Professional Documents
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SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
PADILLA, J.:
Once more the Court is called upon to delineate constitutional boundaries. In this petition for
prohibition, the petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison
from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the
respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting
disbursements in payment of Mison's salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison's
appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not
having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other
hand, maintain the constitutionality of respondent Mison's appointment without the confirmation
of the Commission on Appointments.
Because of the demands of public interest, including the need for stability in the public service,
the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and decide, setting aside the finer
procedural questions of whether prohibition is the proper remedy to test respondent Mison's right
to the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and of whether the petitioners have a
standing to bring this suit.
By the same token, and for the same purpose, the Court allowed the Commission on
Appointments to intervene and file a petition in intervention. Comment was required of
respondents on said petition. The comment was filed, followed by intervenor's reply thereto. The
parties were also heard in oral argument on 8 December 1987.
This case assumes added significance because, at bottom line, it involves a conflict between two
(2) great departments of government, the Executive and Legislative Departments. It also occurs
early in the life of the 1987 Constitution.
The task of the Court is rendered lighter by the existence of relatively clear provisions in the
Constitution. In cases like this, we follow what the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice (later,
Chief Justice) Jose Abad Santos stated in Gold Creek Mining Corp. vs. Rodriguez, 1 that:
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank
of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in
him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he
may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the
appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or
in the heads of the departments, agencies, commissions or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of
the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be
effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of the Congress.
It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just quoted, there are
four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we
will hereafter refer from time to time, are:
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law; 3
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law
4
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. 5
The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of contention. Should they
be appointed by the President with or without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments? By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an
express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those
appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of
the Commission on Appointments. But we need not rely solely on this basic rule of constitutional
construction. We can refer to historical background as well as to the records of the 1986
Constitutional Commission to determine, with more accuracy, if not precision, the intention of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people adopting it, on whether the appointments by the
President, under the second, third and fourth groups, require the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments. Again, in this task, the following advice of Mr. Chief Justice J.
Abad Santos in Gold Creek is apropos:
In deciding this point, it should be borne in mind that a constitutional provision
must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and
understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them. "Courts are
bound to presume that the people adopting a constitution are familiar with the
previous and existing laws upon the subjects to which its provisions relate, and
upon which they express their judgment and opinion in its adoption." (Barry vs.
Truax 13 N.D., 131; 99 N.W., 769,65 L. R. A., 762.) 6
It will be recalled that, under Sec. 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, it is provided that —
(3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and
bureaus, officers of the army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces
from the rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he
may be authorized by law to appoint; but the Congress may by law vest the
appointment of inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of departments.
(4) The President shall havethe power to make appointments during the recess of
the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by
the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
(7) ..., and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall appoint
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls ...
Section 10. The President shall appoint the heads of bureaus and offices, the
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from the rank of Brigadier General
or Commodore, and all other officers of The government whose appointments are
not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom he may be authorized by law
to appoint. However, the Batasang Pambansa may by law vest in the Prime
Minister, members of the Cabinet, the Executive Committee, Courts, Heads of
Agencies, Commissions, and Boards the power to appoint inferior officers in their
respective offices.
Thus, in the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential appointments required the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. It is now a sad part of our political history
that the power of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, under the 1935 Constitution,
transformed that commission, many times, into a venue of "horse-trading" and similar
malpractices.
On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in which it was
molded and remolded by successive amendments, placed the absolute power of appointment in
the President with hardly any check on the part of the legislature.
Given the above two (2) extremes, one, in the 1935 Constitution and the other, in the 1973
Constitution, it is not difficult for the Court to state that the framers of the 1987 Constitution and
the people adopting it, struck a "middle ground" by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments for the first group of appointments and leaving to the President,
without such confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the second and third
groups as well as those in the fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank.
The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission support this conclusion. The original text
of Section 16, Article VII, as proposed by the Committee on the Executive of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, read as follows:
Section 16. The president shall nominate and, with the consent of a Commission
on Appointment, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments
and bureaus, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain and all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and
those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may by law
vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, in the courts, or in
the heads of departments [Emphasis supplied].
7
The above text is almost a verbatim copy of its counterpart provision in the 1935 Constitution.
When the frames discussed on the floor of the Commission the proposed text of Section 16,
Article VII, a feeling was manifestly expressed to make the power of the Commission on
Appointments over presidential appointments more limited than that held by the Commission in
the 1935 Constitution. Thus-
Mr. Monsod: With the Chair's indulgence, I just want to take a few
minutes of our time to lay the basis for some of the amendments
that I would like to propose to the Committee this morning.
On Section 16, I would like to suggest that the power of the Commission on
Appointments be limited to the department heads, ambassadors, generals and
so on but not to the levels of bureau heads and colonels.
In the course of the debates on the text of Section 16, there were two (2) major changes
proposed and approved by the Commission. These were (1) the exclusion of the appointments
of heads of bureaus from the requirement of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments;
and (2) the exclusion of appointments made under the second sentence of the section from the
9
same requirement. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission show the
following:
MR. FOZ: Yes, but the regional directors are under the
supervisiopn of the staff bureau directors.
MR. FOZ: It is still the President who will appoint them but their
appointment shall no longer be subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
Section 16, therefore, would read: 'The President shall nominate, and with the
consent of a Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors. . . .
It is, therefore, clear that appointments to the second and third groups of officers
can be made by the President without the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments.
with particular reference to the word "also," implies that the President shall "in like manner"
appoint the officers mentioned in said second sentence. In other words, the President shall
appoint the officers mentioned in said second sentence in the same manner as he appoints
officers mentioned in the first sentence, that is, by nomination and with the consent (confirmation)
of the Commission on Appointments.
Amicus curiae's reliance on the word "also" in said second sentence is not necessarily supportive
of the conclusion he arrives at. For, as the Solicitor General argues, the word "also" could mean
"in addition; as well; besides, too" (Webster's International Dictionary, p. 62, 1981 edition) which
meanings could, on the contrary, stress that the word "also" in said second sentence means that
the President, in addition to nominating and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appointing the officers enumerated in the first sentence, can appoint (without such
consent (confirmation) the officers mentioned in the second sentence-
Rather than limit the area of consideration to the possible meanings of the word "also" as used in
the context of said second sentence, the Court has chosen to derive significance from the fact
that the first sentence speaks of nomination by the President and appointment by the President
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, whereas, the second sentence speaks
only of appointment by the President. And, this use of different language in two (2) sentences
proximate to each other underscores a difference in message conveyed and perceptions
established, in line with Judge Learned Hand's observation that "words are not pebbles in alien
juxtaposition" but, more so, because the recorded proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission clearly and expressly justify such differences.
As a result of the innovations introduced in Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are
officers whose appointments require no confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, even
if such officers may be higher in rank, compared to some officers whose appointments have to
be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments under the first sentence of the same Sec. 16,
Art. VII. Thus, to illustrate, the appointment of the Central Bank Governor requires no
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, even if he is higher in rank than a colonel in
the Armed Forces of the Philippines or a consul in the Consular Service.
But these contrasts, while initially impressive, merely underscore the purposive intention and
deliberate judgment of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that, except as to those officers
whose appointments require the consent of the Commission on Appointments by express
mandate of the first sentence in Sec. 16, Art. VII, appointments of other officers are left to the
President without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. This conclusion is
inevitable, if we are to presume, as we must, that the framers of the 1987 Constitution were
knowledgeable of what they were doing and of the foreseable effects thereof.
As to the fourth group of officers whom the President can appoint, the intervenor Commission on
Appointments underscores the third sentence in Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution,
which reads:
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in
the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards. [Emphasis supplied].
and argues that, since a law is needed to vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the
President alone, this implies that, in the absence of such a law, lower-ranked officers have to be
appointed by the President subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and, if
this is so, as to lower-ranked officers, it follows that higher-ranked officers should be appointed
by the President, subject also to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
The respondents, on the other hand, submit that the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII,
abovequoted, merely declares that, as to lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest
their appointment in the President, in the courts, or in the heads of the various departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards in the government. No reason however is submitted for the
use of the word "alone" in said third sentence.
The Court is not impressed by both arguments. It is of the considered opinion, after a careful
study of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the use of the word alone"
after the word "President" in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII is, more than anything
else, a slip or lapsus in draftmanship. It will be recalled that, in the 1935 Constitution, the
following provision appears at the end of par. 3, section 1 0, Article VII thereof —
...; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments. [Emphasis
supplied].
The above provision in the 1935 Constitution appears immediately after the provision which
makes practically all presidential appointments subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, thus-
3. The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and
bureaus, officers of the Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces
from the rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not herein provided for, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint; ...
In other words, since the 1935 Constitution subjects, as a general rule, presidential appointments
to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, the same 1935 Constitution saw fit, by way
of an exception to such rule, to provide that Congress may, however, by law vest the
appointment of inferior officers (equivalent to 11 officers lower in rank" referred to in the 1987
Constitution) in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed out, the clear and expressed intent of its
framers was to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec.
16, Article VII. Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article
VII the word "alone" after the word "President" in providing that Congress may by law vest the
appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, because the power to appoint officers whom he (the President) may be authorized
by law to appoint is already vested in the President, without need of confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, in the second sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article VII.
Therefore, the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII could have stated merely that, in the case of
lower-ranked officers, the Congress may by law vest their appointment in the President, in the
courts, or in the heads of various departments of the government. In short, the word "alone" in
the third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, as a literal import from the last
part of par. 3, section 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light
of the second sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. And, this redundancy cannot prevail over the clear
and positive intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential appointments, except
those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII, are not subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
Coming now to the immediate question before the Court, it is evident that the position of
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first
group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. As a
matter of fact, as already pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution includes "heads of bureaus"
among those officers whose appointments need the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, the 1987 Constitution on the other hand, deliberately excluded the position of
"heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission
on Appointments.
Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs. The original text of Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, otherwise known as
the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, which was enacted by the Congress of the
Philippines on 22 June 1957, reads as follows:
601. Chief Officials of the Bureau.-The Bureau of Customs shall have one chief
and one assistant chief, to be known respectively as the Commissioner
(hereinafter known as the 'Commissioner') and Assistant Commissioner of
Customs, who shall each receive an annual compensation in accordance with the
rates prescribed by existing laws. The Assistant Commissioner of Customs shall
be appointed by the proper department head.
Sec. 601 of Republic Act No. 1937, was amended on 27 October 1972 by Presidential Decree
No. 34, amending the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. Sec. 601, as thus amended,
now reads as follows:
Of course, these laws (Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34) were approved during the effectivity of
the 1935 Constitution, under which the President may nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus, like the Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs.
After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, Rep. Act No. 1937 and PD No. 34 have to
be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while the appointment of the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on the President, as an
appointment he is authorizedby law to make, such appointment, however, no longer needs the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
Consequently, we rule that the President of the Philippines acted within her constitutional
authority and power in appointing respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs, without submitting his nomination to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full authority and functions of the office and to
receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.
WHEREFORE, the petition and petition in intervention should be, as they are, hereby
DISMISSED. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.