EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-26341. November 27, 1968.]

ILOILO DOCK & ENGINEERING CO., Petitioner, v. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION

COMMISSION and IRENEA M. PABLO, for herself and in behalf of her minor
children EDWIN, EDGAR and EDNA, all surnamed PABLO, Respondents.

Luisito C. Hofileña for Petitioner.

Villavieja & Villanueva for respondent Workmen’s Compensation Commission.

Gualberto C. Opong for respondent Irenea M. Pablo and her minor children.

SYLLABUS

1. LABOR LAWS; WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION ACT; GRANT OF AWARD FOR INJURIES

SUSTAINED IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT; SCOPE OF TERM "EMPLOYMENT." —
Employment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable margin of
time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where the work
is to be done. If the employee be injured while passing, with the express or implied
consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way over the employer’s premises, or
over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a part of
the employer’s premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the course of the
employment as much as though it had happened while the employee was engaged in
his work at the place of its performance. In other words, the employment may begin in
point of time before the work is entered upon and in point of space before the place
where the work is to be done is reached. Probably, as a general rule, employment may
be said to begin when the employee reaches the entrance to the employer’s premises
where the work is to be done; "but it is clear that in some cases the rule extends to
include adjacent premises used by the employee as a means of ingress and agrees with
the express or implied consent of the employer" (Bountiful Brick Company v. Giles, 72
L. ed. 507, Feb. 20, 1928).

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; INJURIES SUSTAINED BY AN EMPLOYEE IN AN "ACCESS AREA" WHICH

MAY BE TREATED AS PART OF THE EMPLOYER’S PREMISES, COMPENSABLE; CASE AT
BAR. — That part of the road where Pablo was killed is in very close proximity to the
employer’s premises. It is an "access area" "so clearly related to the employee’s
premises as to be fairly treated as a part of the employer’s premises." That portion of
the road bears "so intimate a relation" to the company’s premises. It is the chief means
of entering the IDEGO premises, either for the public or for its employees. The IDEGO
uses it, if extensively in pursuit of its business. It has rights of passage over the road,
either legal, if by virtue of easement, or contractual, if by reason of lease. Pablo was
using the road as a means of access to his work solely because he was an employee.
For this reason, the IDEGO was under obligation to keep the place safe for its
employees. Safe, that is, against dangers that the employees might encounter therein,
one of these dangers being assault by third persons. Having failed to take the proper
security measures over the said area which it controls, the IDEGO is liable for the
injuries suffered by Pablo resulting in his death.

DECISION

CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal by the Iloilo Dock and Engineering Company (hereinafter referred to
as the IDECO) from the decision dated February 28, 1966 of the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission) affirming the
decision of the Regional Office VII in Iloilo City, and ordering the IDECO to pay to the
widow and children of Teodoro G. Pablo (Irenea M. Pablo and the minors Edwin, Edgar
and Edna, all surnamed Pablo) the sum of P4,000, to pay to the widow P89 as
reimbursement for burial expenses and P300 as attorney’s fees, and to pay to the
Commission the amount of P46 as fees pursuant to Section 55 of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, as amended.

At about 5:02 o’clock in the afternoon of January 29, 1960, Pablo, who was employed
as a mechanic of the IDECO, while walking on his way home, was shot to death in front
of, and about 20 meters away from, the main IDECO gate, on a private road commonly
called the IDECO road. The slayer, Martin Cordero, was not heard to say anything
before or after the killing. The motive for the crime was and still is unknown as Cordero
was himself killed before he could be tried for Pablo’s death. At the time of the killing,
Pablo’s companion was Rodolfo Galopez, another employee, who, like Pablo, had
finished overtime work at 5:00 p.m. and was going home. From the main IDECO gate
to the spot where Pablo was killed, there were four "carinderias" on the left side of the
road and two "carinderias" and a residential house on the right side. The entire length
of the road is nowhere stated in the record.

According to the IDECO, the Commission erred (1) in holding that Pablo’s death
occurred in the course of employment and in presuming that it arose out of the
employment; (2) in applying the "proximity rule" ; and (3) in holding that Pablo’s death
was an accident within the purview of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The principal
issue is whether Pablo’s death comes within the meaning and intendment of that
"deceptively simple and litigiously prolific" 1 phrase "arising out of and in the course of
employment." 2 The two components of the coverage formula — "arising out of" and "in
the course of employment" — are said to be separate tests which must be
independently satisfied; 3 however, it should not be forgotten that the basic concept of
compensation coverage is unitary, not dual, and is best expressed in the word, "word-
connection," because an uncompromising insistence on an independent application of
each of the two portions of the test can, in certain cases, exclude clearly work-
connected injuries. 4 The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the
accident, and are descriptive of its character, while the words "in the course of" refer to
the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place. 5

As a matter of general proposition, an injury or accident is said to arise "in the course
of employment" when it takes place within the period of the employment, at a place
where the employee reasonably may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is
engaged in doing something incidental thereto. 6

The general rule in workmen’s compensation law known as the "going & coming rule,"
simply stated, is that "in the absence of special circumstances, an employee injured in,
going to, or coming from his place of work is excluded from the benefits of workmen’s
compensation acts." 7 This rule, however, admits of four well recognized exceptions, to
wit: (1) where the employee is proceeding to or from his work on the premises of his
employer; (2) where the employee is about to enter or about to leave the premises of
his employer by way of the exclusive or customary means of ingress and egress; (3)
where the employee is charged, while on his way to or from his place of employment or
at his home, or during his employment, with some duty or special errand connected
with his employment; and (4) where the employer, as an incident of the employment,
provides the means of transportation to and from the place of employment. 8

We address ourselves particularly to an examination and consideration of the second

exception, i.e., injuries sustained off the premises of the employer, but while using a
customary means of ingress and egress.

This exception, known as the "proximity rule," was applied in Philippine Fiber Processing
Co., Inc. v. Ampil. 9 There, the employee, at about 5:15 a.m., while proceeding to his
place of work and running to avoid the rain, slipped and fell into a ditch fronting the
main gate of employer’s factory, as a result of which he died the next day. The sole
question was whether or not the accident which caused the employee’s death arose out
of and in the course of his employment. This Court ruled in favor of the claimant,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The very case of Afable v. Singer Sewing Machine Co. invoked by the petitioner
intimated that `we do not of course mean to imply that an employee can never recover
for injuries suffered while on his way to or from work. That depends on the nature of
his employment.’ Considering the facts found by the Commission, namely, that the
deceased Angel Ariar was not under any shift routine; that his assignment covered the
entire working hours of the factory; that the first working hour starts at 6:00 o’clock in
the morning; that it takes at least thirty minutes before the machine operates at full
speed or load; that the spot where he fell (ditch fronting petitioner’s factory or sidewalk
of its premises), is immediately proximate to his place of work, the accident in question
must be deemed to have occurred within the zone of his employment and therefore
arose out of and in the course thereof. In Salilig v. Insular Lumber Co., G.R. No. 28951,
September 10, 1928, referred to in the Comments on the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission Act by Morabe and Inton, 1955 edition, compensation was allowed for
injury received by a laborer from an accident in going to his place of work, along a path
or way owned by his employer and commonly used by the latter’s laborers." cralaw virtua1aw library

In contrast is Pampanga Sugar Development Co., Inc. v. Quiroz, 10 which concerned

injuries sustained by a centrifugal operator. He had reported for work at 9:30 p.m.
(March 7, 1958) and was dismissed at 5:30 the following morning. Soon "after he
stepped out of the company gate, and while standing about 2 1/2 meters from it
between the shoulder of the highway and a railroad that came from inside the
compound and intersected the highway, waiting for a ride home, he was bumped by a
jeepney, as a result of which he sustained" injuries. In holding that these injuries were
"not produced by an accident `arising out of and in the course of employment,’" this
Court reasoned thus: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The compensability of an injury suffered by an employee proceeding to or coming from

his work depends upon whether or not it is `work-connected.’ As Chief Justice Kenison
of New Hampshire has put it, `the fact that the employee is travelling to or from work
on a public highway does not necessarily exclude coverage (Brousseau v. Blackstone
Mills, 130 A 2d 543, 545). Conversely, it is not enough to say that the employee would
not have been on the public highway had it not been for his job, since the same can
usually be said of the general public (Payne & Dolan v. Industrial Commission, 46 NE 2d
925). The law, in effect, insures the employee against losses arising from the perils of
his work. In other words, the Workmen’s Compensation Act covers occupational
injuries, which, as such, must have a causative connection with something, not merely
in common with the public, but peculiar to the employment. In order to warrant
recovery for off-the-premises injuries, it must be shown that there has been a very
special danger, some particular risk which the employer could have caused or allowed
to exist. Hence,

`It is significant that practically all successful off-the- premises cases have involved
normal route of access to the plant, or an icy sidewalk adjacent to the premises and
therefore identified with the premises in the sense that the employer should have
removed the ice.’ (Italics supplied.)

"It is true that in Philippine Fiber Processing Co. v. Ampil, G.R. No. L-8130 (June 30,
1956), we held the employer liable for an injury sustained by an employee who, as he
was running to his place of work to avoid the rain, slipped and fell into a ditch in front
of the factory’s main gate and near the same. The ditch was, however, in itself an
obvious hazard which, owing to its proximity to the gate, the employer should have
taken measures to remove. Thus, thru his inaction, he had contributed, in a special
way, to the occurrence of the accident.

"In the case at bar, no such special circumstance appears to exist. There is no
particular causative connection between the injury sustained by the employee and
either his work or his employer. Although, as stated in the decision appealed from, the
record does not show that the company `had taken measures to make the waiting
place safe for the employees,’ neither does the record show either that the accident
occurred at the usual waiting place of the employee, or that said place was particularly
unsafe."cralaw virtua1aw library

Our Workmen’s Compensation Act being essentially American in origin and text, it is not
amis to pay deference to pertinent American jurisprudence. In the precise area of law
here involved, we can draw guidance from an affluence of Federal and State
precedents.

From Samuel B. Horovitz’ Injury and Death under Workmen’s Compensation Laws
(1944), pp. 159 to 165, we glean the following observations: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Suppose, however, that the injury occurs on the way to work or on the way home from
work. Injuries going to or from work have caused many judicial upheavals.

"The question here is limited to whether the injuries are `in the course of’ and not `out
of’ the employment. How the injury occurred is not in point. Street risks, whether the
employee was walking or driving, and all other similar questions deal with the risk of
injury or `out of’ the employment. `In the course of’ deals mainly with the element of
time and space, or `time, place and circumstances.’

"Thus, if the injury occurred fifteen minutes before working hours and within one
hundred feet of the employer’s premises, on sidewalks or public roads, the question of
`in the course of’ the employment is flatly raised.

"Some of our states refuse to extend this definition of `in the course of’ to include
these injuries. Most of the states will protect the employee from the moment his foot or
person reaches the employer’s premises, whether he arrives early or late. These states
find something sacred about the employment premises and define `premises’ very
broadly, not only to include premises owned by the employer, but also premises leased,
hired, supplied or used by him, even private alleyways merely used by the employer.
Adjacent private premises are protected by many states, and a few protect the
employee even on adjacent public sidewalks and streets. Where a city or any employer
owns or controls an island, all its streets are protected premises.

"There is no reason in principle why states should not protect employees for a
reasonable period of time prior to or after working hours and for a reasonable distance
before reaching or after leaving the employer’s premises. The Supreme Court of the
United States has declared that it will not overturn any state decision that so enlarges
the scope of its act. Hence, a deaf worker, trespassing on railroad tracks adjacent to his
employer’s brick-making premises (but shown by his superintendent the specific short
crossing over the track), and killed by a train, was held to be in the course of his
employment when hit by an on-coming train fifteen minutes before his day would have
begun. So long as a causal relation to the employment is discernible, no federal
question arises.

"The narrow rule that a worker is not in the course of his employment until he crosses
the employment threshold is itself subject to many exceptions. off-premises injuries to
or from work, in both liberal and narrow states, are compensable (1) if the employee is
on the way to or from work in a vehicle owned or supplied by the employer, whether in
a public (e.g., the employer’s street car) or private conveyance; (2) if the employee is
subject to call at all hours or at the moment of injury; (3) if the employee is traveling
for the employer, i.e. traveling workers; (4) if the employer pays for the employee’s
time from the moment he leaves his home to his return home; (5) if the employee is on
his way to do further work at home, even though on a fixed salary; (6) where the
employee is required to bring his automobile to his place of business for use there.
Other exceptions undoubtedly are equally justified, dependent on their own peculiar
circumstances." cralaw virtua1aw library

Schneider (supra, at p. 117) makes this significant statement: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"the proximity rule exception to the general going and coming rule is that an employee
is generally considered to be in the course of his employment while coming to or going
from his work, when, though off the actual premises of his employer, he is still in close
proximity thereto, is proceeding diligently at an appropriate time, by reasonable means,
over the natural, practical, customary, convenient and recognized way of ingress, or
egress, either on land under the control of the employer, or on adjacent property with
the express or implied consent of the employer." cralaw virtua1aw library

On pp. 98 to 99 of 85 ALR, we find the following disquisition: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The compensation acts have been very generally held not to authorize an award in
case of an injury or death from a peril which is common to all mankind, or to which the
public at large is exposed. 28 R.C.L. 804. And they do not as a general rule cover
injuries received while going to or from work on public streets, where the employee has
not reached, or has left the employer’s premises. The question whether an injury arises
out of and in the course of the employment, however, is one depending upon the facts
of each case, and in some cases, where an injury occurred while the employee was
going to or from work, but was in the street in front of the employer’s premises, it has
been held compensable.

"Thus, in the reported case (BARNETT V. BRTILING CAFETERIA CO., ante, 85) the
injury was held to have arisen out of and in the course of the employment, where the
employee slipped on ice on the sidewalk immediately in front of the employer’s place of
business, while on her way to report for duty, and just before entering by the only
entrance to her place of employment. The court here recognized the general rule that,
if an employee is injured while going to or from his work to his house, or to or from
some point not visited for the discharge of a duty arising out of the employment, or
while in the use of a public highway, he does not come within the protection of the
Workmen’s Compensation Act, but stated that there is an exception to this rule and
that the employment is not limited by the actual time when the workman reaches the
scene of his labor and begins it, or when he ceases, but includes a reasonable time and
opportunity before and after, while he is at or near his place of employment. The court
reasoned that in the case at bar, although the employee had not entered the
employer’s place of business, and the sidewalk was a public highway so much therefore
as was infront of the employer’s place of business was a necessary adjunct, used in
connection with the business, and that the sidewalk was to a limited degree and
purpose a part of the employer’s premises.

‘In Industrial Commission v. Barber (1927) 117 Ohio St 373, 159 NE 363, the injury
was held to have arisen in the course of the employment where an employee, about
five minutes before the hour when he was to go on duty, was struck by an automobile
owned and driven by another employee, within a short distance from the employer’s
plant, which was located at the dead end of a street maintained by the employer from
its plant to the intersection with another street, and, although the street was a public
one, it led nowhere except to the employer’s plant, and all of its employees were
obliged to use it in going to and from their work. The court stated that where the
conditions under the control of an industrial plant are such that the employee has no
option but to pursue a given course with reference to such conditions and
environments, the pursuance of such course is an implied obligation of the employer in
his contract with such employee, and that when he, for the purpose of entering his
employment, has entered into the sphere or zone controlled by his employer and is
pursuing a course with reference to which he has no option, he is then not only within
the conditions and environments of the plant of his employer, but is then in the course
of his employment; and that, when he receives an injury attributable to such conditions
and environments, there is a direct causal connection between his employment and his
injury, and the injury falls within the class of industrial injuries for which compensation
has been provided by the Workmen’s Compensation Law." cralaw virtua1aw library

99 C.J.S., at pp. 307-314, has this to say: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It is laid down as a general rule, known as the `going and coming’ rule, that, in the
absence of special circumstances, and except in certain unusual circumstances, and
where nothing else appears, harm or injury sustained by an employee while going to or
from his work is not compensable. Such injury, or accident, is regarded by the weight
of authority of many courts as not arising out of his employment, and as not being, or
not occurring, in the course thereof. "However, this rule is not inflexible, is not of
inevitable application, and is subject to qualifications, and to exceptions which depend
on the nature, circumstances, and conditions of the particular employment, the
circumstances of the particular case, and the cause of the injury." cralaw virtua1aw library

Jaynees v. Potlach Forests 11 expresses with enlightening clarity the rationale for
extending the scope of "course of employment" to certain "off-premises" injuries: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"We are urged here to again recognize and apply the distinction between off-premises
injuries which occur on private property and those which occur on public streets and
highways. The extension of the course of employment to off-premises injuries is not
based upon the principle which would justify a distinction upon the narrow ground of
private and public property; it is not sound to say that while an employee is on a public
highway he is always there as a member of the public and in nowise in the exercise of
any right conferred by his contract of employment; nor is it a complete answer to say
that while he is on his employer’s premises his presence there is by contract right,
otherwise he would be a trespasser. The question of whether or not one is a covered
employee should not be resolved by the application of the law relating to rights to enter
upon lands, or by the law of trespass, licensee, invitee or otherwise.

"A substantial and fair ground to justify the extension of the course of employment
beyond the premises of the employer is to extend its scope to the necessary risks and
hazards associated with the employment. These risks may or may not be on the
premises of the employer and for this reason there is no justification to distinguish
between extended risks on public highways and private pathways. In fact it is at most a
distinction without a difference. Under the better reasoned cases the technical status as
public or private is obviously of no moment or in any event in and of itself is not
conclusive."cralaw virtua1aw library

Likewise enlightening is the following explanation of the premises rule exceptions: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"We have, then a workable explanation of the exception to the premises rule; it is not
nearness, or reasonable distance, or even the identifying or surrounding areas with the
premises; it is simply that, when a court has satisfied itself that there is a distinct
`arising out of `or causal connection between the conditions under which claimant
must approach and leave the premises and the occurrence of the injury, it may hold
that the course of employment extends as far as those conditions extend." (Larson’s
Workmen’s Compensation Law, 1965 ed. vol. 1. pp. 210-211)

We now direct our attention to the cause of the employee’s death: assault.

An "assault," although resulting from a deliberate act of the slayer, is considered an

"accident" within the meaning of Sec. 2 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, since the
word "accident" is intended to indicate that "the act causing the injury shall be casual or
unforeseen, an act for which the injured party is not legally responsible." 12

In the cases where the assault was proven to have been work- connected,
compensation was awarded. In Nava, supra, the helmsman of a boat was engaged in
hauling the ship’s cable and in coiling it on the deck of the boat preparatory to passing
it down a hatchway. He found the space necessary for coiling the cable party occupied
by a folding bed of one of the passengers. This passenger, upon being asked, declared
his ownership of the bed. Nava expressed his intention of pushing it out of the way and
proceeded to do so. Angered by this, the passenger exchanged hot words with Nava,
and then, with a piece of wood, jabbed Nava at the pit of the stomach. At this point,
the passenger’s brother ran up to Nava and stabbed him to death. The death was
adjudged compensable.

In Bohol Land Transportation Co. v. Vda. de Mandaguit, 13 the truck which Mandaguit
was driving collided with a cyclist going in the opposite direction. The latter turned
around and immediately pursued the bus. He overtook it a few minutes later when it
stopped to take on passengers. The driver then disembarked from the bus to wash his
hands at a drugstore nearby. The cyclist followed him there and knifed him to death.
We affirmed the grant of compensation upon the finding that the death arose out of and
in the course of employment.

In Galicia v. Dy Pac, 14 the employee, Pablo Carla, was asked to work in lieu of another
employee who had been suspended from work upon request of his labor union; while
Carla was working, the suspended employee asked him to intercede for him, but Carla
refused; an altercation resulted; shortly thereafter the suspended employee stabbed
Carla to death. The death was held compensable because "the injury sustained by the
deceased was caused by an accident arising out of his employment since the evidence
is clear that the fight which resulted in the killing of the deceased had its origin or
cause in the fact that he was placed in the job previously occupied by the assailant." cralaw virtua1aw library

In the three cases above-cited, there was evidence as to the motive of the assailant.

In A.P. Santos, Inc. v. Dabacol, 15 the death of an employee- driver who, while driving
a cab, was killed by an unidentified passenger, was held compensable by the
Commission. However, the question of whether the assault arose out of the
employment, was not raised on appeal to this Court.

In Batangas Transportation Company v. Vda. de Rivera, 16 that question was raised.

While the employee-driver was driving the bus, a passenger boarded it and sat directly
behind the driver. After about thirty minutes, during which the passenger and the driver
never so much as exchanged a word, the passenger shot the driver to death and then
fled. There was no competent proof as to the cause of the assault, although there were
intimations that the incident arose from a personal grudge. The majority decision 17
ruled the death compensable. The bases: (1) Once it is proved that the employee died
in the course of the employment, the legal presumption, in the absence of substantial
evidence to the contrary, is that the claim "comes within the provisions of the
compensation law" (sec. 43), in other words, that the incident arose out of the
workman’s employment. (2) Doubts as to rights to compensation are resolved in favor
of the employee and his dependents. (3) The Commissioner’s declaration on the work-
connection might be binding on the Court. (4) There are employments which increase
the risk of assault on the person of the employee and it is in that sense that an injury
or harm sustained by the assaulted worker arises out of the employment, because the
increased risk to assault supplies the link or connection between the injury and the
employment. Among the jobs enumerated as increasing the risk of assault are (a) jobs
having to do with keeping the peace or guarding property; (b) jobs having to do with
keeping or carrying of money which subject the employee to the risk of assault because
of the increased temptation to robbery; (c) jobs which expose the employee to direct
contact with lawless and irresponsible members of the community, like that of a
bartender; and (d) work as bus driver, taxi driver or street car conductor.

It has been said that an employment may either increase risk of assault because of its
nature or be the subject-matter of a dispute leading to the assault. The first kind of
employment, the so-called "increased risk" jobs comprehend (1) jobs involving
dangerous duties, such as that of guarding the employer’s property, that of carrying or
keeping money, that where the employee is exposed to lawless or irresponsible
members of the public, or that which subjects him to increased or indiscriminate
contact with the public, such as the job of a street car conductor or taxi-driver; 18 (2)
jobs where the employee is placed in a dangerous environment; 19 and (3) jobs of
employees whose work takes them on the highway. On the other hand, the
employment itself may be the subject-matter of a dispute leading to the assault as
where a supervisor is assaulted by a workmen he has fired, or where the argument was
over the performance of work or possession of tools or the like, or where the violence
was due to labor disputes. 20

In Rivera, supra, the unexplained assault on the employee was considered to have
arisen out of the employment because it occurred in the course of employment. This
Court relied on the presumption of law that in any proceeding for the enforcement of a
claim, the claim is presumed to come within the provisions of the Act. 21 According to
this Court, "this statutory presumption was copied from New York." Concerning the
corresponding New York provision of law, Larson has this to say: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In a few jurisdictions, notably New York and Massachusetts, a statutory presumption in
favor of coverage has figured in unexplained- accident cases. The Massachusetts
statute provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

`In any claim for compensation, where the employee has been killed, or is physically or
mentally unable to testify, it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence
to the contrary, that the claim comes within the provisions of this chapter, that
sufficient notice of the injury has been given, and that the injury or death was not
occasioned by the wilful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself or another.’
"This provision was largely copied from the New York section on presumptions, except
that the New York act creates the presumption in all cases, not merely those involving
an employee’s death or inability to testify.

"The sweeping inclusiveness of this language might seem at first glance to mean that
the mere making of a claim is also the making of a prima facie case, as long as death
or injury is shown to have occurred. The New York and Massachusetts courts have not
so interpreted these statutes, however. It seems to be necessary to establish some kind
of preliminary link with the employment before the presumption can attach. Otherwise
the claimant widow would have merely to say, `My husband, who was one of your
employee, has died, and I therefore claim death benefits,’ whereupon the affirmative
burden would devolve upon the employer to prove that there was no connection
between the death and the environment.

"It is not yet entirely clear what initial demonstration of employment-connection will
give the presumption a foothold. Apparently, the idea is to rule out cases in which
claimant can show neither that the injury occurred in the course of employment nor
that it arose out of it, as where he contracted a disease but has no evidence to show
where he got it. If there is evidence that the injury occurred in the course of
employment, the presumption will usually supply the `arising-out-of-employment’
factor. "Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law (1965) vol. 1, pp. 123-124.

We also quote from the decision of the Court of Appeals of New York in Daus v.
Gunderman & Sons : 22

"The statute is not intended to relieve completely an employee from the burden of
showing that accidental injuries suffered by him actually were sustained in the course of
his employment. `It is not the law that mere proof of an accident, without other
evidence, creates the presumption under Section 21 of the Workmen’s Compensation
Law (Consol. Laws, c. 67) that the accident arose out of and in the course of the
employment. On the contrary, it has been frequently held, directly and indirectly, that
there must be some evidence from which the conclusion can be drawn that the injuries
did arise out of and in the course of the employment.’ Proof of the accident will give rise
to the statutory presumption only where some connection appears between the
accident and the employment." cralaw virtua1aw library

Likewise of relevance is the following treatise: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The discussion of the coverage formula, `arising out of and in the course of
employment,’ was opened with the suggestion that, while `course’ and `arising’ were
put under separate headings for convenience, some interplay between the two factors
should be observed in the various categories discussed. "A few examples may now be
reviewed to show that the two tests, in practice, have not been kept in air-tight
compartments, but have to some extent merged into a single concept of work-
connection. One is almost tempted to formulate a sort of quantum theory of work-
connection: that a certain minimum quantum of work-connection must be shown, and if
the `course’ quantity is very small, but the `arising’ quantity is large, the quantum will
add up to the necessary minimum, as it will also when the `arising’ quantity is very
small but the `course’ quantity is relatively large.
"But if both the `course’ and `arising’ quantities are small, the minimum quantum will
not be met.

"As an example of the first, a strong `arising’ factor but weak `course’ factor, one may
cite the cases in which recoveries have been allowed of the employment premises,
outside business hours, when an employee going to or coming from work is injured by a
hazard distinctly traceable to the employment, such as a traffic jam overflowing from
the employment premises, or a rock flying through the air from a blast on the
premises. Here, by normal course of employment standards, there would be no award,
since the employee was not on the premises while coming or going. Yet the
unmistakeable character of the casual relation of the injury to the employment has
been sufficient to make up for the weakness of the `course’ factor. Another example of
the same kind of balancing-out is seen in the line of cases dealing with injury to
travelling men or loggers while sleeping in hotels or bunk-houses. It was shown in the
analysis of these cases that, although the `course’ factor is on the borderline when the
employee is sound asleep at the time of injury, a strong causal relation of the injury to
the conditions of employment — as where a fellow logger runs amok, or a straw falls
into the bunk-house-inmate’s throat from the mattress above, or the employee is
trapped in a burning hotel — will boost the case over the line to success; while a weak
causal connection, as where the salesman merely slips in a hotel bath, coupled with a
weak `course’ factor due to the absence of any direct service performed for the
employer at the time, will under present decisions add up to a quantum of work-
connection too small to support an award. It was also shown that when the `course’
element is strengthened by the fact that the employee is at all times on call, the range
of compensable sources of injury is broader than when the employee, although living
on the premises is not on call.

"A somewhat similar balancing-out process is seen in the holding that a borderline
course-of-employment activity like seeking personal comfort or going to and from work
falls short of compensability if the method adopted is unusual, unreasonable and
dangerous, while no such restriction applies to the direct performance of the work.

"As an example of the reverse situation, a strong `course’ element and a weak `arising’
element, one may recall the `positional’ cases discussed in Section 10, as well as the
unexplained-fall and other `neutra -cause’ cases. Here the course of employment test
is satisfied beyond the slightest doubt: the employee is in the midst of performing the
active duties of his job. But the causal connection is very weak, since the source of the
injury — whether a stray bullet, a wandering lunatic, an unexplained fall or death, or a
mistaken assault by a stranger — is not distinctly associated with employment
conditions as such, and is tied to the employment only by the argument that the injury
would not have occurred to this employee but for the obligation of the employment
which placed him in the position to be hurt. Yet, since the `course’ element is so
strong, awards are becoming increasingly common on these facts.

"Incidentally, it may be observed that this `quantum’ idea forms a useful yardstick for
measuring just how generous a court has become in expanding compensation
coverage; for if a court makes an award when a case, by the above standards, is weak
both on course of employment and on causal connection, one can conclude that the
court is capable of giving the act a broad construction. Thus, an award was made in
Puffin v. General Electric, where the course element was weak (rest period) and the
causal element was weak (setting fire to own sweater while smoking). Both factors
were likewise very weak in O’Leary v. Brown Pacific-Maxon Inc., where the course of
employment consisted of a recreation period interrupted by a rescue of a stranger, and
the arising factor consisted of drowning in a channel where decedent was prohibited
from going. And, in Martin v. Plaut, the course of employment factor was weak (a cook
dressing in the morning) and the causal factor was also weak (an unexplained fall); yet
an award was made in New York.

"But another New York case shows that the simultaneous weakness of course and
arising factors may reach the point where the requisite quantum is not found. In Shultz
v. Nation Associates, compensation was denied to an employee who while combing her
hair preparatory to going to lunch negligently struck her eye with the comb. Here we
see thinness on all fronts: as to course of employment time factor, we have a lunch
period; as to the course of employment activity factor, we have care of personal
appearance; and as to the causal factor, we have negligence of the employee. Eack
weakness standing alone —lunch period, care of appearance, negligence — would not
be fatal; there are many awards in which one or another of these is present. But when
all are present, while an award is not impossible and could be defended on a point by
point basis, it can not be relied upon in most jurisdictions by the prudent lawyer."
Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law, 1965 ed. Vol. 1, pp. 452.97 to 452.100.

In resumé: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Workmen’s compensation is granted if the injuries result from an accident which

arise out of and in the course of employment.

2. Both the "arising" factor and the "course" factor must be present. If one factor is
weak and the other is strong, the injury is compensable, but not where both factors are
weak. Ultimately, the question is whether the accident is work-connected.

3. In a proceeding for the enforcement of a claim, the same is presumed to come within
the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. But a preliminary link must first be
shown to exist between the injury and the employment. Thus if the injury occurred in
the course of employment, it is presumed to have arisen out of the employment.

4. The "course" factor applies to time, place and circumstances. This factor is present if
the injury takes place within the period of employment, at a place where the employee
may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental
thereto.

5. The rule is that an injury sustained while the employee goes to or comes from his
place of work, is not of employment.

6. The exception to the rule is an injury sustained off the employee’s premises, but
while in close proximity thereto and while using a customary means of ingress and
egress. The reason for extending the scope of "course of employment" to off-premises
injuries is that there is a causal connection between the work and the hazard.

7. An "assault" may be considered an "accident" within the meaning of the Workmen’s

Compensation Act. The employment may either increase risk of assault because of its
nature or be the subject-matter of a dispute leading to the assault.

From these milestones, we now proceed to take our bearings in the case at bar, having
in mind always that no cover-all formula can be spelled out with specificity, that the
particular facts and circumstances of each case must be inquired into, and that in any
perceptive inquiry, the question as to where the line should be drawn beyond which the
liability of the employer cannot continue has been held to be usually one of fact.

We shall first dwell on the question of ownership of the private road where Pablo was
killed. In granting compensation, that Commission said that "the road where the
deceased was shot was of private ownership, was called the IDECO road, and led
straight to the main IDECO gate, thus raising the reasonable assumption that it
belonged" to the IDECO. The Commission reasoned out that "even if the ownership of
the road were open to question, there was no doubt that its private character was
obviously exploited by the respondent for the purpose of its own business to such an
extent as to make it to all intents and purposes an extension of its premises," so that
"the shooting of the deceased may be considered to have taken place on the premises,
and therefore within the employment," and that "while respondent allowed its name to
be used in connection with the private road for the ingress and egress of the employees
it did not apparently take the necessary precaution to make it safe for its employees by
employing security guards." cralaw virtua1aw library

But the IDECO denies ownership of the road. In its memorandum filed with the
Regional Office, IDECO averred that Pablo’s death did not originate from his work as to
time, place and circumstances. This, in effect, is a denial of ownership of the road. The
decision of the Regional Office does not state that the road belongs to the IDECO. All
that it says is that Pablo was shot "barely two minutes after he was dismissed from
work and while walking along the IDECO road about twenty (20) meters from the gate."
In its motion for reconsideration and/or review," the IDECO emphasized that "the place
where the incident happened was a public road, not less than (20) meters away from
the main gate of the compound, and therefore not proximate to or in the immediate
vicinity of the place of work." Again, the ownership of the road was implicitly denied.
And in its "motion for reconsideration and/or appeal to the Commission en banc," the
IDECO alleged outright that the "road where the incident took place, although of private
ownership, does not belong to IDECO. There is absolutely no evidence on record that
shows IDECO owns the road." If the road were owned by the IDECO, there would have
been no question that the assault arose "in the course of employment." 23 But if it did
indeed own the road, then the IDECO would have fenced it, and placed its main gate at
the other end of the road where it meets the public highway.

But while the IDECO does not own the private road, it cannot be denied that it was
using the same as the principal means of ingress and egress. The private road leads
directly to its main gate. 24 Its right to use the road must then perforce proceed from
either an easement of right of way or a lease. Its right, therefore, is either a legal one
or a contractual one. In either case the IDECO should logically and properly be charged
with security control of the road. The IDECO owned its employees a safe passage to its
premises. In compliance with such duty, the IDECO should have seen to it not only the
road was properly paved and did not have holes or ditches, but should also have
instituted measures for the proper policing of the immediate area. The point where
Pablo was shot was barely twenty meters away from the main IDECO gate, certainly
nearer than a stone’s throw therefrom. The spot is immediately proximate to the
IDECO’s premises. Considering this fact, and the further facts that Pablo has just
finished overtime work at the time, and was killed barely two minutes after dismissal
from work, the Ampil case is squarely applicable here. We may say, as we did in Ampil,
that the place where the employee was injured being "immediately proximate to his
place of work, the accident in question must be deemed to have occurred within the
zone of his employment and therefore arose out of and in the course thereof." Our
principal question is whether the injury was sustained in the course of employment. We
find that it was, and so conclude that the assault arose out of the employment, even
though the said assault is unexplained.

American jurisprudence supports this view.

In Bountiful Brick Company v. Giles, 25 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Employment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable margin of
time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where the work
is to be done. If the employee be injured while passing, with the express or implied
consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way over the employer’s, to or from
his work by a way over the employer’s premises, or over those of another such
proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a part of the employer’s premises, the
injury is one arising out and in the course of the employment as much as though it had
happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its performance.
In other words, the employment may begin in point of time before the work is entered
upon and in point of space before the place where the work is to be done is reached.
Probably, as a general rule, employment may be said to begin when the employee
reaches the entrance to the employer’s premises where the work is to be done; but it is
clear that in some cases the rule extends to include adjacent premises used by the
employee as a means of ingress and egress with the express or implied consent of the
employer." cralaw virtua1aw library

The above ruling is on all fours with our facts. Two minutes from dismissal and twenty
meters from the main IDECO gate are "a reasonable margin of time and space
necessary to be used in passing to and from" the IDECO’s premises. The IDECO
employees used the private road with its consent, express or implied. Twenty meters
on that road from the main gate is in closed proximity to the IDECO’s premises. It
follows that Pablo’s death was in the course of employment.

In Carter v. Lanzetta, 26 it was held that "such statutes envision extension of coverage
to employees from the time they reach the employer’s premises until they depart
therefrom and that hours of service include a period when this might be accomplished
within a reasonable interval" ; and that "under exceptional circumstances, a
continuance of the course of employment may be extended by allowing the employee a
reasonable time not only to enter or leave the premises but also to surmount certain
hazards adjacent thereto." cralaw virtua1aw library

The private road led directly to the main IDECO gate. From this description, it would
appear that the road is a dead-end street. In Singer v. Rich Marine Sales, 27 it was held
that, where the employee, while returning to work at the end of the lunch period, fell at
the curb of the sidewalk immediately adjacent to the employer’s premises and one
other located thereon, and the general public used the street only in connection with
those premises, and the employer actually stored boats on the sidewalk, the sidewalk
was within the precincts of employment. In that case there were even two business
establishments on the dead-end street. Here, it is exclusively the IDECO premises
which appear to be at the end of the private road.

We find in Jaen v. Chrysler Corporation 28 a meaningful statement of the obligation of

the employer to its employees: "That the employer owes, so to speak, a duty of `safe
passage’ to an employee to the point where he can reach the proper arrival or
departure from his work seems without question." cralaw virtua1aw library

We next quote extensively from Kelty v. Traverllers Insurance Company: 29

"The rule has been repeatedly announced in Texas that an injury received by an
employee while using the public streets and highways in going to or returning from the
place of employment is not compensable, the rationale of the rule being that in most
instances such an injury is suffered as a consequence of risk and hazards to which all
members of the travelling public are subject rather than risk and hazards having to do
with and originating in the work or business of the employer. . . .

"Another exception, however, which is applicable is found in the so-called `access’

cases. In these cases a workman who has been injured at a place intended by the
employer for use as a means of ingress and egress to and from the actual place of the
employee’s work has been held to be in the course of his employment. The courts have
said that these access areas are so closely related to the employer’s premises as to be
fairly treated as a part of the employer’s premises. We shall discuss the principal
authorities dealing with this exception to the general rule.

"The leading cases in Texas dealing with the `access’ exception, and one which we
think is controlling of this appeal, is Lumberman’s Reciprocal Assn. v. Behnken, 112
Tex. 103, 246 S.W. 72, 28 A.L.R. 1402. In that case the employee was employed by
Hartburg Lumber Company, which company operated and owned a sawmill in Hartburg,
Texas, which was a lumber town, consisting solely of the employer’s facilities. A railroad
track ran through the town and a part of the lumber company’s facilities was situated
on either side of the right- of-way. A public road ran parallel to the railroad tracks
which led to the various buildings on the property of the lumber company. This crossing
was used by any member of the public desiring to go to any part of the lumber
company facilities. On the day in question the decedent quit work at noon, went home
for lunch and while returning to the lumber company plant for the purpose of resuming
his employment, was struck and killed by a train at the crossing in question. The
insurance company contended (as it does here) that the decedent’s death did not
originate in the work or business of his employer and that at the time of his fatal
injuries he was not in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of his
employer. The Supreme Court, in an extensive opinion, reviewed the authorities from
other states and especially Latter’s Case 238 Mass. 326, 130 N.E. 637, 638, and arrived
at the conclusion that the injury and death under such circumstances were
compensable under the Texas Act. The court held that the railroad crossing bore so
intimate a relation to the lumber company’s premises that it could hardly be treated
otherwise than as a part of the premises. The court pointed out that the lumber
company had rights in and to the crossing which was used in connection with the
lumber company’s business, whether by employees or by members of the public. In
announcing the `access’ doctrine Justice Greenwood said: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

`Was Behnken engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of his
employer when he received the injury causing his death? He was upon the crossing
provided as the means of access to his work solely because he was an employee. He
encountered the dangers incident to use of the crossing in order that he might perform
the duties imposed by his contract of service. Without subjecting himself to such
dangers he could not do what was required of him in the conduct of the lumber
company’s business. He had reached a place provided and used only as an adjunct to
that business and was injured from a risk created by the conditions under which the
business was carried on. To hold that he was not acting in furtherance of the affairs or
business of the lumber company would be to give a strict interpretation to this remedial
statute, which should be liberally construed with a view to accomplish its purpose and
to promote justice.’. . . "In Texas Employer’s Ins. Ass’n. v. Anderson, Tex. Civ. App.,
125 S.W. 2d 674, wr. ref., this court followed the rule announced in Behnken, supra. In
that case the employee was killed while crossing the railroad track near his place of
employment. In discussing the question of the situs of the injury Justice Looney said:
library
chanrob1es virtual 1aw

`Its use as a means of ingress to and exit from his place of work not only conduced to
his safety and convenience, but contributed to the promptness and efficiency with
which he was enabled to discharge the duties owing his employer; hence the reason
and necessity for his presence upon the railroad track (that portion of the pathway
leading over the railroad right of way) when injured, in our opinion, had to do with,
originated in and grew out of the work of the employer; and that, the injury received at
the time, place, and under the circumstances, necessarily was in furtherance of the
affairs or business of the employer.’

"Again, in Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n. v. Boecker, Tex. Civ. App., 53 S.W. 2d 327, err.
ref., this court had occasion to follow the `access’ doctrine. In that case Chief Justice
Jones quoted from the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Bountiful Brick
Company Et. Al. v. Giles, 276 U.5. 154, 48 S.Ct. 221, 72 L.Ed. 507, 66 A. L.R. 1402, as
follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

`An employment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable
margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where
the work is to be done. If the employee be injured while passing, with the express or
implied consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way over the employer’s
premises, or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical
effect a part of the employer’s premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the
course of the employment as much as though it had happened while the employee was
engaged in his work at the place of its performance. In other words, the employment
may begin in point of time before the work is entered upon and in point of space before
the place where the work is to be done is reached.’"

The ruling enunciated above is applicable in the case at bar. That part of the road
where Pablo was killed is in very close proximity to the employer’s premises. It is an
"access area" "so clearly related to the employee’s premises as to be fairly treated as a
part of the employer’s premises." That portion of the road bears "so intimate a relation"
to the company’s premises. It is the chief means of entering the IDECO premises,
either for the public or for its employees. The IDECO uses it extensively in pursuit of its
business. It has rights of passage over the road, either legal, if by virtue of easement,
or contractual, if by reason of lease. Pablo was using the road as a means of access to
his work solely because he was an employee. For this reason, the IDECO was under
obligation to keep the place safe for its employees. Safe, that is, against dangers that
the employees might encounter therein, one of these dangers being assault by third
persons. Having failed to take the proper security measures over the said area which it
controls, the IDECO is liable for the injuries suffered by Pablo resulting in his death. As
heretofore stated, the assault on Pablo is unexplained. The murderer was himself killed
before he could be brought to trial. It is true there is authority for the statement that
before the "proximity" rule may be applied it must first be shown that there is a causal
connection between the employment and the hazard which resulted in the injury. 30
The following more modern view was expressed in Lewis Wood Preserving Company v.
Jones. 31

"While some earlier cases seem to indicate that the causative danger must be peculiar
to the work and not common to the neighborhood for the injuries to arise out of and in
the course of the employment (see Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peek, 36 Ga. App. 557
[137 S.E. 121], Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Cox, 61 Ga App. 420, 6 S.E. 2d
189), later cases have been somewhat more liberal, saying that, `to be compensable,
injuries do not have to arise from something peculiar to the employment.’ Fidelity &
Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. Bardon, 79 Ga. App. 260, 262, 54 S.E. 2d 443, 444. `Where the
duties of an employee entail his presence (at a place and a time) the claim for an injury
there occurring is not to be barred because it results from a risk common to all others ..
unless it is also common to the general public without regard to such conditions, and
independently of place, employment, or pursuit.’ New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v.
Sumrell, 30 Ga. App. 682, 118 S.E. 786, cited in Globe Indemnity Co. v. MacKendree,
39 Ga. App. 58, 146 S.E. 46, 47. McKiney v. Reynolds & Manley Lumber Co., 79 Ga.
App. 826, 829, 54 S.E. 2d 471, 473." cralaw virtua1aw library

But even without the foregoing pronouncement, the employer should still be held liable
in view of our conclusion that that portion of the road where Pablo was killed, because
of its proximity, should be considered part of the IDECO’s premises. Hence, the injury
was in the course of employment, and there automatically arises the presumption —
invoked in Rivera — that the injury by assault arose out of the employment, i.e., there
is a causal relation between the assault and the employment.

We do say here that the circumstances of time, two minutes after dismissal from
overtime work, and space, twenty meters from the employer’s main gate, bring Pablo’s
death within the scope of the course factor. But it may logically be asked: Suppose it
were three minutes after and thirty meters from, or five minutes after and fifty meters
from, would the "proximity" rule still apply? In answer, we need but quote that portion
of the decision in Jean v. Chrysler Corporation, supra, which answered a question
arising from an ingenious hypothetical situation put forth by the defendant therein: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"We could, of course, say `this is not the case before us’ and utilize the old saw, `that
which is not before us we do not decide.’ Instead, we prefer to utilize the considerably
older saw: `Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof’ (Matthew 1:34), appending,
however, this admonition: no statute is static; it must remain constantly viable to meet
new challenges placed to it. Recovery in a proper case should not be suppressed
because of a conjectural posture which may never arise and which if it does, will be
decided in the light of then-existing law." Since the Workmen’s Compensation Act is
basically a social legislation designed to afford relief to workmen, it must be liberally
construed to attain the purpose for which it was enacted. 32 Liberally construed, Sec. 2
of the Act comprehends Pablo’s death. The Commission did not err in granting
compensation.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is affirmed, at petitioner’s costs.

Concepcion, CJ., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando and Capistrano, JJ.,
concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-46046 April 5, 1985

EMELITA ENAO, petitioner,
vs.
THE EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondent.

Vivencio M. Carpio, Jr. for petitioner.

Jose G. De Vera for respondent ECC.

ALAMPAY, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission (E.C.C.),
dated October 26, 1976, affirming the decision of the Government Service Insurance System,
denying petitioner's claim for Compensation of income benefits due to the injuries sustained by her
when on August 1, 1975, while on her way to Dipolog City for the purpose of purchasing supplies
and other training and school aids for her office, she, together with others, were ambushed by
unidentified men believed to be communist insurgents.

The antecedent facts of this case are not disputed and are well stated in the appealed decision
rendered by the Employees' Compensation Commission, subject of the petition in this case.

... On August 1, 1975, appellant (Emelita Enao), a Public School Teacher, together
with others, was on her way from her official station at Sergio Osmena, Sr.,
Zamboanga del Norte to Dipolog City. According to the Acting Administrative Officer
of her employer, 'Having held classes on July 26, in lieu of August 1, 1975, as per
District Memorandum hereto attached, Miss Enao was on her way home from station
when their group was ambushed and fired upon by armed men hitting her on her
forearm and abdomen necessitating operation' (Part II, Income Benefits Claim for
Payment), and according to appellant's witnesses, who were members of the
ambushed party, she was on her way to Dipolog City for the purpose of 'securing
supplies and other training and school aids necessary for furthering (our) services as
a school teacher' (Affidavits of Francisco L. Podol and Juanita Adanza, respectively).
When the appellant and her group were at barrio de Venta Perla, Polanco,
Zamboanga del Norte, they were fired upon by a band of armed men believed to be
communist insurgents. As a result of the ambush, the appellant sustained gunshot
wounds on her left forearm and abdomen which compelled her confinement at the
Zamboanga del Norte Provincial Hospital from August 1 to 6, 1975, for surgical
removal of foreign bodies (shrapnel) from her left arm and later at the Dipolog
Medical Center from September 10 to 12, 1975 for definitive treatment. She also
developed interstitial pneumonia as a result. (Decision of the Employees'
Compensation Commission, Annex "B", Rollo, pp. 8-9).
On August 5, 1975, petitioner sent a notice of claim of injury to the Secretary of Education and
Culture, through the Division Superintendent of Schools, Zamboanga City. It is said that this claim
was not controverted.

On the same date, a claim for income benefits for disability was filed by the herein petitioner with the
Government Service Insurance System but this claim was denied by the System in its letter-
decision, dated February 27, 1976, on its reasoning that:

It appears that on your way to Dipolog City for the purpose of purchasing your needs,
you were ambushed by unidentified men believed to be NPAS. Though this
happened on August 1, 1975, a regular working day, this was considered your off
day, having held classes in its stead on July 26, 1975, a Saturday, per District
Memorandum No. 1, s. 1975, dated June 2, 1975. Under such situation, for purposes
of the Employees' Compensation, said accident happened outside your time and
place of work, not to mention the fact that you were not in the performance of your
official functions when it happened.

In view of the foregoing, your claim is hereby denied. (Annex "A", Rollo, p. 7)

Not satisfied with the above ruling of the GSIS and upon denial of petitioner's motion for
reconsideration thereof, the latter appealed to the Employees' Compensation Commission. On
October 26, 1976, the ECC affirmed the decision of the GSIS appealed from and dismissed the
Petitioner's claim, on the grounds that:

... First. the day when the accident occurred, more particularly August 1, 1975, was
an off-day. Perusal of the District Memorandum No. 1, series of 1975 and dated June
2, 1975, win show that August 1, 1975, is not just an isolated off-day, but one of
those dates fixed and set in lieu of Saturday. Hence, the injury was incurred not
during office hours. Second, appellant incurred injury while en route to Dipolog City;
more aptly put, while outside t-he school premises where she normally discharges
her official functions. The sworn statement of the Acting Administrative Officer and
the appellant's witness all point to the same circumstance. Third, while appellant's
witnesses testified in an affidavit that appellant left her official station for Dipolog City
on the day in question for the purpose of procurring school supplies and training aids
to enhance her teaching efficiency, we find the version of the Acting Administrative
Officer more credible-that is, the appellant was on her way home from station-for
there is nothing which indicates that it is false, misleading or fabricated. On the other
hand, the preponderance of legal opinion holds that affidavits, as those of appellant's
witnesses, are only prima facie evidence of weak probative force and are in
themselves self-serving declarations where the same have been made in anticipation
of a future litigation. It has been said that 'perhaps the most subtle and prolific of au
the fallacies of testimony arises out of unconscious partisanship.' In the case at bar,
upon the happening of the accident, the companions of the appellant perhaps still
sympathetic to her for what befall her, and testifying in an affidavit, are apt to side
with her. (Annex "B", Rollo, pp. 9-10)

In the petition for review presented to this Court, Petitioner contends that the Respondent ECC has
decided the claim in a way not in accordance with law and applicable decision of the Supreme Court.

At the time of the incident in question, the pertinent and governing provisions of law are to be found
in Section 1, Rule 11, of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, which provides:
 SECTION 1. Grounds.—(a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all
of the following conditions:

(1) The employee must have sustained the injury during his working hours;

(2) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him
to be; and

(3) The employee must have been performing his official function.

The Petitioner, in proceeding to Dipolog City on August 1, 1975, which is a Friday, from her station
at the Municipality of Sergio Osmena, Sr., Zamboanga del Norte, intended to procure supplies and
other training aids which are needed facilities in connection with her services as a school teacher at
the Wilbon Primary School, cannot be at all disputed. The companions of the Petitioner at the time of
the ambush and who appear to be co-teachers of the Petitioner, namely: Francisco L. Podol and
Juanita Adanza, have attested in their respective affidavits that they and the Petitioner were at that
time on their way to Dipolog City "for the purpose of securing supplies and other training and school
aids necessary for the furtherance of their services as school teachers." There is no mention at an in
the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission that this particular assertion has been at
all contradicted or controverted by any evidence whatsoever submitted to the Commission by the
GSIS.

We find no basis at an for the findings made by the Employees' Compensation Commission in its
decision that the statements of Petitioner and her witnesses are merely self-serving declarations
because We can discern no circumstance that would indicate or support such a conclusion. As a
matter of fact, the decision appealed from accepts the fact that the statements given by Petitioner-
Appellant's witnesses constitute prima facie evidence of the matter sought to be established.
Uncontroverted and unrefuted by any evidence, then such statements of appellant's witnesses would
suffice to establish that the multiple gunshot wounds and injuries sustained by appellant and which
caused her confinement at the Zamboanga del Norte Provincial Hospital from August 1 to 6, 1975
for removal of shrapnels from her left arm and later at the Dipolog Medical Center from September 1
to 12, 1975, are definitely work-connected.

The conjecture expressed in the decision of the ECC that appellant obtained the referred self-
serving declaration of her witnesses "in anticipation of a future litigation" is unfair and untenable.
Petitioner could not have even expected that respondent GSIS would resist her claim. Notice of the
same claim for the injuries she sustained is said to have been presented to the Secretary of
Education and Culture, through the Division Superintendent of Schools, Division of Zamboanga del
Norte at Dipolog City, promptly on August 5, 1975, or four (4) days after the ambush incident and
such claim was not controverted by said public school officials. These submissions of Petitioner-
Appellant have not at all been contradicted by Respondent. No cause has, therefore, been shown
why petitioner would have been to obtain false affidavits from her co-teachers whose sense and
probity and righteousness must be presumed until otherwise disproved.

Furthermore, the fact that Dipolog City is also the residence of the Petitioner does not at all, by this
singular circumstance, render untrue or false the clear evidence submitted in this case that Petitioner
and her co-teachers were proceeding to Dipolog City at the time to purchase needed supplies and
other training and school aids. That Dipolog City happened to be also the Petitioner's place of
residence, in this instance, becomes simply incidental and/or purely coincidental.
As it can be rightfully ruled that the Claimant-Petitioner was actually then performing her official
functions, it hardly matters then whether such task which Petitioner was then engaged in or
discharging, happened outside the regular working hours and not in the Petitioner's place of work. It
is rather obvious that in proceeding to purchase school materials in Dipolog City, Petitioner would
necessarily have to leave the school premises and her travel need not be during her usual working
hours. What is significant and controlling is that the injuries she sustained are work-connected,
which the Court finds to be so.

The environmental facts in this case are even more compelling than the earlier case of Vda. de
Torbela vs. Employees' Compensation Commission, L-42627, February 21, 1980, 96 SCRA 260,
where, by a significant majority vote of this Court, it was held that a claim arising from a vehicular
accident sustained by a school principal on his way from Bacolod City where he lived to his school at
Hinigaran, Negros Occidental where he was the school principal of, is compensable. It was therein
ruled that "where an employee is accidentally injured at a point reasonably proximate to the place of
work, while she is going to and from her work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the
course of her employment.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission appealed from is hereby
SET ASIDE, and the Government Service Insurance System is hereby ordered to grant the
Petitioner's claim for loss of income benefits and to process and ascertain the total amount due
herein Petitioner and thereafter to pay the same.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., and De la Fuente, JJ.,
concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 192531               November 12, 2014

BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES, INC., Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Nature of the Case

This Appeal, filed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, seeks to annul the March 17, 2010
Decision  of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. SL-18483-0218-10,
1

entitled Bernardina P. Bartolome v. Social Security System (SSS) [Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc.},
declaring that petitioner is not a beneficiary of the deceased employee under Presidential Decree
No. (PD) 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by PD 626. 2

The Facts

John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime
Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville, since February 2008. As such, he was enrolled
under the government's Employees' Compensation Program (ECP).  Unfortunately, on June 2, 2008,
3

an accident occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John, which led to his untimely
death the following day.4

John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P.
Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death
benefits under PD 626 with the Social Security System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La Union.
However, the SSS La Union office, in a letter dated June 10, 2009  addressed to petitioner, denied
5

the claim, stating:

We regret to inform you that wecannot give due course to your claim because you are no longer
considered as the parent of JOHN COLCOL as he was legally adopted by CORNELIO COLCOL
based on documents you submitted to us.

The denial was appealed tothe Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed the
ruling of the SSS La Union Branch through the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the claim is hereby dismissed for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED. 6
In denying the claim, both the SSS La Union branch and the ECC ruled against petitioner’s
entitlement to the death benefits sought after under PD 626 on the ground she can no longer be
considered John’s primary beneficiary. As culled from the records, John and his sister Elizabeth
were adopted by their great grandfather, petitioner’s grandfather, Cornelio Colcol (Cornelio), by
virtue of the Decision  in Spec. Proc. No. 8220-XII of the Regional Trial Court in Laoag City dated
7

February 4, 1985, which decree of adoption attained finality.  Consequently, as argued by the
8

agencies, it is Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner. Neither, the ECC
reasoned, would petitioner qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary even if it wereproven that
Cornelio has already passed away. As the ECC ratiocinated:

Under Article 167 (j) of P.D. 626, as amended, provides (sic) that beneficiaries are the "dependent
spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In their
absence, the dependent parentsand subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the
illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided; that
the dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary when there
are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit."

The dependent parent referred to by the above provision relates to the legitimate parent of the
covered member, as provided for by Rule XV, Section 1 (c) (1) of the Amended Rules on
Employees’ Compensation. This Commission believes that the appellant is not considered a
legitimate parent of the deceased, having given up the latter for adoption to Mr. Cornelio C. Colcol.
Thus, in effect, the adoption divested her of the statusas the legitimate parent of the deceased.

xxxx

In effect, the rights which previously belong [sic] to the biological parent of the adopted child shall
now be upon the adopting parent. Hence, in this case, the legal parent referred to by P.D. 626, as
amended, as the beneficiary, who has the right to file the claim, is the adoptive father of the
deceased and not herein appellant.  (Emphasis supplied)
9

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was likewise denied by the
ECC.  Hence, the instant petition.
10

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues in the petition:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

I. The Honorable ECC’s Decision is contrary to evidence on record.

II. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse in denying the just, due and lawful claims of
the petitioner as a lawful beneficiary of her deceased biological son.

III. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse of discretion in not giving due
course/denying petitioner’s otherwise meritorious motion for reconsideration. 11

In resolving the case, the pivotal issue is this: Are the biological parents of the covered, but legally
adopted, employee considered secondary beneficiaries and, thus, entitled, in appropriate cases, to
receive the benefits under the ECP?
 The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

The ECC’s factual findings are not consistent with the evidence on record

To recall, one of the primary reasons why the ECC denied petitioner’s claim for death benefits is that
eventhough she is John’s biological mother, it was allegedly not proven that his adoptive parent,
Cornelio, was no longer alive. As intimated by the ECC:

Moreover, there had been no allegation in the records as to whether the legally adoptive parent, Mr.
Colcol, is dead, which would immediately qualify the appellant [petitioner] for Social Security
benefits. Hence, absent such proof of death of the adoptive father, this Commission will presume
him to be alive and well, and as such, is the one entitled to claim the benefit being the primary
beneficiary of the deaceased. Thus, assuming that appellant is indeed a qualified beneficiary under
the Social Security law, in view of her status as other beneficiary, she cannot claim the benefit
legally provided by law to the primary beneficiary, in this case the adoptive father since he is still
alive.

We disagree with the factual finding of the ECC on this point.

Generally, findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally accorded great respect, if not
finality, by the courts by reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said administrative
agenciesover matters falling under their jurisdiction.  However, in the extant case, the ECC had
12

overlooked a crucial piece of evidence offered by the petitioner – Cornelio’s death certificate. 13

Based on Cornelio’s death certificate, it appears that John’s adoptive father died on October 26,
1987,  or only less than three (3) years since the decree of adoption on February 4, 1985, which
14

attained finality.  As such, it was error for the ECC to have ruled that it was not duly proven that the
15

adoptive parent, Cornelio, has already passed away.

The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents is contrary to law

This brings us to the question of whether or not petitioner is entitled to the death benefits claim in
view of John’s work-related demise. The pertinent provision, in this regard, is Article 167 (j) of the
Labor Code, as amended, which reads:

ART. 167. Definition of terms. - Asused in this Title unless the context indicates otherwise:

xxxx

(j) 'Beneficiaries' means the dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who are
the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions
imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are the
secondary beneficiaries; Provided, that the dependent acknowledged natural child shall be
considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent children who are qualified
and eligible for monthly income benefit. (Emphasis supplied)

Concurrently, pursuant to the succeeding Article 177(c) supervising the ECC "[T]o approve rules and
regulations governing the processing of claims and the settlement of disputes arising therefrom as
prescribed by the System," the ECC has issued the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation,
interpreting the above-cited provision as follows:

RULE XV – BENEFICIARIES

SECTION 1. Definition. (a) Beneficiaries shall be either primary or secondary, and determined atthe
time of employee’s death.

(b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered primary:

(1) The legitimate spouse living with the employee at the time of the employee’s
death until he remarries; and

(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or acknowledged natural children, who

are unmarried not gainfully employed, not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of
age provided that he is incapacitated and incapable of self - support due to
physicalor mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority; Provided,
further, that a dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a
primary beneficiary only when there are no other dependent children who are
qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit; provided finally, that if there are two
or more acknowledged natural children, they shall be counted from the youngest and
without substitution, but not exceeding five.

(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered secondary:

(1) The legitimate parentswholly dependent upon the employee for regular support;

(2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who are unmarried, not
gainfully employed, and not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age
providedthat he is incapacitated and incapable of self - support dueto physical or
mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority. (Emphasis supplied)

Guilty of reiteration, the ECC denied petitioner’s claim on the ground that she is no longer the
deceased’s legitimate parent, as required by the implementing rules. As held by the ECC, the
adoption decree severed the relation between John and petitioner, effectively divesting her of the
status of a legitimate parent, and, consequently, that of being a secondary beneficiary.

We disagree.

a. Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation deviates from the
clear language of Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended

Examining the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation in light of the Labor Code, as
amended, it is at once apparent that the ECC indulged in an unauthorized administrative legislation.
In net effect, the ECC read into Art. 167 of the Code an interpretation not contemplated by the
provision. Pertinent in elucidating on this point isArticle 7 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which
reads:

Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall
not beexcused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and
the latter shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or the Constitution.(Emphasis supplied)

As applied, this Court held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco

Corporation  that:
16

As we have previously declared, rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the
mode or proceedings in order to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be
extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the
statute. Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law because
any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law.
(Emphasis supplied)

Guided by this doctrine, We find that Rule XV of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation
is patently a wayward restriction of and a substantial deviation from Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code
when it interpreted the phrase "dependent parents" to refer to "legitimate parents."

It bears stressing that a similar issue in statutory construction was resolved by this Court in Diaz v.
Intermediate Appellate Court  in this wise:
17

It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general acceptation. Amicus
curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to say:

The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by it. In
accordancetherefore with the canons of statutory interpretation, it should beunderstood to have a
general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is a general one. Generalia verba sunt
generaliter intelligenda. That the law does not make a distinction prevents us from making one: Ubi
lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguera debemus. xxx

According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more restrictive sense
thanit is used and intended is not warranted by any rule ofinterpretation. Besides, he further states
that when the law intends to use the termin a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with the
word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code.

Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not only
collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context indicates that
it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense — which as already discussed earlier, is not so in
the case at bar. (Emphasis supplied)

In the same vein, the term "parents" in the phrase "dependent parents" in the afore-quoted Article
167 (j) of the Labor Code is usedand ought to be taken in its general sense and cannot be unduly
limited to "legitimate parents" as what the ECC did. The phrase "dependent parents" should,
therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether by nature or by
adoption. When the law does not distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly, "dependent
parents" are parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption,who are in need of
support or assistance.
Moreover, the same Article 167 (j),as couched, clearly shows that Congress did not intend to limit
the phrase "dependent parents" to solely legitimate parents. At the risk of being repetitive, Article
167 provides that "in their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed
on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are secondary
beneficiaries." Had the lawmakers contemplated "dependent parents" to mean legitimate parents,
then it would have simply said descendants and not "legitimate descendants." The manner by which
the provision in question was crafted undeniably show that the phrase "dependent parents" was
intended to cover all parents – legitimate, illegitimate or parents by nature or adoption.

b. Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation is in contravention
of the equal protection clause

To insist that the ECC validly interpreted the Labor Code provision is an affront to the Constitutional
guarantee of equal protection under the laws for the rule, as worded, prevents the parents of an
illegitimate child from claiming benefits under Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended by PD 626.
To Our mind, such postulation cannot be countenanced.

As jurisprudence elucidates, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires
public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.  In other
18

words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may
not drawdistinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate
governmental objective. 19

The concept of equal protection, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to
all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires isequality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits
classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The
test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane tothe
purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all
members of the same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification." 20

In the instant case, there is no compelling reasonable basis to discriminate against illegitimate
parents. Simply put, the above-cited rule promulgated by the ECC that limits the claim of benefits to
the legitimate parents miserably failed the test of reasonableness since the classification is not
germane to the law being implemented. We see no pressing government concern or interest that
requires protection so as to warrant balancing the rights of unmarried parents on one hand and the
rationale behind the law on the other. On the contrary, the SSS can better fulfill its mandate, and the
policy of PD 626 – that employees and their dependents may promptly secure adequate benefits in
the event of work-connected disability or death - will be better served if Article 167 (j) of the Labor
Code is not so narrowly interpreted.

There being no justification for limiting secondary parent beneficiaries to the legitimate ones, there
can be no other course of action to take other than to strikedown as unconstitutional the phrase
"illegitimate" as appearing in Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’
Compensation.

Petitioner qualifies as John’s dependent parent

In attempting to cure the glaring constitutional violation of the adverted rule, the ECC extended
illegitimate parents an opportunity to file claims for and receive death benefitsby equating
dependency and legitimacy to the exercise of parental authority. Thus, as insinuated by the ECC in
its assailed Decision, had petitioner not given up John for adoption, she could have still claimed
death benefits under the law.

To begin with, nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that "legitimate parents" pertain to
those who exercise parental authority over the employee enrolled under the ECP. Itwas only in the
assailed Decision wherein such qualification was made. In addition, assuming arguendothat the
ECC did not overstep its boundaries in limiting the adverted Labor Code provision to the deceased’s
legitimate parents, and that the commission properly equated legitimacy to parental authority,
petitioner can still qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary.

True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adoptedJohn, then about two (2) years old, petitioner’s parental
authority over John was severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed,
aside from Cornelio’s death, was that when the adoptive parent died less than three (3) years after
the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age.

John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under such
circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological
parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship
and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption,  who was then left to care for the
21

minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?

To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological parents is not a
novel concept. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 8552  (RA 8552), otherwise known as the Domestic
22

Adoption Act, provides:

Section 20. Effects of Rescission.– If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is granted, the parental
authority of the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall
be restored if the adoptee is still a minoror incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the
adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished. (emphasis added)

The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar as the restoration of custody is
concerned.  The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the grounds
1âwphi1

for rescission,  justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations between the adopter and the
23

adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental authority in favor of the biological parents,
simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a
tender age.

To emphasize, We can only apply the rule by analogy, especially since RA 8552 was enacted after
Cornelio’s death. Truth be told, there is a lacuna in the law as to which provision shall govern
contingencies in all fours with the factual milieu of the instant petition. Nevertheless, We are guided
by the catena of cases and the state policies behind RA 8552  wherein the paramount consideration
24

is the best interest of the child, which We invoke to justify this disposition. It is, after all, for the best
interest of the child that someone will remain charged for his welfare and upbringing should his or
her adopter fail or is rendered incapacitated to perform his duties as a parent at a time the adoptee
isstill in his formative years, and, to Our mind, in the absence or, as in this case, death of the
adopter, no one else could reasonably be expected to perform the role of a parent other than the
adoptee’s biological one.

Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental authority is severed by
virtue of adoption, the ties between the adoptee and the biological parents are not entirely
eliminated. To demonstrate, the biological parents, insome instances, are able to inherit from the
adopted, as can be gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family Code:
Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed by the
following rules:

xxx

(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the adopted concur
withthe adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half tobe inherited by the parents or
ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;

xxx

(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the ordinary rules of legal or
intestate succession shall apply.

Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcol’s death, which was prior to the effectivity of the Family Code,
the governing provision is Art. 984 of the New Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or descendants, his parents
and relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs.

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession tothe
estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an
SSS covered employee do not form part of the estateof the adopted child, the pertinent provision on
legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and
those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that
certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which, We
rule, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor
offspring’s adoptive parent. We cannot leave undetermined the fate of a minor child whose second
chance ata better life under the care of the adoptive parents was snatched from him by death’s cruel
grasp. Otherwise, the adopted child’s quality of life might have been better off not being adopted at
all if he would only find himself orphaned in the end. Thus, We hold that Cornelio’s death at the time
of John’sminority resulted in the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority over the adopted child.

On top of this restoration of parental authority, the fact of petitioner’s dependence on John can be
established from the documentary evidence submitted to the ECC. As it appears in the records,
petitioner, prior to John’s adoption, was a housekeeper. Her late husband died in 1984, leaving her
to care for their seven (7) children. But since she was unable to "give a bright future to her growing
children" as a housekeeper, she consented to Cornelio’s adoption of Johnand Elizabeth in 1985.

Following Cornelio’s death in 1987, so records reveal, both petitioner and John repeatedly reported
"Brgy. Capurictan, Solsona, Ilocos Norte" as their residence. In fact, this veryaddress was used in
John’s Death Certificate  executed in Brazil, and in the Report of Personal Injury or Loss of Life
25

accomplished by the master of the vessel boarded by John.  Likewise, this is John’s known address
26

as per the ECC’s assailed Decision.  Similarly, this same address was used by petitioner in filing her
27

claim before the SSS La Union branch and, thereafter, in her appeal with the ECC. Hence, it can be
assumed that aside from having been restored parental authority over John, petitioner indeed
actually execised the same, and that they lived together under one roof.

Moreover, John, in his SSS application,  named petitioner as one of his beneficiaries for his benefits
28

under RA 8282, otherwise known as the "Social Security Law." While RA 8282 does not cover
compensation for work-related deaths or injury and expressly allows the designation of beneficiaries
who are not related by blood to the member unlike in PD 626, John’s deliberate act of indicating
petitioner as his beneficiary at least evinces that he, in a way, considered petitioner as his
dependent. Consequently, the confluence of circumstances – from Cornelio’s death during John’s
minority, the restoration ofpetitioner’s parental authority, the documents showing singularity of
address, and John’s clear intention to designate petitioner as a beneficiary - effectively made
petitioner, to Our mind, entitled to death benefit claims as a secondary beneficiary under PD 626 as
a dependent parent.

All told, the Decision of the ECC dated March 17, 2010 is bereft of legal basis. Cornelio’s adoption of
John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming from
John’s death as a dependent parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority. Since
the parent by adoption already died, then the death benefits under the Employees' Compensation
Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John's sole remaining beneficiary.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The March 17, 2010 Decision of the Employees'
Compensation Commission, in ECC Case No. SL-18483-0218-10, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The ECC is hereby directed to release the benefits due to a secondary beneficiary of the deceased
covered employee John Colcol to petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 196102               November 26, 2014

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner,

vs.
AURELIA Y. CALUMPIANO, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari  are 1) the October 30, 2009 Decision  of the Court
1 2

of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 85908 which set aside the June 24, 2004 Decision  of the 3

Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. GM-16174-0209-04 and ordered
the payment of disability benefits to the herein respondent Aurelia Y. Calumpiano; and 2) the CA's
February 23, 2011 Resolution  denying reconsideration of the assailed CA Decision.
4

Factual Antecedents

As determined by the CA, the facts are as follows:

x x x Aurelia Y. Calumpiano  was employed as Court Stenographer at the then Court of First
5

Instance ofSamar from January 5, 1972 until her retirement on March 30, 2002.

On March 7, 2002, shortly before her retirement, [respondent] filed before the Supreme Court, an
application for disability retirement on account of her ailment[s], Hypertensive Cardiovascular
Disease [and] Acute Angle Closure Glaucoma. To bolster her claim, [respondent] submitted the
medical certificates issued by her attending physicians, Dr. Alfred I. Lim and Dr. Elmer Montes, both
of whom are Op[h]thalmologists [at] Eastern Samar Provincial Hospital. She submitted them
together with the results of her perimetry test, [a certificate of] which x x x was issued by Dr. Lim. On
September 30, 2002, the Supreme Court approved [respondent’s] application for disability
retirement, under Republic Act No. 8291 (New GSIS Act of 1997).

[Respondent’s] disability claim was forwarded to GSIS,  but the latter denied her claim for the reason
6

that hypertension and glaucoma, which were her illnesses, were not work[-]related. Her motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied by the GSIS.

Petitioner filed an appeal [with] the ECC, which rendered the assailed Decision,  the dispositive
7

portion of which stated:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and the
instant appeal dismissed for want of merit.

SO ORDERED. 8
In dismissing respondent’s appeal, the ECC held:

"Glaucoma is characterized by an intraocular pressure sufficiently elevated to produce intraocular

damage. The three major categories of glaucoma are: (1) angle-closure glaucoma, (2) open-angle
glaucoma, and (3) congenital and juvenile glaucoma. Eyes that develop primary angle glaucoma are
anatomically predisposed to the condition. In primary open-angle glaucoma, [the] angle appears
open [and] does notseem to function properly. The exact nature of obstruction has not yet been
elucidated. Congenital glaucoma and juvenile glaucoma are thought to be hereditary inmost cases,
although infectious causes are possible (rubella).["] (Pathologic Basis of Disease by Cotran, 6th
edition, pages 1374-1375)

"Hypertension is an increase in the blood pressure within the normal of less than 120/80 mm Hg as
defined by the Joint National Committee VII. Primary risk factor for developing hypertension is
smoking. Other important risk factors are excess body weight, high salt intake, nutritional factors,
high alcohol consumption, physical inactivity and psychological factors, including stress." (Principles
of Internal Medicine)

To warrant compensability of ailment and its resulting sickness, disability or death under P.D. 626,
as amended, Rule III, Section 1(b) thereof, specifically provides that the ailment must be listed by
the Commission as an occupational disease with the conditions set forth therein satisfied, otherwise,
the conditions imposed under the Increased Risk Theory must be complied with.

Appellant  worked as a Court Stenographer III of the Supreme Court for thirty (30) years. Her duties
9

were no doubt stressful and the same may have caused her to develop her ailment, hypertension.
However, to make the same compensable, it is necessary that there must be impairment of function
of her body organs like kidneys, heart, eyes and brain resulting in her permanent disability. An
examination of the appellant’s records would show that she was not suffering from end[-]organ
damage. This was shown in the x x x report [of the ECG] that was taken on the appellant on January
21, 2002. Thus, the same cannot be considered compensable and work-connected.

Likewise, her other ailment, Glaucoma[,] cannot also be considered work-connected. Medical
science has explained that it is characterized by an intraocular pressure sufficiently elevatedto
produce intraocular glaucoma. Here, there was nothing in her duties that would cause or increase
her risk of contracting the said ailment.
10

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In a Petition for Review  filed with the CA and docketed therein as CAG.R. SP No. 85908,
11

respondent sought to set aside the aboveECC Decision, arguing that her illness is work-connected
which thus entitles her to disability compensation.

On October 30, 2009, the CA issued the herein assailed Decision containing the following decretal
portion:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision is SET ASIDE. Let this
case be REMANDED to the Employees’ Compensation Commission for the payment of the disability
benefits due the Petitioner.

SO ORDERED. 12
The CA held that while respondent’s hypertension and glaucoma are not listed as occupational
diseases under the implementing rules of the Employee Compensation Program under Presidential
Decree No. 626  (PD 626), they were nonetheless contracted and became aggravated during her
13

employment as court stenographer; that under the "increased risk theory," a "non-occupational
disease" is compensable as long as proof of a causal connection between the work and the ailment
is established;  that respondent’s illnesses are connected to her work, given the nature of and
14

pressure involved in her functions and duties as a court stenographer; that the certifications issued
by the attending physicians certifying to respondent’s illnesses should begiven credence; that the
ECC itself conceded that respondent’s duties were "no doubt stressful and the same may have
caused her to develop her ailment, hypertension;" and that while the presumption of compensability
has been abrogated with the issuance of PD 626, employees’ compensation laws nevertheless
constitute social legislation which allows for liberality in interpretation to the benefit of the employee,
and the policy has always been to extend the applicability of said laws to as many employees who
can avail of the benefits thereunder. 15

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied the same in its February 23, 2011
Resolution. Hence, the instant Petition.

Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for resolution:

1. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT RESPONDENT’S

DISEASES (HYPERTENSION AND GLAUCOMA) ARE COMPENSABLE UNDER THE
INCREASED RISK THEORY; AND

2. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE FINDINGS OF

FACTS OF THE ECC. 16

Petitioner’s Arguments

Praying that the assailed CA pronouncements be set aside and that the June 24, 2004 Decision of
the ECC be reinstated, petitioner argues in its Petition and Reply  that respondent’s hypertension
17

and glaucoma are not compensable under the principle of increased risk; that although essential
hypertension is listed as an occupational disease, it is not compensable per seas the conditions
under Section 1, Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation  should be satisfied;
18

that hypertension is compensable only "if it causes impairment of function of body organs like
kidneys, heart,eyes and brain, resulting in permanent disability;"  that since respondent did not
19

suffer "end-organ damage" to or impairment of her kidneys, heart, eyes and brain which resulted in
permanent disability, her illness is not compensable; that respondent’s other illness – glaucoma – is
not compensable;  and that the findings of the ECC should be accorded respect and finality, as it
20

has the expertise and knowledge on account of its specialized jurisdiction overemployee
compensation cases. Respondent’s Arguments

In her Comment,  respondent seeks the denial of the Petition, arguing relevantly that the "increased
21

risk theory," which applies to her, has been upheld in several decided cases;  that in disability
22

compensation cases, it is not the injury which is compensated for but rather the incapacity to work
resulting in the impairment of the employee’s earning capacity;  and that while the ECC has the
23

expertise and knowledge relative to compensation cases, the CA isnot precluded from making its
own assessment of the case which goes against that of the ECC’s. Our Ruling

The Court denies the Petition.

In resolving this case, the case of Government Service Insurance System v. Baul  comes into mind
24

and lays the groundwork for a similar ruling. In said case, the Court held:

Cerebro-vascular accident and essential hypertension are considered as occupational diseases

under Nos. 19 and 29, respectively, of Annex "A" of the Implementing Rules of P.D. No. 626, as
amended. Thus, it is not necessary that there be proof of causal relation between the work and the
illness which resulted in the respondent’s disability. The open-ended Table of Occupational
Diseases requires no proof of causation. In general, a covered claimant suffering from an
occupational disease is automatically paid benefits.

However, although cerebro-vascular accident and essential hypertension are listed occupational
diseases, their compensability requires compliance with all the conditions set forth inthe Rules. In
short, both are qualified occupational diseases. For cerebro-vascular accident, the claimant must
prove the following: (1) there must be a history, which should be proved, of trauma at work (to the
head specifically) due to unusual and extraordinary physical or mental strain or event, or undue
exposure to noxious gases in industry; (2) there must be a direct connection between the trauma or
exertion in the course of the employment and the cerebro-vascular attack; and (3) the trauma or
exertion then and there caused a brain hemorrhage. On the other hand, essential hypertension is
compensable only if it causes impairment of function of body organs like kidneys, heart, eyes and
brain, resultingin permanent disability, provided that, the following documents substantiate it: (a)
chest X-ray report; (b) ECG report; (c) blood chemistry report; (d) funduscopy report; and (e) C-T
scan.

The degree of proof required to validate the concurrence of the above-mentioned conditions under
P.D. No. 626 is merely substantial evidence, that is, such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. What the law requires is a reasonable work
connection and not direct causal relation. It is enough that the hypothesis on which the workmen’s
claim isbased is probable. As correctly pointed out by the CA, probability, not the ultimate degree of
certainty, is the test of proof in compensation proceedings. For, in interpreting and carrying out the
provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the primordial and
paramount consideration is the employee’s welfare. To safeguard the worker’s rights, any doubt as
to the proper interpretation and application must be resolved in [his] favor.

In the instant case, medical reports and drug prescriptions of respondent’s attending physicians
sufficiently support her claim for disability benefits. Neither the GSIS nor the ECC convincingly deny
their genuineness and due execution. The reports are made part of the record and there is no
showing that they are false or erroneous, or resorted to [for the purpose] of deceiving the Court,
hence, are entitled to due probative weight. The failure of respondent to submit to a full medical
examination, as required by the rules, to substantiate her essential hypertension, is of no moment.
The law is that laboratory reports such as X-ray and ECG are not indispensable prerequisites to
compensability, the reason being that the strict rules of evidence need not be observed in claims for
compensation. Medical findings of the attending physician may be received in evidence and used as
proof[s] of the fact in dispute. The doctor’s certification as to the nature of claimant’s disability may
begiven credence as he orshe normally would not make untruthful certification. Indeed, no physician
inhis right mind and who is aware of the far[-]reaching and serious effect that his or her statements
would cause on a money claim against a government agency would vouch indiscriminately without
regarding his own interests and protection.

Significantly, evenmedical authorities have established that the exact etiology of essential
hypertension cannot be accurately traced:
The term essential hypertension has been employed to indicate those cases of hypertension for
which a specific endocrine or renal basis cannot befound, and in which the neural element may be
only a mediator ofother influences. Since even this latter relationship is not entirely clear, it is more
properly listed for the moment in the category of unknown etiology. The term essential hypertension
defines simply by failing to define; hence, it is of limited use except as an expression of our inability
to understand adequately the forces at work. 25

It bears stressing, however, that medical experiments tracing the etiology of essential hypertension
show that there is a relationship between the sickness and the nature and conditions of work. In this
jurisdiction, we have already ruled in a number of cases the strenuous office of a public school
teacher. The case of Makabali v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, which we have re-
affirmed in the subsequent cases of De Vera v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, Antiporda
v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, and De la Torre v. Employees’ Compensation
Commission, amply summarized, thus:

xxxx

The fact that the essential hypertension of respondent worsened and resulted in a CVA at the time
she was already out of service is inconsequential. The main consideration for its compensability is
that her illness was contracted during and by reason ofher employment, and any non-work related
factor that contributed to its aggravation is immaterial.

Indeed, an employee’s disability may not manifest fully at one precise moment in time but rather
over a period of time. It is possible that an injury which at first was considered to be temporary may
later on become permanent or one who suffers a partial disability becomes totally and permanently
disabled from the same cause. The right to compensation extends to disability due to disease
supervening upon and proximately and naturally resulting from a compensable injury. Where the
primary injury is shown to have arisen in the course of employment, every natural consequence that
flows from the injury likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the result of an independent
intervening cause attributable to claimant’s own negligence or misconduct. Simply stated, all medical
consequences that flow fromthe primary injury are compensable.

P.D. No. 626, as amended, is said to have abandoned the presumption of compensability and the
theory of aggravation prevalent under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Nonetheless, we ruled in
Employees’ Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals, that:

Despite the abandonment of the presumption of compensability established by the old law, the
present law has not ceased to be an employees’ compensation law or a social legislation; hence, the
liberality of the law in favor of the working man and woman still prevails, and the official agency
charged by law to implement the constitutional guarantee of social justice should adopt a liberal
attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability, especially in light of the
compassionate policy towards labor which the 1987 Constitution vivifies and enhances. Elsewise
stated, a humanitarian impulse, dictated by no less than the Constitution itself under the social
justice policy, calls for a liberal and sympathetic approach to legitimate appeals of disabled public
servants; or that all doubts to the right to compensation must be resolved in favor of the employee or
laborer. Verily, the policy is to extend the applicability of the law on employees’ compensation to as
many employees who can avail of the benefits thereunder.  (Emphasis supplied)
26

Also, in Government Service Insurance System v. De Castro,  this Court made the following
27

pronouncement:
Other than the given facts, another undisputed aspect of the case is the status of the ailments that
precipitated De Castro’s separation from the military service – CAD and hypertensive cardiovascular
disease. These are occupational diseases. No less than the ECC itself confirmed the status of these
ailments when it declared that "Contrary to the ruling of the System, CAD is a form of cardiovascular
disease which is included in the list of Occupational Diseases." Essential hypertension is also listed
under Item 29 in Annex "A" of the Amended ECC Rules as an occupational disease.

Despite the compensable character of his ailments, both the GSIS and the ECC found De Castro’s
CAD to be non-work related and, therefore, noncompensable. To use the wording of the ECC
decision, it denied De Castro’s claim "due to the presence of factors which are not work-related,
such as smoking and alcohol consumption." De Castro’s own military records triggered this
conclusion ashis Admitting Notes, made when he entered the V. Luna General Hospital due to chest
pains and hypertension, were that he was a smoker and a drinker.

As the CA did, we cannot accept the validity of this conclusion at face value because it considers
only one side – the purely medical side – of De Castro’s case and even then may not be completely
correct. The ECC itself, in its decision, recites that CAD is caused, among others, by atherosclerosis
of the coronary arteries that in turn, and lists the following major causes: increasing age; male
gender; cigarette smoking; lipid disorder due to accumulation of too much fats in the body;
hypertension or high blood pressure; insulin resistance due to diabetes; family history ofCAD. The
minor factors are: obesity; physical inactivity; stress; menopausal estrogen deficiency; high
carbohydrate intake; and alcohol.

We find it strange that both the ECC and the GSIS singled out the presence of smoking and drinking
as the factors that rendered De Castro’s ailments, otherwise listed as occupational, to be non-
compensable. To be sure, the causes of CAD and hypertension that the ECC listed and explained in
its decision cannot be denied; smoking and drinking are undeniably among these causes. However,
they are not the sole causes of CAD and hypertension and, at least, not under the circumstances of
the present case. For this reason, we fear for the implication of the ECC ruling if it will prevail and be
read as definitive on the effects of smoking and drinkingon compensability issues, even on diseases
that are listed as occupational in character. The ruling raises the possible reading that smoking and
drinking, by themselves, are factors that can bar compensability.

We ask the question of whether these factors can be sole determinants of compensability as the
ECC has apparently failed to consider other factors such as age and gender from among those that
the ECC itself listed as major and minor causes of atherosclerosis and, ultimately, of CAD. While
age and gender are characteristics inherent in the person (and thereby may be considered nonwork
related factors), they also do affect a worker’s job performance and may in this sense, together with
stresses of the job, significantly contribute to illnesses such as CAD and hypertension. To cite an
example, some workplace activities are appropriate only for the young (such as the lifting of heavy
objects although these may simply be office files), and when repeatedly undertaken by older
workers, may lead to ailments and disability. Thus, age coupled with an age-affected work activity
may lead to compensability. From this perspective, none of the ECC’s listed factors should be
disregarded to the exclusion of others in determining compensability.

In any determination of compensability, the nature and characteristics of the job are as important as
raw medical findings and a claimant’s personal and social history. This is a basic legal reality in
workers’ compensation law. We are therefore surprised that the ECC and the GSIS simply brushed
aside the disability certification that the military issued with respect to De Castro’s disability, based
mainly on their primacy as the agencies with expertise on workers’ compensation and disability
issues.  (Emphasis supplied)
28
This case should not have been difficult for the petitioner to resolve on its own, given that so many
cases have been decided in the past which should have provided it the guiding hand to decide
disability cases on its own rightly – instead of putting claimants in the unfortunate position of having
to chase the benefits they are clearly entitled to, and waste years prosecuting their claims in spite of
their adverse circumstances in life. This Court should not have to parrot over and over again what
clearly has been the settled rule; in many ways, this is a waste of time, and it only indicates that
petitioner has eithernot learned its lesson, or it refuses to realize it.

Applying Bauland De Castro to the instant case and looking at the factual milieu, the Court agrees
with the CA’s conclusion and so declares that respondent’s illness is compensable. Respondent
served the government for 30 long years; veritably, as the ECC itself said, "[h]er duties were no
doubt stressful and the same may have caused her to develop her ailment, hypertension"  – which is
29

a listed occupational disease, contrary to the CA’s pronouncement that itis not. And because it is a
listed occupational disease, the "increased risk theory" does not apply – again, contrary to the CA’s
declaration; no proof of causation is required.

It can also be said that given respondent’s age at the time, and taking into account the nature,
working conditions, and pressures of her work as court stenographer – which requires her to
faithfully record each and every day virtually all of the court’s proceedings; transcribe these notes
immediately in order to make them available to the court or the parties who require them; take down
dictations by the judge, and transcribe them; and type in final form the judge’s decisions, which
activities extend beyond office hours and without additional compensation or overtime pay  – all
30

these contributed to the development of her hypertension – or hypertensive cardiovascular disease,

as petitioner would call it.  Consequently, her age, work, and hypertension caused the impairment of
31

vision in both eyes due to "advanced to late stage glaucoma",which rendered her "legally blind." 32

Contrary to petitioner’s submissions, there appears to be a link between blood pressure and the
development of glaucoma, which leads the Court to conclude that respondent’s glaucoma developed
as a result of her hypertension.

Although intra ocular pressure (IOP) remains an important risk factor for glaucoma, it is clear that
other factors can also influence disease development and progression. More recently, the role that
blood pressure (BP) has in the genesis of glaucoma has attracted attention, as it represents a
clinically modifiable risk factor and thus provides the potential for new treatment strategies beyond
IOP reduction. The interplay between blood pressure and IOP determines the ocular perfusion
pressure (OPP), which regulates blood flow to the optic nerve. If OPP is a more important
determinant of ganglion cell injury than IOP, then hypotension should exacerbate the detrimental
effects of IOP elevation, whereas hypertension should provide protection against IOP elevation.
Epidemiological evidence provides some conflicting outcomes of the role of systemic hypertension in
the development and progression of glaucoma. The most recent study showed that patients at both
extremes of the blood pressure spectrum show an increased prevalence of glaucoma. Those with
low blood pressure would have low OPP and thus reduced blood flow; however, that people with
hypertension also show increased risk is more difficult to reconcile. This finding may reflect an
inherent blood flow dysregulation secondary to chronic hypertension that would render retinal blood
flow less able to resist changes in ocular perfusion pressure.  x x x (Emphasis and underscoring
33

supplied)

In recent years, we’ve learned a lot about ocular perfusion pressure (OPP), i.e., the pressure
difference between blood entering the eye and IOP. It’s clear that three forces — OPP, IOP and
blood pressure — are interconnected in the glaucoma disease process. The mechanics of that
relationship, however, remain ambiguous.
 xxxx

The ties between hypertension and glaucoma are less well established but the data, in addition to
my involvement in a new study (discussed below), have convinced me they probably do exist.
Therefore, I believe potential hypertension, along with potential low blood pressure, should be
investigated in patients whose glaucoma continues to progress despite what appears to be well
controlled IOP.

xxxx

We suspect there is a close relationship among IOP, OPP, blood pressure and glaucoma, but the
exact nature of these associations remains elusive. Complicating matters is the physiological
phenomenon known as autoregulation. 34

Abstract

Aims: To determine whether systemic hypertension and glaucoma might coexist more often than
expected, with possible implications for treatment.

Methods: Case-control study using general practitioner database of patients with glaucoma matched
with controls for age and sex.

Results: Hypertension was significantly more common in the 27[,]080 patients with glaucoma (odds
ratio 1.29, 95% confidence intervals 1.23 to 1.36, p<0.001) than in controls. x x x 35

While some of the above conclusions are not definitive, it must be stressed that probability, not
certainty, is the test of proof in compensation cases."  It does not preclude the Court from
36

concluding that respondent’s hypertension – apart from her age, work, and working conditions –
impaired her vision as a result.

The Court likewise disregards the ECC’s finding, which petitioner relies upon, that the primary and
important risk factors for developing hypertension are smoking, excess body weight, high salt intake,
nutritional factors, high alcohol consumption, physical inactivity and psychological factors, including
stress. As the Court held in De Castro, these are not the sole causes of hypertension; age, gender,
and work stress significantly contribute to its development, and the nature and characteristics of the
employment are as important as raw medical findings and a claimant’s personal and social history.

Finally, while the ECC possesses the requisite expertise and knowledge in compensation cases, its
decision in respondent’s caseis nonetheless erroneous and contrary to law. The Court cannot
uphold its findings; its specialized training, experience and expertise did not serve justice well in this
case.  The medical certificates and relevant reports issued by respondent’s attending physicians –
1âwphi1

Drs. Alfred I. Lim, Elmer Montes, and Salvador R. Salceda – as well as hospital records,  deserve
37

credence. The identical findings of these three eye specialists simply cannot be ignored.

In arriving at the above conclusions, the Court is well guided by the principles, declared in Bauland
De Castro, that probability, not certainty, is the test of proof in compensation cases;that the
primordial and paramount consideration is the employee’s welfare; that the strict rules of evidence
need not be observed in claims for compensation; that medical findings of the attending physician
may be received in evidence and used as proof of the facts in dispute; that in any determination of
compensability, the nature and characteristics of the job are as important as raw medical findings
and a claimant’s personal and social history; that where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in
the course of employment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out
of the employment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause attributable to
claimant’s own negligenceor misconduct; and that the policy is to extend the application of the law
on employees’ compensation to as many employees who can avail of the benefits thereunder.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed October 30, 2009 Decision and February 23,
2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85908 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-35741         December 20, 1932

VICTORIA TALLER VIUDA DE NAVA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
YNCHAUSTI STEAMSHIP CO., defendant-appellee.

Acting Provincial Fiscal Debuque for appellant.

A. de Aboitiz Pinaga for appellee.
De Witt, Perkins & Brady as amicus curiae.

STREET, J.:

This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo by Victoria Taller Vda. de Nava, for
the purpose of recovering the sum of P1,00.92 from the Ynchausti Steamship Co., it being alleged
that said amount is due to the plaintiff under the Workmen's Compensation Act, No. 3428 of the
Philippine Legislature, by reason of the death of her husband in the course of his duty, while serving
as helmsman (timonel) on the interisland steamer Vizcaya, under the circumstances stated in the
complaint. Upon hearing the cause the trial court absolved the defendant from the complaint, and
the plaintiff appealed.

The case was submitted upon an agreed statement of facts from which it appears that the Ynchausti
Steamship Co. is engaged in the business of operating vessels in the coastwise and interisland
trade, and on April 2, 1930, the steamer Vizcaya, one of its vessels, was being maneuvered in the
mouth of the Iloilo River, at Iloilo. At this time Valentin Nava held the position of helmsman (timonel)
on said boat, receiving a monthly compensation of P35. In connection with moving the boat Nava, in
charge of other members of the crew, was engaged in hauling in the ship's cable and in coiling the
cable on the deck of the boat preparatory to passing it down a hatchway and bestowing it in its
proper place in the vessel. While thus engaged Nava found the space which they required for coiling
the cable partly occupied by a folding bed belonging to one of the third-class passengers. Nava
asked whose bed it was, and Dalmacio Villanueva, one of the passengers, answered that he was
the owner of the bed. Thereupon Nava said that he (Nava) would push it to another place because it
interfered with the work. Suiting the action to the word, he pushed the bed with his foot towards the
other side of the ship. This act aroused the anger of the owner of the bed, and hot words were
exchanged, in the course of which Villanueva, using one of the wooden bars of the bed, gave Nava
a jab in the pit of the stomach. Under the impact of this blow Nava leaned back, and at this moment
Vicente Villanueva, a brother of Dalmacio Villanueva, ran up to Nava and stabbed him with a fan
knife just above the left nipple. The blade penetrated Nava's heart and he died almost instantly. For
the crime of homicide thus committed Vicente Villanueva was later sentenced to imprisonment for
fourteen years, eight months and one day, reclusion temporal, with accessories, and was required to
indemnify the family of the deceased in the amount of P1,000, with costs. The deceased left a wife
and seven children, and this action for compensation was instituted by the widow, under Act No.
3428 of the Philippine Legislature, as amended.
The answer of the defendant raises several questions all of which were decided in favor of the
plaintiff by the trial court with the exception of the most vital one which will chiefly engage our
attention in the course of this opinion. But as the defendant relies in its brief upon the various points
decided against it in the appealed decision, it is advisable to notice these points as preliminary to the
discussion of what we consider to be the main question.

Among other things, it is insisted that the death of Valentin Nava was not an accident within the
meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act, No. 3428. Under section 2 of Act No. 3428, as it
stood when this incident occurred, compensation is demandable for "a personal injury from any
accident due to and in the pursuance of the employment". By the word "accident" as here used it is
intended to indicate that the act causing the injury shall be casual, in the sense of being unforeseen,
and one for which the injured party is not legally responsible. Now, in the case before us, the death
of Valentin Nava, was not, at least as regards the perpetrator of the deed, any accident whatever.
The death was caused by the criminal and intentional act of Vicente Villanueva. But an act may be
an accident as regards one person or from one point of view and not an accident as regards another
person and from another point of view. This homicide was not attributable to the act of deceased
himself and was not capable of being foreseen as a likely consequence of the discharge of his
duties. The trial court therefore correctly held that the death of Nava was due an accident within the
meaning of section 2 of Act No. 3428.

Again, it is insisted that Nava was not an "industrial employee", within the meaning of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, inasmuch as he was employed as a helmsman (timonel) and his duties were not
of an industrial nature. This contention takes too narrow a view of the meaning of the phrase
"industrial employee" as used in the Act cited. As helmsman on the boat Nava was charged with the
performance of duties connected with piloting of the boat and controlling its movements when in
motion. Duties of this character are clearly of an industrial nature, since they are concerned with
effecting the ends and purposes of industry. The definition of "industrial employment", as given in
subsection (d) of section 39, Act No. 3428, covers all employment or work at a trade, occupation or
profession exercised by an employer for the purpose of gain, subject only to the limitation of yearly
gross income. Nava was therefore an industrial employee and entitled to compensation under the
Act, provided the other circumstances attendant upon the accident which caused his death were of
such nature as to bring him within the purview of the Act.

It is further insisted that Act No. 3428, as amended, does not cover the case of an employee upon a
coastwise vessel. In this connection attention is directed to the fact that, under section 38, Act No.
3428 extends to the cases of "employees engaged in the interisland trade"; and it was only by Act
No. 3812 (section 12) that the provision was amended so as to include employees engaged in the
"coastwise and interisland trade". From this it is supposed that the case in question does not fall
under section 38 of Act No. 3428. The question is in our opinion without merit. In the first place, the
word "interisland", as originally used in section 38, was apparently used in a broad sense, to include
all shipping in and among the islands, in vessels of Philippine registration, and it is not limited to
shipping from a port of one island to a port of another island. The expression "the coastwise and"
was therefore of clarifying a possible ambiguity and to bring the phraseology of the Act more into
harmony with the technical terms commonly used in the Customs laws and regulations. Even
supposing, therefore, that the Vizcaya was only engaged in the carrying of trade between different
ports of the same island — a fact which does not appear — the "accident" with which we are here
concerned should be considered within the purview of the law. It is not apparent that the meaning of
the law was changed in any essential feature by this amendment.

Still, again, it is insisted that the case does not come under Act No. 3428 for the reason that it does
not appear that the defendant had a gross income during the year immediately preceding the one
during which the accident occurred of not less than P40,000. But we note that in the agreed
statement of facts it is stated that during the last twelve months anterior to the month of April of
1930, the defendant had a gross income of more than P40,000 as a result of its business. This was
evidently intended to cover the requirement expressed in subsection (d) of section 39 of Act No.
3428, and although the stipulation does not technically cover the gross earning for the full calendar
year anterior to the calendar year in which the accident occurred, we are of the opinion that the trial
judge committed no error in interpreting the stipulation in that sense.

Finally, it is supposed that the circumstance that the criminal court imposed the civil obligation on
Vicente Villanueva to indemnify the family of the deceased in the amount of one thousand pesos
makes it improper to allow additional compensation in this case. As the trial court properly held, the
suggestion is without merit. In the first place, it does not appear that the criminal indemnity has been
paid and, in the second place, that obligation is wholly distinct from the obligation imposed by the
Workmen's Compensation Act and the latter is in no sense subsidiary to the former. lawphil.net

This brings us to consider the most important question in the case, namely, whether the death of
Valentin Nava occurred in the course of his employment, or was the result of the nature of such
employment. In this connection we quote section 2 of Act No. 3428, which runs as follows:

SEC. 2. Grounds for compensation. — When any employee receives a personal injury from
any accident due to and in the pursuance of the employment, or contracts any illness directly
caused by such employment or the result of the nature of such employment, his employer
shall pay compensation in the sums and to the persons hereinafter specified.

This provision was amended by section 1 of Act No. 3812 so as to read as follows:

SEC. 2. Grounds for compensation. — When any employee receives a personal injury from
any accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, or contracts any illness
directly caused by such employment, or the result of the nature of such employment, his
employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the persons hereinafter specified.

This last provision, having been enacted since the death of Valentin Nava, is not directly applicable
to the case before us, but it may properly be quoted for purposes of comparison and interpretation.
Fixing our attention then more particularly upon section 2 of Act No. 3428, it is quite clear that the
death of Valentin Nava was not due to any illness directly caused by his employment or the result of
the nature of such employment. We are of the opinion, however, that it occurred in the course of his
employment and "in pursuance of the employment", as this expression is used in the provision cited.
The attorneys for the appellee presents a narrow view of Nava's employment and insists that,
inasmuch as he was employed as helmsman, he was acting within the scope of his duties only when
his hand was on the helm of the vessel and he was engaged in actually guiding its motions. We are
of the opinion that his duties should be considered as having greater latitude. It is true that the term
indicative of his employment was that of helmsman, but we think that his duties should be
considered as comprehending acts done by him in helping to guide the ship. In maneuvering a
vessel, in entering and leaving ports, it is necessary for the ship's officers in charge of the motions of
the vessel to avail themselves of cables; and the taking in of a cable and the coiling of it upon the
deck are acts properly incident to controlling the motion of the vessel. It results that, when Nava
found that one of the third-class passengers had placed his bed on the deck in a position where it
was in his way, he acted within the scope of his duty when he pushed the bed back; and when the
fatal assault was made upon him because of that act, it must be considered that his death resulted
from an act done in the line of his duty.

At this juncture it may be well to give a few words of explanation concerning the verbiage of section
2 of Act No. 3428 and of the amendment effected in this section by Act No. 3812, and particularly in
the substitution, in the latter Act, of the expression "arising out of and in the course of the
employment" for the expression "due and to in the pursuance of the employment" used in Act No.
3428. Upon this point we note that Act No. 3428 was adopted by the Philippine Legislature in
Spanish, and the original of the section is taken from the statutes of the Territory of Hawaii (section
3604, Chapter 209 of the Revised Laws of Hawaii, 1925). Our English version here is the official
translation into English of the Spanish version as adopted by the Philippine Legislature. In the
Hawaiian law the expression used in the part of the statute here under consideration is "arising out
of and in the course of such employment". These words, after passing through the Spanish version,
and upon being turned back into English, appeared as "due to and in the pursuance of the
employment". It follows that the expression found in the amendatory provision (section 1 of Act No.
3812) is merely a reversion to the English wording of the Hawaiian statute, which corresponds, we
may add, to the wording commonly used in the American statutes. It is clear therefore that the
amendment introduced by the last named Act was merely intended to bring the English version of
our statute into verbal conformity with the Hawaiian and other American laws. No change whatever
in the meaning of the provision was intended to be effected by said amendment.

The attorneys for the appellee have called our attention to some American decisions, which, it is
insisted, support the conclusion of the trial court that the homicide which resulted in the death of
Valentin Nava was not an accident due to and in the pursuance of his employment, as this
expression runs in section 2 of Act No. 3428. The cases most emphatically urged upon us in this
connection by the appellee are State of Minnesota ex rel. School Dist. No. 1, in Itasca
County vs. District Court (140 Minn., 470; 15 A. L. R., 579), and Schmoll vs. Weisbrod & Hess
Brewing Co. (89 N. J. L., 150; 97 Atl., 732). In the first of these cases the facts were as follows:

The school district employed a young woman to teach in the Round Lake school, some 35 miles
from Deer River in Itasca County and 25 miles from Black Duck in Beltrami County, these two places
being the nearest railway points. The country was densely wooded and sparsely settled. The school
was a one-room school and fifteen pupils attended. The nearest house was a half mile away, and
the boarding house was a mile or a mile and a quarter. On the morning of September 20, 1916, an
unknown man asked for food at the boarding place of the teacher. On the evening of that day, when
her work at the school was finished, she started for her boarding house, taking a short cut through
the woods. She had some papers which she intended to correct at home in the evening, and a book
to study. As she was on her way, and when just off the school grounds, she was criminally assaulted
by this for the gratification of his passions, and as part of the transaction he shot her, destroying the
sight of her left eye. She filed a claim for compensation against the school district, under the
Compensation Act, which required an employer to pay compensation "in every case of personal
injury or death of his employee, caused by accident, arising out of and in the course of the
employment". The District Court for Itasca County awarded the compensation prayed for, and the
School District brought an action for certiorari in the Supreme Court of Minnesota, claiming that the
injury suffered by the employee did not arise out of and in the course of the employment. The
Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower court, and held that the injury for which
compensation had been awarded by the district court did not arise out of the employment.

In the second case it appeared that the deceased was a route foreman in the employ of the
respondent. His duties were to look after the various beer delivery routes and see that they were
properly conducted, and on Saturdays he had a beer delivery where he delivered beer and collected
the moneys therefor. On the 19th day of December, 1914, on a Saturday night, at about 8 o'clock,
the deceased made a delivery of beer at some dwelling house in Atlantic City leaving his wagon in
the street, a little distance away, and while returning to his wagon he was assaulted and shot by
some person unknown. The deceased mounted his wagon and returned to brewery and accounted
to his employer for the moneys intrusted to and collected by him and then went to a hospital where
he, ten days later, died from the effects of the gunshot wound.
In the first of these cases it is quite evident that there was no causal relation between the service
which the plaintiff as a teacher, had rendered and the assault which was committed upon her. In the
second case the motive of the assault was evidently robbery, and there was no direct connection
between the work done by the victim of the robbery and the assault. If it had appeared, in the first
case, that the teacher had been attacked while in the act of properly disciplining one of her pupils,
and because of that fact, it would, we think, have been held that the injury had been incurred in the
course of her employment. The second case brings us perhaps into more debatable ground, but the
casual relation between the performance of duty and the assault was not as manifest as in the case
now before us. The following decisions, gleaned from American jurisprudence, shed further light
upon the situation before us:

In In re Wooley vs. Minneapolis Equipment Co. and Globe Indemnity Co. (157 Minn., 428; 196 N. W.
477), where a salesman was shot and killed in a street brawl brought on by himself and for his own
purposes, even though he was engaged in his employee's business just before the fracas, and
intended to resume it afterwards, the court held that the injury did not arise out of the employment.

In Scholtzhauer vs. C. & L. Lunch Co. (233 N. Y., 12; 134 N. E., 701), it was held that the injury did
not arise out of the employment, where a waitress in a restaurant was shot by a negro dish-washer
because she had declined an invitation to out with him and had stated that she would not go out with
a negro.

In the case now in hand it seems clear to us that the plaintiff is entitled to the compensation
demanded and no question has been made as to the amount thereof.

The judgment appealed from will therefore be reversed, and the plaintiff will recover of the defendant
the sum of P1,000.92, with interest from the date of the filing of the complaint and with costs. So
ordered.

Villa-Real, Hull, Vickers and Imperial, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-47360            November 28, 1940

BOHOL LAND TRANSPORTATION CO., recurrente y apelante,

vs.
FERMINA VIUDA DE MADANGUIT Y OTROS, recurridos y apelados.

Sres. Alvear y Agrava en representacion de la recurrente.

D. Antonio Logarta y D. Cecilio I. Lim en representacion de los recurridos.

HORRILLENO, J.:

Este es un recurso de certiorari promotivao por la Bohol Land Transportaion Co. contra Fermina
Viuda de Mandaguit, la recurrida, en el que pide se revoque la decision del Tribunal de Apelaciones,
promulgada el 28 de febrero de 1940, la cual, copiada literalmente, dice asi:.

Driving the passenger truck No. 77 of the defendant transportation company, Ramon
Madanguit left Tagbilaran, Bohol, on his regular trip to barrio Catigbian of another
municipality in the afternoon of May 17, 1937. On the road he overtook and passed another
truck of the defendant, and in doing so he fell but collided with Ciriaco Dalmao (then riding a
bicycle in the opposite direction),practically ditching him. Dalmao immediately turned around
and pursued Madanguit's truck, which a few minutes later had to park in front of the house of
Attorney Celestino Gallares, because some pedestrian signaled to get aboard. Taking
advantage of the stop, Madanguit went to the Lourdes Drug Store across the street to wash
his hands which had become dirty when he cleaned the truck. In the meantime, Ciriaco
Dalmao arrived, went into the drug store, and, without much ado, knifed Madanguit to death.
Dalmao was prosecuted and having pleaded guilty was sentenced accordingly.

Subsequently, the heirs of Madanguit filed this action for compensation under Act No. 3428,
as amended, in the Court of First Instance of Bohol, and obtained judgment for the total sum
of P1,507.58, to be paid in the manner directed. The defendant appealed, questioning not
the amount of compensation nor the manner of payment thereof, but the right of the plaintiff
to be compensated, and submitting the proposition: First, that the death did not arise out of
Madanguit's employment and in the course thereof; and, second that compensation is not
due because the death occurred on the account of Madanguit's notorious negligence, or
intention to inflict injury upon Dalmao.

We are of the opinion that under the facts stated at the beginning of this decision, the death
of Madanguit arose out, and in the course of his employment. It appears that because while
driving the defendant's truck he offended Dalmao, the latter stabbed and killed him.

But the defendant maintains that there is no competent proof regarding Dalmao's motive,
maintaining that the declaration in open court of the widow of Madanguit, who merely
repeated Dalmao's testimony in the criminal case against him for murder is hearsay and
incompetent evidence. But hearsay evidence regarding the motive or intention of a person is
admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule. (See Wigmore on Evidence, par. 1729, et
seq.: and also notes to its Supplement.) And view of the fact that the declarations of Dalmao
were made under the sanction of an oath, and the defendant itself presented Exhibit 9
(testimony of some witness in the criminal case against Dalmao), which corroborates the
widow's testimony, we cannot say that there is not enough evidence about the motive
impelling Dalmao's murderous hand.

At any rate, the declaration of the widow at pages 22 to 25 of the transcript of the
stenographic notes were not objected to as hearsay, and for all purposes are in the record
entitled to some value. (Diaz vs. U.S., 223 U.S. 442.).

Nevertheless, let us suppose, that proof of Dalmao's resentment is insufficient. Then

Madanguit's injury does not appear to have arisen out of his employment; yet it being
undeniable that he was killed 'in the course of his employment' (see Jackson vs. Dairyman's
Creamery, 162 S.E., 359; Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co. vs. Sartonio, 12 Pac. [2nd] 221,
his family is entitled to compensation under the decision of the Supreme Court in Pollisco vs.
Basilan Lumber Co., G.R. 39721, Oct 23, 1993 (Philippine Cases on Workmen's
Compensation by Butalid, p.7)

Referring to the second point, the accident did not arise out of his employment, which was
that of operating the machine and fixing it when it was out of commission, inasmuch as said
accident did not occur while he was engaged in said work and as a consequence thereof.

"But that the accident occurred in the course of his employment there can be no
doubt, for the reason that, being an employee of the firm and while riding in the
wagon furnished by the company to bring then home within the concession after their
work, plaintiff was within the radius of action and under the control of the defendant
company." (Pollisco vs. Basilan Lumber Co., supra ).

In Bellosillo vs. City of Manila (G.R. No. 34522, November 9, 1931, Butalid, supra, p. 16), a
workman employed on a public street temporarily left his work and crossed the street, he
was run over by an automobile and killed. The Supreme Court gave him compensation
under Act 3428, holding that the injury was caused by an accident due to, and in pursuance
of, his employment.

It should be noted in this connection that in constructing this specific provision of the
Workmen's compensation law, the tendency is towards liberality in favor whenever an
employee suffers injury in the course of his employment, a reasonable factual presumption,
is that the hurt arose out of the employment.

The defendant attempted to establish the fact that Madanguit owed Dalmao about P3.50;
that on May 17, just a few minutes before the killing, Dalmao stopped Madanguit and asked
for payment, that Madanguit paid no attention to Dalmao, whereupon the latter became
enraged, followed Madanguit and killed him. The theory is not plausible for it is unlikely that
for a small indebtedness Dalmao should take away the life of an individual. it is also
incredible that he should stop a truck to demand payment. But this alleged debt of Madanguit
lends color to the plaintiff's version, because his rudeness in crowding Dalmao out of the
street was resented by the latter, who, as a creditor of Madanguit, evidently expected better
treatment.

The other defense that the killing was caused by Madanguit's intention to inflict injuries upon
Dalmao, or to his notorious negligence, is concededly premised on the assumption that the
 decision in criminal case No. 4180, Exhibit E, is admissible (appellant's brief, p.34). As we
agree with the defendant that said Exhibit, for the purpose of showing the facts recited
therein, is not admissible, we do not have to go into this defense, specially because we are
not convinced there was notorious negligence or wilfull misconduct on the part of Madanguit.

The net result is that plaintiff are entitled to compensation. And as the defendant has
assigned no error as to the rate or amount of the award, the judgment appealed from will be
affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

La recurrente, como fundamento de su recurso, alega:.

1. The Second Division of said Court of Appeals completely disregarded the fact that the
death of Ramon O. Madanguit was not an accident at all and erroneously held that, because
Ramon O. Madanguit was murdered by Ciriaco Dalmao in the Lourdes Drug Store, the said
death arose in the coarse of his employment or as a result of said employment it been found
by said Second Division of Court of Appeals that the death of the deceased arose from the
following facts:

. . . "On the road he overtook and passed another truck of the defendant, and in doing so he
fell but collided Ciriaco Dalmao (then riding a bicycle in the opposite direction), practically
ditching him, Dalmao immediately turned around and pursued Madanguit's truck which a few
minutes after had to park in front of the house of Attorney Celestino Gallares, because some
pedestrian signaled to get aboard. Taking advantage of the stop. Madanguit went to the
Lourdes Drug Store across the street to wash his hands which had become dirty when he
cleaned the truck. In the meantime, Ciriaco Dalmao arrived, went into the drug store and
without much ado, knifed Madanguit to death. Dalmao was prosecuted, and having pleaded
guilty, was sentence accordingly."

2. The Second Division of the Court of Appeals committed an error in holding the deceased
was not notoriously negligent when, —

(a) The deceased violated and disregarded the rules and regulations of petitioner by starting
late from; petitioner's garage which fact accounted for deceased going to the Lourdes Drug
Store to wash his hands and comb his hair; and

(b) The deceased disregarded the right of Ciriaco Dalmao, his assailant, by almost colliding
with, and there was not enough space for his truck to go through without causing injury or
damage to the travelling public.

3. The Second Division of the Court of Appeals also committed an error of law in implied
holding that petitioner is an insurer against all accidental injuries which might happened to its
employees while in the course of their employment and holding that, because the deceased
was murdered on account of his carelessness and derelictions of duty, the said deceased
Ramon O. Madanguit died in the course of his employment. (See par. 2, p.2, decision,
Appendix A.)

4. The Second Division of the Court of Appeals again committed an error of law by
concluding that petitioner is answerable for the death of decease when it itself finds that "It
appears that because while driving the defendant's truck he (the deceased) offended
Dalmao, the latter stabbed and killed him" and . . .
 5. Finally, the decision of the Second Division of Court of Appeals is against the applicable
decision of this Honorable Court in that it applied without exception and limitation, the
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law in holding that 'the tendency is towards
liberality in favor of the employee. And perhaps it is not error to say that whenever an
employee suffers injuries in the course of his employment, a reasonable factual presumption
is that the hurt arose out of the employment' when according to the case Vergara vs.
Pampanga Bus Co., G.R. No. 44149, January 9, 1936; Vol. V, lawyers' Journal, p. 372, this
Honorable Court says:

"We have heretofore given repeated evidence of our desire to see a spirit of liberality
characterize the construction of the Workmen's Compensation Act. We have endeavored to
interpret the Act to promote its purpose. We have even gone so far as to interpret it fairly in
favor of the employee. But we cannot construct the Act to fit particular cases, and in this
particular case neither the facts nor the law are demonstrative of a meritorious claim on the
part of the employee coming within the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act."

No se discuten por la recurrente, ni puede discurtilos en esta instancia, los hechos declarados
probados por el Tribunal de Apelacion en su decision objeto del presente recurso, a sabeer:

Driving the passenger truck No. 77 of the defendant transportation company, Ramon
Madanguit left Tagbilaran, Bohol, on his regular trip to barrio Catigbian of another
municipality in the afternoon of May 17, 1938. On the road he overtook and passed another
truck of the defendant and in doing so he fell but collided with Ciriaco Dalmao (the riding a
bicycle in the opposite direction), practically ditching him. Dalmao immediately turned around
and pursued Madanguit's truck, which few minutes later had to work in front of the house of
Attorney Celestino Gallares, because some pedestrian signaled to get aboard. Taking
advantage of the stop, Madanguit went to the Lourdes Drug Store across the street to wash
his hands which had become dirty when he cleaned the truck. in the meantime , Ciriaco
Dalmao arrived, went into the drug store, and without much ado, knifed Madanguit to death.
Dalmao was prosecuted, and having pleaded guilty, was sentence accordingly.

Subsequently, the heirs of Madanguit filed this action for compensation under Act 3428, as
amended, in the Court of First Instance of Bohol, and obtained judgment for the total sum of
P1,507,58, to be paid in the manner directed. The defendant appealed, questioning not the amount
of compensation nor the manner of payment thereof, but the right of the plaintiff to be compensated,
and submitting the proposition: First, that the death did not arise out of Madanguit's employment and
in the course thereof; and, occurred on account of Madanguit's notorious negligence, or intention to
inflict upon Dalmao.

La unica cuestion, por consiguiente, que se plantea ante Nos es la de si, en vista de tales hechos,
procede o no otorgar a la recurrida los beneficios de la Ley de Compensacion de Obreros No. 3428,
segun ha sido enmendada por la Ley No. 3812. Dicha ley, tal como ha sido enmendada, dispone en
su articulo 2, lo siguiente:

ART. 2. Motivos para una compensacion. — Cuando un empleado sufre una lesion personal
por accidente proveniente de, y en el curso de su empleo, o contrajere una enfermedad
causada directamente por el empleo o como resultado de la naturaleza de dicho empleo, su
patrono le pagara una compensacion en las cantidades y a las personas que se especifican
mas adelante.

En Pollisco vs. Basilan Lumber Co., R.G. No. 39721, este Tribunal, entre otras cosas, declaro que
Pollisco tenia derecho a la compensacion no obstante haber ocurrido el accidente despues de su
trabajo y mientras volvia ya a su casa. El caso de autos es, a nuestro juicio, mas fuerte y meritorio
todavia que el citado de Pollisco. Como se desprende de los hechos probados segun el Tribunal de
Apelacion, Madanguit, el difunto, era el chofer de uno de los buses de la recurrente, Bohol Land
Transportation Co., y mientras guiaba el coche, este choco contra la bicicleta que montaba Ciriaco
Dalmao; que momentos despues, casi inmediatamente, Madanguit paro su coche frente a la casa
del abogado Celestino Gallares, por haber recibido señas de algunos peatones que querian coger el
camion y, aprovechando esta oportunidad, bajo de el y se dirigio al Lourdes Drug Store con el
objeto de lavarse las manos que se habian ensuciado al limpiar su coche. Entretanto, Ciriaco
Dalmao llego y entro en la botica y, sin mas ni mas, apuñalo a Madanguit que murio en el acto.

En otro asunto, Bellosillo vs. City of Manila, R.G. No. 34522, decidido por este Tribunal, se declaro
que un obrero de la Ciudad de Manila, que trabajaba en las calles publicas, tenia derecho a la
compensacion bajo la ley, a pesar de haber dejado temporalmente su trabajo y cruzado la calle,
momento en que fue atropellado por un automovil que le dejo muerto en el acto. En Corpus Juris,
pag. 673, tomo 71, hallamos lo siguente:

. . . where the employee is injured while seeking toilet facilities or going to ro from a toilet, the
injury arises out of the employment and in the course of it . . .

El Tribunal de Apelacines, por tanto, no incurrio en error alguno al decidir este asunto, confirmando
en todas sus partes el fallo del tribunal a quo a favor de Fermina Vda. de Madanguit, la recurrida.

En su consecuencia, procede, y asi lo declaramos, confirmar en todas sus partes la decision objeto
del recurso, con las costas en ambar instancias a cargo de la recurrente. Asi se ordena.

Avanceña, Pres., Imperial, Diaz y Laurel, MM., estan conformes.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 90204 May 11, 1990

MANUEL BELARMINO, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM, respondents.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

This seven-year-old case involves a claim for benefits for the death of a lady school teacher which the public respondents disallowed on the
ground that the cause of death was not work-connected.

Before her death on February 19, 1982, petitioner's wife, Oania Belarmino, was a classroom teacher
of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports assigned at the Buracan Elementary School in
Dimasalang, Masbate (p. 13, Rollo). She had been a classroom teacher since October 18, 1971, or
for eleven (11) years. Her husband, the petitioner, is also a public school teacher.

On January 14, 1982, at nine o'clock in the morning, while performing her duties as a classroom
teacher, Mrs. Belarmino who was in her 8th month of pregnancy, accidentally slipped and fell on the
classroom floor. Moments later, she complained of abdominal pain and stomach cramps. For several
days, she continued to suffer from recurrent abdominal pain and a feeling of heaviness in her
stomach, but, heedless of the advice of her female co-teachers to take a leave of absence, she
continued to report to the school because there was much work to do. On January 25, 1982, eleven
(11) days after her accident, she went into labor and prematurely delivered a baby girl at home (p.
8, Rollo).

Her abdominal pains persisted even after the delivery, accompanied by high fever and headache.
She was brought to the Alino Hospital in Dimasalang, Masbate on February 11, 1982. Dr. Alfonso
Alino found that she was suffering from septicemia post partum due to infected lacerations of the
vagina. She was discharged from the hospital after five (5) days on February 16, 1982, apparently
recovered but she died three (3) days later. The cause of death was septicemia post partum. She
was 33 years old, survived by her husband and four (4) children, the oldest of whom was 11 years
old and the youngest, her newborn infant (p. 9, Rollo).

On April 21, 1983, a claim for death benefits was filed by her husband. On February 14, 1984, it was
denied by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) which held that 'septicemia post
partum the cause of death, is not an occupational disease, and neither was there any showing that
aforesaid ailment was contracted by reason of her employment. . . . The alleged accident mentioned
could not have precipitated the death of the wife but rather the result of the infection of her lacerated
wounds as a result of her delivery at home" (p. 14 Rollo).
On appeal to the Employees Compensation Commission, the latter issued Resolution No. 3913
dated July 8, 1988 holding:

We agree with the decision of the system, hence we dismiss this appeal. Postpartum
septicemia is an acute infectious disease of the puerperium resulting from the
entrance into the blood of bacteria usually streptococci and their toxins which cause
dissolution of the blood, degenerative changes in the organs and the symptoms of
intoxication. The cause of this condition in the instant case was the infected vaginal
lacerations resulting from the decedent's delivery of her child which took place at
home. The alleged accident in school could not have been the cause of septicemia,
which in this case is clearly caused by factors not inherent in employment or in the
working conditions of the deceased. (pp. 14-15, Rollo.)

Hence, this petition for review.

After a careful consideration of the petition and the annexes thereof, as well as the comments of the
public respondents, we are persuaded that the public respondents' peremptory denial of the
petitioner's claim constitutes a grave abuse of discretion.

Rule III, Section 1 of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation enumerates the grounds for
compensability of injury resulting in disability or death of an employee, as follows:

Sec. 1. Grounds — (a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all
of the following conditions:

(1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his
work requires him to be;

(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions;
and

(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been
executing an order for the employer.

(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the
sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of
these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown
that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.

(c) Only injury or sickness that occurred on or after January 1, 1975 and the resulting
disability or death shall be compensable under these Rules.

The illness, septicemia post partum which resulted in the death of Oania Belarmino, is admittedly not
listed as an occupational disease in her particular line of work as a classroom teacher. However, as
pointed out in the petition, her death from that ailment is compensable because an employment
accident and the conditions of her employment contributed to its development. The condition of the
classroom floor caused Mrs. Belarmino to slip and fall and suffer injury as a result. The fall
precipitated the onset of recurrent abdominal pains which culminated in the premature termination of
her pregnancy with tragic consequences to her. Her fall on the classroom floor brought about her
premature delivery which caused the development of post partum septicemia which resulted in
death. Her fall therefore was the proximate or responsible cause that set in motion an unbroken
chain of events, leading to her demise.

. . . what is termed in American cases the proximate cause, not implying however, as
might be inferred from the word itself, the nearest in point of time or relation, but
rather, [is] the efficient cause, which may be the most remote of an operative chain. It
must be that which sets the others in motion and is to be distinguished from a mere
preexisting condition upon which the effective cause operates, and must have been
adequate to produce the resultant damage without the intervention of an
independent cause. (Atlantic Gulf vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 166,171.)

The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as
a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of
his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
(Bataclan v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181.)

Thus in Enriquez v. WCC, 93 SCRA 366, 372, this Court ruled:

. . . Verily, the right to compensation extends to disability due to disease supervening

upon and proximately and naturally resulting from a compensable injury (82 Am. Jur.
132). Where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in the course of employment,
every natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the
employment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause attributable
to complainants own negligence or misconduct ( I Larson Workmen's Compensation
Law 3-279 [1972]). Simply stated, all the medical consequences and sequels that
flow from the primary injury are compensable. (Ibid.)

Mrs. Belarmino's fall was the primary injury that arose in the course of her employment as a
classroom teacher, hence, all the medical consequences flowing from it: her recurrent abdominal
pains, the premature delivery of her baby, her septicemia post partum and death, are compensable.

There is no merit in the public respondents' argument that the cause of the decedent's post partum
septicemia "was the infected vaginal lacerations resulting from the decedent's delivery of her child at
home" for the incident in school could not have caused septicemia post partum, . . . the necessary
precautions to avoid infection during or after labor were (not) taken" (p. 29, Rollo).

The argument is unconvincing. It overlooks the fact that septicemia post partum is a disease of
childbirth, and premature childbirth would not have occurred if she did not accidentally fall in the
classroom.

It is true that if she had delivered her baby under sterile conditions in a hospital operating room
instead of in the unsterile environment of her humble home, and if she had been attended by
specially trained doctors and nurses, she probably would not have suffered lacerations of the vagina
and she probably would not have contracted the fatal infection. Furthermore, if she had remained
longer than five (5) days in the hospital to complete the treatment of the infection, she probably
would not have died. But who is to blame for her inability to afford a hospital delivery and the
services of trained doctors and nurses? The court may take judicial notice of the meager salaries
that the Government pays its public school teachers. Forced to live on the margin of poverty, they
are unable to afford expensive hospital care, nor the services of trained doctors and nurses when
they or members of their families are in. Penury compelled the deceased to scrimp by delivering her
baby at home instead of in a hospital.

The Government is not entirely blameless for her death for it is not entirely blameless for her
poverty. Government has yet to perform its declared policy "to free the people from poverty, provide
adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life
for all (Sec. 7, Art. II, 1973 Constitution and Sec. 9, Art. II, 1987 Constitution). Social justice for the
lowly and underpaid public school teachers will only be an empty shibboleth until Government
adopts measures to ameliorate their economic condition and provides them with adequate medical
care or the means to afford it. "Compassion for the poor is an imperative of every humane society"
(PLDT v. Bucay and NLRC, 164 SCRA 671, 673). By their denial of the petitioner's claim for benefits
arising from the death of his wife, the public respondents ignored this imperative of Government, and
thereby committed a grave abuse of discretion.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The respondents Employees Compensation

Commission and the Government Service Insurance System are ordered to pay death benefits to
the petitioner and/or the dependents of the late Oania Belarmino, with legal rate of interest from the
filing of the claim until it is fully paid, plus attorney's fees equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the
award, and costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 182978-79               April 7, 2009

BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER AND PROMOTION, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES SIMPLICIO and MILA CUARESMA (for and in behalf of their daughter, Jasmin G.
Cuaresma), WHITE FALCON SERVICES, INC. and JAIME ORTIZ (President,White Falcon
Services, Inc.), Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. Nos. 184298-99               April 7, 2009

SPOUSES SIMPLICIO and MILA CUARESMA (for and in behalf of their daughter, Jasmin G.
Cuaresma), Petitioners,
vs.
WHITE FALCON SERVICES, INC. and BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER AND PROMOTION,
INC., Respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

These consolidated petitions assail the Amended Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated May 14,
2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 80619 and CA-G.R. SP No. 81030 finding White Falcon Services, Inc. and
Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc. solidarily liable to indemnify spouses Simplicio and
Mila Cuaresma the amount of US$4,686.73 in actual damages with interest.

On January 6, 1997, Jasmin Cuaresma (Jasmin) was deployed by Becmen Service Exporter and
Promotion, Inc.2 (Becmen) to serve as assistant nurse in Al-Birk Hospital in the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia (KSA), for a contract duration of three years, with a corresponding salary of US$247.00 per
month.

Over a year later, she died allegedly of poisoning.

Jessie Fajardo, a co-worker of Jasmin, narrated that on June 21, 1998, Jasmin was found dead by a
female cleaner lying on the floor inside her dormitory room with her mouth foaming and smelling of
poison.3

Based on the police report and the medical report of the examining physician of the Al-Birk Hospital,
who conducted an autopsy of Jasmin’s body, the likely cause of her death was poisoning. Thus:

According to letter No. 199, dated 27.2.1419H, issued by Al-Birk Police Station, for examining the
corpse of Jasmin Cuaresma, 12.20 P.M. 27.2.1419H, Sunday, at Al-Birk Hospital.
 1. The Police Report on the Death

2. The Medical Diagnosis

Sex: Female Age: 25 years Relg: Christian

The said person was brought to the Emergency Room of the hospital; time 12.20 P.M. and
she was unconscious, blue, no pulse, no respiration and the first aid esd undertaken but
without success.

3. Diagnosis and Opinion: Halt in blood circulation respiratory system and brain damage due
to an apparent poisoning which is under investigation.4

Name : Jasmin Cuaresma

Sex : Female
Marital Status : Single Nationality: Philipino (sic)
Religion : Christian
Profession : Nurse
Address : Al-Birk Genrl. Hospital Birth Place: The Philippines

On 27.2.1419H, Dr. Tariq Abdulminnem and Dr. Ashoki Komar, both have examined the dead body
of Jasmin Cuaresma, at 12.20 P.M., Sunday, 22.2.14189H, and the result was:

1. Report of the Police on the death

2. Medical Examination: Blue skin and paleness on the Extrimes (sic), total halt to blood
circulation and respiratory system and brain damage. There were no external
injuries. Likely poisoning by taking poisonous substance, yet not determined. There was a
bad smell in the mouth and unknown to us.5 (Emphasis supplied)

Jasmin’s body was repatriated to Manila on September 3, 1998. The following day, the City Health
Officer of Cabanatuan City conducted an autopsy and the resulting medical report indicated that
Jasmin died under violent circumstances, and not poisoning as originally found by the KSA
examining physician. The City Health Officer found that Jasmin had abrasions at her inner lip and
gums; lacerated wounds and abrasions on her left and right ears; lacerated wounds and hematoma
(contusions) on her elbows; abrasions and hematoma on her thigh and legs; intra-muscular
hemorrhage at the anterior chest; rib fracture; puncture wounds; and abrasions on the labia minora
of the vaginal area.6

On March 11, 1999, Jasmin’s remains were exhumed and examined by the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). The toxicology report of the NBI, however, tested negative for non-volatile,
metallic poison and insecticides.7

Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma (the Cuaresmas), Jasmin’s parents and her surviving heirs, received
from the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) the following amounts: P50,000.00 for
death benefits; P50,000.00 for loss of life; P20,000.00 for funeral expenses; and P10,000.00 for
medical reimbursement.
On November 22, 1999, the Cuaresmas filed a complaint against Becmen and its principal in the
KSA, Rajab & Silsilah Company (Rajab), claiming death and insurance benefits, as well as moral
and exemplary damages for Jasmin’s death.8

In their complaint, the Cuaresmas claim that Jasmin’s death was work-related, having occurred at
the employer’s premises;9 that under Jasmin’s contract with Becmen, she is entitled to "iqama
insurance" coverage; that Jasmin is entitled to compensatory damages in the amount of
US$103,740.00, which is the sum total of her monthly salary of US$247.00 per month under her
employment contract, multiplied by 35 years (or the remaining years of her productive life had death
not supervened at age 25, assuming that she lived and would have retired at age 60).

The Cuaresmas assert that as a result of Jasmin’s death under mysterious circumstances, they
suffered sleepless nights and mental anguish. The situation, they claim, was aggravated by findings
in the autopsy and exhumation reports which evidently show that a grave injustice has been
committed against them and their daughter, for which those responsible should likewise be made to
pay moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

In their position paper, Becmen and Rajab insist that Jasmin committed suicide, citing a prior
unsuccessful suicide attempt sometime in March or April 1998 and relying on the medical report of
the examining physician of the Al-Birk Hospital. They likewise deny liability because the Cuaresmas
already recovered death and other benefits totaling P130,000.00 from the OWWA. They insist that
the Cuaresmas are not entitled to "iqama insurance" because this refers to the "issuance" – not
insurance – of iqama, or residency/work permit required in the KSA. On the issue of moral and
exemplary damages, they claim that the Cuaresmas are not entitled to the same because they have
not acted with fraud, nor have they been in bad faith in handling Jasmin’s case.

While the case was pending, Becmen filed a manifestation and motion for substitution alleging that
Rajab terminated their agency relationship and had appointed White Falcon Services, Inc. (White
Falcon) as its new recruitment agent in the Philippines. Thus, White Falcon was impleaded as
respondent as well, and it adopted and reiterated Becmen’s arguments in the position paper it
subsequently filed.

On February 28, 2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision 10 dismissing the complaint for lack of
merit. Giving weight to the medical report of the Al-Birk Hospital finding that Jasmin died of
poisoning, the Labor Arbiter concluded that Jasmin committed suicide. In any case, Jasmin’s death
was not service-connected, nor was it shown that it occurred while she was on duty; besides, her
parents have received all corresponding benefits they were entitled to under the law. In regard to
damages, the Labor Arbiter found no legal basis to warrant a grant thereof.

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (Commission) reversed the decision of the
Labor Arbiter. Relying on the findings of the City Health Officer of Cabanatuan City and the NBI as
contained in their autopsy and toxicology report, respectively, the Commission, via its November 22,
2002 Resolution11 declared that, based on substantial evidence adduced, Jasmin was the victim of
compensable work-connected criminal aggression. It disregarded the Al-Birk Hospital attending
physician’s report as well as the KSA police report, finding the same to be inconclusive. It declared
that Jasmin’s death was the result of an "accident" occurring within the employer’s premises that is
attributable to her employment, or to the conditions under which she lived, and thus arose out of and
in the course of her employment as nurse. Thus, the Cuaresmas are entitled to actual damages in
the form of Jasmin’s lost earnings, including future earnings, in the total amount of US$113,000.00.
The Commission, however, dismissed all other claims in the complaint.
Becmen, Rajab and White Falcon moved for reconsideration, whereupon the Commission issued its
October 9, 2003 Resolution12 reducing the award of US$113,000.00 as actual damages to
US$80,000.00.13 The NLRC likewise declared Becmen and White Falcon as solidarily liable for
payment of the award.

Becmen and White Falcon brought separate petitions for certiorari to the Court of Appeals. 14 On
June 28, 2006, the appellate court rendered its Decision, 15 the dispositive portion of which reads, as
follows:

WHEREFORE, the subject petitions are DENIED but in the execution of the decision, it should first
be enforced against White Falcon Services and then against Becmen Services when it is already
impossible, impractical and futile to go against it (White Falcon).

SO ORDERED.16

The appellate court affirmed the NLRC’s findings that Jasmin’s death was compensable, the same
having occurred at the dormitory, which was contractually provided by the employer. Thus her death
should be considered to have occurred within the employer’s premises, arising out of and in the
course of her employment.

Becmen and White Falcon moved for reconsideration. On May 14, 2008, the appellate court
rendered the assailed Amended Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are GRANTED. Accordingly, the award of
US$80,000.00 in actual damages is hereby reduced to US$4,686.73 plus interest at the legal rate
computed from the time it became due until fully paid. Petitioners are hereby adjudged jointly and
solidarily liable with the employer for the monetary awards with Becmen Service Exporter and
Promotions, Inc. having a right of reimbursement from White Falcon Services, Inc.

SO ORDERED.17

In the Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals found that although Jasmin’s death was
compensable, however, there is no evidentiary basis to support an award of actual damages in the
amount of US$80,000.00. Nor may lost earnings be collected, because the same may be charged
only against the perpetrator of the crime or quasi-delict. Instead, the appellate court held that
Jasmin’s beneficiaries should be entitled only to the sum equivalent of the remainder of her 36-
month employment contract, or her monthly salary of US$247.00 multiplied by nineteen (19) months,
with legal interest.

Becmen filed the instant petition for review on certiorari (G.R. Nos. 182978-79). The Cuaresmas, on
the other hand, moved for a reconsideration of the amended decision, but it was denied. They are
now before us via G.R. Nos. 184298-99.

On October 6, 2008, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 184298-99 with G.R. Nos. 182978-
79.

In G.R. Nos. 182978-79, Becmen raises the following issues for our resolution:

(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT GAVE MORE CREDENCE AND
WEIGHT TO THE AUTOPSY REPORT CONDUCTED BY THE CABANATUAN CITY HEALTH
OFFICE THAN THE MEDICAL AND POLICE REPORTS ISSUED BY THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH
OF KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA AND AL-BIRK HOSPITAL.

(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN ON THE BASIS OF THE POSITION
PAPERS AND ANNEXES THERETO INCLUDING THE AUTOPSY REPORT, IT CONCLUDED
THAT THE DEATH OF JASMIN CUARESMA WAS CAUSED BY CRIMINAL AGGRESSION.

(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE DEATH OF JASMIN
CUARESMA WAS COMPENSABLE PURSUANT TO THE RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT IN
TALLER VS. YNCHAUSTI, G.R. NO. 35741, DECEMBER 20, 1932, WHICH IT FOUND TO BE
STILL GOOD LAW.

(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD BECMEN LIABLE FOR THE
DEATH OF JASMIN CUARESMA NOTWITHSTANDING ITS ADMISSIONS THAT "IQAMA
INSURANCE" WAS A TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR SINCE "IQAMA" IS NOT AN INSURANCE.

(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE DEATH OF
JASMIN WAS WORK RELATED.

(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD BECMEN LIABLE TO JASMIN’S
BENEFICIARIES FOR THE REMAINDER OF HER 36-MONTH CONTRACT COMPUTED IN THIS
MANNER: MONTHLY SALARY OF US$246.67 MULTIPLIED BY 19 MONTHS, THE REMAINDER
OF THE TERM OF JASMIN’S EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT, IS EQUAL TO US$4,686.73.

(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD BECMEN LIABLE TO PAY
INTEREST AT THE LEGAL RATE FROM THE TIME IT WAS DUE UNTIL FULLY PAID.

(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD BECMEN AND WHITE FALCON
JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE EMPLOYER NOTWITHSTANDING THE
ASSUMPTION OF LIABILITY EXECUTED BY WHITE FALCON IN FAVOR OF BECMEN.

On the other hand, in G.R. Nos. 184298-99, the Cuaresmas raise the following issues:

(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING THE PROVISIONS OF THE CIVIL
CODE CONSIDERED GENERAL LAW DESPITE THE CASE BEING COVERED BY E.O. 247, R.A.
8042 AND LABOR CODE CONSIDERED AS SPECIAL LAWS.

(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE DECEASED’S FUTURE
EARNINGS WHICH IS (AN) INHERENT FACTOR IN THE COMPUTATION OF DEATH BENEFITS
OF OVERSEAS FILIPINO CONTRACT WORKERS.

(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED IN REDUCING THE DEATH BENEFITS

AWARDED BY NLRC CONSIDERED FINDINGS OF FACT THAT CANNOT BE DISTURBED
THROUGH CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT.

The issue for resolution is whether the Cuaresmas are entitled to monetary claims, by way of
benefits and damages, for the death of their daughter Jasmin.

The terms and conditions of Jasmin’s 1996 Employment Agreement which she and her employer
Rajab freely entered into constitute the law between them. As a rule, stipulations in an employment
contract not contrary to statutes, public policy, public order or morals have the force of law between
the contracting parties.18 An examination of said employment agreement shows that it provides for
no other monetary or other benefits/privileges than the following:

1. 1,300 rials (or US$247.00) monthly salary;

2. Free air tickets to KSA at the start of her contract and to the Philippines at the end thereof,
as well as for her vacation at the end of each twenty four-month service;

3. Transportation to and from work;

4. Free living accommodations;

5. Free medical treatment, except for optical and dental operations, plastic surgery charges
and lenses, and medical treatment obtained outside of KSA;

6. Entry visa fees will be shared equally between her and her employer, but the exit/re-entry
visa fees, fees for Iqama issuance, renewal, replacement, passport renewal, sponsorship
transfer and other liabilities shall be borne by her;

7. Thirty days paid vacation leave with round trip tickets to Manila after twenty four-months of
continuous service;

8. Eight days public holidays per year;

9. The indemnity benefit due her at the end of her service will be calculated as per labor laws
of KSA.

Thus, the agreement does not include provisions for insurance, or for accident, death or other
benefits that the Cuaresmas seek to recover, and which the labor tribunals and appellate court
granted variably in the guise of compensatory damages.

However, the absence of provisions for social security and other benefits does not make Jasmin’s
employment contract infirm. Under KSA law, her foreign employer is not obliged to provide her these
benefits; and neither is Jasmin entitled to minimum wage – unless of course the KSA labor laws
have been amended to the opposite effect, or that a bilateral wage agreement has been entered
into.

Our next inquiry is, should Jasmin’s death be considered as work-connected and thus
compensable? The evidence indicates that it is not. At the time of her death, she was not on duty, or
else evidence to the contrary would have been adduced. Neither was she within hospital premises at
the time. Instead, she was at her dormitory room on personal time when she died. Neither has it
been shown, nor does the evidence suggest, that at the time she died, Jasmin was performing an
act reasonably necessary or incidental to her employment as nurse, because she was at her
dormitory room. It is reasonable to suppose that all her work is performed at the Al-birk Hospital, and
not at her dormitory room.

We cannot expect that the foreign employer should ensure her safety even while she is not on duty.
It is not fair to require employers to answer even for their employees’ personal time away from work,
which the latter are free to spend of their own choosing. Whether they choose to spend their free
time in the pursuit of safe or perilous undertakings, in the company of friends or strangers, lovers or
enemies, this is not one area which their employers should be made accountable for. While we have
emphasized the need to observe official work time strictly,19 what an employee does on free time is
beyond the employer’s sphere of inquiry.

While the "employer’s premises" may be defined very broadly not only to include premises owned by
it, but also premises it leases, hires, supplies or uses,20 we are not prepared to rule that the dormitory
wherein Jasmin stayed should constitute employer’s premises as would allow a finding that death or
injury therein is considered to have been incurred or sustained in the course of or arose out of her
employment. There are certainly exceptions,21 but they do not appear to apply here. Moreover, a
complete determination would have to depend on the unique circumstances obtaining and the
overall factual environment of the case, which are here lacking.

But, did Jasmin commit suicide? Rajab, Becmen and White Falcon vehemently insist that she did;
thus, her heirs may not claim benefits or damages based on criminal aggression. On the other hand,
the Cuaresmas do not believe so.

The Court cannot subscribe to the idea that Jasmin committed suicide while halfway into her
employment contract. It is beyond human comprehension that a 25-year old Filipina, in the prime of
her life and working abroad with a chance at making a decent living with a high-paying job which she
could not find in her own country, would simply commit suicide for no compelling reason.

The Saudi police and autopsy reports – which state that Jasmin is a likely/or apparent victim of
poisoning – are patently inconclusive. They are thus unreliable as evidence.

On the contrary, the autopsy report of the Cabanatuan City Health Officer and the exhumation report
of the NBI categorically and unqualifiedly show that Jasmin sustained external and internal injuries,
specifically abrasions at her inner lip and gums; lacerated wounds and abrasions on her left
and right ears; lacerated wounds and hematoma (contusions) on her elbows; abrasions and
hematoma on her thigh and legs; intra-muscular hemorrhage at the anterior chest; a fractured
rib; puncture wounds; and abrasions on the labia minora of the vaginal area. The NBI
toxicology report came up negative on the presence of poison.

All these show that Jasmin was manhandled – and possibly raped – prior to her death.

Even if we were to agree with the Saudi police and autopsy reports that indicate Jasmin was
poisoned to death, we do not believe that it was self-induced. If ever Jasmin was poisoned, the
assailants who beat her up – and possibly raped her – are certainly responsible therefor.

We are not exactly ignorant of what goes on with our OFWs. Nor is the rest of the world blind to the
realities of life being suffered by migrant workers in the hands of some foreign employers. It is
inconceivable that our Filipina women would seek employment abroad and face uncertainty in a
foreign land, only to commit suicide for unexplained reasons. Deciding to leave their family, loved
ones, and the comfort and safety of home, to work in a strange land requires unrivaled strength and
courage. Indeed, many of our women OFWs who are unfortunate to end up with undesirable
employers have been there more times than they care to, beaten up and broken in body – yet they
have remained strong in mind, refusing to give up the will to live. Raped, burned with cigarettes,
kicked in the chest with sharp high-heeled shoes, starved for days or even weeks, stabbed, slaved
with incessant work, locked in their rooms, forced to serve their masters naked, grossly debased,
dehumanized and insulted, their spirits fought on and they lived for the day that they would once
again be reunited with their families and loved ones. Their bodies surrendered, but their will to
survive remained strong.
It is surprising, therefore, that Rajab, Becmen and White Falcon should insist on suicide, without
even lifting a finger to help solve the mystery of Jasmin’s death. Being in the business of sending
OFWs to work abroad, Becmen and White Falcon should know what happens to some of our OFWs.
It is impossible for them to be completely unaware that cruelties and inhumanities are inflicted on
OFWs who are unfortunate to be employed by vicious employers, or upon those who work in
communities or environments where they are liable to become victims of crime. By now they should
know that our women OFWs do not readily succumb to the temptation of killing themselves even
when assaulted, abused, starved, debased and, worst, raped.

Indeed, what we have seen is Rajab and Becmen’s revolting scheme of conveniently avoiding
responsibility by clinging to the absurd theory that Jasmin took her own life. Abandoning their legal,
moral and social obligation (as employer and recruiter) to assist Jasmin’s family in obtaining justice
for her death, they immediately gave up on Jasmin’s case, which has remained under investigation
as the autopsy and police reports themselves indicate. Instead of taking the cudgels for Jasmin, who
had no relative or representative in the KSA who would naturally demand and seek an investigation
of her case, Rajab and Becmen chose to take the most convenient route to avoiding and denying
liability, by casting Jasmin’s fate to oblivion. It appears from the record that to this date, no follow up
of Jasmin’s case was ever made at all by them, and they seem to have expediently treated Jasmin’s
death as a closed case. Despite being given the lead via the autopsy and toxicology reports of the
Philippine authorities, they failed and refused to act and pursue justice for Jasmin’s sake and to
restore honor to her name.

Indeed, their nonchalant and uncaring attitude may be seen from how Jasmin’s remains were
repatriated. No official representative from Rajab or Becmen was kind enough to make personal
representations with Jasmin’s parents, if only to extend their condolences or sympathies; instead, a
mere colleague, nurse Jessie Fajardo, was designated to accompany Jasmin’s body home.

Of all life’s tragedies, the death of one’s own child must be the most painful for a parent. Not
knowing why or how Jasmin’s life was snuffed out makes the pain doubly unbearable for Jasmin’s
parents, and further aggravated by Rajab, Becmen, and White Falcon’s baseless insistence and
accusation that it was a self-inflicted death, a mortal sin by any religious standard.

Thus we categorically hold, based on the evidence; the actual experiences of our OFWs; and the
resilient and courageous spirit of the Filipina that transcends the vilest desecration of her physical
self, that Jasmin did not commit suicide but a victim of murderous aggression.

Rajab, Becmen, and White Falcon’s indifference to Jasmin’s case has caused unfathomable pain
and suffering upon her parents. They have turned away from their moral obligation, as employer and
recruiter and as entities laden with social and civic obligations in society, to pursue justice for and in
behalf of Jasmin, her parents and those she left behind. Possessed with the resources to determine
the truth and to pursue justice, they chose to stand idly for the sake of convenience and in order that
they may avoid pecuniary liability, turning a blind eye to the Philippine authorities’ autopsy and
toxicology reports instead of taking action upon them as leads in pursuing justice for Jasmin’s death.
They have placed their own financial and corporate interests above their moral and social
obligations, and chose to secure and insulate themselves from the perceived responsibility of having
to answer for and indemnify Jasmin’s heirs for her death.

Under Republic Act No. 8042 (R.A. 8042), or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995,22 the State shall, at all times, uphold the dignity of its citizens whether in country or overseas,
in general, and Filipino migrant workers, in particular. 23 The State shall provide adequate and timely
social, economic and legal services to Filipino migrant workers. 24 The rights and interest
of distressed25 overseas Filipinos, in general, and Filipino migrant workers, in particular, documented
or undocumented, are adequately protected and safeguarded. 26

Becmen and White Falcon, as licensed local recruitment agencies, miserably failed to abide by the
provisions of R.A. 8042. Recruitment agencies are expected to extend assistance to their deployed
OFWs, especially those in distress. Instead, they abandoned Jasmin’s case and allowed it to remain
unsolved to further their interests and avoid anticipated liability which parents or relatives of Jasmin
would certainly exact from them. They willfully refused to protect and tend to the welfare of the
deceased Jasmin, treating her case as just one of those unsolved crimes that is not worth wasting
their time and resources on. The evidence does not even show that Becmen and Rajab lifted a
finger to provide legal representation and seek an investigation of Jasmin’s case. Worst of all, they
unnecessarily trampled upon the person and dignity of Jasmin by standing pat on the argument that
Jasmin committed suicide, which is a grave accusation given its un-Christian nature.

We cannot reasonably expect that Jasmin’s parents should be the ones to actively pursue a just
resolution of her case in the KSA, unless they are provided with the finances to undertake this
herculean task. Sadly, Becmen and Rajab did not lend any assistance at all in this respect. The most
Jasmin’s parents can do is to coordinate with Philippine authorities as mandated under R.A. 8042,
obtain free legal assistance and secure the aid of the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department
of Labor and Employment, the POEA and the OWWA in trying to solve the case or obtain relief, in
accordance with Section 2327 of R.A. 8042. To our mind, the Cuaresmas did all that was within their
power, short of actually flying to the KSA. Indeed, the Cuaresmas went even further. To the best of
their abilities and capacities, they ventured to investigate Jasmin’s case on their own: they caused
another autopsy on Jasmin’s remains as soon as it arrived to inquire into the true cause of her
death. Beyond that, they subjected themselves to the painful and distressful experience of exhuming
Jasmin’s remains in order to obtain another autopsy for the sole purpose of determining whether or
not their daughter was poisoned. Their quest for the truth and justice is equally to be expected of all
loving parents. All this time, Rajab and Becmen – instead of extending their full cooperation to the
Cuaresma family – merely sat on their laurels in seeming unconcern.

In Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRC,28 a seaman who was being repatriated after his
employment contract expired, failed to make his Bangkok to Manila connecting flight as he began to
wander the streets of Bangkok aimlessly. He was shot to death by Thai police four days after, on
account of running amuck with a knife in hand and threatening to harm anybody within sight. The
employer, sued for death and other benefits as well as damages, interposed as defense the
provision in the seafarer agreement which provides that "no compensation shall be payable in
respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death resulting from a willful act on his own life by the
seaman." The Court rejected the defense on the view, among others, that the recruitment agency
should have observed some precautionary measures and should not have allowed the seaman, who
was later on found to be mentally ill, to travel home alone, and its failure to do so rendered it liable
for the seaman’s death. We ruled therein that –

The foreign employer may not have been obligated by its contract to provide a companion for a
returning employee, but it cannot deny that it was expressly tasked by its agreement to assure the
safe return of said worker. The uncaring attitude displayed by petitioners who, knowing fully
well that its employee had been suffering from some mental disorder, nevertheless still
allowed him to travel home alone, is appalling to say the least. Such attitude harks back to
another time when the landed gentry practically owned the serfs, and disposed of them when
the latter had grown old, sick or otherwise lost their usefulness.29 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, more than just recruiting and deploying OFWs to their foreign principals, recruitment agencies
have equally significant responsibilities. In a foreign land where OFWs are likely to encounter
uneven if not discriminatory treatment from the foreign government, and certainly a delayed access
to language interpretation, legal aid, and the Philippine consulate, the recruitment agencies should
be the first to come to the rescue of our distressed OFWs since they know the employers and the
addresses where they are deployed or stationed. Upon them lies the primary obligation to protect the
rights and ensure the welfare of our OFWs, whether distressed or not. Who else is in a better
position, if not these recruitment agencies, to render immediate aid to their deployed OFWs abroad?

Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith. Article 21 of the Code states that any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage. And, lastly, Article 24 requires that in all contractual, property or other relations, when one
of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence,
mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.

Clearly, Rajab, Becmen and White Falcon’s acts and omissions are against public policy because
they undermine and subvert the interest and general welfare of our OFWs abroad, who are entitled
to full protection under the law. They set an awful example of how foreign employers and recruitment
agencies should treat and act with respect to their distressed employees and workers abroad. Their
shabby and callous treatment of Jasmin’s case; their uncaring attitude; their unjustified failure and
refusal to assist in the determination of the true circumstances surrounding her mysterious death,
and instead finding satisfaction in the unreasonable insistence that she committed suicide just so
they can conveniently avoid pecuniary liability; placing their own corporate interests above of the
welfare of their employee’s – all these are contrary to morals, good customs and public policy, and
constitute taking advantage of the poor employee and her family’s ignorance, helplessness,
indigence and lack of power and resources to seek the truth and obtain justice for the death of a
loved one.

Giving in handily to the idea that Jasmin committed suicide, and adamantly insisting on it just to
protect Rajab and Becmen’s material interest – despite evidence to the contrary – is against the
moral law and runs contrary to the good custom of not denouncing one’s fellowmen for alleged grave
wrongdoings that undermine their good name and honor. 30

Whether employed locally or overseas, all Filipino workers enjoy the protective mantle of Philippine
labor and social legislation, contract stipulations to the contrary notwithstanding. This
pronouncement is in keeping with the basic public policy of the State to afford protection to labor,
promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and
regulate the relations between workers and employers. This ruling is likewise rendered imperative by
Article 17 of the Civil Code which states that laws which have for their object public order, public
policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. 31

The relations between capital and labor are so impressed with public interest, 32 and neither shall act
oppressively against the other, or impair the interest or convenience of the public. 33 In case of doubt,
all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living
for the laborer.34

The grant of moral damages to the employee by reason of misconduct on the part of the employer is
sanctioned by Article 2219 (10)35 of the Civil Code, which allows recovery of such damages in
actions referred to in Article 21.36
Thus, in view of the foregoing, the Court holds that the Cuaresmas are entitled to moral damages,
which Becmen and White Falcon are jointly and solidarily liable to pay, together with exemplary
damages for wanton and oppressive behavior, and by way of example for the public good.

Private employment agencies are held jointly and severally liable with the foreign-based employer
for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment. This joint and solidary
liability imposed by law against recruitment agencies and foreign employers is meant to assure the
aggrieved worker of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due him. 37 If the
recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners
as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or
partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. 38

White Falcon’s assumption of Becmen’s liability does not automatically result in Becmen’s freedom
or release from liability. This has been ruled in ABD Overseas Manpower Corporation v.
NLRC.39 Instead, both Becmen and White Falcon should be held liable solidarily, without prejudice to
each having the right to be reimbursed under the provision of the Civil Code that whoever pays for
another may demand from the debtor what he has paid. 40

WHEREFORE, the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 14, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 80619 and CA-G.R. SP No. 81030 is SET ASIDE. Rajab & Silsilah Company, White Falcon
Services, Inc., Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc., and their corporate directors
and officers are found jointly and solidarily liable and ORDERED to indemnify the heirs of Jasmin
Cuaresma, spouses Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma, the following amounts:

1) TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P2,500,000.00) as moral

damages;

2) TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P2,500,000.00) as exemplary

damages;

3) Attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award; and,

4) Costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 81327 December 4, 1989

CRISPINA VANO, petitioner,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, (Bureau of Posts) and EMPLOYEES'
COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondents.

Severino B. Estonina for petitioner.

The Government Corporate Counsel for GSIS.

PARAS, J.:

The only issue in this case is whether or not the death of petitioner's husband, Filomeno Vano is
compensable under the Employees' Compensation Law.

Filomeno Vano was a letter carrier of the Bureau of Posts in Tagbilaran City. On July 31, 1983, a
Sunday, at around 3:30 p.m. Vano was driving his motorcycle with his son as backrider allegedly on
his way to his station in Tagbilaran for his work the following day, Monday. As they were
approaching Hinawanan Badge in Loay, Bohol, the motorcycle skidded, causing its passengers to
be thrown overboard. Vano's head hit the bridge's railing which rendered him unconscious. He was
taken to the Engelwood Hospital where he was declared dead on arrival due to severe hemorrhage.

Vano's widow, Crispina Vano, filed a death benefit claim under PD 626, as amended, with the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). On April 6, 1984, the GSIS denied the claim, citing
the following reason:

It appears on record that your husband was on his way to his station when he died in
a vehicular accident he figured in a Sunday, July 31, 1983.

Obviously, the accident occurred outside of his time and place of work; neither was
he performing official duties at the time of its occurrence. Accordingly, the conditions
for compensability in accordance with the law have not been satisfied, to wit:

1. that the employee must have been injured at the place where his
work requires him to be;

2. that the employee must have been performing his official functions;
and

3. if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been

executing an order for his employer. (p. 22, Rollo)
Crispina Vano's requests for reconsideration were denied by the GSIS, consequently, the case was
elevated to the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) for appropriate review under ECC
Case No. 2658.

In a Decision dated October 13, 1987, the ECC affirmed the decision denying the claim of Crispina
Vano because:

Under the Employees' Compensation law, injuries resulting from accidents while an
employee is going to and from the place of work is not compensable. Some
exceptions, however, are: when the injury is sustained at a place proximate to the
work-place, when the employee meets the accident while riding in a company vehicle
and when he is on special errand for his employer. (Section 1, Rule III of the
Amended Rules of Employees' Compensation)

We note that the case at bar does not fall under any of the foregoing exceptions. In
fact, the subject employee's accident happened on a Sunday, a non-working day. In
the light of the foregoing, we cannot but affirm respondent's denial of the claim. (pp.
13-15, Rollo; p. 2, Decision, ECC Case No. 2658)

The petitioner then came to this Court on a petition for review on certiorari. She alleges that since
her husband was precisely commuting from his hometown to Tagbilaran City, where he would report
for duty as letter carrier the following day, when he met the accident, then his consequent death
should be compensated.

The respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) reiterates its views and contends
that the present provision of law on employment injury is different from that provided in the old
Workmen's Compensation Act and is "categorical in that the injury must have been sustained at
work while at the workplace or elsewhere while executing an order from the employer." (Rollo, p. 69)

For its part, the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission stood firm in asserting that the
death of Filomeno Vano is not the result of an employment accident as contemplated by law hence
petitioner is clearly not entitled to her claim for death benefits.

The case of Vda. de Torbela vs. Employees' Compensation Commission (96 SCRA 260, 263, 264)
supports petitioner's contention of compensability. In the said case, this Court held:

It is a fact that Jose P. Torbela, Sr. died on March 3, 1975 at about 5:45 o'clock in
the morning due to injuries sustained by him in a vehicular accident while he was on
his way to school from Bacolod City, where he lived, to Hinigaran, Negros Occidental
where the school of which he was the principal was located and that at the time of
the accident he had in his possession official papers he allegedly worked on in his
residence on the eve of his death.

The claim is compensable. When an employee is accidentally injured at a point

reasonably proximate to the place of work, while he is going to and from his work,
such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment.

The same ruling was reiterated in the more recent case of Alano vs. Employees' Compensation
Commission (158 SCRA, 669, 672):
 In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased died while going to her place of
work. She was at the place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job necessarily
required her to be if she was to reach her place of work on time. There was nothing
private or personal about the school principal's being at the place of the accident.
She was there because her employment required her to be there.

We see no reason to deviate from the foregoing rulings. Like the deceased in these two (2)
aforementioned cases, it was established that petitioner's husband the case at bar was on his way to
his place of work when he met the accident. His death, therefore, is compensable under the law as
an employment accident.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and the Government Service
Insurance System is ordered to pay petitioner the sum of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00)) as
death benefit and the sum of One Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (P1,200.00) as attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.

 EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-27588. April 28, 1969.]

LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. WORKMEN’S

COMPENSATION COMMISSION and ROSARIO VDA. DE ROSANO, Respondents.

H . San Luis and L. V . Simbulan for Petitioner.

Juan R. Moreno for respondent Rosario Vda. de Rosano.

Villavieja, Villanueva & Ocampo for respondent Workmen’s Compensation

Commission.

DECISION

REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:

Petition filed by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation for review of the decision of the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission (in R04 WC Case No. 3941), ordering it to pay
claimants Rosario Vda. de Rosano, minors Rebecca, Edgardo and Baltazar, all surnamed
Rosano, death compensation benefits, burial expenses and attorney’s fees for the death
of Pastor Rosano; as well as of the resolution of the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission en banc denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid
decision.

As found by the Acting Referee of the Department of Labor, supported by the evidence
on record, the facts of the case are as follows:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

At about 6 o’clock in the morning of 30 November 1964, stevedore Pastor Rosano went
to Pier 9, Manila, to await the arrival of a barge of herein petitioner corporation,
scheduled to dock at 9 o’clock in the morning. While thus waiting for the vessel, Rosano
had a heated verbal argument with one Benjamin Valdez, another stevedore engaged
by petitioner corporation, over the possession of a platform used in the loading and
unloading of cargoes taken into or out of the watercraft. Rosano was able to get it. As
the barge did not arrive as scheduled, Rosano went home for lunch. When he returned
at about 1 o’clock in the afternoon, he found the platform again in the possession of
Valdez. Rosano’s demand for delivery to him of said platform precipitated another
argument which almost ended in fist fight. Valdez finally gave up the platform, but not
before he had uttered threats against the life of Rosano. Later, informed that the barge
they were waiting for definitely was not arriving, Rosano, with two companions,
boarded a passenger jeep bound for Tondo. When he got off from the jeep near his
house, he was met by Valdez, who whipped out a knife and stabbed him. Rosano fell to
the ground. He was immediately brought to the hospital, where he expired at 2:30 in
the afternoon of that same day, 30 November 1964 (Exhibit C).

On 1 March 1965, the widow, Rosario Vda. de Rosano, for herself and on behalf of her 3
minor children, filed with the Department of Labor a formal claim for death
compensation benefits against petitioner Luzon Stevedoring Corporation for the death
of her husband, Pastor Rosano. The company answered, denying the allegations of the
complaint and raisin, the defense of prescription, in that the claim was filed beyond the
3-month period from the death of Rosano, as provided in the Workmen’s Compensation
Law.

On 15 September 1965, after due hearing, the Acting Referee rendered judgment,
ordering the company to pay to the claimants death compensation benefits in the sum
of P6,000.00; P200.00 as reimbursement for burial expenses; P200.00, as attorney’s
fees; and P61.00 as fees payable to the office. The award was based on the finding that
Rosano was an employee of the company and that death arose out of his said
employment. The defense of prescription was rejected, it appearing that the company
had failed to controvert the claimants’ right to compensation within the period
prescribed in Section 45 of Act 3428. The company appealed to the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission, which affirmed the decision of the Referee. And when its
motion for reconsideration of said decision was denied by the Commission en banc, the
company filed the present petition for review, assigning as alleged errors committed by
the Commission its finding on the existence of employee-employer relationship between
the petitioner and the deceased and the ruling that the right to demand compensation
benefits has not prescribed.

The contention that there existed no employer-employee relationship between

petitioner and the late Pastor Rosano is premised on the allegation that the latter was a
"gang boss" working with the petitioner on an "on and off" basis; that Rosano worked
for petitioner when so assigned by the union, of which he was a member; that, if at all,
the employer-employee relationship existed only whenever the deceased rendered
actual service for the petitioner. Since on 30 November 1964 Rosano was not able to
work (because the barge did not arrive), then, according to petitioner, he was not an
employee when he (Rosano) met his death.

There is no merit to this contention. In the first place, while petitioner company failed
to submit any evidence that the work rendered by the deceased was purely casual, 1 it
has been established that prior to the stabbing incident the deceased, with other
stevedores, was in the pier prepared to do hauling jobs for the petitioner, which work, it
can not be denied, is connected with petitioner’s business. And there is unrebutted
testimony that the deceased had been doing stevedoring work for said petitioner for 15
years. 2 Secondly, even assuming petitioner’s allegations to be true, that the deceased
was a union member, and that it was the union that furnished laborers and stevedores
when required by petitioner company, presumably with the latter delivering the
stevedoring charges directly to the union for distribution to the individual laborers,
these facts did not make the union an independent contractor whose intervention
relieved the said company of liability for the death of a laborer, specially where no
contractor’s bond was required for the union’s performance of its undertaking. 3 The
union here was no more than an agent of the company and whose function is merely to
save the latter from the necessity of dealing with individual laborers. And in this kind of
indirect employment, it has been repeatedly held, the employer is not relieved of
liability under the Workmen’s Compensation law. 4

It is next claimed for the petitioner that even if he were an employee, Rosano’s death is
not compensable because it came when he was outside of the company premises and
not at work.

We do not agree with the appellant. From the proved sequence of events that took
place on 30 November 1964, involving the deceased Pastor Rosano, it is evident that
the cause of his fatal stabbing by Benjamin Valdez (who was thereafter accused and
convicted) can be traced to their disagreement over the possession of a platform that
was to be used in their work for petitioner; that although the altercation started in the
morning the same was resumed when they returned in the afternoon and carried on
when Valdez left, lay in wait near Rosano’s house, and there met and stabbed the latter
when he alighted from the jeep. Neither can it be said that the employer is exempt
from liability under the Workmen’s Compensation Law because the cause of death
arose outside of the company premises, 5 whereas the quarrel happened at the
waterfront, at Pier 9.

For an injury to be compensable, it is not necessary that the cause therefor shall take
place within the place of employment. If a workman is acting within the scope of his
employment, his protection "in the course of" the employment usually continues,
regardless of the place of injury. 6 Thus, in one case, 7 an employee went to the house
of the employer across the warehouse where he worked to get a drink of water; that
there, while trying to drive away a puppy that he saw eating fish in the employer’s
kitchen, he was bitten in the hand, as a result of which he later died of hydrophobia.
The death of the employee was held compensable, on the ground that his trip to the
kitchen was occasioned by the employer’s fault in not providing adequate drinking
water at the warehouse. In the present case, it cannot be disputed that it is inherent in
the stevedoring work for the petitioner that the laborers, like the deceased, stay in the
pier and wait for the docking of petitioner’s vessels.

Furthermore, jurisprudence is to the effect that injuries sustained by an employee while

in the course of his employment, as the result of an assault upon his person by another
employee, or by a third person, no question of the injured employee’s own culpability
being involved, is compensable where from the evidence presented, a rational mind is
able to trace the injury to a cause set in motion by the nature of the employment, or
some condition, obligation or incident therein, and not by some other agency. 8

"The rule as stated by the Connecticut Supreme Court is that . . . when the employee is
assaulted while he is defending his employer, or his employer’s interests, or when the
assault was incidental to some duly of his employment, the injuries he suffers in
consequence of the assault with, as a rule, arise out of the employment. He will then be
serving his employer’s ends and not of his own. (Jacquemin v. Turner and Seymour
Manufacturing Co., Conn., 103 A. 115; Goldhirsch v. American Character Doll Co., 135
Misc. 817, 238 N.Y. 519)"

Similarly, in Appleford v. Kimmel, 296 NW. 861, it appearing that a theater employee’s
job required him to handle disturbances in the theater; that several patrons were
ordered by him to leave the theater because of disturbances they were causing; and
that after the theater closed the employee started for home and was subjected to
injurious assault by those he had previously ordered to leave; the court held that the
evidence sustained the finding that the employee’s injury arose out of, and in the
course of, the employment.

In the leading case of Field v. Charmette Knitted Fabric Co., 245 N.Y. 138, where a
superintendent was injured on the sidewalk by workmen with whom he had quarreled
in the mill, the late Justice Cardozo (then of the New York Supreme Court) declared the
injury compensable, reasoning that the quarrel outside of the mill was merely a
continuation or extension of the quarrel begun within; that continuity of the case had
been so combined with continuity in time and space "that the quarrel from origin to
ending must be taken to be one." cralaw virtua1aw library

The rationale applies to the case at bar, where the facts, shown by the evidence found
by the referee and affirmed by the Commission, are that Rosano had been assaulted by
the man with whom he had quarreled barely a half hour after leaving the place of work
where the quarrel occurred, in connection with the possession of the platform to be
used in unloading cargo, without any independent agency or cause for the assault being
shown. As pointed out by Larson (Workmen’s Compensation Law, Vol. I, Section 29.21)
—

"since the ultimate test applied by Judge Cardozo was whether ‘the quarrel from origin
to ending must be taken to be one’ it should make no difference how widely separated
the assault was from the employment in time and space if it remained an inherent part
of an employment incident." cralaw virtua1aw library

Other cases applying the same principle are collated in Schneider Workmen’s
Compensation, Perm. Ed., Vol. 6, page 131, et seq.

As regards the defense of prescription raised by petitioner, it is true that the formal
demand for compensation for the death of Pastor Rosano on 30 November 1964 was
made by the dependent widow and minor children only on 1 March 1965, or beyond the
3-month period provided for in Section 24 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. But we
are not impressed by petitioner’s disclaimer that it had no knowledge of the stabbing
incident prior to its notification by the Regional Office of the filing of the claim. It may
be pointed out that the law does not speak of "formal notice" by the employer of the
accident; it specifies only "knowledge of the accident." For petitioner to say that it had
no actual knowledge of the stabbing incident on 30 November 1964 would run counter
to the ordinary course of human behavior. An employer could scarcely have been
spared the news of the killing of one of its laborers by another laborer, especially where
the cause therefor started in the place where the laborers gather and work. When the
widow went to the company premises to demand compensation for the death of her
husband a week after his burial, she was able to talk to an unknown employee inside
the compound, who told her that she could not get anything because the death of her
husband did not occur in the company premises. Far from showing lack of knowledge
by the employer, this fact constitutes sufficient indication that the death of Rosano was
already a matter of common knowledge in petitioner’s office that even an allegedly
unidentified employee could advance the exact defense that the employer later set up
in the case.

The fact remains that petitioner failed to controvert in due time the right of the
claimants to compensation, as required by Section 45 of Act 3428. And the rule is now
well-settled that the requirements (for claimants) of giving of notice of injury and filing
of claim within the prescribed period is non-jurisdictional and does not constitute a bar
to compensation proceedings if the employer, who had knowledge of the accident,
failed to controvert the claimant’s right to compensation pursuant to Section 45 of the
law. 9 For such failure of the employer to controvert the claim constitutes a waiver (or
a forfeiture by law) of its right to question the validity and reasonableness of the claim
and precludes the setting up of all non- jurisdictional defenses, such as non-
compensability of injuries, prescription, and the like. 10

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision of the Workmen’s Compensation

Commission and its resolution en banc, the petition for review is hereby dismissed, with
costs against the petitioner.

Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Reyes, J.B.L., C.J., concurs and certifies that the Chief Justice voted in favor of this
opinion before going on official leave.

Capistrano, J., did not take part.

Concepcion, C.J. and Castro, J., are on official leave.

 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 84307. April 17, 1989.]

CIRIACO HINOGUIN, Petitioner, v. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION

and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Armed Forces of the
Philippines), Respondents.

Alexander A. Acain for petitioner.

DECISION

FELICIANO, J.:

This Petition for Review is directed against the Decision of the Employees’
Compensation Commission ("ECC") in ECC Case No. 3275 (Ciriaco Hinoguin v.
Government Service Insurance System [Armed Forces of the Philippines]) which
affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS") denying
petitioner’s claim for compensation benefit on account of the death of petitioner’s son,
Sgt. Lemick G. Hinoguin.

The deceased, Sgt. Hinoguin started his military service in 1974, when he was called to
military training by the Philippine Army. He later on enlisted in the Philippine Army as a
private first class. At the time of his death on 7 August 1985, he was holding the rank
of Sergeant per Special Order P-4200, HPA, dated 15 October 1985, in "A" company,
14th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division, PA. The Headquarters of the 14th
Infantry Battalion was located at Bical, Muñoz, Nueva Ecija. Sgt. Hinoguin was
Detachment Non-Commissioned Officer at Capintalan, Carranglan, Nueva Ecija, "A"
Company being stationed at Carranglan, Nueva Ecija.

On 1 August 1985, Sgt. Hinoguin and two (2) members of his Detachment, Cpl. Rogelio
Clavo and Dft. Nicomedes Alibuyog, sought permission from Captain Frankie Z. Besas,
Commanding Officer of "A" Company to go on overnight pass to Aritao, Nueva Viscaya,
"to settle [an] important matter thereat." 1 Captain Besas orally granted them
permission to go to Aritao and to take their issued firearms with them, considering that
Aritao was regarded as "a critical place," 2 that is, it had peace and order problems due
to the presence of elements of the New People’s Army ("NPA") in or in the vicinity of
Aritao.

Sgt. Hinoguin, Cpl. Clavo and Dft. Alibuyog left Carranglan, Nueva Ecija, about noon on
1 August 1985 and arrived in Aritao, Nueva Viscaya, about 1:30 o’clock P.M. on the
same day. 3 They proceeded to the home of Dft. Alibuyog’s parents where they had
lunch. About 4:00 o’clock P.M., the three (3) soldiers with a fourth man, a civilian and
relative of Dft. Alibuyog, had some gin and beer, finishing a bottle of gin and two (2)
large bottles of beer. Three hours later, at about 7:00 o’clock P.M., the soldiers left the
Alibuyog home to return to their Company Headquarters. They boarded a tricycle,
presumably a motor-driven one, Sgt. Hinoguin and Cpl. Clavo seating themselves in the
tricycle cab while Dft. Alibuyog occupied the seat behind the driver. Upon reaching the
poblacion of Aritao, Dft. Alibuyog dismounted, walked towards and in front of the
tricycle cab, holding his M-16 rifle in his right hand, not noticing that the rifle’s safety
lever was on "semi-automatic" (and not on "safety"). He accidentally touched the
trigger, firing a single shot in the process and hitting Sgt. Hinoguin, then still sitting in
the cab, in the left lower abdomen. The Sergeant did not apparently realize immediately
that he had been hit; he took three (3) steps forward, cried that he had been hit and
fell to the ground.
chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

His companions rushed Sgt. Hinoguin to a hospital in Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya, for
treatment. Their Company Commander, Capt. Besas, hurried to the hospital upon being
notified of the shooting and there talked with the wounded Sergeant. The latter
confirmed to Capt. Besas that he had indeed been accidentally shot by Dft. Alibuyog.
Sgt. Hinoguin was later moved to the AFP Medical Center in Quezon City and there he
died on 7 August 1985. The Death Certificate lists "septic shock" as immediate cause of
death, and "generalized septicemia of peritonitis" as antecedent cause, following his
sustaining a gunshot wound.

An investigation conducted by H.Q., 14th Infantry Battalion on 11 August 1985

concluded that the shooting of Sgt. Hinoguin was "purely accidental in nature." 4 On 19
November 1985, a "Line of Duty Board of Officers" was convened by H.Q., 14th
Infantry Battalion, "to determine Line of Duty Status of [the] late Sgt. Lemick Hinogiun
640407 (Inf.) PA, a member of "A" Co., 14IB, 5ID, PA who died . . . due to Gun Shot
Wound as a result of an accidental fire (sic) committed by Dft. Nicomedes Alibuyog
085-5009 (Inf) PA . . ." After receiving and deliberating on the Investigation Report
dated 11 August 1985 together with the sworn statements of witnesses Alibuyog, Clavo
and Besas, and after some further questioning of Capt. Besas, the Line of Duty Board
reached the following conclusion and recommendation: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sgt. Hinoguin was then the designated Detachment Commander of Capintalan

detachment. On or about 011300H August 1985 Dft Alibuyog invited Sgt. Hinogiun and
Cpl. Clavo to his home to celebrate at Aritao, Nueva Viscaya. They asked permission to
go on overnight and to allow them to carry their firearms with them because the place
where they were going is critical. They were given such permission verbally by their
Commanding Officer. The death of Sgt. Hinoguin was purely accidental as the
Investigation Report presented here proved beyond reasonable [doubt] the fact that
Dft. Alibuyog had no grudge either [against] Cpl. Clavo or Sgt. Himoguin.

RECOMMENDATION: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The recommendation written by the Chairman and unanimously voted for by the
members contain the following: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The Board after a thorough deliberation on presented evidences declares that the Death
of Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin 640407 (Inf) PA is in Line of Duty.

The Board recommend further that all benefits due the legal dependents of the late Sgt.
Lemick Hinogiun be given." 5 (Italics supplied)

Sometime in March 1986, petitioner filed his claim for compensation benefits under P.D.
No. 626 (as amended), claiming that the death of his son was work-connected and
therefore compensable. This was denied 6 by the GSIS on the ground that petitioner’s
son was not at his work place nor performing his duty as a soldier of the Philippine
Army at the time of his death.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which Motion was, however, denied by the
GSIS. This denial was confirmed by the Workmen’s Compensation Commission ("WCC")
in a Decision dated 24 May 1988 which stated that: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

" [F]rom the recital of the facts therein [we found it] very difficult for us to perceive
where the work-connection of the events that led to appellant’s son’s death lies. Under
the law, death resulting from injury is considered compensable if it arises out of and in
the course of employment. Definitely, the death of Hinoguin did not arises out of
employment. Clearly, the facts showed that he was not on his place of work, nor was
he performing official functions. On the contrary, he was on pass and had just came
from a merrymaking when accidentally shot by his companion." 7 (Italics supplied)
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
chanrobles virtualawlibrary

The sole issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the death of Sgt. y Hinoguin
is compensable under the applicable statute and regulations.

Considering that Sgt. Hinoguin died on 7 August 1985, the applicable law is to be found
in Book Four, Title III of the Labor Code, as amended. It may be noted at the outset
that under Article 167 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended and Section 4 (b) (1) of Rule
I of the Amended (Implementing) Rules on Employees’ Compensation, the term
"employee" includes a "member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines." Rule XIII
entitled "Death", of the Amended (Implementing) Rules provides in part as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 1. Conditions to Entitlement. — (a) The beneficiaries of a deceased employee

shall be entitled to an income benefit if all of the following conditions are satisfied:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) The employee had been duly reported to the System;

(2) He died as a result of injury or sickness; and

(3) The System has been duly notified of his death, as well as the injury or sickness
which caused his death.

His employer shall be liable for the benefit if such death occurred before the employee
is duly reported for coverage of the System.

x       x       x"

Article 167 (k) of the Labor Code as amended defines a compensable "injury" quite
simply as "any harmful change in the human organism from any accident arising out of
and in the course of the employment." The Amended (Implementing) Rules have,
however, elaborated considerably on the simple and succinct statutory provision. Rule
III, Section 1 (a) reads: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 1. Grounds. — (a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of
the following grounds: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to
be;

(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and

(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an
order for the employer.

x       x       x"

(Italics supplied)

It will be seen that because the Amended (Implementing) Rules are intended to apply
to all kinds of employment, such rules must be read and applied with reasonable
flexibility and comprehensiveness. The concept of a "work place" referred to in Ground
1, for instance, cannot always be literally applied to a soldier on active duty status, as if
he were a machine operator or a worker in an assembly line in a factory or a clerk in a
particular fixed office. Obviously, a soldier must go where his company is stationed. In
the instant case, Aritao, Nueva Viscaya was not, of course, Carranglan, Nueva Ecija.
Aritao being approximately 1-1/2 hours away from the latter by public transportation.
But Sgt. Hinoguin, Cpl. Clavo and Dft. Alibuyog had permission from their Commanding
Officer to proceed to Aritao, and it appears to us that a place which soldiers have
secured lawful permission to be at cannot be very different, legally speaking, from a
place where they are required to go by their commanding officer. We note that the
three (3) soldiers were on an overnight pass which, notably, they did not utilize in full.
They were not on vacation leave. Morever, they were required or authorized to carry
their firearms with which presumably they were to defend themselves if NPA elements
happened to attack them while en route to and from Aritao or with which to attack and
seek to capture such NPA elements as they might encounter. Indeed, if the three (3)
soldiers had in fact encountered NPAs while on their way to or from Aritao and been
fired upon by them and if Sgt. Hinoguin had been killed by an NPA bullet, we do not
believe that respondent GSIS would have had any difficulty in holding the death a
compensable one.

Turning to the question of whether Sgt. Hinoguin was performing official functions at
the time he sustained the gunshot wound, it has already been pointed out above that
the Line of Duty Board of Officers of the 14th Infantry Battalion Headquarters had
already determined that the death of Sgt. Hinoguin had occurred "in line of duty." It
may be noted in this connection that a soldier on active duty status is really on 24
hours a day official duty status and is subject to military discipline and military law 24
hours a day. He is subject to call and to the orders of his superior officers at all times, 7
days a week, except, of course, when he is on vacation leave status (which Sgt.
Hinoguin was not). Thus, we think that the work-connected character of Sgt. Hinoguin’s
injury and death was not effectively precluded by the simple circumstance that he was
on an overnight pass to go to the home of Dft. Alibuyog, a soldier under his own
command. Sgt. Hinoguin did not effectively cease performing "official functions"
because he was granted a pass. While going to a fellow soldier’s home for a few hours
for a meal and some drinks was not a specific military duty, he was nonetheless in the
course of performance of official functions. Indeed, it appears to us that a soldier
should be presumed to be on official duty unless he is shown to have clearly and
unequivocally put aside that status or condition temporarily by, e.g., going on an
approved vacation leave. 8 Even vacation leave may, it should be remembered, be
preterminated by superior orders.

More generally, a soldier in the Armed Forces must accept certain risks, for instance,
that he will be fired upon by forces hostile to the State or the Government. That is not,
of course, the only risk that he is compelled to accept by the very nature of his
occupation or profession as a soldier. Most of the persons around him are necessarily
also members of the Armed Forces who carry firearms, too. In other words, a soldier
must also assume the risk of being accidentally fired upon by his fellow soldiers. This is
reasonably regarded as a hazard or risk inherent in his employment as a soldier.

We hold, therefore, that the death of Sgt. Hinoguin that resulted from his being hit by
an accidental discharge of the M-16 of Dft. Alibuyog, in the circumstances of this case,
arose out of and in the course of his employment as a soldier on active duty status in
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and hence compensable.

It may be well to add that what we have written above in respect of performance of
official functions of members of the Armed Forces must be understood in the context of
the specific purpose at hand, that is, the interpretation and application of the
compensation provisions of the Labor Code and applicable related regulations. It is
commonplace that those provisions should, to the extent possible, be given the
interpretation most likely to effectuate the beneficient and humanitarian purposes
infusing the Labor Code.

ACCORDINGLY, the Decision of the GSIS taken through its Claim Review Committee
dated 20 November 1986 and the Decision dated 24 May 1988 of the Employees’
Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 3275, are hereby REVERSED and the GSIS
is hereby DIRECTED to award all applicable benefits in respect of the death of Sgt.
Lemick G. Hinogiun, to petitioner. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 128524. April 20, 1999.]

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), Petitioner, v. THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and FELONILA ALEGRE, Respondents.

DECISION

ROMERO, J.:

May a moonlighting policeman’s death be considered compensable? This is the crux of

the controversy now at bar. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The records 1 disclose that private respondent Felonila Alegre’s deceased husband,
SPO2 Florencio A. Alegre, was a police officer assigned to the Philippine National Police
station in the town of Vigan, Ilocos Sur. On that fateful day of December 6, 1994, he
was driving his tricycle and ferrying passengers within the vicinity of Imelda
Commercial Complex when SPO4 Alejandro Tenorio, Jr., Team/Desk Officer of the
Police Assistance Center located at said complex, confronted him regarding his tour of
duty. SPO2 Alegre allegedly snubbed SPO4 Tenorio and even directed curse words upon
the latter. A verbal tussle then ensued between the two which led to the fatal shooting
of the deceased police officer.

On account of her husband’s death, private respondent seasonably filed a claim for
death benefits with petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 626. In its decision on August 7, 1995, the GSIS, however,
denied the claim on the ground that at the time of SPO2 Alegre’s death, he was
performing a personal activity which was not work-connected. Subsequent appeal to
the Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC) proved futile as said body, in a
decision dated May 9, 1996, merely affirmed the ruling of the GSIS.

Private respondent finally obtained a favorable ruling in the Court of Appeals when on
February 28, 1997, the appellate court reversed 2 the ECC’s decision and ruled that
SPO2 Alegre’s death was work-connected and, therefore, compensable. Citing Nitura v.
Employees’ Compensation Commission 3 and Employees’ Compensation Commission v.
Court of Appeals, 4 the appellate court explained the conclusion arrived at, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

" [T]he Supreme Court held that the concept of a ‘workplace’ cannot always be literally
applied to a person in active duty status, as if he were a machine operator or a worker
in an assembly line in a factory or a clerk in a particular fixed office.
It is our considered view that, as applied to a peace officer, his work place is not
confined to the police precinct or station but to any place where his services, as a
lawman, to maintain peace and security, are required.

At the time of his death, Alegre was driving a tricycle at the northeastern part of the
Imelda Commercial Complex where the police assistance center is located. There can be
no dispute therefore that he met his death literally in his place of work.

It is true that the deceased was driving his tricycle, with passengers aboard, when he
was accosted by another police officer. This would lend some semblance of viability to
the argument that he was not in the performance of official duty at the time.

However, the argument, though initially plausible, overlooks the fact that policemen, by
the nature of their functions, are deemed to be on a round-the-clock duty." cralaw virtua1aw library

Aggrieved, GSIS comes to us on petition for review on certiorari reiterating its position

that SPO2 Alegre’s death lacks the requisite element of compensability which is, that
the activity being performed at the time of death must be work-connected.

We grant the petition.

As stated at the outset, the sole issue for the Court’s resolution is whether the death of
SPO2 Alegre is compensable pursuant to the applicable laws and regulations.

Under the pertinent guidelines of the ECC on compensability, it is provided that "for the
injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the
result of an employment accident satisfying all of the following conditions: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to
be;

(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and

(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an
order for the employer." 5

Actually, jurisprudence is rather scant with respect to the above rules’ application in the
case of police officers. Nevertheless, owing to the similarity of functions, that is, to keep
peace and order, and the risks assumed, the Court has treated police officers similar to
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines with regard to the compensability of
their deaths. Thus, echoing Hinoguin v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, 6 a
case involving a soldier who was accidentally fired at by a fellow soldier, we held in
Employees’ Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals, 7 that "members of the
national police are by the nature of their functions technically on duty 24 hours a day"
because "policemen are subject to call at any time and may be asked by their superiors
or by any distressed citizen to assist in maintaining the peace and security of the
community." cralaw virtua1aw library

Upon examination of the Court of Appeals’ reasoning, we believe that the appellate
court committed reversible error in applying the precepts enunciated in the cited cases.
While we agree that policemen, like soldiers, are at the beck and call of public duty as
peace officers and technically on duty round-the-clock, the same does not justify the
grant of compensation benefits for the death of SPO2 Alegre based on the facts
disclosed by the records. For clarity, a review of the cases relevant to the matter at
hand is in order.

In Hinoguin, the deceased Philippine Army soldier, Sgt. Limec Hinoguin, together with
two other members of his detachment, sought and were orally granted permission by
the commanding officer of their company to leave their station in Carranglan, Nueva
Ecija to go on overnight pass to Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya. As they were returning to their
headquarters, one of his companions, not knowing that his M-16 rifle was on "semi-
automatic" mode, accidentally pulled the trigger and shot Sgt. Hinoguin who then died
as a result thereof. Ruling for the grant of death compensation benefits, this Court
held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The concept of a ‘workplace’ referred to in Ground 1, for instance, cannot always be

literally applied to a soldier on active duty status, as if he were a machine operator or a
worker in assembly line in a factory or a clerk in a particular fixed office. Obviously, a
soldier must go where his company is stationed. In the instant case, Aritao, Nueva
Vizcaya was not, of course, Carranglan, Nueva Ecija. Aritao being approximately 1-1/2
hours away from the latter by public transportation. But Sgt. Hinoguin, Cpl. Clavo and
Dft. Alibuyog had permission from their Commanding Officer to proceed to Aritao, and it
appears to us that a place which soldiers have secured lawful permission to be at
cannot be very different, legally speaking, from a place where they are required to go
by their commanding officer. We note that the three (3) soldiers were on an overnight
pass which, notably, they did not utilize in full. They were not on vacation leave.
Moreover, they were required or authorized to carry their firearms with which
presumably they were to defend themselves if NPA elements happened to attack them
while en route to and from Aritao or with which to attack and seek to capture such NPA
elements as they might encounter. Indeed, if the three (3) soldiers had in fact
encountered NPAs while on their way to or from Aritao and been fired upon by them
and if Sgt. Hinoguin had been killed by an NPA bullet, we do not believe that
respondent GSIS would have had any difficulty in holding the death a compensable
one."  chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

Then came the case of Nitura, likewise involving a member of the Philippine Army, Pfc.
Regino S. Nitura, who was assigned at Basagan, Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte. At
the time he met his death, he was instructed by his battalion commander to check on
several personnel of his command post who were then attending a dance party in
Barangay San Jose, Dipolog City. But on his way back to the camp, he passed, crossed
and fell from a hanging wooden bridge which accident caused his death. Reversing the
ECC which earlier denied death benefits to the deceased’s widow, the Court ruled: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"A soldier must go where his company is stationed. In the case at bar, Pfc. Nitura’s
station was at Basagan, Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte. But then his presence at the
site of the accident was with the permission of his superior officer having been directed
to go to Barangay San Jose, Dipolog City. In carrying out said directive, he had to pass
by the hanging bridge which connects the two places. As held in the Hinoguin case
(supra.), a place where soldiers have secured lawful permission to be at cannot be very
different, legally speaking, from a place where they are required to go by their
commanding officer.

As to the question of whether or not he was performing an official function at the time
of the incident, it has been held that a soldier on active duty status is really on a 24
hours a day official duty status and is subject to military discipline and military law 24
hours a day. He is subject to call and to the orders of his superior officers at all times,
seven (7) days a week, except, of course, when he is on vacation leave status. Thus, a
soldier should be presumed to be on official duty unless he is shown to have clearly and
unequivocally put aside that status or condition temporarily by going on approved
vacation leave."cralaw virtua1aw library

The more recent case which was cited by the appellate court in support of its decision is
Employees’ Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals. This time, the claim for
death compensation benefits was made in behalf of a deceased police officer, P/Sgt.
Wilfredo Alvaran, who, at the time of his death, was a member of the Mandaluyong
Police Station but assigned to the Pasig Provincial Jail. Findings showed that the
deceased brought his son to the Mandaluyong Police Station for interview because the
latter was involved in a stabbing incident. While in front of the said station, the
deceased was approached by another policeman and shot him to death. Both the GSIS
and the ECC denied the claim by the deceased’s widow on the ground that Sgt. Alvaran
was plainly acting as a father to his son and that he was in a place where he was not
required to be. The Court of Appeals reversed said denial which decision was affirmed
by this Court, declaring that: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"But for clarity’s sake and as a guide for future cases, we hereby hold that members of
the national police, like P/Sgt. Alvaran, are by the nature of their functions technically
on duty 24 hours a day. Except when they are on vacation leave, policemen are subject
to call at anytime and may be asked by their superiors or by any distressed citizen to
assist in maintaining the peace and security of the community.

x          x           x

We hold that by analogy and for purposes of granting compensation under P. D. No.
626, as amended, policemen should be treated in the same manner as soldiers.

While it is true that, "geographically" speaking, P/Sgt Alvaran was not actually at his
assigned post at the Pasig Provincial Jail when he was attacked and killed, it could not
also be denied that in bringing his son — as a suspect in a case — to the police station
for questioning to shed light on a stabbing incident, he was not merely acting as father
but as a peace officer." cralaw virtua1aw library

From the foregoing cases, it can be gleaned that the Court did not justify its grant of
death benefits merely on account of the rule that soldiers or policemen, as the case
may be, are virtually working round-the-clock. Note that the Court likewise attempted
in each case to find a reasonable nexus between the absence of the deceased from his
assigned place of work and the incident that led to his death.

In Hinoguin, the connection between his absence from the camp where he was assigned
and the place where he was accidentally shot was the permission duly given to him and
his companions by the camp commander to go on overnight pass. According to the
Court, "a place which soldiers have secured lawful permission cannot be very different,
legally speaking, from a place where they are required to go by their commanding
officer" and, hence, the deceased is to be considered as still in the performance of his
official functions.

The same thing can be said of Nitura where the deceased had to go outside of his
station on permission and directive by his superior officer to check on several personnel
of his command who were then attending a dance party.

As for P/Sgt. Alvaran in the Employees’ Compensation Commission case, although he

was not given any directive or permission by a superior officer to be at the
Mandaluyong Police Station, his presence there was nonetheless justified by the
peacekeeping nature of the matter he was attending to at the time that he was
attacked and shot to death, that is, bringing his son to the police station to answer for a
crime, a basic duty which any policeman is expected and ought to perform.

Taking together jurisprudence and the pertinent guidelines of the ECC with respect to
claims for death benefits, namely: (a) that the employee must be at the place where
his work requires him to be; (b) that the employee must have been performing his
official functions; and (c) that if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must
have been executing an order for the employer, it is not difficult to understand then
why SPO2 Alegre’s widow should be denied the claims otherwise due her. Obviously,
the matter SPO2 Alegre was attending to at the time he met his death, that of ferrying
passengers for a fee, was intrinsically private and unofficial in nature proceeding as it
did from no particular directive or permission of his superior officer. In the absence of
such prior authority as in the cases of Hinoguin and Nitura, or peacekeeping nature of
the act attended to by the policeman at the time he died even without the explicit
permission or directive of a superior officer, as in the case of P/Sgt. Alvaran, there is no
justification for holding that SPO2 Alegre met the requisites set forth in the ECC
guidelines. That he may be called upon at any time to render police work as he is
considered to be on a round-the-clock duty and was not on an approved vacation leave
will not change the conclusion arrived at considering that he was not placed in a
situation where he was required to exercise his authority and duty as a policeman. In
fact, he was refusing to render one pointing out that he already complied with the duty
detail. 8 At any rate, the 24-hour duty doctrine, as applied to policemen and soldiers,
serves more as an after-the-fact validation of their acts to place them within the scope
of the guidelines rather than a blanket license to benefit them in all situations that may
give rise to their deaths. In other words, the 24-hour duty doctrine should not be
sweepingly applied to all acts and circumstances causing the death of a police officer
but only to those which, although not on official line of duty, are nonetheless basically
police service in character.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 42003 dated February 28, 1997, is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs. chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 154385 : August 24, 2007]

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner, v. MERLITA

PENTECOSTES, Substituted by Jaime R. Pentecostes, Respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

In this Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) assails the Decision 2 dated 11
April 2002 of the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 65840
and its Resolution3 dated 17 July 2002 denying its Motion for Reconsideration.

Following are the factual and legal antecedents, as culled from the decision of the Court
of Appeals.

Respondent Merlita Pentecostes (Merlita) was 32 years old when she joined the
government service in 1980 as a public school elementary teacher assigned to the
remote and mountainous barangay elementary schools of the towns of Basud, Imelda,
Labo and Jose Panganiban, all in the province of Camarines Norte. In 1995, Merlita was
assigned to the urban town of Daet, Camarines Norte where she retired from service on
24 April 1998 on account of her serious malady. While assigned at the said
mountainous towns, Merlita had to walk six (6) kilometers daily to and from the
barangay elementary school where she taught and her temporary residence in the
poblacion.4 In said locales, Merlita's only source of drinking water came from a deep
well. Merlita frequently experienced urinary tract infections. 5

From 15 November 1997 to 8 December 1997, Merlita was confined at the Bicol Medical
Center in Naga City due to Chronic Renal Failure secondary to Obstructive Uropathy
Secondary to Urolithiasis.6 Consequently, Merlita's right kidney was removed by way of
a nephrectomy in October 1998.7

Merlita's left kidney also failed because of Nephrolithiasis (Renal Stones or Urolithiasis).
On account of her condition, she underwent hemodialysis (a procedure where blood
with the excretory products is removed and replaced with fresh blood) two (2) times a
week which is an expensive procedure done not to cure the disease but to ease the
pain, to lessen the retention of fluids, to minimize further complications, and to
lengthen the chance of survival of Merlita.8
Merlita's condition constrained her to retire from service in April 1998. Her medical
examiners considered her disability as total and permanent. 9 On account of her illness,
Merlita filed a claim with GSIS for compensation benefits which was denied on the
ground that Urolithiasis is not work-related. Merlita sought reconsideration, but it was
similarly denied. On appeal, the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) likewise
rejected Merlita's claim,10 the pertinent portions of whose decision read:

Viewed against the foregoing, we can safely conclude that the development of
appellant's Urolithiasis was not due to factors present in her workplace or the nature of
her employment as a teacher. Familial or hereditary predisposition have been noted in
the development of this disease, thus, we believe that the respondent System correctly
ruled against compensability.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the respondent System appealed

from is hereby AFFIRMED, and the instant case is dismissed for lack of merit. 11

Aggrieved, Merlita interposed an appeal in December 1999 before the Court of Appeals
insisting that the conditions of her work greatly increased the risk of contracting the
ailment.12 A couple of days later, Merlita died and was substituted by her husband and
six (6) children.13

The Court of Appeals sustained Merlita's position, reversed the decision of the ECC, and
declared her heirs entitled to the compensation benefits under Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 626, as amended.14 The appellate court stated:

It can be stressed that Merlita Pentecostes, when she commenced her career as a
public school elementary teacher, first as a substitute classroom teacher from 1980 to
1984, then as a regular classroom teacher up to the time she went out of service in
1998 because of her serious kidney disease was, at the age of 32 years, young and in
good perfect healthy condition. In the fourteen (14) years of teaching she was assigned
in the arid, rural, tropical and mountainous barangays of Basud, Labo, Imelda and Jose
Panganiban, all far-flung towns of Camarines Norte where the petitioner has to
regularly walk daily an exhausting, dehydrating, and lung-busting six (6) kilometers
stretch to and from the barangay elementary school and place of her temporary
residence in the Poblacion of the municipality of said towns. A daily routine for fourteen
(14) years which strained her kidneys coupled with drinking unchlorinated and
uncertain impurities-filled water from deep and shallow water wells and the stress of
working away from the loving arms and bliss of her family who lived in Daet, Camarines
Norte. This dehydrating condition of walking six (6) kilometers to and from the arduous
and hot mountainous barangays on the aforesaid towns of Camarines Norte put heavy
toll on petitioner's kidneys by reducing urine volume and higher secretion and
concentration of insoluble sediments-predisposing factors which contributed and
increased the risk of petitioner's contracting Urolithiasis (a renal disease attributed to
the development of calcium, oxalates, uric acid and/or cystine stones, in the calyces,
papillae, ureter, urinary bladder and other renal parts). This undue strain on petitioner's
kidneys predisposed petitioner to develop this malady, Urolithiasis, which as a
consequence suppressed the kidney functions by way of renal failure. This predisposing
factor of chronic dehydration which contributed and increased the risk of the petitioner
to develop Urolithiasis and Renal Failure has been confirmed by medical experts and
authorities in their respective fields in medicine x x x. 15
 xxx

Moreover, since the cause or causes of Urolithiasis is or are still unknown, no proof can
be presented because the law does not require the impossible. 16

In the instant petition, GSIS reiterates its previous submission that Merlita failed to
discharge the burden of presenting evidence that her ailment was caused by her
work.17 Moreover, it states that the sad plight and the deterioration of the GSIS State
Insurance Fund should not be aggravated by approving claims of ailments not intended
by law to be covered.18

In her Comment19 dated 20 January 2003, Merlita maintains that the development of

urolithiasis as being secondary to chronic renal failure has no clear etiologic factor so as
to a create a conclusive causal connection leading to the disease. Since the cause or
causes of the disease is or are still unknown, no proof can be presented because the
law does not require the impossible.20

In a Resolution21 dated 19 March 2007, the Court noted the death of Merlita's husband
and substitute respondent, Jaime P. Pentecostes, Sr. He was substituted by one of his
children, Jaime R. Pentecostes, Jr., as party respondent.

The sole issue before the Court is whether Merlita is entitled to compensation benefits
under P.D. No. 626, as amended.

After a thorough evaluation of the case and assessment of the arguments of the
parties, the Court finds for Merlita and affirms the challenged decision of the Court of
Appeals.

Section 1(b), Rule III implementing P.D. 626, as amended, provides:

For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness
must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of these Rules with
the conditions set therein satisfied, otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.

Under the above Rule, for Merlita's sickness and resulting disability to be compensable,
there must be proof that (a) her sickness was the result of an occupational disease
listed under Annex "A" of the Rules of Employees' Compensation, or (b) the risk of
contracting the disease was increased by her working conditions. This means that if the
claimant's illness or disease is not included in Annex "A," then he is entitled to
compensation only if he can prove that the risk of contracting the illness or disease was
increased by his working conditions.22 The law does not require that the connection be
established with absolute certainty or that a direct causal relation be shown. It is
enough that the theory upon which the claim is based is probable. Probability, not
certainty, is the touchstone.23

Pertinently, the Court stated in the case of Employees' Compensation Commission v.

Court of Appeals:24
 Despite the abandonment of the presumption of compensability established by the old
law, the present law has not ceased to be an employees' compensation law or a social

legislation; hence, the liberality of the law in favor of the working man and woman still
prevails, and the official agency charged by law to implement the constitutional
guarantee of social justice should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in
deciding claims for compensability, especially in light of the compassionate policy
towards labor which the 1987 Constitution vivifies and enhances. Elsewise stated, a
humanitarian impulse, dictated by no less than the Constitution itself under the social
justice policy, calls for a liberal and sympathetic approach to legitimate appeals of
disabled public servants; or that all doubts to the right to compensation must be
resolved in favor of the employee or laborer. Verily, the policy is to extend the
applicability of the law on employees' compensation to as many employees who can
avail of the benefits thereunder.25

Concededly, Merlita's illness, urolithiasis, is not among those listed in the table of
occupational diseases embodied in Annex "A" of the Rules on Employees'
Compensation. Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals in its finding
that Merlita was able to prove by substantial evidence that her working conditions
increased the risk of contracting the disease. Substantial evidence is the amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify the
conclusion.26

Urolithiasis is the process of forming stones in the kidney, bladder and/or urethra
(urinary tract).27 It is the formation of urinary calculi at any level of the urinary tract.
Urinary calculi (stones) are worldwide in its distribution but are more common in some
geographic areas as in parts of United States, South Africa, Pakistan, India and
Southeast Asia. Nutritional and environmental factors seem to play a role in stone
formation.28 The prevalence of urinary calculi is higher in those who live in
mountainous, desert or tropical areas. Higher temperatures increase perspiration, which
may result in concentrated urine. This promotes increased urinary crystallization. The
mineral content of water also may contribute to the causes of stone disease. Some
studies state that excessive water hardness causes a greater incidence of stone
disease.29

The 15th Edition of Smith's General Urology states that fluid intake and urine output
may have an effect on urinary stone disease. It also states that individuals living in hot
climates are prone to dehydration, which results in an increased incidence of urinary
stones. Although heat may cause a higher fluid intake, sweat loss results in lowered
voided volumes. Hot climates usually expose people to more ultraviolet light, increasing
vitamin D3 production. Increased calcium and oxalate excretion has been correlated
with increased exposure time to sunlight. 30 Those who become dehydrated due to
strenuous physical activity are also particularly at risk of developing stones. 31

According to the 13th Edition of Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine, Vol. 2.

(International Edition, 1994), urinary stones usually arise because of the breakdown of
a delicate balance. The kidneys must conserve water, but they also must excrete
materials that have a low solubility. These two opposing requirements must be
balanced during adaptation to diet, climate and activity. 32 
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The foregoing medical reports establish that the environment (climate and geographical
location), water or fluid intake and activity are important factors in the development or
inhibition of urinary stone disease. The regularity of urination likewise plays an
important role since withholding urine for sometime may disturb the balance. 33 Merlita
was assigned to schools located in mountainous barangays which required her to walk
daily a considerable distance. Considering the climate, the location of her workplace,
i.e. mountainous and far-flung, and the strenuous walk she had to daily endure, she
was prone to dehydration which could have led to the formation of urinary stones.
Additionally, in said place the only available drinking water was the water taken from
the deep well which in all probability was hard water, containing minerals which
contribute to the formation of kidney stones. Merlita could also have missed the
important habit of

regular urination. Teachers have a tendency to sit for hours on end, and to put off or
postpone emptying their bladders when it interferes with their teaching hours or
preparation of lesson plans.34 Thus, while the Court concedes that the nature of
Merlita's work as a teacher does not per se ordinarily cause urolithiasis, the risk of
contracting the same in this case was aggravated by the peculiar conditions and
location of her workplace, which required her to undergo a five-day week schedule of
strenuous and protracted walking.

Finally, it is well to recall the Court's exhortation in Vicente v. Employees'

Compensation Commission35 reiterated in the case of Employees' Compensation
Commission v. Court of Appeals36 wherein the Court ruled that therein private
respondent's job as an NBI Engineer, which included field work, increased her risk of
contracting uterelothiasis, also a urinary stone disease, to wit:

The court takes this occasion to stress once more its abiding concern for the welfare of
government workers, especially the humble rank and file, whose patience, industry,
and dedication to duty have often gone unheralded, but who, in spite of very little
recognition, plod on dutifully to perform their appointed tasks. It is for this reason that
the sympathy of the law on social security is toward its beneficiaries, and the law, by its
own terms, requires a construction of utmost liberality in their favor. It is likewise for
this reason that the Court disposes of this case and ends a workingman's struggle for
his just dues.37

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 11 April 2002 of the Fourteenth Division of the Court
of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 65840, ordering the Government Service Insurance
System to pay the heirs of Merlita Pentecostes compensation benefits as provided
under P.D. No. 626, as amended, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.