Republic of the Philippines General, as constituting attempted robbery, which we think is
SUPREME COURT erroneous.
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-43530             August 3, 1935
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AURELIO LAMAHANG, defendant-appellant.
Honesto K. Bausa for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
RECTO, J.:
The defendant Aurelio Lamahang is before this court on appeal
from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, finding him
guilty of attempted robbery and sentencing him to suffer two
years and four months of prision correccional and to an additional
penalty of ten years and one day of prision mayor for being an
habitual delinquent, with the accessory penalties of the law, and
to pay the costs of the proceeding.
At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing,
who was patrolling his beat on Delgado and C.R. Fuentes streets
of the City of Iloilo, caught the accused in the act of making an
opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods
located on the last named street. At that time the owner of the
store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside with another Chinaman. The
accused had only succeeded in breaking one board and in
unfastening another from the wall, when the policeman showed
up, who instantly arrested him and placed him under custody.
The fact above stated was considered and declared unanimously
by the provincial fiscal of Iloilo, the trial judge and the Solicitor-
It is our opinion that the attempt to commit an offense which the
Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical relation to a
particular, concrete offense; that, which is the beginning of the
execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading
directly to its realization and consummation. The attempt to
commit an indeterminate offense, inasmuch as its nature in
relation to its objective is ambiguous, is not a juridical fact from
the standpoint of the Penal Code. There is no doubt that in the
case at bar it was the intention of the accused to enter Tan Yu's
store by means of violence, passing through the opening which
he had started to make on the wall, in order to commit an offense
which, due to the timely arrival of policeman Tomambing, did not
develop beyond the first steps of its execution. But it is not
sufficient, for the purpose of imposing penal sanction, that an act
objectively performed constitute a mere beginning of execution; it
is necessary to establish its unavoidable connection, like the
logical and natural relation of the cause and its effect, with the
deed which, upon its consummation, will develop into one of the
offenses defined and punished by the Code; it is necessary to
prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its complete
termination following its natural course, without being frustrated
by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the
perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete
offense. Thus, in case of robbery, in order that the simple act of
entering by means of force or violence another person's dwelling
may be considered an attempt to commit this offense, it must be
shown that the offender clearly intended to take possession, for
the purpose of gain, of some personal property belonging to
another. In the instant case, there is nothing in the record from
which such purpose of the accused may reasonably be inferred.
From the fact established and stated in the decision, that the
accused on the day in question was making an opening by
means of an iron bar on the wall of Tan Yu's store, it may only be
inferred as a logical conclusion that his evident intention was to
enter by means of force said store against the will of its owner.
That his final objective, once he succeeded in entering the store,
was to rob, to cause physical injury to the inmates, or to commit
any other offense, there is nothing in the record to justify a
concrete finding.1avvphil.ñet
It must be borne in mind (I Groizard, p. 99) that in
offenses not consummated, as the material damage is
wanting, the nature of the action intended (accion fin)
cannot exactly be ascertained, but the same must be
inferred from the nature of the acts executed (accion
medio). Hence, the necessity that these acts be such that
by their very nature, by the facts to which they are related,
by the circumstances of the persons performing the same,
and by the things connected therewith, they must show
without any doubt, that they are aimed at the
consummation of a crime. Acts susceptible of double
interpretation , that is, in favor as well as against the
culprit, and which show an innocent as well as a
punishable act, must not and can not furnish grounds by
themselves for attempted nor frustrated crimes. The
relation existing between the facts submitted for
appreciation and the offense which said facts are
supposed to produce must be direct; the intention must
be ascertained from the facts and therefore it is
necessary, in order to avoid regrettable instances of
injustice, that the mind be able to directly infer from them
the intention of the perpetrator to cause a particular injury.
This must have been the intention of the legislator in
requiring that in order for an attempt to exist, the offender
must commence the commission of the felony directly by
overt acts, that is to say, that the acts performed must be
such that, without the intent to commit an offense, they
would be meaningless.
Viada (Vol. I, p. 47) holds the same opinion when he says that
"the overt acts leading to the commission of the offense, are not
punished except when they are aimed directly to its execution,
and therefore they must have an immediate and necessary
relation to the offense."
Considering — says the Supreme Court of Spain in its
decision of March 21, 1892 — that in order to declare that
such and such overt acts constitute an attempted offense
it is necessary that their objective be known and
established, or that said acts be of such nature that they
themselves should obviously disclose the criminal
objective necessarily intended, said objective and finality
to serve as ground for the designation of the offense: . . . .
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion, and so hold that
the fact under consideration does not constitute attempted
robbery but attempted trespass to dwelling (People vs. Tayag and
Morales, 59 Phil., 606, and decisions of the Supreme Court of
Spain therein cited). Under article 280 of the Revised Penal
Code, this offense is committed when a private person shall enter
the dwelling of another against the latter's will. The accused may
be convicted and sentenced for an attempt to commit this offense
in accordance with the evidence and the following allegation
contained in the information: "... the accused armed with an iron
bar forced the wall of said store by breaking a board and
unfastening another for the purpose of entering said store ... and
that the accused did not succeed in entering the store due to the
presence of the policeman on beat Jose Tomambing, who upon
hearing the noise produced by the breaking of the wall, promptly
approached the accused ... ." Under the circumstances of this
case the prohibition of the owner or inmate is presumed. (U.S. vs.
Ostrea, 2 Phil., 93; U.S. vs. Silvano, 31 Phil., 509' U.S. vs.
Ticson, 25 Phil., 67; U.S. vs. Mesina, 21 Phil., 615; U.S. vs.
Villanueva, 18 Phil., 215; U.S. vs. Panes, 25 Phil., 292.) Against
the accused must be taken into consideration the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime and former convictions, — inasmuch
as the record shows that several final judgments for robbery and
theft have been rendered against him — and in his favor, the
mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction. The breaking of the
wall should not be taken into consideration as an aggravating
circumstance inasmuch as this is the very fact which in this case
constitutes the offense of attempted trespass to dwelling.

The penalty provided by the Revised Penal Code for the

consummated offense of trespass to dwelling, if committed with
force, is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods
and a fine not exceeding P1,000 (art. 280, par. 2); therefore the
penalty corresponding to attempted trespass to dwelling is to
degrees lower (art. 51), or, arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods. Because of the presence of two aggravating
circumstances and one mitigating circumstance the penalty must
be imposed in its maximum period. Pursuant to article 29 of the
same Code, the accused is not entitled to credit for one-half of his
preventive imprisonment.

Wherefore, the sentence appealed from is revoked and the

accused is hereby held guilty of attempted trespass to dwelling,
committed by means of force, with the aforesaid aggravating and
mitigating circumstances and sentenced to three months and one
day of arresto mayor, with the accessory penalties thereof and to
pay the costs.

Avanceña, C.J., Abad Santos, Hull, and Vickers, JJ., concur.


SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 138033             February 22, 2006
RENATO BALEROS, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Renato Baleros,
Jr. assails and seeks the reversal of the January 13, 1999
decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 17271
as reiterated in its March 31, 1999 resolution 2 denying petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.
The assailed decision affirmed an earlier decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 91-
101642 finding petitioner Renato Baleros, Jr. y David (CHITO)
guilty of attempted rape.3
The accusatory portion of the information4 dated December 17,
1991 charging petitioner with attempted rape reads as follow:
That about 1:50 in the morning or sometime thereafter of 13
December 1991 in Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by forcefully
covering the face of Martina Lourdes T. Albano with a piece of
cloth soaked in chemical with dizzying effects, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commenced the commission of
rape by lying on top of her with the intention to have carnal
knowledge with her but was unable to perform all the acts of
execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance, said acts being committed against
her will and consent to her damage and prejudice.
Upon arraignment on February 5, 1992, petitioner, assisted by
counsel, pleaded "Not Guilty."5 Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued.
To prove its case, the prosecution presented thirteen (13)
witnesses. Among them were private complainant Martina
Lourdes Albano (Malou), and her classmates, Joseph Bernard
Africa, Rommel Montes, Renato Alagadan and Christian Alcala.
Their testimonies, as narrated in some detail in the decision of the
CA, established the following facts:
Like most of the tenants of the Celestial Marie Building (hereafter
"Building", …) along A.H. Lacson Street, Sampaloc, Manila,
MALOU, occupying Room 307 with her maid, Marvilou Bebania
(Marvilou), was a medical student of the University of Sto. Tomas
[UST] in 1991.
In the evening of December 12, inside Unit 307, MALOU retired
at around 10:30. Outside, right in front of her bedroom door, her
maid, Marvilou, slept on a folding bed.
Early morning of the following day, MALOU was awakened by the
smell of chemical on a piece of cloth pressed on her face. She
struggled but could not move. Somebody was pinning her down
on the bed, holding her tightly. She wanted to scream for help but
the hands covering her mouth with cloth wet with chemicals were
very tight (TSN, July 5, 1993, p. 33). Still, MALOU continued
fighting off her attacker by kicking him until at last her right hand
got free. With this …the opportunity presented itself when she
was able to grab hold of his sex organ which she then squeezed.
The man let her go and MALOU went straight to the bedroom
door and roused Marvilou. xxx. Over the intercom, MALOU told
S/G Ferolin that: "may pumasok sa kuarto ko pinagtangkaan ako"
(Ibid., p. 8). Who it was she did not, however, know. The only
thing she had made out during their struggle was the feel of her
attacker’s clothes and weight. His upper garment was of cotton
material while that at the lower portion felt smooth and satin-like
(Ibid, p. 17). He … was wearing a t-shirt and shorts … Original
Records, p. 355).
To Room 310 of the Building where her classmates Christian
Alcala, Bernard Baptista, Lutgardo Acosta and Rommel Montes
were staying, MALOU then proceeded to seek help. xxx.
It was then when MALOU saw her bed … topsy-turvy. Her
nightdress was stained with blue … (TSN, July 5, 1993, pp. 13-
14). Aside from the window with grills which she had originally left
opened, another window inside her bedroom was now open. Her
attacker had fled from her room going through the left bedroom
window (Ibid, Answers to Question number 5; Id), the one without
iron grills which leads to Room 306 of the Building (TSN, July 5,
1993, p.6).
xxx xxx xxx
Further, MALOU testified that her relation with CHITO, who was
her classmate …, was friendly until a week prior to the attack.
CHITO confided his feelings for her, telling her: "Gusto kita,
mahal kita" (TSN, July 5, 1993, p. 22) and she rejected him. ….
(TSN, July 5, 1993, p. 22).
Meanwhile, according to S/G Ferolin, while he was on duty,
CHITO arrived at the Building at 1:30 in the early morning of
December 13, 1991, wearing a white t-shirt with “‘…a marking on
the front of the T-shirt T M and a Greek letter (sic) ΣΦ’ and below
the quoted letters the word ‘1946’ ‘UST Medicine and Surgery’”
(TSN, October 9, 1992, p. 9) and black shorts with the brand
name “Adidas” (TSN, October 16, 1992, p.7) and requested
permission to go up to Room 306. This Unit was being leased by
Ansbert Co and at that time when CHITO was asking permission
to enter, only Joseph Bernard Africa was in the room.
He asked CHITO to produce the required written authorization
and when CHITO could not, S/G Ferolin initially refused [but later,
relented] …. S/G Ferolin made the following entry in the security
guard’s logbook …:
"0130H Baleros Renato Jr. is a visitor of Ansbert Co who has not
have (sic) a Request letter from our tenant of Unit #-306 Ansbert,
but still I let him inter (sic) for the reason that he will be our tenant
this coming summer break as he said so I let him sign it here
(Sgd.) Baleros Renato Jr."
(Exhibit "A-2")
That CHITO arrived at Room 306 at 1:30 A.M. of December 13,
1991 was corroborated by Joseph Bernard Africa (Joseph), ….
xxx xxx xxx
Joseph was already inside Room 306 at 9 o’clock in the evening
of December 12, 1991. xxx by the time CHITO’s knocking on the
door woke him up, …. He was able to fix the time of CHITO’s
arrival at 1:30 A.M. because he glanced at the alarm clock beside
the bed when he was awakened by the knock at the door ….
Joseph noticed that CHITO was wearing dark-colored shorts and
white T-shirt (Ibid., p. 23) when he let the latter in. …. It was at
around 3 o’clock in the morning of December 13, 1991 when he
woke up again later to the sound of knocking at the door, this
time, by Bernard Baptista (Bernard), ….
xxx. With Bernard, Joseph then went to MALOU’s room and
thereat was shown by Bernard the open window through which
the intruder supposedly passed.
xxx xxx xxx
Later, at about 6 to 6:30 in the morning of December 13, 1991,
Joseph was finally able to talk to CHITO …. He mentioned to the
latter that something had happened and that they were not being
allowed to get out of the building. Joseph also told CHITO to
follow him to Room 310.
CHITO did just that. He followed after Joseph to Unit 310,
carrying his gray bag. xxx. None was in Room 310 so Joseph
went to their yet another classmate, Renato Alagadan at Room
401 to see if the others were there. xxx.
People from the CIS came by before 8 o’clock that same morning
…. They likewise invited CHITO and Joseph to go with them to
Camp Crame where the two (2) were questioned ….
An occupant of Room 310 … Christian Alcala (Christian) recalled
in Court that in the afternoon of December 13, 1991, after their
3:30 class, he and his roommates, Bernard Baptista and Lutgardo
Acosta (Gary) were called to the Building and were asked by the
CIS people to look for anything not belonging to them in their
Unit. While they were outside Room 310 talking with the
authorities, Rommel Montes (Loyloy), another roommate of his,
went inside to search the Unit. Loyloy found (TSN, January 12,
1993, p. 6) a gray "Khumbella" bag cloth type (Ibid, pp. 44-45)
from inside their unit which they did not know was there and
surrender the same to the investigators. When he saw the gray
bag, Christian knew right away that it belonged to CHITO (Ibid, p.
55) as he had seen the latter usually bringing it to school inside
the classroom (Ibid, p. 45).
In their presence, the CIS opened the bag and pulled out its
contents, among others, a white t-shirt with a Taunu (sic) Sigma
Phi sign (Ibid, p. 7), a Black Adidas short pants, a handkerchief ,
three (3) white T-shirts, an underwear, and socks (Ibid).
Christian recognized the t-shirt (Exhibit "D-4"), the Adidas short
pants (Exhibit "D-5"), and the handkerchief (Exhibit "D-3) to be
CHITO’s because CHITO had lent the very same one to him ….
The t-shirt with CHITO’s fraternity symbol, CHITO used to wear
on weekends, and the handkerchief he saw CHITO used at least
once in December.
That CHITO left his bag inside Room 310 in the morning of
December 13, 1991, was what consisted mainly of Renato R.
Alagadan’s testimony.
xxx xxx xxx.
The colored gray bag had a handle and a strap, was elongated to
about 11/4 feet and appeared to be full but was closed with a
zipper when Renato saw it then (Ibid, pp. 19-20). At that time
Christian, Gary, Bernard, and Renato went back to Room 310 at
around 3 to 4 o’clock that afternoon along with some CIS agents,
they saw the bag at the same place inside the bedroom where
Renato had seen CHITO leave it. Not until later that night at past
9 o’clock in Camp Crame, however, did Renato know what the
contents of the bag were.
xxx xxx xxx.
The forensic Chemist, Leslie Chambers, of the Philippine National
Police Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, having acted in
response to the written request of PNP Superintendent Lucas M.
Managuelod dated December 13, 1991, (Exhibit "C"; Original
Records, p. 109.) conducted laboratory examination on the
specimen collated and submitted…. Her Chemistry Report No. C-
487-91 (Exhibit "E"; Ibid., p. 112) reads in part, thus:
"SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
xxx xxx xxx:
1) One (1) small white plastic bag marked ‘UNIMART’ with the
following:
xxx xxx xxx
Exh ‘C’ – One (1) night dress colored salmon pink.
2) One (1) small white pl astic bag marked ‘JONAS’ with the
following:
Exh. ‘D’ – One (1) printed handkerchief.
Exh. ‘E’ – One (1) white T-shirt marked ‘TMZI’.
Exh. ‘F’ – One (1) black short (sic) marked ‘ADIDAS’.
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
To determine the presence of volatime (sic), non-volatile and/or
metallic poison on the above stated specimens.
FINDINGS:
Toxicological examination conducted on the above stated
specimens gave the following results:
Exhs. ‘C’ and ‘D’ – POSITIVE to the test for chloroform, a volatile
poison.
Exhs. ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘E’ and ‘F’ are insufficient for further analysis.
CONCLUSION:
Exhs. ‘C’ and ‘D’ contain chloroform, a volatile poison." 6 (Words in
bracket added)
For its part, the defense presented, as its main witness, the
petitioner himself. He denied committing the crime imputed to him
or making at any time amorous advances on Malou. Unfolding a
different version of the incident, the defense sought to establish
the following, as culled from the same decision of the appellate
court:
In December of 1991, CHITO was a medical student of … (UST).
With Robert Chan and Alberto Leonardo, he was likewise a
member of the Tau Sigma Phi Fraternity …. MALOU, …, was
known to him being also a medical student at the UST at the time.
From Room 306 of the Celestial Marie Building …, CHITO,
wearing the prescribed barong tagalog over dark pants and
leather shoes, arrived at their Fraternity house located at … Dos
Castillas, Sampaloc, Manila at about 7 o’clock in the evening of
December 12, 1991. He was included in the entourage of some
fifty (50) fraternity members scheduled for a Christmas gathering
at the house of their senior fraternity brother, Dr. Jose Duran, at
No. 3 John Street, North Greenhills, San Juan. xxx.
The party was conducted at the garden beside [the] swimming
pool …. Soon after, … the four (4) presidential nominees of the
Fraternity, CHITO included, were being dunked one by one into
the pool. xxx.
xxx CHITO had anticipated his turn … and was thus wearing his
t-shirt and long pants when he was dunked. Perla Duran, …,
offered each … dry clothes to change into and CHITO put on the
white t-shirt with the Fraternity’s symbol and a pair of black shorts
with stripes. xxx .
Again riding on Alberto’s car and wearing "barong tagalog over a
white t-shirt with the symbol TAU Sigma Phi, black short pants
with stripe, socks and shoes" (TSN, April 25, 1994, p. 15), CHITO
left the party with Robert Chan and Alberto at more or less past 1
A.M. of December 13, 1991 and proceeded to the Building which
they reached at about 1:30 A.M. (Ibid., p. 19). He had left his gray
traveling bag containing "white t-shirt, sando, underwear, socks,
and toothbrush (Ibid., pp. 17-18) at room 306 in the afternoon of
the previous day ….
At the gate of the Building, CHITO knocked and …, S/G Ferolin,
looking at his watch, approached. Because of this, CHITO also
looked at his own watch and saw that the time was 1:30 (Ibid., p.
26). S/G Ferolin initially refused CHITO entry …. xxx.
S/G Ferolin called Unit 306 …. xxx. When S/G Ferolin finally let
him in, already about ten (10) minutes had lapsed since CHITO
first arrived (Ibid., p. 25).
CHITO went up the floor, found the key left for him by Joseph
behind the opened jalousie window and for five (5) minutes vainly
tried to open the door until Rommel Montes, … approached him
and even commented: "Okey ang suot mo ha, di mo mabuksan
ang pinto (Ibid., pp. 26-29). Rommel tried to open the door of Unit
306 … but was likewise unsuccessful. CHITO then decided to just
call out to Joseph while knocking at the door.
It took another (5) minutes of calling out and knocking before
Joseph, …, at last answered the door. Telling him, "Ikaw na ang
bahala diyan" Joseph immediately turned his back on CHITO and
went inside the bedroom. CHITO , …changed to a thinner shirt
and went to bed. He still had on the same short pants given by
Perla Duran from the fraternity party (TSN, June 16, 1994, p. 20).
At 6 o’clock in the morning of December 13, 1991, CHITO woke
up …. He was already in his school uniform when, around 6:30
A.M, Joseph came to the room not yet dressed up. He asked the
latter why this was so and, without elaborating on it, Joseph told
him that something had happened and to just go to Room 310
which CHITO did.
At Room 310, CHITO was told by Rommel Montes that
somebody, whom MALOU was not able to identify, went to the
room of MALOU and tried to rape her (TSN, April 25, 1994, p.
36). xxx.
Joseph told him that the security guard was not letting anybody
out of the Building …. When two (2) CIS men came to the unit
asking for Renato Baleros, CHITO presented himself.
Congressman Rodolfo B. Albano, father of MALOU, then asked
him for the key to Room 306….
xxx xxx xxx
The CIS men looked inside the bedroom and on the windows.
Joseph was told to dress up and the two (2) of them, CHITO and
Joseph, were brought to Camp Crame.
When they arrived at Camp Crame …, Col. Managuelod asked
Joseph inside his room and talked to him for 30 minutes. xxx. No
one interviewed CHITO to ask his side.
xxx xxx xxx
Both CHITO and Joseph were taken to Prosecutor Abesamis who
later instructed them to undergo physical examination at the
Camp Crame Hospital ….. At the hospital, … CHITO and Joseph
were physically examined by a certain Dr. de Guzman who told
them to strip ….
xxx xxx xxx
CHITO had left his gray bag containing, among others, the black
striped short pants lent to him by Perla Duran (Exhibit "8-A",
Original Records, p. 345), inside Room 310 at more/less 6:30 to 7
o’clock in the morning of December 13, 1991. The next time that
he saw it was between 8 to 9 P.M. when he and Joseph were
brought before Fiscal Abesamis for inquest. One of the CIS
agents had taken it there and it was not opened up in his
presence but the contents of the bag were already laid out on the
table of Fiscal Abesamis who, however, made no effort to ask
CHITO if the items thereat were his.
The black Adidas short pants purportedly found in the bag,
CHITO denied putting in his gray bag which he had left at Room
306 in the early evening of December 12, 1991 before going to
the fraternity house. He likewise disavowed placing said black
Adidas short pants in his gray bag when he returned to the
apartment at past 1:00 o’clock in the early morning of December
13, 1991 (TSN, June 16, 1994, p. 24), nor when he dressed up at
about 6 o’clock in the morning to go to school and brought his
gray bag to Room 310 (Ibid. 25). In fact, at any time on December
13, 1991, he was not aware that his gray bag ever contained any
black short Adidas pants (Ibid). He only found out for the first time
that the black Adidas short pants was alluded to be among the
items inside his gray bag late in the afternoon, when he was in
Camp Crame.
Also taking the witness stand for the defense were petitioner’s
fraternity brothers, Alberto Leonardo and Robert Chan, who both
testified being with CHITO in the December 12, 1991 party held in
Dr. Duran’s place at Greenhills, riding on the same car going to
and coming from the party and dropping the petitioner off the
Celestial Marie building after the party. Both were one in saying
that CHITO was wearing a barong tagalog, with t-shirt inside, with
short pants and leather shoes at the time they parted after the
party.7 Rommel Montes, a tenant of Room 310 of the said
building, also testified seeing CHITO between the hours of 1:30
and 2:00 A.M. of December 13, 1991 trying to open the door of
Room 306 while clad in dark short pants and white barong
tagalog.
On the other hand, Perla Duran confirmed lending the petitioner
the pair of short pants with stripes after the dunking party held in
her father’s house.8 Presented as defense expert witness was
Carmelita Vargas, a forensic chemistry instructor whose actual
demonstration in open court showed that chloroform, being
volatile, evaporates in thirty (30) seconds without tearing nor
staining the cloth on which it is applied. 9
On December 14, 1994, the trial court rendered its
decision10 convicting petitioner of attempted rape and accordingly
sentencing him, thus:
WHEREFORE, under cool reflection and prescinding from the
foregoing, the Court finds the accused Renato D. Baleros, Jr.,
alias "Chito", guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
attempted rape as principal and as charged in the information and
hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment ranging from
FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY of
Prision Correctional, as Minimum to TEN (10) YEARS of Prision
Mayor as Maximum, with all the accessory penalties provided by
law, and for the accused to pay the offended party Martina
Lourdes T. Albano, the sum of P50,000.00 by way of Moral and
exemplary damages, plus reasonable Attorney’s fees of
P30,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, petitioner went to the CA whereat his appellate
recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 17271.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in its assailed Decision
dated January 13, 1999, affirmed the trial court’s judgment of
conviction, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding no basis in fact and in law to deviate from
the findings of the court a quo, the decision appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied
by the CA in its equally assailed resolution of March 31, 1999. 12
Petitioner is now with this Court, on the contention that the CA
erred -
1. In not finding that it is improbable for petitioner to have
committed the attempted rape imputed to him, absent
sufficient, competent and convincing evidence to prove
the offense charged.
2. In convicting petitioner of attempted rape on the basis
merely of circumstantial evidence since the prosecution
failed to satisfy all the requisites for conviction based
thereon.
3. In not finding that the circumstances it relied on to
convict the petitioner are unreliable, inconclusive and
contradictory.
4. In not finding that proof of motive is miserably wanting
in his case.
5. In awarding damages in favor of the complainant
despite the fact that the award was improper and
unjustified absent any evidence to prove the same.
6. In failing to appreciate in his favor the constitutional
presumption of innocence and that moral certainty has
not been met, hence, he should be acquitted on the
ground that the offense charged against him has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Otherwise stated, the basic issue in this case turns on the
question on whether or not the CA erred in affirming the ruling of
the RTC finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of attempted rape.
After a careful review of the facts and evidence on record in the
light of applicable jurisprudence, the Court is disposed to rule for
petitioner’s acquittal, but not necessarily because there is no
direct evidence pointing to him as the intruder holding a chemical-
soaked cloth who pinned Malou down on the bed in the early
morning of December 13, 1991.
Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and
not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of
commission of the crime. There are two types of positive
identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused as the
offender as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of
the crime. This constitutes direct evidence. There may, however,
be instances where, although a witness may not have actually
witnessed the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be
able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator
of a crime as when, for instance, the latter is the person or one of
the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right
after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of
positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial
evidence.13 In the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution
may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its
burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under
condition where concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence
is insisted under all circumstances, the prosecution of vicious
felons who committed heinous crimes in secret or secluded
places will be hard, if not well-nigh impossible, to prove. 14
Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides the
conditions when circumstantial evidence may be sufficient for
conviction. The provision reads:
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient – Circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if –
a) There is more than one circumstance;
b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and
c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
In the present case, the positive identification of the petitioner
forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together
with the other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain,
leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that
petitioner was the intruder in question.
We quote with approval the CA’s finding of the circumstantial
evidence that led to the identity of the petitioner as such intruder:
Chito was in the Building when the attack on MALOU took place.
He had access to the room of MALOU as Room 307 where he
slept the night over had a window which allowed ingress and
egress to Room 306 where MALOU stayed. Not only the Building
security guard, S/G Ferolin, but Joseph Bernard Africa as well
confirmed that CHITO was wearing a black "Adidas" shorts and
fraternity T-shirt when he arrived at the Building/Unit 307 at 1:30
in the morning of December 13, 1991. Though it was dark during
their struggle, MALOU had made out the feel of her intruder’s
apparel to be something made of cotton material on top and
shorts that felt satin-smooth on the bottom.
From CHITO’s bag which was found inside Room 310 at the very
spot where witness Renato Alagadan saw CHITO leave it, were
discovered the most incriminating evidence: the handkerchief
stained with blue and wet with some kind of chemicals; a black
"Adidas" satin short pants; and a white fraternity T-shirt, also
stained with blue. A different witness, this time, Christian Alcala,
identified these garments as belonging to CHITO. As it turned
out, laboratory examination on these items and on the beddings
and clothes worn by MALOU during the incident revealed that the
handkerchief and MALOU’s night dress both contained
chloroform, a volatile poison which causes first degree burn
exactly like what MALOU sustained on that part of her face where
the chemical-soaked cloth had been pressed.
This brings the Court to the issue on whether the evidence
adduced by the prosecution has established beyond reasonable
doubt the guilt of the petitioner for the crime of attempted rape.
The Solicitor General maintained that petitioner, by pressing on
Malou’s face the piece of cloth soaked in chemical while holding
her body tightly under the weight of his own, had commenced the
performance of an act indicative of an intent or attempt to rape
the victim. It is argued that petitioner’s actuation thus described is
an overt act contemplated under the law, for there can not be any
other logical conclusion other than that the petitioner intended to
ravish Malou after he attempted to put her to an induced sleep.
The Solicitor General, echoing what the CA said, adds that if
petitioner’s intention was otherwise, he would not have lain on top
of the victim.15
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed
by a man who has carnal knowledge or intercourse with a woman
under any of the following circumstances: (1) By using force or
intimidation; (2) When the woman is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; and (3) When the woman is under twelve
years of age or is demented. Under Article 6, in relation to the
aforementioned article of the same code, rape is attempted when
the offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt
acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance. 16
Expounding on the nature of an attempted felony, the Court,
speaking thru Justice Claro M. Recto in People vs.
Lamahang,17 stated that "the attempt which the Penal Code
punishes is that which has a logical connection to a particular,
concrete offense; that which is the beginning of the execution of
the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its
realization and consummation." Absent the unavoidable
connection, like the logical and natural relation of the cause and
its effect, as where the purpose of the offender in performing an
act is not certain, meaning the nature of the act in relation to its
objective is ambiguous, then what obtains is an attempt to commit
an indeterminate offense, which is not a juridical fact from the
standpoint of the Penal Code.18
There is absolutely no dispute about the absence of sexual
intercourse or carnal knowledge in the present case. The next
question that thus comes to the fore is whether or not the act of
the petitioner, i.e., the pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth while
on top of Malou, constitutes an overt act of rape.1avvphil.net
Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity
or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular crime,
more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to
its complete termination following its natural course, without being
frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of
the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete
offense.19
Harmonizing the above definition to the facts of this case, it would
be too strained to construe petitioner's act of pressing a chemical-
soaked cloth in the mouth of Malou which would induce her to
sleep as an overt act that will logically and necessarily ripen into
rape. As it were, petitioner did not commence at all the
performance of any act indicative of an intent or attempt to rape
Malou. It cannot be overemphasized that petitioner was fully
clothed and that there was no attempt on his part to undress
Malou, let alone touch her private part. For what reason petitioner
wanted the complainant unconscious, if that was really his
immediate intention, is anybody’s guess. The CA maintained that
if the petitioner had no intention to rape, he would not have lain
on top of the complainant. Plodding on, the appellate court even
anticipated the next step that the petitioner would have taken if
the victim had been rendered unconscious. Wrote the CA:
The shedding of the clothes, both of the attacker and his victim,
will have to come later. His sexual organ is not yet exposed
because his intended victim is still struggling. Where the intended
victim is an educated woman already mature in age, it is very
unlikely that a rapist would be in his naked glory before even
starting his attack on her. He has to make her lose her guard first,
or as in this case, her unconsciousness.20
At bottom then, the appellate court indulges in plain speculation,
a practice disfavored under the rule on evidence in criminal
cases. For, mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute
for proof required to establish the guilt of an accused beyond
reasonable doubt.21
In Perez vs. Court of Appeals,22 the Court acquitted therein
petitioner of the crime of attempted rape, pointing out that:
xxx. In the crime of rape, penetration is an essential act of
execution to produce the felony. Thus, for there to be an
attempted rape, the accused must have commenced the act of
penetrating his sexual organ to the vagina of the victim but for
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance, the penetration, however, slight, is not completed.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner’s act of lying on top of the complainant, embracing and offender’s act causes annoyance, irritation, torment, distress or
kissing her, mashing her breasts, inserting his hand inside her disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is
panty and touching her sexual organ, while admittedly obscene directed.26 That Malou, after the incident in question, cried while
and detestable acts, do not constitute attempted rape absent any relating to her classmates what she perceived to be a sexual
showing that petitioner actually commenced to force his penis into attack and the fact that she filed a case for attempted rape proved
the complainant’s sexual organ. xxx. beyond cavil that she was disturbed, if not distressed by the acts
of petitioner.
Likewise in People vs. Pancho,23 the Court held:
The penalty for coercion falling under the second paragraph of
xxx, appellant was merely holding complainant’s feet when his Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code is arresto menor or a fine
Tito Onio arrived at the alleged locus criminis. Thus, it would be ranging from ₱5.00 to ₱200.00 or both.
stretching to the extreme our credulity if we were to conclude that
mere holding of the feet is attempted rape. WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is hereby
Lest it be misunderstood, the Court is not saying that petitioner is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered
innocent, under the premises, of any wrongdoing whatsoever. ACQUITTING petitioner Renato D. Baleros, Jr. of the charge for
The information filed against petitioner contained an allegation attempted rape. Petitioner, however, is adjudged GUILTY of light
that he forcefully covered the face of Malou with a piece of cloth coercion and is accordingly sentenced to 30 days of arresto
soaked in chemical. And during the trial, Malou testified about the menor and to pay a fine of ₱200.00, with the accessory penalties
pressing against her face of the chemical-soaked cloth and thereof and to pay the costs.
having struggled after petitioner held her tightly and pinned her
down. Verily, while the series of acts committed by the petitioner SO ORDERED.
do not determine attempted rape, as earlier discussed, they
constitute unjust vexation punishable as light coercion under the
second paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code. In
the context of the constitutional provision assuring an accused of
a crime the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation,24 it cannot be said that petitioner was kept in the dark
of the inculpatory acts for which he was proceeded against. To be
sure, the information against petitioner contains sufficient details
to enable him to make his defense. As aptly observed by then
Justice Ramon C. Aquino, there is no need to allege malice,
restraint or compulsion in an information for unjust vexation. As it
were, unjust vexation exists even without the element of restraint
or compulsion for the reason that this term is broad enough to
include any human conduct which, although not productive of
some physical or material harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate
an innocent person.25 The paramount question is whether the
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 202867               July 15, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
REGIE LABIAGA, Appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is an appeal assailing the Decision1 dated 18
October 2011 of the Court of Appeals-Cebu (CA-Cebu) in CA-
G.R. CEB CR-HC No. 01000. The CA-Cebu affirmed with
modification the Joint Decision2 dated 10 March 2008 of the
Regional Trial Court of Barotac Viejo, Iloilo, Branch 66 (RTC), in
Criminal Case No. 2001-155) convicting Regie Labiaga alias
"Banok" (appellant) of murder and Criminal Case No. 2002-1777
convicting appellant of frustrated murder.
The Facts
In Criminal Case No. 2001-1555, appellant, together with a
certain Alias Balatong Barcenas and Cristy Demapanag
(Demapanag), was charged with Murder with the Use of
Unlicensed Firearm under an Information3 which reads:
That on or about December 23, 2000 in the Municipality of Ajuy,
Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, armed with unlicensed
firearm, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, by
means of treachery and with evident premeditation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot
JUDY CONDE alias ‘JOJO’ with said unlicensed firearm, hitting
her and inflicting gunshot wounds on the different parts of her
breast which caused her death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The same individuals were charged with Frustrated Murder with
the Use of Unlicensed Firearm in Criminal Case No. 2002-1777,
under an Information4 which states:
That on or about December 23, 2000 in the Municipality of Ajuy,
Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, armed with unlicensed
firearm, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, by
means of treachery and with evident premeditation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot
Gregorio Conde with said unlicensed firearm, hitting him on the
posterior aspect, middle third right forearm 1 cm. In diameter;
thereby performing all the acts of execution which would produce
the crime of Murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
accused; that is by the timely and able medical assistance
rendered to said Gregorio Conde which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Alias Balatong Barcenas remained at large. Both appellant and
Demapanag pled not guilty in both cases and joint trial ensued
thereafter. The prosecution presented four witnesses: Gregorio
Conde, the victim in Criminal Case No. 2002-1777; Glenelyn
Conde, his daughter; and Dr. Jeremiah Obañana and Dr. Edwin
Jose Figura, the physicians at the Sara District Hospital where
the victims were admitted. The defense, on the other hand,
presented appellant, Demapanag, and the latter’s brother,
Frederick.
Version of the prosecution
The prosecution’s version of the facts is as follows: At around
7:00 p.m. on 23 December 2000, Gregorio Conde, and his two
daughters, Judy and Glenelyn Conde, were in their home at
Barangay Malayu-an, Ajuy, Iloilo. Thereafter, Gregorio stepped
outside. Glenelyn was in their store, which was part of their
house.
Shortly thereafter, appellant, who was approximately five meters
away from Gregorio, shot the latter. Gregorio called Judy for help.
When Judy and Glenelyn rushed to Gregorio’s aid, appellant shot
Judy in the abdomen. The two other accused were standing
behind the appellant. Appellant said, "she is already dead," and
the three fled the crime scene.
Gregorio and Judy were rushed to the Sara District Hospital. Judy
was pronounced dead on arrival while Gregorio made a full
recovery after treatment of his gunshot wound.
Dr. Jeremiah Obañana conducted the autopsy of Judy. His report
stated that her death was caused by "cardiopulmonary arrest
secondary to Cardiac Tamponade due to gunshot wound." 5
Dr. Jose Edwin Figura, on the other hand, examined Gregorio
after the incident. He found that Gregorio sustained a gunshot
wound measuring one centimeter in diameter in his right forearm
and "abrasion wounds hematoma formation" in his right
shoulder.6
Version of the defense
Appellant admitted that he was present during the shooting
incident on 23 December 2000. He claimed, however, that he
acted in self-defense. Gregorio, armed with a shotgun,
challenged him to a fight. He attempted to shoot appellant, but
the shotgun jammed. Appellant tried to wrest the shotgun from
Gregorio, and during the struggle, the shotgun fired. He claimed
that he did not know if anyone was hit by that gunshot.
Demapanag claimed that at the time of the shooting, he was in
D&D Ricemill, which is approximately 14 kilometers away from
the crime scene. This was corroborated by Frederick,
Demapanag’s brother.
The Ruling of the RTC
In its Joint Decision, the RTC acquitted Demapanag due to
insufficiency of evidence. Appellant, however, was convicted of
murder and frustrated murder. The dispositive portion of the Joint
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the court hereby finds the
accused Regie Labiaga @ "Banok" GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the Crime of Murder in Crim. Case No. 2001-1555 and
hereby sentences the said accused to reclusion perpetua
together with accessory penalty provided by law, to pay the heirs
of Judy Conde ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
In Crim. Case No. 2002-1777, the court finds accused Regie
Labiaga @ "Banok" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Frustrated Murder and hereby sentences the said
accused to a prison term ranging from six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal as maximum, together with the
necessary penalty provided by law and without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
Accused’s entire period of detention shall be deducted from the
penalty herein imposed when the accused serves his sentence.
For lack of sufficient evidence, accused Cristy Demapanag is
acquitted of the crimes charged in both cases. The Provincial
Warden, Iloilo Rehabilitation Center, Pototan, Iloilo is hereby
directed to release accused Cristy Demapanag from custody
unless he is being held for some other valid or lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.7
The Ruling of the CA-Cebu
Appellant impugned the RTC’s Joint Decision, claiming that "the
RTC gravely erred in convicting the appellant of the crime
charged despite failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt."8 The CA-Cebu, however, upheld the
conviction for murder and frustrated murder.
The CA-Cebu also modified the Joint Decision by imposing the
payment of moral and exemplary damages in both criminal cases.
The CA-Cebu made a distinction between the civil indemnity
awarded by the RTC in Criminal Case No. 2001-1555 and the
moral damages. The CA-Cebu pointed out that:
The trial court granted the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity in Criminal Case No. 2001-1555. It did not award moral
damages. Nonetheless, the trial court should have awarded both,
considering that they are two different kinds of damages. For
death indemnity, the amount of ₱50,000.00 is fixed "pursuant to
the current judicial policy on the matter, without need of any
evidence or proof of damages. Likewise, the mental anguish of
the surviving family should be assuaged by the award of
appropriate and reasonable moral damages." 9
The dispositive portion of the Decision of the CA-Cebu reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The
Joint Decision dated March 10, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 66, in Barotac Viejo, Iloilo is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. The dispositive portion of the said Joint
Decision should now read as follows:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the court hereby finds the
accused Regie Labiaga @ "Banok" GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder in Crim. Case No. 2001-1555 and
hereby sentences the said accused to reclusion perpetua
together with the accessory penalty provided by law, to pay the
heirs of Judy Conde ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
costs.
In Crim. Case No. 2002-1777 the court finds accused Regie
Labiaga @ "Banok" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Frustrated Murder and hereby sentences the said
accused to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years
and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
together with the accessory penalty provided by law, to pay
Gregorio Conde ₱25,000.00 as moral damages and ₱25,000.00
as exemplary damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency and to pay the costs Accused(’s) entire period of
detention shall be deducted from the penalty herein imposed
when the accused serves his sentence.
For lack of sufficient evidence, accused Cristy Demapanag is
acquitted of the crime(s) charged in both cases. The Provincial
Warden, Iloilo Rehabilitation Center, Pototan, Iloilo is hereby
directed to release accused Cristy Demapanag from custody
unless he is being held for some other valid or lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
SO ORDERED.10
Hence, this appeal.
The Ruling of the Court
Our review of the records of Criminal Case No. 2002-1777
convinces us that appellant is guilty of attempted murder and not
frustrated murder. We uphold appellant’s conviction in Criminal
Case No. 2001-1555 for murder, but modify the civil indemnity
awarded in Criminal Case No. 2001-1555, as well as the award of
moral and exemplary damages in both cases.
Justifying circumstance of self-defense
Appellant’s feeble attempt to invoke self-defense in both cases
was correctly rejected by the RTC and the CA-Cebu. This Court,
in People v. Damitan,11 explained that:
When the accused admits killing a person but pleads self-
defense, the burden of evidence shifts to him to prove by clear
and convincing evidence the elements of his defense. However,
appellant’s version of the incident was uncorroborated. His bare
and self-serving assertions cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the two (2) principal witnesses of the
prosecution.12
Appellant’s failure to present any other eyewitness to corroborate
his testimony and his unconvincing demonstration of the struggle
between him and Gregorio before the RTC lead us to reject his
claim of self-defense. Also, as correctly pointed out by the CA-
Cebu, appellant’s theory of self-defense is belied by the fact that:
x x x The appellant did not even bother to report to the police
Gregorio’s alleged unlawful aggression and that it was Gregorio
who owned the gun, as appellant claimed. And, when appellant
was arrested the following morning, he did not also inform the
police that what happened to Gregorio was merely accidental. 13
Appellant’s claim that he did not know whether Gregorio was hit
when the shotgun accidentally fired is also implausible.
In contrast, we find that the Condes’ account of the incident is
persuasive. Both the CA-Cebu and the RTC found that the
testimonies of the Condes were credible and presented in a clear
and convincing manner. This Court has consistently put much
weight on the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of
witnesses, especially when affirmed by the appellate court.14 In
People v. Mangune,15 we stated that:
It is well settled that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court
because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses first
hand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under
grilling examination. These are important in determining the
truthfulness of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in
the face of conflicting testimonies. For, indeed, the emphasis,
gesture, and inflection of the voice are potent aids in ascertaining
the witness’ credibility, and the trial court has the opportunity to
take advantage of these aids.16
Since the conclusions made by the RTC regarding the credibility
of the witnesses were not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight or
misapprehension of relevant facts, the same must be sustained
by this Court.
Attempted and Frustrated Murder
Treachery was correctly appreciated by the RTC and CA-Cebu. A
treacherous attack is one in which the victim was not afforded any
opportunity to defend himself or resist the attack.17 The existence
of treachery is not solely determined by the type of weapon used.
If it appears that the weapon was deliberately chosen to insure
the execution of the crime, and to render the victim defenseless,
then treachery may be properly appreciated against the
accused.18
In the instant case, the Condes were unarmed when they were
shot by appellant. The use of a 12-gauge shotgun against two
unarmed victims is undoubtedly treacherous, as it denies the
victims the chance to fend off the offender.
We note, however, that appellant should be convicted of
attempted murder, and not frustrated murder in Criminal Case
No. 2002-1777.
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines the stages in the
commission of felonies:
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies.—
Consummated felonies as well as those which are frustrated and
attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its
execution and accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated
when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would
produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do
not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony
by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance.
In Serrano v. People,19 we distinguished a frustrated felony from
an attempted felony in this manner:
1.) In a frustrated felony, the offender has performed all
the acts of execution which should produce the felony as
a consequence; whereas in an attempted felony, the
offender merely commences the commission of a felony
directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of
execution.
2.) In a frustrated felony, the reason for the non-
accomplishment of the crime is some cause independent
of the will of the perpetrator; on the other hand, in an
attempted felony, the reason for the non-fulfillment of the
crime is a cause or accident other than the offender’s own
spontaneous desistance.20
In frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing that the
wound would have been fatal were it not for timely medical
intervention.21 If the evidence fails to convince the court that the
wound sustained would have caused the victim’s death without
timely medical attention, the accused should be convicted of
attempted murder and not frustrated murder.
In the instant case, it does not appear that the wound sustained
by Gregorio Conde was mortal. This was admitted by Dr. Edwin
Figura, who examined Gregorio after the shooting incident:
Prosecutor Con-El:
Q: When you examined the person of Gregorio Conde, can you
tell the court what was the situation of the patient when you
examined him?
A: He has a gunshot wound, but the patient was actually
ambulatory and not in distress.
xxxx
Court (to the witness)
Q: The nature of these injuries, not serious?
A: Yes, Your Honor, not serious. He has also abrasion wounds
hematoma formation at the anterior aspect right shoulder. 22
Since Gregorio’s gunshot wound was not mortal, we hold that
appellant should be convicted of attempted murder and not
frustrated murder. Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code,
the corresponding penalty for attempted murder shall be two
degrees lower than that prescribed for consummated murder
under Article 248, that is, prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its medium period. Section 1 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law provides:
x x x the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view
of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under
the rules of the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum which
shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense. 1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 18 October 2011 Decision of the
Court of Appeals-Cebu in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC No. 01000 with
MODIFICATIONS. In Criminal Case No. 2002-1777, we find that
appellant Regie Labiaga is GUILTY of Attempted Murder and
shall suffer an indeterminate sentence ranging from two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum, and pay ₱40,000.00 as moral damages and
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages. In Criminal Case No. 2001-
1555, appellant shall pay ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
SO ORDERED.

Thus, appellant should serve an indeterminate sentence ranging

from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional in its medium period to eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor in its medium period.

Award of damages

In light of recent jurisprudence, we deem it proper to increase the

amount of damages imposed by the lower court in both cases. In
Criminal Case No. 2001-1555, this Court hereby awards
₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity23 and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages.24 The award of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages in the
foregoing case is sustained. Appellant is also liable to pay
₱40,000.00 as moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, in relation to Criminal Case No. 2002-1777.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 224289, August 14, 2019
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-
APPELLEE, v. DANG ANGELES Y GUARIN, JAMES
SANTOS @ "CHITA," DENNIS RAMOS, AND SONNY
BAYNOSA @ "JONG," ACCUSED, DANG ANGELES Y
GUARIN, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
The Case
This appeal seeks to reverse the Decision dated March
13, 20151 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
05193 which affirmed with modification the trial court's
verdict of conviction against appellant Dang Angeles y
Guarin for murder, frustrated murder, and attempted
murder.2
The Information
Appellant Dang Angeles y Guarin, James Santos alias
"Chita," Dennis Ramos, and Sonny Baynosa alias
"Jong,"3 were charged with murder and two (2) counts of
frustrated murder in the following Amended
Information, viz:
Criminal Case No. L-8886
The undersigned hereby accuses DANG ANGELES y
GUARIN, JAMES SANTOS @,  "Chita", DENNIS
RAMOS and JOHN DOE @,  "JHONG" of the crime
of MURDER committed as follows:
"That on or about 11:45 o'clock in the evening of April
27, 2010 in Brgy. Gayaman, Binmaley, Pangasinan and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused,  conspiring, confederating, and
mutually helping one another,  with treachery, abuse of
superior strength and evident premeditation, with intent
to kill, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab ABELARDO Q.
EVANGELISTA, with the use of a (sic)
bladed  weapons inflicting upon him injuries as shown in
the autopsy report which caused his instantaneous
death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs. "
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.4
x x x          x x x          x x x
Criminal Case No. L-8887
The undersigned hereby accuses DANG ANGELES y
GUARIN, JAMES SANTOS @,  "Chita", DENNIS
RAMOS, and SONNY BAYNOSA @  "Jong" of the crime
of FRUSTRATED MURDER committed as follows:
"That on or about 11:45 o'clock in the evening of April
27, 2010 at Brgy. Gayaman, Binmaley, Pangasinan, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, armed with knives, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with
intent to kill, with treachery and taking advantage of
their superior strength, did then and there, (willfully),
unlawfully and feloniously attack, stab and hit ERIC Q.
EVANGELISTA, inflicting upon him "lacerated wound 1
cm back scapula area", secondary to stabbing, the
accused having thus performed all the acts of execution
which would have produced the crime of Murder but
which did not produce it by reason of cause/s
independent of the will of the accused, that is due to the
timely medical assistance rendered to ERIC Q.
EVANGELISTA to his damage and prejudice."
CONTRARY to Article 248 in relation to Art. 6 of the
Revised Penal Code.5
x x x          x x x          x x x
Criminal Case No. L-8888
The undersigned hereby accuses DANG ANGELES y
GUARIN, JAMES SANTOS @,  "Chita", DENNIS
RAMOS, and SONNY BAYNOSA @,  "Jong" of the
crime of FRUSTRATED MURDER committed as follows:
"That on or about 11:45 o'clock in the evening of April
27, 2010 in Brgy. Gayaman, Binmaley, Pangasinan, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, armed with knives, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with
intent to kill, with treachery and taking advantage of
their superior strength, did then and there, (willfully),
unlawfully and feloniously attack, stab and hit MARK
RYAN Q. EVANGELISTA, inflicting upon him "Grade II
Liver injury R. lobe Hmoritorcum secondary to stab
wound R lumbar posterior aspect, the accused having
thus performed all the acts of execution which would
have produced the crime of Murder but which did not
produce it by reason of cause/s independent of the will of
the accused, that is due to the timely medical assistance
rendered to MARK RYAN Q. EVANGELISTA, to his
damage and prejudice."
CONTRARY to Article 248 in relation to Art. 6 of the
Revised Penal Code.6
The Proceedings Before the Trial Court
Criminal Case No. L-8886 was raffled to the Regional
Trial Court (RTC)-Branch 38, Lingayen, Pangasinan, while
Criminal Case Nos. L-8887 and L-8888, to Branch 37. All
three (3) cases were subsequently consolidated in Branch
38.7
Only Appellant got apprehended and detained. James
Santos alias "Chita," Dennis Ramos, and Sonny Baynosa
alias "Jong" remained at large.
On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to all three
(3) charges.8
Eric Q. Evangelista, Mark Ryan Q. Evangelista, Domingo
Evangelista, SPO1 Ricardo De Vera, PO1 Tristan
Fernandez, Rolando Quinto, Dra. Gladiola Manaois, and
Dr. Cipriano Fernandez, testified for the prosecution. On
the other hand, appellant alone testified for the defense.
Version of the Prosecution
On April 27, 2010, around 11:30 in the evening, Eric and
Mark Ryan Evangelista were inside their residence in
Barangay Gayaman, Binmaley, Pangasinan, celebrating
the eve of their sister's wedding.9 While the celebration
was ongoing, they suddenly heard a loud noise coming
from the engine and muffler of a tricycle. Eric and their
youngest brother Elmer stepped out of the house to
check what the loud noise was all about. Mark Ryan
followed them shortly.10
Sonny "Jong" Baynosa occupied the driver's seat of the
nearby parked tricycle where the noise was coming from.
He was in the company of appellant, James "Chita"
Santos, and Dennis Ramos. As brothers Eric and Elmer
approached, appellant alighted from the tricycle, walked
straight to and forcefully stabbed Elmer in the right
abdomen. The knife snapped.11
When Eric rushed to help Elmer, Baynosa stabbed him
(Eric) in the back, just below his right shoulder. Mark
Ryan who followed his brothers was not spared. Santos
stabbed him, too, in his right waist.12
Abelardo rushed to his brothers' aid. But Ramos also
stabbed him in the left stomach. Santos himself turned to
Abelardo and stabbed the latter in the right abdomen.
Not to be outdone, appellant grabbed an icepick and
joined in. He stabbed Abelardo in the left chest. Baynosa
also pulled an icepick and stabbed Abelardo in the right
chest. In view of the multiple stab wounds he sustained,
Abelardo fell to the ground. But still not satisfied, Santos
stabbed him again in the back. Thereafter, appellant
walked away while Baynosa, Ramos, and Santos fled on
board the tricycle.13
A cousin of the Evangelista brothers, Rolando Quinto,
saw the incident but he was too scared to help.14
Only after the assailants had left did Rolando and others
approach and rush Elmer, Eric, Mark Ryan, and Abelardo
to the hospital.15 Abelardo was pronounced dead on
arrival.16 Elmer died in the hospital.17
Dr. Cipriano C. Fernandez treated Eric and Mark Ryan. As
for Eric, Dr. Fernandez found a stab wound in his back
though it was not fatal. Dr. Fernandez opined that even
without adequate medical attendance, the wound would
heal in seven (7) to ten (10) days. Eric got discharged
from the hospital on the following day. 18
As for Mark Ryan, he sustained a stab wound in the waist
(back). He had to be admitted into the Intensive Care
Unit. After twelve (12) hours, however, his condition
worsened. Wasting no time, Dr. Fernandez immediately
did an operation on Mark Ryan. When Dr. Fernandez
opened up Mark Ryan, the latter's abdomen was filled
with blood flowing from his punctured liver. It was a fatal
injury which could have caused Mark Ryan's death were
it not for the timely and adequate medical attendance
given him. It would take him up to three (3) months to
recover from this injury.19
SPO1 Ricardo de Vera and PO1 Tristan B. Fernandez
were among the police officers who responded to the
reported stabbing incident. When SPO1 de Vera arrived
at the locus criminis,  the victims had already been
brought to the hospital. The victims' father, Domingo 1"
Evangelista, identified appellant as one of the assailants.
SPO1 De Vera and the other police officers were able to "K" to "K- Photos showing Abelardo's body and the
apprehend appellant. After apprising him of his 3" wounds he sustained
constitutional rights, they took appellant to the Lingayen
Community Hospital for medical examination. The police "L" to "L-
: Medical Certificate issued to Eric Evangelista
officers though were not able to apprehend Santos, 3"
Ramos, and Baynosa.20
"M" to Receipts showing the expenses for treatment
:
The prosecution offered the following evidence: "M-7” of Eric's injury
" N" to Medical Certificate issued to Mark Ryan
:
"A" to "A- Joint Affidavit of Arrest executed by PO1 de "N-5" Evangelista
:
2" Vera and PO1 Fernandez
“O” to "O- Receipts showing the expenses for treatment
:
"B" to "B- Domingo Evangelista's Sworn Statement and 19” of Mark Ryan
:
1"  Supplemental Affidavit
"C" to "C-
: Rolando Quinto's Affidavit Version of the Defense
1"
"D" to "D- Appellant testified that on April 27, 2010, his brother-in-
: Eric Evangelista's Sworn Statement law Marlon invited him to a party at Domingo
1"
Evangelista's residence. Marlon was Domingo's nephew.
"E" to "E- Around 11:45 in the evening, he was outside Domingo's
: Mark Ryan Evangelista's Sworn Statement
1" house when Baynosa arrived on board his tricycle.
Baynosa was in the company of Santos and Ramos.21
"F" to "F- Certification of Police Blotter (Entry Nos.
:
1" 01936, 01941-42) Eric and Mark Ryan stepped out from the house and
"G" to "G- Certification of Police Blotter (Entry No. called out Baynosa for the loud noise coming from the
: tricycle. Santos and Ramos alighted from the tricycle and
1" 01943)
asked the Evangelista brothers to stop shouting to avoid
"H" : Two knives further trouble. But Eric yelled even louder at Baynosa
while Mark Ryan cursed Baynosa and his companions.22
"I" to "1-
Abelardo Evangelista's Death Certificate
2" Then together, Eric and Mark Ryan walked up to the
group and repeatedly punched Ramos. At this point,
"J" to "J- Post Mortem Examination Abelardo and Elmer arrived and hit Ramos in the head
with a bottle. Not satisfied, Abelardo hit Ramos a second
time. In retaliation, Ramos drew a knife from his waist
and stabbed Abelardo and Elmer.23 When they saw what
Ramos did to their brothers, Eric and Mark Ryan
motioned to punch Ramos but were repelled by Baynosa
and Santos. Using their respective weapons, Baynosa
and Santos struck at Eric and Mark Ryan.24
Appellant claimed to be a silent witness to the unfolding
of these tragic events. He got so scared, left, and went
home.25
While buying cigarettes from a nearby store, he saw
Domingo and the police coming up to him. Domingo
pointed him out as among those who stabbed the
Evangelista brothers.26
The Trial Court's Ruling
By Decision dated August 12, 2011,27 the trial court
found appellant guilty of murder, frustrated murder, and
attempted murder, viz:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 8886, the Court
finds accused Dang Angeles y Guarin GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of MURDER as defined
and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.  He is further ordered to pay the
heirs of Abelardo Evangelista P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity ex delicto, P80,650.00 as actual damages,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
In Criminal Case No. 8887, the Court finds accused
Dang Angeles y Guarin GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime of ATTEMPTED MURDER, and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correctional,  as minimum, to eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, with all
the accessory penalties imposed by law. He is further
ordered to pay Eric Evangelista the amounts of
P7,032.00. (sic) as actual damages, P40,000.00 as moral
damages, and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In Criminal Case No. 8888, the Court finds accused
Dang Angeles y Guarin GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
for the crime of FRUSTRATED MURDER, and is sentenced
to suffer an indeterminate penalty from 6 years and
1 day of prision mayor as minimum, to 14 years, 8
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as
maximum. In addition, he is ordered to pay the victim
Mark Ryan Evangelista the amount of P40,000.00 as
moral damages, P68,712.00 as actual damages, and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Let the records of these cases be sent to (the) archives
insofar as accused James Santos, Dennis Ramos and
Sonny Baynosa are concerned, to be revived upon their
arrest.
SO ORDERED.28
The trial court found that the prosecution witnesses
testified in a categorical, straightforward, and
spontaneous manner. Their testimonies were consistent
on material points, more particularly, on how each of the
victims was stabbed by appellant and his co-accused.
The trial court held that the credible and positive
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses necessarily
prevail over appellant's denial.
The trial court further held that the qualifying
circumstance of treachery attended the commission of
the crime because the perpetrators, including appellant,
suddenly stabbed the unarmed victims without any
warning, thus, totally depriving the victims of the
opportunity to defend themselves.
Finally, the trial court found appellant to have acted in
conspiracy with his co-accused Santos, Ramos, and
Baynosa. As established by the evidence on record, these
persons acted in such synchronized and coordinated
manner indicating unity of purpose and design.
The Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals
On appeal, appellant faulted the trial court for finding
him guilty as charged in all three (3) cases. We sum up
below appellant's assigned errors, viz:29
(1) The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were
incredible, illogical, and grossly inconsistent with human
experience. At the time of the incident, there was an
ongoing party attended by relatives and friends of the
Evangelista family. It was, therefore, unthinkable, if not
preposterous for the Evangelista brothers not to have
asked help from the people around who supposedly
witnessed the crimes. Even if some of these people may
have been, out of fear, hesitant to help them, it was
utterly against human experience that even their
relatives, other than their immediate family, remained
apathetic at such crucial time when their loved ones were
being butchered. It even took their relatives an hour to
report the incident to the police.30
(2) Eric admittedly had a grudge against him (and vice
versa), yet, during the alleged incident, he purportedly
attacked Elmer first, not Eric against whom he
supposedly had a grudge.31
(3) The trial court should not have readily accepted the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses who, being the
relatives of the victims, were not deemed disinterested
witnesses.32
(4) The testimonies of witnesses who themselves were
aggrieved by the death of their relatives should have
been handled with the realistic thought that these
witnesses had material and emotional ties with the
cases.33
(5) Although generally weak, denial gains commensurate
strength when the credibility of the prosecution witnesses
is wanting and questionable.34
(6) It was Domingo, the victims' father, who implicated
him as the assailant, albeit, Domingo himself did not
actually witness the incident.35
(7) Even assuming he was liable for Abelardo's death, he
should not be made similarly liable for the injuries
sustained by Eric and Mark Ryan. The prosecution
miserably failed to prove that he, Baynosa, Ramos, and
Santos conspired to commit the crimes charged. His
mere presence at the locus criminis  did not mean he
agreed to assault the Evangelista brothers.36
(8) Granting, without conceding that he was liable for the
death of Abelardo and the injuries of Eric and Mark Ryan,
still, he cannot be held liable for murder, frustrated
murder, and attempted murder. At most, he may only be
held liable for homicide, frustrated homicide, and
attempted homicide because the qualifying circumstance
of treachery was absent in these cases. Both Eric and
Mark Ryan knew he (appellant) had a bad reputation in
the community. Thus, when Eric and Mark Ryan
approached him and his group, these two (2) were
already deemed forewarned of the impending danger to
their lives. Hence, the attack on the Evangelista brothers
cannot be considered to be sudden, unexpected, or
unforeseen. There can be no treachery when the victim
was aware of the impending or actual danger to his life. 37
The Office of the Solicitor General, through Assistant
Solicitor General Herman R. Cimafranca and State
Solicitor Cheryl Angeline M. Roque, essentially
countered:38
(a) The trial court's factual findings are entitled to great
weight and should not be disturbed on appeal unless
certain facts of substance and value were overlooked or
misappreciated, which, if correctly considered, may have
altered the outcome of the case.39
(b) Relationship per se  does not affect the credibility of
these witnesses.40
(c) As between the positive testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses and the negative statements of
appellant, the former deserve more credence. 41
(d) The trial court correctly appreciated the attendance of
treachery as qualifying circumstance. Assuming the
Evangelista brothers were forewarned of the impending
danger to their lives that could have possibly come from
appellant, they were not aware that at the time of the
incident Angeles and his group had actually intended to
kill them. The sudden and unexpected attack launched by
appellant and his group on the Evangelista brothers
completely rendered these men unable to defend
themselves.42
(e) Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the
accused before, during, and after the crime, indicating a
common design, concerted acts, and concurrence of
sentiments. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.
Consequently, the precise extent or modality of
participation of each co-conspirator becomes
secondary.43
The Court of Appeals' Ruling
By its assailed Decision dated March 13, 2015, 44 the
Court of Appeals affirmed with modification, viz:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 38
(RTC) is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as follows:
In Criminal Case No. L-8886, accused-appellant Dang
Angeles y Guarin is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of murder and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is ordered to pay
the heirs of Abelardo Q. Evangelista the amounts of
Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) for civil
indemnity, Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for moral
damages, Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) for
exemplary damages and Eighty Thousand Six Hundred
Fifty Pesos (P80,650.00) for actual damages as well as
interest on all these damages assessed at the legal rate
of 6% from date of finality of this decision until fully paid.
In Criminal Case No. L-8887, accused-appellant Dang
Angeles y Guarin is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of attempted murder and is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum to
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum. Accused-appellant is ordered to pay Eric Q.
Evangelista the amounts of Forty Thousand Pesos
(P40,000.00) for moral damages, Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00) for exemplary damages and Twenty-
Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) for temperate
damages as well as interest on all these damages
assessed at the legal rate of 6% from date of finality of
this decision until fully paid.
In Criminal Case No. L-8888, accused-appellant Dang
Angeles y Guarin is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of frustrated murder and is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal,
as maximum. Accused-appellant is ordered to pay Mark
Ryan Q. Evangelista the amounts of Forty Thousand
Pesos (P40,000.00) for moral damages, Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) for exemplary damages
and Sixty-Eight Thousand Seven Hundred Twelve Pesos
(P68,712.00) for actual damages as well as interest on
all these damages assessed at the legal rate of 6% from
date of finality of this decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.45
The Present Appeal
Appellant now seeks affirmative relief and prays anew for
his acquittal. In compliance with Resolution dated June
29, 2016, both appellant46 and the OSG47 manifested
that, in lieu of supplemental briefs, they were adopting
their respective Briefs before the Court of Appeals.
Issue
Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the verdict of
conviction against appellant for murder, frustrated
murder, and attempted murder?
Ruling
The appeal utterly lacks merit.
The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court's finding
that appellant and his co-accused conspired to slay
Abelardo, Eric, and Mark Ryan all surnamed Evangelista.
Conspiracy exists when two (2) or more persons come to
an agreement concerning the commission of a felony,
and decide to commit it.48 Proof of express agreement,
however, is not always required to be shown.49
In People of the Philippines v. Jimmy Evasco, et
al.,50 the Court emphasized the two (2) forms of
conspiracy. The first refers to express conspiracy. It
requires proof of an actual agreement among the co-
conspirators to commit the crime. The second pertains
to implied conspiracy. It exists when two (2) or more
persons are shown by their acts to have aimed toward
the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each
doing a part so that their combined acts, though
apparently independent, are in fact connected and
cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association
and a concurrence of sentiments. This is proved by the
mode and manner the offense was committed, or from
the acts of the accused before, during, and after the
commission of the crime, indubitably pointing to a joint
purpose, a concert of action, and a community of
interest.
In fine, even without proof of express agreement among
the co-accused, conspiracy may still be held to exist
among them. We applied this rule in Evasco,  viz:
Jimmy and Ernesto were shown to have acted in
conspiracy when they assaulted Wilfredo. Although their
agreement concerning the commission of the felony, and
their decision to commit it were not established by direct
evidence, the records contained clear and firm showing
of their having acted in concert to achieve a common
design – that of assaulting Wilfredo. Direct proof of the
agreement concerning the commission of a felony,
and of the decision to commit it is not always
accessible, but that should not be a hindrance to
rendering a finding of implied conspiracy. (Emphasis
supplied)
Here, we are in full accord with the relevant findings of
the Court of Appeals on the existence of conspiracy
among all the victim's attackers, including appellant
himself, viz:
x x x x The presence of conspiracy in this case may be
inferred from the following circumstances where all the
accused acted in concert at the time of the commission of
the offense, to wit: (1) The accused-appellant together
with the other accused arrived at the crime scene at the
same time, (2) Accused-appellant alighted from the same
tricycle where the other accused rode, (3) Accused-
appellant and the other accused successively assaulted
the victims – x x x x ; and (4) All accused fled from the
crime scene immediately after the stabbing incident. 51 x x
xx
Indeed, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
unequivocally depict one clear picture: appellant,
Baynosa, Ramos, and Santos all acted in a coordinated
manner in order to consummate their common desire,
i.e. slay the Evangelista brothers. While there was no
express agreement between appellant and his co-
accused, their concerted actions indicate that they did
conspire with each other for the fulfillment of such
common purpose.52
Having established conspiracy between appellant and his
co-accused, the next question is this: what crime or
crimes did appellant commit in connection with the death
of Abelardo and the injuries inflicted on Eric and Mark
Ryan?
Criminal Case No. L-8886
Murder
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended
by Republic Act No. 7659 (RA 7659)53 provides:
Article 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within
the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be
guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua,  to death if committed with any of the following alternately or simultaneously stabbed Abelardo to death,
attendant circumstances: thus:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of Eric

superior strength, with the aid of armed Evangelista
men, or employing means to weaken the
defense or of means or persons to insure or Q: Thereafter, what transpired next, Mr.
afford impunity; Witness?

x x x          x x x          x x x A: Then, my older brother, Abelardo

Murder requires the following elements: (1) that a person
was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3)
that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Article 248; and (4) that the
killing is not parricide or infanticide. 54
There is no question regarding the first and fourth
elements. Abelardo died of cardiorespiratory arrest
secondary to hypovolemic shock as a result of the
multiple stab wounds inflicted on him. The prosecution
offered in evidence Abelardo's Death Certificate with
Registry No. 2010-13555 and Post-Mortem Examination
Report dated April 28, 201056 of Gladiola M. Manaois.
There is no evidence showing that Abelardo was related
by affinity or consanguinity with Angeles, hence, the
killing is not parricide or infanticide.
Appellant, however, belies the presence of the second
and third elements.
The second element pertains to the identity of the
accused as the person who killed the victim. Here,
prosecution witnesses Eric and Mark Ryan Evangelista,
and Rolando Quinto consistently and positively identified
appellant and his companions as the ones who
Evangelista, was also stabbed by Dennis
Ramos, Madam.
Q: And what portion of his body was stabbed
by accused Dennis Ramos was hit (sic)?
A: He was hit on (the) left side of his abdomen,
Madam.
Q: What was the weapon used by Dennis
Ramos in stabbing your brother, Abelardo
Evangelista, on the left stomach of his body?
A: A knife, Madam.
Q: And after he was stabbed, what happened
next, Mr. Witness?
A: Then, James Santos helped each other in
stabbing my brother wherein Dennis Ramos
again stabbed my older brother, Abelardo
Evangelista, on the right side of his stomach,
Madam.57
x x x          x x x          x x x
COURT
Q: Who stabbed your brother, Abelardo Q: So, after James Santos, alias "Chita" stabbed
Evangelista first? your brother, Abelardo Evangelista, on the
right abdomen, who was the next one who
WITNESS
stabbed your brother, Mr. Witness?
A: Dennis Ramos, sir.
WITNESS:
Q: And he (was) hit on what part?
A: Dang Angeles, Madam.
A: Left side of his stomach, sir.
Q: And what portion of the body of your
Q: And then you said the other accused helped brother was hit by accused Dang Angeles?
each other in attacking your brother,
A: On his left chest, Madam.
Abelardo?
Q: And what was the weapon used by accused
A: Yes, sir.
Dang Angeles when he stabbed your brother
Q: Did you see if aside from Dennis Ramos the on his left chest?
other accused also stabbed your brother?
A: He used icepick, Madam.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you tell us, if you know, how long that
Q: Who was the second person who stabbed icepick which was used by Dang Angeles
your brother, Abelardo Evangelista, if you when he stabbed your brother?
know?
A: One (1) foot long, Madam.
A: James (Santos), alias "Chita", sir.
Q: And at that time after sustaining three (3)
Q: What did he use in stabbing your brother? fatal wound(s), Mr. Witness, can you tell us
the relative condition of your brother?
A: A knife, sir.
A: He turned weak, Madam.
Q: What part of the body of your brother
Abelardo Evangelista, was hit by James Q: But he was still standing?
Santos?
A: Yes, Madam.
A: On his right abdomen, sir.[58
Q: So, after Dang Angeles stabbed him, what
x x x          x x x          x x x transpired next, Mr. Witness?
A: Then, Sonny Baynosa followed in stabbing Abelardo Evangelista went out to see
my brother, Madam. likewise what was happening to you and
your other brothers?
Q: And what portion was hit by Sonny
Baynosa, alias "Jong"? A: He was stabbed by Dennis Ramos.[61
A: On his right chest, Madam. x x x          x x x          x x x
Q: And what weapon was used by accused Q: What happened to your brother Abelardo
Sonny Baynosa, alias "Jong" when he after he was stabbed by Dennis x x x x ?
stabbed your brother on his right chest x x x
A: He was also stabbed by James Santos.[62
x
x x x          x x x          x x x
A: Icepick about a foot long, Madam, of the
same size. Q: So, after he was hit for the second time by
accused James Santos, what happened to
Q: And after he was stabbed by accused Sonny
your brother, Mr. Witness?
Baynosa, alias "Jong", what happened to
your brother, Abelardo Evangelista, Mr. A: Then Dang Angeles stabbed my brother
Witness? again on the left chest x x x x[63
A: Then, he died, Madam.[59 x x x          x x x          x x x
x x x          x x x          x x x Q: So after he was hit with an icepick by
accused Dang Angeles which you said to the
Mark Ryan
Court, he was hit on his left chest, what
Evangelista
happened to your brother?
Q: When you fell down, what transpired next,
A: Then Sonny Baynosa stabbed my brother
Mr. Witness?
Abelardo with an icepick on his right chest.
[64
A: Then my older brother Abelardo came to us.
[60
x x x          x x x          x x x
x x x          x x x          x x x
Rolando
Q: What happened Mr. Witness, when your Quinto
brother who is the victim in this case
Q: Mr. witness, after victim Mark Ryan
 Evangelista had fallen likewise (in) the
ground due to stab wound he sustained from
accused James Santos, what happened next?
A: Then Abelardo also arrived, ma'am.
Q: This Abelardo that you are referring to is the
victim in this case?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: What happened when Abelardo arrived?
A: Dennis suddenly stabbed him on his
stomach, ma'am.
Q: What happened to Abelardo when he was
stabbed by Dennis?
A: He was stabbed by James and then they
helped each other in stabbing him, ma'am.
Q: You said that Abelardo was stabbed by
Dennis and James, can you tell us the names
of those persons who also stabbed Abelardo
aside from Dennis and James?
A: Dang Angeles and Sonny Baynosa alias
Jhong also stabbed him, ma'am.[65
x x x          x x x          x x x
Q: So who followed James, was it Dang
Angeles or Sonny Baynosa?
A: Dang Angeles followed James in stabbing
Abelardo, ma'am.[66
x x x          x x x          x x x
Q: After Dang Angeles hit Abelardo on his left
chest, he was followed by Sonny Baynosa?
A: Yes, ma'am.[67
x x x          x x x          x x x
Q: So that, (sic) after the victim in this case
sustained at least four (4) stab wounds
inflicted by the accused one after the other
using their respective weapons, can you tell
this Honorable Court what transpired next?
A: He fell on the ground when Dennis stabbed
him again on his back, ma'am.[68
x x x          x x x          x x x
The trial court found that the prosecution witnesses'
testimonies were categorical, straightforward, and
spontaneous. They were also consistent on material
points, particularly on the manner and the locus criminis
where appellant and his co-accused stabbed the
Evangelista brothers.69
Indeed, when the credibility of the eyewitness is at issue,
due deference and respect shall be given to the findings
of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies, its
assessment of the probative weight thereof, and its
conclusions anchored on said findings, absent any
showing that it had overlooked circumstances that would
have affected the final outcome of the case. The
foregoing rule finds an even more stringent application
where the findings of the trial court are sustained by the
Court of Appeals,70 as in this case. In People of the
Philippines v. Jeffrey Collamat, et al.71 this Court contradictions in the testimony of the victim do not affect
ordained: the veracity of the testimony if the inconsistencies do not
pertain to material points. (Emphasis supplied)
In cases where the issue rests on the credibility of
witnesses, as in this case, it is important to emphasize x x x          x x x          x x x
the well-settled rule that "appellate courts accord the
highest respect to the assessment made by the trial
court because of the trial judge's unique opportunity to So must it be.
observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their
demeanor, conduct and attitude under grueling Appellant, nonetheless, asserts that the testimonies of
examination." the prosecution witnesses were incredible, illogical, and
grossly inconsistent with human experience. He harps on
We explained in Reyes, Jr. v. Court of Appeals that the the failure of the Evangelista brothers to seek help from
findings of the trial court will not be overturned absent relatives and guests who were also in their house that
any clear showing that it had overlooked, night.
misunderstood or misapplied  some facts or
circumstances of weight or substance that could have The argument fails to persuade.
altered the outcome of the case, viz.:
In a long line of cases, this Court has recognized that
Also, the issue hinges on credibility of witnesses. We
different persons react differently to the same situations
have consistently adhered to the rule that where the
for there is no hard and fast standard by which to
culpability or innocence of an accused would hinge
measure a person's behavior or reaction when confronted
on the issue of credibility of witnesses and the
with a startling or horrifying occurrence, as in this case.
veracity of their testimonies, findings of the trial
Some may shout for help, some may be hysterical, some
court are given the highest degree of respect. These
fight back, and others may simply freeze and take the
findings will not be ordinarily disturbed by an appellate
blows mutely. People of the Philippines v. Golem
court absent any clear showing that the trial court has
Sota72 is apropos:
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight or substance which could very x x x          x x x          x x x
well affect the outcome of the case. It is the trial court
that had the opportunity to observe 'the witnesses'
manner of testifying, their furtive glances, calmness, Noteworthy, in People v. Banez,  the Court ruled that it is
sighs or their scant or full realization of their oaths. It not at all uncommon or unnatural for a witness who, as
had the better opportunity to observe the witnesses in this case, having seen the killing of a person, did not
firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude even move, help, or run away from the crime scene, but
under grueling examination. Inconsistencies or
simply chose to stay and continue plowing. It explained
its ruling as follows:
It is settled that there could be no hard and fast
gauge for measuring a person's reaction or
behavior when confronted with a startling, not to
mention horrifying, occurrence, as in this case.
Witnesses of startling occurrences react differently
depending upon their situation and state of mind,
and there is no standard form of human behavioral
response when one is confronted with a strange,
startling or frightful experience. The workings of the
human mind placed under emotional stress are
unpredictable, and people react differently to shocking
stimulus - some may shout, some may faint, and others
may be plunged into insensibility. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x          x x x          x x x
Appellant further attacks the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses, alleging they are relatives of the victims.
To begin with, relationship per se does not equate to bias
or ulterior motive nor automatically tarnish the testimony
of a witness.73 On the contrary, a witness who is related
to the victim is naturally interested in securing the
conviction of the guilty and definitely not the innocent or
just any or some "fall guy." Otherwise, the real culprits
would gain immunity.74
In any case, against the prosecution witnesses' positive
and categorical testimonies, appellant only invokes
denial. It bears stress that denial, if not substantiated by
clear and convincing evidence, as in this case, is a
negative and self-serving defense. It carries scant, if not
nil, evidentiary value. It cannot prevail over the
consistent and categorical declarations of credible
witnesses on affirmative matters.75
Appellant next points to Ramos, Baynosa, and Santos as
the persons who actually stabbed the Evangelista
brothers.
We are not convinced.
Appellant never before the investigating prosecutor
imputed exclusive criminal liability on Ramos, Baynosa,
and Santos. Appellant did not even file his counter-
affidavit during the preliminary investigation. 76 It could
have been his chance to implicate the real culprits and
consequently be freed of any liability for the crime he
later claimed not to have committed. But he did not.
In any event, We refer back to appellant's liability as co-
conspirator in the murder of Abelardo. Although he and
his co-accused each had their respective designated roles
to perform, no one is excused from the consequent
liability arising from the acts of his co-conspirator. In
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.
In the alternative, appellant prays that his conviction for
murder be reduced to homicide. He insists that treachery
did not attend the killing since the Evangelista brothers
were already "obviously forewarned" of the impending
danger to their lives when they confronted him and his
alleged companions,77 aside from the fact that the
Evangelista brothers knew full well of his notorious
reputation in the community.
Treachery means the offender directly employs means,
methods, or forms for the purpose of ensuring the
execution of the crime without risk to the offender arising
from the defense which the offended party might make.
The essence of treachery lies on the deliberate, swift,
and unexpected attack on the hapless, unarmed, and
unsuspecting victim, leaving the latter no chance to
resist or escape.78
Here, when Abelardo came out of their house and
approached his brothers, he already knew that appellant
and his companions had violently attacked his brothers.
Thus, Abelardo was already aware of the danger
appellant posed in his person. It cannot be said,
therefore, that the attack made against him was
"unexpected." In sum, Aberlardo was not
an "unsuspecting victim.'"  Consequently, treachery
cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance in
Abelardo's killing.
The Court, nonetheless, holds that Abelardo's killing was
attended by abuse of superior strength.
This qualifying circumstance is present whenever there is
a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and
the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of
strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor
selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission
of the crime.79
In People v. Casillar,80 the Court appreciated the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strenght
when four (4) armed assailants attacked the unarmed
victim, as in this case. Too, in People v. Garcia,81 the
Court held that where four (4) persons attacked the
unarmed victim but treachery was not proven, the fact
that there were four (4) assailants constitutes abuse of
superiority. So must it be.
Criminal Case No. L-8887
for Attempted Murder and
Criminal Case No. L-8888
for Frustrated Murder
In these cases, appellant similarly argue that none of the
qualifying circumstances of treachery or abuse of
superior strength is present because the Evangelista
brothers knew of his notorious reputation in their
community.
We do not agree.
In People of the Philippines v. Marcial D.
Pulgo,82 the Court pronounced that treachery may still
be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned of
the danger to his person. What is decisive is that the
execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim
to defend himself or to retaliate.
Here, even assuming the Evangelista brothers knew of
appellant's reputation as a troublemaker, there was no
showing that they were in fact aware of had otherwise
the faintest idea that on the night in question, appellant
and his companions would launch a deadly attack on
them.
Records show that when the Evangelista brothers saw
appellant and his companions, they were just seated
inside the tricycle. Then the Evangelista brothers
approached appellant and his companions to ask them to
tone down the noise coming from their tricyle because
they had a party going on. Under these circumstances,
no one would have suspected that appellant and his
companions would aggressively react the way they did.
Appellant was the first to launch his deadly, swift,
unexpected, and sudden attack on Elmer, then Baynosa
and Santos joined in stabbing Eric and Mark Ryan,
respectively. As in Pulgo, the victims in these cases
were both unarmed, making them more vulnerable from
the sudden attack of appellant and his group.
We agree with the relevant disquisitions of the Court of
Appeals, viz:
x x x          x x x          x x x
In the instant case, it is evident that the attack in the
victim made by accused-appellant and by the other
accused was sudden and deliberate. The attack was
unexpected on the part of the unarmed victims
considering that they were in their house celebrating the
forthcoming wedding of their sister. The attack was
executed in a manner that the victims were renderd
defenseless and unable to retaliate. The severity of the
wounds forestalled any possibility of resisting attack.
Without doubt, accused-appellant and his co-accused
took advantage of the situation. The acts of accused-
appellant and his co-accused were clear indications that
they employed means and methods which tended directly
and specifically to ensure the successful execution of the
offense.83
x x x          x x x          x x x
In sum, the presence of treachery as a qualifying
circumstance in these cases is indubitable.
In murder or homicide, the offender must have the intent
to kill. If he or she did not have such intent, he or she is
liable only for physical injuries.84
In Gary Fantastico, et al. v. People of the
Philippines, et al.,85 the Court considered the following
determinants of intent to kill: (1) the means used by the
malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of
wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the
malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the
killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under
which the crime was committed and the motives of the
accused. The Court also considered the words uttered by
the offender at the time he inflicted injuries on the victim
as an additional determinative factor.
We now turn to the different stages of felony:
consummated, frustrated, and attempted, as enumerated
and defined under Article 6 of the Revised Penal
Code, viz:
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted
felonies.  — Consummated felonies as well as those which
are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements
necessary for its execution and accomplishment are
present; and it is frustrated when the offender
performs all the acts of execution which would
produce the felony as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences
the commission of a felony directly or over acts,
and does not perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony by reason of some cause or
accident other than this own spontaneous desistance.
(Emphasis supplied)
How does Article 6 insofar as the frustrated and
attempted stages apply to Criminal Case Nos. L-8887
and L-8888?
Criminal Case No. L-8887
Eric Evangelista
Eric sustained a single stab wound in the back portion of
his right shoulder. Dr. Fernandez testified that the wound
was not fatal and with proper medication, the same
would heal in seven (7) to ten (10) days, thus:
x x x          x x x          x x x
Q: Doctor, in connection with Criminal Case
No. L-8887 – Eric Evangelista, can you
tell us if there was a time (that) you
treated him?
A: Yes, I did attend (to) this patient. I
admitted him on April 28, 2010 and
discharged him the following day, April
29, 2010.
Q: Can you tell us the x x x physical
condition of the patient, if you can recall?
A: x x x during the time I attended to this
patient he sustained a stab wound at the
right scapular area x x x (Witness
pointing to the right back in this area
scapular bone at the right).[86
x x x          x x x          x x x
Q: Aside from this stab wound, did you find
any injury from the body of the victim
Eric Evangelista?
A: No more.
Q: Can you tell the Honorable Court what
would be the possible effect the cause in
connection (with) this injury if it bot be
(sic) treated immediately x x x?
A: I think you are referring to whether the
wound is fatal? Before I answer that all
wound(s) no matter (how) superficial is
fatal if you will not seek medical
attendance. You might develop tetanus or
because the wound was attended properly
and medical attendance that wound is
none (sic) fatal. We remove that factor
about possible infection.
COURT:
Q: What if factor not considered, will you
consider?
WITNESS:
A: It is not fatal.
PROSECUTOR
PORLUCAS:
Q: As a follow up doctor, you stated this is
stab wound, the injury of victim Eric
 Evangelista is not fatal. Can you tell the
Honorable Court likewise the
complication that may set in if no
medical attendance and can you tell this
is not fatal will heal of (sic) its own?
WITNESS:
A: Yes.
Q: And can you tell this Honorable Court
without any adequate medical attendance,
how many days will it heal?
A: Ten (10) days because of the possible
infection.[87
x x x          x x x          x x x
If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter
survives, the crime committed is either consummated
physical injuries, if the offender had no intention to kill
the victim, or frustrated or attempted homicide or
frustrated murder or attempted murder if the offender
intends to kill the victim. Intent to kill may be proved by
evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number of
weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the
nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim; (d)
the manner the crime was committed; (e) the words
uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are
inflicted by him on the victim;88 and (f) the circumstances
under which the crime was committed. 89
Here, the attendant circumstances showed that appellant
and his companions intended to kill Eric and his brothers
Elmer, Abelardo, and Mark Ryan. The three (3) victims
sustained multiple fatal stab wounds. As a result, Elmer
and Abelardo died. Mark Ryan was spared due to the
timely and proper medical attendance given him; and
Eric was also spared because he sustained a non-fatal
wound. But this does not dissolve appellant's liability for
attempted murder.
In Rivera, et al. v. People,90 the Court convicted
appellants therein of frustrated murder although the
wounds sustained by the victim were not fatal, viz:
That the head wounds sustained by the victim were
merely superficial and could not have produced his death
does not negate petitioners' criminal liability for
attempted murder. Even if Edgardo did not hit the victim
squarely on the head, petitioners are still criminally liable
for attempted murder.
x x x          x x x          x x x
The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two
elements, namely:
(1) That there be external acts;
(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime
intended to be committed.
The Court in People v. Lizada  elaborated on the concept
of an overt or external act, thus:
An overt or external act is defined as some physical
activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a
particular crime, more than a mere planning or
preparation, which if carried out to its complete
termination following its natural course, without being
frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous
desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and
necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The raison
d'etre  for the law requiring a direct overt act is that, in a
majority of cases, the conduct of the accused consisting
merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be
equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his
declared intent. It is that quality of being equivocal that
must be lacking before the act becomes one which may
be said to be a commencement of the commission of the
crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the
crime itself has been committed, and this is so for the
reason that so long as the equivocal quality remains, no
one can say with certainty what the intent of the accused
is. It is necessary that the overt act should have been
the ultimate step towards the consummation of the
design. It is sufficient if it was the "first or some
subsequent step in a direct movement towards the
commission of the offense after the preparations are
made." The act done need not constitute the last
proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however,
that the attempt must have a causal relation to the
intended crime. In the words of Viada, the overt acts
must have an immediate and necessary relation to the
offense.
In the case at bar, petitioners, who acted in concert,
commenced the felony of murder by mauling the victim
and hitting him three times with a hollow block; they
narrowly missed hitting the middle portion of his head. If
Edgardo had done so, Ruben would surely have died.
As stated, the attendant circumstances here clearly show
that appellant and his companions did intend to kill the
Evangelista brothers. They were able to deal multiple
fatal blows on at least three (3) of the brothers; but as
for Eric, they did not spare him. He was also stabbed by
Baynosa. It just so happened they missed to hit him on a
vital part like what they did to Eric's three (3) brothers.
Criminal Case No. L-8888
Mark Ryan
As for Mark Ryan Evangelista, Dr. Fernandez testified
that the victim's injury was fatal and could have led to
Mark Ryan's death were it not for the timely medical
attention given him, thus:
x x x          x x x          x x x
PROSECUTOR
PORCULAS:
Q: Likewise, doctor, the private
complainant is Mark Ryan Q.
Evangelista. Can you tell the Court if
you remember treat(ing) this victim on
April 28, 2010?
WITNESS:
A: Yes. I admit(ted) the patient and was
discharged (in) May 7, 2010.
Q: Can you tell us likewise the physical
condition of the victim at the time of the
admition (sic)?
A: At the time of the admition (sic) of the
patient and after a few hours the
condition of the patient worsen and I
have to schedule the operation.
Q: Can you tell us what were the injury or
injuries sustained as you noticed to the
patient when you admit(ted) him?
A: There was (a) stab wound at the right
lower back, in this area. "Witness
pointing to his lower back.
Q: And aside from that, what else did you
do?
A: I think the main injury of this patient.
Q: So, that is the main injury. You mean it
is fatal injury, doctor?
A: Yes, (it) is fatal.
Q: What did you do when you immediately
noticed his fatal injury, doctor?
A: This patient was admitted to the ICU at
1:30 in the morning and then, at about
1:10 in the (afternoon) about twelve (12)
hours as admitted in the ICU I noticed
that there is something wrong, so, I
scheduled immediately operation.
Q: Few hours, thereafter, from admission
this patient's operation was done upon
his person?
A: Yes.
Q: What was the result of your operation?
A: When I open the entire abdomen was
filled of clotted (sic) blood meaning none
clotting component in the entire
abdomen and the reason for that was, the
liver was injured. There was stab wound.
[91
x x x          x x x          x x x
Q: Aside from qualification of the injury as
fatal in nature, can you tell us if you can
approximately or probable time that the
victim will sustain his life any probable
adequate medical attendance?
A: The patient may die on the same
depending (on) the rate of the bleeding
or fast bleeding the patient might live
about 1 to 3 days depending on the rate
of the blood lost inside.[92
x x x          x x x          x x x
Killing becomes frustrated when the offender performs all
the acts of execution which could have produced the
crime but did not produce it for reasons independent of
his or her will.93People v. Lababo94 is apropros:
As for BBB's case, We agree with the RTC and CA's
factual finding that the eight gunshot wounds sustained
by BBB, as contained in the Medico-Legal
Certificate, would have caused his death if he was not
given timely medical attention. Furthermore, it does not
appear that BBB was armed or was in a position to
deflect the attack. As a matter of fact, based on CCC's
narration of the events that transpired, the suddenness
of the attack upon AAA and BBB cannot be denied. Only
that, unlike AAA, BBB survived.
The act of killing becomes frustrated when an offender
performs all the acts of execution which could produce
the crime but did not produce it for reasons independent
of his or her will.
Here, taking into consideration the fact that BBB was
shot eight times with the use of a firearm and that AAA,
who was with him at that time, was killed, convinces Us
that the malefactor intended to take EBB's life as well.
However, unlike in AAA's case, BBB survived. It was also
established that he survived not because the wounds
were not fatal, but because timely medical attention was
rendered to him. Definitely, EBB's survival was
independent of the perpetrator's will. As such, this Court
is convinced that the attack upon BBB qualifies as
frustrated murder.
All told, the trial court and Court of Appeals both did not
err in finding appellant guilty of murder for the death of
Abelardo; attempted murder for the injury sustained by
Eric; and frustrated murder for the injury sustained by
Mark Ryan.
Penalties
Criminal Case No. 8886
Murder
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA
7659, states:
Article 248. Murder.  - Any person who, not falling within
the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be
guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua,  to death if committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances x x x x
Applying Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code 95 here
the lesser of the two (2) indivisible penalties, i.e.,
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed provided there is no
mitigating or aggravating circumstance that attended the
killing, as in this case. Hence, the Court of Appeals
correctly sentenced appellant to reclusion perpetua.
Going now to appellant's civil liabilities, People of the
Philippines v. Esmael Gervero, et al.96 ruled:
x x x          x x x          x x x
Following the jurisprudence laid down by the Court
in People v. Jugueta,  accused-appellants are ordered to
pay the heirs of Hernando Villegas, Jose Villegas, and
Benito Basug, Jr. P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as
exemplary damages. It was also ruled in Jugueta  that
when no documentary evidence of burial or funeral
expenses is presented in court, the amount of
P50,000.00 as temperate damages shall be awarded. In
addition, interest at the rate of six percent per annum
shall be imposed on all monetary awards from the date
of finality of this decision until fully paid.
 x x x          x x x          x x x
The Court of Appeals, therefore, correctly awarded
Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil
indemnity to the heirs of Abelardo Evangelista.
On the award of actual damages, the family of Abelardo
Evangelista presented receipts in the amount of Forty
Thousand Six Hundred and Fifty Pesos (P40,650.00) for
coffin, funeral mass, and blessing.97 Although they
claimed to have also spent Forty Thousand Pesos
(P40,000.00) for the wake, they failed to present receipts
for the alleged expense. Hence, the actual damages
proven is only Forty Thousand Six Hundred Fifty Pesos
(P40,650.00).
But, as pronounced in Gervero and People v.
Jugueta,98"when no documentary evidence of burial or
funeral expenses is presented in court, the amount of
P50,000.00 as temperate damages shall be
awarded." Considering that the receipts presented by
Abelardo's heirs did not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00), they shall, in lieu of actual damages, be
granted Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) temperate
damages in order to avoid the situation where those who
did not present any receipt at all would get more that
those who claimed for more than Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) but failed to present receipts for the excess
of that amount. Verily, the heirs of Abelardo Evangelista
are entitled to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as
temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages.
As for moral and exemplary damages, the same must be
increased to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00)
each in accordance with Gervero and Jugueta.
Criminal Case No. L-8887
Attempted Murder
Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code states:
Art. 51. Penalty to be imposed upon principals of
attempted crimes.  — A penalty lower by two degrees
than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony
shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempt to
commit a felony.
Under the indeterminate sentence law, the maximum of
the sentence shall be that which could be properly
imposed in view of the attending circumstances, and the
minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.
Absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the
minimum term should be within the range of prision
correccional,  which has a duration of six (6) months and
one (1) day to six (6) years, and the maximum term
should be within the range of prision mayor in its
medium term, which has a duration of eight (8) years
and one (1) day to ten (10) years.99
The trial court and Court of Appeals, therefore, correctly
sentenced appellant to two (2) years, four (4) months,
and one (1) day of prision correccional,  as minimum, to
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,  as
maximum.
As for civil liabilities, Jugueta decreed:
I. For those crimes like, Murder, Parricide, Serious
Intentional Mutilation, Infanticide, and other crimes
involving death of a victim where the penalty consists of
indivisible penalties:
xxxx
2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:
b. Attempted:
i. Civil indemnity – P25,000.00
ii. Moral damages – P25,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – P25,000.00
The award of moral damages here should be reduced
from Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) to Twenty-Five
Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00). The award of exemplary
damages, however, is increased from Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00) to Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00). Appellant is also liable to pay Twenty-Five
Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as civil indemnity.
As for actual damages, the parties stipulated on the
receipts100 as proof of the expenses incurred by Eric
Evangelista for the treatment of the wounds he
sustained.101
In its Decision dated March 13, 2015, the Court of
Appeals, nonetheless, awarded Twenty-Five Thousand
Pesos (P25,000.00) and not just the full claim of Seven
Thousand and Thirty-Two Pesos (P7,032.00) by Eric
Evangelista. The Court of Appeals reasoned:
When actual damages proven by receipts during the trial
amount to less than P25,000.00, the award of temperate
damages for P25,000.00 is justified in lieu of actual
damages of a lesser amount. Conversely, if the amount
of actual damages proven exceeds P25,000.00 then
temperate damages may no longer be awarded; actual
damages base on the receipts presented during trial
should instead be granted.
x x x          x x x          x x x
In the case of Eric Evangelista, the actual damages
proven during the trial amount to less than P25,000.00.
Only medical expenses amounting to P7,032.00 were
duly supported by receipts. Thus, the award of temperate
damages of P25,000.00 in lieu of P7,032.00 as actual
damages is justified.102
We clarify.
In People v. Villanueva,103 the victim's heirs claimed
Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P600,000.00) as actual
and total expenses. But they were only able to present
receipts up to Thirteen Thousand and One Hundred Pesos
(P13,100.00). The Court then, adopted the
pronouncement in People v. Albrazado104 where the
Court granted temperate damages, in lieu of actual
damages, in the amount of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00). The Court said in Albrazado  that it
"would be unfair for the victim's heirs to get nothing,
despite the death of their kin, for the reason alone that
they cannot produce any receipts."
Thus, in Villanueva, the Court said that it would
be "unfair"  for Villanueva's heirs to be awarded with only
Thirteen Thousand One Hundred
Pesos (P13,100.00) "because the victim's heirs who
tried but succeeded in proving actual damages to the
extent of P13,100 only, would be in a worse situation
than, say, those who might have presented no receipts
at all but would now be entitled to P25,000 temperate
damages." The Court ruled that "when actual damages
proven by receipts during the trial amount to less than
P25,000, as in this case, the award of temperate
damages for P25,000 is justified in lieu of actual
damages of a lesser amount. Conversely, if the amount
of actual damages proven exceeds P25,000, then
temperate damages may no longer be awarded; actual
damages based on the receipts presented during trial
should instead be granted"
Here, Eric's full claim was only Seven Thousand and
Thirty-Two Pesos (P7,032.00). No more, no less. For it
was the only amount he spent for his treatment. Why
then should he be given Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00)? It would certainly be unjust for appellant
to be compelled to pay more than what Eric actually
claimed to have spent for his treatment, i.e.  Seven
Thousand and Thirty-Two Pesos (P7,032.00), exactly the
amount covered by the receipts the People offered as
Exhibits "M" to "M-7."
It is, therefore, incorrect for the Court to award more
than the amount Eric Evangelista actually incurred for his
treatment, let alone, beyond what Eric Evangelista
himself claimed to have actually spent.
Criminal Case No. L-8888
Frustrated Murder
Article 50 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 50. Penalty to be imposed upon principals of a
frustrated crime. — The penalty next lower in degree
than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony
shall be imposed upon the principal in a frustrated felony.
In the absence of any modifying circumstances, the
imposable penalty for frustrated murder is reclusion
temporal  in its medium period. Applying the
indeterminate sentence law, appellant was correctly
sentenced to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal,  as maximum.
As for civil liabilities, Jugueta decreed:
II. For those crimes like, Murder, Parricide, Serious
Intentional Mutilation, Infanticide, and other crimes
involving death of a victim where the penalty consists of
indivisible penalties:
xxxx
2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:
a. Frustrated:
i. Civil indemnity – P50,000.00
ii. Moral damages – P50,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages – P50,000.00
In sum, the awards of moral and exemplary damages are
increased to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) each.
Appellant is also ordered to pay Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as civil indemnity.
As for actual damages, both the trial court and Court of
Appeals correctly awarded Sixty Eight Thousand Seven
Hundred and Twelve Pesos (P68,712.00) the same being fourteen (14) years, eight months (8) and one (1)
duly supported by corresponding receipts.105 day of reclusion temporal,  as the maximum. He is
ordered to PAY Mark Ryan Q. Evangelista the following
ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision amounts:
dated March 13, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 05193 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. (1) Php68,712.00 as actual damages;
(2) Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
In Criminal Case No. L-8886, Dang Angeles y  Guarin (3) Php50,000.00 as moral damages; and
is found GUILTY of MURDER and sentenced to reclusion (4) Php50,000.00 as exemplary damages
perpetua.  The qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength, in lieu of treachery is appreciated All monetary awards shall earn interest at the legal rate
against him. He is further ordered to PAY the heirs of of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this
Abelardo Q. Evangelista the following amounts: decision until fully paid.

(1) Php50,000.00 as temperate damages; SO ORDERED.

(2) Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(3) Php75,000.00 as moral damages; and
(4) Php75,000.00 as exemplary damages

In Criminal Case No. L-8887, Dang Angeles y Guarin is

found GUILTY of ATTEMPTED MURDER and sentenced
to the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4)
months, and one (1) day of prision correctional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum. He is ordered
to PAY Eric Q. Evangelista the following amounts:

(1) Php7,032.00 as actual damages;

(2)Php25,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(3)Php25,000.00 as moral damages; and
(4)Php25,000.00 as exemplary damages

In Criminal Case No. L-8888, Dang Angeles y Guarin is

found GUILTY of FRUSTRATED MURDER and
sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of eight (8)
years of prision mayor,  as the minimum, to