discreet and prudent man to believe that an
Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP [GR 64261,
26 December 1984]
En Banc, Escolin (J): 10 concur, 1 took no part
Facts: On 7 December 1982, Judge Ernani
Cruz-Pao, Executive Judge of the then CFI Rizal
[Quezon City], issued 2 search warrants where
the premises at 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon
City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building,
Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business
addresses of the Metropolitan Mail and We complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon
Forum newspapers, respectively, were
searched, and office and printing machines,
equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and
other articles used in the printing, publication
and distribution of the said newspapers, as well
as numerous papers, documents, books and
other written literature alleged to be in the
possession and control of Jose Burgos, Jr.
publisher-editor of the We Forum newspaper,
were seized. A petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction was filed after 6 months
following the raid to question the validity of said
search warrants, and to enjoin the Judge
Advocate General of the AFP, the city fiscal of
Quezon City, et.al. from using the articles seized
as evidence in Criminal Case Q-022782 of the
RTC Quezon City (People v. Burgos).
Issue: Whether allegations of possession and
printing of subversive materials may be the
basis of the issuance of search warrants.
Held: Section 3 provides that no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined by the judge,
or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law, after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. Probable cause
for a search is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably
monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala
offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense
are in the place sought to be searched. In
mandating that no warrant shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce; the Constitution requires no
less than personal knowledge by the
which the issuance of a search warrant may be
justified. Herein, a statement in the effect that
Burgos is in possession or has in his control
printing equipment and other paraphernalia,
news publications and other documents which
were used and are all continuously being used
as a means of committing the offense of
subversion punishable under PD 885, as
amended is a mere conclusion of law and does
not satisfy the requirements of probable cause.
Bereft of such particulars as would justify a
finding of the existence of probable cause, said
allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance
of a search warrant. Further, when the search
warrant applied for is directed against a
newspaper publisher or editor in connection with
the publication of subversive materials, the
application and/or its supporting affidavits must
contain a specification, stating with particularity
the alleged subversive material he has published
or is intending to publish. Mere generalization
will not suffice.
People vs. Chua Ho San [GR 128222, 17
June 1999]
En Banc, Davide Jr. (CJ): 13 concur, 1 on leave
Facts: In response to reports of rampant
smuggling of firearms and other contraband, Jim
Lagasca Cid, as Chief of Police of the Bacnotan
Police Station, of La Union began patrolling the
Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While
on 29 March 1995, he intercepted a radio call at
around 12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan
Almoite of Barangay Tammocalao requesting
police assistance regarding an unfamiliar
speedboat the latter had spotted, which looked
different from the boats ordinarily used by
fisherfolk of the area and was poised to dock at
Tammocalao shores. Cid and 6 of his men led by
his Chief Investigator, SPO1 Reynoso Badua,
proceeded forthwith to Tammocalao beach,
conferred with Almoite, and observed that the
speedboat ferried a lone male passenger. When
the speedboat landed, the male passenger
alighted, and using both hands, carried what
appeared a multicolored strawbag, and walked
towards the road. By this time, Almoite, Cid and
Badua, the latter two conspicuous in their
uniform and issued side-arms, became
suspicious of the man as he suddenly changed
direction and broke into a run upon seeing the
approaching officers. Badua, prevented the man
from fleeing by holding on to his right arm.
Although Cid introduced themselves as police
officers, the man appeared impassive. Speaking
in English, then in Tagalog, and later in Ilocano,
Cid then requested the man to open his bag, but
he seemed not to understand. Cid then resorted
to sign language, motioning with his hands for
the man to open the bag. The man apparently
understood and acceded to the request. A
search of the bag yielded several transparent
plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline
substances. As Cid wished to proceed to the
police station, he signaled the man to follow, but
the latter did not comprehend. Hence, Cid
placed his arm around the shoulders of the man
and escorted the latter to the police
headquarters. At the police station, Cid then
recited and informed the man of his
constitutional rights to remain silent, to have
the assistance of a counsel, etc. Eliciting no
response from the man, Cid ordered his men to
find a resident of the area who spoke Chinese to
act as an interpreter. In the meantime, Badua
opened the bag and counted 29 plastic packets
containing yellowish crystalline substances. The
interpreter, Mr. Go Ping Guan, finally arrived,
through whom the man was apprised of his
constitutional rights. When the policemen
asked the man several questions, he retreated
to his obstinate reticence and merely showed his
ID with the name Chua Ho San printed thereon.
Chuas bag and its contents were sent to the
PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Diego Silang,
Carlatan, San Fernando, La Union for laboratory
examination. In the meantime, Chua was
detained at the Bacnotan Police Station. Later,
Police Chief Inspector and Forensic Chemist
Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid (wife of Cid),
conducted a laboratory examination of 29 plastic
packets, adn in her Chemistry Report D-025-95,
she stated that her qualitative examination
established the contents of the plastic packets,
weighing 28.7 kilos, to be positive of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a
regulated drug. Chua was initially charged with
illegal possession of methamphetamine
hydrochloride before the RTC (Criminal Case
4037). However, pursuant to the
recommendation of the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of San Fernando, La Union, the
information was subsequently amended to
allege that Chua was in violation of Section 15,
Article III of RA 6425 as amended by RA 7659
(illegal transport of a regulated drug). At his
arraignment on 31 July 1995, where the
amended complaint was read to him by a
Fukien-speaking interpreter, Chua entered a
plea of not guilty. Trial finally ensued, with
interpreters assigned to Chua (upon the RTCs
direct request to the Taipei Economic and
Cultural Office in the Philippines, after its failure
to acquire one from the Department of Foreign
Affairs). Chua provided a completely different
story, claiming that the bags belong to his
employer Cho Chu Rong, who he accompanied
in the speedboat; that they decided to dock
when they were low on fuel and telephone
battery; that the police, with nary any spoken
word but only gestures and hand movements,
escorted him to the precinct where he was
handcuffed and tied to a chair; that the police,
led by an officer, arrived with the motor engine
of the speedboat and a bag, which they
presented to him; that the police inspected
opened the bag, weighed the contents, then
proclaimed them as methamphetamine
hydrochloride. In a decision promulgated on 10
February 1997, the RTC convicted Chua for
transporting 28.7 kilos of methamphetamine
hydrochloride without legal authority to do so.
Chua prays for the reversal of the RTC decision
and his acquittal before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether persistent reports of rampant
smuggling of firearm and other contraband
articles, Chuas watercraft differing in
appearance from the usual fishing boats that
commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, Chuas
illegal entry into the Philippines, Chuas
suspicious behavior, i.e. he attempted to flee
when he saw the police authorities, and the
apparent ease by which Chua can return to and
navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch
towards the high seas, constitute probable
cause.
Held: No. Enshrined in the Constitution is the
inviolable right to privacy of home and person.
It explicitly ordains that people have the right to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose. Inseparable, and not merely corollary
or incidental to said right and equally hallowed
in and by the Constitution, is the exclusionary
principle which decrees that any evidence
obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding. The
Constitutional proscription against unreasonable
searches and seizures does not, of course,
forestall reasonable searches and seizure. This
interdiction against warrantless searches and
seizures, however, is not absolute and such
warrantless searches and seizures have long
been deemed permissible by jurisprudence. The
Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless
arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto,
(2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3)
arrests of escaped prisoners. The prosecution
and the defense painted extremely divergent
versions of the incident, but the Court is certain
that Chua was arrested and his bag searched
without the benefit of a warrant. There are no
facts on record reasonably suggestive or
demonstrative of Chuas participation in an
ongoing criminal enterprise that could have
spurred police officers from conducting the
obtrusive search. The RTC never took the pains
of pointing to such facts, but predicated mainly
its decision on the finding that accused was
caught red-handed carrying the bagful of shabu
when apprehended. In short, there is no
probable cause. Persistent reports of rampant
smuggling of firearm and other contraband
articles, Chuas watercraft differing in
appearance from the usual fishing boats that
commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, Chuas
illegal entry into the Philippines, Chuas
suspicious behavior, i.e. he attempted to flee
when he saw the police authorities, and the
apparent ease by which Chua can return to and
navigate his speedboat with immediate dispatch
towards the high seas, do not constitute
probable cause. None of the telltale clues,
e.g., bag or package emanating the pungent
odor of marijuana or other prohibited drug, 20
confidential report and/or positive identification
by informers of courier(s) of prohibited drug
and/or the time and place where they will
transport/deliver the same, suspicious demeanor
or behavior and suspicious bulge in the waist
accepted by the Court as sufficient to justify a
warrantless arrest exists in the case. There was
no classified information that a foreigner would
disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing
prohibited drug on the date in question. Chua
was not identified as a drug courier by a police
informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that
ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the
fishing boats of the area did not automatically
mark him as in the process of perpetrating an
offense. The search cannot therefore be
denominated as incidental to an arrest. To
reiterate, the search was not incidental to an
arrest. There was no warrant of arrest and the
warrantless arrest did not fall under the
exemptions allowed by the Rules of Court as
already shown. From all indications, the search
was nothing but a fishing expedition. Casting
aside the regulated substance as evidence, the
same being the fruit of a poisonous tree, the
remaining evidence on record are insufficient,
feeble and ineffectual to sustain Chuas
conviction.
People vs. Molina [GR 133917, 19
February 2001]
En Banc, Ynares-Santiago (J): 14 concur
Facts: Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino
Paguidopon, then a member of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) detailed at Precinct No. 3,
Matina, Davao City, received an information
regarding the presence of an alleged marijuana
pusher in Davao City. The first time he came to
see the said marijuana pusher in person was
during the first week of July 1996. SPO1
Paguidopon was then with his informer when a
motorcycle passed by. His informer pointed to
the motorcycle driver, Gregorio Mula y Malagura
(@Boboy), as the pusher. As to Nasario Molina
y Manamat (@ Bobong), SPO1 Paguidopon
had no occasion to see him prior to 8 August
1996. At about 7:30 a.m. of 8 August 1996,
SPO1 Paguidopon received an information that
the alleged pusher will be passing at NHA, Maa,
Davao City any time that morning.
Consequently, at around 8:00 a.m. he called for
assistance at the PNP, Precinct 3, Matina, Davao
City, which immediately dispatched the team of
SPO4 Dionisio Cloribel (team leader), SPO2
Paguidopon (brother of SPO1 Marino
Paguidopon), and SPO1 Pamplona, to proceed
to the house of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where
they would wait for the alleged pusher to pass
by. At around 9:30 a.m., while the team were
positioned in the house of SPO1 Paguidopon, a
trisikad carrying Mula and Molina passed by.
At that instance, SPO1 Paguidopon pointed to
Mula and Molina as the pushers. Thereupon, the
team boarded their vehicle and overtook the
trisikad. SPO1 Paguidopon was left in his
house, 30 meters from where Mula and Molina
were accosted. The police officers then ordered
the trisikad to stop. At that point, Mula, who
was holding a black bag, handed the same to
Molina. Subsequently, SPO1 Pamplona
introduced himself as a police officer and asked
Molina to open the bag. Molina replied, Boss, if
possible we will settle this. SPO1 Pamplona
insisted on opening the bag, which revealed
dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter, Mula
and Molina were handcuffed by the police
officers. On 6 December 1996, the accused Mula
and Molina, through counsel, jointly filed a
Demurrer to Evidence, contending that the
marijuana allegedly seized from them is
inadmissible as evidence for having been
obtained in violation of their constitutional right
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The demurrer was denied by the trial court. A
motion for reconsideration was filed by the
accused, but this was likewise denied. The
accused waived presentation of evidence and
opted to file a joint memorandum. On 25 April
1997, the trial court rendered the decision,
finding the accused guilty of the offense
charged, and sentenced both to suffer the
penalty of death by lethal injection. Pursuant to
Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code and Rule
122, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the case
was elevated to the Supreme Court on
automatic review.
Issue: Whether Mula and Molina manifested
outward indication that would justify their
arrest, and the seizure of prohibited drugs that
were in their possession.
Held: The fundamental law of the land
mandates that searches and seizures be carried
out in a reasonable fashion, that is, by virtue or
on the strength of a search warrant predicated
upon the existence of a probable cause.
Complementary to the foregoing provision is the
exclusionary rule enshrined under Article III,
Section 3, paragraph 2, which bolsters and
solidifies the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The foregoing
constitutional proscription, however, is not
without exceptions. Search and seizure may be
made without a warrant and the evidence
obtained therefrom may be admissible in the
following instances: (1) search incident to a
lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor
vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws;
(4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when
the accused himself waives his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6)
stop and frisk situations (Terry search). The first
exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest)
includes a valid warrantless search and seizure
pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest
which must precede the search. Still, the law
requires that there be first a lawful arrest before
a search can be made the process cannot be
reversed. Herein, Mula and Molina manifested
no outward indication that would justify their
arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad, they
could not be said to be committing, attempting
to commit or have committed a crime. It
matters not that Molina responded Boss, if
possible we will settle this to the request of
SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag. Such response
which allegedly reinforced the suspicion of the
arresting officers that Mula and Molina were
committing a crime, is an equivocal statement
which standing alone will not constitute probable
cause to effect an in flagrante delicto arrest.
Note that were it not for SPO1 Marino
Paguidopon, Mula and Molina could not be the
subject of any suspicion, reasonable or
otherwise. Further, it would appear that the
names and addresses of Mula and Molina came
to the knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only after
they were arrested, and such cannot lend a
semblance of validity on the arrest effected by
the peace officers. Withal, the Court holds that
the arrest of Mula and Molina does not fall under
the exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the
search conducted on their person was likewise
illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by
the peace officers could not be admitted as
evidence against them.
Prudente vs. Dayrit [GR 82870, 14
December 1989]
En Banc, Padilla (J): 14 concur
Facts: On 31 October 1987, P/Major Alladin
Dimagmaliw, Chief of the Intelligence Special
Action Division (ISAD) of the Western Police
District (WPD), filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 33, presided over
by Judge Abelardo Dayrit, now Associate Justice
of the Court of Appeals, an application for the
issuance of a search warrant (Search Warrant
87-14) for violation of Presidential Decree 1866
(Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) entitled
People of the Philippines vs. Nemesio E.
Prudente. On the same day, the Judge issued
the Search Warrant, commanding Dimagmaliw
to make an immediate search at any time in
the day or night of the premises of Polytechnic
University of the Philippines, more particularly
(a) offices of the Department of Military Science
and Tactics at the ground floor and other rooms
at the ground floor; (b) office of the President,
Dr. Nemesio Prudente at PUP, Second Floor and
other rooms at the second floor, and forthwith
seize and take possession of the following
personal properties, to wit: (a) M 16 Armalites
with ammunition; (b) .38 and .45 Caliber
handguns and pistols; (c) explosives and hand
grenades; and (d) assorted weapons with
ammunitions. On 1 November 1987, a Sunday
and All Saints Day, the search warrant was
enforced by some 200 WPD operatives led by
P/Col. Edgar Dula Torre, Deputy Superintendent,
WPD, and P/Major Romeo Maganto, Precinct 8
Commander. In his affidavit, dated 2 November
1987, Ricardo Abando y Yusay, a member of the
searching team, alleged that he found in the
drawer of a cabinet inside the wash room of Dr.
Prudentes office a bulging brown envelope with
3 live fragmentation hand grenades separately
wrapped with old newspapers. On 6 November
1987, Prudente moved to quash the search
warrant. He claimed that (1) the complainants
lone witness, Lt. Florenio C. Angeles, had no
personal knowledge of the facts which formed
the basis for the issuance of the search warrant;
(2) the examination of the said witness was not
in the form of searching questions and answers;
(3) the search warrant was a general warrant,
for the reason that it did not particularly
describe the place to be searched and that it
failed to charge one specific offense; and (4) the
search warrant was issued in violation of Circular
19 of the Supreme Court in that the complainant
failed to allege under oath that the issuance of
the search warrant on a Saturday was urgent.
On 9 March 1988, the Judge issued an order,
denying Prudentes motion and supplemental
motion to quash. Prudentes motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied in the order
dated 20 April 1988. Prudente filed a petition for
certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the allegations contained in the
application of P/ Major Alladin Dimagmaliw and
the declaration of P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles in his
deposition were sufficient basis for the issuance
of a valid search warrant.
Held: The probable cause for a valid search
warrant, has been defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed, and that objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched. This probable
cause must be shown to be within the personal
knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses
he may produce and not based on mere
hearsay. Thus, for a valid search warrant to
issue, there must be probable cause, which is to
be determined personally by the judge, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The probable cause must be in connection with
one specific offense,and the judge must, before
issuing the warrant, personally examine in the
form of searching questions and answers, in
writing and under oath, the complainant and
any witness he may produce, on facts personally
known to them and attach to the record their
sworn statements together with any affidavits
submitted. Herein, in his application for search
warrant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw stated that
he has been informed that Nemesio Prudente
has in his control and possession the firearms
and explosives described therein, and that he
has verified the report and found it to be a
fact. On the other hand, in his supporting
deposition, P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles declared
that, as a result of their continuous surveillance
for several days, they gathered informations
from verified sources that the holders of the
said firearms and explosives are not licensed to
possess them. In other words, the applicant and
his witness had no personal knowledge of the
facts and circumstances which became the basis
for issuing the questioned search warrant, but
acquired knowledge thereof only through
information from other sources or persons.
While it is true that in his application for search
warrant, applicant P/Major Dimagmaliw stated
that he verified the information he had earlier
received that petitioner had in his possession
and custody the firearms and explosives
described in the application, and that he found it
to be a fact, yet there is nothing in the record to
show or indicate how and when said applicant
verified the earlier information acquired by him
as to justify his conclusion that he found such
information to be a fact. He might have clarified
this point if there had been searching questions
and answers, but there were none. In fact, the
records yield no questions and answers,
whether searching or not, vis-a-vis the said
applicant. Evidently, the allegations contained in
the application of P/ Major Alladin Dimagmaliw
and the declaration of P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles
in his deposition were insufficient basis for the
issuance of a valid search warrant.
Chia vs. Acting Collector of Customs [GR L-
43810, 26 September 1989]
First Division, Grino-Aquino (J): 4 concur
Facts: Acting on a verified report of a
confidential informant that assorted electronic
and electrical equipment and other articles
illegally imported into the Philippines by a
syndicate engaged in unlawful shipside
activities (foreign goods are unloaded from
foreign ships in transit through Philippine waters
into motorized bancas and landed on Philippine
soil without passing through the Bureau of
Customs, thereby evading payment of the
corresponding customs duties and taxes
thereon) were found inside Toms Electronics afternoon, the hearing officer of Acting Collector
and Sony Merchandising (Philippines) stores
located at 690 and 691 Gonzalo Puyat corner
Evangelista Street, Quiapo, Manila, a letter-
request dated 23 April 1976 was addressed to
the Collector of Customs by the Deputy Director
of the Regional Anti-Smuggling Action Center,
Manila Bay Area (RASAC-MBA) for the issuance
of warrants of seizure and detention. After
evaluation, the Collector of Customs issued
Warrants of Seizure and Detention 14925 and
14925-A, directing the Anti-Smuggling Action
Center to seize the goods mentioned therein,
i.e. various electronic equipments like cassette
tape recorders, car stereos, phonograph needles
(diamond), portable TV sets, imported long
playing records, spare parts of TVs and radios
and other electrical appliances. A RASAC team
was formed and given a mission order to
enforce the warrants, which it implemented with
the assistance of: (1) the National Customs
Police (augmenting the team with 2 members),
(2) the Detective Bureau of the Manila Western
Police District Headquarters (with 3 detectives),
as well as, (3) Precinct 3 of the Manila Western
Police District which exercised jurisdictional
control over the place to be raided. The
intended raid was entered in the respective
police blotters of the police detective bureaus.
On the strength of the warrants of seizure and
detention, the raid was conducted in the
afternoon of 25 April 1976 at the 2 stores of
Tomas Chia. ASAC team leader Gener Sula,
together with his agents Badron Dobli, Arturo
Manuel, Rodolfo Molina and Servillano Florentin
of Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, assisted by
two customs policemen, Val Martinez and
Renato Sorima, and Manila policemen Rogelio
Vinas and John Peralta, recovered from the
stores, assorted electronic equipment and other
articles, the customs duties on which allegedly
had not been paid. They were turned over to
the Customs Auction and Cargo Disposal Unit of
the Bureau of Customs. On 17 May 1976, in the
house may be entered and searched only upon
of Customs Alfredo Francisco conducted a
hearing on the confiscation of the goods taken
by Gener Sula and his agents. 2 days later, Chia
filed the petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus before the Supreme Court to enjoin
the Collector of Customs and/or his agents from
further proceeding with the forfeiture hearing
and prayed that the search warrants be declared
null and void, that the latter be ordered to
return the confiscated articles to Chia, and to
pay damages.
Issue: Whether the warrants issued by the
Collector of Customs partakes the nature of a
general warrants, and thus are invalid.
Held: Not only may goods be seized without a
search and seizure warrant under Section 2536
of the Customs and Tariff Code, when they (the
goods) are openly offered for sale or kept in
storage in a store as herein, but the fact is that
Chias stores Toms Electronics and Sony
Merchandising (Phil.) were searched upon
warrants of search and detention issued by the
Collector of Customs, who, under the 1973
Constitution, was a responsible officer
authorized by law to issue them. Sections 2208
and 2209 of the Tariff and Customs Code
provide when a search may be made without a
warrant and when a warrant is necessary.
Section 2208 provides that For the more
effective discharge of his official duties, any
person exercising the powers herein conferred,
may at any time enter, pass through or search
any land or inclosure or any warehouse, store or
other building, not being a dwelling house. A
warehouse, store or other building or inclosure
used for the keeping or storage of articles does
not become a dwelling house within the
meaning hereof merely by reason of the fact
that a person employed as watchman lives in
the place, nor will the fact that his family stays
there with him alter the case. On the other
hand, Section 2209 provides that A dwelling
warrant issued by a Judge of the court or such
other responsible officers as may be authorized
by law, upon sworn application showing
probable cause and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the person or thing to
be seized. The warrants issued by the Collector
of Customs in this case were not general
warrants for they identified the stores to be
searched, described the articles to be seized and
specified the provision of the Tariff and Customs
Code violated. Upon effecting the seizure of the
goods, the Bureau of Customs acquired
exclusive jurisdiction not only over the case but
also over the goods seized for the purpose of
enforcing the tariff and customs laws. Further, a
party dissatisfied with the decision of the
Collector may appeal to the Commissioner of
Customs, whose decision is appealable to the
Court of Tax Appeals in the manner and within
the period prescribed by law and regulations.
The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals may be
elevated to the Supreme Court for review. Since
Chia did not exhaust his administrative
remedies, his recourse to this Court is
premature.
20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals [GR L-76649-51, 19
August 1988]
Third Division, Gutierrez J. (J): 4 concur
Facts: In a letter-complaint dated 26 August
1985, 20th Century Fox Film Corporation
through counsel sought the National Bureau of
Investigations (NBI) assistance in the conduct
of searches and seizures in connection with the
NBIs anti-film piracy campaign. Specifically, the
letter-complaint alleged that certain videotape
outlets all over Metro Manila are engaged in the
unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted
films in videotape form which constitute a
flagrant violation of Presidential Decree 49
(Decree on the Protection of Intellectual
Property). Acting on the letter-complaint, the
NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of
the outlets pinpointed by the film corporation
and subsequently filed 3 applications for search
warrants against the video outlets owned by
Eduardo M. Barreto, Raul Sagullo, and Fortune
Ledesma. The applications were consolidated
and heard by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati, Branch 132. On 4 September 1985, the
lower court issued the desired search warrants,
describing the articles sought to be seized as(c)
Television sets, Video Cassettes Recorders,
rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories,
equipments and other machines used or
intended to be used in the unlawful
reproduction, sale, rental/lease, distribution of
the above-mentioned video tapes which she is
keeping and concealing in the premises above-
described.. Armed with the search warrants,
the NBI accompanied by the film corporations
agents, raided the video outlets and seized the
items described therein. An inventory of the
items seized was made and left with Barreto, et.
al. Acting on a motion to lift search warrants
and release seized properties filed by Barreto,
et. al., the lower court issued an order dated 8
October 1985, lifting the 3 search warrants
issued earlier against them by the court, due to
the failure of the NBI to deliver the articles to
the Court, and thus ordered the return of the
articles to their respective owners. The lower
court denied a motion for reconsideration filed
by the film corporation in its order dated 2
January 1986. The film corporation filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
to annul the orders of the lower court. The
petition was dismissed. The 20th Century Fox
Film Corporation filed the petition for review
with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the inclusion of certain articles
of property which are usually connected to
legitimate business, and not involving piracy of
intellectual property or infringement of copyright
laws, renders the warrant to be unreasonable.
Held: Television sets, video cassette recorders,
rewinders and tape cleaners are articles which
can be found in a video tape store engaged in
the legitimate business of lending or renting out
betamax tapes. In short, these articles and
appliances are generally connected with, or
related to a legitimate business not necessarily
involving piracy of intellectual property or
infringement of copyright laws. Hence, including
these articles without specification and/or
particularity that they were really instruments in
violating an Anti-Piracy law makes the search
warrant too general which could result in the
confiscation of all items found in any video
store. In fact, this actually happened in the
present case. Although the applications and
warrants themselves covered certain articles of
property usually found in a video store, the
Court believes that the search party should have
confined themselves to articles that are
according to them, evidence constitutive of
infringement of copyright laws or the piracy of
intellectual property, but not to other articles
that are usually connected with, or related to, a
legitimate business, not involving piracy of
intellectual property, or infringement of
copyright laws. So that a television set, a
rewinder, and a whiteboard listing Betamax
tapes, video cassette cleaners video cassette
recorders as reflected in the Returns of Search
Warrants, are items of legitimate business
engaged in the video tape industry, and which
could not be the subject of seizure. The
applicant and his agents therefore exceeded
their authority in seizing perfectly legitimate
personal property usually found in a video
cassette store or business establishment. The
search and seizure is unreasonable.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
CHRISTOPHER CHOI (G.R. No. 152950
August 3, 2006)
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari 1 seeks the
reversal of the decision 2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) dated April 10, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No.
59587, the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and
prohibition is GRANTED. Search Warrant No. 99-
17 is deemed NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE.
Respondent ATTY. BENNY NICDAO is
prohibited from using in evidence the articles
seized by virtue of Search Warrant No. 99-17 in
Crim. Case No. I.S. No. 99-8116.
SO ORDERED. 3
The factual antecedents follow.
On April 27, 1999, Mario P. Nieto, Intelligence
Operative of the Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau, Department of Finance,
applied for a search warrant with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Pampanga,
Branch 56, 4 against respondent Christopher
Choi for violation of Section 168, paragraphs 2
and 3 (a) and (c), in relation to Section 169 of
RA 8293, 5 also known as the Intellectual
Property Code. 6
After examination of the applicant and his
witnesses, namely, Max Cavalera and David Lee
Sealey, Judge Lourdes F. Gatbalite issued
Search Warrant No. 99-17 dated April 27, 1999
worded as follows:
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
G r e e t i n g s:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the
undersigned, after examining under oath in the
form of searching and probing questions, the
applicant, MARIO P. NIETO, Intelligence
Operative, Economic Intelligence Investigation
Bureau, Department of Finance, and his
witnesses Max Cavalera and David Lee Sealey
that there are good and sufficient reasons to
believe that Christopher Choi of No. 25-13
Columbia Street, Carmenville Subd., Angeles
City has in his possession, control and
custody [r]eams and packs of fake Marlboro Red
Cigarettes, as well as cardboard cases of fake
Marlboro Red Cigarettes (each cardboard case
contains two (2) [m]aster [c]ases of Marlboro
and each [m]aster case contains fifty (50)
reams) being distributed, kept and sold thereat
in violation of Section 168, par. 2 and 3 (a) and
(c) in relation to Section 169 of R.A. 8293;
You are hereby commanded to make an
immediate search at anytime of the day or night
of the above-premises and forthwith seize and
take possession of the aforedescribed items
found at the residence/warehouse of
Christopher Choi at No. 25-13 Columbia Street,
Carmenville Subd., Angeles City.
THEREFORE, seize and bring the said articles to
the undersigned to be dealt with in accordance
with law.
You are hereby further directed to submit a
return within ten (10) days from today.
Given under my hand this 27th day of April,
1999 at Angeles City, Philippines. 7
The search was conducted on the same date. 8
On May 12, 1999, respondent filed a "motion to
quash search warrant" 9 and a "supplemental
motion to quash" 10 on June 22, 1999. Both
were denied by Judge Gatbalite in an order
dated November 29, 1999. 11 Reconsideration
was likewise denied. 12
On June 19, 2000, respondent filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition 13 before the CA. He
alleged that Judge Gatbalite committed grave
abuse of discretion in refusing to quash the
search warrant, arguing that probable cause
was not sufficiently established as the
examination conducted was not probing and
exhaustive and the warrant did not particularly
describe the place to be searched. Respondent
also prayed that Atty. Bennie Nicdao 14 be
prohibited from using as evidence the articles
seized by virtue of the search warrant. This was
granted by the CA in a decision dated April 10,
2002.
According to the CA, in determining whether
there was probable cause to believe that the
cigarettes purchased by Nieto were fake and in
violation of RA 8293, 15 Judge Gatbalite failed to
ask searching and probing questions of witness
David Lee Sealey. 16 The examination of Sealey
went this way:
Court:
Q There was testimony here given by Mr. Mario
Nieto and Max Cavalera, that fake Marlboro
cigarettes bought by them from Michael Chua,
Christopher Choi and Johnny Chang were turned
over to you for examination, is that correct?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q After the same had been turned over to you,
what did you do with the said merchandise, if
you did anything?
A I examined the sample of cigarettes and their
packaging bearing the Marlboro Trade Marks
which were suspected to be produc[ed] and
manufactured by La Suerte or [with] the
permission of Philip Morris.
Q What was the result of your examination?
A Based on the packaging of the packs, the
color of the box and the printing on the front
side of the packs and the cigarettes themselves,
I concluded that they are counterfeit or
unauthorized product[s].
Q Do you have any knowledge of this person
named Christopher Choi?
A None, your Honor.
Q There is an affidavit here marked as exhibit,
executed by one David Lee Sealey, do you know
this David Lee Sealey?
A Yes, your Honor, I am the one.
Q Whose signature is this appearing on the
printed name David Lee Sealey?
A This is my signature, your Honor.
Q Do you affirm and confirm other contents of
this affidavit?
A Yes, your Honor.
Court:
Thats all. 17
In addition, the CA ruled that Judge Gatbalite
committed grave abuse of discretion when she
merely relied on the conclusion of Sealey that
the cigarettes he received from Nieto were fake.
She should have at least required Sealey to
present the alleged fake Marlboro cigarettes and
the genuine ones for comparison, instead of
relying on his testimony alone. The CA reasoned
that this was an absolute requirement under the
Supreme Court ruling in 20th Century Fox Film
Corporation v. Court of Appeals. 18
Hence, this petition.
The People of the Philippines aver that the CA
erred in finding that Judge Gatbalite committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the search
warrant allegedly because she failed to
determine probable cause pursuant to Sections
4 and 5 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. 19The
People assail the finding of the CA that, in
issuing the search warrant, Judge Gatbalite
purportedly did not comply strictly with the
requirement to determine the existence of
probable cause by personally examining the
applicant and his witnesses through searching
questions and answers. The People also assert
that the CA erred in applying the doctrine
in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation 20 since it
had already been superseded by Columbia
Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals. 21
We rule for the People of the Philippines.
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 126 state:
Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant .
A search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the things to be seized
which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record.
The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching
questions and answers, in writing and under
oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce on facts personally known to them and
attach to the record their sworn statements,
together with the affidavits submitted.
According to the foregoing provisions, a search
warrant can be issued only upon a finding of
probable cause. Probable cause means such
facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that
the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be
searched. 22 The determination of the existence
of probable cause requires the following:
(1) the judge must examine the complainant
and his witnesses personally;
(2) the examination must be under oath and
(3) the examination must be reduced in writing
in the form of searching questions and
answers. 23
The searching questions propounded to the
applicant and the witnesses depend largely on
the discretion of the judge. Although there is no
hard-and-fast rule governing how a judge
should conduct his examination, it is axiomatic
that the examination must be probing and
exhaustive, not merely routinary, general,
peripheral, perfunctory or pro-forma. 24 The
judge must not simply rehash the contents of
the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on
the intent and justification of the
application. 25 The questions should not merely
be repetitious of the averments stated in the
affidavits or depositions of the applicant and the
witnesses. 26 If the judge fails to determine
probable cause by personally examining the
applicant and his witnesses in the form of
searching questions before issuing a search
warrant, grave abuse of discretion is
committed. 27
The determination of probable cause does not
call for the application of rules and standards of
proof that a judgment of conviction requires
after trial on the merits. As the term implies,
probable cause is concerned with probability,
not absolute or even moral certainty. The
standards of judgment are those of a reasonably
prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a
judge after a full-blown trial. 28 No law or rule
states that probable cause requires a specific
kind of evidence. No formula or fixed rule for its
determination exists. 29 Probable cause is
determined in the light of conditions obtaining in
a given situation. 30 The entirety of the questions
propounded by the court and the answers
thereto must be considered by the judge. 31
In this case, aside from the testimony of Sealey,
petitioner judge also heard the testimony of
applicant Nieto:
Q: In connection with Search Warrant 99-17,
are you the same Mario Nieto who is the
applicant in this application for search warrant
filed today April 27, 1999?
A: Yes, your Honor.
Q: Do you know this Christopher Choi referred
to herein?
A: Yes, your Honor.
Q: Why do you know him?
A: He was introduced to us by Michael Chua,
your Honor.
Q: As what?
A: As the supplier for the goods.
Q: Subject of the application?
A: Yes, your Honor, in violation of Section 169
of R.A. 8293.
Q: How did you know him?
A: When I was conducting a test-buy operation
against Mr. Michael Chua, Mr. Michael Chua told
me that the bulk of supply if we need more
supply we can get from the source, a certain
Christopher Choi, who lives in the same village
and who is actually the supplier for the entire
region.
Q: Where did you see him. This Christopher
Choi?
A: I went to his house, your Honor.
Q: Where?
A: At No. 25-13 Columbia St., Carmenville
Subd., Angeles City, Pampanga.
Q: Upon arriving at the place what did you do?
A: Upon arriving at the place, your Honor, I
introduced myself as the one who was referred
by a certain Michael Chua who is interested in
buying the Marlboro cigarettes from him and he
accommodated me and showed me the sample
that he has and I was able to procure the
samples from him, the samples that like what
we did to the others were inspected by certain
Mr. David Lee Sealey, the representative and
authority from the Philip Morris.
Q: Did you actually buy those samples?
A: Yes, your Honor, I got the samples form Mr.
Christopher Choi and I submitted them to Mr.
David Lee Sealey.
Q: How many Marlboro cigarettes did you buy?
A: We bought only one ream, P17.00 per pack.
Q: Do you know from what particular place the
house of Christopher Choi did he got (sic) those
samples?
A: The volume stocks were found inside the
house, they are almost everywhere in the house
of Christopher Choi.
Q: There is a sketch here attached to your
application, can you point it out here?
A: Yes, your Honor, at the warehouse, in the
storage room as shown in the lay out of the
house, it is adjacent to the residential house as
shown in the sketch.
Q: You went to the warehouse?
A: We were shown [the] entire area by the
supplier, Christopher Choi. As a matter of fact
he was trying to show us how much volume he
has and his capacity to supply. 32
Max Cavalera, a witness who accompanied Nieto
during the "test-buy" operation, 33 also testified:
Q How about this Christopher Choi?
A As Ive said earlier, he was one of those
identified by the informant storing and selling
counterfeit Marlboro cigarettes, so on April 22,
1999 we conducted a surveillance and we were
able to confirm that the said cigarettes are being
stored at the subject place.
Q At what place?
A At 25-13 Columbia St., Carmenville Subd.,
Angeles City. On April 23, 1999 at about 8:30
p.m., Mario Nieto and I again went to the
subject place to conduct a test-buy operation.
[A]fter Mr. Choi had been convinced of our
intention to buy cigarettes from him, he brought
us to his warehouse where he showed to us
several cardboard cases of Marlboro
cigarettes. 34
Given the foregoing testimonies and applying
the established standards in determining
probable cause, we cannot say that Judge
Gatbalite committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the search warrant. Her questions were
sufficiently probing, not at all superficial and
perfunctory. The testimonies were consistent
with each other and the narration of facts was
credible. The testimonies and other evidence on
record constituted adequate bases to establish
probable cause that the alleged offense had
been committed.
Since probable cause is dependent largely on
the opinion and findings of the judge who
conducted the examination and who had the
opportunity to question the applicant and his
witnesses, 35 the findings of the judge deserve
great weight. The reviewing court can overturn
such findings only upon proof that the judge
disregarded the facts before him or ignored the
clear dictates of reason. 36 We thus find no
reason to disturb Judge Gatbalites findings.
Furthermore, as correctly pointed out by
petitioners, 20th Century Fox Film Corporation,
insofar as it required the presentation of the
master tapes for comparison with the pirated
copies for a search warrant to issue, had already
been superseded by Columbia Pictures, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals:
More to the point, it is felt that the
reasonableness of the added requirement
in 20th Century Fox calling for the production of
the master tapes of the copyrighted films for
determination of probable cause in copyright
infringement cases needs revisiting and
clarification.
xxx xxx xxx
In fine, the supposed pronunciamento in said
case regarding the necessity for the
presentation of the master tapes of the
copyrighted films for the validity of search
warrants should at most be understood to
merely serve as a guidepost in determining the
existence of probable cause in copyright
infringement cases where there is doubt as to
the true nexus between the master tape and the
pirated copies. An objective and careful reading
of the decision in said case could lead to no
other conclusion than that said directive was
hardly intended to be a sweeping and
inflexible requirement in all or similar
copyright infringement cases. Judicial dicta
should always be construed within the factual
matrix of their parturition, otherwise a careless
interpretation thereof could unfairly fault the
writer with the vice of overstatement and the
reader with the fallacy of undue generalization.
xxx xxx xxx
Foxregarding master tapes as the dictum for all
It is evidently incorrect to suggest, as the
ruling in 20th Century Fox may appear to
do, that in copyright infringement cases,
the presentation of master tapes of the
copyrighted films is always necessary to
meet the requirement of probable cause
and that, in the absence thereof, there can
be no finding of probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant. It is true that
such master tapes are object evidence, with the
merit that in this class of evidence the
ascertainment of the controverted fact is made
through demonstrations involving the direct use
of the senses of the presiding magistrate. Such
auxiliary procedure, however, does not rule out
the use of testimonial or documentary evidence,
depositions, admissions or other classes of
evidence tending to prove the factum
probandum, especially where the production in
court of object evidence would result in delay,
inconvenience or expenses out of proportion to
its evidentiary value.
xxx xxx xxx
Accordingly, to restrict the exercise of discretion
by a judge by adding a particular requirement
(the presentation of master tapes, as intimated
by 20th Century Fox) not provided nor implied in
the law for a finding of probable cause is beyond
the realm of judicial competence or
statesmanship. It serves no purpose but to
stultify and constrict the judicious exercise of a
courts prerogatives and to denigrate the judicial
duty of determining the existence of probable
cause to a mere ministerial or mechanical
function. There is, to repeat, no law or rule
which requires that the existence of probable
cause is or should be determined solely by a
specific kind of evidence. Surely, this could not
have been contemplated by the framers of the
Constitution, and we do not believe that the
Court intended the statement in 20th Century
seasons and reasons in infringement
cases. 37 (emphasis supplied)
It is obvious that 20th Century Fox Film
Corporation should not be applied to the present
case since this involves the offense of unfair
competition and not copyright infringement.
More importantly, as pronounced by the Court
in Columbia Pictures, Inc., the judges exercise
of discretion should not be unduly restricted by
adding a requirement that is not sanctioned by
law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is
hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals dated April 10, 2002 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 59587 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Judgment is hereby rendered declaring Search
Warrant No. 99-17 as VALID.
SO ORDERED.
ARIEL C. VALLEJO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
(G.R. No. 156413 April 14, 2004)
CALLEJO SR., J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended, to review and reverse the
Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. 24265 dismissing the petitioner's petition as
well as its Resolution dated November 28, 2002
denying the motion to admit petition
for certiorari.
Factual Antecedents
The petitioner is a lawyer in the Register of
Deeds of the province of Isabela. On February
16, 2000, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
Agent, Franklin M. Javier, filed a sworn
application for search warrant before the
Regional Trial Court of Iligan, Isabela, Branch
16, worded as follows:
COMES NOW the undersigned HEAD
AGENT of the National Bureau of
Investigation, Cagayan Valley Regional
Office Ilagan, Isabela hereby requests
that a Search Warrant be issued on the
Office of the Registry (sic) of Deeds,
Provincial Capitol, Alibaga, Iligan for the
purpose of seizing the following
documents, to wit:
01. Undetermined number
of FAKE LAND TITLES,
Official Receipts in the
Cashier's Office, Judicial
Form No. 39 known as Our
Primary Entry Book under
no. 496 and other pertinent
documents related
therewith;
02. Blank Forms of Land
Titles kept inside the
drawers of every table of
employees of the Registry
(sic) of Deeds;
03. Undetermined number
of Land Transfer
transactions without the
corresponding payment of
Documentary Stamps and
Capital Gains Tax.
all of which documents are being used
or intended to be used in the
commission of a felony that is
FALSIFICATION OF LAND TITLES under
Article 171, Revised Penal Code, Article
213, RPC and R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft) and
are hidden or being kept in the said
office.
This application is founded on a
confidential information received by the
undersigned, a peace officer, on
information which I have personally
investigated and founded as follows:
The Office of the Registry (sic) of Deeds
of Isabela is keeping and hiding Fake
Land Titles, and embezzling or stealing
from the government thru non-payment
of Capital Gains Tax and Documentary
Stamps.
That upon the facts above-stated, I
have caused to believe and verily
believe that the said Office of the
Registry (sic) of Deeds located at the
Provincial Capital, Alibagu, Ilagan,
Isabela and/or in the said Office of the
Registry (sic) of Deeds the above-
described documents are hidden and
kept.2
On the same date, Presiding Judge Isaac R. de
Alban issued Search Warrant No. 2000-03
against the petitioner, thusly worded:
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
GREETINGS:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the
undersigned after examining under oath
NBI Head Agent Franklin M. Javier and
his witness that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that Falsification of
Land Titles under Art. 171, Revised
Penal Code, Article 213, RPC and R.A
3019 (Anti-Graft) has been committed
or is about to be committed and that
there are good and sufficient reasons to
believe that the Registry (sic) of Deeds,
Provincial Capitol, Alibagu, Ilagan,
Isabela has in its possession and control
the following:
 1. Undetermined number of Fake
Land Titles, Official Receipts in the
Cashier's Office, Judicial Form No.
39 known as Primary Entry Book
under No. 496 and other pertinent
documents related therewith;
2. Blank Forms of Land Titles kept
inside the drawers of every table of
employees of the Registry (sic) of
Deeds;
3. Undetermined number of land
Transfer transactions without the
corresponding payment of Capital
Gains Tax and payment of
documentary Stamps.
You are hereby commanded to make an
immediate search anytime of the day or
night of the premises above-mentioned
and forthwith seize and take possession
of the above mentioned
documents/subject of the offense and
bring to this court said documents and
persons to be dealt with as the law may
direct. You are further directed to
submit return within 10 days from
today.3
On February 17, 2000, the petitioner filed a
motion to quash the search warrant, which the
trial court denied in its Order dated February 29,
2000. The petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said order on the ground
that the questioned search warrant was in the
form of a general warrant for failure to describe
the persons or things to be seized and was
violative of the Constitution; hence, null and
void. The motion was, likewise, denied for lack
of merit.
On May 4, 2000, the petitioner filed a notice of
appeal and prayed that the entire record of the
case be elevated to the Court of Appeals. The
case was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 24265.
In a Resolution dated September 6, 2000, the
appellate court dismissed the petitioner's appeal
as follows:
The appealed order denying a motion to
quash the search warrant is
interlocutory and not appealable.
Accordingly, the appeal is
hereby DISMISSED. (Rule 41, Sec. 1
(c); Rule 50, Sec. 1 (i) and Sec. 2,
2nd paragraph, in relation to Rule
124, Sec. 18, Revised Rules of
Court).
SO ORDERED.4
The petitioner filed a motion to admit petition
for certiorari on August 29, 2000 before the
Court of Appeals.
Respondent Franklin M. Javier, for and in behalf
of the NBI, filed his comment on the petition
where he alleged his version of the facts as
follows:
4.1 On 08 December 1999, the
undersigned received a "tip-off" (i.e.
from the respondent himself, ATTY.
ARIEL VALLEJO) about the presence of
"fixers" who were allegedly submitting
to him fake titles;
4.2 The undersigned together with other
operatives of the Cagayan Valley
Regional Office (CAVRO) NBI, Isabela,
Respondent Javier asserted that contrary to the
Ilagan, conducted surveillance and
position of the petitioner, the things to be seized
entrapment operations to confirm the
were particularly described in the questioned
veracity of reported, (sic) As a result
warrant. Furthermore, considering the volume of
thereof, the "fixer" was later
apprehended in "flagrante delicto" and
was subjected to investigation together
with other employees of the Register of
Deeds of Ilagan, Isabela;
4.3 Thereafter a certain, MS. REMEDIOS
BIRI, a clerk assigned at the Register of
Deeds of Isabela, volunteered to provide
CAVRO operatives vital information and
later on turned witness considering her
knowledge of the "scheme" being used
by corrupt employees assigned at the
said office;
4.4. On 16 February 2000, after
confirming information relayed to us by
witness MS. REMEDIOS BIRI, the
undersigned applied for a search
warrant against the Office of the
Register of Deeds, Ilagan, Isabela for
Falsification of Public Document under
Art. 171 of the Revised Penal Code. The
respondent presiding Judge HON. ISAAC
DE ALBAN of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 16, Isabela, Ilagan finding the
existence of "probable cause" issued
Search Warrant No. 2000-03;
4.5 On 16 February 2000, operatives of
CAVRO headed by the undersigned
served aforecited search warrant. Found
and seized inside the premises of the
Register of Deeds if Ilagan, Isabela
were several fake titles/documents; On
2 March 2000, a Return of the search
warrant was made informing the
respondent presiding judge of its
positive findings; 5
the documents to be seized, it would be difficult,
if not impossible, to provide the court with the
technical descriptions of all the official receipts
and the titles, including the reference number or
mark of the documents. To require such task is
to render the application of the search warrant
nil, as no such search warrant could be granted.
According to respondent Javier, there was no
way that the court could determine with
precision the exact details of the things to be
seized. The law does not require that the things
to be seized must be described in precise and
minute details as to leave no room for doubt on
the part of the searching
authorities.6 Respondent Javier also posited that
the article "Judicial Form No. 39 known as the
Primary Entry Book" could not or would not have
been mistaken for any other documents;
similarly the "Blank Forms of Land Titles kept
inside the drawer of every table of employees of
the Register of Deeds" clearly indicates the
documents to be seized.7
The Court of Appeals denied the petitioner's
motion in its Resolution dated November 28,
2002 on the following grounds:
First. We earlier dismissed movant's
appeal because it was a wrong choice of
remedy to assail an order denying a
motion to quash the search warrant.
Movant himself has conceded that:
"the relief that was resorted to
by your appellant from the
denial of his motion to quash
search warrant subject of the
case was under the imports of
an ordinary appeal and that it
was not the proper remedy
under the premises."
Second. Movant's petition for certiorari
under rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure purportedly to cure the
procedural defect he incurred cannot be
countenanced. He admitted that his
petition was filed beyond the
reglementary period. The correct
dismissal of an appeal becomes a final
judgment of the appellate court after
the lapse of 15 days from service of a
copy thereof upon the accused or his
counsel.
Third. Movant cannot simultaneously or
alternately resort to a petition for review
under Rule 45 (ordinary appeal) and/or
petition for certiorari under Rule 65
(special civil action). They are mutually
exclusive remedies having different legal
grounds for their availment. Thus, the
dismissed appeal cannot be
incorporated with movant's petition for
certiorari which should have been first
resorted to upon denial of his motion to
quash and docketed as a special civil
action (SP).
ACCORDINGLY, the motion for
reconsideration and the motion to admit
petition for certiorari are DENIED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.8
Hence, the instant petition.
The Petitioner's Arguments
The petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in committing
the following:
A. DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION ON THE
RESOLUTION OF THE RESPONDENT
HON. COURT OF APPEALS DISMISSING
PETITIONER'S APPEAL ON THE
RESPONDENT'S REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT'S ORDER DENYING
PETITIONER'S MOTION TO QUASH
SEARCH WARRANT;
B. DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO
ADMIT PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
UNDER RULE 65 OF THE REVISED
RULES OF COURT, SEEKING TO
CORRECT THE ERROR OF
JURISDICTION COMMITTED BY THE
RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
AS THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF
JUDICIAL DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
EXCESS OR LACK OF JURISDICTION IN
DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE SAID
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT'S ORDER
DENYING THE MOTION TO QUASH
SEARCH WARRANT;
C. FAILING TO APPRECIATE AND
CONSIDER SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE ON
PETITIONER'S APPEAL OR CASE, AND
BY REASON OF THIS FAILURE
SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE IS SERIOUSLY
INJURED AND MADE SUBSERVIENT TO
THE TECHNICALITY OF THE RULES;
D. FAILING TO ACT UPON
PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI AND MAKE A RULING ON
THE MATTER OF THE PATENT NULLITY
OF THE SEARCH WARRANT ISSUED BY
THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT THAT IN ITS EXECUTION
EXTREME PREJUDICE RESULTED AND
THAT BY REASON FOR WHICH RELIEF
IS EXTREMELY URGENT;9
According to the petitioner, by its failure to
consider the petition on the merits, the Court of
Appeals allowed technicality rather than
substantial justice to prevail, considering that
the issue involved is a constitutional right, no
less than the right of one to be secure against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
The petitioner claims that in the implementation
of the questioned search warrant, damages of
far reaching implications were sustained not
only in the functional operations of the Office of
the Register of Deeds, but also in the business
transactions involving lands in the province of
Isabela. According to the petitioner, millions of
documents of various nature were seized and
hauled out of the premises of the office by the
respondent Javier, which continue to be in the
latter's custody.
The petitioner further asserts that the search
warrant issued by the RTC is in the nature of a
general warrant. There was no particularity as to
what documents were to be searched and
seized. While the warrant made mention of
"fake land titles," there was no mention of which
titles were spurious. The petitioner points out
that the Register of Deeds is the repository of all
land titles within the territorial jurisdiction of the
province of Isabela, and millions of such titles
are kept thereat. The phrase "undetermined
number of land transfer transactions without the
corresponding payment of capital gains tax and
payment of documentary stamps" is, likewise, a
dangerous supposition, as there are millions of
documents on various land transactions kept in
the registry. Anent the phrase "blank forms of
land titles kept inside the drawers of every table
of employees of the Register of Deeds," the
petitioner asserts that no conceivable wrong
could have been committed therein, as it was
the normal practice for employees to have such
blank forms in hand, in preparation for their
issuance after thorough examination of the
propriety of documents submitted in support
thereof. However, the petitioner asserts that not
every employee can take hold of such blank
forms but only those designated as examiners.
There was no mention in the warrant of the
names of the employees who purportedly kept
the blank forms.
According to the petitioner, the warrant was a
wanton, sweeping authority for the NBI agents
who raided the Registry Offices and confiscated
and seized every document in sight. It was a
"fishing expedition" for the raiding party to
obtain any kind of conceivable evidence to
support the offense for which it was applied.
The petitioner also contends that the warrant is
patently objectionable for having been issued
despite the fact that the application therefor
contained more than one offense, in violation of
Article III, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution.
The petitioner concludes that the search warrant
in question, being in the nature of a general
warrant, violated the constitutional as well as
the statutory requirements for its issuance, and
as such, is null and void.
The Position of the Office of the Solicitor
General 10
The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part,
agrees with the petitioner and opines that the
strict application of the rules of procedure
should be relaxed in this case.
The OSG also asserts that it cannot sustain the
questioned CA Resolutions of September 6,
2000 and November 28, 2002 for the reason
that the subject search warrant is a patent
nullity. It submitted the following reasons for
such conclusion:
First. The subject search warrant issued by the
RTC was not just for one offense, but for at
least three offenses, namely: violation of a)
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code
(Falsification by public officer, employee or
notary or ecclesiastical minister); b) Article 213
of the same Code (Frauds against the public
treasury and similar offenses); and, c) Rep. Act
No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
Second. The things to be seized were not
particularly described in the search warrant,
leaving the officer of the law with limitless
discretion in its implementation on what articles
to seize.
Third. From the contents of the search warrant
itself, the raiding team could not have
distinguished which of the land titles kept in the
custody of the Register of Deeds in Iligan,
Isabela were fake, and which of them were
genuine. The warrant did not define the
parameters upon which the fake land titles could
be gauged with sufficient clarity and
definiteness, such as distinguishing marks.
Fourth. The issue regarding the validity of a
Torrens title is a judicial question.
Thus, the OSG prays that the instant petition be
granted.
The Court's Ruling
The issues in this case are as follows: a)
whether or not the technical rules of procedure
may be relaxed in the case at bar; and, if so b)
whether or not the warrant issued by the RTC
was valid.
A Relaxation of Technical Rules
Is Warranted in this Case
According to the OSG, the petitioner's motion to
admit petition for certiorari was filed beyond the
sixty-day reglementary period. The petitioner
received a copy of the trial court's Order dated
February 29, 2000 denying the motion to quash
search warrant on March 6, 2000. Thus, he had
only until May 5, 2000 within which to file a
petition for certiorari. Realizing that the appeal
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court he earlier
filed with the Court of Appeals was not the
proper remedy, the petitioner filed his motion to
admit petition for certiorari only on August 29,
2000, way beyond the reglementary period.
However, considering that the petitioner has
presented a good cause for the proper and just
determination of his case, the appellate court
should have relaxed the stringent application of
technical rules of procedure and yielded to
considerations of substantial justice.
We agree. The Court has allowed some
meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent
procedural defects and lapses. This is in keeping
with the principle that rules of procedure are
mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment
of justice and that strict and rigid application of
rules which would result in technicalities that
tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice must always be avoided.11 It is a far
better and more prudent cause of action for the
court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the
parties a review of the case to attain the ends of
justice, rather than dispose of the case on
technicality and cause grave injustice to the
parties, giving a false impression of speedy
disposal of cases while actually resulting in more
delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.12
The issue involved in this case is no less than
the legality of the issuance of a warrant of
arrest.13 It behooved the Court of Appeals to
look past rules of technicality and to resolve the
case on its merits, considering that the
petitioner therein was invoking a constitutional
right. The appellate court should have, thus,
considered the petitioner's appeal under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, as a special civil action
forcertiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules.
Thus, in dismissing the petitioner's appeal, and,
thereafter, the motion to admit petition
forcertiorari, the appellate court gravely abused
its discretion. Indeed, the court has discretion to
dismiss or not to dismiss an appeal, but such
discretion must be a sound one, to be exercised
in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair
play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining
in each case.14
The consequence of our ruling would be for the
Court to direct the Court of Appeals to resolve
on its merits CA-G.R. No. 24265 by delving into
and resolving the issue raised therein on
whether or not Judge de Alban of the RTC of
Isabela, Branch 16, committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing Search Warrant No. 2000-
03. However, such step would unduly prolong
the resolution of the case. We shall act on the
petition, considering that the lone issue raised is
one of law, and an invocation of a constitutional
right at that. It is an accepted rule that the
Court may resolve the dispute and serve the
ends of justice instead of remanding the case to
the lower court for further proceedings, if, based
on the records, pleadings, and other evidence,
the matter can readily be ruled upon.15 We take
cognizance of this petition in view of the
seriousness and urgency of the constitutional
issues raised.16
The Search Warrant in Question
is Constitutionally Infirm; Void
for Lack of Particularity
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
guarantees the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures.
Sec 2. The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no such search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Furthermore, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides the requisites for
the issuance of a search warrant, viz.:
Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search
warrant. A search warrant shall not
issue except upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to
be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized
which may be anywhere in the
Philippines.
Sec. 5. Examination of complainant;
record. The judge must, before issuing
the warrant, personally examine in the
form of searching questions and
answers, in writing and under oath, the
complainant and the witnesses he may
produce on facts personally known to
them and attach to the record their
sworn statements, together with the
affidavits submitted.
Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the judge
must strictly comply with the foregoing
constitutional and statutory requirements;
failure to comply therewith constitutes grave
abuse of discretion.17
The things to be seized must be described with
particularity. Technical precision of description is
not required. It is only necessary that there be
reasonable particularity and certainty as to the
identity of the property to be searched for and
seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere
roving commission.18 Indeed, the law does not
require that the things to be seized must be
described in precise and minute detail as to
leave no room for doubt on the part of the
searching authorities. If this were the rule, it
would be virtually impossible for the applicants
to obtain a warrant as they would not know
exactly what kind of things to look for.19 Any
description of the place or thing to be searched
that will enable the officer making the search
with reasonable certainty to locate such place or
thing is sufficient.20
However, the requirement that search warrants
shall particularly describe the things to be seized
makes general searches under them impossible
and prevents the seizure of one thing under a
warrant describing another. As to what is to be
taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the
officer executing the warrant.21 Thus, the
specific property to be searched for should be so
particularly described as to preclude any
possibility of seizing any other property.22
A perusal of the tenor of the search warrant in
question readily shows that it failed to pass this
test of particularity. The questioned warrant
directed the peace officers to search and seize
the following in the petitioner's office at the
Register of Deeds of Isabela:
4. Undetermined number of Fake Land
Titles, Official Receipts in the Cashier's
Office, Judicial Form No. 39 known as
Primary Entry Book under No. 496 and
other pertinent documents related
therewith;
5. Blank Forms of Land Titles kept inside
the drawers of every table of employees
of the Registry of Deeds;
6. Undetermined number of land
Transfer transactions without the
corresponding payment of Capital Gains
Tax and payment of Documentary
Stamps.23
As correctly pointed out by the petitioner and
the OSG, the terms expressly used in the
warrant were too all-embracing, with the
obvious intent of subjecting all the records
pertaining to all the transactions of the
petitioner's office at the Register of Deeds to
search and seizure. Such tenor of a seizure
warrant contravenes the explicit command of
the Constitution that there be a particular
description of the things to be seized.24 The
executing officer's sole function is to apply the
description to its subject matter, which function
may frequently involve the exercise of limited
discretion in identifying the property described.
A description of such generality, however, as to
lodge in the executing officer virtually unlimited
discretion as to what property shall be seized, is
repugnant to the Constitution.25 As we held in
the early case ofPeople v. Veloso:26
A search warrant must conform strictly
to the requirements of the constitutional
and statutory provisions under which it
was issued. Otherwise, it is void. The
proceedings upon search warrants, it
has rightly been held, must be
absolutely legal, for there is not a
description of process known to law, the
execution of which is more distressing
to the citizen. Perhaps there is none
which excites such intense feeling in
consequence of its humiliating and
degrading effect. The warrant will
always be construed strictly without,
however, going into the full length of
requiring technical accuracy. No
presumptions of regularity are to be
invoked in aid of the process when an
officer undertakes to justify under it.27
The Search Warrant Must
Be Issued for One Specific
Offense
The questioned warrant in this case is a scatter-
shot warrant28 for having been issued for more
than one offense - Falsification of Land Titles
under Article 171 and Article 213 of the Revised
Penal Code, and violation of Rep. Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. A warrant must be issued upon
probable cause in connection with one specific
offense.29 In fact, a careful perusal of the
application for the warrant shows that the
applicant did not allege any specific act
performed by the petitioner constituting a
violation of any of the aforementioned offenses..
Thus, the questioned warrant must be struck
down for having been issued in contravention of
the 1987 Constitution, the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, and existing jurisprudence. As the
Court, through Justice Concepcion held in the
landmark case of Stonehill v. Diokno:30
To uphold the validity of the warrant in
question would be to wipe out
completely one of the most fundamental
rights guaranteed in our Constitution,
for it would place the sanctity of the
domicile and the privacy of
 communication and correspondence at
the mercy of the whims, caprice, or
passion of peace officers. This is
precisely the evil sought to be remedied
by the constitutional provision above-
quoted to outlaw the so-called general
warrants. It is not difficult to imagine
what would happen, in times of keen
political strife, when the party in power
feels that the minority is likely to wrest
it, even though by legal means. 31
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals dated September 6, 2000 and
November 28, 2002 are SET ASIDE AND
REVERSED. The respondent National Bureau of
Investigation is hereby ORDERED to return to
the petitioner all items seized from the subject
premises.
SO ORDERED.
People vs. Sucro [GR 93239, 18 March
1991]
Third Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 21 March 1989, Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a
member of the INP, Kalibo, Aklan, was
instructed by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr. (Station
Commander of the INP Kalibo, Aklan) to monitor
the activities of Edison Sucro, because of
information gathered by Seraspi that Sucro was
selling marijuana. As planned, at about 5:00
P.M. on said date, Pat. Fulgencio positioned
himself under the house of a certain Arlie
Regalado at C. Quimpo Street. Adjacent to the
house of Regalado, about 2 meters away, was a
chapel. Thereafter, Pat. Fulgencio saw Sucro
enter the chapel, taking something which turned
out later to be marijuana from the compartment
of a cart found inside the chapel, and then
return to the street where he handed the same
to a buyer, Aldie Borromeo. After a while Sucro
went back to the chapel and again came out
with marijuana which he gave to a group of
persons. It was at this instance that Pat.
Fulgencio radioed P/Lt. Seraspi and reported the
activity going on P/Lt. Seraspi instructed Pat.
Fulgencio to continue monitoring developments.
At about 6:30 P.M., Pat. Fulgencio again called
up Seraspi to report that a third buyer later
identified as Ronnie Macabante, was transacting
with Sucro. At that point, the team of P/Lt
Seraspi proceeded to the area and while the
police officers were at the Youth Hostel at
Maagma St., Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to
intercept Macabante and Sucro. P/ Lt. Seraspi
and his team caught up with Macabante at the
crossing of Mabini and Maagma Sts. in front of
the Aklan Medical Center. Upon seeing the
police, Macabante threw something to the
ground which turned out to be a tea bag of
marijuana. When confronted, Macabante readily
admitted that he bought the same from Sucro in
front of the chapel. The police team was able to
overtake and arrest Sucro at the corner of C.
Quimpo and Veterans Sts. The police recovered
19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from the
cart inside the chapel and another teabag from
Macabante. The teabags of marijuana were sent
to the PC-INP Crime Laboratory Service, at
Camp Delgado, Iloilo City for analysis. The
specimens were all found positive of marijuana.
Sucro was charged with violation of Section 4,
Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Upon
arraignment, Sucro, assisted by counsel, entered
a plea of not guilty to the offense charged.
Trial ensued and a judgment of conviction was
rendered, finding Sucro guilty of the sale of
prohibited drug and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment, and pay a fine of
P20,000, and costs. Sucro appealed.
Issue: Whether the arrest without warrant of
the accused is lawful and consequently, whether
the evidence resulting from such arrest is
admissible.
Held: Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure provides for the instances
where arrest without warrant is considered
lawful. The rule states that A peace officer or
private person may, without warrant, arrest a
person: (a) When in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just
been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it; An offense is
committed in the presence or within the view of
an officer, within the meaning of the rule
authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when
the officer sees the offense, although at a
distance, or hears the disturbances created
thereby and proceeds at once to the scene
thereof. The failure of the police officers to
secure a warrant stems from the fact that their
knowledge acquired from the surveillance was
insufficient to fulfill the requirements for the
issuance of a search warrant. What is
paramount is that probable cause existed. Still,
that searches and seizures must be supported
by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule.
Among the exceptions granted by law is a
search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec.
12, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,
which provides that a person lawfully arrested
may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search
warrant. Herein, police officers have personal
knowledge of the actual commission of the
crime when it had earlier conducted surveillance
activities of the accused. Under the
circumstances (monitoring of transactions) there
existed probable cause for the arresting officers,
to arrest Sucro who was in fact selling marijuana
and to seize the contraband. Thus, as there is
nothing unlawful about the arrest considering its
compliance with the requirements of a
warrantless arrest; ergo, the fruits obtained
from such lawful arrest are admissible in
evidence.

People vs. Go [GR 116001, 14 March
2001]; also Go vs. Court of Appeals [GR
123943]
First Division, Ynares-Santiago (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 22 October 1992, at around 10:00
p.m., SPO1 Mauro Piamonte and SPO3 Candido
Liquido, members of the Intelligence and
Follow-up Unit of the Calamba Police, went to
the police outpost at Crossing, Calamba,
Laguna, to follow up an intelligence report that
methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu, a
regulated drug, was being supplied there. Police
civilian agent Ronnie Panuringan arrived and
reported to them that he saw Luisito Go, also
known as King Louie, enter the Flamingo Disco
House with two women. Panuringan said that he
spotted a gun tucked in Gos waist. Together,
the three policemen proceeded to the Flamingo,
which was located about a hundred meters
away from the outpost. When they arrived at
the Flamingo, the police officers informed the
owner that they were conducting an Operation
Bakal, whereby they search for illegally
possessed firearms. The owner allowed them in
and told a waiter to accompany them. They
went up to the second floor of the disco. The
waiter turned on the lights, and the police
officers saw Go and his lady companions seated
at a table. They identified themselves and asked
Go to stand up. When the later did so, the
policemen saw the gun tucked in his waist.
SPO1 Piamonte asked for the license of the gun,
but Go was unable to produce any. Instead, Go
brought out the drivers license of a certain Tan
Antonio Lerios. SPO1 Piamonte confiscated the
gun, which was later identified as a 9mm
Walther P88, Serial Number 006784, with a
magazine containing 10 rounds of live
ammunition. Go was invited to the police
precinct for questioning. On the way out of the
disco, Go asked permission to bring his car,
which was parked outside. The police officers
accompanied Go to his car, a Honda Civic with
license plate number TCM-789. Through the
windshield, SPO3 Liquido noticed a Philippine
National Police identification card hanging from
the rearview mirror. He asked Go if he was a
member of the PNP, and he said no. The police
officers asked Go for his drivers license and the
registration papers of the vehicle, but he was
unable to produce them. When Go opened the
door, SPO3 Liquido took the ID card and found
that the same belonged to SPO4 Zenaida
Bagadiong. The police officers saw pieces of
glass tooters and tin foils on the backseat and
floor of the car. They asked Go why he had
these items, but he did not say anything.
Instead, Go suggested that they talk the matter
over, and intimated that he had money. SPO3
Liquido replied that they should talk at the police
headquarters. Go took out an attach case from
the car and opened it. There were two black
clutch bags inside. Go opened the first bag,
which contained shiny white substance wrapped
in cellophane. The second bag contained
P120,000.00 in cash. The police officers brought
Go to the police station. When they arrived at
the precinct, they turned over the attach case
together with the two black clutch bags to the
investigator. The investigator found eight
cellophane bags containing granules suspected
to be shabu in one of the clutch bags. When the
attach case was opened, the police officers
found that it also contained three glass tooters,
tin foils, an improvised burner, magazines and
newspapers. Consequently, two Informations
were filed against Go before the Regional Trial
Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 34 (Criminal
Case 3308-92-C, for violation of Article III of RA
6452 or the Dangerous Drugs Act; and Criminal
Case 3309-92-C, for violation of PD 1866) After
a joint trial, the lower court rendered judgment
convicting Go in the two criminal cases, and
sentencing him in Criminal Case 3308-92-C to a
penalty of imprisonment of 6 years and 1 day to
12 years and a fine of P12,000.00; and in
Criminal Case 3309-92-C to suffer an
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. Go
appealed his conviction in Criminal Case 3309-
92-C directly to the Supreme Court (GR
116001). On the other hand, Go brought his
appeal of the judgment in Criminal Case 3308-
92-C before the Court of Appeals. In an
Amended Decision dated 21 February 1996, the
Court of Appeals affirmed Gos conviction but
modified the penalty imposed by the trial court
by sentencing him, in addition to imprisonment
of 6 years and 1 day to 12 years, to pay a fine
of P6,000.00, citing Section 8 of RA 6425, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Go filed the petition for review (GR 123943).
The two cases were subsequently consolidated.
Issue: Whether Go was legally arrested without
warrant for illegal possession of firearms and
illegal drugs.
Held: The constitutional proscription, that no
person shall be arrested without any warrant of
arrest having been issued prior thereto, is not a
hard-and-fast rule. The Rules of Court and
jurisprudence recognize exceptional cases where
an arrest may be effected without a warrant.
Among these are when, in the presence of a
peace officer, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; or when an
offense has in fact just been committed, and the
arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it. Herein, the police saw the gun
tucked in Gos waist when he stood up. The gun
was plainly visible. No search was conducted as
none was necessary. Go could not show any
license for the firearm, whether at the time of
his arrest or thereafter. Thus, he was in effect
committing a crime in the presence of the police
officers. No warrant of arrest was necessary in
such a situation, it being one of the recognized
exceptions under the Rules. As a consequence
of Gos valid warrantless arrest, he may be
lawfully searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search
warrant, as provided in Rule 126, Section 12.
This is a valid search incidental to the lawful
arrest. The subsequent discovery in his car of
drug paraphernalia and the crystalline
substance, which was later identified as shabu,
though in a distant place from where the illegal
possession of firearm was committed, cannot be
said to have been made during an illegal search.
As such, the seized items do not fall within the
exclusionary clause, which states that any
evidence obtained in violation of the right
against warrantless arrest cannot be used for
any purposes in any proceeding. Hence, not
being fruits of the poisonous tree, so to speak,
the objects found at the scene of the crime,
such as the firearm, the shabu and the drug
paraphernalia, can be used as evidence against
appellant. Besides, it has been held that drugs
discovered as a result of a consented search is
admissible in evidence.
People vs. Gerente [GR 95847-48, 10
March 1993]
First Division, Grino-Aquino (J): 3 concur
Facts: At about 7:00 a.m. of 30 April 1990,
Gabriel Gerente, together with Fredo Echigoren
and Totoy Echigoren, allegedly started drinking
liquor and smoking marijuana in Gerentes
house which is about 6 meters away from the
house of Edna Edwina Reyes who was in her
house on that day. She overheard the three
men talking about their intention to kill Clarito
Blace. She testified that she heard Fredo
Echigoren saying, Gabriel, papatayin natin si
Clarito Blace. Fredo and Totoy Echigoren and
Gerente carried out their plan to kill Clarito Blace
at about 2:00 p.m. of the same day. Reyes
allegedly witnessed the killing. Fredo Echigoren
struck the first blow against Clarito Blace,
followed by Totoy Echigoren and Gabriel
Gerente who hit him twice with a piece of wood
in the head and when he fell, Totoy Echigoren
dropped a hollow block on the victims head.
Thereafter, the three men dragged Blace to a
place behind the house of Gerente. At about
4:00 p.m. of the same day, Patrolman Jaime
Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station received
a report from the Palo Police Detachment about
a mauling incident. He went to the Valenzuela
District Hospital where the victim was brought.
He was informed by the hospital officials that
the victim died on arrival. The cause of death
was massive fracture of the skull caused by a
hard and heavy object. Right away, Patrolman
Urrutia, together with Police Corporal Romeo
Lima and Patrolman Alex Umali, proceeded to
Paseo de Blas where the mauling incident took
place. There they found a piece of wood with
blood stains, a hollow block and two roaches of
marijuana. They were informed by Reyes that
she saw the killing and she pointed to Gabriel
Gerente as one of the three men who killed
Clarito. The policemen proceeded to the house
of Gerente, who was then sleeping. They told
him to come out of the house and they
introduced themselves as policemen. Patrolman
Urrutia frisked Gerente and found a coin purse
in his pocket which contained dried leaves
wrapped in cigarette foil. The dried leaves were
sent to the National Bureau of Investigation for
examination. The Forensic Chemist found them
to be marijuana. Only Gerente was apprehended
by the police. The other suspects, Fredo and
Totoy Echigoren, are still at large. On 2 May
1990, two separate informations were filed by
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Benjamin Caraig
against him for Violation of Section 8, Art. II, of
RA 6425, and for Murder. When arraigned on 16
May 1990, Gerente pleaded not guilty to both
charges. A joint trial of the two cases was held.
On 24 September 1990, the Regional Trial Court
of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, found
Gerente guilty of Violation of Section 8 of
Republic Act 6425 and sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment for a term of 12
years and 1 day, as minimum, to 20 years, as
maximum; and also found him guilty of Murder
for which crime he was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. . Gerente
appealed.
Issue: Whether the police officers have the
personal knowledge of the killing of Blace to
allow them to arrest, and the subsequent
searchly Gerentes person, without the
necessary warrant.
Held: The search of Gerentes person and the
seizure of the marijuana leaves in his possession
were valid because they were incident to a
lawful warrantless arrest. Paragraphs (a) and
(b), Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Court provide that A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When
an offense has in fact just been committed, and
he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed
it; The policemen arrested Gerente only some 3
hours after Gerente and his companions had
killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital
and when they inspected the scene of the crime,
they found the instruments of death: a piece of
wood and a concrete hollow block which the
killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The
eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the
happening to the policemen and pinpointed her
neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under
those circumstances, since the policemen had
personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace
and of facts indicating that Gerente and two
others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest
Gerente without a warrant. If they had
postponed his arrest until they could obtain a
warrant, he would have fled the law as his two
companions did. The search conducted on
Gerentes person was likewise lawful because it
was made as an incident to a valid arrest. This is
in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Court which provides that A
person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant. The frisk and search
of Gerentes person upon his arrest was a
permissible precautionary measure of arresting
officers to protect themselves, for the person
who is about to be arrested may be armed and
might attack them unless he is first disarmed.
People vs. Cubcubin [GR 136267, 10 July
2001]
En Banc, Mendoza (J): 12 concur, 1 on official
business, 1 on leave
Facts: At about 3:30 a.m. of 26 August 1997,
Sgt. Rogel, desk officer of the Cavite City police
station, received a telephone call that a person
had been shot near the cemetery along Julian
Felipe Boulevard in San Antonio, Cavite City. For
this reason, a police team, composed of SPO1
Malinao, Jr., PO3 Rosal, PO3 Estoy, Jr., PO3
Manicio, and SPO3 Manalo, responded to the
call and found Henry P. Piamonte slumped dead
on his tricycle which was then parked on the
road. Police photographer Fred Agana took
pictures of the crime scene showing the victim
slumped on the handle of the tricycle. PO3 Rosal
testified that a tricycle driver, who refused to
divulge his name, told him that Fidel Abrenica
Cubcubin Jr. and the victim were last seen
together coming out of the Sting Cafe, located in
San Antonio near the gate of Sangley Point,
Cavite City, about a kilometer and a half away
from the crime scene. Forthwith, PO3 Rosal and
SPO1 Malinao, Jr. went to the cafe and talked to
Danet Garcellano, a food server/waitress in
Sting Cafe. Garcellano described Cubcubin as a
lean, dark-complexioned, and mustachioed man
who had on a white t-shirt and brown short
pants. Armando Plata, another tricycle driver,
told PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. that
Garcellanos description fitted a person known
as alias Jun Dulce. Armando Plata, who knew
where Cubcubin lived, led PO3 Rosal, SPO1
Malinao, Jr., and Prosecutor Lu to Cubucubins
house in Garcia Extension, Cavite City. The
policemen knocked on the door for about 3
minutes before it was opened by a man who
answered the description given by Danet
Garcellano and who turned out to be Cubcubin.
The police operatives identified themselves and
informed him that he was being sought in
connection with the shooting near the cemetery.
Cubcubin denied involvement in the incident.
PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. then asked
permission to enter and look around the house.
SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said that upon entering the
house, he noticed a white t-shirt, bearing the
brand name Hanes and the name Dhenvher PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr., the arresting
written in the inner portion of the shirts
hemline, placed over a divider near the kitchen.
Upon close examination, he said that he found it
to be bloodied. When he picked up the t-shirt,
two spent .38 caliber shells fell from it. PO3
Rosal stayed with Cubcubin while he conducted
a search. They then took the t-shirt and the two
bullet shells. SPO1 Malinao, Jr. then asked
Cubcubin to go with them to Sting Cafe for
purposes of identification. There, Cubcubin was
positively identified by Danet Garcellano as the
victims companion. The police investigators
asked Cubcubin where the fatal gun was. SPO1
Malinao, Jr. said Cubcubin refused to tell him
where he hid the gun so he sought the latters
permission to go back to his house to conduct a
further search. Thereupon, SPO1 Malinao, Jr.,
accompanied by Prosecutor Lu, PO3 Estoy, Jr.,
PO3 Manicio, SPO3 Manalo, and PO3 Rosal,
proceeded thereto. Inside the house, they saw
Cubcubins 11-year old son Jhumar. PO3 Estoy,
Jr. found on top of a plastic water container
(drum) outside the bathroom a homemade
Smith and Wesson caliber .38 revolver (six
shooter), without a serial number. He found the
gun loaded with five live bullets. PO3 Estoy, Jr.
said that he inscribed his initials RDE (for
Raymundo D. Estoy) on the cylinder of the gun
with the use of a sharp object. While PO3 Estoy,
Jr. was conducting the search, SPO1 Malinao, Jr.
and PO3 Rosal stayed with Cubcubin in the sala.
The .38 caliber gun, the white Hanes t-shirt,
and the two spent .38 caliber shells were all
photographed. Cubcubin was then taken to the
police station, where he was photographed
along with the things seized from him. Cubcubin
was charged for the crime of murder. On 5
October 1998, the Regional Trial Court, Branch
88, Cavite City, found Cubcubin guilty of murder
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
death. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue: Whether there was probable cause for
officers, to believe that Cubcubin committed the
crime, to allow them to conduct the latters
warrantless arrest.
Held: Rule 113, 5 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides that
A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in
his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an
offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it; (c)
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another. Under 5(b), two
conditions must concur for a warrantless arrest
to be valid: first, the offender has just
committed an offense and, second, the arresting
peace officer or private person has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it. It has been held
that personal knowledge of facts in arrests
without a warrant must be based upon probable
cause, which means an actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion. Herein, the
arrest of Cubcubin was effected shortly after the
victim was killed. There was no probable cause,
however, for PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr.,
the arresting officers, to believe that Cubcubin
committed the crime. The two did not have
personal knowledge of facts indicating that
Cubcubin had committed the crime. Their
knowledge of the circumstances from which
they allegedly inferred that Cubcubin was
probably guilty was based entirely on what they
had been told by others, to wit: by someone
who called the PNP station in San Antonio,
Cavite City at about 3:30 a.m. of 26 August
1997 and reported that a man had been killed
along Julian Felipe Boulevard of the said city; by
an alleged witness who saw Cubcubin and the
victim coming out of the Sting Cafe; by Danet
Garcellano, waitress at the Sting Cafe, who said
that the man last seen with the victim was lean,
mustachioed, dark-complexioned and was
wearing a white t-shirt and a pair of brown short
pants; by a tricycle driver named Armando Plata
who told them that the physical description
given by Garcellano fitted Cubcubin, alias Jun
Dulce and who said he knew where Cubcubin
lived and accompanied them to Cubcubins
house. Thus, PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr.
merely relied on information given to them by
others. Be that as it may, Cubcubin cannot now
question the validity of his arrest without a
warrant. The records show that he pleaded not
guilty to the charge when arraigned on 11
November 1997. Cubcubin did not object to the
arraignment, and thus has waived the right to
object to the legality of his arrest. On the other
hand, the search of Cubcubins house was illegal
and, consequently, the things obtained as a
result of the illegal search, i.e., the white
Hanes t-shirt, two spent shells, and the .38
caliber gun, are inadmissible in evidence against
him. It cannot be said that the .38 caliber gun
was discovered through inadvertence. After
bringing Cubcubin to the Sting Cafe where he
was positively identified by a waitress named
Danet Garcellano as the victims companion, the
arresting officers allegedly asked Cubcubin
where he hid the gun used in killing the victim.
According to SPO1 Malinao, Jr., when Cubcubin
refused to answer, he sought Cubcubins
permission to go back to his house and there
found the .38 caliber revolver on top of a plastic
water container outside the bathroom. Thus, the
gun was purposely sought by the police officers
and they did not merely stumble upon it. Nor
were the police officers justified in seizing the
white Hanes t-shirt placed on top of the
divider in plain view as such is not contraband
nor is it incriminating in nature which would lead
SPO1 Malinao, Jr. to conclude that it would
constitute evidence of a crime. Contrary to what
SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said, the t-shirt was not
bloodied which could have directed his
attention to take a closer look at it. From the
photograph of the t-shirt, it is not visible that
there were bloodstains. The actual t-shirt merely
had some small specks of blood at its lower
portion. Furthermore, there is no evidence to
link Cubcubin directly to the crime.
Go vs. Court of Appeals [GR 101837, 11
February 1992]
En Banc, Feliciano (J): 5 concur
Facts: On 2 July 1991, Eldon Maguan was
driving his car along Wilson St., San Juan, Metro
Manila, heading towards P. Guevarra St. Rolito
Go y Tambunting entered Wilson St., where it is
a one-way street and started traveling in the
opposite or wrong direction. At the corner of
Wilson and J. Abad Santos Sts., Gos and
Maguans cars nearly bumped each other. Go
alighted from his car, walked over and shot
Maguan inside his car. Go then boarded his car
and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby
restaurant was able to take down Gos car plate
number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at
the scene of the shooting and there retrieved an
empty shell and one round of live ammunition
for a 9mm caliber pistol. Verification at the Land
Transportation Office showed that the car was
registered to one Elsa Ang Go. The following
day, the police returned to the scene of the
shooting to find out where the suspect had
come from; they were informed that Go had
dined at Cravings Bake Shop shortly before the
shooting. The police obtained a facsimile or
impression of the credit card used by Go from
the cashier of the bake shop. The security guard
of the bake shop was shown a picture of Go and
he positively identified him as the same person
who had shot Maguan. Having established that
the assailant was probably Go, the police
launched a manhunt for Go. On 8 July 1991, Go
presented himself before the San Juan Police
Station to verify news reports that he was being
hunted by the police; he was accompanied by
two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained
him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at
the police station at that time, positively
identified Go as the gunman. That same day,
the police promptly filed a complaint for
frustrated homicide against Go with the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. First Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio
(Prosecutor) informed Go, in the Presence of
his lawyers. that he could avail himself of his
right to preliminary investigation but that he
must first sign a waiver of the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Go
refused to execute any such waiver. On 9 July
1991, while the complaint was still with the
Prosecutor, and before an information could be
filed in court, the victim, Eldon Maguan, died of
his gunshot wound(s). Accordingly, on 11 July
1991, the Prosecutor, instead of filing an
information for frustrated homicide, filed an
information for murder before the Regional Trial
Court. No bail was recommended. At the bottom
of the information, the Prosecutor certified that
no preliminary investigation had been conducted
because the accused did not execute and sign a
waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code. In the afternoon of 11 July
1991, Gos counsel filed with the prosecutor an
omnibus motion for immediate release and
proper preliminary investigation, alleging that
the warrantless arrest of Go was unlawful and
that no preliminary investigation had been
conducted before the information was filed. On
12 July 1991, Go filed an urgent ex-parte motion
for special raffle in order to expedite action on
the Prosecutors bail recommendation. The case
was raffled to the sala of Judge Benjamin V.
Pelayo (Branch 168, RTC of Pasig City), who, on
the same date, approved the cash bond posted
by Go and ordered his release. Go was in fact
released that same day. On 16 July 1991, the
Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court a
motion for leave to conduct preliminary
investigation and prayed that in the meantime
all proceedings in the court be suspended. On
the said date, the trial court issued an Order 9
granting leave to conduct preliminary
investigation and cancelling the arraignment set
for 15 August 1991 until after the prosecution
shall have concluded its preliminary
investigation. On 17 July 1991, however, the
Judge motu proprio issued an Order, (1)
recalling the 12 July 1991 Order which granted
bail: petitioner was given 48 hours from receipt
of the Order to surrender himself: (2) recalling
and cancelling the 16 July 1991 Order which
granted leave to the Prosecutor to conduct
preliminary investigation: (3) treating Gos
omnibus motion for immediate release and
preliminary investigation dated 11 July 1991 as
a petition for bail and set for hearing on 23 July
1991. On 19 July 1991, Go filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the
Supreme Court assailing the 17 July 1991 Order.
Go also moved for suspension of all proceedings
in the case pending resolution by the Supreme
Court of his petition: this motion was, however,
denied by Judge Pelayo. On 23 July 1991, Go
surrendered to the police. By a Resolution dated
24 July 1991, the Supreme Court remanded the
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
to the Court of Appeals. On 16 August 1991,
Judge Pelayo issued an order in open court
setting Gos arraignment on 23 August 1991. On
19 August 1991, Go filed with the Court of
Appeals a motion to restrain his arraignment. On
23 August 1991, Judge Pelayo issued a
Commitment Order directing the Provincial
Warden of Rizal to admit Go into his custody at
the Rizal Provincial Jail. On the same date, Go
was arraigned. In view, however, of his refusal
to enter a plea, the trial court entered for him a
plea of not guilty. The trial court then set the
criminal case for continuous hearings on 19, 24
and 26 September; on 2, 3, 11 and 17 October;
and on 7, 8, 14, 15, 21 and 22 November 1991.
On 27 August 1991. Go filed a petition for
habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals. On 30
August 1991, the Court of Appeals issued the
writ of habeas corpus. The petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, on the one hand,
and the petition for habeas corpus, upon the
other, were subsequently consolidated in the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, on 2
September 1991, issued a resolution denying
Gos motion to restrain his arraignment on the
ground that motion had become moot and
academic. On 19 September 1991, trial of the
criminal case commenced. On 23 September
1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a
consolidated decision dismissing the 2 petitions
on the grounds that Gos warrantless arrest was
valid and Gos act of posting bail constituted
waiver of any irregularity attending his arrest,
among others. On 3 October 1991, the
prosecution presented three (3) more witnesses
at the trial. Gos Counsel also filed a Withdrawal
of Appearance with the trial court, with Gos
conformity. On 4 October 1991, Go filed the
present petition for Review on Certiorari. On 14
October 1991, the Court issued a Resolution
directing Judge Pelayo to held in abeyance the
hearing of the criminal case below until further
orders from the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Go was arrested legally without
warrant for the killing of Maguan, and is thus
not entitled to be released pending the conduct
of a preliminary investigation.
Held: Gos warrantless arrest or detention
does not fall within the terms of Section 5 of
Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure which provides that A peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the
person to be created has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just
been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the
person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending or
has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another. In cases falling under
paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail,
and he shall be proceeded against in accordance
with Rule 112, Section 7. Gos arrest took
place 6 days after the shooting of Maguan. The
arresting officers obviously were not present,
within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time
Go had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the
arrest effected 6 days after the shooting be
reasonably regarded as effected when [the forthwith subject only to his appearing at the
shooting had] in fact just been committed preliminary investigation.
within the meaning of Section 5 (b). Moreover,
none of the arresting officers had any
personal knowledge of facts indicating that Go
was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The
information upon which the police acted had
been derived from statements made by alleged
eyewitnesses to the shooting one stated that
Go was the gunman another was able to take
down the alleged gunmans cars plate number
which turned out to be registered in Gos wifes
name. That information did not, however,
constitute personal knowledge. It is thus clear
to the Court that there was no lawful
warrantless arrest of Go within the meaning of
Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear too that Section
7 of Rule 112 is also not applicable. Indeed, Go
was not arrested at all. When he walked into the
San Juan Police Station, accompanied by two (2)
lawyers, he in fact placed himself at the disposal
of the police authorities. He did not state that he
was surrendering himself, in all probability to
avoid the implication he was admitting that he
had slain Eldon Maguan or that he was
otherwise guilty of a crime. When the police
filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the
Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately
scheduled a preliminary investigation to
determine whether there was probable cause for
charging Go in court for the killing of Eldon
Maguan. Instead, as noted earlier, the
Prosecutor proceeded under the erroneous
supposition that Section 7 of Rule 112 was
applicable and required Go to waive the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code as a condition for carrying out a
preliminary investigation. This was substantive
error, for Go was entitled to a preliminary
investigation and that right should have been
accorded him without any conditions. Moreover,
since Go had not been arrested; with or without
a warrant, he was also entitled to be released