G.R. No.

L-26341 November 27, 1968

ILOILO DOCK & ENGINEERING CO., petitioner,

vs.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and IRENEA M. PABLO, for herself and in behalf of her minor children EDWIN, EDGAR
and EDNA, all surnamed PABLO, respondents.

Luisito C. Hofilena for petitioner.

Villavieja and Villanueva for respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission.
Gualberto C. Opong for respondent Irenea M. Pablo and her minor children.

CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal by the Iloilo Dock and Engineering Company (hereinafter referred to as the IDECO) from the decision dated February 28,
1966 of the Workmen's Compensation Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission) affirming the decision of the Regional Office
VII in Iloilo City, and ordering the IDECO to pay to the widow and children of Teodoro G. Pablo (Irenea M. Pablo and the minors Edwin,
Edgar and Edna, all surnamed Pablo) the sum of P4,000, to pay to the widow P89 as reimbursement for burial expenses and P300 as
attorney's fees, and to pay to the Commission the amount of P46 as fees pursuant to section 55 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as
amended.

At about 5:02 o'clock in the afternoon of January 29, 1960, Pablo, who was employed as a mechanic of the IDECO, while walking on his way
home, was shot to death in front of, and about 20 meters away from, the main IDECO gate, on a private road commonly called the IDECO
road. The slayer, Martin Cordero, was not heard to say anything before or after the killing. The motive for the crime was and still is unknown
as Cordero was himself killed before he could be tried for Pablo's death. At the time of the killing, Pablo's companion was Rodolfo Galopez,
another employee, who, like Pablo, had finished overtime work at 5:00 p.m. and was going home. From the main IDECO gate to the spot
where Pablo was killed, there were four "carinderias" on the left side of the road and two "carinderias" and a residential house on the right
side. The entire length of the road is nowhere stated in the record.

According to the IDECO, the Commission erred (1) in holding that Pablo's death occurred in the course of employment and in presuming
that it arose out of the employment; (2) in applying the "proximity rule;" and (3) in holding that Pablo's death was an accident within the
purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

The principal issue is whether Pablo's death comes within the meaning and intendment of that "deceptively simple and litigiously
prolific",1 phrase The two components of the coverage formula "arising out of" and "in the course of employment."2 The two components
of the coverage formula "arising out of" and "in the course of employment" are said to be separate tests which must be independently
satisfied;3 however, it should not be forgotten that the basic concept of compensation coverage is unitary, not dual, and is best expressed in
the word, "work-connection," because an uncompromising insistence on an independent application of each of the two portions of the test
can, in certain cases, exclude clearly work-connected injuries.4 The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and are
descriptive of its character, while the words "in the course of" refer to the time, place and circumstances under which the accident takes
place.5

As a matter of general proposition, an injury or accident is said to arise "in the course of employment" when it takes place within the period
of the employment, at a place where the employee reasonably may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something
incidental thereto.6

The general rule in workmen's compensation law known as the "going & coming rule," simply stated, is that "in the absence of special
circumstances, an employee injured in, going to, or coming from his place of work is excluded from the benefits of workmen's compensation
acts."7 This rule, however, admits of four well-recognized exceptions, to wit: (1) where the employee is proceeding to or from his work on
the premises of his employer; (2) where the employee is about to enter or about to leave the premises of his employer by way of the
exclusive or customary means of ingress and egress; (3) where the employee is charged, while on his way to or from his place of
employment or at his home, or during his employment, with some duty or special errand connected with his employment; and (4) where
the employer, as an incident of the employment, provides the means of transportation to and from the place of employment. 8

We address ourselves particularly to an examination and consideration of the second exception, i.e., injuries sustained off the premises of
the employer, but while using a customary means of ingress and egress.

This exception, known as the "proximity rule," was applied in Philippine Fiber Processing Co., Inc. vs. Ampil.9 There, the employee, at about
5:15 a.m., while proceeding to his place of work and running to avoid the rain, slipped and fell into a ditch fronting the main gate of the
employer's factory, as a result of which he died the next day. The sole question was whether or not the accident which caused the
employee's death arose out of and in the course of his employment. This Court ruled in favor of the claimant thus:
The very case of Afable vs. Singer Sewing Machine Co. invoked by the petitioner intimated that "we do not of course mean to imply that an
employee can never recover for injuries suffered while on his way to or from work. That depends on the nature of his employment."
Considering the facts found by the Commission, namely, that the deceased Angel Ariar was not under any shift routine; that his assignment
covered the entire working hours of the factory; that the first working hour starts at 6:00 o'clock in the morning; that it takes at least thirty
minutes before the machine operates at full speed or load; that the spot where he fell (ditch fronting petitioner's factory or sidewalk of its
premises), is immediately proximate to his place of work, the accident in question must be deemed to have occurred within the zone of his
employment and therefore arose out of and in the course thereof. In Salilig vs. Insular Lumber Co., G.R. No. 28951, September 10, 1928,
referred to in the Comments on the Workmen's Compensation Commission Act by Morabe and Inton, 1955 edition, compensation was
allowed for injury received by a laborer from an accident in going to his place of work, along a path or way owned by his employer and
commonly used by the latter's laborers.

In contrast is Pampanga Sugar Development Co., Inc. vs. Quiroz,10 which concerned injuries sustained by a centrifugal operator. He had
reported for work at 9:30 p.m. (March 7, 1958) and was dismissed at 5:30 the following morning. Soon "after he stepped out of the company
gate, and while standing about 2- meters from it between the shoulder of the highway and a railroad that came from inside the compound
and intersected the highway, waiting for a ride home, he was bumped by a jeepney, as a result of which he sustained" injuries. In holding
that these injuries were "not produced by an accident "arising out of and in the course of employment," " this Court reasoned thus:

The compensability of an injury suffered by an employee proceeding to or coming from his work depends upon whether or not it is
"work-connected." As Chief Justice Kenison of New Hampshire has put it, "the fact that the employee is travelling to or from work on a
public highway does not necessarily exclude coverage (Brousseau vs. Blackstone Mills, 130 A 2d 543, 545). Conversely, it is not enough to
say that the employee would not have been on the public highway had it not been for his job, since the same can usually be said of the
general public (Payne & Dolan vs. Industrial Commission, 46 NE 2d 925). The law, in effect, insures the employee against losses arising from
the perils of his work. In other words, the Workmen's Compensation Act covers occupational injuries, which, as such, must have a causative
connection with something, not merely in common with the public, but peculiar to the employment. In order to warrant recovery for
off-the-premises injuries, it must be shown that there has been a very special danger, some particular risk which the employer could have
caused or allowed to exist. Hence,

It is significant that practically all successful off-the-premises cases have involved normal route of access to the plant, or an icy sidewalk
adjacent to the premises and therefore identified with the premises in the sense that the employer should have removed the ice. (Emphasis
ours.)

It is true that in Philippine Fiber Processing Co. v. Ampil, G.R. No. L-8130 (June 30, 1956), we held the employer liable for an injury
sustained by an employee who, as he was running to his place of work to avoid the rain, slipped and fell into a ditch in front of the
factory's main gate and near the same. The ditch was, however, in itself an obvious hazard which, owing to its proximity to the gate, the
employer should have taken measures to remove. Thus, thru his inaction, he had contributed, in a special way, to the occurrence of the
accident.

In the case at bar, no such special circumstance appears to exist. There is no particular causative connection between the injury sustained
by the employee and either his work or his employer. Although, as stated in the decision appealed from, the record does not show that the
company "had taken measures to make the waiting place safe for the employees," neither does the record show either that the accident
occurred at the usual waiting place of the employees, or that said place was particularly unsafe.

Our Workmen's Compensation Act being essentially American in origin and text, it is not amiss to pay deference to pertinent American
jurisprudence. In the precise area of law here involved, we can draw guidance from an affluence of Federal and State precedents.

From Samuel B. Horovitz' Injury and Death under Workmen's Compensation Laws (1944), pp. 159 to 165, we glean the following
observations:

Suppose, however, that the injury occurs on the way to work or on the way home from work. Injuries going to or from work have caused
many judicial upheavals.

The question here is limited to whether the injuries are "in the course of" and not "out of" the employment. How the injury occurred is not
in point. Street risks, whether the employee was walking or driving, and all other similar questions deal with the risk of injury or "out of"
the employment. "In the course of" deals mainly with the element of time and space, or "time, place and circumstances."

Thus, if the injury occurred fifteen minutes before working hours and within one hundred feet of the employer's premises, on sidewalks or
public roads, the question of "in the course of" the employment is flatly raised.

Some of our states refuse to extend this definition of "in the course of" to include these injuries. Most of the states will protect the employee
from the moment his foot or person reaches the employer's premises, whether he arrives early or late. These states find something sacred
about the employment premises and define "premises" very broadly, not only to include premises owned by the employer, but also premises
leased, hired, supplied or used by him, even private alleyways merely used by the employer. Adjacent private premises are protected by many
states, and a few protect the employee even on adjacent public sidewalks and streets. Where a city or any employer owns or controls an island,
all its streets are protected premises.

There is no reason in principle why states should not protect employees for a reasonable period of time prior to or after working hours and
for a reasonable distance before reaching or after leaving the employer's premises. The Supreme Court of the United States has declared that
it will not overturn any state decision that so enlarges the scope of its act. Hence, a deaf worker, trespassing on railroad tracks adjacent to
his employer's brick-making premises (but shown by his superintendent the specific short crossing over the track), and killed by a train,
was held to be in the course of his employment when hit by an oncoming train fifteen minutes before his day would have begun. So long as
causal relation to the employment is discernible, no federal question arises.

The narrow rule that a worker is not in the course of his employment until he crosses the employment threshold is itself subject to
many exceptions. Off-premises injuries to or from work, in both liberal and narrow states, are compensable (1) if the employee is on the way
to or from work in a vehicle owned or supplied by the employer, whether in a public (e.g., the employer's street car) or private conveyance;
(2) if the employee is subject to call at all hours or at the moment of injury; (3) if the employee is travelling for the employer, i.e., travelling
workers; (4) if the employer pays for the employee's time from the moment he leaves his home to his return home; (5) if the employee is on
his way to do further work at home, even though on a fixed salary; (6) where the employee is required to bring his automobile to his place
of business for use there. Other exceptions undoubtedly are equally justified, dependent on their own peculiar circumstances.

Schneider (supra, at p. 117) makes this significant statement:

The proximity rule exception to the general going and coming rule is that an employee is generally considered to be in the course of his
employment while coming to or going from his work, when, though off the actual premises of his employer, he is still in close proximity thereto,
is proceeding diligently at an appropriate time, by reasonable means, over the natural, practical, customary, convenient and recognized way of
ingress, or egress either on land under the control of the employer, or on adjacent property with the express or implied consent of the employer.

On pp. 98 to 99 of 85 ALR, we find the following disquisition:

The compensation acts have been very generally held not to authorize an award in case of an injury or death from a peril which is common
to all mankind, or to which the public at large is exposed. 28 R.C. L. 804. And they do not as a general rule cover injuries received while going
to or from work on public streets, where the employee has not reached, or has left the employer's premises. The question whether an injury
arises out of and in the course of the employment, however, is one dependent upon the facts of each case, and in some cases, where an
injury occured while the employee was going to or from work, but was in the street in front of the employer's premises, it has been held
compensable.

Thus, in the reported case (Barnett v. Brtiling Cafeteria Co., ante, 85) the injury was held to have arisen out of and in the course of the
employment, where the employee slipped on ice on the sidewalk immediately in front of the employer's place of business, while on her way
to report for duty, and just before entering by the only entrance to her place of employment. The court here recognized the general rule that,
if an employee is injured while going to or from his work to his house, or to or from some point not visited for the discharge of a duty arising
out of the employment, or while in the use of a public highway, he does not come within the protection of the Workmen's Compensation Act,
but stated that there is an exception to this rule and that the employment is not limited by the actual time when the workman reaches the
scene of his labor and begins it, or when he ceases, but includes a reasonable time and opportunity before and after, while he is at or near his
place of employment. The court reasoned that in the case at bar, although the employee had not entered the employer's place of business, and
the sidewalk was a public highway so much therefore as was in front of the employer's place of business was a necessary adjunct, used in
connection with the business, and that the sidewalk was to a limited degree and purpose a part of the employer's premises.

In Industrial Commission v. Barber (1927) 117 Ohio St 373, 159 NE 363, the injury was held to have arisen in the course of the employment
where an employee, about five minutes before the hour when he was to go on duty, was struck by an automobile owned and driven by
another employee, within a short distance from the employer's plant, which was located at the dead end of a street maintained by the
employer from its plant to the intersection with another street, and, although the street was a public one, it led nowhere except to the
employer's plant, and all of its employees were obliged to use it in going to and from their work. The court stated that where the conditions
under the control of an industrial plant are such that the employee has no option but to pursue a given course with reference to such
conditions and environments, the pursuance of such course is an implied obligation of the employer in his contract with such employee, and
that when he, for the purpose of entering his employment, has entered into the sphere or zone controlled by his employer and is pursuing a
course with reference to which he has no option, he is then not only within the conditions and environments of the plant of his employer,
but is then in the course of his employment; and that, when he receives an injury attributable to such conditions and environments, there is
a direct causal connection between his employment and his injury, and the injury falls within the class of industrial injuries for which
compensation has been provided by the Workmen's Compensation Law.

99 C.J.S., at pp. 807-814, has this to say:

It is laid down as a general rule, known as the "going and coming" rule, that, in the absence of special circumstances, and except in certain
unusual circumstances, and where nothing else appears, harm or injury sustained by an employee while going to or from his work is not
compensable. Such injury, or accident, is regarded by the weight of authority of many courts as not arising out of his employment, and as
not being, or not occurring, in the course thereof.

However, this rule is not inflexible, is not of inevitable application, and is subject to qualifications, and to exceptions which depend on the
nature, circumstances, and conditions of the particular employment, the circumstances of the particular case, and the cause of the injury.

Jaynes vs. Potlach Forests11 expresses with enlightening clarity the rationale for extending the scope of "course of employment" to certain
"off-premises" injuries:

We are urged here to again recognize and apply the distinction between off-premises injuries which occur on private property and those
which occur on public streets and highways. The extension of the course of employment to off-premises injuries is not based upon the
principle which would justify a distinction upon the narrow ground of private and public property; it is not sound to say that while an
employee is on public highway he is always there as a member of the public and in nowise in the exercise of any right conferred by his
contract to employment; nor is it a complete answer to say that while he is on his employer's premises his presence there is by contract
right, otherwise he would be a trespasser. The question of whether or not one is a covered employee should not be resolved by the
application of the law relating to rights to enter upon lands, or by law of trespass, licensee, invitee or otherwise.

A substantial and fair ground to justify the extension of the course of employment beyond the premises of the employer is to extend its
scope to the necessary risks and hazards associated with the employment. These risks may or may not be on the premises of the employer
and for this reason there is no justification to distinguish between extended risks on public highways and private pathways. In fact it is at
most a distinction without a difference. Under the better reasoned cases the technical status as public or private is obviously of no moment
or in any event in and of itself is not conclusive.

Likewise enlightening is the following explanation of the premises rule exceptions:

We have, then a workable explanation of the exception to the premises rule: it is not nearness, or reasonable distance, or even the identifying or
surrounding areas with the premises; it is simply that, when a court has satisfied itself that there is a distinct "arising out of" or causal
connection between the conditions under which claimant must approach and leave the premises and the occurrence of the injury, it may hold
that the course of employment extends as far as those conditions extend. (Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, 1965 ed., vol. 1, pp. 210-211)

We now direct our attention to the cause of the employee's death: assault.

An "assault," although resulting from a deliberate act of the slayer, is considered an "accident" within the meaning of sec. 2 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, since the word "accident" is intended to indicate that "the act causing the injury shall be casual or
unforeseen, an act for which the injured party is not legally responsible."12

In the cases where the assault was proven to have been work-connected, compensation was awarded. In Nava, supra, the helmsman of a
boat was engaged in hauling the ship's cable and in coiling the cable partly occupied by a folding bed of one of the passengers. This
passenger, upon being asked, declared his ownership of the bed. Nava expressed his intention of pushing it out of the way and proceeded to
do so. Angered by this, the passenger exchanged hot words with Nava, and then, with a piece of wood, jabbed Nava at the pit of the stomach.
At this point, the passenger's brother ran up to Nava and stabbed him to death. The death was adjudged compensable.

In Bohol Land Transportation Co. vs. Vda. de Mandaguit,13 the truck which Mandaguit was driving collided with a cyclist going in the opposite
direction. The latter turned around and immediately pursued the bus. He overtook it a few minutes later when it stopped to take on
passengers. The driver then disembarked from the bus to wash his hands at a drugstore nearby. The cyclist followed him there and knifed
him to death. We affirmed the grant of compensation upon the finding that the death arose out of and in the course of employment.

In Galicia vs. Dy Pac,14 the employee, Pablo Carla, was asked to work in lieu of another employee who had been suspended from work upon
request of his labor union; while Carla was working, the suspended employee asked him to intercede for him, but Carla refused; an
altercation resulted; shortly thereafter the suspended employee stabbed Carla to death. The death was held compensable because "the
injury sustained by the deceased was caused by an accident arising out of his employment since the evidence is clear that the fight which
resulted in the killing of the deceased had its origin or cause in the fact that he was placed in the job previously occupied by the assailant."

In the three cases above-cited, there was evidence as to the motive of the assailant.

In A. P. Santos, Inc. vs. Dabacol,15 the death of an employee-driver who, while driving a cab, was killed by an unidentified passenger, was held
compensable by the Commission. However, the question of whether the assault arose out of the employment, was not raised on appeal to
this Court.
In Batangas Transportation Company vs. Vda. de Rivera,16 that question was raised. While the employee-driver was driving a bus, a
passenger boarded it and sat directly behind the driver. After about thirty minutes, during which the passenger and the driver never so
much as exchanged a word, the passenger shot the driver to death and then fled. There was no competent proof as to the cause of the
assault, although there were intimations that the incident arose from a personal grudge. The majority decision 17 ruled the death
compensable. The bases: (1) Once it is proved that the employee died in the course of the employment, the legal presumption, in the absence
of substantial evidence to the contrary, is that the claim "comes within the provisions of the compensation law" (sec. 43), in other words,
that the incident arose out of the workman's employment. (2) Doubts as to rights to compensation are resolved in favor of the employee and
his dependents. (3) The Commissioner's declaration on the work-connection might be binding on the Court. (4) There are employments
which increase the risk of assault on the person of the employee and it is in that sense that an injury or harm sustained by the assaulted
worker arises out of the employment, because the increased risk to assault supplies the link or connection between the injury and the
employment. Among the jobs enumerated as increasing the risk of assault are (a) jobs having to do with keeping the peace or guarding
property; (b) jobs having to do with keeping or carrying of money which subject to the employee to the risk of assault because of the
increased temptation to robbery; (c) jobs which expose the employee to direct contact with lawless and irresponsible members of the
community, like that of a bartender; and (d) work as bus driver, taxi driver or street car conductor.

It has been said that an employment may either increase risk of assault because of its nature or be the subject-matter of a dispute leading to
the assault. The first kind of employment, the so-called "increased risk" jobs comprehend (1) jobs involving dangerous duties, such as that
of guarding the employer's property, that of carrying or keeping money, that where the employee is exposed to lawless or irresponsible
members of the public, or that which subjects him to increased or indiscriminate contact with the public, such as the job of a street car
conductor or taxi-driver;18 (2) jobs where the employee is placed in a dangerous environment; 19 and (3) jobs of employees whose work
takes them on the highway. On the other hand, the employment itself may be the subject-matter of a dispute leading to the assault as where
a supervisor is assaulted by workmen he has fired, or where the argument was over the performance of work or possession of tools or the
like, or where the violence was due to labor disputes.20

In Rivera, supra, the unexplained assault on the employee was considered to have arisen out of the employment because it occurred in
the course of employment. This Court relied on the presumption of law that in any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim, the claim is
presumed to come within the provisions of the Act.21 According to this Court, "this statutory presumption was copied from New York."
Concerning the corresponding New York provision of law, Larson has this to say:

In a few jurisdictions, notably New York and Massachusetts, a statutory presumption in favor of coverage has figured in
unexplained-accident cases. The Massachusetts statute provides:

In any claim for compensation, where the employee has been killed, or is physically or mentally unable to testify, it shall be presumed, in the
absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, that the claim comes within the provisions of this chapter, that sufficient notice of the injury
has been given, and that the injury or death was not occasioned by the wilful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself or another.

This provision was largely copied from the New York section on presumptions, except that the New York act creates the presumption in all
cases, not merely those involving an employee's death or inability to testify.

The sweeping inclusiveness of this language might seem at first glance to mean that the mere making of a claim is also the making of a prima
facie case, as long as death or injury is shown to have occurred. The New York and Massachusetts courts have not so interpreted these
statutes, however. It seems to be necessary to establish some kind of preliminary link with the employment before the presumption can
attach. Otherwise, the claimant widow would have merely to say, "My husband, who was one of your employee, has died, and I therefore
claim death benefits," whereupon the affirmative burden would devolve upon the employer to prove that there was no connection between
the death and the environment.

It is not yet entirely clear what initial demonstration of employment-connection will give the presumption a foothold. Apparently, the idea is
to rule out cases in which claimant can show neither that the injury occurred in the course of employment nor that it arose out of it, as
where he contracted a disease but has no evidence to show where he got it. If there is evidence that the injury occurred in the course of
employment, the presumption will usually supply the "arising-out-of-employment" factor." Larson's Workmen Compensation Law (1965)
vol. 1, pp. 123-124.

We also quote from the decision of the Court of Appeals of New York in Daus vs. Gunderman & Sons:22

The statute is not intended to relieve completely an employee from the burden of showing that accidental injuries suffered by him actually
were sustained in the course of his employment. "It is not the law that mere proof of an accident, without other evidence, creates the
presumption under section 21 of the Workmen's Compensation Law (Consol. Law, c. 67) that the accident arose out of and in the course of
the employment. On the contrary, it has been frequently held, directly and indirectly, that there must be some evidence from which the
conclusion can be drawn that the injuries did arise out of and in the course of the employment." Proof of the accident will give rise to the
statutory presumption only where some connection appears between the accident and the employment.
Likewise of relevance is the following treatise:

The discussion of the coverage formula, "arising out of and in the course of employment," was opened with the suggestion that, while
"course" and "arising" were put under separate headings for convenience, some interplay between the two factors should be observed in
the various categories discussed.

A few examples may now be reviewed to show that the two tests, in practice, have not been kept in air-tight compartments, but have to
some extent merged into a single concept of work-connection. One is almost tempted to formulate a sort of quantum theory of
work-connection: that a certain minimum quantum of work-connection must be shown, and if the "course" quantity is very small, but the
"arising" quantity is large, the quantum will add up to the necessary minimum, as it will also when the "arising" quantity is very small but
the "course" quantity is relatively large.

But if both the "course" and "arising" quantities are small, the minimum quantum will not be met.

As an example of the first, a strong "arising" factor but weak "course" factor, one may cite the cases in which recoveries have been allowed
off the employment premises, outside business hours, when an employee going to or coming from work is injured by a hazard distinctly
traceable to the employment, such as a traffic jam overflowing from the employment premises, or a rock flying through the air from a blast
on the premises. Here, by normal course of employment standards, there would be no award, since the employee was not on the premises
while coming or going. Yet the unmistakable character of the causal relation of the injury to the employment has been sufficient to make up
for the weakness of the "course" factor. Another example of the same kind of balancing-out is seen in the line of cases dealing with injury to
travelling men or loggers while sleeping in hotels or bunkhouses. It was shown in the analysis of these cases that, although the "course"
factor is on the borderline when the employee is sound asleep at the time of injury, a strong causal relation of the injury to the conditions of
employment as where a fellow-logger runs amok, or a straw falls into the bunkhouse-inmate's throat from the mattress above, or the
employee is trapped in a burning hotel will boost the case over the line to success; while a weak causal connection, as where the
salesman merely slips in a hotel bath, coupled with a weak "course" factor due to the absence of any direct service performed for the
employer at the time, will under present decisions add up to a quantum of work-connection too small to support an award. It was also
shown that when the "course" element is strengthened by the fact that the employee is at all times on call, the range of compensable sources
of injury is broader than when the employee, although living on the premises is not on call.

A somewhat similar balancing-out process is seen in the holding that a borderline course-of-employment activity like seeking personal
comfort or going to and from work falls short of compensability if the method adopted is unusual, unreasonable and dangerous, while no
such restriction applies to the direct performance of the work.

As an example of the reverse situation, a strong "course" element and a weak "arising" element; one may recall the "positional" cases
discussed in section 10, as well as the unexplained-fall and other "neutral-cause" cases. Here the course of employment test is satisfied
beyond the slightest doubt: the employee is in the midst of performing the active duties of his job. But the causal connection is very weak,
since the source of the injury whether a stray bullet, a wandering lunatic, and unexplained fall or death, or a mistaken assault by a
stranger is not distinctly associated with employment conditions as such, and is tied to the employment only by the argument that the
injury would not have occurred to this employee but for the obligation of the employment which placed him in the position to be hurt. Yet,
since the "course" element is so strong, awards are becoming increasingly common on these facts.

Incidentally, it may be observed that this "quantum" idea forms a useful yardstick for measuring just how generous a court has become in
expanding compensation coverage; for if a court makes an award when a case, by the above standards, is weak both on course of
employment and on causal connection, one can conclude that the court is capable of giving the act a broad construction. Thus, an award was
made in Puffin v. General Electric, where the course element was weak (rest period) and the causal element was weak (setting fire to own
sweater while smoking). Both factors were likewise very weak in O'Leary v. Brown Pacific-Maxon Inc., where the course of employment
consisted of a recreation period interrupted by a rescue of a stranger, and the arising factor consisted of drowning in a channel where
decedent was prohibited from going. And, in Martin v. Plaut, the course of employment factor was weak (a cook dressing in the morning)
and the causal factor was also weak (an unexplained fall); yet an award was made in New York.

But another New York case shows that the simultaneous weakness of course and arising factors may reach the point where the requisite
quantum is not found. In Shultz v. Nation Associates, compensation was denied to an employee who while combing her hair preparatory to
going to lunch negligently struck her eye with the comb. Here we see thinness on all fronts: as to course of employment time factor, we have
a lunch period; as to the course of employment activity factor, we have care of personal appearance; and as to the causal factor, we have
negligence of the employee. Each weakness standing alone lunch period, care of appearance, negligence would not be fatal; there are
many awards in which one or another of these is present. But when all are present, while an award is not impossible and could be defended
on a point by point basis, it cannot be relied upon in most jurisdictions by the prudent lawyer. Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law1965
ed. Vol. 1, pp. 452.97 to 452.100.

In resume:
1. Workmen's compensation is granted if the injuries result from an accident which arise out of and in the course of employment.

2. Both the "arising" factor and the "course" factor must be present. If one factor is weak and the other is strong, the injury is compensable,
but not where both factors are weak. Ultimately, the question is whether the accident is work-connected.

3. In a proceeding for the enforcement of a claim, the same is presumed to come within the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
But a preliminary link must first be shown to exist between the injury and the employment. Thus if the injury occurred in the course of
employment, it is presumed to have arisen out of the employment.

4. The "course" factor applies to time, place and circumstances. This factor is present if the injury takes place within the period of
employment, at a place where the employee may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto.

5. The rule is that an injury sustained while the employee goes to or comes from his place of work, is not of the employment.

6. The exception to the rule is an injury sustained off the employee's premises, but while in close proximity thereto and while using a
customary means of ingress and egress. The reason for extending the scope of "course of employment" to off-premises injuries is that there
is a causal connection between the work and the hazard.

7. An "assault" may be considered an "accident" within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The employment may either
increase risk of assault because of its nature or be the subject-matter of a dispute leading to the assault.

From the milestones, we now proceed to take our bearings in the case at bar, having in mind always that no cover-all formula can be spelled
out with specificity, that the particular facts and circumstances of each case must be inquired into, and that in any perceptive inquiry, the
question as to where the line should be drawn beyond which the liability of the employer cannot continue has been held to be usually one of
fact.

We shall first dwell on the question of ownership of the private road where Pablo was killed. In granting compensation, the Commission
said that "the road where the deceased was shot was of private ownership, was called the IDECO road, and led straight to the main IDECO
gate, thus raising the reasonable assumption that it belonged" to the IDECO. The Commission reasoned out that "even if the ownership of
the road were open to question, there was no doubt that its private character was obviously exploited by the respondent for the purpose of
its own business to such an extent as to make it to all intents and purposes an extension of its premises," so that the "shooting of the
deceased may be considered to have taken place on the premises, and therefore within the employment;" and that "while respondent
allowed its name to be used in connection with the private road for the ingress and egress of the employees it did not apparently take the
necessary precaution to make it safe for its employees by employing security guards."

But the IDECO denies ownership of the road. In its memorandum filed with the Regional Office, IDECO averred that Pablo's death did not
originate from his work as to time, place and circumstances. This, in effect, is a denial of ownership of the road. The decision of the Regional
Office does not state that the road belongs to the IDECO. All that it says is that Pablo was shot "barely two minutes after he was dismissed
from work and while walking along the IDECO road about twenty (20) meters from the gate." In its "motion for reconsideration and/or
review," the IDECO emphasized that "the place where the incident happened was a public road, not less than twenty (20) meters away from
the main gate of the compound, and therefore not proximate to or in the immediate vicinity of the place of work." Again, the ownership of
the road was implicitly denied. And in its "motion for reconsideration and/or appeal to the Commission en banc," the IDECO alleged outright
that the "road where the incident took place, although of private ownership, does not belong to IDECO. There is absolutely no evidence on
record that shows IDECO owns the road." If the road were owned by the IDECO, there would have been no question that the assault arose
"in the course of employment."23 But if it did indeed own the road, then the IDECO would have fenced it, and place its main gate at the other
end of the road where it meets the public highway.

But while the IDECO does not own the private road, it cannot be denied that it was using the same as the principal means of ingress and
egress. The private road leads directly to its main gate.24 Its right to use the road must then perforce proceed from either an easement of
right of way or a lease. Its right, therefore, is either a legal one or a contractual one. In either case the IDECO should logically and properly be
charged with security control of the road. The IDECO owed its employees a safe passage to its premises. In compliance with such duty, the
IDECO should have seen to it not only that road was properly paved and did not have holes or ditches, but should also have instituted
measures for the proper policing of the immediate area. The point where Pablo was shot was barely twenty meters away from the main
IDECO gate, certainly nearer than a stone's throw therefrom. The spot is immediately proximate to the IDECO's premises. Considering this
fact, and the further facts that Pablo had just finished overtime work at the time, and was killed barely two minutes after dismissal from
work, the Ampil case is squarely applicable here. We may say, as we did in Ampil, that the place where the employee was injured being
"immediately proximate to his place of work, the accident in question must be deemed to have occurred within the zone of his employment
and therefore arose out of and in the course thereof." Our principal question is whether the injury was sustained in the course of
employment. We find that it was, and so conclude that the assault arose out of the employment, even though the said assault is unexplained.
American jurisprudence supports this view.

In Bountiful Brick Company vs. Giles,25 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled:

Employment includes both only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to
and from the place where the work is to be done. If the employee to be injured while passing, with the express or implied consent of the
employer, to or from his work by a way over the employer's premises, or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in
practical effect a part of the employer's premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the course of employment as much as though it had
happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its performance. In other words, the employment may begin in point
of time before the work is entered upon and in point of space before the place where the work is to be done is reached. Probably, as a
general rule, employment may be said to begin when the employee reaches the entrance to the employer's premises where the work is to be
done; but it is clear that in some cases the rule extends to include adjacent premises used by the employee as a means of ingress and egress with
the express or implied consent of the employer.

The above ruling is on all fours with our facts. Two minutes from dismissal and twenty meters from the main IDECO gate are "a reasonable
margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from" the IDECO's premises. The IDECO employees used the private road
with its consent, express or implied. Twenty meters on that road from the main gate is in close proximity to the IDECO's premises. It follows
that Pablo's death was in the course of employment.

In Carter vs. Lanzetta,26 it was held that "such statutes envision extension of coverage to employees from the time they reach the employer's
premises until they depart therefrom and that hours of service include a period when this might be accomplished within a reasonable
interval;" and that "under exceptional circumstances, a continuance of the course of employment may be extended by allowing the
employee a reasonable time not only to enter or leave the premises but also to surmount certain hazards adjacent thereto."

The private road led directly to the main IDECO gate. From this description, it would appear that the road is a dead-end street. In Singer vs.
Rich Marine Sales,27 it was held that, where the employee, while returning to work at the end of the lunch period, fell at the curb of the
sidewalk immediately adjacent to the employer's premises and one other located thereon, and the general public used the street only in
connection with those premises, and the employer actually stored boats on the sidewalk, the sidewalk was within the precincts of
employment. In that case there were even two business establishments on the dead-end street. Here, it is exclusively the IDECO premises
which appear to be at the end of the private road.

We find in Jean vs. Chrysler Corporation28 a meaningful statement of the obligation of the employer to its employees: "That the employer
owes, so to speak, a duty of 'safe passage' to an employee to the point where he can reach the proper arrival or departure from his work
seems without question."

We next quote extensively from Kelty vs. Travellers Insurance Company:29

The rule has been repeatedly announced in Texas that an injury received by an employee while using the public streets and highways in
going to or returning from the place of employment is not compensable, the rationale of the rule being that in most instances such an injury
is suffered as a consequence of risk and hazards to which all members of the travelling public are subject rather than risk and hazards
having to do with and originating in the work or business of the employer....

Another exception, however, which is applicable is found in the so-called "access" cases. In these cases a workman who has been injured at a
plane intended by the employer for use as a means of ingress or egress to and from the actual place of the employee's work has been held to
be in the course of his employment. The courts have said that these access areas are so closely related to the employer's premises as to be
fairly treated as a part of the employer's premises. We shall discuss the principal authorities dealing with this exception to the general rule.

The leading cases in Texas dealing with the "access" exception, and one which we think is controlling of this appeal, is Lumberman's
Reciprocal Ass'n v. Behnken, 112 Tex. 103, 246 S.W. 72, 28 A.L.R. 1402. In that case the employee was employed by Hartburg Lumber
Company, which company operated and owned a sawmill in Hartburg, Texas, which was a lumber town, consisting solely of the employer's
facilities. A railroad track ran through the town and a part of the lumber company's facilities was situated on either side of the right-of-way.
A public road ran parallel to the railroad tracks which led to the various buildings on the property of the lumber company. This crossing was
used by any member of the public desiring to go to any part of the lumber company facilities. On the day in question the decedent quit work
at noon, went home for lunch and while returning to the lumber company plant for the purpose of resuming his employment, was struck
and killed by a train at the crossing in question. The insurance company contended (as it does here) that the decedent's death did not
originate in the work or business of his employer and that at the time of his fatal injuries he was not in or about the furtherance of the
affairs or business of his employer. The Supreme Court, in an extensive opinion, reviewed the authorities from other states and especially
Latter's Case 238 Mass. 326, 130 N. E. 637, 638, and arrived at the conclusion that the injury and death under such circumstances were
compensable under the Texas Act. The court held that the railroad crossing bore so intimate a relation to the lumber company's premises that
it could hardly be treated otherwise than as a part of the premises. The Court pointed out that the lumber company had rights in and to the
crossing which was used in connection with the lumber company's business, whether by employees or by members of the public. In
announcing the "access" doctrine Justice Greenwood said:

Was Behnken engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of his employer when he received the injury causing his death?
He was upon the crossing provided as the means of access to his work solely because he was an employee. He encountered the dangers
incident to use of the crossing in order that he might perform the duties imposed by his contract of service. Without subjecting himself to
such dangers he could not do what was required of him in the conduct of the lumber company's business. He had reached a place provided
and used only as an adjunct to that business, and was injured from a risk created by the conditions under which the business was carried on.
To hold that he was not acting in furtherance of the affairs or business of the lumber company would be to give a strict interpretation to this
remedial statute, which should be liberally construed with a view to accomplish its purpose and to promote justice.

xxx xxx xxx

In Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Anderson, Tex. Civ. App., 125 S. W. 2d 674, wr. ref., this court followed the rule announced in Behnken,
supra. In that case the employee was killed while crossing the railroad track near his place of employment. In discussing the question of the
situs of the injury Justice Looney said:

Its use as a means of ingress to and exit from his place of work not only conduced his safety and convenience, but contributed to the promptness
and efficiency with which he was enabled to discharge the duties owing his employer; hence the reason and necessity for his presence upon
the railroad track (that portion of the pathway leading over the railroad right of way) when injured, in our opinion, had to do with,
originated in and grew out of the work of the employer; and that, the injury received at the time, place and under the circumstances,
necessarily was in furtherance of the affairs or business of the employer.

Again, in Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Boecker, Tex. Civ. App. 53 S. W. 2d 327, err. ref., this court had occasion to follow the "access"
doctrine. In that case Chief Justice Jones quoted from the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Bountiful Brisk Company, et al. v.
Giles, 276 U.S. 154, 48 S. Ct. 221, 72 L. Ed. 507, 66 A. L. R. 1402, as follows:

An employment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and
from the place where the work is to be done. If the employee be injured while passing, with the express or implied consent of the employer, to
or from his work by a way over the employer's premises, or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a
part of the employer's premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the course of the employment as much as though it had happened
while the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its performance. In other words, the employment may begin in point of time
before the work is entered upon and in point of space before the place where the work is to be done is reached.

The ruling enunciated above is applicable in the case at bar. That part of the road where Pablo was killed is in very close proximity to the
employer's premises. It is an "access area" "so clearly related to the employer's premises as to be fairly treated as a part of the employer's
premises." That portion of the road bears "so intimate a relation" to the company's premises. It is the chief means of entering the IDECO
premises, either for the public or for its employees. The IDECO uses it extensively in pursuit of its business. It has rights of passage over the
road, either legal, if by virtue of easement, or contractual, if by reason of lease. Pablo was using the road as a means of access to his work
solely because he was an employee. For this reason, the IDECO was under obligation to keep the place safe for its employees. Safe, that is,
against dangers that the employees might encounter therein, one of these dangers being assault by third persons. Having failed to take the
proper security measures over the said area which it controls, the IDECO is liable for the injuries suffered by Pablo resulting in his death.

As therefore stated, the assault on Pablo is unexplained. The murderer was himself killed before he could be brought to trial. It is true there
is authority for the statement that before the "proximity" rule may be applied it must first be shown that there is a causal connection
between the employment and the hazard which resulted in the injury.30 The following more modern view was expressed in Lewis Wood
Preserving Company vs. Jones:31

While some earlier cases seem to indicate that the causative danger must be peculiar to the work and not common to the neighborhood for
the injuries to arise out of and in the course of the employment (see Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peek, 36 Ga. App. 557 [137 S.E. 121]; Hartford
Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Cox, 61 Ga. App. 420, 6 S.E. 2d 189), later cases have been somewhat more liberal, saying that, "to be
compensable, injuries do not have to arise from something peculiar to the employment." Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. Bardon, 79 Ga. App.
260, 262, 54 S.E. 2d 443, 444. "Where the duties of an employee entail his presence (at a place and a time) the claim for an injury there
occurring is not to be barred because it results from a risk common to all others ... unless it is also common to the general public without
regard to such conditions, and independently of place, employment, or pursuit." New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Sumrell, 30 Ga. App. 682,
118 S.E. 786, cited in Globe Indemnity Co. v. MacKendree, 39 Ga. App. 58, 146 S.E. 46, 47; McKiney v. Reynolds & Manley Lumber Co., 79 Ga.
App. 826, 829, 54 S.E. 2d 471, 473.

But even without the foregoing pronouncement, the employer should still be held liable in view of our conclusion that that portion of the
road where Pablo was killed, because of its proximity, should be considered part of the IDECO's premises. Hence, the injury was in
the course of employment, and there automatically arises the presumption invoked in Rivera that the injury by assault arose out of the
employment, i. e., there is a causal relation between the assault and the employment.

We do say here that the circumstances of time, two minutes after dismissal from overtime work, and space, twenty meters from the
employer's main gate, bring Pablo's death within the scope of the course factor. But it may logically be asked: Suppose it were three minutes
after and thirty meters from, or five minutes after and fifty meters from, would the "proximity" rule still apply? In answer, we need but
quote that portion of the decision in Jean vs. Chrysler Corporation, supra, which answered a question arising from an ingenious hypothetical
question put forth by the defendant therein:

We could, of course, say "this is not the case before us" and utilize the old saw, "that which is not before us we do not decide." Instead, we
prefer to utilize the considerably older law: "Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof" (Matthew 1:34), appending, however, this
admonition: no statute is static; it must remain constantly viable to meet new challenges placed to it. Recovery in a proper case should not
be suppressed because of a conjectural posture which may never arise and which if it does, will be decided in the light of then existing law.

Since the Workmen's Compensation Act is basically a social legislation designed to afford relief to workmen, it must be liberally construed
to attain the purpose for which it was enacted.32 Liberally construed, sec. 2 of the Act comprehends Pablo's death. The Commission did not
err in granting compensation.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is affirmed, at petitioner's cost.

G.R. No. 90204 May 11, 1990

MANUEL BELARMINO, petitioner,

vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondents.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:

This seven-year-old case involves a claim for benefits for the death of a lady school teacher which the public respondents disallowed on the
ground that the cause of death was not work-connected.

Before her death on February 19, 1982, petitioner's wife, Oania Belarmino, was a classroom teacher of the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports assigned at the Buracan Elementary School in Dimasalang, Masbate (p. 13, Rollo). She had been a classroom teacher since
October 18, 1971, or for eleven (11) years. Her husband, the petitioner, is also a public school teacher.

On January 14, 1982, at nine o'clock in the morning, while performing her duties as a classroom teacher, Mrs. Belarmino who was in her 8th
month of pregnancy, accidentally slipped and fell on the classroom floor. Moments later, she complained of abdominal pain and stomach
cramps. For several days, she continued to suffer from recurrent abdominal pain and a feeling of heaviness in her stomach, but, heedless of
the advice of her female co-teachers to take a leave of absence, she continued to report to the school because there was much work to do. On
January 25, 1982, eleven (11) days after her accident, she went into labor and prematurely delivered a baby girl at home (p. 8, Rollo).

Her abdominal pains persisted even after the delivery, accompanied by high fever and headache. She was brought to the Alino Hospital in
Dimasalang, Masbate on February 11, 1982. Dr. Alfonso Alino found that she was suffering from septicemia post partum due to infected
lacerations of the vagina. She was discharged from the hospital after five (5) days on February 16, 1982, apparently recovered but she died
three (3) days later. The cause of death was septicemia post partum. She was 33 years old, survived by her husband and four (4) children,
the oldest of whom was 11 years old and the youngest, her newborn infant (p. 9, Rollo).

On April 21, 1983, a claim for death benefits was filed by her husband. On February 14, 1984, it was denied by the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) which held that 'septicemia post partum the cause of death, is not an occupational disease, and neither was there
any showing that aforesaid ailment was contracted by reason of her employment. . . . The alleged accident mentioned could not have
precipitated the death of the wife but rather the result of the infection of her lacerated wounds as a result of her delivery at home" (p.
14 Rollo).

On appeal to the Employees Compensation Commission, the latter issued Resolution No. 3913 dated July 8, 1988 holding:

We agree with the decision of the system, hence we dismiss this appeal. Postpartum septicemia is an acute infectious disease of the
puerperium resulting from the entrance into the blood of bacteria usually streptococci and their toxins which cause dissolution of the blood,
degenerative changes in the organs and the symptoms of intoxication. The cause of this condition in the instant case was the infected
vaginal lacerations resulting from the decedent's delivery of her child which took place at home. The alleged accident in school could not
have been the cause of septicemia, which in this case is clearly caused by factors not inherent in employment or in the working conditions of
the deceased. (pp. 14-15, Rollo.)

Hence, this petition for review.

After a careful consideration of the petition and the annexes thereof, as well as the comments of the public respondents, we are persuaded
that the public respondents' peremptory denial of the petitioner's claim constitutes a grave abuse of discretion.

Rule III, Section 1 of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation enumerates the grounds for compensability of injury resulting in
disability or death of an employee, as follows:

Sec. 1. Grounds (a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment
accident satisfying all of the following conditions:

(1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be;

(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and
(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer.

(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed
under Annex "A" of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the
disease is increased by the working conditions.

(c) Only injury or sickness that occurred on or after January 1, 1975 and the resulting disability or death shall be compensable under these
Rules.

The illness, septicemia post partum which resulted in the death of Oania Belarmino, is admittedly not listed as an occupational disease in
her particular line of work as a classroom teacher. However, as pointed out in the petition, her death from that ailment is compensable
because an employment accident and the conditions of her employment contributed to its development. The condition of the classroom
floor caused Mrs. Belarmino to slip and fall and suffer injury as a result. The fall precipitated the onset of recurrent abdominal pains which
culminated in the premature termination of her pregnancy with tragic consequences to her. Her fall on the classroom floor brought about
her premature delivery which caused the development of post partum septicemia which resulted in death. Her fall therefore was the
proximate or responsible cause that set in motion an unbroken chain of events, leading to her demise.

. . . what is termed in American cases the proximate cause, not implying however, as might be inferred from the word itself, the nearest in
point of time or relation, but rather, [is] the efficient cause, which may be the most remote of an operative chain. It must be that which sets
the others in motion and is to be distinguished from a mere preexisting condition upon which the effective cause operates, and must have
been adequate to produce the resultant damage without the intervention of an independent cause. (Atlantic Gulf vs. Insular Government, 10
Phil. 166,171.)

The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor the final event
in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that
the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. (Bataclan v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181.)

Thus in Enriquez v. WCC, 93 SCRA 366, 372, this Court ruled:

. . . Verily, the right to compensation extends to disability due to disease supervening upon and proximately and naturally resulting from a
compensable injury (82 Am. Jur. 132). Where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in the course of employment, every natural
consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause
attributable to complainants own negligence or misconduct ( I Larson Workmen's Compensation Law 3-279 [1972]). Simply stated, all the
medical consequences and sequels that flow from the primary injury are compensable. (Ibid.)

Mrs. Belarmino's fall was the primary injury that arose in the course of her employment as a classroom teacher, hence, all the medical
consequences flowing from it: her recurrent abdominal pains, the premature delivery of her baby, her septicemia post partum and death,
are compensable.

There is no merit in the public respondents' argument that the cause of the decedent's post partum septicemia "was the infected vaginal
lacerations resulting from the decedent's delivery of her child at home" for the incident in school could not have caused septicemia post
partum, . . . the necessary precautions to avoid infection during or after labor were (not) taken" (p. 29, Rollo).

The argument is unconvincing. It overlooks the fact that septicemia post partum is a disease of childbirth, and premature childbirth would
not have occurred if she did not accidentally fall in the classroom.

It is true that if she had delivered her baby under sterile conditions in a hospital operating room instead of in the unsterile environment of
her humble home, and if she had been attended by specially trained doctors and nurses, she probably would not have suffered lacerations of
the vagina and she probably would not have contracted the fatal infection. Furthermore, if she had remained longer than five (5) days in the
hospital to complete the treatment of the infection, she probably would not have died. But who is to blame for her inability to afford a
hospital delivery and the services of trained doctors and nurses? The court may take judicial notice of the meager salaries that the
Government pays its public school teachers. Forced to live on the margin of poverty, they are unable to afford expensive hospital care, nor
the services of trained doctors and nurses when they or members of their families are in. Penury compelled the deceased to scrimp by
delivering her baby at home instead of in a hospital.

The Government is not entirely blameless for her death for it is not entirely blameless for her poverty. Government has yet to perform its
declared policy "to free the people from poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve
the quality of life for all (Sec. 7, Art. II, 1973 Constitution and Sec. 9, Art. II, 1987 Constitution). Social justice for the lowly and underpaid
public school teachers will only be an empty shibboleth until Government adopts measures to ameliorate their economic condition and
provides them with adequate medical care or the means to afford it. "Compassion for the poor is an imperative of every humane society"
(PLDT v. Bucay and NLRC, 164 SCRA 671, 673). By their denial of the petitioner's claim for benefits arising from the death of his wife, the
public respondents ignored this imperative of Government, and thereby committed a grave abuse of discretion.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The respondents Employees Compensation Commission and the Government Service
Insurance System are ordered to pay death benefits to the petitioner and/or the dependents of the late Oania Belarmino, with legal rate of
interest from the filing of the claim until it is fully paid, plus attorney's fees equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the award, and costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 84307 April 17, 1989

CIRIACO HINOGUIN petitioner,

vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Armed Forces of the
Philippines), respondents.

Alexander A. Acain for petitioner.

FELICIANO, J.:

This Petition for Review is directed against the Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission ("ECC") in ECC Case No. 3275 (Ciriaco
Hinoguin v. Government Service Insurance System [Armed Forces of the Philippines]) which affirmed the decision of the Government
Service Insurance System ("GSIS") denying petitioner's claim for compensation benefit on account of the death of petitioner's son, Sgt.
Lemick G. Hinoguin

The deceased, Sgt. Hinoguin started his military service in 1974, when he was called to military training by the Philippine Army. He later on
enlisted in the Philippine Army as a private first class. At the time of his death on 7 August 1985, he was holding the rank of Sergeant per
Special Order P-4200, HPA dated 15 October 1985, in "A" company 14th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division, PA. The Headquarters of
the 14th Infantry Battalion was located at Bical, Muoz, Nueva Ecija. Sgt. Hinoguin was Detachment Non-Commissioned Officer at
Capintalan, Carranglan, Nueva Ecija, "A" Company being stationed at Carranglan, Nueva Ecija.

On 1 August 1985, Sgt. Hinoguin and two (2) members of his Detachment, Cpl. Rogelio Clavo and Dft. Nicomedes Alibuyog, sought
permission from Captain Frankie Z. Besas, Commanding Officer of "A" Company to go on overnight pass to Aritao, Nueva Viscaya, "to settle
[an] important matter thereat." 1 Captain Besas orally granted them permission to go to Aritao and to take their issued firearms with them,
considering that Aritao was regarded as "a critical place " 2 that is, it had peace and order problems due to the presence of elements of the
New People's Army ("NPA!') in or in the vicinity of Aritao.

Sgt. Hinoguin, Cpl. Clavo and Dft. Alibuyog left Carranglan, Nueva Ecija, about noon on 1 August 1985 and arrived in Aritao, Nueva Viscaya,
about 1:30 o'clock P.M. on the same day. 3 They proceeded to the home of Dft. Alibuyog's parents where they had lunch. About 4:00 o'clock
P.M., the three (3) soldiers with a fourth man, a civilian and relative of Dft. Alibuyog, had some gin and beer, finishing a bottle of gin and two
(2) large bottles of beer. Three hours later, at about 7:00 o'clock P.M., the soldiers left the Alibuyog home to return to their Company
Headquarters. They boarded a tricycle, presumably a motor-driven one, Sgt. Hinoguin and Cpl. Clavo seating themselves in the tricycle cab
while Dft. Alibuyog occupied the seat behind the driver. Upon reaching the poblacion of Aritao, Dft. Alibuyog dismounted, walked towards
and in front of the tricycle cab, holding his M-16 rifle in his right hand, not noticing that the rifle's safety lever was on semi automatic (and
not on "safety"). He accidentally touched the trigger, firing a single shot in the process and hitting Sgt. Hinoguin, then still sitting in the cab,
in the left lower abdomen. The Sergeant did not apparently realize immediately that he had been hit; he took three (3) steps forward, cried
that he had been hit and fell to the ground.

His companions rushed Sgt. Hinoguin to a hospital in Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya, for treatment. Their Company Commander, Capt. Besas,
hurried to the hospital upon being notified of the shooting and there talked with the wounded Sergeant. The latter confirmed to Capt. Besas
that he had indeed been accidentally shot by Dft. Alibuyog Sgt. Hinoguin was later moved to the AFP Medical Center in Quezon City and
there he died on 7 August 1985. The Death Certificate lists "septic shock" as immediate cause of death, and "generalized septicemia of
peritonitis" as antecedent cause, following his sustaining a gunshot wound.

An investigation conducted by H.Q., 14th Infantry Battalion on 11 August 1985 concluded that the shooting of Sgt. Hinoguin was "purely
accidental in nature." 4 On 19 November 1985, a "Line of Duty Board of Officers" was convened by H.Q. 14th Infantry Battalion, "to
determine Line of Duty Status of [the] late Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin 640407 (Inf.) PA, a member of "A" Co., 14IB, 5 ID, PA who died ... due to Gun
Shot Wound as a result of an accidental fire (sic) committed by Dft. Nicomedes Alibuyog 085-5009 (Inf.) PA ... ." After receiving and
deliberating . g on the Investigation Report dated 11 August 1985 together with the sworn statements of witnesses Alibuyog, Clavo and
Besas, and after some further questioning of Capt. Besas, the Line of Duty Board reached the following conclusion and recommendation:

Sgt. Hinoguin was then the designated Detachment Commander of Capintalan detachment. On or about 011300H August 1985 Dft. Alibuyog
invited Sgt. Hinoguin and Cpl. Clavo to his home to celebrate at Aritao, Nueva Viscaya. They asked permission to go on overnight and to
allow them to carry their firearms with them because the place where they were going is critical. They were given such permission verbally
by their Commanding Officer. The death of Sgt. Hinoguin was purely accidental as the Investigation Report presented here proved beyond
reasonable [doubt] the fact that Dft. Alibuyog had no grudge either [against] Cpl. Clavo or Sgt. Hinoguin
RECOMMENDATION:

The recommendation written by the Chairman and unanimously voted for by the members contain the following:

The Board after a thorough deliberation on presented evidences declares that the Death of Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin 640407 (Inf.) PA is in Line
of Duty.

The Board recommend farther that all benefits due the legal dependents of the late Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin be given. 5 (Emphasis supplied)

Sometime in March 1986, petitioner filed his claim for compensation benefits under P.D. No. 626 (as amended), claiming that the death of
his son was work-connected and therefore compensable. This was denied 6 by the GSIS on the ground that petitioner's son was not at his
work place nor performing his duty as a soldier of the Philippine Army at the time of his death.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which Motion was, however, denied by the GSIS. This denial was confirmed by the Workmen's
Compensation Commission ("WCC") in a Decision dated 24 May 1988 which stated that:

[F]rom the recital of the facts therein [we found it] very difficult for us to perceive where the work-connection of the events that led to
appellant's son's death lies. Under the law, death resulting from injury is considered compensable if it arises out of and in the course of
employment. Definitely, the death of Hinoguin did not arises out of employment. Clearly, the facts showed that he was not on his place of work
nor was he performing official functions. On the contrary, he was on pass and had just came from a merrymaking when accidentally shot by his
companion, 7 (Emphasis supplied)

The sole issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the death of Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin is compensable under the applicable statute
and regulations.

Considering that Sgt. Hinoguin died on 7 August 1985, the applicable law is to be found in Book Four, Title III of the Labor Code, as amended.
It may be noted at the outset that under Article 167 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended and Section 4 (b) (1) of Rule I of the Amended
(Implementing) Rules on Employees' Compensation, the term "employee" includes a "member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines." Rule
XIII entitled "Death", of the Amended (Implementing) Rules provides in part as follows:

SECTION 1. Conditions to Entitlement. (a) The beneficiaries of a deceased employee shall be entitled to an income benefit if all of the
following conditions are satisfied:

(1) The employee had been duly reported to the System;

(2) He died as a result of injury or sickness; and

(3) The System has been duly notified of his death, as well as the injury or sickness which caused his death. His employer shall be liable for
the benefit if such death occurred before the employee is duly reported for coverage of the System.

xxx xxx xxx

Article 167 (k) of the Labor Code as amended defines a compensable "injury" quite simply as "any harmful change in the human organism
from any accident arising out of and in the course of the employment." The Amended (Implementing) Rules have, however, elaborated
considerably on the simple and succinct statutory provision. Rule III, Section 1 (a) reads:

SECTION 1. Grounds. (a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an
employment accident satisfying all of the following grounds:

(1) The employee must have been injured at the place work requires him to be;

(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and

(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)
It will be seen that because the Amended (Implementing) Rules are intended to apply to all kinds of employment, such rules must be read
and applied with reasonable flexibility and comprehensiveness. The concept of a "work place" referred to in Ground 1, for instance, cannot
always be literally applied to a soldier on active duty status, as if he were a machine operator or a worker in an assembly line in a factory or
a clerk in a particular fixed office. Obviously, a soldier must go where his company is stationed. In the instant case, Aritao, Nueva Viscaya
was not, of course, Carranglan, Nueva Ecija. Aritao being approximately 1-1/2 hours away from the latter by public transportation. But Sgt.
Hinoguin, Cpl. Clavo and Dft. Alibuyog had permission from their Commanding Officer to proceed to Aritao, and it appears to us that a place
which soldiers have secured lawful permission to be at cannot be very different, legally speaking, from a place where they are required to go
by their commanding officer. We note that the three (3) soldiers were on an overnight pass which, notably, they did not utilize in full. They
were not on vacation leave. Moreover, they were required or authorized to carry their firearms with which presumably they were to defend
themselves if NPA elements happened to attack them while en route to and from Aritao or with which to attack and seek to capture such
NPA elements as they might encounter. Indeed, if the three (3) soldiers had in fact encountered NPAs while on their way to or from Aritao
and been fired upon by them and if Sgt. Hinoguin had been killed by an NPA bullet, we do not believe that respondent GSIS would have had
any difficulty in holding the death a compensable one.

Turning to the question of whether Sgt. Hinoguin was performing official functions at the time he sustained the gunshot wound, it has
already been pointed out above that the Line of Duty Board of Officers of the 14th Infantry Battalion Headquarters had already determined
that the death of Sgt. Hinoguin had occurred "in line of duty." It may be noted in this connection that a soldier on active duty status is really
on 24 hours a day official duty status and is subject to military discipline and military law 24 hours a day. He is subject to call and to the
orders of his superior officers at all times, 7 days a week, except, of course, when he is on vacation leave status (which Sgt. Hinoguin was
not). 'Thus, we think that the work-connected character of Sgt. Hinoguins injury and death was not effectively precluded by the simple
circumstance that he was on an overnight pass to go to the home of Dft. Alibuyog, a soldier under his own command. Sgt. Hinoguin did not
effectively cease performing "official functions" because he was granted a pass. While going to a fellow soldier's home for a few hours for a
meal and some drinks was not a specific military duty, he was nonetheless in the course of performance of official functions. Indeed, it
appears to us that a soldier should be presumed to be on official duty unless he is shown to have clearly and unequivocally put aside that
status or condition temporarily by, e.g., going on an approved vacation leave. 8 Even vacation leave may, it should be remembered, be
preterminated by superior orders.

More generally, a soldier in the Armed Forces must accept certain risks, for instance, that he will be fired upon by forces hostile to the State
or the Government. That is not, of course, the only ask that he is compelled to accept by the very nature of his occupation or profession as a
soldier. Most of the persons around him are necessarily also members of the Armed Forces who carry firearms, too. In other words, a
soldier must also assume the risk of being accidentally fired upon by his fellow soldiers. This is reasonably regarded as a hazard or risk
inherent in his employment as a soldier.

We hold, therefore, that the death of Sgt. Hinoguin that resulted from his being hit by an accidental discharge of the M-16 of Dft. Alibuyog, in
the circumstances of this case, arose out of and in the course of his employment as a soldier on active duty status in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and hence compensable.

It may be well to add that what we have written above in respect of performance of official functions of members of the Armed Forces must
be understood in the context of the specific purpose at hand, that is, the interpretation and application of the compensation provisions of
the Labor Code and applicable related regulations. It is commonplace that those provisions should, to the extent possible, be given the
interpretation most likely to effectuate the beneficient and humanitarian purposes infusing the Labor Code.

ACCORDINGLY, the Decision of the GSIS taken through its Claim Review Committee dated 20 November 1986 and the Decision dated 24
May 1988 of the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 3275, are hereby REVERSED and the GSIS is hereby DIRECTED to
award all applicable benefits in respect of the death of Sgt. Lemick G. Hinoguin, to petitioner. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 128524. April 20, 1999]

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and FELONILA
ALEGRE, respondents.

DECISION

ROMERO, J.:

May a moonlighting policemans death be considered compensable? This is the crux of the controversy now at bar.

The records[1].1 disclose that private respondent Felonila Alegres deceased husband, SPO2 Florencio A. Alegre, was a police officer
assigned to the Philippine National Police station in the town of Vigan, Ilocos Sur. On that fateful day of December 6, 1994, he was driving
his tricycle and ferrying passengers within the vicinity of Imelda Commercial Complex when SPO4 Alejandro Tenorio, Jr., Team/Desk Officer
of the Police Assistance Center located at said complex, confronted him regarding his tour of duty. SPO2 Alegre allegedly snubbed SPO4
Tenorio and even directed curse words upon the latter. A verbal tussle then ensued between the two which led to the fatal shooting of the
deceased police officer.

On account of her husbands death, private respondent seasonably filed a claim for death benefits with petitioner Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 626. In its decision on August 7, 1995, the GSIS, however, denied the claim on
the ground that at the time of SPO2 Alegres death, he was performing a personal activity which was not work-connected. Subsequent appeal
to the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) proved futile as said body, in a decision dated May 9, 1996, merely affirmed the ruling of
the GSIS.

Private respondent finally obtained a favorable ruling in the Court of Appeals when on February 28, 1997, the appellate court
reversed[2] the ECCs decision and ruled that SPO2 Alegres death was work-connected and, therefore, compensable. Citing Nitura v.
Employees Compensation Commission[3] and Employees Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals,[4] the appellate court explained the
conclusion arrived at, thus:

[T]he Supreme Court held that the concept of a workplace cannot always be literally applied to a person in active duty status, as if he were a
machine operator or a worker in an assembly line in a factory or a clerk in a particular fixed office.

It is our considered view that, as applied to a peace officer, his work place is not confined to the police precinct or station but to any place
where his services, as a lawman, to maintain peace and security, are required.

At the time of his death, Alegre was driving a tricycle at the northeastern part of the Imelda Commercial Complex where the police
assistance center is located. There can be no dispute therefore that he met his death literally in his place of work.

It is true that the deceased was driving his tricycle, with passengers aboard, when he was accosted by another police officer. This would
lend some semblance of viability to the argument that he was not in the performance of official duty at the time.

However, the argument, though initially plausible, overlooks the fact that policemen, by the nature of their
functions, are deemed to be on a round-the-clock duty.

Aggrieved, GSIS comes to us on petition for review on certiorari reiterating its position that SPO2 Alegres death lacks the requisite
element of compensability which is, that the activity being performed at the time of death must be work-connected.

We grant the petition.

As stated at the outset, the sole issue for the Courts resolution is whether the death of SPO2 Alegre is compensable pursuant to the
applicable laws and regulations.

Under the pertinent guidelines of the ECC on compensability, it is provided that for the injury and the resulting disability or death to
be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of the following conditions:

(1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be;

(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and

(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer. [5]

Actually, jurisprudence is rather scant with respect to the above rules application in the case of police officers. Nevertheless, owing to
the similarity of functions, that is, to keep peace and order, and the risks assumed, the Court has treated police officers similar to members
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines with regard to the compensability of their deaths. Thus, echoing Hinoguin v. Employees Compensation
Commission,[6] a case involving a soldier who was accidentally fired at by a fellow soldier, we held in Employees Compensation Commission v.
Court of Appeals,[7] that members of the national police are by the nature of their functions technically on duty 24 hours a day because
policemen are subject to call at any time and may be asked by their superiors or by any distressed citizen to assist in maintaining the peace
and security of the community.

Upon examination of the Court of Appeals reasoning, we believe that the appellate court committed reversible error in applying the
precepts enunciated in the cited cases. While we agree that policemen, like soldiers, are at the beck and call of public duty as peace officers
and technically on duty round-the-clock, the same does not justify the grant of compensation benefits for the death of SPO2 Alegre based on
the facts disclosed by the records. For clarity, a review of the cases relevant to the matter at hand is in order.

In Hinoguin, the deceased Philippine Army soldier, Sgt. Limec Hinoguin, together with two other members of his detachment, sought
and were orally granted permission by the commanding officer of their company to leave their station in Carranglan, Nueva Ecija to go on
overnight pass to Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya. As they were returning to their headquarters, one of his companions, not knowing that his M-16
rifle was on semi-automatic mode, accidentally pulled the trigger and shot Sgt. Hinoguin who then died as a result thereof. Ruling for the
grant of death compensation benefits, this Court held:

The concept of a workplace referred to in Ground 1, for instance, cannot always be literally applied to a soldier on active duty status, as if he
were a machine operator or a worker in assembly line in a factory or a clerk in a particular fixed office. Obviously, a soldier must go where
his company is stationed. In the instant case, Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya was not, of course, Carranglan, Nueva Ecija. Aritao being approximately
1-1/2 hours away from the latter by public transportation. But Sgt. Hinoguin, Cpl. Clavo and Dft. Alibuyog had permission from their
Commanding Officer to proceed to Aritao, and it appears to us that a place which soldiers have secured lawful permission to be at cannot be
very different, legally speaking, from a place where they are required to go by their commanding officer. We note that the three (3) soldiers
were on an overnight pass which, notably, they did not utilize in full. They were not on vacation leave. Moreover, they were required or
authorized to carry their firearms with which presumably they were to defend themselves if NPA elements happened to attack them while
en route to and from Aritao or with which to attack and seek to capture such NPA elements as they might encounter. Indeed, if the three (3)
soldiers had in fact encountered NPAs while on their way to or from Aritao and been fired upon by them and if Sgt. Hinoguin had been killed
by an NPA bullet, we do not believe that respondent GSIS would have had any difficulty in holding the death a compensable one.

Then came the case of Nitura, likewise involving a member of the Philippine Army, Pfc. Regino S. Nitura, who was assigned at Basagan,
Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte. At the time he met his death, he was instructed by his battalion commander to check on several personnel
of his command post who were then attending a dance party in Barangay San Jose, Dipolog City. But on his way back to the camp, he passed,
crossed and fell from a hanging wooden bridge which accident caused his death. Reversing the ECC which earlier denied death benefits to
the deceaseds widow, the Court ruled:

A soldier must go where his company is stationed. In the case at bar, Pfc. Nituras station was at Basagan, Katipunan, Zamboanga del
Norte. But then his presence at the site of the accident was with the permission of his superior officer having been directed to go to
Barangay San Jose, Dipolog City. In carrying out said directive, he had to pass by the hanging bridge which connects the two places. As held
in the Hinoguin case (supra.), a place where soldiers have secured lawful permission to be at cannot be very different, legally speaking, from
a place where they are required to go by their commanding officer.

As to the question of whether or not he was performing an official function at the time of the incident, it has been held that a soldier on
active duty status is really on a 24 hours a day official duty status and is subject to military discipline and military law 24 hours a day. He is
subject to call and to the orders of his superior officers at all times, seven (7) days a week, except, of course, when he is on vacation leave
status. Thus, a soldier should be presumed to be on official duty unless he is shown to have clearly and unequivocally put aside that status
or condition temporarily by going on approved vacation leave.

The more recent case which was cited by the appellate court in support of its decision is Employees Compensation Commission v. Court
of Appeals. This time, the claim for death compensation benefits was made in behalf of a deceased police officer, P/Sgt. Wilfredo Alvaran,
who, at the time of his death, was a member of the Mandaluyong Police Station but assigned to the Pasig Provincial Jail. Findings showed
that the deceased brought his son to the Mandaluyong Police Station for interview because the latter was involved in a stabbing
incident. While in front of the said station, the deceased was approached by another policeman and shot him to death. Both the GSIS and the
ECC denied the claim by the deceaseds widow on the ground that Sgt. Alvaran was plainly acting as a father to his son and that he was in a
place where he was not required to be. The Court of Appeals reversed said denial which decision was affirmed by this Court, declaring that:

But for claritys sake and as a guide for future cases, we hereby hold that members of the national police, like P/Sgt. Alvaran, are by the
nature of their functions technically on duty 24 hours a day. Except when they are on vacation leave, policemen are subject to call at
anytime and may be asked by their superiors or by any distressed citizen to assist in maintaining the peace and security of the community.

xxxxxxxxx
We hold that by analogy and for purposes of granting compensation under P. D. No. 626, as amended, policemen should be treated in the
same manner as soldiers.

While it is true that, geographically speaking, P/Sgt Alvaran was not actually at his assigned post at the Pasig Provincial Jail when he was
attacked and killed, it could not also be denied that in bringing his son --- as a suspect in a case --- to the police station for questioning to
shed light on a stabbing incident, he was not merely acting as father but as a peace officer.

From the foregoing cases, it can be gleaned that the Court did not justify its grant of death benefits merely on account of the rule that
soldiers or policemen, as the case may be, are virtually working round-the-clock. Note that the Court likewise attempted in each case to find
a reasonable nexus between the absence of the deceased from his assigned place of work and the incident that led to his death.

In Hinoguin, the connection between his absence from the camp where he was assigned and the place where he was accidentally shot
was the permission duly given to him and his companions by the camp commander to go on overnight pass. According to the Court, a place
which soldiers have secured lawful permission cannot be very different, legally speaking, from a place where they are required to go by
their commanding officer and, hence, the deceased is to be considered as still in the performance of his official functions.

The same thing can be said of Nitura where the deceased had to go outside of his station on permission and directive by his superior
officer to check on several personnel of his command who were then attending a dance party.

As for P/Sgt. Alvaran in the Employees Compensation Commission case, although he was not given any directive or permission by a
superior officer to be at the Mandaluyong Police Station, his presence there was nonetheless justified by the peacekeeping nature of the
matter he was attending to at the time that he was attacked and shot to death, that is, bringing his son to the police station to answer for a
crime, a basic duty which any policeman is expected and ought to perform.

Taking together jurisprudence and the pertinent guidelines of the ECC with respect to claims for death benefits, namely: (a) that the
employee must be at the place where his work requires him to be; (b) that the employee must have been performing his official functions;
and (c) that if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer, it is not difficult to
understand then why SPO2 Alegres widow should be denied the claims otherwise due her. Obviously, the matter SPO2 Alegre was attending
to at the time he met his death, that of ferrying passengers for a fee, was intrinsically private and unofficial in nature proceeding as it did
from no particular directive or permission of his superior officer. In the absence of such prior authority as in the cases
of Hinoguin and Nitura, or peacekeeping nature of the act attended to by the policeman at the time he died even without the explicit
permission or directive of a superior officer, as in the case of P/Sgt. Alvaran, there is no justification for holding that SPO2 Alegre met the
requisites set forth in the ECC guidelines.That he may be called upon at any time to render police work as he is considered to be on a
round-the-clock duty and was not on an approved vacation leave will not change the conclusion arrived at considering that he was not
placed in a situation where he was required to exercise his authority and duty as a policeman. In fact, he was refusing to render one pointing
out that he already complied with the duty detail.[8] At any rate, the 24-hour duty doctrine, as applied to policemen and soldiers, serves
more as an after-the-fact validation of their acts to place them within the scope of the guidelines rather than a blanket license to benefit
them in all situations that may give rise to their deaths. In other words, the 24-hour duty doctrine should not be sweepingly applied to all
acts and circumstances causing the death of a police officer but only to those which, although not on official line of duty, are nonetheless
basically police service in character.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 42003 dated February
28, 1997, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 136200. June 8, 2000]

CELERINO VALERIANO, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM, respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

To be compensable, an injury must have resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. It must be shown that it
was sustained within the scope of employment while the claimant was performing an act reasonably necessary or incidental thereto or
while following the orders of a superior. Indeed, the standard of "work connection" must be satisfied even by one who invokes the
24-hour-duty doctrine; otherwise, the claim for compensability must be denied.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 assailing the January 30, 1998 Court of Appeals[1] (CA) Decision,[2] as well as the September
25, 1998 Resolution[3] in CA-GR SP No. 31141. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows: [4]

"WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Employees Compensation Commission dated April 1, 1993 is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto."

The September 25, 1998 Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are summarized in the assailed Decision as follows: [5]

"Celerino S. Valeriano was employed as a fire truck driver assigned at the San Juan Fire Station. Sometime on the evening
of July 3, 1985, petitioner was standing along Santolan Road, Quezon City, when he met a friend by the name of Alexander
Agawin. They decided to proceed to Bonanza Restaurant in EDSA, Quezon City, for dinner. On their way home at around
9:30 PM, the owner-type jeepney they were riding in figured in a head-on collision with another vehicle at the
intersection of N. Domingo and Broadway streets in Quezon City. Due to the strong impact of the collision, petitioner was
thrown out of the vehicle and was severely injured. As a result of the mishap, petitioner was brought to several hospitals
for treatment.

"On September 16, 1985, he filed a claim for income benefits under PD 626, with the Government Security Insurance
Service. His claim for benefits was opposed on the ground that the injuries he sustained did not directly arise or result
from the nature of his work. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial by the System but the same was
turned down on the ground that the condition for compensability had not been satisfied. Petitioner then interposed an
appeal to the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC for short). In a decision dated April 1, 1993, the ECC ruled
against herein appellant, the pertinent portions of which are stated in the following wise:

After a study of the records of the case under consideration, we find the decision of the respondent System
denying appellants claim in order.

Under the present compensation law, injury and the resulting disability or death is compensable if the injury
resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. It means that the injury or death must
be sustained while the employee is in the performance of his official duty; that the injury is sustained at the
place where his work requires him to be; and if the injury is sustained elsewhere, that the employee is executing
an order for the employer. The aforementioned conditions are found wanting in the instant case. The accident
that the appellant met in the instant case occurred outside of his time and place of work. Neither was appellant
performing his official duties as a fireman at the time of the accident. In fact, appellant just left the Bonanza
Restaurant where he and his friends had dinner. Apparently, the injuries appellant sustained from the accident
did not arise out of [and] in the course of his employment. Considering therefore the absence of a causal link
between the contingency for which income benefits [are] being claimed and his occupation as fireman, his claim
under PD 626, as amended, cannot be given due course."

The CA Ruling
The Court of Appeals agreed with the finding of the Employees Compensation Commission that petitioners injuries and disability were not
compensable, emphasizing that they were not work-connected.

"Turning to the case before us, the evidence on record shows that herein petitioner was injured not at the place where
his work required him to be. Neither was he executing an order from his superior, nor performing his official functions at
the time of the accident. It must be recalled that at the time of the accident, petitioner was already dismissed from his
regular 8-hour daily work. He was walking along Santolan Road when he met his friend and they decided to go to
Bonanza Restaurant for dinner. Notwithstanding his claim that he can be called to report for work anytime in case there
is a fire, or that his position is akin to that of a military man, a contention we cannot support, still the circumstances
leading to the accident in which he was injured reveals that there is no causative connection between the injury he
sustained and his work. Petitioners invocation of the ruling in Hinoguin vs. ECC, 172 SCRA 350 is misplaced. In that case,
petitioner Sgt. Hinoguin was a member of the Armed Forces and soldiers are presumed to be on official duty 24 hours a
day. In the case at bar, petitioner is a fireman with a specific tour of duty. To sustain petitioners contention of
compensability would, in effect, make the employer, in this case the State, the insurer against all perils. That is not the
intendment of our lawmakers in enacting the Workmens Compensation Act." [6]

Hence, this Petition.[7]

The Issues

In his Petition,[8]Petitioner Celerino Valeriano urges the Court to resolve the following questions:

"I

WHETHER PETITIONERS INJURIES ARE WORK-CONNECTED.

"II

WHETHER PETITIONER FIREMAN, LIKE SOLDIERS, CAN BE PRESUMED TO BE ON 24-HOUR DUTY."[9]

These questions point to the sole issue of the compensability of Petitioner Valerianos injuries and resulting disability.

The Courts Ruling

We find no merit in the Petition.

Main Issue: Compensability of Valerianos Injuries and Resulting Disability

Disability benefits are granted an employee who sustains an injury or contracts a sickness resulting in temporary total, permanent total, or
permanent partial, disability.[10] For the injury and the resulting disability to be compensable, they must have necessarily resulted from an
accident arising out of and in the course of employment.[11]

Were Petitioners Injuries

Work-Connected?

Citing Iloilo Dock & Engineering Co. v. Workmens Compensation Commission,[12] the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners claim on the
ground that he had not been injured at his work place, executing an order of his superior, or performing official functions when he met the
accident.

We agree. In Iloilo, the Court explained the phrase "arising out of and in the course of employment" in this wise:

"The two components of the coverage formula -- "arising out of" and "in the course of employment" -- are said to be
separate tests which must be independently satisfied; however, it should not be forgotten that the basic concept of
compensation coverage is unitary, not dual, and is best expressed in the word, "work-connection," because an
uncompromising insistence on an independent application of each of the two portions of the test can, in certain cases,
exclude clearly work-connected injuries. The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and are
descriptive of its character, while the words "in the course of" refer to the time, place and circumstances under which the
accident takes place.
 "As a matter of general proposition, an injury or accident is said to arise "in the course of employment" when it takes
place within the period of the employment, at a place where the employee may reasonably x x x be, and while he is
fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto."[13]

Thus, for injury to be compensable, the standard of "work connection" must be substantially satisfied. The injury and the resulting disability
sustained by reason of employment are compensable regardless of the place where the injured occurred, if it can be proven that at the time
of the injury, the employee was acting within the purview of his or her employment and performing an act reasonably necessary or
incidental thereto.[14]

Petitioner Valeriano was not able to demonstrate solidly how his job as a firetruck driver was related to the injuries he had suffered. That he
sustained the injuries after pursuing a purely personal and social function -- having dinner with some friends -- is clear from the records of
the case. His injuries were not acquired at his work place; nor were they sustained while he was performing an act within the scope of his
employment or in pursuit of an order of his superior. Thus, we agree with the conclusion reached by the appellate court that his injuries and
consequent disability were not work-connected and thus not compensable.

Applicability of Hinoguin and Nitura

Petitioner debunks the importance given by the appellate court to the fact that he was not at his work place and had in fact been dismissed
for the day when he met the accident. He argues that his claim for disability benefits is anchored on the proposition that the exigency of his
job as a fireman requires a constant observance of his duties as such; thus, he should be considered to have been "on call" when he met the
accident. He underscores the applicability of Hinoguin v. ECC[15] and Nitura v. ECC[16] to his case.

In Hinoguin and Nitura, the Court granted death compensation benefits to the heirs of Sgt. Limec Hinoguin and Pfc. Regino Nitura, both
members of the Philippine Army. After having gone elsewhere on an overnight pass, Sgt. Hinoguin was accidentally shot by a fellow soldier
during the formers return trip to their headquarters. Pfc. Nitura, on the other hand, died after falling from a bridge during his trip back to
his camp. At the time of his death, he had just accomplished his commanders instruction to check on several personnel of his command post
who were then at a dance party.

Both cases espoused the position that the concept of "work place" cannot always be literally applied to a soldier on active duty status who,
to all intents and purposes, is on a 24-hour official duty status, subject to military discipline and law and at the beck and call of his superior
officers at all times, except when he is on vacation leave status.[17]

This ratiocination, later applied to police officers in Employees Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals,[18] was dissected in the more
recent GSIS v. Court of Appeals.[19] In the latter case, the deceased police officer, SPO2 Florencio Alegre, was moonlighting as a tricycle driver
at the time of his death. The Court reviewed Hinoguin, Nitura and ECC and noted that in each case death benefits were granted, not just
because of the principle that soldiers or policemen were virtually working round the clock. More important, there was a finding of a
reasonable nexus between the absence of the deceased from his assigned place of work and the incident causing his death. The Court
explained:

"In Hinoguin, the connection between his absence from the camp where he was assigned and the place where he was
accidentally shot was the permission duly given to him and his companions by the camp commander to go on overnight
pass. According to the Court, "a place [where] soldiers have secured lawful permission cannot be very different, legally
speaking, from a place where they are required to go by their commanding officer" and hence, the deceased is to be
considered as still in the performance of his official functions.

"The same thing can be said of Nitura where the deceased had to go outside of his station on permission and directive by
his superior officer to check on several personnel of his command who were then attending a dance party.

"As for P/Sgt. Alvaran in the Employees Compensation Commission case, although he was not given any directive or
permission by a superior officer to be at the Mandaluyong Police Station, his presence there was nonetheless justified by
the peacekeeping nature of the matter he was attending to at the time x x x he was attacked and shot to death, that is,
[while] bringing his son to the police station to answer for a crime [--] a basic duty which any policeman is expected and
ought to perform."[20]

Ruling that the death of SPO2 Alegre was not compensable, the Court pointed out that the 24-hour-duty doctrine should not embrace all acts
and circumstances causing the death of a police officer, but only those that can be categorized as police service in character. It further held:

"Taking together jurisprudence and the pertinent guidelines of the ECC with respect to claims for death benefits, namely:
(a) that the employee must be at the place where his work requires him to be; (b) that the employee must have been
performing his official functions; and (c) that if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing
 an order for the employer, it is not difficult to understand then why SPO2 Alegres widow should be denied the claims
otherwise due her. Obviously, the matter SPO2 Alegre was attending to at the time he met his death, that of ferrying
passengers for a fee, was intrinsically private and unofficial in nature proceeding as it did from no particular directive or
permission of his superior officer. In the absence of such prior authority as in the cases of Hinoguin and Nitura, or
peace-keeping nature of the act attended to by the policeman at the time he died even without the explicit permission or
directive of a superior officer, as in the case of P/Sgt. Alvaran, there is no justification for holding that SPO2 Alegre met
the requisites set forth in the ECC guidelines. That he may be called upon at anytime to render police work as he is
considered to be on a round-the-clock duty and was not on an approved vacation leave will not change the conclusion
arrived at[,] considering that he was not placed in a situation where he was required to exercise his authority and duty as
policeman. In fact, he was refusing to render one[,] pointing out that he already complied with the duty detail. At any rate,
the 24-hour duty doctrine, as applied to policemen and soldiers, serves more as an after-the-fact validation of their acts
to place them within the scope of the guidelines rather than [as] a blanket license to benefit them in all situations that
may give rise to their deaths. In other words, the 24-hour duty doctrine should not be sweepingly applied to all acts and
circumstances causing the death of a police officer but only to those which, although not on official line of duty, are
nonetheless basically police service in character." [21]

We recognize the importance and laud the efforts of firemen in our society. Indeed, the nature of their job requires them to be always on
alert, like soldiers and police officers, and to respond to fire alarms which may occur anytime of the day. Be that as it may, the circumstances
in the present case do not call for the application of Hinoguin and Nitura. Following the rationalization in GSIS, the 24-hour-duty doctrine
cannot be applied to petitioner's case, because he was neither at his assigned work place nor in pursuit of the orders of his superiors when
he met an accident. But the more important justification for the Courts stance is that he was not doing an act within his duty and authority
as a firetruck driver, or any other act of such nature, at the time he sustained his injuries. We cannot find any reasonable connection
between his injuries and his work as a firetruck driver.

While we sympathize with petitioners plight, we cannot grant his Petition. True, the policy is to extend the applicability of Presidential
Decree No. 626 to as many qualified employees as possible,[22] but this must be balanced by the equally vital interest of denying undeserving
claims for compensation.[23] Considering the circumstances in petitioners case, he cannot be deemed qualified for disability benefits under
the law.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-48594 March 16, 1988

GENEROSO ALANO, petitioner,

vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondent.

GUTTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The only issue in this case is whether or not the injury sustained by the deceased Dedicacion de Vera resulting in her death is compensable
under the law as an employment accident.

The facts as found by the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission are as follows:

Dedicacion de Vera, a government employee during her lifetime, worked as principal of Salinap Community School in San Carlos City,
Pangasinan. Her tour of duty was from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. On November 29, 1976, at 7:00 A.M., while she was waiting for a ride at Plaza
Jaycee in San Carlos City on her way to the school, she was bumped and run over by a speeding Toyota mini-bus which resulted in her
instantaneous death. She is survived by her four sons and a daughter.

On June 27, 1977, Generoso C. Alano, brother of the deceased, filed the instant claim for in come benefit with the GSIS for and in behalf of the
decedent's children. The claim was, however, denied on the same date on the ground that the "injury upon which compensation is being
claimed is not an employment accident satisfying all the conditions prescribed by law." On July 19, 1977 appellant requested for a
reconsideration of the system's decision, but the same was denied and the records of the case were elevated to this Commission for review.
(Rollo, p. 12)

The respondent Commission affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System. It stated that Section I (a), Rule III of the
Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation specifically provides that: "For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all the following conditions (1) The employee must have
sustained the injury during his working hours; (2) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be;
and (3) The employee must have been performing his official functions." (Rollo, p. 13)

According to the respondent Commission, the deceased's accident did not meet any of the aforementioned conditions. First, the accident
occured at about 7:00 a.m. or thirty minutes before the deceased's working hours. Second, it happened not at her workplace but at the plaza
where she usually waits for a ride to her work. Third, she was not then performing her official functions as school principal nor was she on a
special errand for the school. The case, therefore, was dismissed.

The petitioner then went to this Court on petition for review on certiorari. He alleges that the deceased's accident has "arisen out of or in the
course of her employment."

The respondent Commission reiterates its views and contends that the present provision of law on employment injury is different from that
provided in the old Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428) and is "ategorical in that the injury must have been sustained at work while at
the workplace, or elsewhere while executing an order from the employer." (Rollo, p. 44)

The Government Service Insurance System which received a copy of the Court's resolution requiring the parties to submit their memoranda,
however manifests that it does not appear to be a party to the case because it had not been impleaded as a party thereto.

We rule in favor of the petitioner.

This case does not come to us with a novel issue. In the earlier case of Vda. de Torbela v. Employees' Compensation Commission (96 SCRA
260,263,264) which has a similar factual background, this Court held:

It is a fact that Jose P. Torbela, Sr. died on March 3, 1975 at about 5:45 o'clock in the morning due to injuries sustained by him in a vehicular
accident while he was on his way to school from Bacolod City, where he lived, to Hinigaran Negros Occidental where the school of which he
was the principal was located and that at the time of the accident he had in his possession official papers he allegedly worked on in his
residence on the eve of his death.

The claim is compensable. When an employee is accidentally injured at a point reasonably proximate to the place at work, while he is going
to and from his work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment.
In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased died while going to her place of work. She was at the place where, as the petitioner puts it,
her job necessarily required her to be if she was to reach her place of work on time. There was nothing private or personal about the school
principal's being at the place of the accident. She was there because her employment required her to be there.

As to the Government Service Insurance System's manifestation, we hold that it is not fatal to this case that it was not impleaded as a party
respondent. As early as the case of La O v. Employees' Compensation Commission, (97 SCRA 782) up to Cabanero v. Employees' Compensation
Commission (111 SCRA 413) and recently, Clemente v. Government Service Insurance System (G.R. No. L-47521, August 31,1987), this Court
has ruled that the Government Service Insurance System is a proper party in employees' compensation cases as the ultimate implementing
agency of the Employees' Compensation Commission. We held in the aforecited cases that "the law and the rules refer to the said System in
all aspects of employee compensation including enforcement of decisions (Article 182 of Implementing Rules)."

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and the Government Service
Insurance System is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) as death benefit and the sum
of One Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (P1,200.00) as attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 78617 June 18, 1990

SALVADOR LAZO, petitioner,

vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION & GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (CENTRAL BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES), respondents.

Oscar P. Paguinto for petitioner.

PADILLA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the respondent Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. 2883 which affirmed the
dismissal of petitioner's claim for compensation against the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).

The petitioner, Salvador Lazo, is a security guard of the Central Bank of the Philippines assigned to its main office in Malate, Manila. His
regular tour of duty is from 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 10:00 o'clock in the evening. On 18 June 1986, the petitioner rendered duty
from 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 10:00 o'clock in the evening. But, as the security guard who was to relieve him failed to arrive, the
petitioner rendered overtime duty up to 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 19 June 1986, when he asked permission from his superior to leave
early in order to take home to Binangonan, Rizal, his sack of rice.

On his way home, at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of 19 June 1986, the passenger jeepney the petitioner was riding on turned turtle due
to slippery road. As a result, he sustained injuries and was taken to the Angono Emergency Hospital for treatment. He was later transferred
to the National Orthopedic Hospital where he was confined until 25 July 1986.

For the injuries he sustained, petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits under PD 626, as amended. His claim, however, was denied by
the GSIS for the reason that

It appears that after performing your regular duties as Security Guard from 2:00 P.M. to 10:00 P.M. on June 18, 1986, you rendered overtime
duty from 10:00 P.M. to 5:06 A.M. of the following day; that at about 5:06 A.M. after asking permission from your superior you were allowed
to leave the Office to do certain personal matter that of bringing home a sack of rice and that, while on your way home, you met a
vehicular accident that resulted to (sic) your injuries. From the foregoing informations, it is evident that you were not at your work place
performing your duties when the incident occurred.1

It was held that the condition for compensability had not been satisfied.

Upon review of the case, the respondent Employees Compensation Commission affirmed the decision since the accident which involved the
petitioner occurred far from his work place and while he was attending to a personal matter.

Hence, the present recourse.

The petitioner contends that the injuries he sustained due to the vehicular accident on his way home from work should be construed as
"arising out of or in the course of employment" and thus, compensable. In support of his prayer for the reversal of the decision, the
petitioner cites the case of Pedro Baldebrin vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission,2 where the Court awarded compensation to the
petitioner therein who figured in an accident on his way home from his official station at Pagadian City to his place of residence at Aurora,
Zamboanga del Sur. In the accident, petitioner's left eye was hit by a pebble while he was riding on a bus.

Respondents claim that the Baldebrin ruling is a deviation from cases earlier decided and hence, not applicable to the present case.

The Court has carefully considered the petition and the arguments of the parties and finds that the petitioner's submission is meritorious.
Liberally interpreting the employees compensation law to give effect to its compassionate spirit as a social legislation 3 in Vda. de Torbela u.
ECC, 4 the Court held:

It is a fact that Jose P. Torbela, Sr. died on March 3, 1975 at about 5:45 o'clock in the morning due to injuries sustained by him in a vehicular
accident while he was on his way to school from Bacolod City, where he lived, to Hinigaran, Negros Occidental where the school of which he
was the principal was located and that at the time of the accident he had in his possession official papers he allegedly worked on in his
residence on the eve of his death. The claim is compensable. When an employee is accidentally injured at a point reasonably proximate to
the place at work, while he is going to and from his work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment.
Again in Alano v. ECC, 5 it was reiterated:

Dedicacion de Vera, a government employee during her lifetime, worked as principal of Salinap Community School in San Carlos City,
Pangasinan. Her tour of duty was from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. On November 29, 1976, at 7:00 A-M., while she was waiting for a ride at Plaza
Jaycee in San Carlos City on her way to the school, she was bumped and run over by a speeding Toyota mini-bus which resulted in her
instantaneous death. ...

In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased died while going to her place of work. She was at the place where, as the petitioner puts it,
her job necessarily required her to be if she was to reach her place of work on time. There was nothing private or personal about the school
principal's being at the place of the accident. She was there because her employment required her to be there.

More recently, in Vano vs. GSIS & ECC, 6 this Court, applying the above quoted decisions, enunciated:

Filomeno Vano was a letter carrier of the Bureau of Posts in Tagbilaran City. On July 31, 1983, a Sunday, at around 3:30 p.m. Vano was
driving his motorcycle with his son as backrider allegedly on his way to his station in Tagbilaran for his work the following day, Monday. As
they were approaching Hinawanan Bridge in Loay, Bohol, the motorcycle skidded, causing its passengers to be thrown overboard. Vano's
head hit the bridge's railing which rendered him unconscious. He was taken to the Engelwood Hospital where he was declared dead on
arrival due to severe hemorrhage.

We see no reason to deviate from the foregoing rulings. Like the deceased in these two (2) aforementioned cases, it was established that
petitioner's husband in the case at bar was on his way to his place of work when he met the accident. His death, therefore, is compensable
under the law as an employment accident.

In the above cases, the employees were on their way to work. In the case at bar, petitioner had come from work and was on his way home,
just like in the Baldebrin case, where the employee "... figured in an accident when he was ping home from his official station at Pagadian
City to his place of residence at Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur ...."7Baldebrin, the Court said:

The principal issue is whether petitioner's injury comes within the meaning of and intendment of the phrase 'arising out of and in the
course of employment.'(Section 2, Workmen's Compensation Act). In Philippine Engineer's Syndicate, Inc. vs. Flora S. Martin and Workmen's
Compensation Commission, 4 SCRA 356, We held that 'where an employee, after working hours, attempted to ride on the platform of a service
truck of the company near his place of work, and, while thus attempting, slipped and fell to the ground and was run over by the truck,
resulting in his death, the accident may be said to have arisen out of or in the course of employment, for which reason his death is
compensable. The fact standing alone, that the truck was in motion when the employee boarded, is insufficient to justify the conclusion that
he had been notoriously negligent, where it does not appear that the truck was running at a great speed.'And, in a later case, Iloilo Dock &
Engineering Co. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 26 SCRA 102, 103, We ruled that '(e)mployment includes not only the actual doing
of the work, but a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where the work is to be done.
If the employee be injured while passing, with the express or implied consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way over the
employer's premises, or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a part of the employer's premises,
the injury is one arising out of and in the course of the employment as much as though it had happened while the employee was engaged in
his work at the place of its performance. (Emphasis supplied)

In the case at bar, it can be seen that petitioner left his station at the Central Bank several hours after his regular time off, because the
reliever did not arrive, and so petitioner was asked to go on overtime. After permission to leave was given, he went home. There is no
evidence on record that petitioner deviated from his usual, regular homeward route or that interruptions occurred in the journey.

While the presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation under the Workmen's Compensation Act (under which
the Baldebrin case was decided) may have been abandoned under the New Labor Code, 8 it is significant that the liberality of the law in
general in favor of the workingman still subsists. As agent charged by the law to implement social justice guaranteed and secured by the
Constitution, the Employees Compensation Commission should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for
compensability, especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection to the accident.

This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor
Code which states that 'all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing
rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.'

The policy then is to extend the applicability of the decree (PD 626) to as many employees who can avail of the benefits thereunder. This is
in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor. 9

There is no reason, in principle, why employees should not be protected for a reasonable period of time prior to or after working hours and
for a reasonable distance before reaching or after leaving the employer's premises. 10
If the Vano ruling awarded compensation to an employee who was on his way from home to his work station one day before an official
working day, there is no reason to deny compensation for accidental injury occurring while he is on his way home one hour after he had left
his work station.

We are constrained not to consider the defense of the street peril doctrine and instead interpret the law liberally in favor of the employee
because the Employees Compensation Act, like the Workmen's Compensation Act, is basically a social legislation designed to afford relief to
the working men and women in our society.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the case be remanded to the ECC and the GSIS for disposition in
accordance with this decision.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-46046 April 5, 1985

EMELITA ENAO, petitioner,

vs.
THE EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondent.

Vivencio M. Carpio, Jr. for petitioner.

Jose G. De Vera for respondent ECC.

ALAMPAY, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission (E.C.C.), dated October 26, 1976, affirming the
decision of the Government Service Insurance System, denying petitioner's claim for Compensation of income benefits due to the injuries
sustained by her when on August 1, 1975, while on her way to Dipolog City for the purpose of purchasing supplies and other training and
school aids for her office, she, together with others, were ambushed by unidentified men believed to be communist insurgents.

The antecedent facts of this case are not disputed and are well stated in the appealed decision rendered by the Employees' Compensation
Commission, subject of the petition in this case.

... On August 1, 1975, appellant (Emelita Enao), a Public School Teacher, together with others, was on her way from her official station at
Sergio Osmena, Sr., Zamboanga del Norte to Dipolog City. According to the Acting Administrative Officer of her employer, 'Having held
classes on July 26, in lieu of August 1, 1975, as per District Memorandum hereto attached, Miss Enao was on her way home from station
when their group was ambushed and fired upon by armed men hitting her on her forearm and abdomen necessitating operation' (Part II,
Income Benefits Claim for Payment), and according to appellant's witnesses, who were members of the ambushed party, she was on her
way to Dipolog City for the purpose of 'securing supplies and other training and school aids necessary for furthering (our) services as a
school teacher' (Affidavits of Francisco L. Podol and Juanita Adanza, respectively). When the appellant and her group were at barrio de
Venta Perla, Polanco, Zamboanga del Norte, they were fired upon by a band of armed men believed to be communist insurgents. As a result
of the ambush, the appellant sustained gunshot wounds on her left forearm and abdomen which compelled her confinement at the
Zamboanga del Norte Provincial Hospital from August 1 to 6, 1975, for surgical removal of foreign bodies (shrapnel) from her left arm and
later at the Dipolog Medical Center from September 10 to 12, 1975 for definitive treatment. She also developed interstitial pneumonia as a
result. (Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission, Annex "B", Rollo, pp. 8-9).

On August 5, 1975, petitioner sent a notice of claim of injury to the Secretary of Education and Culture, through the Division Superintendent
of Schools, Zamboanga City. It is said that this claim was not controverted.

On the same date, a claim for income benefits for disability was filed by the herein petitioner with the Government Service Insurance System
but this claim was denied by the System in its letter-decision, dated February 27, 1976, on its reasoning that:

It appears that on your way to Dipolog City for the purpose of purchasing your needs, you were ambushed by unidentified men believed to
be NPAS. Though this happened on August 1, 1975, a regular working day, this was considered your off day, having held classes in its stead
on July 26, 1975, a Saturday, per District Memorandum No. 1, s. 1975, dated June 2, 1975. Under such situation, for purposes of the
Employees' Compensation, said accident happened outside your time and place of work, not to mention the fact that you were not in the
performance of your official functions when it happened.

In view of the foregoing, your claim is hereby denied. (Annex "A", Rollo, p. 7)

Not satisfied with the above ruling of the GSIS and upon denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof, the latter appealed to the
Employees' Compensation Commission. On October 26, 1976, the ECC affirmed the decision of the GSIS appealed from and dismissed the
Petitioner's claim, on the grounds that:

... First. the day when the accident occurred, more particularly August 1, 1975, was an off-day. Perusal of the District Memorandum No. 1,
series of 1975 and dated June 2, 1975, win show that August 1, 1975, is not just an isolated off-day, but one of those dates fixed and set in
lieu of Saturday. Hence, the injury was incurred not during office hours. Second, appellant incurred injury while en route to Dipolog City;
more aptly put, while outside t-he school premises where she normally discharges her official functions. The sworn statement of the Acting
Administrative Officer and the appellant's witness all point to the same circumstance. Third, while appellant's witnesses testified in an
affidavit that appellant left her official station for Dipolog City on the day in question for the purpose of procurring school supplies and
training aids to enhance her teaching efficiency, we find the version of the Acting Administrative Officer more credible-that is, the appellant
was on her way home from station-for there is nothing which indicates that it is false, misleading or fabricated. On the other hand, the
preponderance of legal opinion holds that affidavits, as those of appellant's witnesses, are only prima facie evidence of weak probative force
and are in themselves self-serving declarations where the same have been made in anticipation of a future litigation. It has been said that
'perhaps the most subtle and prolific of au the fallacies of testimony arises out of unconscious partisanship.' In the case at bar, upon the
happening of the accident, the companions of the appellant perhaps still sympathetic to her for what befall her, and testifying in an affidavit,
are apt to side with her. (Annex "B", Rollo, pp. 9-10)

In the petition for review presented to this Court, Petitioner contends that the Respondent ECC has decided the claim in a way not in
accordance with law and applicable decision of the Supreme Court.

At the time of the incident in question, the pertinent and governing provisions of law are to be found in Section 1, Rule 11, of the Amended
Rules on Employees' Compensation, which provides:

SECTION 1. Grounds.(a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an
employment accident satisfying all of the following conditions:

(1) The employee must have sustained the injury during his working hours;

(2) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be; and

(3) The employee must have been performing his official function.

The Petitioner, in proceeding to Dipolog City on August 1, 1975, which is a Friday, from her station at the Municipality of Sergio Osmena, Sr.,
Zamboanga del Norte, intended to procure supplies and other training aids which are needed facilities in connection with her services as a
school teacher at the Wilbon Primary School, cannot be at all disputed. The companions of the Petitioner at the time of the ambush and who
appear to be co-teachers of the Petitioner, namely: Francisco L. Podol and Juanita Adanza, have attested in their respective affidavits that
they and the Petitioner were at that time on their way to Dipolog City "for the purpose of securing supplies and other training and school
aids necessary for the furtherance of their services as school teachers." There is no mention at an in the decision of the Employees'
Compensation Commission that this particular assertion has been at all contradicted or controverted by any evidence whatsoever
submitted to the Commission by the GSIS.

We find no basis at an for the findings made by the Employees' Compensation Commission in its decision that the statements of Petitioner
and her witnesses are merely self-serving declarations because We can discern no circumstance that would indicate or support such a
conclusion. As a matter of fact, the decision appealed from accepts the fact that the statements given by Petitioner-Appellant's witnesses
constitute prima facie evidence of the matter sought to be established. Uncontroverted and unrefuted by any evidence, then such statements
of appellant's witnesses would suffice to establish that the multiple gunshot wounds and injuries sustained by appellant and which caused
her confinement at the Zamboanga del Norte Provincial Hospital from August 1 to 6, 1975 for removal of shrapnels from her left arm and
later at the Dipolog Medical Center from September 1 to 12, 1975, are definitely work-connected.

The conjecture expressed in the decision of the ECC that appellant obtained the referred self-serving declaration of her witnesses "in
anticipation of a future litigation" is unfair and untenable. Petitioner could not have even expected that respondent GSIS would resist her
claim. Notice of the same claim for the injuries she sustained is said to have been presented to the Secretary of Education and Culture,
through the Division Superintendent of Schools, Division of Zamboanga del Norte at Dipolog City, promptly on August 5, 1975, or four (4)
days after the ambush incident and such claim was not controverted by said public school officials. These submissions of
Petitioner-Appellant have not at all been contradicted by Respondent. No cause has, therefore, been shown why petitioner would have been
to obtain false affidavits from her co-teachers whose sense and probity and righteousness must be presumed until otherwise disproved.

Furthermore, the fact that Dipolog City is also the residence of the Petitioner does not at all, by this singular circumstance, render untrue or
false the clear evidence submitted in this case that Petitioner and her co-teachers were proceeding to Dipolog City at the time to purchase
needed supplies and other training and school aids. That Dipolog City happened to be also the Petitioner's place of residence, in this
instance, becomes simply incidental and/or purely coincidental.

As it can be rightfully ruled that the Claimant-Petitioner was actually then performing her official functions, it hardly matters then whether
such task which Petitioner was then engaged in or discharging, happened outside the regular working hours and not in the Petitioner's
place of work. It is rather obvious that in proceeding to purchase school materials in Dipolog City, Petitioner would necessarily have to leave
the school premises and her travel need not be during her usual working hours. What is significant and controlling is that the injuries she
sustained are work-connected, which the Court finds to be so.

The environmental facts in this case are even more compelling than the earlier case of Vda. de Torbela vs. Employees' Compensation
Commission, L-42627, February 21, 1980, 96 SCRA 260, where, by a significant majority vote of this Court, it was held that a claim arising
from a vehicular accident sustained by a school principal on his way from Bacolod City where he lived to his school at Hinigaran, Negros
Occidental where he was the school principal of, is compensable. It was therein ruled that "where an employee is accidentally injured at a
point reasonably proximate to the place of work, while she is going to and from her work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in
the course of her employment.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE, and the Government Service
Insurance System is hereby ordered to grant the Petitioner's claim for loss of income benefits and to process and ascertain the total amount
due herein Petitioner and thereafter to pay the same.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-15978 December 29, 1960

DAVAO GULF LUMBER CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
HON. N. BAENS DEL ROSARIO, ET AL., respondents.

Primitivo A. Diaz for petitioner.

N. S. Nata and R. Occea for respondents.

BENGZON, J.:

Review of a decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission.

On September 29, 1967, the truck of Davao Gulf Lumber Corporation carrying some lumber from its sawmill to Davao City, accidentally
overturned on the road. Vicente Soriano, its driver, was killed instantly together with his son, Vicente Soriano Jr.

His widow, Flavia A. Soriano, claimed compensation on November 11, before the Regional Office No. 8, at Davao, of the Department of Labor.
Having found thedriver guilty of notorious negligence, the hearing officer denied compensation.

On appeal, the Chairman of the Workmen's Compensation saw differently. He found no such negligence, and awarded compensation. Fifteen
days after receiving copy of such award, the Davao Gulf moved for reconsideration by the Commission as a whole. It happened, however,
that there was a rule of the Commission which provided:

Sec. 3. Disposition of Appeal. The Commissioner to whom an appealed case is assigned by the Chairman shall decide the same on its merit.
Either appellee or appellant, or both, may seek the reconsideration of the decision of a Commissioner by the Commission en banc within
10 days from receipt of said decision.

So, pursuant to such rule, the Commission denied the motion for being out of time.

Now, this petition for mandamus seeks to compel the Commission to decide its motion on the merits, petitioner contending that its motion to
reconsider had been filed on time, because the law allows "fifteen days" for appeal, under sec. 50, Republic Act No. 772. The rule is void,
asserts herein petitioner, because it shortens the period specified by law. We think it clear, however, that the section cited by petitioner
refers to appeals from Workmen's Commission to this Court. Maybe the Commission rule holds that when no appeal to it from the decision
of one Commissioner is made in ten days' the latter's opinion becomes the decision of the Commission. From which an appeal may be taken
to this Court within fifteen days from notice, as by statute provided.

Nevertheless, without ruling on this matter, we have chosen to act in accordance with the second alternative of the petition before us; to
regard it as a petition for review of the compensatory award.

According to the decision, the facts were these:

Vicente Soriano since 1947 until his death on September 29, 1957, was employed as a driver of the respondent corporation, earning P5.00 a
day or P30.00 a week. In the early morning of the last mentioned date, said Vicente Soriano together with his assistant Mariano Bariquit,
and one Rodolfo Mapa,another employee of the respondent corporation, loaded his truck with lumber from the sawmill to be brought to the
company yard in Davao City. Then Vicente Soriano brought the truck to the gasoline station owned and operated by the respondent within
its sawmill compound, and filled the truck with gasoline(60 liters). A delivery receipt for the lumber was issued by the dispatcherand the
truck was allowed to proceed to Davao City. On the way, the truck did have passengers Vicente Soriano's wife and 3 minor children, his
assistant, Mario Bariquit and 6 laborers who hitched a ride in the truck.

Sitting beside Vicente Soriano was Vicente Soriano, Jr., then Mario Bariquit, Conchita, a daughter of Soriano, and Mrs. Flavia Aliwasag de
Soriano. The truck was loaded with about one hundred (100) pieces of rough lumber. Sittingon the load of rough lumber were the
aforementioned laborers of the Davao Gulf Lumber Corporation.

At about 10:30 a.m., same date, when they were near the house of Ex-Sgt. Oxales, PC, at Nalagos, Davao City, driver Vicente Soriano stopped
the truck because they heard an unusual sound from under the rear portion thereof. Soriano, together with Mario Bariquit, descended from
the truck and decided to investigate. They then dismantled the rear axle of the vehicle and seeing no defect therein, they returned the parts
to their respective places and then proceeded with their trip. At about 11 o'clock that same morning, after having passed Nalagos crossing,
policeman F. Macias of Davao City, signalled the truck to stop because he wanted to ride, but seeing no place to sit in the truck, he gave up
the idea and told the truck driver to proceed.

After the truck had run about a period of 20 minutes along the descending road, at Km. 30, Nalagos, Davao City, the gear of the truck went
out of order rendering the gear shift useless. The truck was rapidly gaining speed and Vicente Soriano finding that the brakes would not
function ordered the persons riding atop the load of lumber to jump off the vehicle.

At this instance Mario Bariquit pulled the hand brake so as to stop the truck but it did not function. Vicente Soriano stepped on the clutch
pedal and manipulated the transmission in order to switch to low gear but to no avail. Vicente Soriano was able to guide the truck from Km.
30 to Km. 29 at Nalagos, Davao City. But Vicente Soriano, Jr. became scared and jumped into the arms of his father who lost control of the
vehicle, which then bumped Km. Post #29 and a pile of big stones about one (1)) meter in diameter by the right side of the road causing the
truck to somersault. As a result of the impact, the new cable about one half inch in diameter with which the load of lumber was tied was cut
and the pieces of lumber were strewn on the road. Vicente Soriano, Sr. and his son, Vicente Soriano, Jr. were killed instantly.

On the basis of the above, the Commissioner ordered the Davao Gulf Lumber Corporation to pay. The latter insists the accident was due to
the deceased's reckless negligence, and points out to the findings of the hearing officer. The latter, it must be stated, imputed notorious
negligence to the driver because:

1. Preceding the accident the truck was running 40 to 50 kilometers per hour;

2. That the road was dangerous forming a steep slope and the curve of the road was very near the accident;lawphil.net

3. That the machine of the truck was very defective as the truck that met the accident has no more brakes at the time it was going down at a
distance of 5 kms;

4. That the trip in question was personal to meet the relative of the wife of the deceased and the loading of the lumber on that day SUNDAY
was never authorized by the respondent nor any of its representatives. (Pp. 3-2 s.t.n.) (P. 8 s.t.n.)

5. That the trip was made solely at the instance of the deceased;

6. That the dump truck that met the accident was not registered in the Motor Vehicle Office as the same must be utilized only in carrying
slabs inside the sawmill compound; so that its brakes are not in good condition and unworthy to be taken to the public highway;

7. That despite the defective condition of the truck the deceased (Vicente Soriano Sr.) still drove the truck until he met the accident;

8. That the members of his family were all seated in the front seat and immediately preceding the accident his Jr. jump into his arms as a
consequence of which he lost control of the steering wheel thus hitting a kilometer post. (Affidavit of Mario Bariquit). (Exh. 7-B)

In our opinion, the truck was running fast just before overturning because it was then on a slope, and (as declared by the Commission) the
"gear of the truck went out of order rendering the gear shift useless," and that the brake "would not function." As to the fourth and fifth
circumstances, the Commissioner's decision says the Company consented to or authorized the trip.

Concerning the non-registration of the truck in Motor Vehicle Office, and its defective condition there is no finding that the driver knew
this at the time of driving. Registration of the vehicle was not his concern.

As to the presence of members of his family in the vehicle, supposing it was in violation of company regulations, it is not certain that it
caused the accident. 1Indeed, as his wife and children were present, this driver must have been extremely careful not reckless. What
happened must have been unforeseen, it may only be blamed upon the worn-out condition of the motor transport or to "accident," for which
the employer is responsible, it having arisen out of and in the course of the deceased's regular duties as driver. (Sec. 2, Act No. 3428 as
amended by Republic Act 772.)

The death was, consequently, compensable. The Commission and this Court find no notorious negligence.
G.R. No. L-48488 April 25, 1980

GLORIA D. MENEZ, petitioner,

vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION &
CULTURE), respondents.

Gloria D. Menez in her own behalf.

Manuel M. Lazaro for respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:

Petition for review on certiorari from the decision en banc dated March 1, 1978 of the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case
No. 0462, affirming the denial by the Government Service Insurance System of the claim of petitioner for benefits under Presidential Decree
No. 626 (now Title II the New Labor Code) and dismissing said claim.

The records disclose that petitioner Gloria D. Menez was employed by the Department (now Ministry) of Education & Culture as a school
teacher. She retired on August 31, 1975 under the disability retirement plan at the age of 54 years after 32 years of teaching, due to
rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis. Before her retirement, she was assigned at Raja Soliman High School in Tondo-Binondo, Manila near
a dirty creek.

On October 21, 1976, petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, with respondent
Government Service Insurance System (p. 1, ECC rec.).

On October 25, 1976, respondent GSIS denied said claim on the ground that petitioner's ailments, rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis, are
not occupational diseases taking into consideration the nature of her particular work. In denying aforesaid claim, respondent GSIS thus
resolved:

Upon evaluation based on general accepted medical authorities, your ailments are found to be the least causally related to your duties and
conditions of work. We believe that our ailments are principally traceable to factors which are definitely not work-connected. Moreover, the
evidences you have, submitted have not shown that the said ailments directly resulted from your occupation as Teacher IV of Raja Soliman
High School, Manila (Letter-Resolution, p. 4, ECC Case No. 0462).

On November 24, 1976, petitioner filed a letter-request for reconsideration of the aforesaid denial of her claim, which request was denied
by the GSIS in its letter-resolution of November 28, 1976 therein reiterating that on the basis of the evidence on record, it appears that
petitioner has not established that her employment had any causal relationship with the contraction of the ailments (p. 6, ECC rec.).

On March 7, 1977, petitioner again requested for reconsideration of the second denial of said claim, still alleging that her ailments arose out
of and in the course of employment (p. 11, ECC rec.).

On March 11, 1977, respondent GSIS reaffirmed its stand on the case and elevated the entire records thereof to the Employees'
Compensation Commission for review (p. 12, ECC rec.).

On March 1, 1978, respondent Commission issued a decision en banc thus stating:

... Despite assertions to the contrary by herein appellant, this Commission fully agrees with the respondent system that appellant's
employment has nothing to do with the development of her disabling illnesses. Appellant's ailments are not listed as occupational diseases
for the employment she was engaged in as to merit compensation under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended (p. 13, rec.).

On July 7, 1978, petitioner filed this petition seeking a review of aforesaid decision of respondent Commission (p. 2, rec.).

Petitioner claims she contracted pneumonitis and/or bronchiectasis with hemoptysis and rheumatoid arthritis on January 27, 1975 after
wetting and chilling during the course of employment which are permanent and recurring in nature and work-connected (p. 2, rec.).

She specifically alleged that

... said sickness and/or disabilities arose out of or in the course of employment and is aggravated by the condition and nature of the work in
school, that appellant belonged to the afternoon and night shifts as shown by her time record, Annex D, subjecting her to varying climatic
(sic) temperature at noon and night time; and that the place of work, Raja Soliman High School, is surrounded by the Divisoria market at the
north, Sta. Helena Bridge and Creek which is heavily polluted; in the Northeast, is the presence of many squatter houses too, and in the
south gasoline stations, bakery, Textile market as stated before and a fact. That as a teacher of social studies handling 250 students more
or less a day, she is subjected to infections from students who have flu, colds and other respiratory infections which aggravated her ailments
(p. 3, rec.).

Petitioner now maintains that her ailments arose in the course of employment and were aggravated by the condition and nature of her work.
Specifically, she asserts that "pneumonitis or baby pneumonia which has become chronic that led to bronchiectasis which is irreversible and
permanent in nature is compensable under No. 21 of compensable diseases (Resolution No. 432 dated July 20, 1977) as conditions were
present as attested to by doctor's affidavits and certifications."

Respondents Commission and System contend that petitioner's ailments of rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis are not among the
occupational diseases listed as compensable under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, or under Annex "A" of the Rules on Employees'
Compensation; and, that respondent Commission's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the form of accepted medical findings
thus making said decision final and conclusive on the matter (p. 33 & 68, rec.).

Article 167 (1) of the new Labor Code provides that

(1) 'Sickness' means any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by
employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. ...

Rule 111, Section 1 (b) of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation thus provides:

xx xx xx

(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed
under Annex 'A' of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the
disease is increased by working conditions.

Rule III, Section 1 (c) of said Rules states:

(c) Only inqiury or sickness that occurred on or after January 1, 1975 and the resulting disability or death shall be compensable under these
Rules.

The aforequoted provisions clearly establish that for an illness to be compensable, it must either be:

1. An illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease; or

2. An illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working
conditions.

An occupational disease is one "which results from the nature of the employment, and by nature is meant conditions to which all employees
of a class are subject and which produce the disease as a natural incident of a particular occupation, and attach to that occupation a hazard
which distinguishes it from the usual run of occupations and is in excess of the hazard attending the employment in general" (Goldberg vs. 954
Mancy Corp., 12 N. E. 2d 311; Emphasis supplied).

To be occupational, the disease must be one "due wholly to causes and conditions which are normal and constantly present and
characteristic of the particular occupation; that is, those things which science and industry have not yet learned how to eliminate. Every
worker in every plant of the same industry is alike constantly exposed to the danger of contracting a particular occupational disease"
(Seattle Can Co. vs. Dept. of Labor, 265, p. 741; Emphasis supplied).

An occupational disease is one which develops as a result of hazards peculiar to certain occupations, due to toxic substances (as in the
organic solvents industry), radiation (as in television repairmen), repeated mechanical injury, emotional strain, etc. (Schmidts Attorneys'
Dictionary of Medicine, p. 561).

From the foregoing definitions of occupational diseases or ailments, rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis can be considered as such
occupational diseases. All public high school teachers, like herein petitioner, admittedly the most underpaid but overworked employees of
the government, are subject to emotional strains and stresses, dealing as they do with intractable teenagers especially young boys, and
harassed as they are by various extra-curricular or non- academic assignments, aside from preparing lesson plans until late at night, if they
are not badgered by very demanding superiors. In the case of the petitioner, her emotional tension is heightened by the fact that the high
school in which she teaches is situated in a tough area - Binondo district, which is inhabited by thugs and other criminal elements and
further aggravated by the heavy pollution and congestion therein as well as the stinking smell of the dirty Estero de la Reina nearby. Women,
like herein petitioner, are most vulnerable to such unhealthy conditions. The pitiful situation of all public school teachers is further
accentuated by poor diet for they can ill-afford nutritious food.

In her work, petitioner also has to contend with the natural elements, like the inclement weather heavy rains, typhoons as well as dust
and disease-ridden surroundings peculiar to an insanitary slum area.

These unwholesome conditions are "normal and consistently present in" or are the "hazards peculiar to" the occupation of a public high
school teacher. It is therefore evident that rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis are the "natural incidents" of petitioner's occupation as
such public high school teacher.

But even if rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis are not occupational diseases, there is ample proof that petitioner contracted such
ailments by reason of her occupation as a public high school teacher due to her exposure to the adverse working conditions
above-mentioned.

Indisputably, petitioner contracted pneumonitis and/or bronchiectasis with hemoptysis and rheumatoid arthritis on January 27, 1975 after
being drenched and the consequent "chilling during the course of employment which are permanent and recurring in nature and
work-connected." Undoubtedly, petitioner's ailments thus become compensable under the New Labor Code since under Rule 111, Section 1
(c) of its Implementing Rules, "only sickness or injury which occurred on or after January 1, 1975 and the resulting disability or death shall
be compensable under these Rules."

It must be borne in mind that petitioner was a teacher of the Raja Soliman High School which is located in the heart of Binondo District. She
was constantly exposed to the heavily polluted air and congestion (squatter's area) characteristic of the area. She was not only exposed to
the elements - varying degrees of temperature throughout the day and night - but also had to withstand long hours of standing while
performing her teaching job. Likewise, she had to regularly negotiate long trips from her home in Project 2, Quirino District, Quezon City
(her residence) to said high school in Binondo, scampering from one ride to another, rain or shine, and sweating in the process.

Furthermore, judicial notice should be taken of the fact that our country is in a typhoon belt and that yearly we experience torrential rains
and storms. Needless to say, in her daily rides from Quezon City to Binondo and back, she had to go through the ordeal of perspiring and
getting wet from downpours or heavy rains, thus making her susceptible to contracting her ailments. Moreover, petitioner was always in
contact with 250 students who might have been carriers of contagious respiratory diseases like flu and colds and who were themselves
inadequately nourished, residing as they do in a depressed and congested area. And adding to the unhygienic working atmosphere was her
malnutrition or undernourishment. More often than not, a teacher who has no other source of income takes to aside from the poor man's
staple diet of tuyo, daing and rice legumes like mongo, vegetables and fruits with edible seeds which contain much uric and.

Acute arthritis is inflammation of a joint marked by pain, swelling, heat and redness; the result of rheumatism or gout (p. 56, The Simplified
Medical Dictionary for Lawyers). Gout is a disease characterized by painful inflammation of the joints, in excessive amount of uric acid in the
blood Poor man's gout is caused by hard work, poor food and exposure (p. 268, supra). It may thus be seen that uric acid eventually causes
arthritis, aside from excessive mental and physical stresses to which teachers are subject of reason of their duties.

Consequently, this Court finds petitioner to have substantially shown that the risk of contracting her ailments had been increased by
unfavorable working conditions.

In Dimaano vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission (78 SCRA 510 [1977]), WE ruled that illnesses of rheumatic arthritis with sub-acute
exacerbation and hypertension of therein petitioner, who was herself a teacher, as service-connected, after WE considered her working
conditions and nature of employment which are substantially the same as those of herein petitioner.

Significantly, also, the Employees' Compensation Commission, in its Resolutions Nos. 233 and 432, respectively dated March 16, 1977 and
July 20, 1977, adopted a more realistic construction of the provisions of the New Labor Code by including in the list of compensable
ailments and diseases, cardiovascular disease which comprehends myocardial infarction, pneumonitis and bronchial asthma (Sepulveda vs.
WCC, et al., L-46290, Aug. 25,1978).

Furthermore, it must be stressed that "the approval of petitioner's application for retirement is a clear indication that she was physically
incapacitated to render efficient service (Sudario vs. Republic, L-44088, Oct. 6, 1977; Dimaano vs. WCC, et al., supra). Petitioner was allowed
to retire under the disability retirement plan on August 31, 1975 at the age of 54 which is way below the compulsory retirement age of 65.
Under Memorandum Circular No. 133 issued by the retirement shall be recommended for approval only when "the employee applicant is
below 65 years of age and is physically incapacitated to render further efficient service." Obviously, petitioner thus retired by reason of her
ailments.

Finally, Republic Act 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Charta for Public School Teachers, recognized the enervating effects of these
factors (duties and activities of a school teacher certainly involve physical, mental and emotional stresses) on the health of school teachers
when it directed in one of its provisions that "Teachers shall be protected against the consequences of employment injury in accordance
with existing laws. The effects of the physical and nervous strain on the teachers's health shall be recognized as compensable occupational
diseases in accordance with laws" (Pantoja vs. Republic, et al.. L-43317, December 29, 1978).

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION IS HEREBY SET ASIDE AND THE MINISTRY OF
EDUCATION AND CULTURE IS HEREBY ORDERED

1) TO PAY PETITIONER THE SUM OF SIX THOUSAND [P 6,000.00] PESOS AS DISABILITY INCOME BENEFITS; AND

2) TO REIMBURSE PETITIONER'S MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL EXPENSES DULY SUPPORTED BY RECEIPTS.

SO ORDERED.

Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro concur.

Teehankee (Chairman), concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent.

The Workmen's Compensation Act has been expressly repealed. It is the new Labor Code and its provisions on employees' compensation
that govern compensability. Section I (b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation explicitly provides:

SECTION 1.

xxx xxx xxx

(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed
under Annex "A" of these rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the
disease is increased by the working conditions" (Rule III, Amended Rules of Employees' Compensation) (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner retired due to rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis. Those ailments are not listed as occupational diseases. Nor is there
adequate proof that the risk of contracting them was increased by conditions under which petitioner worked In fact, in so far as rheumatoid
arthritis is concerned, it has been described as a "chronic systemic inflammatory disease of unknown cause" (Current Medical Diagnosis and
Treatment, Krupp & Chatton, 16 th Annual Revision, p. 474). It is also a disease that is worlds apart from acute arthritis, mentioned in page
7 of the Decision.

And, as I stated in my dissent in Biscarra vs. Republic and WCC (G.R. No. L-43425), Mitra vs. ECC (G.R. No. L-45846), and Torbela vs. ECC (G.R.
No. L-42627), the rulings and opinions of administrative agencies in areas within their competence command great respect and weight,
except in case of palpable error or grave abuse of discretion. With these factors absent in this particular case, I vote for the affirmance of the
ruling of the Employees' Compensation Commission.
Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent.

The Workmen's Compensation Act has been expressly repealed. It is the new Labor Code and its provisions on employees' compensation
that govern compensability. Section I (b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation explicitly provides:

SECTION 1.

xxx xxx xxx

(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed
under Annex "A" of these rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the
disease is increased by the working conditions" (Rule III, Amended Rules of Employees' Compensation) (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner retired due to rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis. Those ailments are not listed as occupational diseases. Nor is there
adequate proof that the risk of contracting them was increased by conditions under which petitioner worked In fact, in so far as rheumatoid
arthritis is concerned, it has been described as a "chronic systemic inflammatory disease of unknown cause" (Current Medical Diagnosis and
Treatment, Krupp & Chatton, 16 th Annual Revision, p. 474). It is also a disease that is worlds apart from acute arthritis, mentioned in page
7 of the Decision.

And, as I stated in my dissent in Biscarra vs. Republic and WCC (G.R. No. L-43425), Mitra vs. ECC (G.R. No. L-45846), and Torbela vs. ECC (G.R.
No. L-42627), the rulings and opinions of administrative agencies in areas within their competence command great respect and weight,
except in case of palpable error or grave abuse of discretion. With these factors absent in this particular case, I vote for the affirmance of the
ruling of the Employees' Compensation Commission.
 [G.R. No. 132761. March 26, 2003]

NORMA ORATE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
(MANILA BAY SPINNING MILLS, INC.), respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the May 14, 1997 Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals[2] in CA-G.R. SP No. 42280, and its January 29, 1998 Resolution[3] denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The undisputed facts are as follows:

On December 5, 1972, petitioner Norma Orate was employed by Manila Bay Spinning Mills, Inc., as a regular machine operator. [4] Her
duties included the following:

A) Doffing:

1) Obtain empty cones from storage prior to doffing; incl. patrol round trip.

2) Prepare empty cones to each spindle prior to doffing; incl. attention to condition of empty cones.

3) Doff full cones to bank over machine.

4) Take empty cones by L. H. drop ends inside cone or wrap around cones and load to spindle then start spindle.

B) Creeling:

1) Remove empty bobbins from creel pin to conveyor.

2) Obtain one-full cop from bank and remove tail ends.

3) Fit full cop to creel pin and thread to guides

4) Find end from running cone and joint-end from full cop; incl. keep clearer free from accumulated cone.

5) Remove tail from empty bobbin when necessary. 20%

6) Stop spindles. (occasionally when stop motion malfunction. 10%)

C) Repair Breaks:

1) Patrol to break-end.

2) Stop spindle. (occasionally) 10%

3) Get end from full cop and thread to guides.

4) Find end from running cone by R.H. and joint ends by knotter on L. H., then start spindle; including keep cleaner free
from accumulated cone.

D) Machine Cleaning Duties once per shift (start of shift):

1) Patrol to obtain brush.

2) Brush ends of machine.

 3) Brush creel bar.

4) Brush frame beam and stand.[5]

On March 22, 1995, she was diagnosed to be suffering from invasive ductal carcinoma (breast, left),[6] commonly referred to as cancer
of the breast. Consequently, she underwent modified radical mastectomy on June 9, 1995.[7] The operation incapacitated her from
performing heavy work, for which reason she was forced to go on leave and, eventually, to retire from service at the age of 44.

On November 17, 1995, petitioner applied for employees compensation benefits [8] with the Social Security System (SSS), but the same
was denied on the ground that her illness is not work-related. On January 22, 1996, she moved for reconsideration contending that her
duties as machine operator which included lifting heavy objects increased the risk of contracting breast cancer.[9] The SSS, however,
reiterated its denial of petitioners claim for benefits under the Employees Compensation Program. Instead, it approved her application as a
sickness benefit claim under the SSS,[10] and classified the same as a permanent partial disability equivalent to a period of twenty-three (23)
months.[11] Thus

Respectfully referred is a letter and copies of EC-Sickness Benefit Claim of subject employee for your further evaluation and review.

Said claim was not considered as EC, however, sickness and disability benefit claims under SSS were approved, computer print-out hereto
attached.[12]

Petitioner requested the elevation of her case to the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed on June 20, 1996,
the decision of the SSS in ECC Case No. MS-7938-296. The ECC ruled that petitioners disability due to breast cancer is not compensable
under the Employees Compensation Program because said ailment is not included among the occupational diseases under Annex A of the
Rules on Employees Compensation; and it was not established that the risk of contracting said ailment was increased by the working
conditions at Manila Bay Spinning Mills, Inc.[13] The dispositive portion of the ECCs decision reads

IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and the instant case is accordingly DISMISSED for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.[14]

Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 42280. On May 14, 1997, the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the ECC, and granted petitioners claim for compensation benefit under the Workmens Compensation Act
(Act No. 3428).[15] It held that petitioners breast cancer must have intervened before the effectivity of Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code on
Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund on January 1, 1975, hence, the governing law on petitioners claim for compensation
benefit is Act No. 3428, which works upon the presumption of compensability, and not the provisions of the Labor Code on employees
compensation. The Court of Appeals further ruled that since Manila Bay Spinning Mills, Inc. failed to discharge the burden of proving that
petitioners ailment did not arise out of or in the course of employment, the presumption of compensability prevails, entitling her to
compensation. The dispositive portion of the said decision states:

THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the contested Decision (ECC Case No. MS-7838-296) is hereby set aside; petitioner instead should be
entitled to the benefits under Act No. 3428, as amended, together with the medical-surgical expenses, including doctors bill.

SO ORDERED.[16]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration[17] arguing that it is the Labor Code which should be applied to her case inasmuch as
there is no evidence that the onset of her breast carcinoma occurred before January 1, 1975. She claimed that the basis of the computation
of her compensation benefits should be the Labor Code and not the Workmens Compensation Act.

On January 29, 1998, the Court of Appeals denied her motion for reconsideration.[18]

Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition insisting that her disability should be compensated under the provisions of the Labor Code
and not under the Workmens Compensation Act.

The resolution of the instant controversy hinges on the following issues: (1) What is the law applicable to petitioners claim for
disability benefits? and (2) Is she entitled under the applicable law to be compensated for disability arising from breast carcinoma?

The first law on workmens compensation in the Philippines is Act No. 3428, otherwise known as the Workmens Compensation Act,
which took effect on June 10, 1928. This Act works upon the presumption of compensability which means that if the injury or disease arose
out of and in the course of employment, it is presumed that the claim for compensation falls within the provisions of the law. Simply put, the
employee need not present any proof of causation. It is the employer who should prove that the illness or injury did not arise out of or in the
course of employment.[19]
 On November 1, 1974, the Workmens Compensation Act was repealed by the Labor Code (Presidential Decree No. 442). On December
27, 1974, Presidential Decree No. 626 (which took effect on January 1, 1975) was issued. It extensively amended the provisions of Title II,
Book IV of the Labor Code on Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund. [20] The law as it now stands requires the claimant to
prove a positive thing that the illness was caused by employment and the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working
conditions.[21]It discarded, among others, the concepts of presumption of compensability and aggravation and substituted a system based on
social security principles. The present system is also administered by social insurance agencies the Government Service Insurance System
and Social Security System under the Employees Compensation Commission. The intent was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the
employers obligation to pay workmens compensation and the employees right to receive reparation for work-connected death or
disability.[22]

In Sarmiento v. Employees Compensation Commission, et al.,[23] we explained the nature of the new employees compensation scheme
and the State Insurance Fund, as follows

The new law establishes a state insurance fund built up by the contributions of employers based on the salaries of their employees. The
injured worker does not have to litigate his right to compensation. No employer opposes his claim. There is no notice of injury nor
requirement of controversion. The sick worker simply files a claim with a new neutral Employees Compensation Commission which then
determines on the basis of the employee's supporting papers and medical evidence whether or not compensation may be paid. The payment
of benefits is more prompt. The cost of administration is low. The amount of death benefits has also been doubled.

On the other hand, the employers duty is only to pay the regular monthly premiums to the scheme. It does not look for insurance companies
to meet sudden demands for compensation payments or set up its own funds to meet these contingencies. It does not have to defend itself
from spuriously documented or long past claims.

The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of workmens compensation. The Commission administers and settles
claims from a fund under its exclusive control. The employer does not intervene in the compensation process and it has no control, as in the
past, over payment of benefits. The open ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. A covered claimant suffering
from an occupational disease is automatically paid benefits.

Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a claim for compensation, the rules on presumption of compensability and controversion
cease to have importance. The lopsided situation of an employer versus one employee, which called for equalization through the various
rules and concepts favoring the claimant, is now absent. . . .

In workmens compensation cases, the governing law is determined by the date when the claimant contracted the disease. An injury or
illness which intervened prior to January 1, 1975, the effectivity date of P.D. No. 626, shall be governed by the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, while those contracted on or after January 1, 1975 shall be governed by the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. No.
626.[24] Corollarily, where the claim for compensation benefit was filed after the effectivity of P.D. No. 626 without any showing as to when
the disease intervened, the presumption is that the disease was contracted after the effectivity of P.D. No. 626. [25]

In the case at bar, petitioner was found to be positive for breast cancer on March 22, 1995. No evidence, however, was presented as to
when she contracted said ailment. Hence, the presumption is that her illness intervened when P.D. No. 626 was already the governing law.

The instant controversy is not on all fours with the cases where the Court applied the presumption of compensability and aggravation
under the Workmens Compensation Act, even though the claim for compensation benefit was filed after January 1, 1975. In the said cases,
the symptoms of breast cancer manifested before or too close to the cut off date January 1, 1975, that it is logical to presume that the breast
carcinoma of the employee concerned must have intervened prior to January 1, 1975. Thus

(1) In Avendao v. Employees Compensation Commission,[26] the Workmens Compensation Act was applied to a claim for disability
income benefit arising from breast carcinoma, though the said claim was filed only in 1976, after the effectivity of the Labor Code. Per
certification of the physician of the claimant, her breast cancer was contracted sometime in 1959, although the clinical manifestations
thereof started only in 1969.

(2) In Cayco, et al. v. Employees Compensation Commission, et al.,[27] the deceased employees breast carcinoma first showed up in 1972
or 6 years before she died on April 26, 1978.We ruled therein that the presumption on compensability under the Workmens Compensation
Act governs since her right accrued before the Labor Code took effect.

(3) In Ajero v. Employees Compensation Commission, et al.,[28] the claimant was confined and treated for pulmonary tuberculosis and
cancer of the breast from January 5 to 15, 1976.In granting the employees claim for income benefit, it was held that her ailments, especially
pulmonary tuberculosis, must have supervened several years before, when the Workmens Compensation Act was still in force.

(4) In Mandapat v. Employees Compensation Commission, et al.,[29] we held that since the deceased underwent radical mastectomy on
May 10, 1975, it is obvious that the tumor in her right breast started to develop even before 1975. We further noted [t]hat the onset of
cancer is quiet and gradual, in contrast [to] many diseases It takes six to twelve months for a breast cancer to grow from a size which can
just be found to the size actually encountered at the time of surgery.
 (5) In Nemaria v. Employees Compensation Commission, et al.,[30] the deceased employee was confined for cancer of the liver, duodenal
cancer, and cancer of the breast, from September 8-25, 1978, before she succumbed to death October 16, 1978. In the said case, we
recognized that cancer is a disease which is often discovered when it is too late. Hence, we surmised that the possibility that its onset was
even before the effectivity of the New Labor Code cannot be discounted.

(6) In De Leon v. Employees Compensation Commission, et al.,[31] we ruled that the governing law on the claim for income benefit filed
by the mother of the deceased on June 8, 1976 is the Workmen's Compensation Act. The modified radical mastectomy conducted on the
deceased on September 16, 1968 obviously showed that she contracted breast carcinoma before the effectivity of P.D. No. 626.

Clearly therefore, the presumption of compensability and aggravation under the Workmens Compensation Act cannot be applied to
petitioners claim for compensation benefit arising from breast cancer. We are not experts in this field to rule that the onset of her breast
carcinoma occurred prior to January 1, 1975, or almost twenty years ago. Hence, the provisions of the Labor Code govern. For breast
carcinoma and resulting disability to be compensable, the claimant must prove, by substantial evidence, either of two things: (a) that the
sickness was the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex A of the Rules on Employees Compensation; or (b) if the sickness is
not so listed, that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the claimants working conditions. [32]

There is no dispute that cancer of the breast is not listed as an occupational disease under Annex A of the Rules on Employees
Compensation. As such, petitioner has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the causal relationship between her illness and her
working conditions.

Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. [33] In the
case at bar, petitioner argued before the SSS and the ECC that her job as machine operator, which required lifting of heavy objects increased
the risk of her contracting breast carcinoma. In addition, she contended that her job in the winding department exposed her to
cancer-causing dyes used in coloring threads.[34] In support thereof, she cited the following:

Some industrial chemicals create a cancer hazard for people who work with them. Such chemicals include aniline dyes, arsenic, asbestos,
chromium and iron compounds, lead, nickel, vinyl chloride, and certain products of coal, lignite, oil shale, and petroleum. Unless industrial
plants carefully control the use of such chemicals, excessive amounts may escape or be released into the environment. The chemicals then
create a cancer hazard for people in surrounding areas. (World Book Encyclopedia, Vol. 3, 1992 ed., p. 119) [35]

Regrettably, however, said bare allegations and vague excerpts on cancer do not constitute such evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support the conclusion that there is a causal relationship between her illness and her working
conditions. Awards of compensation cannot rest on speculations and presumptions. The claimant must prove a positive proposition.[36] A
perusal of the records reveals that there is no evidence that she was indeed exposed to dyes. Even assuming that she was dealing directly
with chemicals, there is no proof that the company where she worked did not implement measures to control the hazards occasioned by the
use of such chemicals.

Indeed, cancer is a disease that strikes people in general. The nature of a persons employment appears to have no relevance. Cancer
can strike a lowly paid laborer or a highly paid executive or one who works on land, in water, or in the deep bowels of the earth. It makes no
difference whether the victim is employed or unemployed, a white collar employee or a blue collar worker, a housekeeper, an urban dweller
or a resident of a rural area.[37]

It is not also correct to say that all disability or death resulting from all kinds of cancer are not compensable. There are certain cancers
which are reasonably considered as strongly induced by specific causes. Heavy doses of radiation as in Chernobyl, USSR, cigarette smoke
over a long period for lung cancer, certain chemicals for specific cancers, and asbestos dust, among others, are generally accepted as
increasing the risks of contracting specific cancers. What the law requires for others is proof.[38] This was not satisfied in the instant case.

Hence, while we sustain petitioners claim that it is the Labor Code that applies to her case, we are nonetheless constrained to rule that
under the same code, her disability is not compensable. Much as we commiserate with her, our sympathy cannot justify an award not
authorized by law. It is well to remember that if diseases not intended by the law to be compensated are inadvertently or recklessly
included, the integrity of the State Insurance Fund is endangered. Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by law ignores the
need to show a greater concern for the trust fund to which the tens of millions of workers and their families look to for compensation
whenever covered accidents, diseases and deaths occur. This stems from the development in the law that no longer is the poor employee
still arrayed against the might and power of his rich corporate employer, hence the necessity of affording all kinds of favorable
presumptions to the employee. This reasoning is no longer good policy. It is now the trust fund and not the employer which suffers if
benefits are paid to claimants who are not entitled under the law.[39]

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42280, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The decision of the Employees Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. MS-7938-296, dismissing petitioners claim for
compensation benefits under the Employees Compensation Program is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
 NFD INTERNATIONAL MANNING AGENTS, INC./BARBER G.R. No. 183054
SHIP MANAGEMENT LTD.,
Petitioners, Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

NACHURA,
-versus- PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

ESMERALDO C. ILLESCAS, Promulgated:

Respondent.
September 29, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] of the Court of Appeals Decision dated October 23, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 97941, and
its Resolution dated May 9, 2008denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. The Decision of the Court of Appeals nullified and set aside
the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), and ordered petitioners to pay respondent the amount of US$90,000.00 as
disability benefit. The Resolution dated May 9, 2008 denied petitioners motion for reconsideration and awarded respondent attorneys fees.

The facts are as follows:

On September 6, 2002, respondent Esmeraldo C. Illescas entered into a Contract of Employment with petitioner NFD International

Manning Agents, Inc., acting for and in behalf of its foreign principal, co-petitioner Barber Ship Management, Ltd. Under the contract,

respondent was employed as Third Officer of M/V Shinrei for a period of nine months, with a basic monthly salary of US$854.00. The
employment contract complied with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Standard Contract for Seafarers, and

the standard terms and conditions governing the employment of Filipino seafarers on board ocean-going vessels under Department

Order No. 4, series of 2000.

After respondent passed the pre-employment medical examination, he boarded the vessel and started performing his job

on October 6, 2002.

On May 16, 2003, when respondent had been on board the vessel for seven months, Captain Jaspal Singh and Chief Officer

Maydeo Rajev ordered respondent to carry 25 fire hydrant caps from the deck to the engine workshop, then back to the deck to refit the

caps. The next day, while carrying a heavy basketful of fire hydrant caps, respondent felt a sudden snap on his back, with pain that
radiated down to the left side of his hips. He immediately informed the ship captain about his condition, and he was advised to take pain

relievers. As the pain was initially tolerable, he continued with his work. After a few days, the pain became severe, and respondent had

difficulty walking.
 On May 27, 2003, when the vessel was in Japan, respondent was brought to the Higashiogishima Clinic. Respondent was diagnosed

to be suffering from lumbago and sprain. The doctor gave respondent medication and advised him to wear a corset, avoid lifting heavy

objects and get further examination and treatment if the symptoms persisted. [2]

Despite the lighter work assigned to respondent, he continued to experience excruciating pain. On June 13, 2003, petitioner was

referred to a doctor upon arrival of M/VShinrei at the port of Hay Point, Australia. The doctor declared that respondent was unfit to work,

and recommended that respondent return home for further management.[3]

On June 14, 2003, respondent was repatriated to the Philippines. On June 17, 2003, respondent was referred to the Alegre

Medical Clinic under the care of Dr. Natalio G. Alegre II. Dr. Alegre advised respondent to undergo a lumbo-sacral x-ray, and later a

Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) of his lumbo-sacral spine. The MRI revealed multi-level disc dessication, broad-based central and

left-sided posterior disc herniation, L4 L5, with severe canal stenosis.[4] Dr. Alegre recommended laminectomy and discectomy.[5]

On August 27, 2003, respondent underwent a laminectomy with discectomy at the St. Luke's Medical Center. He was discharged from

the hospital on September 6, 2003. Thereafter, he underwent physical rehabilitation. Nevertheless, medical examinations showed that there

was still restriction in respondents truncal mobility and in the lifting power of his trunk.

As his condition did not improve, respondent sought the expertise of Dr. Marciano F. Almeda, Jr., a specialist in occupational medicine

and orthopedics, at the Medical Center Muntinlupa for the assessment and evaluation of his health condition and/or disability. Dr. Almeda

found that respondent sustained partial permanent disability with an impediment Grade of 11 (14.93%), described as slight rigidity or

one-third loss of motion or lifting power of the trunk under the POEA Standard Contract for Seafarers.[6] Dr. Almeda declared that respondent

was unfit to work at sea in any capacity as a seaman.[7]

On December 29, 2003, petitioners received a letter[8] dated December 16, 2003 from respondents counsel, demanding the payment

of disability benefit. The claim was referred to Pandiman Philippines, Inc., the local correspondent of the P&I Club with which petitioner

Barber Ship Management Ltd. was affiliated. In the meantime, respondent filed a Complaint with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC.

During the preliminary conferences in this case, the parties explored the possibility of settlement. In a letter[9] dated April 12, 20004,

Pandiman Philippines, Inc, in behalf of petitioners, offered to pay respondent disability benefit in the amount of US$16,795.00, corresponding

to Grade 8 disability under the POEA Standard Contract for Seafarers. Respondent, through counsel, refused the offer on the ground that the

injury sustained by him was caused by an accident, which was compensable in the amount of US$90,000.00 under the Collective Bargaining

Agreement (CBA), thus:

If a seafarer/officer, due to no fault of his own, suffers permanent disability as a result of an accident while
serving on board or while traveling to or from the vessel on Company's business or due to marine peril, and as a result, his
ability to work is permanently reduced, totally or partially, the Company shall pay him a disability compensation which,
including the amounts stipulated by the POEA's Rules and Regulations Part II, Section C, shall be maximum of US$70,000 for
ratings and US$90,000 for officers.[10]

Since the parties failed to arrive at an agreement, the NLRC directed them to file their Position Papers.

In his Position Paper,[11] respondent submitted that Section 20 (B.6) of the POEA Standard Contract for Seafarers provides:
 xxxx

In case of permanent total or partial disability of a seafarer during the term of employment caused by either
injury or illness, the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits enumerated in Section 32
of his Contract. Computation of his benefits arising from the illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules
of compensation applicable at the time the illness or disease was contracted.

However, respondent stated that he is a member of the Associated Marine Officers' and Seamen's Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP),

which has a CBA with petitioners.Under the CBA, he is entitled to a higher disability benefit in the amount of US$90,000.00, since his injury

resulted from an accident while carrying a basketful of heavy fire hydrant caps on board the vessel.[12]

Respondent prayed that petitioners be ordered to pay him disability benefit in the amount of US$90,000.00, illness allowance

equivalent to 120 days, as well as moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.

In their Position Paper,[13] petitioners countered that it is the POEA Standard Contract for Seafarers, and not the CBA, that governs

this case. They stated that Blacks Law Dictionary defined accident as an unusual, fortuitous, unexpected, unforeseen or unlooked for

event. They argued that respondent's disability was not the result of an accident, as respondent was merely performing his normal duty of

transporting fire hydrant caps from the deck to the engine workshop, then back to the deck to refit the caps. During the performance thereof,

no unusual, unforeseen and unexpected event transpired as proved by the absence of any accident report. Moreover, respondents Affidavit did

not mention the occurrence of any accident which gave rise to his injury. Petitioners argued that, since no accident took place, the disability

benefits under the CBA do not apply to this case.

Petitioners further averred that based on the assessment of its accredited-clinic, the Alegre Medical Clinic, respondent suffered from

Grade 8 disability, described as moderate rigidity or two-thirds (2/3) loss of motion or lifting power of the trunk. During the preliminary

conference, they offered to pay respondent disability benefit in the amount of US$16,795.00 for the Grade 8 disability under Section 32 of the

POEA Standard Contract for Seafarers.[14]

The main issue for resolution before the Labor Arbiter was whether the disability of complainant (respondent) was compensable

under the provision of Article 13 of the CBA in the amount of US$90,000.00.

On January 6, 2005, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision[15] finding respondent entitled to disability benefit under the CBA in the

amount of US$90,000.00 as 100% compensation; US$3,456.00 (US$864 x 4) as sickness allowance equivalent to 120 days; and US$9,345.60 as

attorney's fees, or a total of US$102,801.60. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondents NFD International
Manning Agents, Inc. and Barber Ship Management Ltd. to jointly and severally pay complainant Esmeraldo C. Illescas the
amount of ONE HUNDRED TWO THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED ONE US DOLLARS & 60/100 (US$102,801.60) in its
equivalent in Philippine Peso at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of actual payment representing his disability
benefits, sickness wages and attorney's fees.

All other claims are DlSMISSED for lack of merit.[16]

 The Labor Arbiter held that the injury suffered by respondent was the result of an accident arising out of, and in the course of, his

employment while carrying the heavy fire hydrant caps, and that his injury was unexpected and unforeseen by him.

Moreover, the Labor Arbiter stated that respondent was declared unfit to work by the physician who treated him in Australia, which

was confirmed by Dr. Marciano Almeda, Jr. of the Medical Center in Muntinlupa when he declared complainant unfit to work back at sea in any

capacity as a Seaman. The Labor Arbiter also noted that both Dr. Natalio Alegre, the company physician, and Dr. Marciano Almeda, Jr.,

respondents independent doctor, assessed respondents disability as partial and permanent disability. Hence, the Labor Arbiter held that

respondents disability was 100% compensable under the CBA in the amount of US$90,000.00, and not merely under the Standard Crew

Contract.

Petitioners appealed the Labor Arbiters decision to the NLRC.

In a Decision[17] dated July 13, 2006, the NLRC modified the decision of the Labor Arbiter, as it awarded respondent disability benefit

under Section 32

of the POEA Standard Contract for Seafarers.[18] The dispositive portion of the NLRC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is hereby modified by deleting the award of
US$102,801.60 and instead ordering respondent NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. and Barber Ship Management Ltd.
to jointly and severally pay complainant Esmeraldo C. Illescas the amount of Sixteen Thousand Seven Hundred Ninety-Five
US Dollars (US$16,795.00) at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of actual payment representing his disability
benefit.[19]

The NLRC held that the injury sustained by respondent was not the result of an accident, although it arose out of his work. It stated

that the task of carrying hydrant caps was not a fortuitous, unusual or unforeseen event, or a marine peril. According to the NLRC, back

pains or chest-trunk-spine injuries are inherent in the job of carrying heavy objects, and the injury may occur over a period of time or on the

spot depending upon the physical strength and posture of the workers.

The NLRC deleted the award for sickness allowance based on the letter dated June 9, 2004 of petitioner NFD International

Manning Agents, Inc. to Pandiman Philippines, Inc. The letter stated that respondent's illness allowance from June 15, 2003 to October 14,

2003 (120 days) had already been processed and remitted to respondents bank account. The NLRC held that the payment of the sickness

allowance may be presumed, since respondent did not dispute the letter.

The NLRC also deleted the attorney's fees awarded to respondent on the ground that there was no unlawful withholding of

payment of benefits in view of petitioners compromise offer of US$16,795.00, which was the amount of disability benefit awarded by the

NLRC to respondent.
Respondent's motion for reconsideration[20] was denied by the NLRC for lack of merit in a Resolution[21] dated December 7, 2006.
 Respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that his injury was not the result of an accident on board the vessel; in not

applying the pertinent provisions of the CBA; and in deleting the award of attorneys fees.

On October 23, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision [22] in favor of respondent. The dispositive portion of the Decision

states:

WHEREFORE, finding merit in the petition, We hereby GRANT the same. The assailed Decision and Resolution
of the NLRC are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Private respondents are ORDERED to pay petitioner the amount of
US$90,000.00 as disability benefits.[23]

The Court of Appeals, citing Jarco Marketing v. Court of Appeals,[24] held that respondents disability resulted from an accident as the

injury was unforeseen and happened without any fault on his part.

The appellate court declared that the Labor Arbiter correctly applied Article 13 of the CBA[25] in awarding respondent disability

benefit in the amount of US$90,000.00. It ruled that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction in disregarding the CBA.

Petitioners and respondent filed separate motions for reconsideration. Petitioners contended that the absence of an accident

report negated the appellate courts finding that the injury suffered by respondent was the result of an accident arising out of, and in the

course of, his employment. Respondents motion for partial reconsideration sought an additional award of attorneys fees equivalent to 10%

of the total monetary award.

In a Resolution dated May 9, 2008, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioners, but granted the

motion for partial reconsideration of respondent. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, finding merit in the Motion for Partial Reconsideration filed by petitioner, the same is hereby
GRANTED. The Decision dated October 23, 2007 is MODIFIED in that private respondents are further ordered to pay TEN
PERCENT (10%) of the total monetary award as attorneys fees.

The motion for reconsideration filed by private respondents is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.[26]

The Court of Appeals justified the award of attorneys fees under Article 111[27] of the Labor Code and Article 2208[28] of the Civil

Code, as respondent was forced to litigate and has incurred expenses to protect his right and interest.

Petitioners filed this petition raising the following issues:

I.
 THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT'S MEDICAL CONDITION WAS A
RESULT OF AN ACCIDENT DURING THE TERM OF HIS EMPLOYMENT WITH PETITIONERS, AND HENCE, COVERED BY
THE PROVISIONS OF THE CBA.

II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT ORDERED THE PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO
RESPONDENT.[29]

The issues raised before this Court are: (1) whether or not the disability suffered by respondent was caused by an accident; (2)

whether or not the disability is compensable under the CBA; and (3) whether or not respondent is entitled to attorneys fees.

Petitioners contend that respondent did not suffer a disability as a result of an accident as defined under existing laws

or jurisprudence. They argue that Jarco Marketing v. Court of Appeals,[30] the case citied by the Court of Appeals to support its decision,

defined an accident as:

x x x an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant. It is "a fortuitous circumstance, event or
happening; an event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an
event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens.

Petitioners point out that the above definition of the word accident, subscribed to by the Court of Appeals, explicitly states that

it pertains to a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening.[31] Petitioners cited Lasam v. Smith,[32] which defined "fortuitous event" as an

unexpected event or act of God which could neither be foreseen or resisted, such as floods, torrents, shipwrecks, conflagrations, lightning,

compulsion, insurrections, destruction of buildings by unforeseen accidents and other occurrences of similar nature. Petitioners contend that

the term "accident," as contemplated by the subject CBA provision, refers to a separate event or incident which gives rise to the injury of the

seafarer.

Petitioners argue that in this case, no such unusual, fortuitous, unexpected or unforeseen event took place or was reported. Respondent

merely went about his normal duties when he transported fire hydrant caps from the deck to the engine workshop, then back to the deck to

refit the caps. The sudden snap respondent felt on his back while carrying the fire hydrant caps cannot, by itself, qualify as an accident.
Hence, petitioners assert that respondent is not entitled to the benefits provided under the CBA. They add that if the ruling of the Court of
Appeals would be sustained, it would open the floodgates for absurd claims for double or higher indemnity, especially in insurance cases,
considering that an employee who suffers a stroke, congenital heart failure, or even appendicitis, while at work, would now be considered
as resulting from an accident, since the same may be regarded as an unusual and unexpected occurrence which happened without the
employees fault.

Petitioners also contend that there is no basis for the award of attorney's fees, as they did not act in gross and evident bad
faith. They merely acted in the interest of what was just and right, since respondent was not entitled to full disability benefit under the CBA.

The petition is denied.

The provisions of the CBA, which are relevant to this case, are as follows:

Art. 13 (Compensation for Death and Disability)

If a seafarer/officer, due to no fault of his own, suffers permanent disability as a result of an

accident while serving on board or while traveling to or from the vessel on Company's business or due to marine
peril, and as a result, his ability to work is permanently reduced, totally or partially, the Company shall pay him a
disability compensation which including the amounts stipulated by the POEA's Rules and Regulations Part II,
Section C, shall be maximum of US$70,000.00 for ratings and US$90,000.00 for officers.
 The degree of disability, which the Company, subject to this Agreement, is liable to pay, shall be determined by a
doctor appointed by the Company. If a doctor appointed by the Seafarer and his Union disagrees with the assessment, a
third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Company and the seafarer and his/her Union, and third doctors decision
shall be final and binding on both parties.

A seafarer who is disabled as a result of an injury, and whose permanent disability in accordance with the POEA
schedule is assessed at 50% or more shall, for the purpose of this paragraph, be regarded as permanently disabled and be
entitled to 100% compensation (USD90,000 for officers and USD70,000 for ratings).

A seafarer/officer who is disabled as a result of any injury, and who is assessed as less than 50%
permanently disabled, but permanently unfit for further service at sea in any capacity, shall also be entitled to a
100% compensation.

xxxx
The applicable disability compensation shall be in accordance with the degree of disability and rate of
compensation indicated in the table hereunder, to wit:
DEGREE OF DISABILITY RATE OF COMPENSATION
% RATINGS OFFICERS
US$
100 70,000 90,000
75 52,500 67,500
60 42,000 54,000
xxxx

Any payment effected under any section of this article shall be without prejudice to any claim for compensation made in
law, but such payments shall be deducted from any award of damages.[33]

Was respondents disability the result of an accident?

Blacks Law Dictionary[34] defines accident as [a]n unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence; something that does not occur in

the usual course of events or that could not be reasonably anticipated, x x x [a]n unforeseen and injurious occurrence not attributable to

mistake, negligence, neglect or misconduct.

The Philippine Law Dictionary[35] defines the word accident as [t]hat which happens by chance or fortuitously, without intention and

design, and which is unexpected, unusual and unforeseen.

Accident, in its commonly accepted meaning, or in its ordinary sense, has been defined as:

[A] fortuitous circumstance, event, or happening, an event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly
or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual and unexpected by the person to
whom it happens x x x.

The word may be employed as denoting a calamity, casualty, catastrophe, disaster, an undesirable or
unfortunate happening; any unexpected personal injury resulting from any unlooked for mishap or occurrence;
any unpleasant or unfortunate occurrence, that causes injury, loss, suffering or death; some untoward occurrence aside
from the usual course of events.[36]

The Court holds that the snap on the back of respondent was not an accident, but an injury sustained by respondent from carrying

the heavy basketful of fire hydrant caps, which injury resulted in his disability. The injury cannot be said to be the result of an accident, that is,
an unlooked for mishap, occurrence, or fortuitous event, because the injury resulted from the performance of a duty. Although respondent

may not have expected the injury, yet, it is common knowledge that carrying heavy objects can cause back injury, as what happened in this

case. Hence, the injury cannot be viewed as unusual under the circumstances, and is not synonymous with the term accident as defined above.
 Although the disability of respondent was not caused by an accident, his disability is still compensable under Article 13 of the CBA

under the following provision:

A seafarer/officer who is disabled as a result of any injury, and who is assessed as less than 50% permanently
disabled, but permanently unfit for further service at sea in any capacity, shall also be entitled to a 100% compensation.

The Court notes that the CBA states that the degree of disability, which the company is liable to pay, shall be determined by a
doctor appointed by the company. In this case, the POEA schedule is the basis of the assessment whether a seafarers permanent disability is
50 percent or more, or less than 50 percent.[37] The Alegre Medical Clinic, petitioners accredited clinic, found that respondent had a Grade 8
disability (33.59%), described as moderate rigidity or two-thirds (2/3) loss of motion or lifting power of the trunk. Dr. Almeda, respondents
independent doctor, on the other hand, found respondent to be suffering from Grade 11 disability (14.93%), described as slight rigidity or
one-third (1/3) loss of motion or lifting power of the trunk.

In HFS Philippines, Inc. v. Pilar,[38] the Court held that a claimant may dispute the company-designated physicians report by
seasonably consulting another doctor. In such a case, the medical report issued by the latter shall be evaluated by the labor tribunal and the
court based on its inherent merit.[39] In this case, petitioners never questioned the weight given by the Labor Arbiter and the Court of
Appeals to the findings of respondents independent doctor in regard to the disability of respondent.

Dr. Almeda, respondents independent doctor, and petitioners accredited medical clinic, both assessed respondents disability in
accordance with the POEA schedule as less than 50% permanently disabled. Moreover, Dr. Almeda, who is a specialist in occupational
medicine and orthopedics, found that respondent was unfit to work in any capacity as a seaman. The Medical Report[40] of Dr. Almeda
states:

xxxx

He is now three months post surgery, but still, Mr. Illescas continue to have back pain. There is still on and off pain and
numbness on his left thigh. He is also unable to tolerate prolonged standing and walking. With his present complaints, Mr.
Illescas cannot withstand the demands of his previous work at sea. Doing so could aggravate his existing back problem. I
therefore recommend a partial permanent disability with Grade 11 Impediment based on the POEA Contract.

Justification of Impediment:
Grade 11 (14.93%)
Slight rigidity or one-third (1/3) loss of motion or lifting power of the trunk.

Mr. Illescas started having back problems in a workplace incident where he lifted a basketful of hydrant caps. He
underwent surgery which he claimed as afforded him partial relief initially. However, up to the present time, the residual
symptoms continue to bother him. This has restricted him in the active performance of certain tasks.

Often, symptoms following surgery are relieved only to recur after a variable period. The causes may include insufficient
removal of disc material and further extrusion, rupture of another disc, adhesions about the nerve root and formation of
an osteophyte at the site of removal of bone. Even a successful disc removal, therefore, does not guarantee a permanent
cure as fibrosis can produce a dense constricting scar tissue, which is presumed to be a prime cause of recurrent
symptoms.

Diagnostic imaging studies, although important, is but a single facet of the overall evaluation of patients with suspected
disc herniation or spinal stenosis, which must include thorough history taking and physical examination. It is not
surprising to encounter some variation between the neurologic symptoms and the result of the patient's imaging studies.
Each individual has a different spinal canal diameter. While a mild herniation may not produce any symptom at all in one
person, it may be significant in one with a narrow spinal canal.
Surgery can never stop the pathological process nor restore the back to its previous state. Similar poor results have been
found with repeated attempts at surgical intervention for the relief of chronic low back pain. If long term relief is desired,
 continued mechanical stress of postural or occupational type must be avoided. Resuming his usual work, which includes
increased loading, twisting, or bending and extension of the back, will further expose Mr. lllescas to dangers of enhancing
his discomfort even more.

It is for this reason that I find him UNFIT to work back at sea in any capacity as a Seaman.[41]

The Court finds merit in the reasons stated by Dr. Almeda in his Medical Report for declaring respondent unfit to work in any

capacity as a seaman. Respondent is, therefore, entitled to disability benefit in the amount of US$90,000.00 under the CBA, thus:

A seafarer/officer who is disabled as a result of any injury, and who is assessed as less than 50% permanently
disabled, but permanently unfit for further service at sea in any capacity, shall also be entitled to a 100% compensation.

xxxx

The applicable disability compensation shall be in accordance with the degree of disability and rate of
compensation indicated in the table hereunder, to wit:
DEGREE OF DISABILITY RATE OF COMPENSATION
% RATINGS OFFICERS
US$
100 70,000 90,000
75 52,500 67,500
60 42,000 54,000
xxxx

In regard to the award of attorneys fees, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that respondent is entitled to the same under

Article 2208 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorneys fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs,
cannot be recovered, except:

xxxx

(2) When the defendants act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect his interest;

xxxx
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorneys fees and expenses of litigation
should be recovered.

This case involves the propriety of the award of disability compensation under the CBA to respondent, who worked as a seaman in
the foreign vessel of petitioner Barber Ship Management Ltd. The award of attorneys fees is justified under Article 2208 (2) of the Civil
Code. Even if petitioners did not withhold payment of a smaller disability benefit, respondent was compelled to litigate to be entitled to a
higher disability benefit. Moreover, in HFS Philippines, Inc. v. Pilar[42] and Iloreta v. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc.,[43] the Court
sustained the NLRCs award of attorneys fees, in addition to disability benefits to which the concerned seamen-claimants were entitled. It is
no different in this case wherein respondent has been awarded disability benefit and attorneys fees by the Labor Arbiter and the Court of
Appeals. It is only just that respondent be also entitled to the award of attorneys fees. In Iloreta v. Philippine Transmarine Carriers,
Inc.,[44] the Court found the amount of US$1,000.00 as reasonable award of attorneys fees.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated October 23, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 97941, and its

Resolution dated May 9, 2008 are AFFIRMED insofar as respondent is awarded disability benefit in the amount of US$90,000.00, as well as

attorneys fees, which is reduced to US$1,000.00. Petitioners NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. and Barber Ship Management Ltd. are

hereby ORDERED to jointly and severally pay respondent Esmeraldo C. Illescas disability benefit in the amount of NINETY THOUSAND

DOLLARS (US$90,000.00) and attorneys fees in the amount of ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS (US$1,000.00) in its equivalent in Philippine Peso

at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of actual payment.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-51543 June 6, 1989

EMILIA VDA. DE INGUILLO, petitioner,

vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and the GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Ministry of Education and
Culture), respondents.

Teonarde V. Inguillo for petitioner.

The Government Corporate Counsel for respondent GSIS.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

A review is sought herein of the Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) affirming that of the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) denying the claim for death benefits filed by the widow of a public school janitor, who died of cancer of the
esophagus and pneumonia.

Petitioner's husband, the late Enrique V. Inguillo, during his lifetime, worked as a janitor at the E. Jacinto Elementary School in Tondo,
Manila. He was in the government service for thirty-one (31) years.

From 24 February to 5 June 1978, he was confined at the Veteran's Memorial Hospital on "complaints of difficulty in swallowing of food,
solid and liquid, accompanied by chest pains difficulty of breathing, fever and productive cough." He died on 20 June 1978, at the age of 52,
the cause of death being attributed to "Terminal malignancy, Poorly differentiated Esophageal Edenocarcinoma with Bone and Cervical
Metastasis, Pneumonia" (Certificate of Death, Annex "A", Petition).

The surviving spouse, Emilia Inguillo, filed a claim for death benefits with the GSIS. The claim was denied on the ground that the cause of
death, cancer of the esophagus, is not an occupational disease. A motion for reconsideration of the GSIS decision having been denied,
claimant-petitioner appealed to respondent ECC.

On 9 August 1979 respondent ECC affirmed the GSIS denial and dismissed petitioner's claim.

Hence, this petition for review.

Petitioner's position is anchored on the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, particularly, on the rule on controversion, the
presumption of compensability, and the principle of aggravation.

Considering, however, that the deceased was confined in the hospital from 24 February 1978 to 5 June 1978, and that he later died on 20
June 1978, and absent any evidence as to when his ailment was contracted, it is the new Labor Code that becomes the governing law. As
specifically provided in Article 208 of said Code, its provisions cover "injury, sickness, disability or death occurring on or after January 1,
1975." The recent case of Rosales vs. ECC (G.R. No. 46443, June 28, 1988) implemented that provision when it held that "in workmen's
compensation cases, the governing law is determined by the date on which the claimant contracted his illness."

The concepts relied on by petitioner under the former Workmen's Compensation Act, therefore, have ceased to apply, having been expressly
discarded under the compensation scheme in the new Labor Code (Sarmiento vs. ECC, et al., G.R. No. 65680, May 11, 1988).

We come now to the primary issue, that is, whether or not the death of petitioner's husband is compensable under the Labor Code.

Article 167(l) of the Labor Code defines compensable "sickness" thus:

(l) 'Sickness' means any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by
employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. For this purpose, the
Commission is empowered to determine and approve occupational diseases and work-related illnesses that may be considered
compensable based on peculiar hazards of employment (PD 1368, May 1, 1978)

Section l(b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation further amplifies:
(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed
under Annex 'A' of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the
disease is increased by the working conditions.

Definitely, "esophageal edenocarcinoma with bone and cervical metastasis" can not be considered as an occupational disease since it is not
one of those listed under Annex "A' of the mentioned Rules. In the recent case of Raro vs. Employees' Compensation Commission (G.R. No.
58445, April 27, 1989), it was held that cancer ailments, except for a specified few, are not compensable. It is a disease that strikes people in
general. The nature of a person's employment appears to have no relevance. In Navalta vs. Government Service Insurance System (G.R. No.
46684, April 27, 1988), this Court further elucidated that unless it be shown that a particular form of cancer is caused by specific working
conditions (e.g. chemical fumes, nuclear radiation, asbestos dust, etc.) we can not conclude that it was the employment which increased the
risk of contracting the disease.

We note, however, that respondent ECC failed to adequately take into consideration that there was another cause of death, which was
"pneumonia." Under the same Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, pneumonia is a qualifiedly occupational
disease "under all the following conditions:"

(a) There must be an honest and definite history of wetting and chilling during the course of employment, also industrial injury to the chest
wall with or without rib fracture, or inhalation of noxious gases, fumes and other deleterious substances in the place of work.

(b) There must be a direct connection between the offending agent or event and the worker's illness.

(c) The signs of consolidation should appear soon (within a few hours) and the symptoms of initial chilling and fever should at least be
twenty-four (24) hours after the injury.

(d) The patient must present one of the following findings within a few days of the accident:

(1) Severe chill and fever.

(2) Headache and pain, agonizing in character in the side.

(3) Short, dry painful cough with blood-tinged expectoration.

(4) Physical signs of consolidation with fine rales (ECC Resolution No. 432 dated July 20, 1988).

Noteworthy is the fact that the decedent's complaint of "difficulty in swallowing of food, solid and liquid" was accompanied by "chest pains,
difficulty of breathing, fever and productive cough." The latter are clearly some of the above-specified symptoms of pneumonia, which by
itself can also be a killer disease (Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine, 8th ed., pp. 802-804). Further, a review of the deceased's work
activities, as janitor, will show that they included the regular use of "deleterious substances" such as muriatic acid, the fumes from which
are inhaled when used in cleaning and clearing of toilet bowls and unclogging of toilet pipes and plumbing connections. The deceased also
performed other varied manual work such as sweeping, scrubbing and mopping school corridors, with the resultant inhalation of a lot of
dust, lifting heavy objects, painting classrooms, preparing seats for pupils during school programs, as well as going to and from his place of
work thus exposing him to occasional "wetting and chilling" from downpours and rains. The combination of all these, coupled with thefact
that the decedent was working in Tondo, a depressed and congested area characterized by unsanitary conditions and heavy pollution, must
have lowered his resistance to fight the microbes causative of pneumonia. The risk of contracting the said disease, therefore, was increased
by his working conditions, thereby satisfying an additional condition for compensability.

While, concededly, "all" of the qualifying conditions to consider pneumonia compensable do not concur, there is substantial compliance
therewith, added to the fact that punctilious adherence to stringent technical rules may be relaxed in the interest of the working man, who
has less in life, and in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor (Acosta vs. Employees'
Compensation Commission, L-55464, November 12, 1981, 109 SCRA 209).

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED, and public respondents are hereby ordered to pay petitioner and/or her
heirs the proper benefits for the death of Enrique V. Inguillo, plus attorney's fees of ten (10%) percent of the amount recoverable. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
GILBERT QUIZORA, G.R. No. 185412
Petitioner,

Present:

- versus -

VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,

BRION,*

DENHOLM CREW MANAGEMENT ABAD,

(PHILIPPINES), INC.,
Respondent. PEREZ,* * and

MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:

November 16, 2011

x -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review challenging the September 10, 2008 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), which set

aside the Resolutions[2] of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated September 20, 2004 and May 24, 2005, and reinstated the

Decision of the Labor Arbiter (LA) dated June 27, 2002.

The Facts

Records show that in 1992, Denholm Crew Management (Philippines), Inc. (respondent company), a domestic manning agency that supplied

manpower to Denklav Maritime Services, Ltd. (Denklav), a foreign maritime corporation, hired the services of Gilbert Quizora (petitioner) to

work as a messman on board the international vessels of Denklav. Based on Article 4.2 of the Collective Bargaining

Agreement[3] (CBA) entered into by and between the Association of Marine Officers and Seamen Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP) and

Denholm Ship Management (Singapore) Ltd., represented by Denklav, his contractual work as messman was considered terminated upon

the expiration of each contract. Article 5.1 thereof provided that the duration of his sea service with respondent company was nine (9)
months depending on the requirements of the foreign principal. After the end of a contract for a particular vessel, he would be given his next

assignment on a different vessel. His last assignment was from November 4, 1999 to July 16, 2000on board the vessel MV Leopard.
 After the expiration of his contract with MV Leopard, petitioner was lined up for another assignment to a different vessel, but he

was later disqualified for employment and declared unfit for sea duty after he was medically diagnosed to be suffering from venous duplex

scan (lower extremities) deep venous insufficiency, bilateral femoral and superficial femoral veins and the (L) popliteal vein. In laymans

terms, he was medically found to have varicose veins.

Subsequently, petitioner demanded from respondent company the payment of disability benefits, separation pay and

reimbursement of medical expenses. His demands, however, were denied. He then submitted his claim before the AMOSUP, but it was

likewise denied. Thereafter, he filed with the LA a complaint for payment of disability benefits, medical expenses, separation pay, damages,

and attorneys fees.

On June 27, 2002, the LA, after due hearing, rendered a decision dismissing petitioners complaint for lack of merit.

On appeal, the NLRC issued its Resolution dated September 20, 2004 reversing the LAs decision and ordering respondent company to pay

petitioner his disability compensation in the amount of US$60,000.00.

Upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration in the NLRC Resolution dated May 24, 2005, respondent company elevated the case to the

CA with the following arguments:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO DISABILITY BENEFITS OF $60,000.00
CONSIDERING THAT:

1) PRIVATE RESPONDENT FAILED TO PROVE BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT HIS

ACQUISITION OF VARICOSE VEINS WAS CAUSED BY HIS PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENT WITH
PETITIONER COMPANY.

2) VARICOSE VEINS IS A COMMON DISEASE FOR THOSE WHO ARE AT LEAST 30 YEARS OLD. IT
CAN BE ACQUIRED GENETICALLY OR CAN BE DUE TO LACK OF EXERCISE. HENCE, TO BLAME
THE PETITIONER COMPANY FOR PRIVATE RESPONDENTS VARICOSE VEINS IS MOST UNFAIR
AND UNJUST.

3) WHILE PRIVATE RESPONDENT MAY HAVE ACQUIRED A DISABILITY, HE NEVER LOST HIS
EARNING CAPACITY PERMANENTLY SO AS TO ENTITLE HIM TO DISABILITY BENEFITS UNDER
THE CBA.

Decision of the Court of Appeals

On September 8, 2010, the CA rendered a decision setting aside the NLRC Resolution and reinstating the LA Decision. The CA

explained that since having varicose veins was not among those listed as occupational diseases under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 626,

petitioner bore the burden of proving that such ailment was brought about by his working conditions. His mere claim that his employment
with respondent company was the cause of his varicose veins hardly constituted substantial evidence to convince a reasonable mind that

his ailment was work-related or the risk of contracting it was increased by his working conditions with respondent company. There was

even no proof that the disease progressed due to the circumstances of his work which did not fall under any of the factors that contribute to
varicose veins. The mere fact that he had no other employer except respondent company did not necessarily impute to the latter the disease

acquired by him. Since his claim was not supported by substantial evidence, he was not entitled to disability benefits.

Unsatisfied with the CA decision, petitioner raised before this Court the following

ISSUES

I
WHETHER RESPONDENT HAS THE BURDEN OF PROVING THAT PETITIONERS ILLNESS IS NOT WORK RELATED

II

WHETHER PETITIONERS ILLNESS IS WORK RELATED

III

WHETHER PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO DISABILITY BENEFITS

In advocacy of his position, petitioner argues that the burden of proving that his illness is not work-related rests on the respondent

company. Citing the provisions of the Philippine Overseas and Employment Authority Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), he

claims that illnesses not listed therein are disputably presumed work-related. It is only when the claim is under the provisions of the

Employees Compensation Act that the claimant has the burden of proving that the illness is work-related. As it is not listed, he is relieved

from the trouble of proving the work-relatedness of the illness because it is already disputably presumed by law. Hence, respondent

company should rebut this presumption by proving otherwise but, unfortunately, it failed to do so.

To petitioner, there is little difficulty in showing that acquiring varicose veins is work-related for a seafarer. He avers that he was

engaged by respondent company as a seafarer for nine (9) years covering seven (7) contracts with their vessels; that he was medically

screened in every contract; and that he was found fit to work up to his last contract on board the vessel MV Leopard.

Moreover, petitioner claims that he is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits because his varicose veins have rendered

him permanently incapacitated to return to work as a seafarer.

Position of respondent company

Respondent company counters that there is no evidence showing that petitioners varicose veins were caused by his previous employment

with respondent company, that this disease was work-related, and that it caused him permanent disability.

Petitioner omitted to mention his health after his stint on the MV Leopard. Also, his application for a new contract with respondent

company came long after the contract ended. He was discovered to have varicose veins in March 2001, or months after his last employment
contract with respondent company ended in July 2000. So, it is difficult to conclude that his varicose veins can only be attributable to his

previous employment with the company.

Besides, petitioners employment was not continuous but on a per-contract basis which usually lasted for nine (9) months

depending on the requirement of the foreign principal. He was considered signed-off upon the expiration of each contract. It was possible

that he acquired varicose veins while he was signed-off from the vessels of respondent company. Except for his bare allegations, there is

nothing to support his theory that his intermittent contracts of employment with respondent company had reasonable connection with his

acquisition of varicose veins. He neither presented proof on this point nor offered a medical expert opinion.

Respondent company further argues that the disputable presumption under Section 20(B) (4) of the 2000 POEA SEC is completely

irrelevant to this case. First, the 2000 POEA-SEC initially took effect sometime in July 2002. Petitioners last employment contract with

respondent company was from November 1999 to July 2000. Thus, at the time the parties entered into an overseas employment contract in

November 1999, the provisions of the POEA-SEC, which were deemed incorporated into the contract, were those from the 1996 POEA-SEC.

Hence, it is the 1996 POEA-SEC, not the 2000 POEA-SEC, which should govern his claim for disability benefits. The disputable presumption

relied upon by petitioner does not appear in the 1996 POEA-SEC but can only be found in the 2000 POEA-SEC.

Second, even assuming that the 2000 POEA-SEC governed petitioners previous employment with respondent company, he was still

not entirely relieved of the burden to submit evidence to prove his claim because Section 20(B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC specifically pertains

to work-related injury or illness. Therefore, it is still incumbent upon him to present proof that his varicose veins were reasonably

connected to his work.

Respondent company opines that varicose veins is a common disease for those who are at least 30 years old and it can be acquired

genetically or through lack of exercise.

Lastly, respondent company asserts that there is no showing that petitioners varicose veins caused him permanent disability.

While affliction with varicose veins may bring pain and discomfort to the body of a person, the illness is not permanent as it can actually be

treated, either through self-help or medical care.

The Courts Ruling

The Court finds no merit in the petition.

Before tackling the issue of what rule governs the case, there is a need to compare the provisions of Section 20-B of the 1996 POEA-SEC and

Section 20-B of the 2000 POEA-SEC. Section 20 (B) of the 1996 POEA-SEC reads as follows:
SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS:
The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:
1. The employer shall continue to pay the seafarer his wages during the time he is on board the vessel;
2. If the injury or illness requires medical and/or dental treatment in a foreign port, the employer shall be liable for the
full cost of such medical, serious dental, surgical and hospital treatment as well as board and lodging until the seafarer is
declared fit to work or to be repatriated.
However, if after repatriation, the seafarer still requires medical attention arising from said injury or illness, he shall be
so provided at cost to the employer until such time he is declared fit or the degree of his disability has been established
by the company-designated physician.
3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his
basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the
company-designated physician, but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.
For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated
physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a
written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the
mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.
4. Upon sign-off of the seafarer from the vessel for medical treatment, the employer shall bear the full cost of repatriation
in the event that the seafarer is declared (1) fit for repatriation; or (2) fit to work but the employer is unable to find
employment for the seafarer on board his former vessel or another vessel of the employer despite earnest efforts.
5. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer during the term of employment caused by either injury or
illness, the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits enumerated in Section 30 of his
Contract. Computation of his benefits arising from an illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of
compensation applicable at the time the illness or disease was contracted.

On the other hand, Section 20 (B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC reads:

SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS
The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are
as follows:
1. The employer shall continue to pay the seafarer his wages during the time he is on board the vessel;
2. If the injury or illness requires medical and/or dental treatment in a foreign port, the employer shall be liable for the
full cost of such medical, serious dental, surgical and hospital treatment, as well as board and lodging, until the seafarer is
declared fit to work or to be repatriated.
However, if after repatriation, the seafarer still requires medical attention arising from said injury or illness, he shall be
so provided at cost to the employer until such time he is declared fit or the degree of his disability has been established
by the company-designated physician.
3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his
basic wage until he is declared fit to work, or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the
company-designated physician, but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.
For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated
physician within three working days upon his return, except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case a
written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the
mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.
If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the
employer and the seafarer. The third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties.
4. Those illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as work related.
5. Upon sign-off of the seafarer from the vessel for medical treatment, the employer shall bear the full cost of repatriation
in the event the seafarer is declared (1) fit for repatriation; or (2) fit to work, but the employer is unable to find
employment for the seafarer on board his former vessel or another vessel of the employer despite earnest efforts.
6. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer caused by either injury or illness, the seafarer shall be
compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits enumerated in Section 32 of his Contract. Computation of his
benefits arising from an illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of compensation applicable at the
time the illness or disease was contracted. [Emphasis supplied]
 Considering that petitioner executed an overseas employment contract with respondent company in November 1999, the 1996

POEA-SEC should govern. The 2000 POEA-SEC initially took effect on June 25, 2000. Thereafter, the Court issued the Temporary Restraining

Order (TRO) which was later lifted on June 5, 2002. This point was discussed in the case of Coastal Safeway Marine Services, Inc. v. Leonisa

Delgado,[4] where it was written:

The employment of seafarers, including claims for death benefits, is governed by the contracts they sign
every time they are hired or rehired; and as long as the stipulations therein are not contrary to law, morals, public
order or public policy, they have the force of law between the parties. While the seafarer and his employer are governed
by their mutual agreement, the POEA rules and regulations require that the POEA Standard Employment Contract be
integrated in every seafarers contract.

A perusal of Jerrys employment contract reveals that what was expressly integrated therein by the parties was
DOLE Department Order No. 4, series of 2000 or the POEA Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the
Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels, and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 9, series of
2000. However, POEA had issued Memorandum Circular No. 11, series of 2000 stating that:

In view of the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Supreme Court in a Resolution dated 11 September
2000 on the implementation of certain amendments of the Revised Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of
Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels as contained in DOLE Department Order No. 04 and POEA
Memorandum Circular No. 09, both Series of 2000, please be advised of the following:

Section 20, Paragraphs (A), (B) and (D) of the former Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment
of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels, as provided in DOLE Department Order No. 33, and POEA
Memorandum Circular No. 55, both Series of 1996 shall apply in lieu of Section 20 (A), (B) and (D) of the
Revised Version;

xxxx

In effect, POEA Memorandum Circular No. 11-00 thereby paved the way for the application of the POEA
Standard Employment Contract based on POEA Memorandum Circular No. 055, series of 1996. Worth noting, Jerry
boarded the ship [in] August 2001 before the said temporary restraining order was lifted on June 5, 2002 by
virtue of Memorandum Circular No. 2, series of 2002. Consequently, Jerrys employment contract with Coastal must
conform to Section 20(A) of the POEA Standard Employment Contract based on POEA Memorandum Circular No.
055, series of 1996, in determining compensability of Jerrys death. [Emphases supplied]

Thus, petitioner cannot simply rely on the disputable presumption provision mentioned in Section 20 (B) (4) of

the 2000 POEA-SEC. As he did so without solid proof of work-relation and work-causation or work-aggravation of his illness, the Court

cannot provide him relief.

At any rate, granting that the provisions of the 2000 POEA-SEC apply, the disputable presumption provision in Section 20 (B) does

not allow him to just sit down and wait for respondent company to present evidence to overcome the disputable presumption of

work-relatedness of the illness. Contrary to his position, he still has to substantiate his claim in order to be entitled to disability

compensation. He has to prove that the illness he suffered was work-related and that it must have existed during the term of his
employment contract. He cannot simply argue that the burden of proof belongs to respondent company.

For disability to be compensable under Section 20 (B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC, two elements must concur: (1)
the injury or illness must be work-related; and (2) the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the
term of the seafarers employment contract. In other words, to be entitled to compensation and benefits under this
 provision, it is not sufficient to establish that the seafarers illness or injury has rendered him permanently or partially
disabled; it must also be shown that there is a causal connection between the seafarers illness or injury and the work
for which he had been contracted.

The 2000 POEA-SEC defines work-related injury as injury[ies] resulting in disability or death arising out of and
in the course of employment and work-related illness as any sickness resulting to disability or death as a result of an
occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this contract with the conditions set therein satisfied.[5]

Unfortunately for petitioner, he failed to prove that his varicose veins arose out of his employment with respondent company.

Except for his bare allegation that it was work-related, he did not narrate in detail the nature of his work as a messman aboard Denklavs

vessels. He likewise failed to particularly describe his working conditions while on sea duty. He also failed to specifically state how he

contracted or developed varicose veins while on sea duty and how and why his working conditions aggravated it. Neither did he present

any expert medical opinion regarding the cause of his varicose veins. No written document whatsoever was presented that would clearly

validate his claim or visibly demonstrate that the working conditions on board the vessels he served increased the risk of acquiring varicose

veins.
Moreover, although petitioner was rehired by respondent company several times, his eight-year service as a seaman was not

actually without a sign-off period. His contract with respondent company was considered automatically terminated after the expiration of

each overseas employment contract. Upon the termination of each contract, he was considered signed-off and he would have to go back and

re-apply by informing respondent company as to his availability. Thereafter, he would have to sign an Availability Advise Form. Meanwhile,

he would have to wait for a certain period of time, probably months, before he would be called again for sea service.

Thus, respondent company can argue that petitioners eight (8) years of service with it did not automatically mean that he acquired

his varicose veins by reason of such employment. His sea service was not an unbroken service. The fact that he never applied for a job with

any other employer is of no moment. He enjoyed month-long sign-off vacations when his contract expired. It is possible that he acquired his

condition during one of his sign-off periods.

As discussed in the decision of the CA, varicose veins may be caused by trauma, thrombosis, inflammation or heredity. Although

the exact cause of varicose veins is still unknown, a number of factors contribute to it which include heredity, advance aging, prolonged

standing, being overweight, hormonal influences during pregnancy, use of birth control pills, post-menopausal hormonal replacement

therapy, prolonged sitting with legs crossed, wearing tight undergarments or clothes, history of blood clots, injury to the veins, conditions

that cause increased pressure in the abdomen including liver disease, fluid in the abdomen, previous groin injury, heart failure, topical

steroids, trauma or injury to the skin, previous venous surgery and exposure to ultra-violet rays.

Lastly, there is also no proof that petitioners varicose veins caused him to suffer total and permanent disability. The

Pre-Employment Medical Examination[6] (PEME) he underwent cannot serve as enough basis to justify a finding of a total and permanent

disability because of its non-exploratory nature.

The fact that respondent passed the companys PEME is of no moment. We have ruled that in the past the PEME
is not exploratory in nature. It was not intended to be a totally in-depth and thorough examination of an applicants
medical condition. The PEME merely determines whether one is "fit to work" at sea or "fit for sea service," it does not
state the real state of health of an applicant. In short, the "fit to work" declaration in the respondents PEME cannot be a
conclusive proof to show that he was free from any ailment prior to his deployment. Thus we held in NYK-FIL Ship
Management, Inc. v. NLRC:
 While a PEME may reveal enough for the petitioner (vessel) to decide whether a seafarer is fit for overseas
employment, it may not be relied upon to inform petitioners of a seafarers true state of health. The PEME could not have
divulged respondents illness considering that the examinations were not exploratory. [7]

Besides, it was not expressly stated in his medical diagnosis that his illness was equivalent to a total and permanent disability.

Absent any indication, the Court cannot accommodate him.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 196102 November 26, 2014

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner,

vs.
AURELIA Y. CALUMPIANO, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are 1) the October 30, 2009 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 85908
which set aside the June 24, 2004 Decision3 of the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. GM-16174-0209-04 and
ordered the payment of disability benefits to the herein respondent Aurelia Y. Calumpiano; and 2) the CA's February 23, 2011
Resolution4 denying reconsideration of the assailed CA Decision.

Factual Antecedents

As determined by the CA, the facts are as follows:

x x x Aurelia Y. Calumpiano5 was employed as Court Stenographer at the then Court of First Instance ofSamar from January 5, 1972 until her
retirement on March 30, 2002.

On March 7, 2002, shortly before her retirement, [respondent] filed before the Supreme Court, an application for disability retirement on
account of her ailment[s], Hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease [and] Acute Angle Closure Glaucoma. To bolster her claim, [respondent]
submitted the medical certificates issued by her attending physicians, Dr. Alfred I. Lim and Dr. Elmer Montes, both of whom are
Op[h]thalmologists [at] Eastern Samar Provincial Hospital. She submitted them together with the results of her perimetry test, [a certificate
of] which x x x was issued by Dr. Lim. On September 30, 2002, the Supreme Court approved [respondents] application for disability
retirement, under Republic Act No. 8291 (New GSIS Act of 1997).

[Respondents] disability claim was forwarded to GSIS,6 but the latter denied her claim for the reason that hypertension and glaucoma,
which were her illnesses, were not work[-]related. Her motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the GSIS.

Petitioner filed an appeal [with] the ECC, which rendered the assailed Decision, 7 the dispositive portion of which stated:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and the instant appeal dismissed for want of merit.

SO ORDERED.8

In dismissing respondents appeal, the ECC held:

"Glaucoma is characterized by an intraocular pressure sufficiently elevated to produce intraocular damage. The three major categories of
glaucoma are: (1) angle-closure glaucoma, (2) open-angle glaucoma, and (3) congenital and juvenile glaucoma. Eyes that develop primary
angle glaucoma are anatomically predisposed to the condition. In primary open-angle glaucoma, [the] angle appears open [and] does
notseem to function properly. The exact nature of obstruction has not yet been elucidated. Congenital glaucoma and juvenile glaucoma are
thought to be hereditary inmost cases, although infectious causes are possible (rubella).["] (Pathologic Basis of Disease by Cotran, 6th
edition, pages 1374-1375)

"Hypertension is an increase in the blood pressure within the normal of less than 120/80 mm Hg as defined by the Joint National Committee
VII. Primary risk factor for developing hypertension is smoking. Other important risk factors are excess body weight, high salt intake,
nutritional factors, high alcohol consumption, physical inactivity and psychological factors, including stress." (Principles of Internal
Medicine)

To warrant compensability of ailment and its resulting sickness, disability or death under P.D. 626, as amended, Rule III, Section 1(b)
thereof, specifically provides that the ailment must be listed by the Commission as an occupational disease with the conditions set forth
therein satisfied, otherwise, the conditions imposed under the Increased Risk Theory must be complied with.

Appellant9 worked as a Court Stenographer III of the Supreme Court for thirty (30) years. Her duties were no doubt stressful and the same
may have caused her to develop her ailment, hypertension. However, to make the same compensable, it is necessary that there must be
impairment of function of her body organs like kidneys, heart, eyes and brain resulting in her permanent disability. An examination of the
appellants records would show that she was not suffering from end[-]organ damage. This was shown in the x x x report [of the ECG] that
was taken on the appellant on January 21, 2002. Thus, the same cannot be considered compensable and work-connected.

Likewise, her other ailment, Glaucoma[,] cannot also be considered work-connected. Medical science has explained that it is characterized
by an intraocular pressure sufficiently elevatedto produce intraocular glaucoma. Here, there was nothing in her duties that would cause or
increase her risk of contracting the said ailment.10

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In a Petition for Review11 filed with the CA and docketed therein as CAG.R. SP No. 85908, respondent sought to set aside the aboveECC
Decision, arguing that her illness is work-connected which thus entitles her to disability compensation.

On October 30, 2009, the CA issued the herein assailed Decision containing the following decretal portion:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision is SET ASIDE. Let this case be REMANDED to the Employees
Compensation Commission for the payment of the disability benefits due the Petitioner.

SO ORDERED.12

The CA held that while respondents hypertension and glaucoma are not listed as occupational diseases under the implementing rules of the
Employee Compensation Program under Presidential Decree No. 62613 (PD 626), they were nonetheless contracted and became aggravated
during her employment as court stenographer; that under the "increased risk theory," a "non-occupational disease" is compensable as long
as proof of a causal connection between the work and the ailment is established;14 that respondents illnesses are connected to her work,
given the nature of and pressure involved in her functions and duties as a court stenographer; that the certifications issued by the attending
physicians certifying to respondents illnesses should begiven credence; that the ECC itself conceded that respondents duties were "no
doubt stressful and the same may have caused her to develop her ailment, hypertension;" and that while the presumption of compensability
has been abrogated with the issuance of PD 626, employees compensation laws nevertheless constitute social legislation which allows for
liberality in interpretation to the benefit of the employee, and the policy has always been to extend the applicability of said laws to as many
employees who can avail of the benefits thereunder.15

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied the same in its February 23, 2011 Resolution. Hence, the instant Petition.

Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for resolution:

1. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS DISEASES (HYPERTENSION AND GLAUCOMA) ARE
COMPENSABLE UNDER THE INCREASED RISK THEORY; AND

2. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE ECC.16

Petitioners Arguments

Praying that the assailed CA pronouncements be set aside and that the June 24, 2004 Decision of the ECC be reinstated, petitioner argues in
its Petition and Reply17 that respondents hypertension and glaucoma are not compensable under the principle of increased risk; that
although essential hypertension is listed as an occupational disease, it is not compensable per seas the conditions under Section 1, Rule III of
the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation18 should be satisfied; that hypertension is compensable only "if it causes impairment of
function of body organs like kidneys, heart,eyes and brain, resulting in permanent disability;" 19 that since respondent did not suffer
"end-organ damage" to or impairment of her kidneys, heart, eyes and brain which resulted in permanent disability, her illness is not
compensable; that respondents other illness glaucoma is not compensable;20 and that the findings of the ECC should be accorded
respect and finality, as it has the expertise and knowledge on account of its specialized jurisdiction overemployee compensation cases.
Respondents Arguments

In her Comment,21 respondent seeks the denial of the Petition, arguing relevantly that the "increased risk theory," which applies to her, has
been upheld in several decided cases;22 that in disability compensation cases, it is not the injury which is compensated for but rather the
incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of the employees earning capacity; 23 and that while the ECC has the expertise and
knowledge relative to compensation cases, the CA isnot precluded from making its own assessment of the case which goes against that of
the ECCs. Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.

In resolving this case, the case of Government Service Insurance System v. Baul24 comes into mind and lays the groundwork for a similar
ruling. In said case, the Court held:

Cerebro-vascular accident and essential hypertension are considered as occupational diseases under Nos. 19 and 29, respectively, of Annex
"A" of the Implementing Rules of P.D. No. 626, as amended. Thus, it is not necessary that there be proof of causal relation between the work
and the illness which resulted in the respondents disability. The open-ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation.
In general, a covered claimant suffering from an occupational disease is automatically paid benefits.

However, although cerebro-vascular accident and essential hypertension are listed occupational diseases, their compensability requires
compliance with all the conditions set forth inthe Rules. In short, both are qualified occupational diseases. For cerebro-vascular accident, the
claimant must prove the following: (1) there must be a history, which should be proved, of trauma at work (to the head specifically) due to
unusual and extraordinary physical or mental strain or event, or undue exposure to noxious gases in industry; (2) there must be a direct
connection between the trauma or exertion in the course of the employment and the cerebro-vascular attack; and (3) the trauma or
exertion then and there caused a brain hemorrhage. On the other hand, essential hypertension is compensable only if it causes impairment
of function of body organs like kidneys, heart, eyes and brain, resultingin permanent disability, provided that, the following documents
substantiate it: (a) chest X-ray report; (b) ECG report; (c) blood chemistry report; (d) funduscopy report; and (e) C-T scan.

The degree of proof required to validate the concurrence of the above-mentioned conditions under P.D. No. 626 is merely substantial
evidence, that is, such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. What the law requires is a
reasonable work connection and not direct causal relation. It is enough that the hypothesis on which the workmens claim isbased is
probable. As correctly pointed out by the CA, probability, not the ultimate degree of certainty, is the test of proof in compensation
proceedings. For, in interpreting and carrying out the provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the
primordial and paramount consideration is the employees welfare. To safeguard the workers rights, any doubt as to the proper
interpretation and application must be resolved in [his] favor.

In the instant case, medical reports and drug prescriptions of respondents attending physicians sufficiently support her claim for disability
benefits. Neither the GSIS nor the ECC convincingly deny their genuineness and due execution. The reports are made part of the record and
there is no showing that they are false or erroneous, or resorted to [for the purpose] of deceiving the Court, hence, are entitled to due
probative weight. The failure of respondent to submit to a full medical examination, as required by the rules, to substantiate her essential
hypertension, is of no moment. The law is that laboratory reports such as X-ray and ECG are not indispensable prerequisites to
compensability, the reason being that the strict rules of evidence need not be observed in claims for compensation. Medical findings of the
attending physician may be received in evidence and used as proof[s] of the fact in dispute. The doctors certification as to the nature of
claimants disability may begiven credence as he orshe normally would not make untruthful certification. Indeed, no physician inhis right
mind and who is aware of the far[-]reaching and serious effect that his or her statements would cause on a money claim against a
government agency would vouch indiscriminately without regarding his own interests and protection.

Significantly, evenmedical authorities have established that the exact etiology of essential hypertension cannot be accurately traced:

The term essential hypertension has been employed to indicate those cases of hypertension for which a specific endocrine or renal basis
cannot befound, and in which the neural element may be only a mediator ofother influences. Since even this latter relationship is not
entirely clear, it is more properly listed for the moment in the category of unknown etiology. The term essential hypertension defines
simply by failing to define; hence, it is of limited use except as an expression of our inability to understand adequately the forces at work.25

It bears stressing, however, that medical experiments tracing the etiology of essential hypertension show that there is a relationship
between the sickness and the nature and conditions of work. In this jurisdiction, we have already ruled in a number of cases the strenuous
office of a public school teacher. The case of Makabali v. Employees Compensation Commission, which we have re-affirmed in the
subsequent cases of De Vera v. Employees Compensation Commission, Antiporda v. Workmens Compensation Commission, and De la Torre
v. Employees Compensation Commission, amply summarized, thus:

xxxx

The fact that the essential hypertension of respondent worsened and resulted in a CVA at the time she was already out of service is
inconsequential. The main consideration for its compensability is that her illness was contracted during and by reason ofher employment,
and any non-work related factor that contributed to its aggravation is immaterial.

Indeed, an employees disability may not manifest fully at one precise moment in time but rather over a period of time. It is possible that an
injury which at first was considered to be temporary may later on become permanent or one who suffers a partial disability becomes totally
and permanently disabled from the same cause. The right to compensation extends to disability due to disease supervening upon and
proximately and naturally resulting from a compensable injury. Where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in the course of
employment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the result of an
independent intervening cause attributable to claimants own negligence or misconduct. Simply stated, all medical consequences that flow
fromthe primary injury are compensable.

P.D. No. 626, as amended, is said to have abandoned the presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation prevalent under the
Workmens Compensation Act. Nonetheless, we ruled in Employees Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals, that:

Despite the abandonment of the presumption of compensability established by the old law, the present law has not ceased to be an
employees compensation law or a social legislation; hence, the liberality of the law in favor of the working man and woman still prevails,
and the official agency charged by law to implement the constitutional guarantee of social justice should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of
the employee in deciding claims for compensability, especially in light of the compassionate policy towards labor which the 1987
Constitution vivifies and enhances. Elsewise stated, a humanitarian impulse, dictated by no less than the Constitution itself under the social
justice policy, calls for a liberal and sympathetic approach to legitimate appeals of disabled public servants; or that all doubts to the right to
compensation must be resolved in favor of the employee or laborer. Verily, the policy is to extend the applicability of the law on employees
compensation to as many employees who can avail of the benefits thereunder.26 (Emphasis supplied)

Also, in Government Service Insurance System v. De Castro,27 this Court made the following pronouncement:

Other than the given facts, another undisputed aspect of the case is the status of the ailments that precipitated De Castros separation from
the military service CAD and hypertensive cardiovascular disease. These are occupational diseases. No less than the ECC itself confirmed
the status of these ailments when it declared that "Contrary to the ruling of the System, CAD is a form of cardiovascular disease which is
included in the list of Occupational Diseases." Essential hypertension is also listed under Item 29 in Annex "A" of the Amended ECC Rules as
an occupational disease.

Despite the compensable character of his ailments, both the GSIS and the ECC found De Castros CAD to be non-work related and, therefore,
noncompensable. To use the wording of the ECC decision, it denied De Castros claim "due to the presence of factors which are not
work-related, such as smoking and alcohol consumption." De Castros own military records triggered this conclusion ashis Admitting Notes,
made when he entered the V. Luna General Hospital due to chest pains and hypertension, were that he was a smoker and a drinker.

As the CA did, we cannot accept the validity of this conclusion at face value because it considers only one side the purely medical side of
De Castros case and even then may not be completely correct. The ECC itself, in its decision, recites that CAD is caused, among others, by
atherosclerosis of the coronary arteries that in turn, and lists the following major causes: increasing age; male gender; cigarette smoking;
lipid disorder due to accumulation of too much fats in the body; hypertension or high blood pressure; insulin resistance due to diabetes;
family history ofCAD. The minor factors are: obesity; physical inactivity; stress; menopausal estrogen deficiency; high carbohydrate intake;
and alcohol.

We find it strange that both the ECC and the GSIS singled out the presence of smoking and drinking as the factors that rendered De Castros
ailments, otherwise listed as occupational, to be non-compensable. To be sure, the causes of CAD and hypertension that the ECC listed and
explained in its decision cannot be denied; smoking and drinking are undeniably among these causes. However, they are not the sole causes
of CAD and hypertension and, at least, not under the circumstances of the present case. For this reason, we fear for the implication of the
ECC ruling if it will prevail and be read as definitive on the effects of smoking and drinkingon compensability issues, even on diseases that
are listed as occupational in character. The ruling raises the possible reading that smoking and drinking, by themselves, are factors that can
bar compensability.

We ask the question of whether these factors can be sole determinants of compensability as the ECC has apparently failed to consider other
factors such as age and gender from among those that the ECC itself listed as major and minor causes of atherosclerosis and, ultimately, of
CAD. While age and gender are characteristics inherent in the person (and thereby may be considered nonwork related factors), they also
do affect a workers job performance and may in this sense, together with stresses of the job, significantly contribute to illnesses such as
CAD and hypertension. To cite an example, some workplace activities are appropriate only for the young (such as the lifting of heavy objects
although these may simply be office files), and when repeatedly undertaken by older workers, may lead to ailments and disability. Thus, age
coupled with an age-affected work activity may lead to compensability. From this perspective, none of the ECCs listed factors should be
disregarded to the exclusion of others in determining compensability.

In any determination of compensability, the nature and characteristics of the job are as important as raw medical findings and a claimants
personal and social history. This is a basic legal reality in workers compensation law. We are therefore surprised that the ECC and the GSIS
simply brushed aside the disability certification that the military issued with respect to De Castros disability, based mainly on their primacy
as the agencies with expertise on workers compensation and disability issues.28 (Emphasis supplied)
This case should not have been difficult for the petitioner to resolve on its own, given that so many cases have been decided in the past
which should have provided it the guiding hand to decide disability cases on its own rightly instead of putting claimants in the unfortunate
position of having to chase the benefits they are clearly entitled to, and waste years prosecuting their claims in spite of their adverse
circumstances in life. This Court should not have to parrot over and over again what clearly has been the settled rule; in many ways, this is a
waste of time, and it only indicates that petitioner has eithernot learned its lesson, or it refuses to realize it.

Applying Bauland De Castro to the instant case and looking at the factual milieu, the Court agrees with the CAs conclusion and so declares
that respondents illness is compensable. Respondent served the government for 30 long years; veritably, as the ECC itself said, "[h]er duties
were no doubt stressful and the same may have caused her to develop her ailment, hypertension" 29 which is a listed occupational disease,
contrary to the CAs pronouncement that itis not. And because it is a listed occupational disease, the "increased risk theory" does not apply
again, contrary to the CAs declaration; no proof of causation is required.

It can also be said that given respondents age at the time, and taking into account the nature, working conditions, and pressures of her work
as court stenographer which requires her to faithfully record each and every day virtually all of the courts proceedings; transcribe these
notes immediately in order to make them available to the court or the parties who require them; take down dictations by the judge, and
transcribe them; and type in final form the judges decisions, which activities extend beyond office hours and without additional
compensation or overtime pay30 all these contributed to the development of her hypertension or hypertensive cardiovascular disease, as
petitioner would call it.31 Consequently, her age, work, and hypertension caused the impairment of vision in both eyes due to "advanced to
late stage glaucoma",which rendered her "legally blind."32

Contrary to petitioners submissions, there appears to be a link between blood pressure and the development of glaucoma, which leads the
Court to conclude that respondents glaucoma developed as a result of her hypertension.

Although intra ocular pressure (IOP) remains an important risk factor for glaucoma, it is clear that other factors can also influence disease
development and progression. More recently, the role that blood pressure (BP) has in the genesis of glaucoma has attracted attention, as it
represents a clinically modifiable risk factor and thus provides the potential for new treatment strategies beyond IOP reduction. The
interplay between blood pressure and IOP determines the ocular perfusion pressure (OPP), which regulates blood flow to the optic nerve. If
OPP is a more important determinant of ganglion cell injury than IOP, then hypotension should exacerbate the detrimental effects of IOP
elevation, whereas hypertension should provide protection against IOP elevation. Epidemiological evidence provides some conflicting
outcomes of the role of systemic hypertension in the development and progression of glaucoma. The most recent study showed that
patients at both extremes of the blood pressure spectrum show an increased prevalence of glaucoma. Those with low blood pressure would
have low OPP and thus reduced blood flow; however, that people with hypertension also show increased risk is more difficult to reconcile.
This finding may reflect an inherent blood flow dysregulation secondary to chronic hypertension that would render retinal blood flow less
able to resist changes in ocular perfusion pressure.33 x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In recent years, weve learned a lot about ocular perfusion pressure (OPP), i.e., the pressure difference between blood entering the eye and
IOP. Its clear that three forces OPP, IOP and blood pressure are interconnected in the glaucoma disease process. The mechanics of that
relationship, however, remain ambiguous.

xxxx

The ties between hypertension and glaucoma are less well established but the data, in addition to my involvement in a new study (discussed
below), have convinced me they probably do exist. Therefore, I believe potential hypertension, along with potential low blood pressure,
should be investigated in patients whose glaucoma continues to progress despite what appears to be well controlled IOP.

xxxx

We suspect there is a close relationship among IOP, OPP, blood pressure and glaucoma, but the exact nature of these associations remains
elusive. Complicating matters is the physiological phenomenon known as autoregulation. 34

Abstract

Aims: To determine whether systemic hypertension and glaucoma might coexist more often than expected, with possible implications for
treatment.

Methods: Case-control study using general practitioner database of patients with glaucoma matched with controls for age and sex.

Results: Hypertension was significantly more common in the 27[,]080 patients with glaucoma (odds ratio 1.29, 95% confidence intervals
1.23 to 1.36, p<0.001) than in controls. x x x35
While some of the above conclusions are not definitive, it must be stressed that probability, not certainty, is the test of proof in
compensation cases."36 It does not preclude the Court from concluding that respondents hypertension apart from her age, work, and
working conditions impaired her vision as a result.

The Court likewise disregards the ECCs finding, which petitioner relies upon, that the primary and important risk factors for developing
hypertension are smoking, excess body weight, high salt intake, nutritional factors, high alcohol consumption, physical inactivity and
psychological factors, including stress. As the Court held in De Castro, these are not the sole causes of hypertension; age, gender, and work
stress significantly contribute to its development, and the nature and characteristics of the employment are as important as raw medical
findings and a claimants personal and social history.

Finally, while the ECC possesses the requisite expertise and knowledge in compensation cases, its decision in respondents caseis
nonetheless erroneous and contrary to law. The Court cannot uphold its findings; its specialized training, experience and expertise did not
serve justice well in this case.1wphi1 The medical certificates and relevant reports issued by respondents attending physicians Drs.
Alfred I. Lim, Elmer Montes, and Salvador R. Salceda as well as hospital records,37 deserve credence. The identical findings of these three
eye specialists simply cannot be ignored.

In arriving at the above conclusions, the Court is well guided by the principles, declared in Bauland De Castro, that probability, not certainty,
is the test of proof in compensation cases;that the primordial and paramount consideration is the employees welfare; that the strict rules of
evidence need not be observed in claims for compensation; that medical findings of the attending physician may be received in evidence and
used as proof of the facts in dispute; that in any determination of compensability, the nature and characteristics of the job are as important
as raw medical findings and a claimants personal and social history; that where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in the course of
employment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the result of an
independent intervening cause attributable to claimants own negligenceor misconduct; and that the policy is to extend the application of
the law on employees compensation to as many employees who can avail of the benefits thereunder.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed October 30, 2009 Decision and February 23, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 85908 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, G.R. No. 166863
Petitioner, Present:

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO DE CASTRO,*
BRION,
-versus- PERALTA,** and
PEREZ, JJ.

Promulgated:
JUM ANGEL,
Respondent. July 20, 2011

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

On appeal by certiorari[1] from the Decision[2] of the First Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61304 dated 31 May
2004, granting the Petition of Jum Angel (respondent) to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision[3] and Order of the Employees
Compensation Commission (ECC) denying payment of death benefits due to private respondent as widow of Sergeant Benjamin Angel (Sgt.
Angel) under Presidential Decree No. 626 otherwise known as Employees' Compensation and State Insurance Fund.

The relevant factual antecedents of the case, as gathered by the court, are the following:

The late Sgt. Angel started his military training on 1 July 1974. On 7 October 1977, he was admitted into active service. He was
later promoted to the rank of Corporal in December 1982 and to the rank of Sergeant in July 1986. He was in active service until his death
on 3 March 1998.

On 3 March 1998, Sgt. Angel was fetched/invited from his post by a certain Capt. Fabie M. Lamerez (Capt. Lamerez) of the
Intelligence Service Group of the Philippine Army to shed light on his alleged involvement in a pilferage/gunrunning case being investigated
by the Philippine Army.[4]

On or about 2 p.m. of the same day, he was placed inside a detention cell to await further investigation.

The following day, the lifeless body of Sgt. Angel was found hanging inside his cell with an electric cord tied around his
neck. According to the Autopsy Report conducted by the Crime Laboratory of the Philippine National Police (PNP), the cause of death
was asphyxia by strangulation.
 Respondent, the wife of the late Sgt. Angel, filed a complaint before the PNP Criminal Investigation Command, alleging that her
husband was murdered and named the elements of Intelligence Service Group led by Capt. Lamerez as suspects.
On 8 April 1998, upon investigation, the Office of the Provost Marshal reported that Sgt. Angel died under suspicious circumstance
while in line of duty. The Provost Marshal found it incredible that Sgt. Angel would take his life, in view of his impending retirement and
being a father to four (4) children. The Provost Marshal concluded that foul play may have been committed against Sgt. Angel and
recommended that the case be tried by a court martial.

On 25 April 1998, the Inspector General, upon referral of the case, held that there is no evidence suggesting foul play in the death
of Sgt. Angel and maintained that the detention of Sgt. Angel could have triggered a mental block that caused him to hang himself.

The case was referred to a Judge Advocate General, to determine whether or not Sgt. Angel died while in line of duty. On 3
December 1999, Judge Advocate General Honorio Capulong in his report recommended that Sgt. Angel be declared to have died in line of
duty.

On 15 March 2000, the Philippine Army through Chief of Staff Brig. General Pedro V. Atienza, Jr., issued General Order No. 270
declaring the line of duty status in favor of Sgt. Angel. Section 1 of the Order states:

I. Declaration of in Line of Duty Status the death of the late Sgt. Benjamin R. Angel 633863, Philippine Army
formerly assigned with SBTM, ASCOM who died on March 3, 1998 at ISG, Fort Bonifacio, Makati is declared IN LINE OF
DUTY STATUS.[5] (Emphasis ours)

By reason thereof, respondent, as widow of Sgt. Angel, filed a claim for death benefits with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended.
On 29 September 1999, the GSIS denied the respondents claim on the ground that Sgt. Angels death did not arise out of and in the course of
employment. A motion for reconsideration was filed but the same was denied by the GSIS.

On appeal before the ECC, the ECC in its Decision [6] dated 13 April 2000 likewise denied the claim for want of merit. The relevant portion of
the decision states that:

After careful deliberation of the facts attendant to this case, this Commission believes that the death benefits prayed for
under P.D. 626, as amended, cannot be granted. It has been stressed time and again that the thrust of Employees
Compensation Law is to secure adequate and prompt benefits to the employee and his dependents in the event of a
work-related disability or death. In this connection, Rule III, Section 1(a) of the Implementing Rules of PD 626, as
amended, defines when an injury or death is considered compensable, to wit: For the injury and the resulting disability
or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of accident arising out of and in the course of employment. The
circumstances surrounding this case do not meet the aforementioned conditions. Clearly, the deceased was not
performing his official duties at the time of the incident. On the contrary, he was being investigated regarding his alleged
involvement on a pilferage/gunrunning case when he was found dead in his cell, an activity which is foreign and
unrelated to his employment as a soldier. Thus, the protective mantle of the law cannot be extended to him as the
documents appear bereft of any showing to justify a casual connection between his death and his employment.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the respondent System appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, and this
case DISMISSED for want of merit.[7]
Respondent appealed the case before the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Before the appellate
court, she raised the issue that the ECC erred:

1. In declaring that the death benefits prayed for under P.D. 626, as amended, cannot be granted, as the deceased
was not performing his official duties at the time of the incident.
2. In declaring that the subject matter of the investigation, during which he was found dead in his cell, is foreign
and unrelated to his employment as a soldier.
 3. In declaring that the mantle of the law cannot be extended to the deceased as the documents appear bereft of
any showing to justify a causal connection between his death and his employment. [8]

On 31 May 2004, the Court of Appeals reversed the ECC ruling. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed decision dated April 13, 2000 of respondent
ECC is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the GSIS [is] ORDERED to pay the death benefits due the petitioner as
widow of Sgt. Angel under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended.[9]
The appellate court in its decision pointed out that Sgt. Angel was manning his post at the Army Support Command when invited by Capt.
Lamerez of the Intelligence Service Group to undergo an investigation concerning a gunrunning/pilferage case in the Philippine Army. Sgt.
Angel was never arrested; he went with Capt. Lamerez to shed light on the investigation. [10] It was never shown that Sgt. Angels subsequent
detention was a punishment for any wrong doing.[11] Furthermore, the appellate court recognized the peculiar nature of a soldiers job as
decided by the Supreme Court. To quote:

x x x a soldier on active duty status is really on a 24 hours a day official duty status and is subject to military discipline
and military law 24 hours a day. He is subject to call and to the orders of his superior officers at all times, seven (7) days a
week, except, of course, when he is on vacation leave status. Thus, a soldier should be presumed to be on official duty
unless he is shown to have clearly and unequivocally put aside that status or condition temporarily by going on an
approved vacation leave.[12]
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Petitioner GSIS raises the issue whether or not the Court of Appeals disregarded the law and jurisprudence when it set aside the ECC
Decision dated 13 April 2000 that for the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of
accident arising out of and in the course of employment.

Courts Ruling

GSIS contends that the death of Sgt. Angel did not arise out of in the course of employment as provided by Section 1, Rule III of the
Implementing Rules of Presidential Decree No. 626, otherwise known as the Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund. The
widow, on the other hand, counters that her husband died in line of duty so that such death is compensable under the Fund.

The contentions bring out the issue whether or not the declaration by the Philippine Army that the death of Sgt. Angel was in line of duty
status confers compensability under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 626 otherwise known as Employees Compensation and State
Insurance Fund.

We rule in favor of petitioner GSIS.

For the injury and the resulting death to be compensable, the law provides:

Implementing Rules of P.D. 626,[13] RULE III COMPENSABILITY, Section 1. Grounds.

(a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of accident
arising out of and in the course of the employment. (Underscoring supplied)

Pertinent jurisprudence outline that the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of the following: 1) the
employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be; 2) the employee must have been performing his official
functions; and 3) if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer. [14]
It is important to note, however, that the requirement that the injury must arise out of and in the course of employment proceeds from the
limiting premise that the injury must be the result of an accident.

The term accident has been defined in an insurance case.[15] We find the definition applicable to the present case. Thus:

The words accident and accidental have never acquired any technical signification in law, and when used in an insurance
contract are to be construed and considered according to the ordinaryunderstanding and common usage and speech of
people generally. In substance, the courts are practically agreed that the words accident and accidental mean that which
happens by chance or fortuitously, without intention or design, and which is unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen. The
definition that has usually been adopted by the courts is that an accident is an event that takes place without ones foresight
or expectation an event that proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an unusual effect of a known case, and therefore not
expected.

An accident is an event which happens without any human agency or, if happening through human agency, an event which,
under the circumstances, is unusual to and not expected by the person to whom it happens. It has also been defined as an
injury which happens by reason of some violence or casualty to the insured without his design, consent, or voluntary
cooperation.
Significantly, an accident excludes that which happens with intention or design, with ones foresight or expectation or that which under the
circumstances is expected by the person to whom it happens.

The exclusion of an intentional or designed act which exclusion refines the definition of accident that we find applicable to the provisions of
the implementing rules of the law is specifically provided for in Article 172 of the law, Presidential Decree No. 626. Thus:

Art. 172. Limitation of liability The State Insurance Fund shall be liable for compensation to the employee or his
dependents, except when the disability or death was occasioned by the employees intoxication, willful intention to injure
or kill himself or another, notorious negligence or otherwise provided under this title. (Underscoring supplied)

The factual foundation of respondents claim is that on the day following Sgt. Angels detention for investigation of his alleged involvement in
a pilferage/gunrunning case, his lifeless body was found hanging inside his cell with an electric cord tied around his neck. The autopsy
report stated that the cause of death as asphyxia by strangulation.

With the law upon the facts, we conclude that the death of Sgt. Angel did not result from an accident which is compensable under
Presidential Decree No. 626. It was on the contrary occasioned by an intentional or designed act which removes the resulting death from the
coverage of the State Insurance Fund. It is unexpected that the discussion below by the GSIS, the ECC and the Court of Appeals, veered away
from the indispensible antecedent that the death must be caused by accident and, instead, focused on the requirement that the death must
arise out of or in the course of employment. Such that, the ECC denied compensability because:

Clearly the deceased was not performing his official duties at the time of the incident. On the contrary, he was
being investigated regarding his alleged involvement on a pilferage/gunrunning case when he was found dead in his cell,
an activity which is foreign and unrelated to his employment as a soldier. Thus, the protective mantle of the law cannot
be extended to him as the documents appear bereft of any showing to justify causal connection between his death and his
employment.[16]

Led into a confined debate, the Court of Appeals merely met the ECCs reasons and said that even during the investigation, Sgt. Angel was
still in the performance of his duties.The Court of Appeals alluded to the ruling that a soldier is on active duty status 24-hours a day and
concluded that the ECC should not have ignored the official findings of the military that the deceased sergeant died while in the performance
of his duties.

We should undo the reversal by the Court of Appeals of the ECC ruling.
1. The finding of the military authorities that Sgt. Angel died while in the line of duty is not binding on the ECC. This is not a new ECC
doctrine. Apropos is the case of Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals,[17] even if the case concerns the PNP and not the
AFP. Thus:

x x x the proceedings before the PNP Board and the ECC are separate and distinct, treating of two (2) totally different
subjects; moreover, the PNP Boards conclusions here may not be used as basis to find that private respondent is entitled
to compensation under P.D. No. 626, as amended. The presumption afforded by the Order relied upon by the PNP Board
concerns itself merely with the query as to whether one died in the line of duty, while P.D. No. 626 addressed the issue of
whether a causal relation existed between a claimants ailment and his working conditions.Plainly, these are different
issues calling for differing forms of proof or evidence, thus accounting for the existence of a favorable presumption in
favor of a claimant under the Defense Department Order, but not under P.D. No. 626 when the disease is not listed under
Annex A of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation.

Paraphrasing the above ruling, we find that the proceedings before the Philippine Army which finally resulted in the issuance by the Chief of
Staff of General Order No. 270 that the death of Sgt. Angel was in line of duty status may not be used as basis for the finding that the widow
of Sgt. Angel is entitled to compensation under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. Death in line of duty is not equivalent to a finding
that the death resulted from an accident and was not occasioned by the sergeants willful intention to kill himself. It is not enough, as
erroneously pointed out by the Court of Appeals, that there is evidence to support the conclusion that the sergeant died while in the
performance of his duties since he was not arrested but was merely invited to shed light on the investigation which was part of xxx official
duties to cooperate with the inquiry being conducted by the Philippine Army. There must be evidence that the sergeant did not take his own
life considering the fact that he was found hanging inside his cell with an electric cord tied around his neck.
2. The scene and setting of apparent suicide was contested by herein respondent, wife of the sergeant through a complaint before the PNP
Criminal Investigation Command alleging that her husband was murdered and named the elements of Intelligence Service Group led by Capt.
Lamerez as suspects. The alleged murder vis--vis the apparent suicide is precisely the determinant of compensability, with death in line of
duty as a given factor. The sergeant was fetched from his post for investigation and he died in a detention cell while awaiting further
investigation. The findings regarding his death provided by the Provost Marshall and the Inspector General are conflicting. The former
found it incredible that the deceased would take his life in view of his impending retirement and being a father to four children and
concluded that foul play may have been committed. The latter held that there was no evidence suggesting foul play maintaining that the
detention of Sgt. Angel could have triggered a mental block that caused him to hang himself. The conflict was not resolved by subsequent
official actions. The Judge Advocate General recommended that Sgt. Angel be declared to have died while in line of duty which declaration
was done by the Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army. Noticeably, the declaration went no further than state that Sgt. Angel died on March 3,
1998 at ISG, FortBonifacio, Makati. There was no mention about the cause of death. There was nothing in the declaration that would resolve
the contradiction between the conclusion of foul play reached by the Provost Marshall and the finding of the Inspector General that there is
no evidence suggesting foul play. The senior officers merely declared the fact that death occurred inside Fort Bonifacio.

From what is extant in the records, though, we rule in favor of the positive finding that there is no evidence of foul play over the inference
that foul play may have been committed. The circumstances of Sgt. Angels death his lifeless body was found hanging inside his cell with an
electric cord tied around his neck taken together with the unrebutted finding that there is no evidence of foul play negate respondents
claim of murder of her husband and of compensability of such death. It was not accidental death that is covered by Presidential Decree No.
626.

3. We are not unmindful of the fact that liberality of the law in favor of the working man and woman prevails in light of the Constitution and
social justice.[18] But, as stated in Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, it is now the trust fund and not the employer
which suffers if benefits are paid to claimants who are not entitled under the law. There is now an intention to restore a sensible
equilibrium between the employers obligation to pay workmens compensation and the employees right to receive separation for work
connected death or disability.[19]

There is a competing, yet equally vital interest to heed in passing upon undeserving claims for compensation. It
is well to remember that if diseases or death not intended by the law to be compensated are inadvertently or recklessly
included, the integrity of the State Insurance Fund is endangered. Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by
 the law ignores the need to show a greater concern for the trust fund to which the tens of millions of workers and their
families look to for compensation whenever covered accidents, diseases and deaths occur.[20]

This Court sympathizes with the sad predicament of respondent, the widow of Sgt. Angel. Such, however has already been
considered in fixing the equilibrium between obligation and right in employees compensation cases. It can no longer tilt the balance in
respondents favor.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED. The Decision dated
13 April 2000 of the Employees Compensation Commission is REINSTATED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.