the contents of text messages they got from the cellular phone of the
subject Engr. Tagitis. One of the very important text messages of Engr. Tagitis sent to his daughter
Zaynah Tagitis was that she was not allowed to answer any telephone calls in his condominium unit.

While we were there he did not tell us any information of the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis. After the
said meeting with Col. Ancanan, he treated us as guests to the city. His two staffs accompanied us to
the mall to purchase our plane ticket going back to Davao City on November 12, 2007.

When we arrived in Davao City on November 12, 2007 at 9:00 in the morning, Col. Ancanan and I were
discussing some points through phone calls. He assured me that my husband is alive and he’s last
looked [sic] in Talipapao, Jolo, Sulu. Yet I did not believe his given statements of the whereabouts of my
husband, because I contacted some of my friends who have access to the groups of MILF, MNLF and
ASG. I called up Col. Ancanan several times begging to tell me the exact location of my husband and
who held him but he refused.

While I was in Jolo, Sulu on November 30, 2007, I called him up again because the PNP, Jolo did not
give me any information of the whereabouts of my husband. Col. Ancanan told me that "Sana ngayon
alam mo na kung saan ang kinalalagyan ng asawa mo." When I was in Zamboanga, I was thinking of
dropping by the office of Col. Ancanan, but I was hesitant to pay him a visit for the reason that the
Chief of Police of Jolo told me not to contact any AFP officials and he promised me that he can solve
the case of my husband (Engr. Tagitis) within nine days.

I appreciate the effort of Col. Ancanan on trying to solve the case of my husband Engr. Morced Tagitis,
yet failed to do so.

The respondent also narrated her encounter with Col. Kasim, as follows:41

On November 7, 2007, I went to Land Bank of the Philippines, Bajada Branch, Davao City to meet Mr.
Rudy Salvador. I told him that my husband, Engineer Morced Tagitis was presumed to be abducted in
Jolo, Sulu on October 30, 2007. I asked him a favor to contact his connections in the military in Jolo,
Sulu where the abduction of Engr. Tagitis took place. Mr. Salvador immediately called up Camp
Katitipan located in Davao City looking for high-ranking official who can help me gather reliable
information behind the abduction of subject Engineer Tagitis.

On that same day, Mr. Salvador and my friend, Anna Mendoza, Executive Secretary, accompanied me
to Camp Katitipan to meet Col. Kasim. Mr. Salvador introduced me to Col. Kasim and we had a short
conversation. And he assured me that he’ll do the best he can to help me find my husband.

After a few weeks, Mr. Salvador called me up informing me up informing me that I am to go to Camp
Katitipan to meet Col. Kasim for he has an urgent, confidential information to reveal.

On November 24, 2007, we went back to Camp Katitipan with my three friends. That was the time that
Col. Kasim read to us the confidential report that Engr. Tagitis was allegedly connected [with] different
terrorist [groups], one of which he mentioned in the report was OMAR PATIK and a certain SANTOS - a
Balik Islam.

It is also said that Engr. Tagitis is carrying boxes of medicines for the injured terrorists as a supplier.
These are the two information that I can still remember. It was written in a long bond paper with PNP
Letterhead. It was not shown to us, yet Col. Kasim was the one who read it for us.

He asked a favor to me that "Please don’t quote my Name! Because this is a raw report." He assured
me that my husband is alive and he is in the custody of the military for custodial investigation. I told
him to please take care of my husband because he has aliments and he recently took insulin for he is a
diabetic patient.

In my petition for writ of amparo, I emphasized the information that I got from Kasim.

On February 11, 2008, the respondent presented Mrs. Marydel Martin Talbin (Mrs. Talbin) to
corroborate her testimony regarding her efforts to locate her husband, in relation particularly with the
information she received from Col. Kasim. Mrs. Talbin testified that she was with the respondent when
she went to Zamboanga to see Col. Ancanan, and to Davao City at Camp Katitipan to meet Col. Kasim. 42

In Zamboanga, Mrs. Talbin recounted that they met with Col. Ancanan, who told them that there was a
report and that he showed them a series of text messages from Tagitis’ cellular phone, which showed
that Tagitis and his daughter would meet in Manila on October 30, 2007. 43

She further narrated that sometime on November 24, 2007, she went with the respondent together
with two other companions, namely, Salvacion Serrano and Mini Leong, to Camp Katitipan to talk to
Col. Kasim.44 The respondent asked Col. Kasim if he knew the exact location of Engr. Tagitis. Col. Kasim
told them that Tagitis was in good hands, although he was not certain whether he was with the PNP or
with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). She further recounted that based on the report Col.
Kasim read in their presence, Tagitis was under custodial investigation because he was being charged
with terrorism; Tagitis in fact had been under surveillance since January 2007 up to the time he was
abducted when he was seen talking to Omar Patik and a certain Santos of Bulacan, a "Balik Islam"
charged with terrorism. Col. Kasim also told them that he could not give a copy of the report because it
was a "raw report."45 She also related that the Col. Kasim did not tell them exactly where Tagitis was
being kept, although he mentioned Talipapao, Sulu.Prof., lalabas din yan."50 Prof. Matli also
emphasized that despite what his January 4, 2008 affidavit indicated, 51 he never told PS Supt. Pingay,
or made any accusation, that Tagitis took away money entrusted to him. 52 Prof. Matli confirmed,
however, that that he had received an e-mail report53 from Nuraya Lackian of the Office of Muslim
Affairs in Manila that the IDB was seeking assistance of the office in locating the funds of IDB scholars
deposited in Tagitis’ personal account.54

On cross-examination by the respondent’s counsel, Prof. Matli testified that his January 4, 2008
affidavit was already prepared when PS Supt. Pingay asked him to sign it. 55 Prof Matli clarified that
although he read the affidavit before signing it, he "was not so much aware of… [its] contents." 56

On February 11, 2008, the petitioners presented Col. Kasim to rebut material portions of the
respondent’s testimony, particularly the allegation that he had stated that Tagitis was in the custody of
either the military or the PNP.57 Col. Kasim categorically denied the statements made by the
respondent in her narrative report, specifically: (1) that Tagitis was seen carrying boxes of medicines as
supplier for the injured terrorists; (2) that Tagitis was under the custody of the military, since he merely
said to the respondent that "your husband is in good hands" and is "probably taken cared of by his
armed abductors;" and (3) that Tagitis was under custodial investigation by the military, the PNP or the
CIDG Zamboanga City.58 Col. Kasim emphasized that the "informal letter" he received from his
informant in Sulu did not indicate that Tagitis was in the custody of the CIDG.59 He also stressed that
the information he provided to the respondent was merely a "raw report" sourced from "barangay
intelligence" that still needed confirmation and "follow-up" as to its veracity. 60

On cross-examination, Col. Kasim testified that the information he gave the respondent was given to
him by his informant, who was a "civilian asset," through a letter which he considered as
"unofficial."61 Col. Kasim stressed that the letter was only meant for his "consumption" and not for
reading by others.62 He testified further that he destroyed the letter right after he read it to the
respondent and her companions because "it was not important to him" and also because the
information it contained had no importance in relation with the abduction of Tagitis. 63 He explained
that he did not keep the letter because it did not contain any information regarding the whereabouts
of Tagitis and the person(s) responsible for his abduction.64
In the same hearing on February 11, 2008, the petitioners also presented Police Senior Superintendent
Jose Volpane Pante (Col. Pante), Chief of the CIDG-9, to disprove the respondent’s allegation that
Tagitis was in the custody of CIDG-Zamboanga City.65 Col. Pante clarified that the CIDG was the
"investigative arm" of the PNP, and that the CIDG "investigates and prosecutes all cases involving
violations in the Revised Penal Code particularly those considered as heinous crimes." 66 Col. Pante
further testified that the allegation that 9 RCIDU personnel were involved in the disappearance of
Tagitis was baseless, since they did not conduct any operation in Jolo, Sulu before or after Tagitis’
reported disappearance.67 Col. Pante added that the four (4) personnel assigned to the Sulu CIDT had
no capability to conduct any "operation," since they were only assigned to investigate matters and to
monitor the terrorism situation.68 He denied that his office conducted any surveillance on Tagitis prior
to the latter’s disappearance.69 Col. Pante further testified that his investigation of Tagitis’
disappearance was unsuccessful; the investigation was "still facing a blank wall" on the whereabouts of
Tagitis.70

THE CA RULING
On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision 71 confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis was an
"enforced disappearance" under the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearances.72 The CA ruled that when military intelligence pinpointed the
investigative arm of the PNP (CIDG) to be involved in the abduction, the missing-person case qualified
as an enforced disappearance. The conclusion that the CIDG was involved was based on the
respondent’s testimony, corroborated by her companion, Mrs. Talbin. The CA noted that the
information that the CIDG, as the police intelligence arm, was involved in Tagitis’ abduction came from
no less than the military – an independent agency of government. The CA thus greatly relied on the
"raw report" from Col. Kasim’s asset, pointing to the CIDG’s involvement in Tagitis’ abduction. The CA
held that "raw reports" from an "asset" carried "great weight" in the intelligence world. It also labeled
as "suspect" Col. Kasim’s subsequent and belated retraction of his statement that the military, the
police, or the CIDG was involved in the abduction of Tagitis.

The CA characterized as "too farfetched and unbelievable" and "a bedlam of speculation" police
theories painting the disappearance as "intentional" on the part of Tagitis. He had no previous brushes
with the law or any record of overstepping the bounds of any trust regarding money entrusted to him;
no student of the IDB scholarship program ever came forward to complain that he or she did not get
his or her stipend. The CA also found no basis for the police theory that Tagitis was "trying to escape
from the clutches of his second wife," on the basis of the respondent’s testimony that Tagitis was a
Muslim who could have many wives under the Muslim faith, and that there was "no issue" at all when
the latter divorced his first wife in order to marry the second. Finally, the CA also ruled out kidnapping
for ransom by the Abu Sayyaf or by the ARMM paramilitary as the cause for Tagitis’ disappearance,
since the respondent, the police and the military noted that there was no acknowledgement of Tagitis’
abduction or demand for payment of ransom – the usual modus operandi of these terrorist groups.

Based on these considerations, the CA thus extended the privilege of the writ to Tagitis and his family,
and directed the CIDG Chief, Col. Jose Volpane Pante, PNP Chief Avelino I. Razon, Task Force Tagitis
heads Gen. Joel Goltiao and Col. Ahiron Ajirim, and PACER Chief Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina to exert
extraordinary diligence and efforts to protect the life, liberty and security of Tagitis, with the obligation
to provide monthly reports of their actions to the CA. At the same time, the CA dismissed the petition
against the then respondents from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano and Gen. Ruben Rafael, based
on the finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the military, that was involved.
On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision, but the CA denied the motion
in its Resolution of April 9, 2008.73

THE PETITION
In this Rule 45 appeal questioning the CA’s March 7, 2008 decision, the petitioners mainly dispute the
sufficiency in form and substance of the Amparo petition filed before the CA; the sufficiency of the
legal remedies the respondent took before petitioning for the writ; the finding that the rights to life,
liberty and security of Tagitis had been violated; the sufficiency of evidence supporting the conclusion
that Tagitis was abducted; the conclusion that the CIDG Zamboanga was responsible for the abduction;
and, generally, the ruling that the respondent discharged the burden of proving the allegations of the
petition by substantial evidence.74
THE COURT’S RULING
We do not find the petition meritorious.

Sufficiency in Form and Substance

In questioning the sufficiency in form and substance of the respondent’s Amparo petition, the
petitioners contend that the petition violated Section 5(c), (d), and (e) of the Amparo Rule. Specifically,
the petitioners allege that the respondent failed to:

1) allege any act or omission the petitioners committed in violation of Tagitis’ rights to life,
liberty and security;
2) allege in a complete manner how Tagitis was abducted, the persons responsible for his
disappearance, and the respondent’s source of information;
3) allege that the abduction was committed at the petitioners’ instructions or with their
consent;
4) implead the members of CIDG regional office in Zamboanga alleged to have custody over her
husband;
5) attach the affidavits of witnesses to support her accusations;
6) allege any action or inaction attributable to the petitioners in the performance of their duties
in the investigation of Tagitis’ disappearance; and
7) specify what legally available efforts she took to determine the fate or whereabouts of her
husband.

A petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed and verified and shall allege, among others (in terms
of the portions the petitioners cite):75

(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation
by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed
with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;

(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses
of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation,
together with any report;

(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in stating
the threatened or actual violation of a victim’s rights. As in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader
must of course state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary
details.76 In an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature and
purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able
to describe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct
or arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained, because these information may purposely be
hidden or covered up by those who caused the disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the
level of specificity, detail and precision that the petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo
Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of judicial concern for violations of the constitutional rights to
life, liberty and security.

To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo situation,
the test in reading the petition should be to determine whether it contains the details available to the
petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the
victim’s rights to life, liberty and security through State or private party action. The petition should
likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated component parts, to determine if the
required elements – namely, of the disappearance, the State or private action, and the actual or
threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or security – are present.

In the present case, the petition amply recites in its paragraphs 4 to 11 the circumstances under which
Tagitis suddenly dropped out of sight after engaging in normal activities, and thereafter was nowhere
to be found despite efforts to locate him. The petition alleged, too, under its paragraph 7, in relation to
paragraphs 15 and 16, that according to reliable information, police operatives were the perpetrators
of the abduction. It also clearly alleged how Tagitis’ rights to life, liberty and security were violated
when he was "forcibly taken and boarded on a motor vehicle by a couple of burly men believed to be
police intelligence operatives," and then taken "into custody by the respondents’ police intelligence
operatives since October 30, 2007, specifically by the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, x x x held against his
will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect [him] with different terrorist groups." 77

These allegations, in our view, properly pleaded ultimate facts within the pleader’s knowledge about
Tagitis’ disappearance, the participation by agents of the State in this disappearance, the failure of the
State to release Tagitis or to provide sufficient information about his whereabouts, as well as the actual
violation of his right to liberty. Thus, the petition cannot be faulted for any failure in its statement of a
cause of action.

If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this defect is its lack of supporting affidavit, as
required by Section 5(c) of the Amparo Rule. Owing to the summary nature of the proceedings for the
writ and to facilitate the resolution of the petition, the Amparo Rule incorporated the requirement for
supporting affidavits, with the annotation that these can be used as the affiant’s direct
testimony.78 This requirement, however, should not be read as an absolute one that necessarily leads
to the dismissal of the petition if not strictly followed. Where, as in this case, the petitioner has
substantially complied with the requirement by submitting a verified petition sufficiently detailing the
facts relied upon, the strict need for the sworn statement that an affidavit represents is essentially
fulfilled. We note that the failure to attach the required affidavits was fully cured when the respondent
and her witness (Mrs. Talbin) personally testified in the CA hearings held on January 7 and 17 and
February 18, 2008 to swear to and flesh out the allegations of the petition. Thus, even on this point,
the petition cannot be faulted.
Section 5(d) of the Amparo Rule requires that prior investigation of an alleged disappearance must
have been made, specifying the manner and results of the investigation. Effectively, this requirement
seeks to establish at the earliest opportunity the level of diligence the public authorities undertook in
relation with the reported disappearance.79

We reject the petitioners’ argument that the respondent’s petition did not comply with the Section
5(d) requirements of the Amparo Rule, as the petition specifies in its paragraph 11 that Kunnong and
his companions immediately reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the police authorities in Jolo, Sulu as
soon as they were relatively certain that he indeed had disappeared. The police, however, gave them
the "ready answer" that Tagitis could have been abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group or other anti-
government groups. The respondent also alleged in paragraphs 17 and 18 of her petition that she filed
a "complaint" with the PNP Police Station in Cotobato and in Jolo, but she was told of "an intriguing
tale" by the police that her husband was having "a good time with another woman." The
disappearance was alleged to have been reported, too, to no less than the Governor of the ARMM,
followed by the respondent’s personal inquiries that yielded the factual bases for her petition. 80

These allegations, to our mind, sufficiently specify that reports have been made to the police
authorities, and that investigations should have followed. That the petition did not state the manner
and results of the investigation that the Amparo Rule requires, but rather generally stated the inaction
of the police, their failure to perform their duty to investigate, or at the very least, their reported failed
efforts, should not be a reflection on the completeness of the petition. To require the respondent to
elaborately specify the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority, as
well the manner and conduct of the investigation is an overly strict interpretation of Section 5(d), given
the respondent’s frustrations in securing an investigation with meaningful results. Under these
circumstances, we are more than satisfied that the allegations of the petition on the investigations
undertaken are sufficiently complete for purposes of bringing the petition forward.

Section 5(e) is in the Amparo Rule to prevent the use of a petition – that otherwise is not supported by
sufficient allegations to constitute a proper cause of action – as a means to "fish" for evidence. 81 The
petitioners contend that the respondent’s petition did not specify what "legally available efforts were
taken by the respondent," and that there was an "undue haste" in the filing of the petition when,
instead of cooperating with authorities, the respondent immediately invoked the Court’s intervention.

We do not see the respondent’s petition as the petitioners view it.

Section 5(e) merely requires that the Amparo petitioner (the respondent in the present case) allege
"the actions and recourses taken to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the
identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission." The following allegations of the
respondent’s petition duly outlined the actions she had taken and the frustrations she encountered,
thus compelling her to file her petition.
xxxx
7. Soon after the student left the room, Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension house to take his early
lunch but while out on the street, a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives,
forcibly took him and boarded the latter on a motor vehicle then sped away without the knowledge of
his student, Arsimin Kunnong;
xxxx
10. When Kunnong could not locate Engr. Tagitis, the former sought the help of another IDB scholar
and reported the matter to the local police agency;
11. Arsimin Kunnong, including his friends and companions in Jolo, exerted efforts in trying to locate
the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and when he reported the matter to the police authorities in Jolo, he
was immediately given a ready answer that Engr. Tagitis could [have been] abducted by the Abu Sayyaf
group and other groups known to be fighting against the government;

12. Being scared with these suggestions and insinuations of the police officers, Kunnong reported the
matter to the [respondent](wife of Engr. Tagitis) by phone and other responsible officers and
coordinators of the IDB Scholarship Programme in the Philippines who alerted the office of the
Governor of ARMM who was then preparing to attend the OIC meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia;

13. [The respondent], on the other hand, approached some of her co-employees with the Land Bank in
Digos branch, Digos City, Davao del Sur, who likewise sought help from some of their friends in the
military who could help them find/locate the whereabouts of her husband;
xxxx
15. According to reliable information received by the [respondent], subject Engr. Tagitis is in the
custody of police intelligence operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held
against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the
different terrorist groups;
xxxx
17. [The respondent] filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station at the ARMM in Cotobato and in
Jolo, as suggested by her friends, seeking their help to find her husband, but [the respondent’s]
request and pleadings failed to produce any positive results
xxxx
20. Lately, [respondent] was again advised by one of the [petitioners] to go to the ARMM Police
Headquarters again in Cotobato City and also to the different Police Headquarters including the police
headquarters in Davao City, in Zamboanga City, in Jolo, and in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and all these
places have been visited by the [respondent] in search for her husband, which entailed expenses for
her trips to these places thereby resorting her to borrowings and beggings [sic] for financial help from
friends and relatives only to try complying to the different suggestions of these police officers, despite
of which, her efforts produced no positive results up to the present time;
xxxx
25. [The respondent] has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and under
the circumstances, [respondent] has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect and get
the release of subject Engr. Morced Tagitis from the illegal clutches of [the petitioners], their
intelligence operatives and the like which are in total violation of the subject’s human and
constitutional rights, except the issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO.

Based on these considerations, we rule that the respondent’s petition for the Writ of Amparo is
sufficient in form and substance and that the Court of Appeals had every reason to proceed with its
consideration of the case.

The Desaparecidos

The present case is one of first impression in the use and application of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
in an enforced disappearance situation. For a deeper appreciation of the application of this Rule to an
enforced disappearance situation, a brief look at the historical context of the writ and enforced
disappearances would be very helpful.
The phenomenon of enforced disappearance arising from State action first attracted notice in Adolf
Hitler’s Nact und Nebel Erlass or Night and Fog Decree of December 7, 1941. 82 The Third Reich’s Night
and Fog Program, a State policy, was directed at persons in occupied territories "endangering German
security"; they were transported secretly to Germany where they disappeared without a trace. In order
to maximize the desired intimidating effect, the policy prohibited government officials from providing
information about the fate of these targeted persons.83

In the mid-1970s, the phenomenon of enforced disappearances resurfaced, shocking and outraging the
world when individuals, numbering anywhere from 6,000 to 24,000, were reported to have
"disappeared" during the military regime in Argentina. Enforced disappearances spread in Latin
America, and the issue became an international concern when the world noted its widespread and
systematic use by State security forces in that continent under Operation Condor 84 and during the Dirty
War85 in the 1970s and 1980s. The escalation of the practice saw political activists secretly arrested,
tortured, and killed as part of governments’ counter-insurgency campaigns. As this form of political
brutality became routine elsewhere in the continent, the Latin American media standardized the term
"disappearance" to describe the phenomenon. The victims of enforced disappearances were called the
"desaparecidos,"86 which literally means the "disappeared ones."87 In general, there are three different
kinds of "disappearance" cases:

1) those of people arrested without witnesses or without positive identification of the arresting
agents and are never found again;

2) those of prisoners who are usually arrested without an appropriate warrant and held in
complete isolation for weeks or months while their families are unable to discover their
whereabouts and the military authorities deny having them in custody until they eventually
reappear in one detention center or another; and

3) those of victims of "salvaging" who have disappeared until their lifeless bodies are later
discovered.88

In the Philippines, enforced disappearances generally fall within the first two categories, 89 and 855
cases were recorded during the period of martial law from 1972 until 1986. Of this number, 595
remained missing, 132 surfaced alive and 127 were found dead. During former President Corazon C.
Aquino’s term, 820 people were reported to have disappeared and of these, 612 cases were
documented. Of this number, 407 remain missing, 108 surfaced alive and 97 were found dead. The
number of enforced disappearances dropped during former President Fidel V. Ramos’ term when only
87 cases were reported, while the three-year term of former President Joseph E. Estrada yielded 58
reported cases. KARAPATAN, a local non-governmental organization, reports that as of March 31,
2008, the records show that there were a total of 193 victims of enforced disappearance under
incumbent President Gloria M. Arroyo’s administration. The Commission on Human Rights’ records
show a total of 636 verified cases of enforced disappearances from 1985 to 1993. Of this number, 406
remained missing, 92 surfaced alive, 62 were found dead, and 76 still have undetermined
status.90 Currently, the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearance91 reports 619 outstanding cases of enforced or involuntary disappearances covering the
period December 1, 2007 to November 30, 2008.92

Enforced Disappearances

Under Philippine Law

The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the "writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof."93 We note that although the writ specifically covers "enforced
disappearances," this concept is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction. The records of the
Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of Rules (Committee) reveal that the drafters of the Amparo
Rule initially considered providing an elemental definition of the concept of enforced disappearance: 94

JUSTICE MARTINEZ: I believe that first and foremost we should come up or formulate a specific
definition [for] extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. From that definition, then we can
proceed to formulate the rules, definite rules concerning the same.

CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO: … As things stand, there is no law penalizing extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances… so initially also we have to [come up with] the nature of these extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances [to be covered by the Rule] because our concept of killings and
disappearances will define the jurisdiction of the courts. So we’ll have to agree among ourselves about
the nature of killings and disappearances for instance, in other jurisdictions, the rules only cover state
actors. That is an element incorporated in their concept of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. In other jurisdictions, the concept includes acts and omissions not only of state actors
but also of non state actors. Well, more specifically in the case of the Philippines for instance, should
these rules include the killings, the disappearances which may be authored by let us say, the NPAs or
the leftist organizations and others. So, again we need to define the nature of the extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances that will be covered by these rules. [Emphasis supplied] 95

In the end, the Committee took cognizance of several bills filed in the House of Representatives 96 and in
the Senate97 on extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, and resolved to do away with a clear
textual definition of these terms in the Rule. The Committee instead focused on the nature and scope
of the concerns within its power to address and provided the appropriate remedy therefor, mindful
that an elemental definition may intrude into the ongoing legislative efforts. 98

As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not
crimes penalized separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings
and enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special
laws.99 The simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on the matter; the determination of
what acts are criminal and what the corresponding penalty these criminal acts should carry are matters
of substantive law that only the Legislature has the power to enact under the country’s constitutional
scheme and power structure.

Even without the benefit of directly applicable substantive laws on extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearances, however, the Supreme Court is not powerless to act under its own constitutional
mandate to promulgate "rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts," 100 since extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, by their nature and purpose, constitute State or private party violation of the
constitutional rights of individuals to life, liberty and security. Although the Court’s power is strictly
procedural and as such does not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights, the legal protection
that the Court can provide can be very meaningful through the procedures it sets in addressing
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The Court, through its procedural rules, can set the
procedural standards and thereby directly compel the public authorities to act on actual or threatened
violations of constitutional rights. To state the obvious, judicial intervention can make a difference –
even if only procedurally – in a situation when the very same investigating public authorities may have
had a hand in the threatened or actual violations of constitutional rights.
Lest this Court intervention be misunderstood, we clarify once again that we do not rule on any issue
of criminal culpability for the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance. This is an issue that
requires criminal action before our criminal courts based on our existing penal laws. Our intervention is
in determining whether an enforced disappearance has taken place and who is responsible or
accountable for this disappearance, and to define and impose the appropriate remedies to address it.
The burden for the public authorities to discharge in these situations, under the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo, is twofold. The first is to ensure that all efforts at disclosure and investigation are undertaken
under pain of indirect contempt from this Court when governmental efforts are less than what the
individual situations require. The second is to address the disappearance, so that the life of the victim
is preserved and his or her liberty and security restored. In these senses, our orders and directives
relative to the writ are continuing efforts that are not truly terminated until the extrajudicial killing or
enforced disappearance is fully addressed by the complete determination of the fate and the
whereabouts of the victim, by the production of the disappeared person and the restoration of his or
her liberty and security, and, in the proper case, by the commencement of criminal action against the
guilty parties.

Enforced Disappearance
Under International Law

From the International Law perspective, involuntary or enforced disappearance is considered a flagrant
violation of human rights.101 It does not only violate the right to life, liberty and security of the
desaparecido; it affects their families as well through the denial of their right to information regarding
the circumstances of the disappeared family member. Thus, enforced disappearances have been said
to be "a double form of torture," with "doubly paralyzing impact for the victims," as they "are kept
ignorant of their own fates, while family members are deprived of knowing the whereabouts of their
detained loved ones" and suffer as well the serious economic hardship and poverty that in most cases
follow the disappearance of the household breadwinner.102

The UN General Assembly first considered the issue of "Disappeared Persons" in December 1978 under
Resolution 33/173. The Resolution expressed the General Assembly’s deep concern arising from
"reports from various parts of the world relating to enforced or involuntary disappearances," and
requested the "UN Commission on Human Rights to consider the issue of enforced disappearances
with a view to making appropriate recommendations." 103

In 1992, in response to the reality that the insidious practice of enforced disappearance had become a
global phenomenon, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearance (Declaration). 104 This Declaration, for the first time, provided in
its third preambular clause a working description of enforced disappearance, as follows:

Deeply concerned that in many countries, often in a persistent manner, enforced disappearances
occur, in the sense that persons are arrested, detained or abducted against their will or otherwise
deprived of their liberty by officials of different branches or levels of Government, or by organized
groups or private individuals acting on behalf of, or with the support, direct or indirect, consent or
acquiescence of the Government, followed by a refusal to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the
persons concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of their liberty, which places such
persons outside the protection of the law. [Emphasis supplied]

Fourteen years after (or on December 20, 2006), the UN General Assembly adopted the International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (Convention). 105 The
Convention was opened for signature in Paris, France on February 6, 2007. 106 Article 2 of the
Convention defined enforced disappearance as follows:

For the purposes of this Convention, "enforced disappearance" is considered to be the arrest,
detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or
groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the
disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law. [Emphasis supplied]

The Convention is the first universal human rights instrument to assert that there is a right not to be
subject to enforced disappearance107 and that this right is non-derogable.108 It provides that no one
shall be subjected to enforced disappearance under any circumstances, be it a state of war, internal
political instability, or any other public emergency. It obliges State Parties to codify enforced
disappearance as an offense punishable with appropriate penalties under their criminal law. 109 It also
recognizes the right of relatives of the disappeared persons and of the society as a whole to know the
truth on the fate and whereabouts of the disappeared and on the progress and results of the
investigation.110 Lastly, it classifies enforced disappearance as a continuing offense, such that statutes
of limitations shall not apply until the fate and whereabouts of the victim are established. 111

Binding Effect of UN
Action on the Philippines

To date, the Philippines has neither signed nor ratified the Convention, so that the country is not yet
committed to enact any law penalizing enforced disappearance as a crime. The absence of a specific
penal law, however, is not a stumbling block for action from this Court, as heretofore mentioned;
underlying every enforced disappearance is a violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and
security that the Supreme Court is mandated by the Constitution to protect through its rule-making
powers.

Separately from the Constitution (but still pursuant to its terms), the Court is guided, in acting on
Amparo cases, by the reality that the Philippines is a member of the UN, bound by its Charter and by
the various conventions we signed and ratified, particularly the conventions touching on humans
rights. Under the UN Charter, the Philippines pledged to "promote universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions as to race, sex,
language or religion."112 Although no universal agreement has been reached on the precise extent of
the "human rights and fundamental freedoms" guaranteed to all by the Charter, 113 it was the UN itself
that issued the Declaration on enforced disappearance, and this Declaration states: 114

Any act of enforced disappearance is an offence to dignity. It is condemned as a denial of the purposes
of the Charter of the United Nations and as a grave and flagrant violation of human rights and
fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights  and reaffirmed and
developed in international instruments in this field. [Emphasis supplied]

As a matter of human right and fundamental freedom and as a policy matter made in a UN Declaration,
the ban on enforced disappearance cannot but have its effects on the country, given our own
adherence to "generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land." 115

In the recent case of Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III, 116 we
held that:
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either
by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The
incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed
to have the force of domestic law. [Emphasis supplied]

We characterized "generally accepted principles of international law" as norms of general or customary

international law that are binding on all states. We held further:117

[G]enerally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the
Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The
classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from
the combination [of] two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of
States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or
necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory
by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. [Emphasis in the original]

The most widely accepted statement of sources of international law today is Article 38(1) of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, which provides that the Court shall apply "international
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law."118 The material sources of custom include
State practice, State legislation, international and national judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and
other international instruments, a pattern of treaties in the same form, the practice of international
organs, and resolutions relating to legal questions in the UN General Assembly. 119 Sometimes referred
to as "evidence" of international law,120 these sources identify the substance and content of the
obligations of States and are indicative of the "State practice" and "opinio juris" requirements of
international law.121 We note the following in these respects:

First, barely two years from the adoption of the Declaration, the Organization of American States (OAS)
General Assembly adopted the Inter-American Convention on Enforced Disappearance of Persons in
June 1994.122 State parties undertook under this Convention "not to practice, permit, or tolerate the
forced disappearance of persons, even in states of emergency or suspension of individual
guarantees."123 One of the key provisions includes the States’ obligation to enact the crime of forced
disappearance in their respective national criminal laws and to establish jurisdiction over such cases
when the crime was committed within their jurisdiction, when the victim is a national of that State, and
"when the alleged criminal is within its territory and it does not proceed to extradite him," which can
be interpreted as establishing universal jurisdiction among the parties to the Inter-American
Convention.124 At present, Colombia, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela have enacted separate
laws in accordance with the Inter-American Convention and have defined activities involving enforced
disappearance to be criminal.1251avvphi1

Second, in Europe, the European Convention on Human Rights has no explicit provision dealing with
the protection against enforced disappearance. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), however,
has applied the Convention in a way that provides ample protection for the underlying rights affected
by enforced disappearance through the Convention’s Article 2 on the right to life; Article 3 on the
prohibition of torture; Article 5 on the right to liberty and security; Article 6, paragraph 1 on the right
to a fair trial; and Article 13 on the right to an effective remedy. A leading example demonstrating the
protection afforded by the European Convention is Kurt v. Turkey,126 where the ECHR found a violation
of the right to liberty and security of the disappeared person when the applicant’s son disappeared
after being taken into custody by Turkish forces in the Kurdish village of Agilli in November 1993. It
further found the applicant (the disappeared person’s mother) to be a victim of a violation of Article 3,
as a result of the silence of the authorities and the inadequate character of the investigations
undertaken. The ECHR also saw the lack of any meaningful investigation by the State as a violation of
Article 13.127

Third, in the United States, the status of the prohibition on enforced disappearance as part of
customary international law is recognized in the most recent edition of Restatement of the Law: The
Third,128 which provides that "[a] State violates international law if, as a matter of State policy, it
practices, encourages, or condones… (3) the murder or causing the disappearance of
individuals."129 We significantly note that in a related matter that finds close identification with
enforced disappearance – the matter of torture – the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit Court held in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala130 that the prohibition on torture had attained the status of
customary international law. The court further elaborated on the significance of UN declarations, as
follows:

These U.N. declarations are significant because they specify with great precision the obligations of
member nations under the Charter. Since their adoption, "(m)embers can no longer contend that they
do not know what human rights they promised in the Charter to promote." Moreover, a U.N.
Declaration is, according to one authoritative definition, "a formal and solemn instrument, suitable for
rare occasions when principles of great and lasting importance are being enunciated." Accordingly, it
has been observed that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights "no longer fits into the dichotomy
of ‘binding treaty’ against ‘non-binding pronouncement,' but is rather an authoritative statement of
the international community." Thus, a Declaration creates an expectation of adherence, and "insofar as
the expectation is gradually justified by State practice, a declaration may by custom become
recognized as laying down rules binding upon the States." Indeed, several commentators have
concluded that the Universal Declaration has become, in toto, a part of binding, customary
international law. [Citations omitted]

Fourth, in interpreting Article 2 (right to an effective domestic remedy) of the International Convention
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which the Philippines is both a signatory and a State Party, the
UN Human Rights Committee, under the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, has stated
that the act of enforced disappearance violates Articles 6 (right to life), 7 (prohibition on torture, cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) and 9 (right to liberty and security of the person) of
the ICCPR, and the act may also amount to a crime against humanity. 131

Fifth, Article 7, paragraph 1 of the 1998 Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court
(ICC) also covers enforced disappearances insofar as they are defined as crimes against
humanity,132 i.e., crimes "committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian
population, with knowledge of the attack." While more than 100 countries have ratified the Rome
Statute,133 the Philippines is still merely a signatory and has not yet ratified it. We note that Article 7(1)
of the Rome Statute has been incorporated in the statutes of other international and hybrid tribunals,
including Sierra Leone Special Court, the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in Timor-Leste, and the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.134 In addition, the implementing legislation of State
Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC has given rise to a number of national criminal provisions also
covering enforced disappearance.135

While the Philippines is not yet formally bound by the terms of the Convention on enforced
disappearance (or by the specific terms of the Rome Statute) and has not formally declared enforced
disappearance as a specific crime, the above recital shows that enforced disappearance as a State
practice has been repudiated by the international community, so that the ban on it is now a generally
accepted principle of international law, which we should consider a part of the law of the land, and
which we should act upon to the extent already allowed under our laws and the international
conventions that bind us.

The following civil or political rights under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR and
the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR) may be infringed in the
course of a disappearance:136

1) the right to recognition as a person before the law;

2) the right to liberty and security of the person;
3) the right not to be subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment;
4) the right to life, when the disappeared person is killed;
5) the right to an identity;
6) the right to a fair trial and to judicial guarantees;
7) the right to an effective remedy, including reparation and compensation;
8) the right to know the truth regarding the circumstances of a disappearance.
9) the right to protection and assistance to the family;
10) the right to an adequate standard of living;
11) the right to health; and
12) the right to education [Emphasis supplied]

Article 2 of the ICCPR, which binds the Philippines as a state party, provides:

Article 2

3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:

(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall
have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons
acting in an official capacity;

(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined
by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent
authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of
judicial remedy;

(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.
[Emphasis supplied]

In General Comment No. 31, the UN Human Rights Committee opined that the right to an effective
remedy under Article 2 of the ICCPR includes the obligation of the State to investigate ICCPR violations
promptly, thoroughly, and effectively, viz:137

15. Article 2, paragraph 3, requires that in addition to effective protection of Covenant rights, States
Parties must ensure that individuals also have accessible and effective remedies to vindicate those
rights… The Committee attaches importance to States Parties' establishing appropriate judicial and
administrative mechanisms for addressing claims of rights violations under domestic law…
Administrative mechanisms are particularly required to give effect to the general obligation to
investigate allegations of violations promptly, thoroughly and effectively through independent and
impartial bodies. A failure by a State Party to investigate allegations of violations could in and of itself
give rise to a separate breach of the Covenant. Cessation of an ongoing violation is an essential
element of the right to an effective remedy. [Emphasis supplied]

The UN Human Rights Committee further stated in the same General Comment No. 31 that failure to
investigate as well as failure to bring to justice the perpetrators of ICCPR violations could in and of itself
give rise to a separate breach of the Covenant, thus: 138

18. Where the investigations referred to in paragraph 15 reveal violations of certain Covenant rights,
States Parties must ensure that those responsible are brought to justice. As with failure to investigate,
failure to bring to justice perpetrators of such violations could in and of itself give rise to a separate
breach of the Covenant. These obligations arise notably in respect of those violations recognized as
criminal under either domestic or international law, such as torture and similar cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment (article 7), summary and arbitrary killing (article 6) and enforced disappearance
(articles 7 and 9 and, frequently, 6). Indeed, the problem of impunity for these violations, a matter of
sustained concern by the Committee, may well be an important contributing element in the recurrence
of the violations. When committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian
population, these violations of the Covenant are crimes against humanity (see Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, article 7). [Emphasis supplied]

In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,139 this Court, in ruling that the right to security of persons is
a guarantee of the protection of one’s right by the government, held that:

The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees
full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is
the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and
security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights
especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations,
organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or
enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar
of justice. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of investigation in the
Velasquez Rodriguez Case, viz:

(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality

preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as
its own legal duty, not as a step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim
or his family or upon their offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government.
[Emphasis supplied]

Manalo significantly cited Kurt v. Turkey,140 where the ECHR interpreted the "right to security" not only
as a prohibition on the State against arbitrary deprivation of liberty, but also as the imposition of a
positive duty to afford protection to the right to liberty. The Court notably quoted the following ECHR
ruling:

[A]ny deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the substantive and
procedural rules of national law but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5,
namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness... Having assumed control over that individual, it is
incumbent on the authorities to account for his or her whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must be
seen as requiring the authorities to take effective measures to safeguard against the risk of
disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective investigation into an arguable claim that a person has
been taken into custody and has not been seen since. [Emphasis supplied]

These rulings effectively serve as the backdrop for the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, which the Court
made effective on October 24, 2007. Although the Amparo Rule still has gaps waiting to be filled
through substantive law, as evidenced primarily by the lack of a concrete definition of "enforced
disappearance," the materials cited above, among others, provide ample guidance and standards on
how, through the medium of the Amparo Rule, the Court can provide remedies and protect the
constitutional rights to life, liberty and security that underlie every enforced disappearance.

Evidentiary Difficulties Posed

by the Unique Nature of an
Enforced Disappearance

Before going into the issue of whether the respondent has discharged the burden of proving the
allegations of the petition for the Writ of Amparo by the degree of proof required by the Amparo Rule,
we shall discuss briefly the unique evidentiary difficulties presented by enforced disappearance cases;
these difficulties form part of the setting that the implementation of the Amparo Rule shall encounter.

These difficulties largely arise because the State itself – the party whose involvement is alleged –
investigates enforced disappearances. Past experiences in other jurisdictions show that the evidentiary
difficulties are generally threefold.

First, there may be a deliberate concealment of the identities of the direct perpetrators. 141 Experts note
that abductors are well organized, armed and usually members of the military or police forces, thus:

The victim is generally arrested by the security forces or by persons acting under some form of
governmental authority. In many countries the units that plan, implement and execute the program
are generally specialized, highly-secret bodies within the armed or security forces. They are generally
directed through a separate, clandestine chain of command, but they have the necessary credentials to
avoid or prevent any interference by the "legal" police forces. These authorities take their victims to
secret detention centers where they subject them to interrogation and torture without fear of judicial
or other controls.142

In addition, there are usually no witnesses to the crime; if there are, these witnesses are usually afraid
to speak out publicly or to testify on the disappearance out of fear for their own lives. 143 We have had
occasion to note this difficulty in Secretary of Defense v. Manalo 144 when we acknowledged that
"where powerful military officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify
against them comes as no surprise."

Second, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence of the disappearance is a distinct possibility; the
central piece of evidence in an enforced disappearance – i.e., the corpus delicti or the victim’s body – is
usually concealed to effectively thwart the start of any investigation or the progress of one that may
have begun.145 The problem for the victim’s family is the State’s virtual monopoly of access to pertinent
evidence. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) observed in the landmark case of
Velasquez Rodriguez146 that inherent to the practice of enforced disappearance is the deliberate use of
the State’s power to destroy the pertinent evidence. The IACHR described the concealment as a clear
attempt by the State to commit the perfect crime.147

Third is the element of denial; in many cases, the State authorities deliberately deny that the enforced
disappearance ever occurred.148 "Deniability" is central to the policy of enforced disappearances, as the
absence of any proven disappearance makes it easier to escape the application of legal standards
ensuring the victim’s human rights.149 Experience shows that government officials typically respond to
requests for information about desaparecidos by saying that they are not aware of any disappearance,
that the missing people may have fled the country, or that their names have merely been invented. 150

These considerations are alive in our minds, as these are the difficulties we confront, in one form or
another, in our consideration of this case.

Evidence and Burden of Proof in

Enforced Disappearances Cases

Sections 13, 17 and 18 of the Amparo Rule define the nature of an Amparo proceeding and the degree
and burden of proof the parties to the case carry, as follows:

Section 13. Summary Hearing. The hearing on the petition shall be summary. However, the court,
justice or judge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the
possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties.

xxxx

Section 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. – The parties shall establish their
claims by substantial evidence.

The respondent who is a private individual must prove that ordinary diligence as required by applicable
laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.

The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as
required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.

The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed or evade responsibility or liability.

Section 18. Judgment. – … If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the
court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and
appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. [Emphasis supplied]

These characteristics – namely, of being summary and the use of substantial evidence as the required
level of proof (in contrast to the usual preponderance of evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt in
court proceedings) – reveal the clear intent of the framers of the Amparo Rule to have the equivalent
of an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in addressing Amparo situations. The
standard of diligence required – the duty of public officials and employees to observe extraordinary
diligence – point, too, to the extraordinary measures expected in the protection of constitutional rights
and in the consequent handling and investigation of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearance
cases.
Thus, in these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply with the substance
and form requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the allegations by
substantial evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the respondents must then respond and
prove their defenses based on the standard of diligence required. The rebuttable case, of course, must
show that an enforced disappearance took place under circumstances showing a violation of the
victim’s constitutional rights to life, liberty or security, and the failure on the part of the investigating
authorities to appropriately respond.

The landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations151 provided the Court its first
opportunity to define the substantial evidence required to arrive at a valid decision in administrative
proceedings. To directly quote Ang Tibay:

Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. [citations omitted] The statute provides that
‘the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.’ The obvious
purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical
rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial
proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. [citations omitted] But this assurance of a
desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in
evidence having rational probative force. [Emphasis supplied]

In Secretary of Defense v. Manalo,152 which was the Court’s first petition for a Writ of Amparo, we
recognized that the full and exhaustive proceedings that the substantial evidence standard regularly
requires do not need to apply due to the summary nature of Amparo proceedings. We said:

The remedy [of the writ of amparo] provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary
proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the
petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or
liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring
substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. [Emphasis supplied]

Not to be forgotten in considering the evidentiary aspects of Amparo petitions are the unique
difficulties presented by the nature of enforced disappearances, heretofore discussed, which
difficulties this Court must frontally meet if the Amparo Rule is to be given a chance to achieve its
objectives. These evidentiary difficulties compel the Court to adopt standards appropriate and
responsive to the circumstances, without transgressing the due process requirements that underlie
every proceeding.

In the seminal case of Velasquez Rodriguez,153 the IACHR – faced with a lack of direct evidence that the
government of Honduras was involved in Velasquez Rodriguez’ disappearance – adopted a relaxed and
informal evidentiary standard, and established the rule that presumes governmental responsibility for
a disappearance if it can be proven that the government carries out a general practice of enforced
disappearances and the specific case can be linked to that practice.154 The IACHR took note of the
realistic fact that enforced disappearances could be proven only through circumstantial or indirect
evidence or by logical inference; otherwise, it was impossible to prove that an individual had been
made to disappear. It held:

130. The practice of international and domestic courts shows that direct evidence, whether testimonial
or documentary, is not the only type of evidence that may be legitimately considered in reaching a
decision. Circumstantial evidence, indicia, and presumptions may be considered, so long as they lead to
conclusions consistent with the facts.

131. Circumstantial or presumptive evidence is especially important in allegations of disappearances,

because this type of repression is characterized by an attempt to suppress all information about the
kidnapping or the whereabouts and fate of the victim. [Emphasis supplied]

In concluding that the disappearance of Manfredo Velásquez (Manfredo) was carried out by agents
who acted under cover of public authority, the IACHR relied on circumstantial evidence including the
hearsay testimony of Zenaida Velásquez, the victim’s sister, who described Manfredo’s kidnapping on
the basis of conversations she had with witnesses who saw Manfredo kidnapped by men in civilian
clothes in broad daylight. She also told the Court that a former Honduran military official had
announced that Manfredo was kidnapped by a special military squadron acting under orders of the
Chief of the Armed Forces.155 The IACHR likewise considered the hearsay testimony of a second witness
who asserted that he had been told by a Honduran military officer about the disappearance, and a
third witness who testified that he had spoken in prison to a man who identified himself as
Manfredo.156

Velasquez stresses the lesson that flexibility is necessary under the unique circumstances that enforced
disappearance cases pose to the courts; to have an effective remedy, the standard of evidence must be
responsive to the evidentiary difficulties faced. On the one hand, we cannot be arbitrary in the
admission and appreciation of evidence, as arbitrariness entails violation of rights and cannot be used
as an effective counter-measure; we only compound the problem if a wrong is addressed by the
commission of another wrong. On the other hand, we cannot be very strict in our evidentiary rules and
cannot consider evidence the way we do in the usual criminal and civil cases; precisely, the
proceedings before us are administrative in nature where, as a rule, technical rules of evidence are not
strictly observed. Thus, while we must follow the substantial evidence rule, we must observe flexibility
in considering the evidence we shall take into account.

The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality,
and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is
consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most
basic test of reason – i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with
all other pieces of adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this
basic minimum test.

We note in this regard that the use of flexibility in the consideration of evidence is not at all novel in
the Philippine legal system. In child abuse cases, Section 28 of the Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness157 is expressly recognized as an exception to the hearsay rule. This Rule allows the admission of
the hearsay testimony of a child describing any act or attempted act of sexual abuse in any criminal or
non-criminal proceeding, subject to certain prerequisites and the right of cross-examination by the
adverse party. The admission of the statement is determined by the court in light of specified
subjective and objective considerations that provide sufficient indicia of reliability of the child
witness.158 These requisites for admission find their counterpart in the present case under the above-
described conditions for the exercise of flexibility in the consideration of evidence, including hearsay
evidence, in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearance cases.

Assessment of the Evidence

The threshold question for our resolution is: was there an enforced disappearance within the meaning
of this term under the UN Declaration we have cited?

The Convention defines enforced disappearance as "the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form
of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which
place such a person outside the protection of the law." 159 Under this definition, the elements that
constitute enforced disappearance are essentially fourfold:160

(a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

(b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of persons acting with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of the State;
(c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a concealment of the fate of the
disappeared person; and
(d) placement of the disappeared person outside the protection of the law. [Emphasis supplied]

We find no direct evidence indicating how the victim actually disappeared. The direct evidence at hand
only shows that Tagitis went out of the ASY Pension House after depositing his room key with the hotel
desk and was never seen nor heard of again. The undisputed conclusion, however, from all concerned
– the petitioner, Tagitis’ colleagues and even the police authorities – is that Tagistis disappeared under
mysterious circumstances and was never seen again. The respondent injected the causal element in
her petition and testimony, as we shall discuss below.

We likewise find no direct evidence showing that operatives of PNP CIDG Zamboanga abducted or
arrested Tagitis. If at all, only the respondent’s allegation that Tagistis was under CIDG Zamboanga
custody stands on record, but it is not supported by any other evidence, direct or circumstantial.

In her direct testimony, the respondent pointed to two sources of information as her bases for her
allegation that Tagistis had been placed under government custody (in contrast with CIDG Zamboanga
custody). The first was an unnamed friend in Zamboanga (later identified as Col. Ancanan), who
occupied a high position in the military and who allegedly mentioned that Tagitis was in good hands.
Nothing came out of this claim, as both the respondent herself and her witness, Mrs. Talbin, failed to
establish that Col. Ancanan gave them any information that Tagitis was in government custody. Col.
Ancanan, for his part, admitted the meeting with the respondent but denied giving her any information
about the disappearance.

The more specific and productive source of information was Col. Kasim, whom the respondent,
together with her witness Mrs. Talbin, met in Camp Katitipan in Davao City. To quote the relevant
portions of the respondent’s testimony:

Q: Were you able to speak to other military officials regarding the whereabouts of your husband
particularly those in charge of any records or investigation?

A: I went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City. Then one military officer, Col. Casim, told me that my
husband is being abducted [sic] because he is under custodial investigation because he is allegedly
"parang liason ng J.I.", sir.

Q: What is J.I.?
A: Jema’ah Islamiah, sir.

Q: Was there any information that was read to you during one of those visits of yours in that Camp?

A: Col. Casim did not furnish me a copy of his report because he said those reports are highly
confidential, sir.

Q: Was it read to you then even though you were not furnished a copy?

A: Yes, sir. In front of us, my friends.

Q: And what was the content of that highly confidential report?

A: Those alleged activities of Engineer Tagitis, sir.161 [Emphasis supplied]

She confirmed this testimony in her cross-examination:

Q: You also mentioned that you went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City?

A: Yes, ma’am.

Q: And a certain Col. Kasim told you that your husband was abducted and under custodial
investigation?

A: Yes, ma’am.

Q: And you mentioned that he showed you a report?

A: Yes, ma’am.

Q: Were you able to read the contents of that report?

A: He did not furnish me a copy of those [sic] report because those [sic] were highly confidential. That
is a military report, ma’am.

Q: But you were able to read the contents?

A: No. But he read it in front of us, my friends, ma’am.

Q: How many were you when you went to see Col. Kasim?

A: There were three of us, ma’am.

Q: Who were your companions?

A: Mrs. Talbin, tapos yung dalawang friends nya from Mati City, Davao Oriental, ma’am. 162

xxxx
Q: When you were told that your husband is in good hands, what was your reaction and what did you
do?

A: May binasa kasi sya that my husband has a parang meeting with other people na parang mga
terorista na mga tao. Tapos at the end of the report is [sic] under custodial investigation. So I told him
"Colonel, my husband is sick. He is diabetic at nagmemaintain yun ng gamot. Pakisabi lang sa
naghohold sa asawa ko na bigyan siya ng gamot, ma’am."163

xxxx

Q: You mentioned that you received information that Engineer Tagitis is being held by the CIDG in
Zamboanga, did you go to CIDG Zamboanga to verify that information?

A: I did not go to CIDG Zamboanga. I went to Camp Karingal instead. Enough na yun na effort ko
because I know that they would deny it, ma’am.164

On February 11, 2008, the respondent presented Mrs. Talbin to corroborate her testimony that her
husband was abducted and held under custodial investigation by the PNP-CIDG Zamboanga City, viz:

Q: You said that you went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City sometime November 24, 2007, who was
with you when you went there?

A: Mary Jean Tagitis, sir.

Q: Only the two of you?

A: No. We have some other companions. We were four at that time, sir.

Q: Who were they?

A: Salvacion Serrano, Mini Leong, Mrs. Tagitis and me, sir.

Q: Were you able to talk, see some other officials at Camp Katitipan during that time?

A: Col. Kasim (PS Supt. Julasirim Ahadin Kasim) only, sir.

Q: Were you able to talk to him?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: The four of you?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What information did you get from Col. Kasim during that time?

A: The first time we met with [him] I asked him if he knew of the exact location, if he can furnish us the
location of Engr. Tagitis. And he was reading this report. He told us that Engr. Tagitis is in good hands.
He is with the military, but he is not certain whether he is with the AFP or PNP. He has this serious
case. He was charged of terrorism because he was under surveillance from January 2007 up to the time
that he was abducted. He told us that he was under custodial investigation. As I’ve said earlier, he was
seen under surveillance from January. He was seen talking to Omar Patik, a certain Santos of Bulacan
who is also a Balik Islam and charged with terrorism. He was seen carrying boxes of medicines. Then
we asked him how long will he be in custodial investigation. He said until we can get some information.
But he also told us that he cannot give us that report because it was a raw report. It was not official, sir.

Q: You said that he was reading a report, was that report in document form, in a piece of paper or was
it in the computer or what?

A: As far as I can see it, sir, it is written in white bond paper. I don’t know if it was computerized but I’m
certain that it was typewritten. I’m not sure if it used computer, fax or what, sir.

Q: When he was reading it to you, was he reading it line by line or he was reading in a summary form?

A: Sometimes he was glancing to the report and talking to us, sir.165

xxxx

Q: Were you informed as to the place where he was being kept during that time?

A: He did not tell us where he [Tagitis] was being kept. But he mentioned this Talipapao, Sulu, sir.

Q: After that incident, what did you do if any?

A: We just left and as I’ve mentioned, we just waited because that raw information that he was reading
to us [sic] after the custodial investigation, Engineer Tagitis will be released. [Emphasis supplied] 166

Col. Kasim never denied that he met with the respondent and her friends, and that he provided them
information based on the input of an unnamed asset. He simply claimed in his testimony that the
"informal letter" he received from his informant in Sulu did not indicate that Tagitis was in the custody
of the CIDG. He also stressed that the information he provided the respondent was merely a "raw
report" from "barangay intelligence" that still needed confirmation and "follow up" as to its veracity. 167

To be sure, the respondent’s and Mrs. Talbin’s testimonies were far from perfect, as the petitioners
pointed out. The respondent mistakenly characterized Col. Kasim as a "military officer" who told her
that "her husband is being abducted because he is under custodial investigation because he is allegedly
‘parang liason ng J.I.’" The petitioners also noted that "Mrs. Talbin’s testimony imputing certain
statements to Sr. Supt. Kasim that Engr. Tagitis is with the military, but he is not certain whether it is
the PNP or AFP is not worthy of belief, since Sr. Supt. Kasim is a high ranking police officer who would
certainly know that the PNP is not part of the military."

Upon deeper consideration of these inconsistencies, however, what appears clear to us is that the
petitioners never really steadfastly disputed or presented evidence to refute the credibility of the
respondent and her witness, Mrs. Talbin. The inconsistencies the petitioners point out relate, more
than anything else, to details that should not affect the credibility of the respondent and Mrs. Talbin;
the inconsistencies are not on material points.168 We note, for example, that these witnesses are lay
people in so far as military and police matters are concerned, and confusion between the police and
the military is not unusual. As a rule, minor inconsistencies such as these indicate truthfulness rather
than prevarication169and only tend to strengthen their probative value, in contrast to testimonies from
various witnesses dovetailing on every detail; the latter cannot but generate suspicion that the
material circumstances they testified to were integral parts of a well thought of and prefabricated
story.170

Based on these considerations and the unique evidentiary situation in enforced disappearance cases,
we hold it duly established that Col. Kasim informed the respondent and her friends, based on the
informant’s letter, that Tagitis, reputedly a liaison for the JI and who had been under surveillance since
January 2007, was "in good hands" and under custodial investigation for complicity with the JI after he
was seen talking to one Omar Patik and a certain "Santos" of Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with
terrorism. The respondent’s and Mrs. Talbin’s testimonies cannot simply be defeated by Col. Kasim’s
plain denial and his claim that he had destroyed his informant’s letter, the critical piece of evidence
that supports or negates the parties’ conflicting claims. Col. Kasim’s admitted destruction of this letter
– effectively, a suppression of this evidence – raises the presumption that the letter, if produced, would
be proof of what the respondent claimed.171 For brevity, we shall call the evidence of what Col. Kasim
reported to the respondent to be the "Kasim evidence."

Given this evidence, our next step is to decide whether we can accept this evidence, in lieu of direct
evidence, as proof that the disappearance of Tagitis was due to action with government participation,
knowledge or consent and that he was held for custodial investigation. We note in this regard that Col.
Kasim was never quoted to have said that the custodial investigation was by the CIDG Zamboanga. The
Kasim evidence only implies government intervention through the use of the term "custodial
investigation," and does not at all point to CIDG Zamboanga as Tagitis’ custodian.

Strictly speaking, we are faced here with a classic case of hearsay evidence – i.e., evidence whose
probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witnesses (the respondent, Mrs. Talbin
and Col. Kasim himself) but on the knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand (the
informant).172

To say that this piece of evidence is incompetent and inadmissible evidence of what it substantively
states is to acknowledge – as the petitioners effectively suggest – that in the absence of any direct
evidence, we should simply dismiss the petition. To our mind, an immediate dismissal for this reason is
no different from a statement that the Amparo Rule – despite its terms – is ineffective, as it cannot
allow for the special evidentiary difficulties that are unavoidably present in Amparo situations,
particularly in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The Amparo Rule was not
promulgated with this intent or with the intent to make it a token gesture of concern for constitutional
rights. It was promulgated to provide effective and timely remedies, using and profiting from local and
international experiences in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, as the situation may
require. Consequently, we have no choice but to meet the evidentiary difficulties inherent in enforced
disappearances with the flexibility that these difficulties demand.1avvphi1

To give full meaning to our Constitution and the rights it protects, we hold that, as in Velasquez, we
should at least take a close look at the available evidence to determine the correct import of every
piece of evidence – even of those usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence –
taking into account the surrounding circumstances and the test of reason that we can use as basic
minimum admissibility requirement. In the present case, we should at least determine whether the
Kasim evidence before us is relevant and meaningful to the disappearance of Tagistis and reasonably
consistent with other evidence in the case.
The evidence about Tagitis’ personal circumstances surrounded him with an air of mystery. He was
reputedly a consultant of the World Bank and a Senior Honorary Counselor for the IDB who attended a
seminar in Zamboanga and thereafter proceded to Jolo for an overnight stay, indicated by his request
to Kunnong for the purchase of a return ticket to Zamboanga the day after he arrived in Jolo. Nothing
in the records indicates the purpose of his overnight sojourn in Jolo. A colleague in the IDB, Prof. Matli,
early on informed the Jolo police that Tagitis may have taken funds given to him in trust for IDB
scholars. Prof Matli later on stated that he never accused Tagitis of taking away money held in trust,
although he confirmed that the IDB was seeking assistance in locating funds of IDB scholars deposited
in Tagitis’ personal account. Other than these pieces of evidence, no other information exists in the
records relating to the personal circumstances of Tagitis.

The actual disappearance of Tagitis is as murky as his personal circumstances. While the Amparo
petition recited that he was taken away by "burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives,"
no evidence whatsoever was introduced to support this allegation. Thus, the available direct evidence
is that Tagitis was last seen at 12.30 p.m. of October 30, 2007 – the day he arrived in Jolo – and was
never seen again.

The Kasim evidence assumes critical materiality given the dearth of direct evidence on the above
aspects of the case, as it supplies the gaps that were never looked into and clarified by police
investigation. It is the evidence, too, that colors a simple missing person report into an enforced
disappearance case, as it injects the element of participation by agents of the State and thus brings
into question how the State reacted to the disappearance.

Denials on the part of the police authorities, and frustration on the part of the respondent,
characterize the attempts to locate Tagitis. Initially in Jolo, the police informed Kunnong that Tagitis
could have been taken by the Abu Sayyaf or other groups fighting the government. No evidence was
ever offered on whether there was active Jolo police investigation and how and why the Jolo police
arrived at this conclusion. The respondent’s own inquiry in Jolo yielded the answer that he was not
missing but was with another woman somewhere. Again, no evidence exists that this explanation was
arrived at based on an investigation. As already related above, the inquiry with Col. Ancanan in
Zamboanga yielded ambivalent results not useful for evidentiary purposes. Thus, it was only the inquiry
from Col. Kasim that yielded positive results. Col. Kasim’s story, however, confirmed only the fact of his
custodial investigation (and, impliedly, his arrest or abduction), without identifying his abductor/s or
the party holding him in custody. The more significant part of Col. Kasim’s story is that the abduction
came after Tagitis was seen talking with Omar Patik and a certain Santos of Bulacan, a "Balik Islam"
charged with terrorism. Mrs. Talbin mentioned, too, that Tagitis was being held at Talipapao, Sulu.
None of the police agencies participating in the investigation ever pursued these leads. Notably, Task
Force Tagitis to which this information was relayed did not appear to have lifted a finger to pursue
these aspects of the case.

More denials were manifested in the Returns on the writ to the CA made by the petitioners. Then PNP
Chief Gen. Avelino I. Razon merely reported the directives he sent to the ARMM Regional Director and
the Regional Chief of the CIDG on Tagitis, and these reports merely reiterated the open-ended initial
report of the disappearance. The CIDG directed a search in all of its divisions with negative results.
These, to the PNP Chief, constituted the exhaustion "of all possible efforts." PNP-CIDG Chief General
Edgardo M. Doromal, for his part, also reported negative results after searching "all divisions and
departments [of the CIDG] for a person named Engr. Morced N. Tagitis . . . and after a diligent and
thorough research, records show that no such person is being detained in the CIDG or any of its
department or divisions." PNP-PACER Chief PS Supt. Leonardo A. Espina and PNP PRO ARMM Regional
Director PC Superintendent Joel R. Goltiao did no better in their affidavits-returns, as they essentially
reported the results of their directives to their units to search for Tagitis.

The extent to which the police authorities acted was fully tested when the CA constituted Task Force
Tagitis, with specific directives on what to do. The negative results reflected in the Returns on the writ
were again replicated during the three hearings the CA scheduled. Aside from the previously
mentioned "retraction" that Prof. Matli made to correct his accusation that Tagitis took money held in
trust for students, PS Supt. Ajirim reiterated in his testimony that the CIDG consistently denied any
knowledge or complicity in any abduction and said that there was no basis to conclude that the CIDG
or any police unit had anything to do with the disappearance of Tagitis; he likewise considered it
premature to conclude that Tagitis simply ran away with the money in his custody. As already noted
above, the Task Force notably did not pursue any investigation about the personal circumstances of
Tagitis, his background in relation to the IDB and the background and activities of this Bank itself, and
the reported sighting of Tagistis with terrorists and his alleged custody in Talipapao, Sulu. No attempt
appears to have ever been made to look into the alleged IDB funds that Tagitis held in trust, or to tap
any of the "assets" who are indispensable in investigations of this nature. These omissions and
negative results were aggravated by the CA findings that it was only as late as January 28, 2008 or
three months after the disappearance that the police authorities requested for clear pictures of Tagitis.
Col. Kasim could not attend the trial because his subpoena was not served, despite the fact that he was
designated as Ajirim’s replacement in the latter’s last post. Thus, Col. Kasim was not then questioned.
No investigation – even an internal one – appeared to have been made to inquire into the identity of
Col. Kasim’s "asset" and what he indeed wrote.

We glean from all these pieces of evidence and developments a consistency in the government’s denial
of any complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis, disrupted only by the report made by Col. Kasim to
the respondent at Camp Katitipan. Even Col. Kasim, however, eventually denied that he ever made the
disclosure that Tagitis was under custodial investigation for complicity in terrorism. Another distinctive
trait that runs through these developments is the government’s dismissive approach to the
disappearance, starting from the initial response by the Jolo police to Kunnong’s initial reports of the
disappearance, to the responses made to the respondent when she herself reported and inquired
about her husband’s disappearance, and even at Task Force Tagitis itself.

As the CA found through Task Force Tagitis, the investigation was at best haphazard since the
authorities were looking for a man whose picture they initially did not even secure. The returns and
reports made to the CA fared no better, as the CIDG efforts themselves were confined to searching for
custodial records of Tagitis in their various departments and divisions. To point out the obvious, if the
abduction of Tagitis was a "black" operation because it was unrecorded or officially unauthorized, no
record of custody would ever appear in the CIDG records; Tagitis, too, would not be detained in the
usual police or CIDG detention places. In sum, none of the reports on record contains any meaningful
results or details on the depth and extent of the investigation made. To be sure, reports of top police
officials indicating the personnel and units they directed to investigate can never constitute exhaustive
and meaningful investigation, or equal detailed investigative reports of the activities undertaken to
search for Tagitis. Indisputably, the police authorities from the very beginning failed to come up to the
extraordinary diligence that the Amparo Rule requires.

CONCLUSIONS AND THE AMPARO REMEDY

Based on these considerations, we conclude that Col. Kasim’s disclosure, made in an unguarded
moment, unequivocally point to some government complicity in the disappearance. The consistent but
unfounded denials and the haphazard investigations cannot but point to this conclusion. For why
would the government and its officials engage in their chorus of concealment if the intent had not
been to deny what they already knew of the disappearance? Would not an in-depth and thorough
investigation that at least credibly determined the fate of Tagitis be a feather in the government’s cap
under the circumstances of the disappearance? From this perspective, the evidence and
developments, particularly the Kasim evidence, already establish a concrete case of enforced
disappearance that the Amparo Rule covers. From the prism of the UN Declaration, heretofore cited
and quoted,173 the evidence at hand and the developments in this case confirm the fact of the enforced
disappearance and government complicity, under a background of consistent and unfounded
government denials and haphazard handling. The disappearance as well effectively placed Tagitis
outside the protection of the law – a situation that will subsist unless this Court acts.

This kind of fact situation and the conclusion reached are not without precedent in international
enforced disappearance rulings. While the facts are not exactly the same, the facts of this case run very
close to those of Timurtas v. Turkey,174 a case decided by ECHR. The European tribunal in that case
acted on the basis of the photocopy of a "post-operation report" in finding that Abdulvahap Timurtas
(Abdulvahap) was abducted and later detained by agents (gendarmes) of the government of Turkey.
The victim's father in this case brought a claim against Turkey for numerous violations of the European
Convention, including the right to life (Article 2) and the rights to liberty and security of a person
(Article 5). The applicant contended that on August 14, 1993, gendarmes apprehended his son,
Abdulvahap for being a leader of the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Silopi region. The petition was
filed in southeast Turkey nearly six and one half years after the apprehension. According to the father,
gendarmes first detained Abdulvahap and then transferred him to another detainment facility.
Although there was no eyewitness evidence of the apprehension or subsequent detainment, the
applicant presented evidence corroborating his version of events, including a photocopy of a post-
operation report signed by the commander of gendarme operations in Silopi, Turkey. The report
included a description of Abdulvahap's arrest and the result of a subsequent interrogation during
detention where he was accused of being a leader of the PKK in the Silopi region. On this basis, Turkey
was held responsible for Abdulvahap’s enforced disappearance.

Following the lead of this Turkish experience - adjusted to the Philippine legal setting and the Amparo
remedy this Court has established, as applied to the unique facts and developments of this case – we
believe and so hold that the government in general, through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and in
particular, the Chiefs of these organizations together with Col. Kasim, should be held fully accountable
for the enforced disappearance of Tagitis.

The PNP and CIDG are accountable because Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise known as
the "PNP Law,"175 specifies the PNP as the governmental office with the mandate "to investigate and
prevent crimes, effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in their
prosecution." The PNP-CIDG, as Col. Jose Volpane Pante (then Chief of CIDG Region 9) testified, is the
"investigative arm" of the PNP and is mandated to "investigate and prosecute all cases involving
violations of the Revised Penal Code, particularly those considered as heinous crimes." 176 Under the
PNP organizational structure, the PNP-CIDG is tasked to investigate all major crimes involving violations
of the Revised Penal Code and operates against organized crime groups, unless the President assigns
the case exclusively to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). 177 No indication exists in this case
showing that the President ever directly intervened by assigning the investigation of Tagitis’
disappearance exclusively to the NBI.
Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members were the ones who were remiss in
their duties when the government completely failed to exercise the extral'>To fully enforce the
Amparo remedy, we refer this case back to the CA for appropriate proceedings directed at the
monitoring of the PNP and the PNP-CIDG investigations and actions, and the validation of their results
through hearings the CA may deem appropriate to conduct. For purposes of these investigations, the
PNP/PNP-CIDG shall initially present to the CA a plan of action for further investigation, periodically
reporting the detailed results of its investigation to the CA for its consideration and action. On behalf of
this Court, the CA shall pass upon: the need for the PNP and the PNP-CIDG to make disclosures of
matters known to them as indicated in this Decision and as further CA hearings may indicate; the
petitioners’ submissions; the sufficiency of their investigative efforts; and submit to this Court a
quarterly report containing its actions and recommendations, copy furnished the petitioners and the
respondent, with the first report due at the end of the first quarter counted from the finality of this
Decision. The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1) full year to undertake their investigation. The
CA shall submit its full report for the consideration of this Court at the end of the 4th quarter counted
from the finality of this Decision.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petitioners’ petition for review on certiorari for lack
of merit, and AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 7, 2008 under the following
terms:

a. Recognition that the disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis is an enforced

disappearance covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;

b. Without any specific pronouncement on exact authorship and responsibility, declaring the
government (through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG) and Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim
accountable for the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;

c. Confirmation of the validity of the Writ of Amparo the Court of Appeals issued;

d. Holding the PNP, through the PNP Chief, and the PNP-CIDG, through its Chief, directly
responsible for the disclosure of material facts known to the government and to their offices
regarding the disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis, and for the conduct of proper
investigations using extraordinary diligence, with the obligation to show investigation results
acceptable to this Court;

e. Ordering Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim impleaded in this case and holding him accountable
with the obligation to disclose information known to him and to his "assets" in relation with the
enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;

f. Referring this case back to the Court of Appeals for appropriate proceedings directed at the
monitoring of the PNP and PNP-CIDG investigations, actions and the validation of their results;
the PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall initially present to the Court of Appeals a plan of action for
further investigation, periodically reporting their results to the Court of Appeals for
consideration and action;

g. Requiring the Court of Appeals to submit to this Court a quarterly report with its
recommendations, copy furnished the incumbent PNP and PNP-CIDG Chiefs as petitioners and
the respondent, with the first report due at the end of the first quarter counted from the
finality of this Decision;
 h. The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1) full year to undertake their investigations; the
Court of Appeals shall submit its full report for the consideration of this Court at the end of the
4th quarter counted from the finality of this Decision;

These directives and those of the Court of Appeals’ made pursuant to this Decision shall be given to,
and shall be directly enforceable against, whoever may be the incumbent Chiefs of the Philippine
National Police and its Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, under pain of contempt from this
Court when the initiatives and efforts at disclosure and investigation constitute less than the
extraordinary diligence that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and the circumstances of this case
demand. Given the unique nature of Amparo cases and their varying attendant circumstances, these
directives – particularly, the referral back to and monitoring by the CA – are specific to this case and
are not standard remedies that can be applied to every Amparo situation.

The dismissal of the Amparo petition with respect to General Alexander Yano, Commanding General,
Philippine Army, and General Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terrorism Task Force Comet, Zamboanga City, is
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 204528               February 19, 2013

SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, DIRECTOR NONNATUS R. ROJAS and DEPUTY DIRECTOR REYNALDO 0.
ESMERALDA, Petitioners,
vs.
MAGTANGGOL B. GATDULA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

Submitted for our resolution is a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin "the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, in Manila from implementing its
Decision x x x in Civil Case No. 12-127405 granting respondent's application for the issuance of
inspection and production orders x x x."1 This is raised through a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 from the "Decision" rendered by the Regional Trial Court dated 20 March 2012.

From the records, it appears that on 27 February 2012, respondent Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed
a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in the Regional Trial Court of Manila.2 This case was
docketed as In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Amparo of Atty. Magtanggol B.
Gatdula, SP No. 12-127405. It was raffled to the sala of Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. on the same day.

The Amparo was directed against petitioners Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R.
Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda of the National Bureau of Investigation (DE LIMA, ET
AL. for brevity). Gatdula wanted De Lima, et al. "to cease and desist from framing up Petitioner
[Gatdula] for the fake ambush incident by filing bogus charges of Frustrated Murder against Petitioner
[Gatdula] in relation to the alleged ambush incident."3

Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo, the judge issued summons and ordered De
Lima, et al. to file an Answer.4 He also set the case for hearing on 1 March 2012. The hearing was held
allegedly for determining whether a temporary protection order may be issued. During that hearing,
counsel for De Lima, et al. manifested that a Return, not an Answer, is appropriate for Amparo cases.5

In an Order dated 2 March 2012,6 Judge Pampilo insisted that "[s]ince no writ has been issued, return is
not the required pleading but answer".7 The judge noted that the Rules of Court apply suppletorily
in Amparo cases.8 He opined that the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure applied and thus required
an Answer.9

Judge Pampilo proceeded to conduct a hearing on the main case on 7 March 2012. 10 Even without a
Return nor an Answer, he ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda within five (5)
working days after that hearing. Since the period to file an Answer had not yet lapsed by then, the
judge also decided that the memorandum of De Lima, et al. would be filed in lieu of their Answer. 11

On 20 March 2012, the RTC rendered a "Decision" granting the issuance of the Writ of Amparo. The
RTC also granted the interim reliefs prayed for, namely: temporary protection, production and
inspection orders. The production and inspection orders were in relation to the evidence and reports
involving an on-going investigation of the attempted assassination of Deputy Director Esmeralda. It is
not clear from the records how these pieces of evidence may be related to the alleged threat to the
life, liberty or security of the respondent Gatdula.

In an Order dated 8 October 2012, the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration dated 23 March
2012 filed by De Lima, et al.

Petitioners Sec. De Lima, et al. thus came to this Court assailing the RTC "Decision" dated 20 March
2012 through a Petition for Review on Certiorari (With Very Urgent Application for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction) via Rule 45, as enunciated in Section 19 of
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9- 12-SC, 25 September 2007), viz:

SEC. 19. Appeal. – Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to the Supreme Court under
Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both. x x x (Emphasis supplied).

It is the Court’s view that the "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 granting the writ of Amparo is not the
judgment or final order contemplated under this rule. Hence, a Petition for Review under Rule 45 may
not yet be the proper remedy at this time.

The RTC and the Parties must understand the nature of the remedy of Amparo to put its procedures in
the proper context.

The remedy of the Writ of Amparo is an equitable and extraordinary remedy to safeguard the right of
the people to life, liberty12 and security13 as enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.14 The Rule on the Writ
of Amparo was issued as an exercise of the Supreme Court's power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.15 It aims to address concerns such as, among
others, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. 16
Due to the delicate and urgent nature of these controversies, the procedure was devised to afford swift
but decisive relief.17 It is initiated through a petition18 to be filed in a Regional Trial Court,
Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, or the Supreme Court.19 The judge or justice then makes an
"immediate" evaluation20 of the facts as alleged in the petition and the affidavits submitted "with the
attendant circumstances detailed".21 After evaluation, the judge has the option to issue the
Writ of Amparo22 or immediately dismiss the case. Dismissal is proper if the petition and the supporting
affidavits do not show that the petitioner's right to life, liberty or security is under threat or the acts
complained of are not unlawful. On the other hand, the issuance of the writ itself sets in motion
presumptive judicial protection for the petitioner. The court compels the respondents to appear before
a court of law to show whether the grounds for more permanent protection and interim reliefs are
necessary.

The respondents are required to file a Return23 after the issuance of the writ through the clerk of court.
The Return serves as the responsive pleading to the petition.24 Unlike an Answer, the Return has other
purposes aside from identifying the issues in the case. Respondents are also required to detail the
actions they had taken to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party.

If the respondents are public officials or employees, they are also required to state the actions they
had taken to: (i) verify the identity of the aggrieved party; (ii) recover and preserve evidence related to
the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition; (iii) identify witnesses and obtain
statements concerning the death or disappearance; (iv) determine the cause, manner, location, and
time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the
death or disappearance; and (vi) bring the suspected offenders before a competent court. 25 Clearly
these matters are important to the judge so that s/he can calibrate the means and methods that will
be required to further the protections, if any, that will be due to the petitioner.

There will be a summary hearing26 only after the Return is filed to determine the merits of the petition
and whether interim reliefs are warranted. If the Return is not filed, the hearing will be done ex
parte.27 After the hearing, the court will render the judgment within ten (10) days from the time the
petition is submitted for decision.28

If the allegations are proven with substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ
and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate.29 The judgment should contain measures which the
judge views as essential for the continued protection of the petitioner in the Amparo case. These
measures must be detailed enough so that the judge may be able to verify and monitor the actions
taken by the respondents. It is this judgment that could be subject to appeal to the Supreme Court via
Rule 45.30 After the measures have served their purpose, the judgment will be satisfied.
In Amparo cases, this is when the threats to the petitioner’s life, liberty and security cease to exist as
evaluated by the court that renders the judgment. Parenthetically, the case may also be terminated
through consolidation should a subsequent case be filed – either criminal or civil. 31 Until the full
satisfaction of the judgment, the extraordinary remedy of Amparo allows vigilant judicial monitoring to
ensure the protection of constitutional rights.

The "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 assailed by the petitioners could not be the judgment or final
order that is appealable under Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. This is clear from the
tenor of the dispositive portion of the "Decision", to wit:

The Branch Clerk of Court of Court [sic] is hereby DIRECTED to issue the Writ of Amparo.
Likewise, the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby DIRECTED to effect the service of the Writ of Amparo in
an expeditious manner upon all concerned, and for this purpose may call upon the assistance of any
military or civilian agency of the government.

This "Decision" pertained to the issuance of the writ under Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo, not the judgment under Section 18. The "Decision" is thus an interlocutory order, as
suggested by the fact that temporary protection, production and inspection orders were given
together with the decision. The temporary protection, production and inspection orders are interim
reliefs that may be granted by the court upon filing of the petition but before final judgment is
rendered.32

The confusion of the parties arose due to the procedural irregularities in the RTC.

First, the insistence on filing of an Answer was inappropriate. It is the Return that serves as the
responsive pleading for petitions for the issuance of Writs of Amparo. The requirement to file an
Answer is contrary to the intention of the Court to provide a speedy remedy to those whose right to
life, liberty and security are violated or are threatened to be violated. In utter disregard of the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo, Judge Pampilo insisted on issuing summons and requiring an Answer.

Judge Pampilo’s basis for requiring an Answer was mentioned in his Order dated 2 March 2012:

Under Section 25 of the same rule [on the Writ of Amparo], the Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily
insofar as it is not inconsistent with the said rule.

Considering the summary nature of the petition, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure
shall apply.

Section 5. Answer – Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall file his Answer
to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff. x x x

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the respondents are required to file their Answer ten (days) from
receipt of this Order.33

The 1991 Revised Rules of Summary Procedure is a special rule that the Court has devised for the
following circumstances:

SECTION 1. Scope. – This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the
following cases falling within their jurisdiction:

A. Civil Cases:

(1) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, x x x.

(2) All other cases, except probate proceedings, where the total amount of the plaintiff’s
claim does not exceed x x x.

B. Criminal Cases:

(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;

 (2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
(4) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged
is imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos
(P1,000.00), or both, x x x.
xxxx
It is clear from this rule that this type of summary procedure only applies to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is
mind-boggling how this rule could possibly apply to proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this Court
limited the application of summary procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is
a special proceeding. It is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or particular
fact.34 It is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the application of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure is seriously misplaced.

The second irregularity was the holding of a hearing on the main case prior to the issuance of the writ
and the filing of a Return. Without a Return, the issues could not have been properly joined.

Worse, is the trial court’s third irregularity: it required a memorandum in lieu of a responsive pleading
(Answer) of De Lima, et al.

The Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to frame the issues subject to a hearing. Hence, it
should be done prior to the hearing, not after. A memorandum, on the other hand, is a synthesis of the
claims of the party litigants and is a final pleading usually required before the case is submitted for
decision. One cannot substitute for the other since these submissions have different functions in
facilitating the suit.

More importantly, a memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.35

The fourth irregularity was in the "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 itself. In the body of its decision, the
RTC stated:

"Accordingly this court GRANTS the privilege of the writ and the interim reliefs prayed for by the
petitioner." (Emphasis supplied).

This gives the impression that the decision was the judgment since the phraseology is similar to Section
18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo:

"SEC. 18. Judgment. — The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition
is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court
shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the
privilege shall be denied." (Emphasis supplied).

The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from the actual order called the Writ of
Amparo. The privilege includes availment of the entire procedure outlined in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo. After examining the petition and its attached affidavits, the Return and the
evidence presented in the summary hearing, the judgment should detail the required acts from the
respondents that will mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the violation of or the threat to the petitioner's
life, liberty or security.
A judgment which simply grants "the privilege of the writ" cannot be executed.1âwphi1 It is
tantamount to a failure of the judge to intervene and grant judicial succor to the petitioner. Petitions
filed to avail of the privilege of the Writ of Amparo arise out of very real and concrete circumstances.
Judicial responses cannot be as tragically symbolic or ritualistic as "granting the privilege of the Writ
of Amparo."

The procedural irregularities in the RTC affected the mode of appeal that petitioners used in elevating
the matter to this Court.

It is the responsibility of counsels for the parties to raise issues using the proper procedure at the right
time. Procedural rules are meant to assist the parties and courts efficiently deal with the substantive
issues pertaining to a case. When it is the judge himself who disregards the rules of procedure, delay
and confusion result.

The Petition for Review is not the proper remedy to assail the interlocutory order denominated
as "Decision" dated 20 March 2012. A Petition for Certiorari, on the other hand, is prohibited. 36 Simply
dismissing the present petition, however, will cause grave injustice to the parties involved. It
undermines the salutary purposes for which the Rule on the Writ of Amparo were promulgated.

In many instances, the Court adopted a policy of liberally construing its rules in order to promote a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. 37 The rules can be suspended on
the following grounds: (1) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (2) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances, (3) the merits of the case, (4) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (5) a lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (6) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby.38

WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice, as a prophylactic to the irregularities committed by the trial
court judge, and by virtue of its powers under Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the Constitution, the
Court RESOLVES to:

(1) NULLIFY all orders that are subject of this Resolution issued by Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr.
after respondent Gatdula filed the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo;
(2) DIRECT Judge Pampilo to determine within forty-eight (48) hours from his receipt of
this Resolution whether the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is proper on the basis of the
petition and its attached affidavits.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to cause the personal service of this Resolution on Judge Silvino T.
Pampilo, Jr. of Branch 26 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila for his proper guidance together with a
WARNING that further deviation or improvisation from the procedure set in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC shall
be meted with severe consequences.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

November 7, 2017

G.R. No. 181796

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DIRECTOR/HEAD OF THE CRIMINAL

INVESTIGATION AND DETECTION GROUP (CIDG), PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), Petitioner
vs.
REGINA N. CA YANAN AND SPOl ROLANDO V. PASCUA, Respondents

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Substantial evidence is sufficient in proceedings involving petitions for the writ of amparo. The
respondent must show in the return on the writ of amparo the observance of extraordinary diligence.
Once an enforced disappearance is established by substantial evidence, the relevant State agencies
should be tasked to assiduously investigate and determine the disappearance, and, if warranted, to
bring to the bar of justice whoever may be responsible for the disappearance.

The Case
The Government, represented by the Director/Head of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG) of the Philippine National Police (PNP), appeals the resolution issued on December 13, 2007 by
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 91, in Quezon City (RTC) maintaining the writ of amparo; ordering the
CIDG to continue its investigation into the disappearance of Pablo A. Cayanan (Pablo); directing
respondent SPO1 Rolando V. Pascua (Pascua) to appear before the proper forum; making the
temporary protection order permanent; and upholding the enrollment of Regina N. Cayanan (Regina)
in the Witness Protection Program of the Department of Justice.1

Also under appeal is the resolution of January 31, 2008, whereby the RTC denied the petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.2

Antecedents
On August 16, 2007, Regina filed a petition for habeas corpus in the R TC alleging that Pablo, her
husband, was being illegally detained by the Director/Head of the CIDG; 3 that on July 9, 2007 a group of
armed men identifying themselves as operatives of the CIDG, led by Pascua, had forcibly arrested Pablo
on Magalang Street, East A venue, Diliman, Quezon City without any warrant of arrest, and had then
detained him at the office of the CIDG in Camp Crame, Quezon City; that Pablo had not been found or
heard from since then; and that despite repeated demands by her and her relatives, the CIDG
operatives had not produced the body of Pablo.4
On August 21, 2007, the CIDG received the petition for habeas corpus brought in behalf of Pablo. On
August 28, 2007, the CIDG filed its return on the writ wherein it denied having the custody of Pablo or
having detained him. It prayed for the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus.5

On September 7, 2007, the R TC directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda. 6

On October 24, 2007, Regina, albeit reiterating the allegations of the petition for habeas
corpus, amended her petition to now seek instead the issuance of a writ of amparo.7

On October 24, 2007, the RTC issued the writ of amparo.8

On November 5, 2007, the CIDG and Pascua submitted their respective comments vis-a-vis the writ
of amparo.9

On November 5, 2007, Regina moved ex parte for the issuance of a temporary protection order and
witness protection order. The RTC granted her motion on November 6, 2007. 10

Pascua did not appear in the proceedings in the RTC. He tendered explanations for his non-appearance,
specifically: for the initial hearing, he was then suffering acute gastroenteritis; and for the later
hearings, he wanted to protect his identity as part of his defenses in the criminal case of kidnapping
brought against him in the Department of Justice.11

On December 13, 2007, the RTC issued the first assailed resolution, 12 disposing thusly:

Foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows, to wit:

1) The Court hereby maintains the Writ of Amparo earlier issued;

2) For respondent CIDG Chief/Director to continue the investigation it earlier conducted;
3) For SP02 Rolando V. Pascua to appear to the proper forum;
4) The Temporary Protection Order is hereby made permanent;
5) And the Granting of the Witness Protection Program availed of by the petitioner is hereby retained
until the finality of the case/cases related thereto.

It is so ordered.13

The CIDG forthwith moved for reconsideration;14 however, the RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration on January 31, 2008 through the second assailed resolution. 15

Hence, the CIDG has directly appealed to the Court.

Issues

The CIDG urges the following grounds for review and reversal of the assailed resolutions, namely: 16
I.
The trial court gravely erred in granting the writ of amparo, there being no sufficient evidence to
support the same.
A.
The Rule on the writ of amparo did not change the rules on burden of proof.
 B.
A mere accusation accompanied by inherently hearsay evidence is not sufficient ground for the court
to issue a writ of amparo or allow its continued effectivity.
II.
Petitioner discharged its functions as required in its mandate and exhausted all remedies available
under the law.
On his part, Pascua submits in his comment to the petition that: 17
I.
Complainant failed to establish by the required burden of proof that respondent SP02 Pascua, in his
personal capacity or as police officer, caused the "forced disappearance" of Pablo Cayanan within the
ambit protected by the rule on the writ of amparo.
A.
Following Mexico's Amparo, it is [an] essential requirement for the supposed victim to establish where
he is being held. Moreover, Philippine rule on amparo specifically covers "public official or employee,
or of a private individual or entity'', which evidently precludes a government
institution/instrumentality, such as CIDG-PNP.
B.
Enforced or forced disappearance means that it must be established that agents of the state
perpetrated its commission.
II.
Respondent-Accused Pascua is entitled to presumption of innocence, which cannot be diminished by
the rule on writ of amparo.

The issues for consideration and resolution in this appeal are follows: (1) whether or not sufficient
evidence supported the grant of the writ of amparo by the RTC; (2) whether or not the CIDG already
discharged its duty as required by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo; (3) whether or not the petition for
the issuance of the writ of amparo was defective; and (4) whether or not the issuance of the writ
of amparo by the RTC impaired Pascua's right to the presumption of his innocence.

Ruling of the Court

The appeal lacks merit.

We have to indicate as a preliminary observation that although this mode of appeal is usually limited to
the determination of questions of law, Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo explicitly allows
the review by the Court of questions of fact or of law or of both. Accordingly, we shall also determine
herein the sufficiency of the evidence presented in support of the petition for the issuance of the writ
of amparo.
I.
Substantial evidence existed to warrant
the issuance of the writ of amparo

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo defines the nature of the writ of amparo as a remedy
against enforced disappearances or threats to life, liberty and personal security, viz.:

Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right
to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

Section 17 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo specifies the degree of proof required from the petitioner
as a respondent named in the petition for the writ of amparo, to wit:

Section 1 7. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish their
claims by substantial evidence.
xxxx
Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires substantial evidence to establish the allegations
of the petition for the writ of amparo and to warrant granting the privilege of the writ of amparo, to
wit:

Section 18. Judgment. - x x x If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the
court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise,
the privilege shall be denied.

Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.18 This standard was applied in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,19 the first
ruling by the Court relating to the remedy of the writ of amparo.

In Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis,20 a case involving the propriety of the trial court's issuance of the writ
of amparo, the Court expounded on the need for substantial evidence to support the petition for the
writ of amparo, viz.:

We see no merit in the petitioners' submitted position that no sufficient evidence exists to support the
conclusion that the Kasim evidence unequivocally points to some government complicity in the
disappearance x x x. We painstakingly ruled:

To give full meaning to our Constitution and the rights it protects, we hold that, as in Velasquez, we
should at least take a close look at the available evidence to determine the correct import of every
piece of evidence - even of those usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence -
taking into account the surrounding circumstances and the test of reason that we can use as basic
minimum admissibility requirement x x x.
xxxx
Likewise, we see no merit in the petitioners' claim that the Kasim evidence does not amount to
substantial evidence required by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. This is not a new issue; we
extensively and thoroughly considered and resolved it in our December 3, 2009 Decision. At this point,
we need not go into another full discussion of the justifications supporting an evidentiary standard
specific to the Writ of Amparo. Suffice it to say that we continue to adhere to the substantial evidence
rule that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires, with some adjustments for flexibility in considering
the evidence presented. When we ruled that hearsay evidence (usually considered inadmissible under
the general rules of evidence) may be admitted as the circumstances of the case may require, we did
not thereby dispense with the substantial evidence rule; we merely relaxed the evidentiary rule on
the admissibility of evidence, maintaining all the time the standards of reason and relevance that
underlie every evidentiary situation. This, we did, by considering the totality of the obtaining
situation and the consistency of the hearsay evidence with the other available evidence in the case.

Thus viewed, common threads that plainly run in the three cited cases are applicable to the present
case. There is the evidence of ineffective investigation in Manalo and Velasquez Rodriguez, while in all
three was the recognition that the burden of proof must be lowered or relaxed (either through the use
of circumstantial or indirect evidence or even by logical inference); the requirement for direct evidence
to establish that an enforced disappearance occurred -- as the petitioners effectively suggest -- would
render it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove that an individual has been made to disappear.
In these lights, we emphasized in our December 3, 2009 Decision that while the need for substantial
evidence remains the rule, flexibility must be observed where appropriate (as the Courts in Velasquez
Rodriguez and Timurtas did) for the protection of the precious rights to life, liberty and security. This
flexibility, we noted, requires that 'we should take a close look at the available evidence to determine
the correct import of every piece of evidence - even of those usually considered inadmissible under the
general rules of evidence - taking into account the surrounding circumstances and the test of reason
that we can use as basic minimum admissibility requirement.' From these perspectives, we see no error
that we should rectify or reconsider.21 (Emphases supplied)

The CIDG contends that Regina did not discharge her burden of proof because she did not present
substantial evidence to support her petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo.

The contention of the CIDG is without merit.

We declare that Regina fully discharged her duty to present substantial evidence in support of her
petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo.

Firstly, the sinumpaang salaysay executed on July 30, 2007 before Special Investigator Cesar S. Rivera
of the Anti-Kidnapping, Hijacking and Armed Robbery Division of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), whereby affiant Ronaldo F. Perez (Perez), an eyewitness no less, detailed the events of the
abduction of Pablo in mid-afternoon of July 9, 2007, was consistent and credible in itself. Perez's
statements therein definitely recounted how the abductors perpetrated the abduction by blocking the
path of Pablo's Isuzu Sportivo (plate numbered ZCW 283) with their whitecolored Kia 2-door Sedan
bearing plate numbered YBA 255 and their greencolored Toyota Lite Ace with plate numbered "___-
488." Perez identified one of the perpetrators of the abduction by name ("SP02 Rolando Pascua") and
supplied another identifying circumstance for Pascua ("Siya po nagpapagawa din sa akin ng araw na
yon ng International Drivers License, police po siya, dating naka-destino sa Firearms and Explosives
Division (FED), Camp Crame"). He thereby revealed having last seen Pablo on the day of the abduction
as being inside the Isuzu Sportivo that the abductors parked in front of the main office of the CIDG in
Camp Crame.

The relevant portions of the sinumpaang salaysay of Perez are quoted for ready reference as follows:

4. T. Sino ba si PABLO CAYANAN?

S. Kliyente ko po si PABLO, nagpapagawa ng mga rehistro ng mga sasakyan. May pwesto po siya sa
Dagupan at namimili at nagbebenta ng mga second hand car. Mga isang taon mahigit ko na po siyang
kilala.

5. T. Kailan at papano siya nawala o dinukot? [When and how did he disappear or was abducted]

S. Noon pong ika-9 ng Hulyo 2007, nag-text si PABLO sa akin, tinatanong kung ok na yung papel ng
Transfer of Ownership ng sasakyan, at sabi ko po "ok na". Sabi niya "Sige punta ako diyan." Mga alas-
tres (3:00) ng hapon dumating siya sa harap ng opisina naming sa Cres Eden building sa 8A Magalang
St., Pinyahan, Quezon City. Dala ni PABLO yung Isuzu Sportivo (Plate ZCW-283) na kulay orange. Hindi
na siya bumaba ng sasakyan at tinawag na lang ako para sumakay sa kanya. Pag-sakay ko po ay may
humarang na dalawang sasakyan, isang Kia 2 door Sedan, puti, na may plate number YBA 255, at isang
Toyota Lite Ace, green, plate number ___-488. Tinutukan kami ng Calibre .45 pistol ng 2 lalaking tumabi
sa amin ni PABLO. Lumapit si SP02 ROLANDO PASCUA sa amin at pinalipat ako sa Pajero niya (kulay
navy blue). May ibang nag-maneho ng sasakyan ni PABLO na kasama siya doon. Kasama po ni PASCUA
yung driver niya.

6. T. Sino si SP02 ROLANDO PASCUA?

S: Siya po nagpapagawa din sa akin ng araw na yon ng International Drivers License, police po siya,
dating naka-destino sa Firearms and Explosives Division (FED), Camp Crame.
xxxx
11. T. Saan kayo dinala ni PABLO?

S. Inikut-ikot kami sa labas ng Crame mga kalahating oras (3:00- 3:30 nh), tapos po ay pumasok kami sa
loob ng Crame sa tapat ng CIDG Building, parking area. Nasa labas lang kami ng CIDG Building nakapark
mga isa't kalahating oras (3:30-5:00 nh), nasa loob lang ako ng Pajero ni PASCUA. Si PABLO ay
kinakausap nila SP02 ROLANDO PASCUA sa loob ng Sportivo. Pinaalis na po ako mga bandang alas
singko (5:00) ng hapon, tumuloy na ako sa upisina sa Pinyahan. Naiwan po doon si PABLO CAYANAN Jr.
bantay siya ng mga dumukot sa kanya, kasama si SP02 ROLANDO PASCUA.

12. T. Paano mo nasabing nasa CIDG Crame kayo?

S. Madalas po ako doon, makikita po sa labas ng building na may malaking nakasulat na Criminal
Investigation and Detention (sic) Group (CIDG).22

Given that no ill-motive was imputed to Perez for firmly identifying Pascua as the person leading the
abduction of Pablo, the credibility of the identification of Pascua was unassailable. Indeed, Perez was
not likely to falsely incriminate a police officer like Pascua in the commission of a crime as serious as
abduction unless the incrimination was the truth.

Secondly, Pascua himself expressly admitted the abduction of Pablo, albeit asserting himself as another
victim of the same abduction. Pascua's version on the abduction, as culled from his counter-affidavit,
follows:

a) On July 9, 2007, I was at the vicinity of Magalang Street near the Land Transportation Office (LTO)
along East Avenue, Quezon City. I was then processing the application for International Driver's License
of a relative which was coursed and requested through me;

b) To facilitate the processing of the said application for International Driver's License, I met a friend
named Ronaldo F. Perez, who incidentally was [a] known "fixer" in the area to help him (sic) facilitate
the application;

c) At around 3:00 in the afternoon and while I am seated in a "turo turo" (cafeteria) talking to Ronaldo
Perez regarding the license detail, a group of men (referred to herein as "Malefactor" for brevity) more
or less ten (10) brandishing long and short firearms arrived and in a "Gestapo" like manner hauled
several persons including me and Ronaldo Perez. The incident transpired in no less than a minute. The
Malefactor seem to be trained and have prepared for the incident;
d) At that precise moment, [I] could not identify myself as a police officer yet to the Malefactors for
fear that I would be shot at by the Malefactors. At that time I did not bear with me my service fire arm
- caliber 9mm pistol;

e) We were ordered to board in a vehicle, which vehicle I cannot identify nor their license plate
number. There were Seven persons in the vehicle, four (4) members of the Malefactors and three (3)
person who were hauled including me and Ronaldo Perez;

f) All three (3) of us who were taken by the malefactors were ordered, at gun point, to bow our head
while the vehicle is moving. We were directed not to look anywhere;

g) Same vehicle, together with two more vehicle apparently taking the lead, drove all the way to EDSA
southbound passing by the street near the building where the Department of Interior and Local
Government is located;

h) It was along Kamuning or a few minutes after their (sic) hauling when I had the opportunity to
identify myself to one of the Malefactors that I am a bonafide member of the police force. I was asked
if I am is (sic) sure that I am a police officer, to which I answered "Opo";

i) A few minutes after and upon learning that I am a police officer, the vehicle stopped and I was
required to get off, which I immediately did. I was however directed by one of the Malefactor not to
look back or I would be shot which I complied;

j) Fearing that what I experienced may be [a] violation of the law, I boarded a taxi cab and immediately
proceeded to the Central Metro Manila Criminal Investigation and Detection Team located at Camp
Karingal, Sikatuna Village, Quezon City to report the incident. This is the station that I am quite familiar,
hence, I decided to proceed to the same station x x x.

k) I tried to locate Ronaldo Perez that night but to no avail and so I decided to wait for any news that
may come there after;

l) The next day, July 10, 2007 (Tuesday), I was surprised to learn from Ronaldo Perez through telephone
call, that he was likewise released and that he is now ready to process the requested International
Driver's License of his relative Rizalino Pascua Gani, Jr. x x x.23

Asserting himself as another victim of the same abduction was Pascua's way of denying his
participation in the abduction of Pablo. Yet, he did not furnish details of the abduction that would have
given to the investigators firm leads to quickly comer the perpetrators as well as to determine and
locate the whereabouts of Pablo. His omission as fatal to his credibility. He could not simply belie his
part in the abduction by issuing a blanket denial. He was expected to furnish details because he was a
police officer sworn to uphold and enforce the law. It is significant that his denial was already doubtful
in light of Perez's sinumpaang salaysay positively identifying of him as the leader of the perpetrators of
the abduction.

Thirdly, Pascua's version of being a victim of the same abduction deserved no consideration. For one,
he could not even mention the type and the color of the vehicle that he and Pablo were supposedly
ordered to board. Such inability was uncharacteristic of a veteran police officer like him. To justify his
alleged inability to provide details about the abductors in his counter-affidavit, he stated that he and
Pablo were told to "bow their heads and not to look." The justification was implausible, however,
because it was incompatible with his declaration in the same counter-affidavit to the effect that the
"[s]ame vehicle, together with two or more vehicle apparently taking the lead, drove all the way to
EDSA southbound passing by the street near the building where the Department of Interior and Local
Government is located."24 Furthermore, he said that he was released by the abductors only after
having introduced himself as a police officer. But he thereby contradicted himself because he also
stated in the same counter-affidavit that he feared being shot during the abduction if he identified
himself as a police officer. Moreover, he claimed that although he was released he submissively
complied with the order of one of the abductors for him "not to look back or [he] would be shot." 25 The
claim of submissiveness was unnatural for a police officer like him because he was expected - mainly
because of his training and experience as a police officer, or even because of simple curiosity on his
part - to have at least glanced at the fleeing vehicle of the abductors in order to get a clue for the
follow-up investigation. That he did not give chase or tail the vehicle, or alert other police officers
about the abduction soonest added to the suspiciousness of his denial of participation in the
abduction. And, lastly, his proceeding to a relatively farther police station to report the incident,
instead of to the nearer police station or outpost made his version absolutely suspicious.

Fourthly, Regina presented other witnesses, namely: Ricardo Cayanan 26 and Leonila R. Francisco,27 to
corroborate the allegation on the occurrence of the abduction. Such other witnesses also identified
Pascua as the person leading the abductors of Pablo and Perez.

And, fifthly, Perez's recantation of his sinumpaang salaysay had no evidentiary value for being general
and bereft of any details. A perusal shows that the recantation did not offer details of what had really
occurred if the abduction of Pablo did not actually happen. Such details were the only means to
directly contradict the details stated in the recanted sinumpaang salaysay.

It is relevant to note that the RTC, whose ascertainment of the credibility of conflicting testimonies is
generally accorded great respect by the reviewing court, easily disbelieved Perez's recantation of
his sinumpaang salaysay, observing as follows:

Even the recantation of Ronaldo Perez of his Sinumpaang Salaysay as presented by the respondent
SPO2 Rolando Pascua is frowned upon by the Court. Jurisprudence has invariably regarded such
affidavit as exceedingly unreliable, because it can easily be secured from a poor and ignorant witness,
usually through intimidation or for monetary consideration. Considering that the respondents herein
belong to the police force, the motive of Ronaldo Perez in executing his Affidavit of Recantation is
doubted by the Court. Moreover, Ronaldo Perez's defiance of the subpoena sent to him by this Court
proved all the more the doubt of the Court of the veracity of his recantation. 28

II.
The CIDG did not observe the
required extraordinary diligence

Section 17 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo defines the diligence required of a public official or
employee who is named as a respondent in the petition for the writ of amparo, to wit:

Section 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish their
claims by substantial evidence.

The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary diligence as required by
applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as
required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.

The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed to evade the responsibility or liability.

The CIDG posits that it was only required to observe ordinary diligence in conducting its investigation
of the disappearance of Pablo and in determining Pablo's whereabouts.

The CIDG's position is incorrect. The diligence required of the CIDG was extraordinary.

Section 9 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo expressly states what a public official or employee
impleaded as a respondent in the petition for the writ of amparo should submit with the verified
written return, to wit:

Section 9. Return; Contents. - Within seventy-two (72) hours after service of the writ, the respondent
shall file a verified written return together with supporting affidavits which shall, among other things,
contain the following:

(a) The lawful defenses to show that the respondent did not violate or threaten with violation the right
to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party, through any act or omission;

(b) The steps or actions taken by the respondent to determine the fate or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for the threat, act or omission;

(c) All relevant information in the possession of the respondent pertaining to the threat, act or
omission against the aggrieved party; and

(d) If the respondent is a public official or employee, the return shall further state the actions that have
or will still be taken:

(i) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;

(ii) to recover ·and preserve the evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person
identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible;

(iii) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or disappearance;

(iv) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well as any
pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance;

(v) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and

(vi) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.

The return shall also state other matters relevant to the investigation, its resolution and the
prosecution of the case.

A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed.

In its return, the CIDG only attached passive certificates issued by its operating divisions to the effect
that Pablo was not being detained by any of them.29 Said certifications were severely inadequate. It is
almost needless to characterize the certifications as non-compliant with the requirement for a detailed
return. As such, the certifications amounted to a general denial on the part of the CIDG. The quoted
rule requires the verified written return of the CIDG to be accompanied by supporting affidavits. Such
affidavits, which could be those of the persons tasked by the CIDG and other agencies like the NBI and
probably the Land Transportation Office (LTO) to collaborate in the investigation of the abduction of
Pablo, would have specified and described the efforts expended in the search for Pablo, if such search
was really conducted, and would have reported the progress of the investigation of the definite leads
given in the Perez's sinumpaang salaysay on the abduction itself.

The allegation that the CIDG had continuously searched for Pablo among its various operating divisions
similarly constituted a general denial because the CIDG did not thereby indicate who had conducted
the search, and how thoroughly the allegedly continuous searches had been conducted.

The CIDG pointed out in its return that the CIDG had undertaken an administrative investigation
against Pascua, and submitted in that regard the certification on the pre-charge evaluation and
investigation of Pascua. The CIDG asserts that its investigation of the disappearance of Pablo was
conducted in tandem with that of the NBI; that it had also formed its own investigating team to
conduct a "thorough investigation" of the abduction of Pablo; and that it had meanwhile verified the
vehicle used in the abduction from the LT0.30

Under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the return should spell out the details of the investigations
conducted by the CIDG and the NBI in a manner that would enable the RTC to judiciously determine
whether or not the efforts to ascertain Pablo's whereabouts had been sincere and adequate. The
return by the CIDG was non-compliant in that regard. To be noted at this juncture is that the CIDG
should have exerted greater effort at complying with both the letter and spirit of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo in light of Perez's sinumpaang salaysay having fully placed the responsibility for the
abduction and disappearance of Pablo right at the very doorsteps of the CIDG in Camp Crame. It is
disheartening for us to see the CIDG's investigation having been limited to Pascua despite the
circumstances justifying a broader inquiry. There was also no affirmative showing of any investigation
of the area of the abduction itself despite Regina having presented witnesses from the area. Indeed,
the CIDG did not seem to have itself investigated Perez on the abduction. 31

III.
The petition for the writ of amparo
was not defective

In his comment, which the CIDG adopted, Pascua reminds that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo was
partly patterned after the rules on the writ of amparo adopted in Mexico. He posits that it has been an
essential requirement in Mexico for the petition for the writ of amparo to state where the victim of
involuntary disappearance was being held. He argues that upon the recantation by Perez of
his sinumpaang salaysay, there was no more evidence from which to determine where Pablo was
being held.

The argument of Pascua is unfounded.

Section 5 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo lists the matters to be alleged in the petition for the writ
of amparo:
Section 5. Contents of the Petition. - The petition shall be signed and verified and shall allege the
following:

(a) The personal circumstance of the petitioner;

(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or
omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed
appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by
an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the
attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of
the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation,
together with the report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for.

The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs.

As Section 5 shows, there is no requirement for the petition to state the probable whereabouts of the
victim. We have no doubt, however, that Regina was not aware where Pablo had been kept at the time
she filed her petition for the writ of habeas corpus.

Nonetheless, the Court clarifies that the application and implementation of the rule
of amparo adopted in Mexico or in any other country could only be persuasive at best. Despite its
being patterned after the rules on the writ of amparo of other countries, particularly those in Latin-
American, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo promulgated by the Court should not be wholly dependent
on how those other rules of amparo have operated, or have been implemented. Such operation and
implementation, if worthy of emulation, are only best practices to be considered and optionally relied
upon, if at all. Circumstances and needs peculiar to our country, which the Court has well considered in
crafting the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, dictate different operation and implementation.

It was actually presumptuous for Pascua to argue that there was no evidence at all that indicated the
whereabouts of Pablo following the abduction. There was such evidence, and it was substantial.
Specifically, Perez's sinumpaang salaysay stated the place where Pablo was detained or was last seen,
to wit:

11. T: Saan kayo dinala ni PABLO?

S: Inikut-ikot kami sa labas ng Crame mga kalahating oras (3:00- 3:30 nh), tapos po ay pumasok sa loob
ng Crame sa tapat ng CIDG Building, parking area. Nasa labas lang kami ng CIDG Building nakapark, mga
isa't kalahating oras (3:30-5:00 nh), nasa loob lang ako ng Pajero ni PASCUA. Si PABLO ay kinakausap
nila SPO2 ROLANDO PASCUA sa loob ng Sportivo. Pinaalis na po ako mga bandang alas singko (5:00) ng
hapon; tumuloy na ako sa upisina sa Pinyahan. Naiwan po doon si PABLO CAYANAN, Jr., bantay siya ng
mga dumukot sa kanya, kasama si SP02 ROLANDO PASCUA.

12. T: Paano mo nasabing nasa CIDG Crame kayo?

S: Madalas po ako doon, makikita po sa labas ng building na may malaking nakasulat na Criminal
Investigation and Detention (sic) Group (CIDG).32

Pascua suggests that the State, or any of its agencies or institutions like the CIDG, cannot be made a
respondent in the petition for the writ of amparo. He probably bases his suggestion on the text of
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, which provides:

Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right
to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. (Emphasis supplied)

The suggestion of Pascua lacks substance. Although Section 1 states that the violation may be
committed by the persons therein listed (i.e., public official or employee, or a private individual or
entity), it does not state that only the listed persons can be made respondents. The rule does not list
the State or its agencies as possible violators simply because the State and its agencies may not be
presumed to sanction such violations.

In proper circumstances, the State or any of its relevant agencies may be impleaded; otherwise, the
rule on the writ of amparo may be rendered ineffective or toothless. There may be occasions when the
remedy of the writ of amparo can be made effective only through the State and its agencies. This is
because the State is vested with the authority and responsibility for securing every inhabitant's life,
liberty and property. After all, the State controls the legal, moral and material resources by which to
fully enforce the Constitution and the laws guaranteeing life, liberty and property.

IV.
The issuance of the writ of amparo did not impair
SPO2 Pascua's right to the presumption of innocence

Pascua supposes that the issuance of the writ of amparo issued against him impaired or diminished his
right to the presumption of innocence.1âwphi1

Pascua's supposition entirely misses the point.

The proceedings taken under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo are not akin or similar to those in criminal
prosecutions. In the former, the guilt or innocence of the respondents is not determined, and no penal
sanctions are meted. The proceedings only endeavor to give the aggrieved parties immediate remedies
against imminent or actual threats to life, liberty or security. The presumption of innocence is never an
issue. In the latter, the prosecution of the accused with due process of law is the object of the
proceedings. The presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is always the starting point. Hence,
the need for the State to adduce proof beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.

V.
Reliefs to be granted

We next consider the reliefs to be granted in addition to the grant of the privilege of the writ
of amparo.

According to Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the court hearing the petition may grant
the privilege of the writ of amparo "and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate." This means
that the amparo court should enable every act or move to prevent any violation of another person's
right to life, liberty and security or to defeat any threat of a violation of such right.

Under Section 9 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the respondent is required to also state in the
return the actions that have been or will still be taken: (a) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
(b) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in
the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible; (c) to identify
witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or disappearance; (d) to determine
the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that
may have brought about the death or disappearance; (e) to identify and apprehend the person or
persons involved in the death or disappearance; and (f) to bring the suspected offenders before a
competent court.

With the records of the hearing sufficiently indicating the personal participation of Pascua in the
abduction of Pablo, Pascua ostensibly knew more than he cared to reveal thus far about the abduction.
As a start, Pascua, as the leader of the abduction, knew the identities of the eight or nine other
abductors. He should be assiduously investigated for his participation in the abduction, and, if
warranted, he should be promptly but duly held accountable for it. All those conspiring with him in
abducting Pablo should also be held to account to the full extent of the law. The CIDG and the NBI
should not halt in seeing to this, for they bear the primary responsibility in that respect.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRMS the resolution
rendered on December 13, 2007 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 91, in Quezon City in all respects
subject to the following MODIFICATIONS of the dispositive portion, as follows:

Foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows, to wit:

1. The Court hereby grants the privilege of the Writ of Amparo;

2. Ordering respondent CIDG Chief/Director and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation to
cause the speedy conduct of a thorough investigation of the disappearance of Pablo A. Cayanan
probably caused by members of the Philippine National Police then assigned in Camp Crame,
presumably with the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group;

3. Requiring the full investigation of SPO2 Rolando V. Pascua and other persons who took part in the
abduction of Pablo A. Cayanan; and, if warranted, charging them with the appropriate criminal offense
or offenses in the Department of Justice in relation to the abduction of Pablo A. Cayanan;

4. The Temporary Protection Order is hereby made permanent;

5. And the Granting of the Witness Protection Program availed of by the petitioner is hereby retained
until the finality of the case/cases related thereto.

It is so ordered.

The Court REMANDS the case to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 91, in Quezon City for the
implementation of and compliance with this decision with utmost dispatch.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 191805               November 15, 2011

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF
NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, PDG JESUS AME VERSOZA, LT. GEN. DELFIN
BANGIT, MAJ. GEN. NESTOR Z. OCHOA, P/CSUPT. AMETO G. TOLENTINO, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS,
COL. REMIGIO M. DE VERA, an officer named MATUTINA, LT. COL. MINA, CALOG, GEORGE PALACPAC
under the name "HARRY," ANTONIO CRUZ, ALDWIN "BONG" PASICOLAN and VINCENT
CALLAGAN, Respondents.
x------------------------x
G.R. No. 193160              

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF
NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, POLICE DIR. GEN. JESUS A. VERSOZA, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, BGEN.
REMEGIO M. DE VERA, 1st LT. RYAN S. MATUTINA, LT. COL. LAURENCE E. MINA, ANTONIO C. CRUZ,
ALDWIN C. PASICOLAN and VICENTE A. CALLAGAN, Petitioners,
vs.
NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

Before this Court are two consolidated cases, namely, (1) Petition for Partial Review on Certiorari dated
20 April 2010 (G.R. No. 191805), and (2) Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 19 August 2010 (G.R.
No. 193160).1 Both Petitions assail the 12 April 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition for writ of amparo and writ of habeas data is GRANTED.

Respondents Gen. Victor S. Ibrado, Lt. Gen. Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor Z. Ochoa, PCSupt. Ameto G.
Tolentino, PSSupt. Jude W. Santos, Col. Remigio M. De Vera, Lt. Col. Laurence E. Mina and 1Lt. Ryan S.
Matutina, or their replacements in their official posts if they have already vacated the same, are
ORDERED to furnish this Court within five (5) days from notice of this decision, official or unofficial
reports pertaining to petitioner – covering but not limited to intelligence reports, operation reports
and provost marshal reports prior to, during and subsequent to September 6, 2009 – made by the 5th
Infantry Division, Philippine Army, its branches and subsidiaries, including the 17th Infantry Battalion,
Philippine Army.

The above-named respondents are also DIRECTED to refrain from using the said reports in any
transaction or operation of the military. Necessarily, the afore-named respondents are ORDERED to
expunge from the records of the military all documents having any reference to petitioner.
Likewise, the afore-named respondents, as well as respondents Police Director General Jesus Ame
Versoza, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and Vicente Callagan are DIRECTED to ensure that no further
violation of petitioner’s rights to life, liberty and security is committed against the latter or any member
of his family.

The petition is DISMISSED with respect to President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on account of her
presidential immunity from suit. Similarly, the petition is DISMISSED with respect to respondents Calog
and George Palacpac or Harry for lack of merit.

Petitioner’s prayer for issuance of a temporary protection order and inspection order is DENIED.

Noriel Rodriguez (Rodriguez) is petitioner in G.R. No. 191805 and respondent in G.R. No. 193160. He is
a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant organization affiliated with
Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP).

On the other hand, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (former President Arroyo), Police Director General (PDG.)
Jesus A. Verzosa, Police Senior Superintendent (P/SSupt.) Jude W. Santos, Brigadier General (Brig. Gen.)
Remegio M. De Vera, First Lieutenant (1st Lt.) Ryan S. Matutina, Lieutenant Colonel (Lt. Col.) Laurence
E. Mina, Antonio C. Cruz (Cruz), Aldwin C. Pasicolan (Pasicolan) and Vicente A. Callagan (Callagan) are
respondents in G.R. No. 191805 and petitioners in G.R. No. 193160. At the time the events relevant to
the present Petitions occurred, former President Arroyo was the President of the Philippines. PDG.
Verzosa, P/SSupt. Santos, Brig. Gen. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina and Lt. Col. Mina were officers of the
Philippine National Police (PNP). Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan were Special Investigators of the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) in Region II.

Antecedent Facts

Rodriguez claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya,
making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. 2

On 6 September 2009, at 5:00 p.m., Rodriguez had just reached Barangay Tapel, Cagayan onboard a
tricycle driven by Hermie Antonio Carlos (Carlos), when four men forcibly took him and forced him into
a car. Inside the vehicle were several men in civilian clothes, one of whom was holding a .45 caliber
pistol. Subsequently, three more persons arrived, and one of them carried a gun at his side. Two men
boarded the car, while the others rode on the tricycle.3

The men tied the hands of Rodriguez, ordered him to lie on his stomach, sat on his back and started
punching him. The car travelled towards the direction of Sta. Teresita-Mission and moved around the
area until about 2:00 a.m. During the drive, the men forced Rodriguez to confess to being a member of
the New People’s Army (NPA), but he remained silent. The car then entered a place that appeared to
be a military camp. There were soldiers all over the area, and there was a banner with the word
"Bravo" written on it. Rodriguez later on learned that the camp belonged to the 17th Infantry Battalion
of the Philippine Army.4

Rodriguez was brought to a canteen, where six men confronted him, ordering him to confess to his
membership in the NPA. Due to his exhaustion, he unintentionally fell asleep. As a result, the men hit
him on the head to wake him up. After the interrogation, two of the men guarded him, but did not
allow him to sleep.5
In the morning of 7 September 2009, the men tied the hands of Rodriguez, blindfolded him and made
him board a vehicle. While they were in transit, the soldiers repeatedly hit him in the head and
threatened to kill him. When the car stopped after about ten minutes, the soldiers brought him to a
room, removed his blindfold, and forced him to confess to being a member of the NPA. During the
interrogation, the soldiers repeatedly hit him on the head. Thereafter, he was detained inside the room
for the entire day. The soldiers tied his stomach to a papag, and gave him rice and viand. Fearing that
the food might be poisoned, he refused to eat anything. He slept on the papag while being tied to it at
the waist.6

On 8 September 2009, the men forced Rodriguez into a vehicle, which brought them to Bugey and
Mission. While passing houses along the way, the men asked him if his contacts lived in those houses.
When he failed to answer, a soldier pointed a gun to his head and threatened to kill him and his family.
Because he remained silent, the soldiers beat him and tied him up. The vehicle returned to the military
camp at past 1:00 p.m., where he was again subjected to tactical interrogation about the location of an
NPA camp and his alleged NPA comrades. He suffered incessant mauling every time he failed to
answer.7

At dawn on 9 September 2009, soldiers armed with rifles took Rodriguez and made him their guide on
their way to an NPA camp in Birao. Accompanying them was a man named Harry, who, according to
the soldiers, was an NPA member who had surrendered to the military. Harry pointed to Rodriguez and
called him a member of the NPA. He also heard Harry tell the soldiers that the latter knew the area well
and was acquainted with a man named Elvis. The soldiers loaded Rodriguez into a military truck and
drove to Tabbak, Bugey. While he was walking with the soldiers, he noticed a soldier with the name tag
"Matutina," who appeared to be an official because the other soldiers addressed him as "sir." 8

Upon reaching Birao on foot, the soldiers looked for and was able to locate a certain Elvis and told him
that Rodriguez had identified his whereabouts location. The soldiers forced Rodriguez to convince Elvis
to disclose the location of the NPA camp. They brought the two to the mountains, where both were
threatened with death. When the soldiers punched Elvis, Rodriguez told them that he would reveal the
location of the NPA camp if they let Elvis go home. They finally released Elvis around 3:00 p.m. that
day. The soldiers and Rodriguez spent the next three nights in the mountains.9

On 12 September 2009, the soldiers again hit Rodriguez and forced him to identify the location of the
NPA camp. He was blindfolded and warned to get ready because they would beat him up again in the
military camp. Upon arrival therein, they brought him to the same room where he had first been
detained, and two soldiers mauled him again. They repeatedly punched and kicked him. In the
afternoon, they let him rest and gave him an Alaxan tablet. Thereafter, he fell asleep due to over-
fatigue and extreme body pain. The soldiers, however, hit him again. After giving him a pen and a piece
of paper, they ordered him to write down his request for rice from the people. When he refused, the
soldiers maltreated him once more.10

On 13 September 2009, the soldiers forced Rodriguez to sign documents declaring that he had
surrendered in an encounter in Cumao, and

that the soldiers did not shoot him because he became a military asset in May. When he refused to
sign the document, he received another beating. Thus, he was compelled to sign, but did so using a
different signature to show that he was merely coerced.11
The soldiers showed Rodriguez photographs of different persons and asked him if he knew the men
appearing therein. When he told them that he did not recognize the individuals on the photos, the
soldiers instructed him to write down the name of his school and organization, but he declined. The
soldiers then wrote something on the paper, making it appear that he was the one who had written it,
and forced him to sign the document. The soldiers took photographs of him while he was signing.
Afterwards, the soldiers forced him down, held his hands, and sat on his feet. He did not only receive
another beating, but was also electrocuted. The torture lasted for about an hour. 12

At 11:00 p.m. on 15 September 2009, the soldiers brought Rodriguez to a military operation in the
mountains, where he saw Matutina again. They all spent the night there. 13

In the morning of 16 September 2009, the soldiers and Rodriguez started their descent. When they
stopped, the soldiers took his photograph and asked him to name the location of the NPA camp.
Thereafter, they all returned to the military camp. The soldiers asked him to take a bath and wear a
white polo shirt handed to him. He was then brought to the Enrile Medical Center, where Dr. Juliet
Ramil (Dr. Ramil) examined him.14 When the doctor asked him why he had bruises and contusions, he
lied and told her that he sustained them when he slipped, as he noticed a soldier observing him. Dr.
Ramil’s medical certificate indicated that he suffered from four hematomas in the epigastric area, chest
and sternum.15

Back at the camp, the soldiers let Rodriguez eat with several military officials and took pictures of him
while he was eating with them. They also asked him to point to a map in front of him and again took
his photograph. Later, they told him that he would finally see his mother. 16

Rodriguez was brought to another military camp, where he was ordered to sign a piece of paper stating
that he was a surrenderee and was never beaten up. Scared and desperate to end his ordeal, he signed
the paper and was warned not to report anything to the media.17

Around 6:00 a.m. on 17 September 2009, the soldiers instructed petitioner to take a bath. They gave
him a pair of jeans and perfume. While he was having breakfast, the two soldiers guarding him
repeatedly reminded him not to disclose to the media his experience in the camp and to say instead
that he had surrendered to the military.18

At 9:00 a.m. on the same day, the mother and the brother of Rodriguez arrived surrounded by several
men. His mother, Wilma Rodriguez (Wilma), talked to Lt. Col. Mina. Rodriguez heard one of the soldiers
tell Wilma that he had surrendered to the military and had long been its asset. His brother, Rodel
Rodriguez (Rodel), informed him that the men accompanying them were from the CHR, namely,
Pasicolan, Cruz and Callagan. Upon seeing Rodriguez, Cruz instructed him to lift up his shirt, and one of
the CHR employees took photographs of his bruises.19

A soldier tried to convince Wilma to let Rodriguez stay in the camp for another two weeks to
supposedly prevent the NPA from taking revenge on him. Respondent Calog also approached
Rodriguez and Rodel and asked them to become military assets. Rodel refused and insisted that they
take Rodriguez home to Manila. Again, the soldiers reminded them to refrain from facing the media.
The soldiers also told them that the latter will be taken to the Tuguegarao Airport and guarded until
they reached home.20

Rodriguez and his family missed their flight. Subsequently, the soldiers accompanied them to the CHR
office, where Rodriguez was made to sign an affidavit stating that he was neither abducted nor
tortured. Afraid and desperate to return home, he was forced to sign the document. Cruz advised him
not to file a case against his abductors because they had already freed him. The CHR personnel then
led him and his family to the CHR Toyota Tamaraw FX service vehicle. He noticed that a vehicle with
soldiers on board followed them.21

The Tamaraw FX pulled over and respondent 1st Lt. Matutina boarded the vehicle. Upon reaching a
mall in Isabela, Rodriguez, his family, Callagan, 1st Lt. Matutina and two other soldiers transferred to
an orange Toyota Revo with plate number WTG 579. Upon reaching the boundary of Nueva Ecija and
Nueva Viscaya, 1st Lt. Matutina alighted and called Rodriguez to a diner. A certain Alan approached
Rodriguez and handed him a cellphone with a SIM card. The latter and his family then left and resumed
their journey back home.22

Rodriguez reached his house in Sta. Ana, Manila at 3:00 a.m. on 18 September 2010. Callagan and two
soldiers went inside the house, and took photographs and a video footage thereof. The soldiers
explained that the photos and videos would serve as evidence of the fact that Rodriguez and his family
were able to arrive home safely. Despite Rodriguez’s efforts to confront the soldiers about their acts,
they still continued and only left thirty minutes later. 23

On 19 September 2009, Dr. Reginaldo Pamugas, a physician trained by the International Committee on
Torture and Rehabilitation, examined Rodriguez and issued a Medical Certificate stating that the latter
had been a victim of torture.24

Around 7:00 a.m. on 3 November 2010, Rodriguez and his girlfriend, Aileen Hazel Robles, noticed that
several suspicious-looking men followed them at the Metro Rail Transit (MRT), in the streets and on a
jeepney.25

On 7 December 2009, Rodriguez filed before this Court a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition
for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of
Documents and Personal Properties dated 2 December 2009.26 The petition was filed against former
President Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Major General (Maj. Gen.) Nestor Z.
Ochoa, P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Calog, George Palacpac
(Palacpac), Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan. The petition prayed for the following reliefs:

a. The issuance of the writ of amparo ordering respondents to desist from violating Rodriguez’s
right to life, liberty and security.
b. The issuance of an order to enjoin respondents from doing harm to or approaching
Rodriguez, his family and his witnesses.
c. Allowing the inspection of the detention areas of the Headquarters of Bravo Co., 5th Infantry
Division, Maguing, Gonzaga, Cagayan and another place near where Rodriguez was brought.
d. Ordering respondents to produce documents submitted to them regarding any report on
Rodriguez, including operation reports and provost marshall reports of the 5th Infantry Division,
the Special Operations Group of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), prior to, on and
subsequent to 6 September 2009.1âwphi1
e. Ordering records pertinent or in any way connected to Rodriguez, which are in the custody of
respondents, to be expunged, disabused, and forever barred from being used. 27

On 15 December 2009, we granted the respective writs after finding that the petition sufficiently
alleged that Rodriguez had been abducted, tortured and later released by members of the 17th
Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army.28 We likewise ordered respondents therein to file a verified
return on the writs on or before 22 December 2009 and to comment on the petition on or before 4
January 2010.29 Finally, we directed the Court of Appeals to hear the petition on 4 January 2010 and
decide on the case within 10 days after its submission for decision. 30

During the initial hearing on 4 January 2010, the Court of Appeals required the parties to submit
affidavits and other pieces of evidence at the next scheduled hearing on 27 January 2010. 31

On 8 January 2010, respondents therein, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed their
Return of the Writ, which was likewise considered as their comment on the petition. 32 In their Return,
respondents therein alleged that Rodriguez had surrendered to the military on 28 May 2009 after he
had been put under surveillance and identified as "Ka Pepito" by former rebels. 33 According to his
military handlers, Corporal (Cpl.) Rodel

B. Cabaccan and Cpl. Julius P. Navarro, Rodriguez was a former member of the NPA operating in
Cagayan Valley.34 Wanting to bolt from the NPA, he told Cpl. Cabaccan and Cpl. Navarro that he would
help the military in exchange for his protection.35

Upon his voluntary surrender on 28 May 2009, Rodriguez was made to sign an Oath of Loyalty and an
Agent’s Agreement/Contract, showing his willingness to return to society and become a military
asset.36 Since then, he acted as a double agent, returning to the NPA to gather information. 37 However,
he feared that his NPA comrades were beginning to suspect him of being an infiltrator. 38 Thus, with his
knowledge and consent, the soldiers planned to stage a sham abduction to erase any suspicion about
him being a double agent.39 Hence, the abduction subject of the instant petition was conducted.40

Meanwhile, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan filed a Consolidated Return of the Writ dated 15 January
2010,41 alleging that they had exercised extraordinary diligence in locating Rodriguez, facilitating his
safe turnover to his family and securing their journey back home to Manila. More specifically, they
alleged that, on 16 September 2009, after Wilma sought their assistance in ascertaining the
whereabouts of her son, Cruz made phone calls to the military and law enforcement agencies to
determine his location.42 Cruz was able to speak with Lt. Col. Mina, who confirmed that Rodriguez was
in their custody.43 This information was transmitted to CHR Regional Director Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga. He,
in turn, ordered Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan to accompany Wilma to the 17th Infantry Division. 44

When the CHR officers, along with Wilma and Rodel, arrived at the 17th Infantry Battalion at Masin,
Alcala, Cagayan, Brigade Commander Col. de Vera and Battalion Commander Lt. Col. Mina alleged that
Rodriguez had become one of their assets, as evidenced by the Summary on the Surrender of Noriel
Rodriguez and the latter’s Contract as Agent.45 The CHR officers observed his casual and cordial
demeanor with the soldiers.46 In any case, Cruz asked him to raise his shirt to see if he had been
subjected to any maltreatment. Cruz and Pasicolan did not see any traces of torture. Thereafter,
Rodriguez was released to his family, and they were made to sign a certification to this effect. During
the signing of the document, herein CHR officers did not witness any threat, intimidation or force
employed against Rodriguez or his family. 47

During their journey back to the home of Rodriguez, the CHR officers observed that he was very much
at ease with his military escorts, especially with 1st Lt. Matutina. 48 Neither was there any force or
intimidation when the soldiers took pictures of his house, as the taking of photographs was performed
with Wilma’s consent.49
During the hearing on 27 January 2010, the parties agreed to file additional affidavits and position
papers and to have the case considered submitted for decision after the filing of these pleadings. 50

On 12 April 2010, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision. 51 Subsequently, on 28 April 2010,
respondents therein filed their Motion for Reconsideration. 52 Before the Court of Appeals could resolve
this Motion for Reconsideration, Rodriguez filed the instant Petition for Partial Review on Certiorari
(G.R. No. 191805), raising the following assignment of errors:

a. The Court of Appeals erred in not granting the Interim Relief for temporary protection order.
b. The Court of Appeals erred in saying: "(H)owever, given the nature of the writ of amparo,
which has the effect of enjoining the commission by respondents of violation to petitioner’s
right to life, liberty and security, the safety of petitioner is ensured with the issuance of the
writ, even in the absence of an order preventing respondent from approaching petitioner."
c. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that respondent Gloria Macapagal Arroyo had
command responsibility.53

On the other hand, respondents therein, in their Comment dated 30 July 2010, averred:

a. The Court of Appeals properly dropped then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a party-
respondent, as she may not be sued in any case during her tenure of office or actual
incumbency.
b. Petitioner had not presented any adequate and competent evidence, much less substantial
evidence, to establish his claim that public respondents had violated, were violating or
threatening to violate his rights to life, liberty and security, as well as his right to privacy. Hence,
he was not entitled to the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data or to the
corresponding interim reliefs (i.e. inspection order, production order and temporary protection
order) provided under the rule on the writ of amparo and the rule on the writ of habeas data. 54

On 19 August 2010, PDG. Verzosa, P/SSupt. Santos, BGen. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Lt. Col. Mina, Cruz,
Pasicolan and Callagan filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari, seeking the reversal of the 12 April
2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals.55 They alleged that Rodriguez –

Has not presented any adequate and competent evidence, must less substantial evidence, to establish
his claim that petitioners have violated, are violating or threatening with violation his rights to life,
liberty and security, as well as his right to privacy; hence, he is not entitled to the privilege of the writs
of amparo and habeas data and their corresponding interim reliefs (i.e., inspection order, production
order and temporary protection order) provided under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and the Rule on
the Writ of Habeas Data.56

In ascertaining whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in issuing its assailed Decision
and Resolution, the following issues must be resolved:

I. Whether the interim reliefs prayed for by Rodriguez may be granted after the writs of amparo
and habeas data have already been issued in his favor.
II. Whether former President Arroyo should be dropped as a respondent on the basis of the
presidential immunity from suit.
III. Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and habeas data
cases.
 IV. Whether the rights to life, liberty and property of Rodriguez were violated or threatened by
respondents in G.R. No. 191805.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that the writs of amparo and habeas data were promulgated to
ensure the protection of the people’s rights to life, liberty and security. 57 The rules on these writs were
issued in light of the alarming prevalence of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. 58 The
Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on 24 October 2007,59 and the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data
on 2 February 2008.60

The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and independent remedy that provides rapid judicial relief, as it
partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate
interim and permanent reliefs available to the petitioner.61 It is not an action to determine criminal
guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of
evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and
exhaustive proceedings.62 Rather, it serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the
problem of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. 63 It is preventive in that it breaks the
expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the
subsequent punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and action. 64

Meanwhile, the writ of habeas data provides a judicial remedy to protect a person’s right to control
information regarding oneself, particularly in instances where such information is being collected
through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.65 As an independent and summary remedy
to protect the right to privacy – especially the right to informational privacy 66 – the proceedings for the
issuance of the writ of habeas data does not entail any finding of criminal, civil or administrative
culpability. If the allegations in the petition are proven through substantial evidence, then the Court
may (a) grant access to the database or information; (b) enjoin the act complained of; or (c) in case the
database or information contains erroneous data or information, order its deletion, destruction or
rectification.67

First issue: Grant of interim reliefs

In the petition in G.R. No. 191805, Rodriguez prays for the issuance of a temporary protection order. It
must be underscored that this interim relief is only available before final judgment. Section 14 of the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo clearly provides:

Interim Reliefs. – Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final judgment, the court, justice or
judge may grant any of the following reliefs:

Temporary Protection Order. – The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may order
that the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family be protected in a
government agency or by an accredited person or private institution capable of keeping and securing
their safety. If the petitioner is an organization, association or institution referred to in Section 3(c) of
this Rule, the protection may be extended to the officers involved.

The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private institutions that shall extend temporary
protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family, in
accordance with guidelines which it shall issue.
The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the rules and conditions that may be
imposed by the court, justice or judge.

(a) Inspection Order. – The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may
order any person in possession or control of a designated land or other property, to permit entry for
the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any relevant object
or operation thereon.

The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be supported by affidavits or
testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge of the enforced disappearance or whereabouts of
the aggrieved party.

If the motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the
information, the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of
the opposition.

The movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to establish the right of the aggrieved
party alleged to be threatened or violated.

The inspection order shall specify the person or persons authorized to make the inspection and the
date, time, place and manner of making the inspection and may prescribe other conditions to protect
the constitutional rights of all parties. The order shall expire five (5) days after the date of its issuance,
unless extended for justifiable reasons.

(b) Production Order. – The court, justice, or judge, upon verified motion and after due hearing, may
order any person in possession, custody or control of any designated documents, papers, books,
accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, or objects in digitized or electronic form,
which constitute or contain evidence relevant to the petition or the return, to produce and permit their
inspection, copying or photographing by or on behalf of the movant.

The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged nature of the
information, in which case the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine
the merit of the opposition.

The court, justice or judge shall prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all the
parties.

(c) Witness Protection Order. – The court, justice or judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may refer the
witnesses to the Department of Justice for admission to the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit
Program, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6981.

The court, justice or judge may also refer the witnesses to other government agencies, or to accredited
persons or private institutions capable of keeping and securing their safety. (Emphasis supplied)

We held in Yano v. Sanchez68 that "[t]hese provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it
arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo petition." Being interim reliefs, they can only be
granted before a final adjudication of the case is made. In any case, it must be underscored that the
privilege of the writ of amparo, once granted, necessarily entails the protection of the aggrieved party.
Thus, since we grant petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo, there is no need to issue a
temporary protection order independently of the former. The order restricting respondents from going
near Rodriguez is subsumed under the privilege of the writ.

Second issue: Presidential immunity from suit

It bears stressing that since there is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability in
amparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertaining responsibility or
accountability for the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing. As we held in Razon v. Tagitis: 69

It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather, it
determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of
imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance. Responsibility refers to the extent
the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by
action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft,
among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible
parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that
should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without
bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed
with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or
those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation
of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our
primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty
and security are restored.70 (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, in the case at bar, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision71 found respondents in G.R. No. 191805 –
with the exception of Calog, Palacpac or Harry – to be accountable for the violations of Rodriguez’s
right to life, liberty and security committed by the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the
Philippine Army. 72 The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition with respect to former President Arroyo
on account of her presidential immunity from suit. Rodriguez contends, though, that she should remain
a respondent in this case to enable the courts to determine whether she is responsible or accountable
therefor. In this regard, it must be clarified that the Court of Appeals’ rationale for dropping her from
the list of respondents no longer stands since her presidential immunity is limited only to her
incumbency.

In Estrada v. Desierto,73 we clarified the doctrine that a non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity
from suit, even for acts committed during the latter’s tenure. We emphasize our ruling therein that
courts should look with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it
impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right, to wit:

We reject [Estrada’s] argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be
convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted
by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on
February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 "Recognizing that the Impeachment
Court is Functus Officio." Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for
petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be
prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a submission
has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a better situation than a non-sitting President
who has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal
prosecution. To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when
impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper
criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him, viz:
"x x x           x x x          x x x
Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been filed against the President, for
example, and the President resigns before judgment of conviction has been rendered by the
impeachment court or by the body, how does it affect the impeachment proceeding? Will it be
necessarily dropped?

Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one from office, then his resignation
would render the case moot and academic. However, as the provision says, the criminal and civil
aspects of it may continue in the ordinary courts."

This is in accord with our ruling in In Re: Saturnino Bermudez that "incumbent Presidents are immune
from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure" but not
beyond. xxx

We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President.
The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and
graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which
carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president.
Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and
wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is
an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public
officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the
same footing as any other trespasser.

Indeed, a critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial disinclination
to expand the privilege especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a
right. In the 1974 case of US v. Nixon, US President Richard Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed
to produce certain recordings and documents relating to his conversations with aids and advisers.
Seven advisers of President Nixon's associates were facing charges of conspiracy to obstruct justice and
other offenses which were committed in a burglary of the Democratic National Headquarters in
Washington's Watergate Hotel during the 1972 presidential campaign. President Nixon himself was
named an unindicted co-conspirator. President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on the ground,
among others, that the President was not subject to judicial process and that he should first be
impeached and removed from office before he could be made amenable to judicial proceedings. The
claim was rejected by the US Supreme Court. It concluded that "when the ground for asserting
privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized
interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the
fair administration of criminal justice." In the 1982 case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the US Supreme Court
further held that the immunity of the President from civil damages covers only "official acts." Recently,
the US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case of Clinton v. Jones where
it held that the US President's immunity from suits for money damages arising out of their official acts
is inapplicable to unofficial conduct.74 (Emphasis supplied)

Further, in our Resolution in Estrada v. Desierto,75 we reiterated that the presidential immunity from
suit exists only in concurrence with the president’s incumbency:
Petitioner stubbornly clings to the contention that he is entitled to absolute immunity from suit. His
arguments are merely recycled and we need not prolong the longevity of the debate on the subject. In
our Decision, we exhaustively traced the origin of executive immunity in our jurisdiction and its bends
and turns up to the present time. We held that given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life
to the policy that a public office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim
executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting President. Petitioner's
rehashed arguments including their thinly disguised new spins are based on the rejected contention
that he is still President, albeit, a President on leave. His stance that his immunity covers his entire
term of office or until June 30, 2004 disregards the reality that he has relinquished the presidency and
there is now a new de jure President.

Petitioner goes a step further and avers that even a non-sitting President enjoys immunity from suit
during his term of office. He buttresses his position with the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, viz:

"Mr. Suarez. Thank you.

The last question is with reference to the Committee's omitting in the draft proposal the immunity
provision for the President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very well in
striking out this second sentence, at the very least, of the original provision on immunity from suit
under the 1973 Constitution. But would the Committee members not agree to a restoration of at least
the first sentence that the president shall be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we
do not provide him that kind of an immunity, he might be spending all his time facing litigations, as the
President-in-exile in Hawaii is now facing litigations almost daily?

Fr. Bernas:

The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that during his
tenure he is immune from suit.

Mr. Suarez:

So there is no need to express it here.

Fr. Bernas:

There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the 1973 Constitution was to
make that explicit and to add other things.

Mr. Suarez:

On the understanding, I will not press for any more query, madam President.

I thank the Commissioner for the clarification."

Petitioner, however, fails to distinguish between term and tenure. The term means the time during
which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several
incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent
actually holds office. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power
of the incumbent. From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the
president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his term. 76 (Emphasis supplied)

Applying the foregoing rationale to the case at bar, it is clear that former President Arroyo cannot use
the presidential immunity from suit to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether,
within the context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of
Rodriguez.

Third issue: Command responsibility in amparo proceedings

To attribute responsibility or accountability to former President Arroyo, Rodriguez contends that the
doctrine of command responsibility may be applied. As we explained in Rubrico v. Arroyo, 77 command
responsibility pertains to the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate
members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or
domestic conflict."78 Although originally used for ascertaining criminal complicity, the command
responsibility doctrine has also found application in civil cases for human rights abuses. 79 In the United
States, for example, command responsibility was used in Ford v. Garcia and Romagoza v. Garcia – civil
actions filed under the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Torture Victim Protection Act. 80 This development
in the use of command responsibility in civil proceedings shows that the application of this doctrine has
been liberally extended even to cases not criminal in nature. Thus, it is our view that command
responsibility may likewise find application in proceedings seeking the privilege of the writ of amparo.
As we held in Rubrico:

It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police
commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made
applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a
principle of international law or customary international law in accordance with the incorporation
clause of the Constitution.
x x x           x x x          x x x
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most, be
only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address,
the disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial
measures that may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo.
As intimated earlier, however, the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on
respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary
proceedings under existing administrative issuances, if there be any. 81 (Emphasis supplied.)

Precisely in the case at bar, the doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether
respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to
enable the courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes this
Court from applying the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertain
responsibility and accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. In this regard,
the Separate Opinion of Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales in Rubrico is worth noting, thus:

That proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo do not determine criminal, civil or
administrative liability should not abate the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility.
Taking Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo and Razon v. Tagitis in proper context, they do not
preclude the application of the doctrine of command responsibility to Amparo cases.
Manalo was actually emphatic on the importance of the right to security of person and its
contemporary signification as a guarantee of protection of one’s rights by the government. It further
stated that protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government
apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, or threats
thereof, and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice.

Tagitis, on the other hand, cannot be more categorical on the application, at least in principle, of the
doctrine of command responsibility:

Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members were the ones who were remiss in
their duties when the government completely failed to exercise the extraordinary diligence that the
Amparo Rule requires. We hold these organizations accountable through their incumbent Chiefs who,
under this Decision, shall carry the personal responsibility of seeing to it that extraordinary diligence, in
the manner the Amparo Rule requires, is applied in addressing the enforced disappearance of Tagitis.

Neither does Republic Act No. 9851 emasculate the applicability of the command responsibility
doctrine to Amparo cases. The short title of the law is the "Philippine Act on Crimes Against
International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity." Obviously, it should,
as it did, only treat of superior responsibility as a ground for criminal responsibility for the crimes
covered.http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/feb2010/gr_183871_2010.html - fnt20cm Such
limited treatment, however, is merely in keeping with the statute’s purpose and not intended to rule
out the application of the doctrine of command responsibility to other appropriate cases.

Indeed, one can imagine the innumerable dangers of insulating high-ranking military and police officers
from the coverage of reliefs available under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. The explicit adoption of
the doctrine of command responsibility in the present case will only bring Manalo and Tagitis to their
logical conclusion.

In fine, I submit that the Court should take this opportunity to state what the law ought to be if it truly
wants to make the Writ of Amparo an effective remedy for victims of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof. While there is a genuine dearth of evidence to hold respondents
Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon accountable under the command
responsibility doctrine, the ponencia’s hesitant application of the doctrine itself is replete with
implications abhorrent to the rationale behind the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. 82 (Emphasis supplied.)

This Separate Opinion was reiterated in the recently decided case of Boac v. Cadapan, 83 likewise
penned by Justice Carpio-Morales, wherein this Court ruled:

Rubrico categorically denies the application of command responsibility in amparo cases to determine

criminal liability. The Court maintains its adherence to this pronouncement as far as amparo cases are
concerned.

Rubrico, however, recognizes a preliminary yet limited application of command responsibility in

amparo cases to instances of determining the responsible or accountable individuals or entities that
are duty-bound to abate any transgression on the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.

If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most, be
only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address,
the disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial
measures that may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo.
As intimated earlier, however, the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on
respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary
proceedings under existing administrative issuances, if there be any.

In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify
those accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an
amparo court would issue. In such application, the amparo court does not impute criminal
responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best position to protect the
rights of the aggrieved party.

Such identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a preliminary
determination of criminal liability which, of course, is still subject to further investigation by the
appropriate government agency. (Emphasis supplied.)

As earlier pointed out, amparo proceedings determine (a) responsibility, or the extent the actors have
been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission,
in an enforced disappearance, and (b) accountability, or the measure of remedies that should be
addressed to those (i) who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the
level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or (ii) who are imputed with
knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or (iii)
those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation
of the enforced disappearance. Thus, although there is no determination of criminal, civil or
administrative liabilities, the doctrine of command responsibility may nevertheless be applied to
ascertain responsibility and accountability within these foregoing definitions.

a. Command responsibility of the President

Having established the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings,
it must now be resolved whether the president, as commander-in-chief of the military, can be held
responsible or accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. We rule in the
affirmative.

To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must
obtain:

a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the
perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate;
b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been
committed; and
c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal
acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.84

The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, 85 necessarily possesses control over
the military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command responsibility
doctrine. 86

On the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that although international tribunals apply a strict
standard of knowledge, i.e., actual knowledge, such may nonetheless be established through
circumstantial evidence.87 In the Philippines, a more liberal view is adopted and superiors may be
charged with constructive knowledge. This view is buttressed by the enactment of Executive Order No.
226, otherwise known as the Institutionalization of the Doctrine of ‘Command Responsibility’ in all
Government Offices, particularly at all Levels of Command in the Philippine National Police and other
Law Enforcement Agencies (E.O. 226).88 Under E.O. 226, a government official may be held liable for
neglect of duty under the doctrine of command responsibility if he has knowledge that a crime or
offense shall be committed, is being committed, or has been committed by his subordinates, or by
others within his area of responsibility and, despite such knowledge, he did not take preventive or
corrective action either before, during, or immediately after its commission. 89 Knowledge of the
commission of irregularities, crimes or offenses is presumed when (a) the acts are widespread within
the government official’s area of jurisdiction; (b) the acts have been repeatedly or regularly committed
within his area of responsibility; or (c) members of his immediate staff or office personnel are
involved.90

Meanwhile, as to the issue of failure to prevent or punish, it is important to note that as the
commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the president has the power to effectively command, control
and discipline the military.91

b. Responsibility or accountability of former President Arroyo

The next question that must be tackled is whether Rodriguez has proven through substantial evidence
that former President Arroyo is responsible or accountable for his abduction. We rule in the negative.

Rodriguez anchors his argument on a general allegation that on the basis of the "Melo Commission"
and the "Alston Report," respondents in G.R. No. 191805 already had knowledge of and information
on, and should have known that a climate of enforced disappearances had been perpetrated on
members of the NPA.92 Without even attaching, or at the very least, quoting these reports, Rodriguez
contends that the Melo Report points to rogue military men as the perpetrators. While the Alston
Report states that there is a policy allowing enforced disappearances and pins the blame on the
President, we do not automatically impute responsibility to former President Arroyo for each and every
count of forcible disappearance.93 Aside from Rodriguez’s general averments, there is no piece of
evidence that could establish her responsibility or accountability for his abduction. Neither was there
even a clear attempt to show that she should have known about the violation of his right to life, liberty
or security, or that she had failed to investigate, punish or prevent it.

Fourth issue: Responsibility or accountability of respondents in G.R. No. 191805

The doctrine of totality of evidence in amparo cases was first laid down in this Court’s ruling in
Razon,94 to wit:

The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality,
and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is
consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most
basic test of reason – i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with
all other pieces of adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this
basic minimum test.95 (Emphasis supplied.)

In the case at bar, we find no reason to depart from the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, the
same being supported by substantial evidence. A careful examination of the records of this case reveals
that the totality of the evidence adduced by Rodriguez indubitably prove the responsibility and
accountability of some respondents in G.R. No. 191805 for violating his right to life, liberty and
security.

a. The totality of evidence proved by substantial evidence the responsibility or accountability of

respondents for the violation of or threat to Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and security.

After a careful examination of the records of these cases, we are convinced that the Court of Appeals
correctly found sufficient evidence proving that the soldiers of the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry
Division of the military abducted Rodriguez on 6 September 2009, and detained and tortured him until
17 September 2009.

Rodriguez’s Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 4 December 2009 was a meticulous and straightforward
account of his horrific ordeal with the military, detailing the manner in which he was captured and
maltreated on account of his suspected membership in the NPA. 96 His narration of his suffering
included an exhaustive description of his physical surroundings, personal circumstances and perceived
observations. He likewise positively identified respondents 1st Lt. Matutina and Lt. Col. Mina to be
present during his abduction, detention and torture,97 and respondents Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan as
the CHR representatives who appeared during his release.98

More particularly, the fact of Rodriguez’s abduction was corroborated by Carlos in his Sinumpaang
Salaysay dated 16 September 2009,99 wherein he recounted in detail the circumstances surrounding
the victim’s capture.

As regards the allegation of torture, the respective Certifications of Dr. Ramil and Dr. Pamugas validate
the physical maltreatment Rodriguez suffered in the hands of the soldiers of the 17th Infantry
Battalion, 5th Infantry Division. According to the Certification dated 12 October 2009 executed by Dr.
Ramil,100 she examined Rodriguez in the Alfonso Ponce Enrile Memorial District Hospital on 16
September 2009 and arrived at the following findings:

FACE

- 10cm healed scar face right side

- 2cm healed scar right eyebrow (lateral area)
- 2cm healed scar right eye brow (median area)
- 4cm x 2cm hematoma anterior chest at the sternal area right side
- 3cm x 2cm hematoma sternal area left side
- 6cm x 1cm hematoma from epigastric area to ant. chest left side
- 6cm x 1cm hematoma from epigastric area to ant. chest right side
- Multiple healed rashes (brownish discoloration) both forearm
- Multiple healed rashes (brownish discoloration)
- both leg arm
- hip area/lumbar area101

Dr. Pamugas performed a separate medical examination of Rodriguez on 19 September 2009, the
results of which confirmed that the injuries suffered by the latter were inflicted through torture. Dr.
Pamugas thus issued a Medical Report dated 23 September 2009, 102 explicitly stating that Rodriguez
had been tortured during his detention by the military, to wit:
X. Interpretation of Findings

The above physical and psychological findings sustained by the subject are related to the torture and
ill-treatment done to him. The multiple circular brown to dark brown spots found on both legs and
arms were due to the insect bites that he sustained when he was forced to join twice in the military
operations. The abrasions could also be due to the conditions related during military operations. The
multiple pin-point blood spots found on his left ear is a result of an unknown object placed inside his
left ear. The areas of tenderness he felt during the physical examination were due to the overwhelming
punching and kicking on his body. The occasional difficulty of sleeping is a symptom experience (sic) by
the subject as a result of the psychological trauma he encountered during his detention.

XI. Conclusions and Recommendations

The physical injuries and psychological trauma suffered by the subject are secondary to the torture and
ill-treatment done to him while in detention for about 11 days. The physical injuries sustained by the
subject, of which the age is compatible with the alleged date of infliction (sic). 103 (Emphasis supplied.)

In assessing the weight of the Certifications, the Court of Appeals correctly relied on the medical
finding that the injuries suffered by Rodriguez matched his account of the maltreatment inflicted on
him by the soldiers of the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army. Further,
the kind of injuries he sustained showed that he could not have sustained them from merely falling,
thus making respondents’ claim highly implausible.

Despite these medical findings that overwhelmingly supported and lent credibility to the allegations of
Rodriguez in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, respondents in G.R. No. 191805 still stubbornly clung to their
argument that he was neither abducted nor detained. Rather, they claimed that he was a double
agent, whose relationship with the military was at all times congenial. This contention cannot be
sustained, as it is far removed from ordinary human experience.

If it were true that Rodriguez maintained amicable relations with the military, then he should have
unhesitatingly assured his family on 17 September 2009 that he was among friends. Instead, he
vigorously pleaded with them to get him out of the military facility. In fact, in the Sinumpaang Salaysay
dated 4 December 2009104 Wilma executed, she made the following averments:

18. Na nang Makita ko ang aking anak ay nakaramdam ako sa kanya ng awa dahil sa mukha
syang pagod at malaki ang kanyang ipinayat.

19. Na niyakap ko sya at sa aming pagkakayakap ay binulungan nya ako na wag ko syang iiwan
sa lugar na iyon;
x x x           x x x          x x x
23. Na sinabihan ako ng mga sundalo na kung pwede daw ay maiwan muna ng dalawang linggo
sa kampo ako at si Noriel para daw matrain pa si Noriel sa loob ng kampo;
24. Na hindi ako pumayag na maiwan ang aking anak;
x x x           x x x          x x x
33. Na sa kasalukuhan, hanggang ngayon ay nag-aalala pa ako sa paa (sic) sa kaligtasan ng
aming buong pamilya, lalo na kay Noriel; xxx105

Also, Rodel made the following supporting averments in his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 3
December 2009:106
 24. Na nang makita ko si Noriel, hindi sya makalakad ng diretso, hinang-hina sya, malaki ang
ipinayat at nanlalalim ang mga mata;

25. Na nang makita ko ang aking kapatid ay nakaramdam ako ng awa dahil nakilala ko syang
masigla at masayahin;

26. Na ilang minuto lang ay binulugan nya ako ng "Kuya, ilabas mo ako dito, papatayin nila ako."

27. Na sinabihan kami ni Lt. Col. Mina na baka pwedeng maiwan pa ng dalwang linggo ang aking
kapatid sa kanila para raw ma-train sya.

28. Na hindi kami pumayag ng aking nanay; xxx107

Moreover, the Court of Appeals likewise aptly pointed out the illogical, if not outrightly contradictory,
contention of respondents in G.R. No. 191805 that while Rodriguez had complained of his exhaustion
from his activities as a member of the CPP-NPA, he nevertheless willingly volunteered to return to his
life in the NPA to become a double-agent for the military. The lower court ruled in this manner:

In the Return of the Writ, respondent AFP members alleged that petitioner confided to his military
handler, Cpl. Navarro, that petitioner could no longer stand the hardships he experienced in the
wilderness, and that he wanted to become an ordinary citizen again because of the empty promises of
the CPP-NPA. However, in the same Return, respondents state that petitioner agreed to become a
double agent for the military and wanted to re-enter the CPP-NPA, so that he could get information
regarding the movement directly from the source. If petitioner was tired of life in the wilderness and
desired to become an ordinary citizen again, it defies logic that he would agree to become an
undercover agent and work alongside soldiers in the mountains – or the wilderness he dreads – to
locate the hideout of his alleged NPA comrades.108 (Emphasis supplied.)

Furthermore, the appellate court also properly ruled that aside from the abduction, detention and
torture of Rodriguez, respondents, specifically 1st Lt. Matutina, had violated and threatened the
former’s right to security when they made a visual recording of his house, as well as the photos of his
relatives, to wit:

In the videos taken by the soldiers – one of whom was respondent Matutina – in the house of
petitioner on September 18, 2009, the soldiers even went as far as taking videos of the photos of
petitioner’s relatives hung on the wall of the house, as well as videos of the innermost part of the
house. This Court notes that 1Lt. Matutina, by taking the said videos, did not merely intend to make
proofs of the safe arrival of petitioner and his family in their home. 1Lt. Matutina also desired to instill
fear in the minds of petitioner and his family by showing them that the sanctity of their home, from
then on, will not be free from the watchful eyes of the military, permanently captured through the
medium of a seemingly innocuous cellhpone video camera. The Court cannot – and will not – condone
such act, as it intrudes into the very core of petitioner’s right to security guaranteed by the
fundamental law.109 (Emphasis supplied.)

Taken in their totality, the pieces of evidence adduced by Rodriguez, as well as the contradictory
defenses presented by respondents in G.R. No. 191805, give credence to his claim that he had been
abducted, detained and tortured by soldiers belonging to the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry
Division of the military.
It must be pointed out, however, that as to respondents Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan, there was no
substantial evidence to show that they violated, or threatened with violation, Rodriguez’s right to life,
liberty and security. Despite the dearth of evidence to show the CHR officers’ responsibility or
accountability, this Court nonetheless emphasizes its criticism as regards their capacity to recognize
torture or any similar form of abuse. The CHR, being constitutionally mandated to protect human rights
and investigate violations thereof,110 should ensure that its officers are well-equipped to respond
effectively to and address human rights violations. The actuations of respondents unmistakably
showed their insufficient competence in facilitating and ensuring the safe release of Rodriguez after his
ordeal.

b. The failure to conduct a fair and effect investigation amounted to a violation of or threat to
Rodriguez’s rights to life, liberty and security.

The Rule on the Writ of Amparo explicitly states that the violation of or threat to the right to life,
liberty and security may be caused by either an act or an omission of a public official. 111 Moreover, in
the context of amparo proceedings, responsibility may refer to the participation of the respondents, by
action or omission, in enforced disappearance.112 Accountability, on the other hand, may attach to
respondents who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry
the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary
diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. 113

In this regard, we emphasize our ruling in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo 114 that the right to
security of a person includes the positive obligation of the government to ensure the observance of the
duty to investigate, viz:

Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the government. In
the context of the writ of Amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty
under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from
threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to
security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full respect
for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief
guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of
person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when
they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the
government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances
(or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez
Case, viz:

(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality
preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as
its own legal duty, not as a step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim
or his family or upon their offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the "right to security" not only
as prohibiting the State from arbitrarily depriving liberty, but imposing a positive duty on the State to
afford protection of the right to liberty. The ECHR interpreted the "right to security of person" under
Article 5(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights in the leading case on disappearance of
persons, Kurt v. Turkey. In this case, the claimant's son had been arrested by state authorities and had
not been seen since. The family's requests for information and investigation regarding his whereabouts
proved futile. The claimant suggested that this was a violation of her son's right to security of person.
The ECHR ruled, viz:

... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the substantive and
procedural rules of national law but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5,
namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness... Having assumed control over that individual it is
incumbent on the authorities to account for his or her whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must be
seen as requiring the authorities to take effective measures to safeguard against the risk of
disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective investigation into an arguable claim that a person
has been taken into custody and has not been seen since.115 (Emphasis supplied)

In the instant case, this Court rules that respondents in G.R. No. 191805 are responsible or accountable
for the violation of Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and security on account of their abject failure to
conduct a fair and effective official investigation of his ordeal in the hands of the military. Respondents
Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Col. De Vera and Lt. Col. Mina only
conducted a perfunctory investigation, exerting no efforts to take Ramirez’s account of the events into
consideration. Rather, these respondents solely relied on the reports and narration of the military. The
ruling of the appellate court must be emphasized:

In this case, respondents Ibrado, Verzosa, Bangit, Tolentino, Santos, De Vera, and Mina are
accountable, for while they were charged with the investigation of the subject incident, the
investigation they conducted and/or relied on is superficial and one-sided. The records disclose that
the military, in investigating the incident complained of, depended on the Comprehensive Report of
Noriel Rodriguez @Pepito prepared by 1Lt. Johnny Calub for the Commanding Officer of the 501st
Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division, Philippine Army. Such report, however, is merely based on the
narration of the military. No efforts were undertaken to solicit petitioner’s version of the subject
incident and no witnesses were questioned regarding the alleged abduction of petitioner.

Respondent PDG Verzosa, as Chief of the PNP, is accountable because Section 24 of Republic Act No.
6975, otherwise known as the "PNP Law," specifies the PNP as the governmental office with the
mandate "to investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to
justice and assist in their prosecution." In this case, PDG Verzosa failed to order the police to conduct
the necessary investigation to unmask the mystery surrounding petitioner’s abduction and
disappearance. Instead, PDG Verzosa disclaims accountability by merely stating that petitioner has no
cause of action against him. Palpable, however, is the lack of any effort on the part of PDG Verzosa to
effectively and aggressively investigate the violations of petitioner’s right to life, liberty and security by
members of the 17th Infantry Battalion, 17th Infantry Division, Philippine Army. 116 (Emphasis supplied.)

Clearly, the absence of a fair and effective official investigation into the claims of Rodriguez violated his
right to security, for which respondents in G.R. No. 191805 must be held responsible or accountable.

Nevertheless, it must be clarified that Rodriguez was unable to establish any responsibility or
accountability on the part of respondents P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Calog and Palacpac.
Respondent P/CSupt. Tolentino had already retired when the abduction and torture of Rodriguez was
perpetrated, while P/SSupt. Santos had already been reassigned and transferred to the National
Capital Regional Police Office six months before the subject incident occurred. Meanwhile, no sufficient
allegations were maintained against respondents Calog and Palacpac.
From all the foregoing, we rule that Rodriguez was successful in proving through substantial evidence
that respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Brig. Gen. De Vera, 1st
Lt. Matutina, and Lt. Col. Mina were responsible and accountable for the violation of Rodriguez’s rights
to life, liberty and security on the basis of (a) his abduction, detention and torture from 6 September to
17 September 2009, and (b) the lack of any fair and effective official investigation as to his allegations.
Thus, the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data must be granted in his favor. As a result,
there is no longer any need to issue a temporary protection order, as the privilege of these writs
already has the effect of enjoining respondents in G.R. No. 191805 from violating his rights to life,
liberty and security.

It is also clear from the above discussion that despite (a) maintaining former President Arroyo in the list
of respondents in G.R. No. 191805, and (b) allowing the application of the command responsibility
doctrine to amparo and habeas data proceedings, Rodriguez failed to prove through substantial
evidence that former President Arroyo was responsible or accountable for the violation of his rights to
life, liberty and property. He likewise failed to prove through substantial evidence the accountability or
responsibility of respondents Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan.

WHEREFORE, we resolve to GRANT the Petition for Partial Review in G.R. No. 191805 and DENY the
Petition for Review in G.R. No. 193160. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION.

The case is dismissed with respect to respondents former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, P/CSupt.
Ameto G. Tolentino, and P/SSupt. Jude W. Santos, Calog, George Palacpac, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin
Pasicolan and Vicent Callagan for lack of merit.

This Court directs the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to
take the appropriate action with respect to any possible liability or liabilities, within their respective
legal competence, that may have been incurred by respondents Gen. Victor Ibrado, PDG. Jesus
Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor Ochoa, Brig. Gen. Remegio De Vera, 1st Lt. Ryan
Matutina, and Lt. Col. Laurence Mina. The Ombudsman and the DOJ are ordered to submit to this
Court the results of their action within a period of six months from receipt of this Decision.

In the event that herein respondents no longer occupy their respective posts, the directives mandated
in this Decision and in the Court of Appeals are enforceable against the incumbent officials holding the
relevant positions. Failure to comply with the foregoing shall constitute contempt of court.

SO ORDERED.
 En Banc
March 7, 2017
G.R. No. 211010

VICTORIA SEGOVIA, RUEL LAGO, CLARIESSE JAMI CHAN, REPRESENTING THE CARLESS PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES; GABRIEL ANASTACIO, REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER GRACE ANASTACIO, DENNIS
ORLANDOSANGALANG, REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER MAY ALILI SANGALANG, MARIA PAULINA
CASTANEDA, REPRESENTED BY HER MOTHERATRICIAANN CASTANEDA, REPRESENTING THE
CHILDREN OF THE PHILIPPINES AND CHILDREN OF THE FUTURE; AND RENATO PINEDA, JR., ARON
KERR MENGUITO, MAY ALILI SANGALANG, AND GLYNDA BATHAN BATERINA, REPRESENTING
CAROWNERS WHO WOULD RATHER NOT HA VE CARS IF GOOD PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION WERE
SAFE, CONVENIENT, ACCESSIBLE AND RELIABLE, Petitioners
vs
THE CLIMATE CHANGE COMMISSION, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN, HIS EXCELLENCY BENIGNO S.
AQUINO III, AND ITS COMMISSIONERS MARY ANN LUCILLE SERING, HEHERSON
ALVAREZANDNADAREV SANO; DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC)
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, HONORABLE JOSEPH ABAYA; DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS
AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH) AND THE ROAD BOARD, REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, HONORABLE
ROGELIO SINGSON; DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (DILG), REPRESENTED BY
ITS SECRETARY, HONORABLE MANUEL ROXAS; DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES (DENR), REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, HONORABLE RAMON PAJE; DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT (DBM), REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, HONORABLE FLORENCIO
ABAD; METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (MMDA), REPRESENTED BY ITS
CHAIRMAN, FRANCIS TOLENTINO; DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (DA), REPRESENTED BY ITS
SECRETARY, HONORABLE PROCESO ALCALA; AND JOHN DOES, REPRESENTING AS YET UNNAMED
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE LOCAL CHIEF EXECUTIVE, JURIDICAL ENTITIES,
AND NATURAL PERSONS WHO FAIL OR REFUSE TO IMPLEMENT THE LAW OR COOPERATE IN THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW, Respondents

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

This is a petition for the issuance of writs of kalikasan and continuing mandamus to compel the
implementation of the following environmental laws and executive issuances - Republic Act No. (RA)
97291 (Climate Change Act), and RA 87492 (Clean Air Act); Executive Order No. 7743 (BO 774); AO 254,
s. 20094 (AO 254); and Administrative Order No. 171, s. 20075 (AO 171).

Accordingly, the Petitioners seek to compel: (a) the public respondents to: (1) implement the Road
Sharing Principle in all roads; (2) divide all roads lengthwise, one-half (½) for all-weather sidewalk and
bicycling, the other half for Filipino-made transport vehicles; (3) submit a time-bound action plan to
implement the Road Sharing Principle throughout the country; (b) the Office of the President, Cabinet
officials and public employees of Cabinet members to reduce their fuel consumption by fifty percent
(50%) and to take public transportation fifty percent (50%) of the time; (c) Public respondent DPWH to
demarcate and delineate the road right-of-way in all roads and sidewalks; and (d) Public respondent
DBM to instantly release funds for Road Users' Tax.6

The Facts

To address the clamor for a more tangible response to climate change, Former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued AO 171 which created the Presidential Task Force on Climate Change (PTFCC)
on February 20, 2007. This body was reorganized through BO 774, which designated the President as
Chairperson, and cabinet secretaries as members of the Task Force. EO 774 expressed what is now
referred to by the petitioners as the "Road Sharing Principle." Its Section 9(a) reads:

Section 9. Task Group on Fossil Fuels. - (a) To reduce the consumption of fossil fuels, the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC) shall lead a Task Group to reform the transportation
sector. The new paradigm in the movement of men and things must follow a simple principle: "Those
who have less in wheels must have more in road." For this purpose, the system shall favor
nonmotorized locomotion and collective transportation system (walking, bicycling, and the man-
powered mini-train).

In 2009, AO 254 was issued, mandating the DOTC (as lead agency for the Task Group on Fossil Fuels
or TGFF) to formulate a national Environmentally Sustainable Transport Strategy (EST) for the
Philippines. The Road Sharing Principle is similarly mentioned, thus:

SECTION 4. Functions of the TGFF- In addition to the functions provided in EO 774, the TGFF shall
initiate and pursue the formulation of the National EST Strategy for the Philippines.

Specifically, the TGFF shall perform the following functions:

(a) Reform the transport sector to reduce the consumption of fossil fuels. The new paradigm in the
movement of men and things must follow a simple principle: "Those who have less in wheels must
have more in road." For this purpose, the system shall favor non-motorized locomotion and collective
transportation system (walking, bicycling, and the manpowered mini-train).

xxxx
Later that same year, Congress passed the Climate Change Act. It created the Climate Change
Commission which absorbed the functions of the PTFCC and became the lead policy-making body of
the government which shall be tasked to coordinate, monitor and evaluate the programs and action
plans of the government relating to climate change.7

Herein petitioners wrote respondents regarding their pleas for implementation of the Road Sharing
Principle, demanding the reform of the road and transportation system in the whole country within
thirty (30) days from receipt of the said letter - foremost, through the bifurcation of roads and the
reduction of official and government fuel consumption by fifty percent (50%). 8 Claiming to have not
received a response, they filed this petition.

The Petition

Petitioners are Carless People of the Philippines, parents, representing their children, who in turn
represent "Children of the Future, and Car-owners who would rather not have cars if good public
transportation were safe, convenient, accessible, available, and reliable". They claim that they are
entitled to the issuance of the extraordinary writs due to the alleged failure and refusal of respondents
to perform an act mandated by environmental laws, and violation of environmental laws resulting in
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health and property of all Filipinos. 9

These identified violations10 include: (a) The government's violation of "atmospheric trust" as provided

under Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution, and thoughtless extravagance in the midst of acute
public want under Article 25 of the Civil Code for failure to reduce personal and official consumption of
fossil fuels by at least fifty percent (50%); (b) DOTC and DPWH's failure to implement the Road Sharing
Principle under EO 774; (c) DA's failure to devote public open spaces along sidewalks, roads and
parking lots to sustainable urban farming as mandated by Section 12(b) 11 f EO 774; (d) DILG's failure to
coordinate with local government units (LGUs) to guide them on the Road Sharing Principle under
Section 9(g)12 of EO 774; (e) DENR's failure to reduce air pollutant emissions; and lastly, (f) DBM's
failure to make available Road Users' Tax for purposes stated in Section 9(e) 13 of EO 774.

In gist, petitioners contend that respondents' failure to implement the foregoing laws and executive
issuances resulted in the continued degradation of air quality, particularly in Metro Manila, in violation
of the petitioners' constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology, 14 and may even be
tantamount to deprivation of life, and of life sources or "land, water, and air" by the government
without due process of law.15 They also decry the "unequal" protection of laws in the prevailing
scheme, claiming that ninety-eight percent (98%) of Filipinos are discriminated against by the law when
the car-owning two percent (2%) is given almost all of the road space and while large budgets are
allocated for construction and maintenance of roads, hardly any budget is given for sidewalks, bike
lanes and non-motorized transportation systems.16

Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their Comment seeking the outright
dismissal of the petition for lack of standing and failure to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts.17 Moreover, respondents argue that petitioners are not entitled to the reliefs prayed for.

Specifically, respondents assert that petitioners are not entitled to a writ of kalikasan because they
failed to show that the public respondents are guilty of an unlawful act or omission; state the
environmental law/s violated; show environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life,
health or property of inhabitants of two or more cities; and prove that non- implementation of Road
Sharing Principle will cause environmental damage. Respondents likewise assert that petitioners are
similarly not entitled to a

Continuing Mandamus because: (a) there is no showing of a direct or personal injury or a clear legal

right to the thing demanded; (b) the writ will not compel a discretionary act or anything not in a public
officer's duty to do (i.e. the manner by which the Road Sharing Principle will be applied; and to compel
DA to exercise jurisdiction over roadside lands); and (c) DBM cannot be compelled to make an instant
release of funds as the same requires an appropriation made by law (Article VI, Section 29[1] of the
Constitution) and the use of the Road Users' Tax (more appropriately, the Motor Vehicle Users' Charge)
requires prior approval of the Road Board.18

In any event, respondents denied the specific violations alleged in the petition, stating that they have
taken and continue to take measures to improve the traffic situation in Philippine roads and to improve
the environment condition - through projects and programs such as: priority tagging of expenditures
for climate change adaptation and mitigation, the Integrated Transport System which is aimed to
decongest major thoroughfares, Truck Ban, Anti-Smoke Belching Campaign, Anti-Colorum, Mobile Bike
Service Programs, and Urban Re-Greening Programs. These projects are individually and jointly
implemented by the public respondents to improve the traffic condition and mitigate the effects of
motorized vehicles on the environment.19 Contrary to petitioners' claims, public respondents assert
that they consider the impact of the transport sector on the environment, as shown in the Philippine
National Implementation Plan on Environment Improvement in the Transport Sector which targets air
pollution improvement actions, greenhouse gases emission mitigation, and updating of noise pollution
standards for the transport sector.

In response, petitioner filed their Reply, substantially reiterating the arguments they raised in the
Petition.

ISSUES

From the foregoing submissions, the main issues for resolution are:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have standing to file the petition;

2. Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for failing to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts; and

3. Whether or not a writ of Kalikasan and/or Continuing Mandamus should issue.

RULING

The petition must be dismissed.

Procedural Issues

Citing Section 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases 20 (RPEC), respondents argue
that the petitioners failed to show that they have the requisite standing to file the petition, being
representatives of a rather amorphous sector of society and without a concrete interest or
injury.21 Petitioners counter that they filed the suit as citizens, taxpayers, and representatives; that the
rules on standing had been relaxed following the decision in Oposa v. Factoran;22 and that, in any
event, legal standing is a procedural technicality which the Court may set aside in its discretion. 23

The Court agrees with the petitioners' position. The RPEC did liberalize the requirements on standing,
allowing the filing of citizen's suit for the enforcement of rights and obligations under environmental
laws.24 This has been confirmed by this Court's rulings in Arigo v. Swift,25 and International Service for
the Acquisition of Agri-BioTech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines). 26 However,
it bears noting that there is a difference between a petition for the issuance of a writ
of kalikasan, wherein it is sufficient that the person filing represents the inhabitants prejudiced by the
environmental damage subject of the writ;27 and a petition for the issuance of a writ of
continuing mandamus, which is only available to one who is personally aggrieved by the unlawful act
or omission. 28

Respondents also seek the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the petitioners failed to adhere
to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, reasoning that since a petition for the issuance of a writ
of kalikasan must be filed with the Supreme Court or with any of the stations of the Court of
Appeals,29 then the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is applicable. 30 Petitioners, on the other hand, cite
the same provision and argue that direct recourse to this Court is available, and that the provision
shows that the remedy to environmental damage should not be limited to the territorial jurisdiction of
the lower courts.31

The respondents' argument does not persuade. Under the RPEC, the writ of kalikasan is an
extraordinary remedy covering environmental damage of such magnitude that will prejudice the life,
health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. It is designed for a narrow but
special purpose: to accord a stronger protection for environmental rights, aiming, among others, to
provide a speedy and effective resolution of a case involving the violation of one's constitutional right
to a healthful and balanced ecology that transcends political and territorial boundaries, and to address
the potentially exponential nature of large-scale ecological threats. 32 At the very least, the magnitude
of the ecological problems contemplated under the RPEC satisfies at least one of the exceptions to the
rule on hierarchy of courts, as when direct resort is allowed where it is dictated by public
welfare.1âwphi1 Given that the RPEC allows direct resort to this Court,33 it is ultimately within the
Court's discretion whether or not to accept petitions brought directly before it.

Requisites for issuance of Writs of

Kalikasan and Continuing
Mandamus

We find that the petitioners failed to establish the requisites for the issuance of the writs prayed for.

For a writ of kalikasan to issue, the following requisites must concur:

1. there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology;

2. the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or private individual or entity; and

3. the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such
magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces.34

It is well-settled that a party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan has to show
that a law, rule or regulation was violated or would be violated.35

In this case, apart from repeated invocation of the constitutional right to health and to a balanced and
healthful ecology and bare allegations that their right was violated, the petitioners failed to show that
public respondents are guilty of any unlawful act or omission that constitutes a violation of the
petitioners' right to a balanced and healthful ecology.

While there can be no disagreement with the general propositions put forth by the petitioners on the
correlation of air quality and public health, petitioners have not been able to show that respondents
are guilty of violation or neglect of environmental laws that causes or contributes to bad air quality.
Notably, apart from bare allegations, petitioners were not able to show that respondents failed to
execute any of the laws petitioners cited. In fact, apart from adducing expert testimony on the adverse
effects of air pollution on public health, the petitioners did not go beyond mere allegation in
establishing the unlawful acts or omissions on the part of the public respondents that have a causal link
or reasonable connection to the actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced
and healthful ecology of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules, as required of petitions of this
nature.36

Moreover, the National Air Quality Status Report for 2005-2007 (NAQSR) submitted by the petitioners
belies their claim that the DENR failed to reduce air pollutant emissions - in fact, the NAQSR shows that
the National Ambient Total Suspended Particulates (TSP) value used to determine air quality has
steadily declined from 2004 to 2007,37 and while the values still exceed the air quality guideline value,
it has remained on this same downward trend until as recently as 2011. 38

On the other hand, public respondents sufficiently showed that they did not unlawfully refuse to
implement or neglect the laws, executive and administrative orders as claimed by the petitioners.
Projects and programs that seek to improve air quality were undertaken by the respondents, jointly
and in coordination with stakeholders, such as: priority tagging of expenditures for climate change
adaptation and mitigation, the Integrated Transport System which is aimed to decongest major
thoroughfares, Truck Ban, Anti-Smoke Belching Campaign, Anti-Colorum, Mobile Bike Service
Programs, and Urban Re-Greening Programs.

In fact, the same NAQSR submitted by the petitioners show that the DENR was, and is, taking concrete
steps to improve national air quality, such as information campaigns, free emission testing to
complement the anti-smoke-belching program and other programs to reduce emissions from industrial
smokestacks and from open burning of waste.39 The efforts of local governments and administrative
regions in conjunction with other · executive agencies and stakeholders are also outlined. 40

Similarly, the writ of continuing mandamus cannot issue.

Rule 8, Section 1 of the RPEC lays down the requirements for a petition for continuing mandamus as
follows:

RULES
WRIT OF CONTINUING MANDAMUS

SECTION 1. Petition for continuing mandamus.-When any agency or instrumentality of the government

or officer thereof unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an
environmental law rule or regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or
enjoyment of such right and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty, attaching thereto supporting evidence, specifying that the petition concerns an
environmental law, rule or regulation, and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent to do an act or series of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay damages
sustained by the petitioner by reason of the malicious neglect to perform the duties of the respondent,
under the law, rules or regulations. The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum
shopping.

First, the petitioners failed to prove direct or personal injury arising from acts attributable to the
respondents to be entitled to the writ.1âwphi1 While the requirements of standing had been
liberalized in environmental cases, the general rule of real party-in-interest applies to a petition for
continuing mandamus.41
Second, the Road Sharing Principle is precisely as it is denominated - a principle. It cannot be
considered an absolute imposition to encroach upon the province of public respondents to determine
the manner by which this principle is applied or considered in their policy decisions. Mandamus lies to
compel the performance of duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not those that are
discretionary,42 and the official can only be directed by mandamus to act but not to act one way or the
other. The duty being enjoined in mandamus must be one according to the terms provided in the law
itself. Thus, the recognized rule is that, in the performance of an official duty or act involving discretion,
the corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act, but not to act one way or the
other.43

This Court cannot but note that this is precisely the thrust of the petition - to compel the respondents
to act one way to implement the Road Sharing Principle - to bifurcate all roads in the country to devote
half to sidewalk and bicycling, and the other to Filipino-made transport - when there is nothing in EO
774, AO 254 and allied issuances that require that specific course of action in order to implement the
same. Their good intentions notwithstanding, the petitioners cannot supplant the executive
department's discretion with their own through this petition for the issuance of writs of kalikasan and
continuing mandamus.

In this case, there is no showing of unlawful neglect on the part of the respondents to perform any act
that the law specifically enjoins as a duty - there being nothing in the executive issuances relied upon
by the petitioners that specifically enjoins the bifurcation of roads to implement the Road Sharing
Principle. To the opposite, the respondents were able to show that they were and are actively
implementing projects and programs that seek to improve air quality.1âwphi1

At its core, what the petitioners are seeking to compel is not the performance of a ministerial act, but a
discretionary act - the manner of implementation of the Road Sharing Principle. Clearly, petitioners'
preferred specific course of action (i.e. the bifurcation of roads to devote for all-weather sidewalk and
bicycling and Filipino-made transport vehicles) to implement the Road Sharing Principle finds no
textual basis in law or executive issuances for it to be considered an act enjoined by law as a duty,
leading to the necessary conclusion that the continuing mandamus prayed for seeks not the
implementation of an environmental law, rule or regulation, but to control the exercise of discretion of
the executive as to how the principle enunciated in an executive issuance relating to the environment
is best implemented. Clearly, the determination of the means to be taken by the executive in
implementing or actualizing any stated legislative or executive policy relating to the environment
requires the use of discretion. Absent a showing that the executive is guilty of "gross abuse of
discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of authority," 44 the general rule applies that discretion
cannot be checked via this petition for continuing mandamus. Hence, the
continuing mandamus cannot issue.1âwphi1

Road Users' Tax

Finally, petitioners seek to compel DBM to release the Road Users' Tax to fund the reform of the road
and transportation system and the implementation of the Road Sharing Principle.

It bears clarifying that the Road Users' Tax mentioned in Section 9(e) of EO 774, apparently reiterated
in Section 5 of AO 254 is the Special Vehicle Pollution Control Fund component of the Motor Vehicle
Users' . Charge ("MVUC') imposed on owners of motor vehicles in RA 8794, otherwise known as the
Road Users' Tax Law. By the express provisions of the aforementioned law, the amounts in the special
trust accounts of the MVUC are earmarked solely and used exclusively (1) for road maintenance and
the improvement of the road drainage, (2) for the installation of adequate and efficient traffic lights
and road safety devices, and (3) for the air pollution control, and their utilization are subject to the
management of the Road Board.45 Verily, the petitioners' demand for the immediate and unilateral
release of the Road Users' Tax by the DBM to support the petitioners' operationalization of this Road
Sharing Principle has no basis in law. The executive issuances relied upon by the petitioner do not rise
to the level of law that can supplant the provisions of RA 8794 that require the approval of the Road
Board for the use of the monies in the trust fund. In other words, the provisions on the release of funds
by the DBM as provided in EO 774 and AO 254 are necessarily subject to the conditions set forth in RA
8794. Notably, RA 9729, as amended by RA 10174, provides for the establishment for the People's
Survival Fund46 that may be tapped for adaptation activities, which similarly require approval from the
PSF Board.47

That notwithstanding, the claim made by the petitioners that hardly any budget is allotted to mitigating
environmental pollution is belied by the priority given to programs aimed at addressing and mitigating
climate change that the DBM and the CCC had been tagging and tracking as priority expenditures since
2013.48 With the coordination of the DILG, this priority tagging and tracking is cascaded down to the
local budget management of local government units.49

Other causes of action

As previously discussed, the petitioners' failure to show any violation on the part of the respondents
renders it unnecessary to rule on other allegations of violation that the petitioners rely upon as causes
of action against the public respondents.

In fine, the allegations and supporting evidence in the petition fall short in showing an actual or
threatened violation of the petitioners' constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology arising
from an unlawful act or omission by, or any unlawful neglect on the part of, the respondents that
would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed for.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.