Marbury v Madison
may arise once a PET decision is appealed before the SC.
In Marbury v. Madison (1803) the Supreme Court
announced for the first time the principle that a court may
declare an act of Congress void if it is inconsistent with the
Constitution. William Marbury had been appointed a
justice of the peace for the District of Columbia in the final
hours of the Adams administration. When James Madison,
Thomas Jeffersons secretary of state, refused to deliver
Marburys commission, Marbury, joined by three other
similarly situated appointees, petitioned for a writ of
mandamus compelling delivery of the commissions.
Chief Justice John Marshall, writing for a unanimous
Court, denied the petition and refused to issue the writ.
Although he found that the petitioners were entitled to their
commissions, he held that the Constitution did not give the
Supreme Court the power to issue writs of mandamus.
Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that such
writs might be issued, but that section of the act was
inconsistent with the Constitution and therefore invalid.
Although the immediate effect of the decision was to deny
power to the Court, its long-run effect has been to increase
the Courts power by establishing the rule that it is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is. Since Marbury v.
Madison the Supreme Court has been the final arbiter of the
constitutionality of congressional legislation.
Lopez v Roxas
Fernando Lopez and Gerardo Roxas were the candidates
for Vice President in the 1965 elections. Lopez won the
election. Roxas appealed his loss before the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal (PET). The PET was created by RA 1793.
It is provided in the law that:
There shall be an independent Presidential Electoral
Tribunal . . . which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
president-elect and the Vice-president elect of the
Philippines.
In effect, a losing candidate would have the right to appeal
his loss. Lopez assailed the law and he sought to enjoin
Roxas and the PET from proceeding with the case. Lopez
averred that the PET is unconstitutional for it was not
provided for in the constitution. Also, since the PET is
composed of the Chief Justice and the other ten members
of the SC any decision of the PET cannot be validly
appealed before the SC or that there may be conflict that
ISSUE: Whether or not the PET is a valid body.
HELD: Yes. In coming up with the PET, the Congress merely
conferred a new function to the Supreme Court. Such is
within its power, the Constitution allowed Congress to
determine which body should decide controversies
relating to the election of the President or the Vice
President. RA 1793 did not create another court within the
SC for pursuant to the Constitution, the Judicial power
shall be vested in one SC and in such inferior courts as may
be established by law
The Supreme Court went on to emphasize that the
fundamental law vests in the judicial branch of the
government, not merely some specified or limited judicial
power, but the judicial power under our political system,
and, accordingly, the entirety or all of said power,
except, only, so much as the Constitution confers upon
some other agency, such as the power to judge all
contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the Senate and those of the
House of Representatives, which is vested by the
fundamental law solely in the Senate Electoral Tribunal
and the House Electoral Tribunal, respectively.
Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable
controversies or disputes involving rights that are
enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice
or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights. The
proper exercise of said authority requires legislative
action: (1) defining such enforceable and demandable
rights and/or prescribing remedies for violations thereof;
and (2) determining the court with jurisdiction to hear and
decide said controversies or disputes, in the first instance
and/or on appeal. For this reason, the Constitution ordains
that Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe,
and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts,
subject to the limitations set forth in the fundamental law.
The SC ruled that the PET is not in conflict with the
constitution. RA 1793 merely added the courts jurisdiction
and such can be validly legislated by Congress. It merely
conferred upon the SC additional functions i.e., the
functions of the PET. This is valid because the determining
of election contests is essentially judicial.
Belgica v Ochoa
BELGICA, ET AL. VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
ET AL. (G.R. NO. 208566; SOCIAL JUSTICE
SOCIETY VS. HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, ET AL.
(G.R. NO. 208493); NEPOMUCENO VS. PRES.
AQUINO (G.R. NO. 209251) NOVEMBER 19,
2013
FACTS
HISTORY of CONGRESSIONAL PORK
BARREL
The term pork barrel, a political parlance of
American-English origin, refers to an
appropriation of government spending
meant for localized projects and secured
solely or primarily to bring money to a
representatives district.
The earliest form of the pork barrel system is
found in Section 3 of Act 3044, otherwise
known as the Public Works Act of 1922.
Under this provision, release of funds and
realignment of unexpended portions of an
item or appropriation were subject to the
approval of a joint committee elected by the
Senate and the House of Representatives.
In 1950, members of Congress, by virtue of
being representatives of the people, also
became involved in project identification.
The pork barrel system was temporarily
discontinued when martial law was
declared.
It reappeared in 1982 through an item in the
General Appropriations Act (GAA) called
Support for Local Development Projects
(SLDP). SLDP started the giving of lump-
sum allocations to individual legislators. The
SLDP also began to cover not only public
works project or hard projects but also
covered soft projects such as those which
would fall under education, health and
livelihood.
After the EDSA People Power Revolution
and the restoration of democracy, the pork
barrel was revived through the Mindanao
Development Fund and the Visayas
Development Fund.
In 1990, the pork barrel was renamed
Countrywide Development Fund (CDF).
The CDF was meant to cover small local
infrastructure and other priority community
projects.
CDF Funds were, with the approval of the
President, released directly to implementing
agencies subject to the submission of the
required list of projects and activities.
Senators and congressmen could identify
any kind of project from hard projects such
as roads, buildings and bridges to soft
projects such as textbooks, medicines, and
scholarships.
In 1993, the CDF was further modified such
that the release of funds was to be made
upon the submission of the list of projects
and activities identified by individual
legislators. This was also the first time when
the Vice-President was given an allocation.
The CDF contained the same provisions from
1994-1996 except that the Department of
Budget and Management was required to
submit reports to the Senate Committee on
Finance and the House Committee on
Appropriations regarding the releases made
from the funds.
Congressional insertions (CIs) were
another form of congressional pork barrel
aside from the CDF. Examples of the CIs
include the DepEd School Building Fund, the
Congressional Initiative Allocations, and the
Public Works Fund, among others.
The allocations for the School Building Fund
were made upon prior consultation with the
representative of the legislative district
concerned and the legislators had the power
to direct how, where and when these
appropriations were to be spent.
In 1999, the CDF was removed from the
GAA and replaced by three separate forms of
CIs: (i) Food Security Program Fund, (ii)
Lingap Para sa Mahihirap Fund, and (iii)
Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure
Program Fund. All three contained a
provision requiring prior consultation with
members of Congress for the release of
funds.
In 2000, the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) appeared in the
GAA. PDAF required prior consultation with
the representative of the district before the
release of funds. PDAF also allowed
realignment of funds to any expense
category except personal services and other
personnel benefits.
 In 2005, the PDAF introduced the program
menu concept which is essentially a list of
general programs and implementing
agencies from which a particular PDAF
project may be subsequently chosen by the
identifying authority. This was retained in
the GAAs from 2006-2010.
It was during the Arroyo administration
when the formal participation of non-
governmental organizations in the
implementation of PDAF projects was
introduced.
The PDAF articles from 2002-2010 were
silent with respect to specific amounts for
individual legislators.
In 2011, the PDAF Article in the GAA
contained an express statement on lump-
sum amounts allocated for individual
legislators and the Vice-President. It also
contained a provision on realignment of
funds but with the qualification that it may
be allowed only once.
The 2013 PDAF Article allowed LGUs to be
identified as implementing
agencies. Legislators were also allowed
identify programs/projects outside of his
legislative district. Realignment of funds and
release of funds were required to be
favorably endorsed by the House Committee
on Appropriations and the Senate Committee
on Finance, as the case may be.
MALAMPAYA FUNDS AND PRESIDENTIAL
SOCIAL FUND
The use of the term pork barrel was
expanded to include certain funds of the
President such as the Malampaya Fund and
the Presidential Social Fund (PSF).
The Malampaya Fund was created as a
special fund under Section 8 of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 910 issued by President
Ferdinand Marcos on March 22, 1976.
The PSF was created under Section 12, Title
IV of PD No. 1869, or the Charter of the
Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR), as amended by PD
No. 1993. The PSF is managed and
administered by the Presidential
Management Staff and is sourced from the
share of the government in the aggregate
gross earnings of PAGCOR.
PORK BARREL MISUSE
In 1996, Marikina City Representative Romeo
Candozo revealed that huge sums of money
regularly went into the pockets of legislators
in the form of kickbacks.
In 2004, several concerned citizens sought
the nullification of the PDAF but the
Supreme Court dismissed the petition for
lack of evidentiary basis regarding illegal
misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks.
In July 2013, the National Bureau of
Investigation probed the allegation that a
syndicate defrauded the government of P10
billion using funds from the pork barrel of
lawmakers and various government agencies
for scores of ghost projects.
In August 2013, the Commission on Audit
released the results of a three-year audit
investigation detailing the irregularities in the
release of the PDAF from 2007 to 2009.
Whistle-blowers also alleged that at least
P900 million from the Malampaya Funds had
gone into a dummy NGO.
ISSUE/S
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the
consolidated petitions involve an actual and
justiciable controversy, (b) the issues raised
are matters of policy not subject to judicial
review, (c) petitioners have legal standing to
sue, (d) previous decisions of the Court bar
the re-litigation of the constitutionality of the
Pork Barrel system.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and
all other Congressional Pork Barrel laws are
unconstitutional for violating the
constitutional provisions on (a) separation of
powers, (b) non-delegability of legislative
power, (c) checks and balances, (d)
accountability, (e) political dynasties, (f)
local autonomy.
RULING
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
(a) There is an actual and justiciable
controversy
 There exists an actual and justiciable
controversy in the cases. The requirement of
contrariety of legal rights is satisfied by the
antagonistic positions of the parties
regarding the constitutionality of the pork
barrel system.
The case is ripe for adjudication since the
challenged funds and the laws allowing for
their utilization are currently existing and
operational and thereby posing an
immediate or threatened injury to
petitioners.
The case is not moot as the proposed
reforms on the PDAF and the abolition
thereof does not actually terminate the
controversy on the matter. The President
does not have constitutional authority to
nullify or annul the legal existence of the
PDAF.
The moot and academic principle cannot
stop the Court from deciding the case
considering that: (a) petitioners allege grave
violation of the constitution, (b) the
constitutionality of the pork barrel system
presents a situation of exceptional character
and is a matter of paramount public interest,
(c) there is a practical need for a definitive
ruling on the systems constitutionality to
guide the bench, the bar and the public, and
(d) the preparation and passage of the
national budget is an annual occurrence.
(b) Political Question Doctrine is
Inapplicable
The intrinsic constitutionality of the Pork
Barrel System is not an issue dependent
upon the wisdom of the political branches of
the government but rather a legal one which
the Constitution itself has commanded the
Court to act upon.
The 1987 Constitution expanded the concept
of judicial power such that the Supreme
Court has the power to determine whether
there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality
on the part of the government.
(c) Petitioners have legal standing to Sue
Petitioners have legal standing by virtue of
being taxpayers and citizens of the
Philippines.
As taxpayers, they are bound to suffer from
the unconstitutional usage of public funds.
As citizens, the issues they have raised are
matters of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest.
(d) The Petition is not barred by previous
cases
The present case is not barred by the ruling
in Philconsa vs. Enriquez [1] because the
Philconsa case was a limited response to a
separation of powers problem, specifically on
the propriety of conferring post-enactment
identification authority to Members of
Congress.
On the contrary, the present cases involve a
more holistic examination of (a) the inter-
relation between the CDF and the PDAF
Articles with each other, and (b) the inter-
relation of post-enactment measures
contained within a particular CDF or PDAF
article, including not only those related to
the area of project identification but also to
the areas of fund release and realignment.
Moreover, the Philconsa case was riddled
with inherent constitutional inconsistencies
considering that the authority to identify
projects is an aspect of appropriation and
the power of appropriation is a form of
legislative power thereby lodged in
Congress. This power cannot be exercised by
individual members of Congress and the
authority to appropriate cannot be exercised
after the GAA has already been passed.
The case of Lawyers Against Monopoly and
Poverty vs. Secretary of Budget and
Management[2] does not also bar judgment
on the present case because it was
dismissed on a procedural technicality and
hence no controlling doctrine was rendered.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON
CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL
(a) The separation of powers between
the Executive and the Legislative Departments
has been violated.
The post-enactment measures including
project identification, fund release, and fund
realignment are not related to functions of
 congressional oversight and, hence, allow
legislators to intervene and/or assume duties
that properly belong to the sphere of budget
execution, which belongs to the executive
department.
Legislators have been, in one form or
another, authorized to participate in the
various operational aspects of budgeting,
including the evaluation of work and
financial plans for individual activities and
the regulation and release of funds in
violation of the separation of powers
principle.
Any provision of law that empowers
Congress or any of its members to play any
role in the implementation or enforcement of
the law violates the principle of separation of
powers and is thus unconstitutional.
That the said authority to identify projects is
treated as merely recommendatory in nature
does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since
the prohibition covers any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law.
Respondents also failed to prove that the
role of the legislators is only
recommendatory in nature. They even
admitted that the identification of the
legislator constitutes a mandatory
requirement before the PDAF can be tapped
as a funding source.
(b)The principle of non-delegability of
legislative powers has been violated
The 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers
post-enactment identification authority to
individual legislators, violates the principle of
non-delegability since said legislators are
effectively allowed to individually exercise
the power of appropriation, which as
settled in Philconsa is lodged in Congress.
That the power to appropriate must be
exercised only through legislation is clear
from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which states that: No money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
The legislators are individually exercising the
power of appropriation because each of
them determines (a) how much of their
PDAF fund would go to and (b) a specific
project or beneficiary that they themselves
also determine.
(c) Checks and balances
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of
P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective
allocation limit since the said amount would
be further divided among individual
legislators who would then receive personal
lump-sum allocations and could, after the
GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF
funds based on their own discretion.
This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment
legislative identification budgeting system
fosters the creation of a budget within a
budget which subverts the prescribed
procedure of presentment and consequently
impairs the Presidents power of item veto.
It forces the President to decide between (a)
accepting the entire PDAF allocation without
knowing the specific projects of the
legislators, which may or may not be
consistent with his national agenda and (b)
rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of
all other legislators with legitimate projects.
In fact, even without its post-enactment
legislative identification feature, the 2013
PDAF Article would remain constitutionally
flawed since it would then operate as a
prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation.
This is because the appropriation law leaves
the actual amounts and purposes of the
appropriation for further determination and,
therefore, does not readily indicate a
discernible item which may be subject to the
Presidents power of item veto.
(d) The Congressional Pork Barrel
partially prevents accountability as Congress is
incapable of checking itself or its members.
The fact that individual legislators are given
post-enactment roles in the implementation
of the budget makes it difficult for them to
become disinterested observers when
scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the
implementation of the appropriation law.
The conduct of oversight would be tainted as
said legislators, who are vested with post-
enactment authority, would, in effect, be
checking on activities in which they
themselves participate.
The concept of post-enactment authorization
violates Section 14, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, which prohibits members of
Congress to intervene in any matter before
any office of the Government, because it
renders them susceptible to taking undue
advantage of their own office.
The Court, however, cannot completely
agree that the same post-enactment
 authority and/or the individual legislators
control of his PDAF per se would allow him
to perpetuate himself in office.
The use of his PDAF for re-election purposes
is a matter which must be analyzed based on
particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.
(e) The constitutional provision
regarding political dynasties is not self-
executing.
Section 26, Article II of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that the state
shall prohibit political dynasties as may be
defined by law, is not a self-executing
provision.
Since there appears to be no standing law
which crystallizes the policy on political
dynasties for enforcement, the Court must
defer from ruling on this issue.
(f) The Congressional Pork Barrel
violates constitutional principles on local
autonomy
The Congressional Pork Barrel goes against
the constitutional principles on local
autonomy since it allows district
representatives, who are national officers, to
substitute their judgments in utilizing public
funds for local development.
The gauge of PDAF and CDF
allocation/division is based solely on the fact
of office, without taking into account the
specific interests and peculiarities of the
district the legislator represents.
The allocation/division limits are clearly not
based on genuine parameters of equality,
wherein economic or geographic indicators
have been taken into consideration.
This concept of legislator control underlying
the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the
functions of the various Local Development
Councils (LDCs) which are already legally
mandated toassist the corresponding
sanggunian in setting the direction of
economic and social development, and
coordinating development efforts within its
territorial jurisdiction.
Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities
whose functions are essentially geared
towards managing local affairs, their
programs, policies and resolutions should not
be overridden nor duplicated by individual
legislators, who are national officers that
have no law-making authority except only
when acting as a body.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON
PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL
(a) Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section
12 of PD No. 1869 are valid appropriation laws.
For an appropriation law to be valid under
Section 29 (1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that No money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law,
it is enough that (a) the provision of law sets
apart a determinate or determinable amount
of money and (b) allocates the same for a
particular public purpose.
Section 8 of PD 910 is a valid appropriation
law because it set apart a determinable
amount: a Special Fund comprised of all
fees, revenues, and receipts of the [Energy
Development] Board from any and all
sources.
It also specified a public purpose: energy
resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government
and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President.
Section 12 of PD No. 1869 is also a valid
appropriation law because it set apart a
determinable amount: [a]fter deducting five
(5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty
(50%) percent share of the Government in
the aggregate gross earnings of [PAGCOR],
or 60%[,] if the aggregate gross earnings be
less than P150,000,000.00.
It also specified a public purpose: priority
infrastructure development projects and x x
x the restoration of damaged or destroyed
facilities due to calamities, as may be
directed and authorized by the Office of the
President of the Philippines.
(b) Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section
12 of PD No. 1869 constitutes undue
delegation of legislation powers.
The phrase and for such other purposes as
may be hereafter directed by the President
under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power insofar
 as it does not lay down a sufficient standard
to adequately determine the limits of the
Presidents authority with respect to the
purpose for which the Malampaya Funds
may be used.
This phrase gives the President wide latitude
to use the Malampaya Funds for any other
purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows
him to unilaterally appropriate public funds
beyond the purview of the law.
This notwithstanding, it must be underscored
that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows
for the use of the Malampaya Funds to
finance energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the
government, remains legally effective and
subsisting.
Section 12 of PD No. 1869 constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative powers
because it lies independently unfettered by
any sufficient standard of the delegating law.
The law does not supply a definition of
priority infrastructure development projects
and hence, leaves the President without any
guideline to construe the same.
The delimitation of a project as one of
infrastructure is too broad of a
classification since the said term could
pertain to any kind of facility.
Araullo v Aquino
When President Benigno Aquino III took office,
his administration noticed the sluggish growth of
the economy. The World Bank advised that the
economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget
Secretary Florencio Butch Abad then came up
with a program called the Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the
funding of government projects. DAP enables the
Executive to realign funds from slow moving
projects to priority projects instead of waiting for
next years appropriation. So what happens under
the DAP was that if a certain government project
is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive
agency, the funds allotted therefor will be
withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn,
these funds are declared as savings by the
Executive and said funds will then be reallotted
to other priority projects. The DAP program did
work to stimulate the economy as economic
growth was in fact reported and portion of such
growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by
the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the
unprogrammed funds from the General
Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed
funds are standby appropriations made by
Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy
Estrada made an expos claiming that he, and
other Senators, received Php50M from the
President as an incentive for voting in favor of
the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato
Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money
was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon
the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns
out that the DAP does not only realign funds
within the Executive. It turns out that some non-
Executive projects were also funded; to name a
few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera Peoples
Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro
National Liberation Front), P700M for the
Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain
Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo,
Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens
to file various petitions with the Supreme Court
questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their
contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the
constitutional rule which provides that no money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on
certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and
augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art.
VI of the Constitution (power of the President to
augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order
292 (power of the President to suspend
expenditures and authority to use savings,
respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle
no money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be
considered as impoundments by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP
realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of
unprogrammed funds to the DAP is
constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact
is applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art.
VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a
program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is
it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing
government spending. As such, it did not violate
the Constitutional provision cited in Section
29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no
additional funds were withdrawn from the
 Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by
law would have been required. Funds, which
were already appropriated for by the GAA, were
merely being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the
DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the
Presidents power to refuse to spend
appropriations or to retain or deduct
appropriations for whatever reason.
Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA
unless there will be an unmanageable national
government budget deficit (which did not
happen). Nevertheless, theres no impoundment
in the case at bar because whats involved in the
DAP was the transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were
unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and
even the heads of the other branches of the
government) are allowed by the Constitution to
make realignment of funds, however, such
transfer or realignment should only be made
within their respective offices. Thus, no cross-
border transfers/augmentations may be allowed.
But under the DAP, this was violated because
funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive
were being transferred to the Legislative and
other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers within their respective offices
also contemplate realignment of funds to an
existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP,
even though some projects were within the
Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar
as the GAA is concerned because no funds were
appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some
of these projects may be legitimate, they are still
non-existent under the GAA because they were
not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to
such projects is unconstitutional and is without
legal basis.
On the issue of what are savings
These DAP transfers are not savings contrary
to what was being declared by the Executive.
Under the definition of savings in the GAA,
savings only occur, among other instances, when
there is an excess in the funding of a certain
project once it is completed, finally discontinued,
or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to
savings as funds withdrawn from a slow
moving project. Thus, since the statutory
definition of savings was not complied with
under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the
transfers. Further, savings should only be
declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under
the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn
from certain projects in the middle of the year
and then being declared as savings by the
Executive particularly by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA
cannot be used as money source for the DAP
because under the law, such funds may only be
used if there is a certification from the National
Treasurer to the effect that the revenue
collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In
this case, no such certification was secured before
unprogrammed funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which
recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it
being declared as unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has
definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has
funded numerous projects. If the Executive is
ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP,
then it may cause more harm than good. The
DAP effects can no longer be undone. The
beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to
return what they received especially so that they
relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the
Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable
to the authors, implementers, and proponents of
the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate
tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that
they have not acted in good faith.
Angara v Electoral Commission
In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the
respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates voted for
the position of member of the National Assembly for the
first district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935,
Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the
said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of
office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled,
passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the
members of the National Assembly against whom no
protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua,
filed before the Electoral Commission a Motion of
Protest against the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935,
the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date
as the last day for the filing of protests against the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the NA,
notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the
NA. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by
virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer
protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC
proclamation governs and that the EC can take cognizance
of the election protest and that the EC cannot be subject to
a writ of prohibition from the SC.
ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such
matter.
Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election protest.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC
emphasized that in cases of conflict between the several
departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary,
with the SC as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional
mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and
allocate constitutional boundaries.
That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review
in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the
power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the
government transcends the Constitution, which is the
source of all authority.
That the Electoral Commission is an independent
constitutional creation with specific powers and functions
to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification
to the legislative than to any of the other two departments
of the government.
That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly.
Mutuc v Comelec
AMELITO R. MUTUC vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioner Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the
Constitutional Convention. He filed a special civil
action against the respondent COMELEC when the
latter informed him through a telegram that his
certificate of candidacy was given due course but he
was prohibited from using jingles in his mobile units
equipped with sound systems and loud speakers. The
petitioner accorded the order to be violative of his
constitutional right to freedom of speech. COMELEC
justified its prohibition on the premise that the
Constitutional Convention act provided that it is
unlawful for the candidates to purchase, produce,
request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral
propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of
whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or
materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches,
cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or
foreign origin. COMELEC contended that the jingle or
the recorded or taped voice of the singer used by
petitioner was a tangible propaganda material and
was, under the above statute, subject to confiscation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the usage of the jingle by the
petitioner form part of the prohibition invoked by the
COMELEC.
HELD:
The Court held that the general words following any
enumeration being applicable only to things of the
same kind or class as those specifically referred to.
The COMELECs contention that a candidates jingle
form part of the prohibition, categorized under the
phrase and the like, could not merit the courts
approval by principle of Ejusdem Generis. It is quite
apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was
the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a
means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for
the candidate responsible for its distribution.
Furthermore, the COMELEC failed to observe
construction of the statute which should be in
consonance to the express terms of the constitution.
The intent of the COMELEC for the prohibition may
be laudable but it should not be sought at the cost of
the candidates constitutional rights.
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS GR 122156, 3 February
1997
WHETHER OR NOT THE COSNTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS ARE SELF-EXECUTING
FACTS:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
pursuant to the privatization program of the
Philippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated
8 December 1986, decided to sell through public
bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding
shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding
held on 18 September 1995 only two bidders
participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the
MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and
Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton
as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number
of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than
the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of
Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic
partner and the execution of the necessary
contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid
price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong
Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995.
Manila Prince Hotel sent a managers check to the
GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused
to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps
apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of
the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC
may be hastened by GSIS and consummated with
Renong Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the
Court on prohibition and mandamus.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of the
Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are
self-executing.
RULING:
A provision which lays down a general
principle, such as those found in Article II of the
1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But
a provision which is complete in itself and becomes
operative without the aid of supplementary or
enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient
rule by means of which the right it grants may be
enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a
constitutional provision is self-executing if the
nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself,
so that they can be determined by an examination
and construction of its terms, and there is no
language indicating that the subject is referred to
the legislature for action. In self-executing
constitutional provisions, the legislature may still
enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers
directly granted by the constitution, further the
operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to
be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient
remedy for the protection of the rights secured or
the determination thereof, or place reasonable
safeguards around the exercise of the right. The
mere fact that legislation may supplement and add
to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-
executing constitutional provision does not render
such a provision ineffective in the absence of such
legislation. The omission from a constitution of any
express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right
or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was
not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a
self-executing provision of the constitution does not
necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject,
but any legislation must be in harmony with the
constitution, further the exercise of constitutional
right and make it more available. Subsequent
legislation however does not necessarily mean that
the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself,
fully enforceable. As against constitutions of the
past, modern constitutions have been generally
drafted upon a different principle and have often
become in effect extensive codes of laws intended
to operate directly upon the people in a manner
similar to that of statutory enactments, and the
function of constitutional conventions has evolved
into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence,
unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional
provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead
of self-executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate
of the fundamental law. In fine, Section 10, second
paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in
itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement.
From its very words the provision does not require
any legislation to put it in operation.