1. Leung Yee vs Strong Machinery Co.
Appellant should have registered its protest before or at the time of the sale of the
37 PHIL 644 GR No. L-11658 February 15, 1918
FACTS: The Compania Agricola Filipina (CAF) purchased from Strong Machinery Co. rice
cleaning machines which CAF installed in one of its buildings.
As security for the purchase price, CAF executed a chattel mortgage on the machines and
the building on which they had been installed.
When CEF failed to pay, the registered mortgage was foreclosed and Strong Machinery
Co. purchased the building. This sale was annotated in the Chattel Mortgage Registry.
Later, Strong Machinery Co. also purchased from Agricola the lot on which the building
was constructed. The sale wasn't registered in the Registry of Property BUT Strong
Machinery Co. took possession of the building and the lot.
However, the same building had been previously purchased by Leung Yee, a creditor
of Agricola, at a sheriff's sale despite his knowledge of the prior sale in favor of Strong
Machinery Co.. The sale to Leung Yee was registered in the Registry of Property.
ISSUES
1. Was the property's nature changed by its registration in the Chattel Mortgage
Registry?
2. Who has a better right to the property?
HELD
1. Where the interest conveyed is of the nature of real property, the placing of the
document on record in the Chattel Mortgage Registry is a futile act.
Chattel Mortgage refers to the mortgage of Personal Property executed in the manner
and form prescribed in the statute.
Since the building is REAL PROPERTY, its sale as annotated in the Chattel Mortgage
Registry cannot be given the legal effect of registration in the Registry of Real Property.
2. Following the rule on possessory rights provided in Art. 1473, Strong Machinery
Co. has a better right to the property since it first purchased the same ahead of Leung
Yee, the latter not being a purchaser in good faith
2. Davao Sawmill Co. vs Castillo
61 PHIL 709 GR No. L-40411 August 7, 1935
FACTS: Davao Sawmill Co., operated a sawmill. The land upon which the business was
conducted was leased from another person. On the land, Davao Sawmill erected a
building which housed the machinery it used. Some of the machines were mounted and
placed on foundations of cement. In the contract of lease, Davo Sawmill agreed to turn
over free of charge all improvements and buildings erected by it on the premises with
the exception of machineries, which shall remain with the Davao Sawmill. In an action
brought by the Davao Light and Power Co., judgment was rendered against Davao
Sawmill. A writ of execution was issued and the machineries placed on the sawmill were
levied upon as personalty by the sheriff. Davao Light and Power Co., proceeded to
purchase the machinery and other properties auctioned by the sheriff.
ISSUE: Are the machineries real or personal property?
HELD
Art.415 of the New Civil Code provides that Real Property consists of:
(1) Lands, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil;
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner pf the
tenement for an industry ot works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of
land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works;
property. While not conclusive, the appellant's characterization of the property as
chattels is indicative of intention and impresses upon the property the character
determined by the parties.
Machinery is naturally movable. However, machinery may be immobilized by destination
or purpose under the following conditions:
General Rule: The machinery only becomes immobilized if placed in a plant by the
owner of the property or plant.
Immobilization cannot be made by a tenant, a usufructuary, or any person having only
a temporary right.
Exception: The tenant, usufructuary, or temporary possessor acted as agent of the
owner of the premises; or he intended to permanently give away the property in favor of
the owner.
As a rule, therefore, the machinery should be considered as Personal Property, since it
was not placed on the land by the owner of the said land.
3. Mindanao Bus Co. v. City Assessor
G.R. No. L-17870 29 September 1962
Facts: Petitioner is a public utility company engaged in the transport of passengers and
cargo by motor vehicles in Mindanao with main offices in Cagayan de Oro (CDO).
Petitioner likewise owned a land where it maintains a garage, a repair shop and
blacksmith or carpentry shops. The machineries are placed thereon in wooden and
cement platforms. The City Assessor of CDO then assessed a P4,400 realty tax on said
machineries and repair equipment. Petitioner appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals but
it sustained the City Assessor's decision, while the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) sustained
the same.
Issue: Whether or not the machineries and equipments are considered immobilized and
thus subject to a realty tax
Held: The Supreme Court decided otherwise and held that said machineries and
equipments are not subject to the assessment of real estate tax.
Said equipments are not considered immobilized as they are merely incidental, not
esential and principal to the business of the petitioner. The transportation business could
be carried on without repair or service shops of its rolling equipment as they can be
repaired or services in another shop belonging to another.
4. SERGS PRODUCTS AND GOQUIOLAY V. PCI LEASING AND FINANCE (338 SCRA
499 )
FACTS: PCI filed a case for collection of a sum of money as well as a writ of
replevin for the seizure of machineries, subject of a chattel mortgage executed by
petitioner in favor of PCI.
Machineries of petitioner were seized and petitioner filed a motion for special
protective order. It asserts that the machineries were real property and could not be
subject of a chattel mortgage.
Issue: Whether the machinery are considered a real or personal property.
HELD: The machineries in question have become immobilized by destination
because they are essential and principal elements in the industry, and thus have become
immovable in nature.
Nonetheless, they are still proper subjects for a chattel mortgage.
Contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered
as personal. After agreement, they are consequently estopped from claiming
otherwise.
5. Board of Assessment Appeals, Q.C. v. Meralco, G.R. No. L-15334 (January 31,
1964)
Facts: Meralco constructed 40 steel towers within Quezon City, which carry electric
transmission wires attached to insulators from its hydro-electric plant located in the
province of Laguna to the City of Manila.
The City Assessor of Quezon City declared Meralco's steel towers for real property tax.
Issue: Whether or not Meralco's steel towers are considered real properties so that they
can be subject to real property tax.
Held:
No, Meralco's steel towers are not considered real properties that can be subject to real
property tax.
Article 415 of the Civil Code states the following are immovable properties:
(1) Land, buildings, roads, and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil;
(3) Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot
be separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object;
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the
tenement for an industry or works, which may be carried in a building or on a piece of
land, and which tends directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works;
The steel towers do not come within the objects mentioned in above paragraphs.
They are not construction analogous to buildings nor adhering to the soil. They are
removable and merely attached to a square metal frame by means of bolts, which when
unscrewed could easily be dismantled and moved from place to place.
They are also not attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, and they can be separated
without breaking the material or causing deterioration upon the object to which they are
attached.
They are not machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended for industry
or works on the land. Meralco is not engaged in an industry or works on the land in
which the steel towers are constructed.
The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals, which ordered the cancellation of the tax
declarations, were affirmed by the Supreme Court.
6. MANILA ELECTRIC CO. V. CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS (114 SCRA
273 )
FACTS: Petitioner owns two oil storage tanks, made of steel plates wielded and
assembled on the spot. Their bottoms rest on a foundation consisted of compacted
earth, sand pad as immediate layer, and asphalt stratum as top layer. The tanks merely
sit on its foundation.
The municipal treasurer of Batangas made an assessment for realty tax on the two tanks,
based on the report of the Board of Assessors. MERALCO wished to oppose this
assessment as they averred that the tanks are not real properties.
HELD:
While the two storage tanks are not embodied in the land, they may
nevertheless be considered as improvements in the land, enhancing its utility and
rendering it useful to the oil industry.
For purposes of taxation, the term real property may include things, which
should generally be considered as personal property. it is familiar
phenomenon to see things classified as real property for purposes of
taxation which on general principle may be considered as personal
property.
7. Provincial assesosr of agusan del sur vs filipinas palm oil plantation
Facts: Filipinas Palm Oil Plantation Inc. (Filipinas) is a private organization engaged in palm
oil plantation5 with a total land area of more than 7,000 hectares of National Development
Company (NDC) lands in Agusan del Sur.6 Harvested fruits from oil palm trees are converted
into oil through Filipinas' milling plant in the middle of the plantation area. Within the
plantation, there are also three (3) plantation roads and a number of residential homes
constructed by Filipinas for its employees After the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law was
passed, NDC lands were transferred to Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law beneficiaries
who formed themselves as the merged NDC-Guthrie Plantations, Inc. - NDC-Guthrie Estates,
Inc. (NGPI-NGEI) Cooperatives. Filipinas entered into a lease contract agreement with NGPI-
NGEI The Provincial-Assessor of Agusan del Sur (Provincial Assessor) is a government agency
in charge with the assessment of lands under the public domain. It assessed Filipinas'
properties found within the plantation area which held that the road equipment and mini
haulers of the lessee palm oil that should be tax according to local gvt code sec 199 appearing
to be real property. Respondent argued that provincial assesor erred in including mini haulers
and road equipment as they are exempt from tax and it is movable property.
Issue: Whether the contention of provincial assessor is correct.
Rule: The properties under Article 415, paragraph (5) of the Civil Code are immovables by
destination, or "those which are essentially movables, but by the purpose for which they have
been placed in an immovable, partake of the nature of the latter because of the added utility
derived therefrom." These properties, including machinery, become immobilized if the
following requisites concur: (a) they are placed in the tenement by the owner of such
tenement; (b) they are destined for use in the industry or work in the tenement; and (c) they
tend to directly meet the needs of said industry or works. The first two requisites are not
found anywhere in the Local Government Code.92 Section 199(o) of the Local Government
prevails over Article 415(5) of the Civil Code. In Manila Electric Company: As between the
Civil Code, a general law governing property and property relations, and the Local
Government Code, a special law granting local government units the power to impose real
property tax, then the latter shall prevail. As the Court pronounced in Disomangcop v. The
Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways
Petitioner is correct in claiming that the phrase pertaining to physical facilities for production
is comprehensive enough to include the road equipment and mini haulers as actually, directly,
and exclusively used by respondent to meet the needs of its operations in palm oil
production.Moreover, "mini-haulers are farm tractors pulling attached trailers used in the
hauling of seedlings during planting season and in transferring fresh palm fruits from the
farm [or] field to the processing plant within the plantation area.
The indispensability of the road equipment and mini haulers in transportation makes it
actually, directly, and exclusively used in the operation of respondent's business
8. FELS ENERGY, INC., Petitioner, versus- THE PROVINCE OF BATANGAS and THE OFFICE OF
THE PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF BATANGAS, Respondents.
FACTS: On January 18, 1993, NPC entered into a lease contract with Polar Energy, Inc. over
3x30 MW diesel engine power barges moored at Balayan Bay in Calaca, Batangas. The
contract, denominated as an Energy Conversion Agreement, was for a period of five years.
Article 10 reads: 10.1 RESPONSIBILITY. NAPOCOR shall be responsible for the payment of (a)
all taxes, import duties, fees, charges and other levies imposed by the National Government of
the Republic of the Philippines Subsequently, Polar Energy, Inc. assigned its rights under the
Agreement to FELS. On August 7, 1995, FELS received an assessment of real property taxes on
the power barge FELS referred the matter to NPC, reminding it of its obligation under the
Agreement to pay all real estate taxes This prompted NPC to file a petition with the Local
Board of Assessment Appeals (LBAA) for the setting aside of the assessment and the
declaration of the barges as non-taxable items; it also prayed that should LBAA find the barges
to be taxable, the Provincial Assessor be directed to make the necessary corrections
Issue: whether the barge were immovable property and subject to tax under FELS.
RULE: Article 415 (9) of the New Civil Code provides that [d]ocks and structures which,
though floating, are intended by their nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a river,
lake, or coast are considered immovable property. Thus, power barges are categorized as
immovable property by destination, being in the nature of machinery and other implements
intended by the owner for an industry or work which may be carried on in a building or on a
piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of said industry or work It follows
then that FELS cannot escape liability from the payment of realty taxes by invoking its
exemption in Section 234 (c) of R.A. No. 7160, which reads: SECTION 234. Exemptions from
Real Property Tax. The following are exempted from payment of the real property tax: x x x
(c) All machineries and equipment that are actually, directly and exclusively used by local
water districts and government-owned or controlled corporations engaged in the supply and
distribution of water and/or generation and transmission of electric power
9. Presbitero vs Fernandez
Facts: It appears that during the lifetime of Esperidion Presbitero, judgment was rendered
against him by the Court of Appeals on October 14, 1959, in CA-G.R. No. 20879, ... to execute in
favor of the plaintiff, within 30 days from the time this judgment becomes final, a deed of
reconveyance of Lot No. 788 of the cadastral survey of Valladolid, free from all liens and
encumbrances, and another deed of reconveyance of a 7-hectare portion of Lot No. 608 of the
same cadastral survey, also free from all liens and encumbrances, or, upon failure to do so, to
pay to the plaintiff the value of each of the said properties, as may be determined by the Court
a quo upon evidence to be presented by the parties before it. The defendant is further
adjudged to pay to the plaintiff the value of the products received by him from the 5-hectare
portion equivalent to 20 cavans of palay per hectare every year, or 125 cavans yearly, at the
rate of P10.00 per cavan, from 1951 until possession of the said 5-hectare portion is finally
delivered to the plaintiff with legal interest thereon from the time the complaint was filed; and
to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P1,000.00 by way of attorney's fees, plus costs. Thereafter,
plaintiff's counsel, in a letter dated December 8, 1959, sought in vain to amicably settle the
case through petitioner's son, Ricardo Presbitero. When no response was forthcoming, said
counsel asked for, and the court a quo ordered on June 9, 1960, the issuance of a partial writ
of execution for the sum of P12,250.00. On the following day, June 10, 1960, said counsel, in
another friendly letter, reiterated his previous suggestion for an amicable settlement, but the
same produced no fruitful result. Thereupon, on June 21, 1960, the sheriff levied upon and
garnished the sugar quotas allotted to plantation Issue:whether sugar quotas are real
(immovable) or personal properties. While respondent's arguments are thought-provoking,
they cannot stand against the positive mandate of the pertinent statute. The Sugar Limitation
Law (Act 4166, as amended) provides SEC. 9. The allotment corresponding to each piece of
land under the provisions of this Act shall be deemed to be an improvement attaching to the
land entitled thereto .... and Republic Act No. 1825 similarly provides SEC. 4. The
production allowance or quotas corresponding to each piece of land under the provisions of
this Act shall be deemed to be an improvement attaching to the land entitled thereto .... And
Executive Order No. 873 defines "plantation" as follows: (a) The term 'plantation' means any
specific area of land under sole or undivided ownership to which is attached an allotment of
centrifugal sugar. Thus, under express provisions of law, the sugar quota allocations are
accessories to land, and can not have independent existence away from a plantation, although
the latter may vary. Indeed, this Court held in the case of Abelarde vs. Lopez, 74 Phil. 344, that
even if a contract of sale of haciendas omitted "the right, title, interest, participation, action
(and) rent" which the grantors had or might have in relation to the parcels of land sold, the
sale would include the quotas, it being provided in Section 9, Act 4166, that the allotment is
deemed an improvement attached to the land, and that at the time the contract of sale was
signed the land devoted to sugar were practically of no use without the sugar allotment. As an
improvement attached to land, by express provision of law, though not physically so united,
the sugar quotas are inseparable therefrom, just like servitudes and other real rights over an
immovable. Article 415 of the Civil Code, in enumerating what are immovable properties,
names 10. Contracts for public works, and servitudes and other real rights over immovable
property.
10. laverne
11. laverne
12. laverne
13. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Commander Raymond Alpuerto of
the Naval Base Camillo Osias, Port San Vicente, Sta. Ana, Cagayan, Petitioner, vs. REV.
CLAUDIO R. CORTEZ, SR., Respondent.
September 7, 2015 GR. No. 197472
FACTS:
An inalienable public land cannot be appropriated and thus may not be the proper object
of possession. Hence, injunction cannot be issued in order to protect ones alleged right of
possession over the same.
Respondent Rev. Claudio R. Cortez, Sr. (Rev. Cortez), a missionary by vocation engaged in
humanitarian and charitable activities, established an orphanage and school in Punta
Verde, Palaui Island, San Vicente, Sta. Ana, Cagayan. He claimed that since 1962, he has
been in peaceful possession of about 50 hectares of land located in the western portion
of Palaui Island in Sitio Siwangag, Sta. Ana, Cagayan which he, with the help of Aetas and
other people under his care, cleared and developed for agricultural purposes in order to
support his charitable, humanitarian and missionary works.
On May 22, 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 201 reserving
for military purposes a parcel of the public domain situated in Palaui Island. Pursuant
thereto, 2,000 hectares of the southern half portion of the Palaui Island were withdrawn
from sale or settlement and reserved for the use of the Philippine Navy, subject, however,
to private rights if there be any.
On June 13, 2000, Rev. Cortez filed a Petition for Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance
of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction5 against Rogelio C. Bias (Bias) in his
capacity as Commanding Officer of the Philippine Naval Command in Port San Vicente,
Sta. Ana, Cagayan.1wphi1 According to him, some members of the Philippine Navy,
upon orders of Bias, disturbed his peaceful and lawful possession of the said 50-hectare
portion of Palaui Island when on March 15, 2000, they commanded him and his men,
through the use of force and intimidation, to vacate the area. When he sought assistance
from the Office of the Philippine Naval Command, he was met with sarcastic remarks and
threatened with drastic military action if they do not vacate. Thus, Rev. Cortez and his
men were constrained to leave the area. In view of these, Rev. Cortez filed the said
Petition with the RTC seeking preliminary mandatory injunction ordering Bias to
restore to him possession and to not disturb the same, and further, for the said
preliminary writ, if issued, to be made permanent.
After the conduct of hearing on the application for preliminary mandatory injunction6
and the parties submission of their respective memoranda,7 the RTC issued an Order8
dated February 21, 2002 granting the application for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction. However, the same pertained to five hectares (subject area) only, not to the
whole 50 hectares claimed to have been occupied by Rev. Cortez. On July 3, 2007, the
RTC rendered its Decision making the injunction final and permanent. In so ruling, the
said court made reference to the Indigenous Peoples [Right] Act (IPRA).
However, the CA ruled against Rev. Cortez, arguing that it is not applicable to the present
case since Rev. Cortez neither alleged in his Petition that he is claiming rights under the
said act nor was there any showing that he is a member of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities and/or the Indigenous Peoples as defined under the IPRA.
ISSUE:
Whether Rev. Cortez is entitled to a final writ of mandatory injunction
RULING:
A preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to
judgment or final order.26 For its issuance, the applicant is required to show, at least
tentatively, that he has a right which is not vitiated by any substantial challenge or
contradiction.27 Simply stated, the applicant needs only to show that he has the
ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in his complaint. Two requisites must concur
for injunction to issue: (1) there must be a right to be protected and (2) the acts against
which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right."35 Thus, it is necessary
that the Court initially determine whether the right asserted by Rev. Cortez indeed exists.
As earlier stressed, it is necessary that such right must have been established by him
with absolute certainty.
Rev. Cortez argues that he is entitled to the injunctive writ based on the right of
possession (jus possesionis) by reason of his peaceful and continuous possession of the
subject area since 1962. He avers that as this right is protected by law, he cannot be
peremptorily dispossessed therefrom, or if already dispossessed, is entitled to be
restored in possession. Hence, the mandatory injunctive writ was correctly issued in his
favor.
Jus possessionis or possession in the concept of an owner36 is one of the two concepts of
possession provided under Article 52537 of the Civil Code. Also referred to as adverse
possession,38 this kind of possesion is one which can ripen into ownership by
prescription.39 As correctly asserted by Rev. Cortez, a possessor in the concept of an
owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he possesses with a just title and he
cannot be obliged to show or prove it.40 In the same manner, the law endows every
possessor with the right to be respected in his possession.41
It must be emphasized, however, that only things and rights which are susceptible of
being appropriated may be the object of possession.42 The following cannot be
appropriated and hence, cannot be possessed: property of the public dominion, common
things (res communes) such as sunlight and air, and things specifically prohibited by
law.43
Here, the Court notes that while Rev. Cortez relies heavily on his asserted right of
possession, he, nevertheless, failed to show that the subject area over which he has a
claim is not part of the public domain and therefore can be the proper object of
possession.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State.44
Hence, "[a]ll lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public
domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private
persons."45 To prove that a land is alienable, the existence of a positive act of the
government, such as presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative
action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a
statute declaring the land as alienable and disposable must be established.46
In this case, there is no such proof showing that the subject portion of Palaui Island has
been declared alienable and disposable when Rev. Cortez started to occupy the same.
Hence, it must be considered as still inalienable public domain. Being such, it cannot be
appropriated and therefore not a proper subject of possession under Article 530 of the
Civil Code. Viewed in this light, Rev. Cortez claimed right of possession has no leg to
stand on. His possession of the subject area, even if the same be in the concept of an
owner or no matter how long, cannot produce any legal effect in his favor since the
property cannot be lawfully possessed in the first place.
14. NAVY OFFICERS' VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC. (NOVAI), Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. 177168, August 03, 2015
FACTS:
TCT No. T-15387,5 issued in NOVAI's name, covers a 475,009 square-meter parcel of
land (the property)6 situated inside the former Fort Andres Bonifacio Military
Reservation (FBMR) in Taguig, Metro Manila.
The property previously formed part of a larger 15,812,684 square-meter parcel of land
situated at the former Fort William McKinley, Rizal, which was covered by TCT No.
61524 issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
On July 12, 1957, then President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 4237
"reserving for military purposes certain parcels of the public domain situated in the
municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Paraaque, province of Rizal, and Pasay City," which
included the 15,812,684 square-meter parcel of land covered by TCT No. 61524.
On September 29, 1965, then Pres. Diosdado Macapagal issued Proclamation No. 4618
which excluded from Fort McKinley "a certain portion of land embraced therein, situated
in the municipalities of Taguig and Paraaque, Province of Rizal, and Pasay City," with an
area of 2,455,310 square meters, and declared the excluded area as "AFP Officers'
Village" to be disposed of under the provisions of Republic Act Nos. 2749 and
730.10cralawrednad
Barely a month after, or on October 25, 1965, Pres. Macapagal issued Proclamation No.
47811 "reserving for the veterans rehabilitation, medicare and training center site
purposes" an area of 537,520 square meters of the land previously declared as AFP
Officers' Village under Proclamation No. 461, and placed the reserved area under the
administration of the Veterans Federation of the Philippines (VFP).
The property is within the 537,520 square-meter parcel of land reserved in VFP's favor.
On November 15, 1991, the property was the subject of a Deed of Sale12between the
Republic of the Philippines, through former Land Management Bureau (LMB) Director
Abelardo G. Palad, Jr., (Dir. Palad) and petitioner NOVAI. The deed of sale was
subsequently registered and from which TCT No. T-15387 was issued in NOVAI's name.
The Republic's Complaint for Cancellation of Title
In its complaint13 filed with the RTC on December 23, 1993, the Republic sought to
cancel NOVAFs title based on the following grounds: (a) the land covered by NOVAFs title
is part of a military reservation; (b) the deed of sale conveying the property to NOVAI,
which became the basis for the issuance of TCT No. 15387, is fictitious; (c) the LMB has
no records of any application made by NOVAI for the purchase of the property, and of the
NOVAFs alleged payment of P14,250,270.00 for the property; and (d) the presidential
proclamation, i.e., Proclamation No. 2487, claimed to have been issued by then President
Corazon C. Aquino in 1991 that authorized the transfer and titling of the property to
NOVAI, is fictitious.
NOVAI's Answer to the Complaint
In its answer (which was later amended) to the Republic's complaint, NOVAI counter-
argued that the property was no longer part of the public dominion, as the land had long
been segregated from the military reservation pursuant to Proclamation No. 461.
NOVAI claimed that, contrary to the Republic's contention that there were no records of
the sale, it had actually filed a letter-application for a sales patent over the property with
the LMB which prepared, verified and approved the property's plan and technical
description; and that the LMB delivered to it a copy of the deed of sale, signed and
executed by Dir. Palad, after it had paid a portion of the P14,250,270.00 purchase price,
corresponding taxes, and other charges, with the balance to be paid in installments.
The RTC's decision
The RTC narrowed down the issues to: (a) the character of the property in question, i.e.,
whether the property in question was part of the FBMR, and hence, inalienable; and (b)
the validity of the deed of sale conveying the property to NOVAI, i.e., whether the title
over the property was acquired by NOVAI through fraud. The RTC resolved both issues
in NOVAI's favor.
The CA's decision
The CA reversed and set aside the RTC's decision. It ruled that the property is inalienable
land of the public domain; thus, it cannot be disposed of or be the subject of a sale. It
pointed out that, since NOVAI failed to discharge its burden of proving the existence of
Proclamation No. 2487 - the positive governmental act that would have removed the
property from the public domain the property remained reserved for veterans
rehabilitation purposes under Proclamation No. 478, the latest executive issuance
affecting the property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not property is alienable and deed of sale is void and inexistent
RULING:
We resolve to DENY NOVAI's petition for review on certiorari as we find no reversible
error committed by the CA.
The property is non-disposable land of the public domain reserved for public or quasi-
public use or purpose
(1) Lands of the public domain classified as reservations for public or quasi-public uses
are non-alienable and shall not be subject to disposition, although they are, by the
general classification under Section 6 of C.A. No. 141, alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain, until declared open for disposition by proclamation of the President;
and
(2) Lands of the public domain classified as reservations are property of the public
dominion; they remain to be property of the public dominion until withdrawn from the
public or quasi-public use for which they have been reserved, by act of Congress or by
proclamation of the President, or otherwise positively declared to have been converted
to patrimonial property. The classification and disposition of lands of the public domain
are governed by Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141 or the Public Land Act, the country's
primary law on the matter.
Under Section 6 of C.A. No. 141, the President of the Republic of the Philippines, upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, may, from time
to time, classify lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and
mineral lands, and transfer these lands from one class to another for purposes of their
administration and disposition.
Thus, the President may, for example, transfer a certain parcel of land from its
classification as agricultural (under Section 9 [a]), to residential, commercial, industrial,
or for similar purposes (under Section 9 [b]) and declare it available for disposition
under any of the modes of disposition of alienable and disposable public lands.
15. DREAM VILLAGE NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its Incumbent
President, GREG SERIEGO, Petitioner, vs. BASES DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 192896 July 24, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner Dream Village Neighborhood Association, Inc. (Dream Village) claims to
represent more than 2,000 families who have been occupying a 78,466-square meter lot
in Western Bicutan, Taguig City since 1985 "in the concept of owners continuously,
exclusively and notoriously."6 The lot used to be part of the Hacienda de Maricaban
(Maricaban), owned by Dolores Casal y Ochoa and registered under a Torrens title,7
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 291, issued on October 17, 1906 by the Registry of
Deeds of Rizal.8 Maricaban covered several parcels of land with a total area of over 2,544
hectares spread out over Makati, Pasig, Taguig, Pasay, and Paraaque.
Following the purchase of Maricaban by the government of the United States of America
(USA) early in the American colonial period, to be converted into the military reservation
known as Fort William Mckinley, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 192 was issued in
the name of the USA to cancel OCT No. 291. On December 6, 1956, the USA formally
ceded Fort William Mckinley to the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), and on
September 11, 1958, TCT No. 2288 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 61524, this
time in the name of the Republic.
On January 7, 1986, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476
declaring certain portions of Fort Bonifacio alienable and disposable.
On March 13, 1992, R.A. No. 7227 was passed19 creating the Bases Conversion and
Development Authority (BCDA) to oversee and accelerate the conversion of Clark and
Subic military reservations and their extension camps (John Hay Station, Wallace Air
Station, ODonnell Transmitter Station, San Miguel Naval Communications Station and
Capas Relay Station) to productive civilian uses. The law, thus, expressly authorized the
President of the Philippines "to sell the above lands, in whole or in part, which are
hereby declared alienable and disposable pursuant to the provisions of existing laws and
regulations governing sales of government properties,"21 specifically to raise capital for
the BCDA.
On August 15, 2000, Dream Village formalized its complaint by filing an Amended
Petition26 in the COSLAP. Among the reliefs it sought: DECLARING the subject property
as alienable and disposable by virtue of applicable laws
ISSUE:
Whether or not BCDA has a better right over Fort Bonifacio
RULING:
That the BCDA has title to Fort Bonifacio has long been decided with finality. It is
unequivocal that the Philippine Government, and now the BCDA, has title and ownership
over Fort Bonifacio. The case of Acting Registrars of Land Titles and Deeds of Pasay City,
Pasig and Makati is final and conclusive on the ownership of the then Hacienda de
Maricaban estate by the Republic of the Philippines. Clearly, the issue on the ownership
of the subject lands in Fort Bonifacio is laid to rest. Other than their view that the USA is
still the owner of the subject lots, petitioner has not put forward any claim of ownership
or interest in them.
Article 1113 of the Civil Code provides that "property of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription." Thus,
under Article 422 of the Civil Code, public domain lands become patrimonial property
only if there is a declaration that these are alienable or disposable, together with an
express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer
retained for public service or the development of national wealth. Only when the
property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of
property of the public dominion begin to run. Also under Section 14(2) of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, it is provided that before acquisitive prescription can commence,
the property sought to be registered must not only be classified as alienable and
disposable, it must also be expressly declared by the State that it is no longer intended
for public service or the development of the national wealth, or that the property has
been converted into patrimonial. Absent such an express declaration by the State, the
land remains to be property of public dominion.
16. ROMAN R. SANTOS, petitioner-appellee, vs. HON. FLORENCIO MORENO, as Secretary
of Public Works and Communications and JULIAN C. CARGULLO, respondents-appellants.
G.R. No. L-15829 December 4, 1967
FACTS:
Roman Santos acquired in 1940 from the Zobel family a larger portion of Hacienda San
Esteban wherein are located 25 streams which were closed by Ayala y Cia., and are now
the subject matter in the instant controversy.
Eighteen years later, that is in 1958, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 20562 following
a congressional inquiry which was kindled by a speech delivered by Senator Rogelio de
la Rosa in the Senate. On August 15, 1958 Senator de la Rosa requested in writing the
Secretary of Public Works and communications to proceed in pursuance of Republic Act
No. 2056 against fishpond owners in the province of Pampanga who have closed rivers
and appropriated them as fishponds without color of title. On the same day, Benigno
Musni and other residents in the vicinity of Hacienda San Esteban petitioned the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications to open the following streams:
Balbaro, Batasan Matua, Bunga, Cansusu, Macabacle, Macanduling, Maragul, Mariablus,
Malate, Matalabang, Maisac, Nigui, Quiorang Silab, Sapang Maragul and Sepung Bato.
Thereupon, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications instructed Julian C.
Cargullo to conduct an investigation on the above named streams.
On October 20, 1958 Musni and his co-petitioners amended their petition to include
other streams. The amended petition therefore covered the following streams:
Balbaro, Balili, Banawa, Batasan Matua Bato, Bengco, Bunga, Buta-buta, Camastiles,
Cansusu, Cela, Don Timpo, Mabalanga, Mabutol, Macabacle, Macabacle qng. Iba,
Macanduling, Maragul, Malauli, Magasawa, Mariablus Malate Masamaral, Matalabang
Maisa, Mariablus,3 Nigui, Pita, Quiorang, Silab, Sapang Maragul, Sepung Bato, Sinag and
Tumbong.
On March 2, 4, 10, 30 and 31, and April 1, 1959, the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications rendered his decisions ordering the opening and restoration of the
channel of all the streams in controversy except Sapang Malauling, Maragul, Quiorang,
Silab, Nigui Pepangebonan, Nasi and Bulacus, within 30 days on the ground that said
streams belong to the public domain.
On April 29, 1959, that is, after receipt of the Secretary's decision dated March 4, 1959,
Roman Santos filed a motion with the Court of First Instance of Man for junction against
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications and Julian C. Cargullo. As prayed for
preliminary injunction was granted on May 8, 1959. The Secretary of Public Work and
Communications answered and alleged as defense that venue was improperly laid; that
Roman Santos failed to exhaust administrative remedies; that the contract between
Ayala y Cia., and the Municipality of Macabebe is null and void; and, that Section 39 of Act
496 excludes public streams from the operation of the Torrens System.
On April 29 and June 12, 1969, Roman Santos received the decision of the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications dated March 10 and March 30, March 31, and April 1,
1959. Consequently, on June 24, 1959 he asked the court to cite in contempt Secretary
Florendo Moreno, Undersecretary M.D. Bautista and Julian Cargullo for issuing and
serving upon him the said decisions despite the existence of the preliminary injunction.
The Solicitor General opposed the motion alleging that the decisions in question had long
been issued when the petition for injunction was filed, that they were received after
preliminary injunction issued because they were transmitted through the District
Engineer of Pampanga to Roman Santos; that their issuance was for Roman Santos'
information and guidance; and, that the motion did not allege that respondents took
steps to enforce the decision. Acting upon said motion, on July 17, 1959, the trial court
considered unsatisfactory the explanation of the Solicitor General but ruled that
Secretary Florencio Moreno, Undersecretary M.D. Bautista and Julian Cargullo acted in
good faith. Hence, they were merely "admonished to desist from any and further action
in this case, observe the preliminary injunction issued by this Court, with the stern
warning, however, that a repetition of the acts complained of shall be dealt with
severely."
On July 18, 1959 the trial court declared all the streams under litigation private, and
rendered the following judgment:
The Writ of preliminary injunction restraining the respondent Secretary of Public Works
& Communications from enforcing the decisions of March 2 And 4, 1959 and all other
similar decisions is hereby made permanent.
The Secretary of Public Works and Communication and Julian Cargullo appealed to this
Court from the order of July 17, 1959 issued in connection with Roman Santos' motion
for contempt and from the decision of the lower court on the merits of the case.
ISSUE:
Do the streams involved in this case belong to the public domain or to the owner of
Hacienda San Esteban according to law and the evidence submitted to the Department of
Public Works and Communications?
RULING:
Sapang Cansusu, being a natural stream and a continuation of the Cansusu River,
admittedly a public stream, belongs to the public domain. Its closure therefore by the
predecessors of Roman Santos was illegal.
All the other streams, being artificial and devoted exclusively for the use of the hacienda
owner and his personnel, are declared of private ownership. Hence, the dams across
them should not he ordered demolished as public nuisances.
Art. 339. Property of public ownerships is
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, river banks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character;
Art. 407. The following are of public ownership:
1. Rivers and their natural channels;
2. Continuous or intermittent waters from springs or brooks running in their natural
channels and the channels themselves.
3. Waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands of public ownership;
4. Lakes and ponds formed by nature, on public lands, and their beds;
5. Rain waters running through ravines or sand beds, the channels of which are of public
ownership;
6. Subterranean waters on public lands;
7. Waters found within the zone of operation of public works, even though constructed
under contract;
8. Waters which flow continuously or intermittently from lands belonging to private
persons, to the State, to provinces, or to towns, from the moment they leave such lands;
9. The waste waters of fountains, sewers, and public institutions.
Art. 408. The following are of private ownership:
1. Waters, either continuous or intermittent rising on private etates, while they run
through them;
2. Lakes and ponds and their beds when formed by nature on such estates;
3. Subterranean waters found therein;
4. Rain water falling thereon as long as their bounderies.
5. The channels of flowing streams, continuous or intermittent, formed by rain water,
and those of brooks crossing estates which are not of public ownership.
The water, bed, banks, and floodgates of a ditch or aqueduct are deemed to be an integral
part of the estate or building for which the waters are intended. The owners of estates
through or along the boundaries of which the aqueduct passes can assert no ownership
over it, nor any right to make use. of it beds or banks, unless they base their claims on
title deed which specify the right or the ownership claimed.
17. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS,
Petitioner, vs. ROSARIO DE GUZMAN VDA. DE JOSON
G.R. No. 163767 March 10, 2014
FACTS:
The land subject of the application was a riceland with an area of 12,342 square meters
known as Lot 2633, Cad-297, Paombong, Bulacan, and covered by plan Ap-03-001603;8
that the riceland had been originally owned and possessed by one Mamerto Dionisio
since 1907;9 that on May 13, 1926, Dionisio, by way of a deed of sale,10 had sold the land
to Romualda Jacinto; that upon the death of Romualda Jacinto, her sister Maria Jacinto
(mother of the respondent) had inherited the land; that upon the death of Maria Jacinto
in 1963, the respondent had herself inherited the land, owning and possessing it openly,
publicly, uninterruptedly, adversely against the whole world, and in the concept of
owner since then; that the land had been declared in her name for taxation purposes.
However, the Director of Lands and the Director of Forest Development averred that
whatever legal and possessory rights the respondent had acquired by reason of any
Spanish government grants had been lost, abandoned or forfeited for failure to occupy
and possess the land for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the
application;13 and that the land applied for, being actually a portion of the Labangan
Channel operated by the Pampanga River Control System, could not be subject of
appropriation or land registration.14
On August 10, 1981, the CFI rendered its decision,18 ordering the registration of the land
in favor of the respondent on the ground that she had sufficiently established her open,
public, continuous, and adverse possession in the concept of an owner for more than 30
years.
On January 30, 2004, the CA promulgated its assailed judgment,21 affirming the decision
of the trial court upon the following ratiocination:
The foregoing documentary and testimonial evidence stood unrebutted and
uncontroverted by the oppositor-appellant and they should serve as proof of the paucity
of the claim of the applicant-appellee over the subject property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Land for registration is susceptible of private acquisition.
RULING:
The period of possession prior to the reclassification of the land as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain is not considered in reckoning the prescriptive
period in favor of the possessor.

Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer
intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property
of the State." It is this provision that controls how public dominion property may be
converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all,
Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property "which belong to the State, without being
for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the
national wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the
State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the
public dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or for the development of
the national wealth".1wphi1
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion
property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national
wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express
declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property
of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by
prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared
by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of the
national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such
declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential
Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.
It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree limits its scope and reach and thus affects the registrability even of
lands already declared alienable and disposable to the detriment of the bona fide
possessors or occupants claiming title to the lands. Yet this interpretation is in accord
with the Regalian doctrine and its concomitant assumption that all lands owned by the
State, although declared alienable or disposable, remain as such and ought to be used
only by the Government.
18. ADRIANO MANECLANG, JULIETA, RAMONA, VICTOR, ANTONINA, LOURDES,
TEODORO and MYRNA, all surnamed MANECLANG, petitioners, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT and ALFREDO MAZA, CORLETO CASTRO, SALOME RODRIGUEZ,
EDUCARDO CUISON, FERNANDO ZARCILLA, MARIANO GABRIEL, NICOMEDES
CORDERO, CLETO PEDROZO, FELIX SALARY and JOSE PANLILIO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-66575 September 30, 1986
FACTS
Petitioners Adriano Maneclang, et. al. filed before the then Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, Branch XI a complaint for quieting of title over a certain fishpond located
within the four [41 parcels of land belonging to them situated in Barrio Salomague,
Bugallon, Pangasinan. The trial court dismissed the complaint in a decision dated August
15, 1975 upon a finding that the body of water traversing the titled properties of
petitioners is a creek constituting a tributary of the Agno River; therefore public in
nature and not subject to private appropriation.
The lower court likewise held that Resolution No. 38, ordering an ocular inspection of
the Cayangan Creek situated between Barrios Salomague Sur and Salomague Norte, and
Resolution No. 95 authorizing public bidding for the lease of all municipal ferries and
fisheries, including the fishpond under consideration, were passed by respondents
herein as members of the Municipal Council of Bugallon, Pangasinan in the exercise of
their legislative powers.
Petitioners appealed said decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court, which affirmed
the same on April 29, 1983. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Acting on the petition, the Court required the respondents to comment thereon.
However, before respondents could do so, petitioners manifested that for lack of interest
on the part of respondent Alfredo Maza, the awardee in the public bidding of the
fishpond, the parties desire to amicably settle the case by submitting to the Court a
Compromise Agreement praying that judgment be rendered recognizing the ownership
of petitioners over the land the body of water found within their titled properties, stating
therein, among other things, that "to pursue the case, the same will not amount to any
benefit of the parties, on the other hand it is to the advantage and benefit of the
municipality if the ownership of the land and the water found therein belonging to
petitioners be recognized in their favor as it is now clear that after the National Irrigation
Administration [NIA] had built the dike around the land, no water gets in or out of the
land.
ISSUE
Whether or not a creek is of public dominion
RULING
A CREEK is a recess/arm extending from a river and participating in the eb and flow of
the sea. It is a property belonging to the public domain. It is not susceptible to
appropriation & acquisitive prescription because such is
As a public water, it cannot be registered under the Torrens System in the name of any
individual.
Its nature as property of the public domain cannot be modified by the construction of
irrigation dikes by the National Irrigation Authority, or by its conversion into a fishpond.
Hence, a compromise agreement adjudicating the ownership of such property in favor of
an individual is null and void.
The compromise agreement has no legal effect since it is contrary to law and public
policy.
19. Usero Vs CA
G.R. No. 152115, 26 January 2005
Property Law
Facts: This is a consolidated petition assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA).
Petitioners and the private respondent are registered owners of neighboring parcels of
land wherein between the lots is a low-level strip of land with stagnant body of water.
Whenever there is a storm or heavy rain, the water therein would flood thereby causing
damage to houses of the Polinars prompting them to build a concrete wall on the bank of
the strip of land about 3meters from their house and riprapped the soil in that portion.
The Useros claimed ownership of the strip, demanded the halt of the construction but the
Polinars never heeded believing that the strip is part of a creek. However, the Polinars
offered to pay for the land. As the parties still failed to settle, both filed separate
complaints for forcible entry. The Municipal Trial Court ruled in favor of the petitioner,
while the regional trial court reversed and ordered the dismissal of the complaint and
confirmed the existence of the creek between the lots.
Issue: Whether or not the disputed strip of land is part of the creek hence part
of public domain
Held: YES. Art. 420 of the Philippine New Civil Code (NCC) provides for properties which
are part of public domain. A creek is included in the phrase "and others of similar
character". A creek, which refers to a recess or arm of a river is a property belonging to
the public domain, therefore not susceptible of private ownership. Being a public water,
it cannot be registered under the Torrens system under the name of any individual.
20. OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR OF PARAAQUE CITY v. MARIO D.EBIO AND HIS
CHILDREN/HEIRS
FACTS: Respondents claim to be absolute owners of a 406 sqm. parcel of land in
Paraaque City covered by Tax in the name of respondent Mario D. Ebio. Said land was
an accretion of Cut-cut creek. Respondents assert that the original occupant and
possessor land was their great grandfather, Jose Vitalez, which was given to his son,
Pedro Valdez, in 1930. From then on, Pedro continuously and exclusively occupied and
possessed the said lot. In 1966, after executing an affidavit declaring possession and
occupancy he also paid taxes for the land.
Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio married Pedros daughter, Zenaida. In April
1964 and in October 1971, Mario Ebio secured building permits from the Paraaque
municipal office for the construction of their house within the land. On April 21, 1987,
Pedro transferred his rights over the land in favor of Ebio.On March 30, 1999, the Office
of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed Resolution No. 08, series of 1990 seeking
assistance from the City Government of Paraaque for the construction of an access road
along Cut-cut Creek located in the said barangay. The proposed road will run from Urma
Drive to the main road of Vitalez Compound traversing the lot occupied by the
respondents. Respondents immediately opposed and the project was suspended.
In January 2003, however, respondents were surprised when severalofficials from the
barangay and the city planning office proceeded to cuteight (8) coconut trees planted on
the said lot.On March 28, 2005, the City Administrator sent a letter to therespondents
ordering them to vacate the area within the next thirty (30) days,or be physically evicted
from the said property. Respondents sent a reply, asserting their claim over the subject
property and expressing intent for a further dialogue. The request remained unheeded.
Threatened of being evicted, respondents went to the RTC of Paraaque City on April
21, 2005 and applied for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the State may build on the land in question.
HELD:No.
It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits that
have gradually settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek. This being the case, the law that
governs ownership over the accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters
of 1866, which remains in effect, in relation to Article 457 of the Civil Code.
ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams,
rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments from the waters thereof, belong to the
owners of such lands. Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of
rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of
the waters.
It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along the
banks of a creek do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property
automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The
only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must
register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be
subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription. No matter
how long the possession of the properties has been, there can be no prescription against
the State regarding property of public domain. Even a city or municipality cannot acquire
them by prescription as against the State.
Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion, the land which is
formed by the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of sediments along its banks does
not form part of the public domain by clear provision of law.
21. CHAVEZ V. PUBLIC ESTATE AUTHORITY
FACTS:
From the time of Marcos until Estrada, portions of Manila Bay were being reclaimed. A
law was passed creating the Public Estate Authority which was granted with the power
to transfer reclaimed lands. Now in this case, PEA entered into a Joint Venture
Agreement with AMARI, a private corporation. Under the Joint Venture Agreement
between AMARI and PEA, several hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom
Islands and several portions of submerged areas of Manila Bay were going to be
transferred to AMARI .
ISSUE:
Whether or not the stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands,
reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution
RULING: YES!
Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are classified as
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain Section 3 of the Constitution:
Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private
corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain
except by lease The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands,
now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public
domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer
ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to
Philippine
citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts whose object or purpose is
contrary to law, or whose object is outside the commerce of men, are inexistent and
void from the beginning. The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the
Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.
22. REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR Nos. 103882, 105276 November 25, 1998
FACTS:
On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was approved granting authority to all municipalities
and chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their own expense the reclamation by
dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish,
provide, construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and harbor
facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities may determine in consultation with
the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was passed by the city of Pasay for the
reclamation of foreshore lands within their jurisdiction and entered into an agreement
with Republic Real Estate Corporation for the said project.
Republic questioned the agreement. It contended, among others, that the agreement
between RREC and the City of Pasay was void for the object of the contract is outside the
commerce of man, it being a foreshore land.
Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in question is within the commerce of
man because RA 1899 gives a broader meaning on the term foreshore land than that in
the definition provided by the dictionary.
RTC rendered judgment in favour of Pasay City and RREC, and the decision was affirmed
by the CA with modifications.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the term foreshore land includes the submerged area.
II. Whether or not foreshore land and the reclaimed area is within the commerce of
man.
HELD:
The Court ruled that it is erroneous and unsustainable to uphold the opinion of the
respondent court that the term foreshore land includes the submerged areas. To
repeat, the term "foreshore lands" refers to:
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet
and dry according to the flow of the tide.
A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part of a seashore
between the low-water line usually at the seaward margin of a low-tide terrace and the
upper limit of wave wash at high tide usually marked by a beach scarp or berm.(Webster's
Third New International Dictionary)
The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot
broaden its meaning; much less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention of Congress
were to include submerged areas, it should have provided expressly. That Congress did
not so provide could only signify the exclusion of submerged areas from the term
foreshore lands.
It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as amended by
Ordinance No. 158, and the Agreement under attack, have been found to be outside the
intendment and scope of RA 1899, and therefore ultra vires and null and void
23. MIAA vs CA
FACTS: Petitioner Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport (NAIA) Complex in Paranaque City. As operator, MIAA
administers the land, improvements and equipment within the NAIA Complex. The MIAA
Charter transferred to MIAA approximately 600 hectares of land, including the runways
and buildings. Pursuant to the opinion of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
(OGCC) that the LGC of 1991 withdrew the exemption from the real estate tax granted to
MIAA, the local government of Paranaque demanded MIAA to pay its real estate tax
delinquencies. MIAA failed to pay. Thereupon, the city of Paranaque arranged for the
public sale of the airport lands and buildings of MIAA. The latter filed an urgent ex-parte
and motion for TRO before the Court questioning the validity of the demand of the city of
Paranaque for it to pay real estate tax. ISSUE: Whether MIAA is a government-owned and
controlled corporation with a special charter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not:
1. MIAA is an instrumentality of the government and not a government owned and
controlled corporationand as such exempted from tax.
2. The land and buildings of MIAA are part of the public dominion and thus cannot be the
subject of levy and auction sale.
RULING:
1. Under the Local government code, (GOCCs) government owned and controlled
corporation are NOT exempted from real estate tax.
MIAA is not a government owned and controlled corporation, for to become one MIAA
should either be a stock or non stock corporation. MIAA is not a stock corporation for its
capital is not divided into shares. It is not a non stock corporation since it has no
members.
MIAA is an instrumentality of the government vested with corporate powers and
government functions. Under the civil code, property may either be under public
dominion or private ownership. Those under public dominion are owned by the State
and are utilized for public use, public service and for the development of national
wealth. When properties under public dominion cease to be for public use and service,
they form part of the patrimonial property of the State.
2. The court held that the land and buildings of MIAA are part of the public dominion.
Since the airport is devoted for public use, for the domestic and international travel and
transportation. Even if MIAA charge fees, this is for support of its operation and for
regulation and does not change the character of the land and buildings of MIAA as part of
the public dominion.
As part of the public dominion the land and buildings of MIAA are outside the commerce
of man. To subject them to levy and public auction is contrary to public policy. Unless the
President issues a proclamation withdrawing the airport land and buildings from public
use, these properties remain to be of public dominion and are inalienable. As long as the
land and buildings are for public use the ownership is with the Republic of the
Philippines
24. City of Lapu Lapu vs PEZA
The case is regarding tax collection imposed by City of Lapu Lapu against PEZA. The
arguments as follows based on the definition of public dominion.
Real properties under the PEZAs title are owned by the Republic of the Philippines
Under Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code, real properties owned by the
Republic of the Philippines are exempt from real property
taxes:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. The following are exempted from
payment of real property tax:
(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political
subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration
or otherwise, to a taxable person[.]
Properties owned by the state are either property of public dominion or patrimonial
property. Article 420 of the Civil Code of the Philippines enumerates property of public
dominion:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar
character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without belonging for public use, and are intended
for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
Properties of public dominion are outside the commerce of man. These properties are
exempt from levy, encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale. 278 As
this court explained in Manila International Airport
Authority:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance
or disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or
auction sale of any property of public dominion is void for being contrary to public
policy. Essential public services will stop if properties of public dominion are subject to
encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale[.]279
On the other hand, all other properties of the state that are not intended for public use or
are not intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth
are patrimonial properties. Article 421 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the
preceding article, is patrimonial property.
Patrimonial properties are also properties of the state, but the state may dispose of its
patrimonial property similar to private persons disposing of their property. Patrimonial
properties are within the commerce of man and are susceptible to prescription, unless
otherwise provided.280chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In this case, the properties sought to be taxed are located in publicly owned economic
zones. These economic zones are property of public dominion. The City seeks to tax
properties located within the Mactan Economic Zone,281 the site of which was reserved
by President Marcos under Proclamation No. 1811, Series of 1979. Reserved lands are
lands of the public domain set aside for settlement or public use, and for specific public
purposes by virtue of a presidential proclamation.282 Reserved lands are inalienable and
outside the commerce of man,283 and remain property of the Republic until withdrawn
from public use either by law or presidential proclamation.284 Since no law or
presidential proclamation has been issued withdrawing the site of the Mactan Economic
Zone from public use, the property remains reserved land.
As for the Bataan Economic Zone, the law consistently characterized the property as a
port. Under Republic Act No. 5490, Congress declared Mariveles, Bataan a principal
port of entry285 to serve as site of a foreign trade zone where foreign and domestic
merchandise may be brought in without being subject to customs and internal revenue
laws and regulations of the Philippines.286 Section 4 of Republic Act No. 5490 provided
that the foreign trade zone in Mariveles, Bataan shall at all times remain to be owned by
the Government:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Held:
Petitioners, therefore, are not deprived of revenues from the operations of economic
zones within their respective territorial jurisdictions. The national government ensured
that local government units comprising economic zones shall retain their basic
autonomy and identity.295chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
All told, the PEZA is an instrumentality of the national government. Furthermore, the
lands owned by the PEZA are real properties owned by the Republic of the
Philippines. The City of Lapu-Lapu and the Province of Bataan cannot collect real
property taxes from the PEZA.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are DENIED.
25. Laurel v. Abrogar
Facts: Luis Marcos Laurel is accused of stealing and using the international long distance
phone calls belonging to PLDT by conducting International Simple Resale (ISR), which is
a method of routing and completing international long distance calls using certain
facilities which connect directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country
where the call is destined, effectively stealing this business from PLDT while using its
facilities to the damage and prejudice by the latter. Thus, the PLDT charged Laurel of
theft.
On Laurels defense, he alleged that the international long distance calls and the business
of providing telecommunication services are not personal properties and hence cannot
be subject of theft. On the other hand, PLDT contented that the enumeration of real
properties in Article 415 of the Civil Code is exclusive such that all those not included
therein are personal properties. Since Art. 308 of the RPC used the words personal
property without qualification, it follows that all personal properties as understood in
the context of Civil Code, may be the subject of theft under Art. 308 of RPC. Therefore,
PLDT alleged that the international calls and business of providing telecommunication
service are personal properties capable of appropriation and can be objects of theft.
Issue: Whether international calls and business of providing telecommunication service
are personal properties?
Held: Yes, international calls and business of providing telecommunication service are
personal properties. In the instant case however, the court held that the international
calls are not owned by PLDT, thus the latter cannot validly claim that the international
calls were stolen. PLDT merely encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and transmits said
calls using its complex communications facilities. It is the use of these communications
facilities without the consent of PLDT that constitutes the crime of theft, which is the
unlawful taking of the telephone services and business.
26. Strochecker v. Ramirez
Facts: The half-interest in the business (Antigua Botica Ramirez) was mortgaged with
Fidelity & Surety Co. on 10 March 1919, and registered in due time in the registry of
property, while another mortgage was made with Ildefonso Ramirez on 22 September
1919 and registered also in the registry. Raised in the lower court, the trial court
declared the mortgage of Fidelity & Surety Co. entitled to preference over that of
Ildefonso Ramirez and another mortgage by Concepcion Ayala. Ayala did not appeal, but
Ramirez did.
Issue: Whether or not half-interest over a business is a movable property?
Held: Interest in business may be subject of mortgage with regard to the nature of the
property mortgaged which is one-half interest in the business, such interest is a personal
property capable of appropriation and not included in the enumeration of real properties
in articles 415 of the Civil Code, and may be the subject of mortgage. All personal
property may be mortgaged. (Sec. 7, Act 1508.)
27. Sibal v. Valdez
Facts: The deputy sheriff of the Province of Tarlac, by virtue of a writ of execution issued
by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, attached and sold to the defendant Emiliano
J. Valdez the sugar cane planted by the plaintiff and his tenants on seven parcels of land
described in a complaint. Tthat within one year from the date of the attachment and sale
the plaintiff, Leon Sibal, offered to redeem said sugar cane and tendered to the defendant
Valdez the amount sufficient to cover the price paid by the latter, the interest thereon
and any assessments or taxes which he may have paid thereon after the purchase, and
the interest corresponding thereto and that Valdez refused to accept the money and to
return the sugar cane to the plaintiff.
Among others, Sibal prayed that Valdez be ordered to consent to the redemption of the
sugar cane in question. Valdez contented however that the said sugar cane is personal
property and is not, therefore, subject to redemption.
Issue: Whether the sugar cane is personal property?
Held: Generally, sugar cane comes under the classification of ungathered products
under real properties of the CC. However, under certain conditions, it may be considered
as personal property. For purposes of attachment and execution, as well as for the
purposes of the Chattel Mortgage Law, ungathered products have the nature of personal
property.
28. Republic v. Cortez
Facts: Emmanuel C. Cortez (Cortez) filed with the RTC an application for judicial
confirmation of title over a parcel of land. In support of his application, Cortez submitted,
inter alia, the following documents: (1) tax declarations for various years from 1966 until
2005; (2) survey plan of the property, with the annotation that the property is classified
as alienable and disposable; (3) technical description of the property, with a certification
issued by a geodetic engineer; (4) tax clearance certificate; (5) extrajudicial settlement of
estate dated March 21, 1998, conveying the subject property to Cortez; and (6) escritura
de particion extrajudicial dated July 19, 1946, allocating the subject property to
Felicisima Cotas Cortez mother.
RTC granted Cortez application for registration. The Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the OSG, appealed the decision to the CA alleging that the RTC erred in
granting the application for registration despite the failure of Cortez to comply with the
requirements for original registration of title.
CA affirmed the decision of RTC ruling that Cortez was able to prove that the subject
property was indeed alienable and disposable, as evidenced by the declaration/notation
from the BFD.
Issue: Whether CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision granting the application for
registration filed by Cortez?
Held: Yes, CA erred in affirming the RTC decision. The Court held that Cortez failed to
comply with the legal requirements for the registration of the subject property under
Section 14(1) and (2) of P.D. No. 1529.
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles to public land acquired under Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended
by P.D. No. 1073. Under Section 14(1) [of P.D. No. 1529], applicants for registration of
title must sufficiently establish first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable
and alienable lands of the public domain; second, that the applicant and his predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.
The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. Cortez reliance on survey plan does
not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that the subject
property remains part of the inalienable public domain.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant
must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may also
secure a certification from the Government that the lands applied for are alienable and
disposable. In the case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified
by the Lands Management Services of the DENR, the certification refers only to the
technical correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan and has nothing to do
whatsoever with the nature and character of the property surveyed. Respondents failed
to submit a certification from the proper government agency to prove that the lands
subject for registration are indeed alienable and disposable.
Anent the second and third requirements, the Court finds that Cortez likewise failed to
establish the same. Cortez failed to present any evidence to prove that he and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject property since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Further, the earliest tax declaration presented by Cortez was only in 1966. Cortez failed
to explain why, despite his claim that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the subject property since time immemorial, it was only in 1966 that his
predecessors-in-interest started to declare the same for purposes of taxation.
Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 sanctions the original registration of lands acquired by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws. As Section 14(2) [of P.D. No. 1529]
categorically provides, only private properties may be acquired thru prescription and
under Articles 420 and 421 of the Civil Code, only those properties, which are not for
public use, public service or intended for the development of national wealth, are
considered private.
In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic,[21] the Court however clarified that lands of the
public domain that are patrimonial in character are susceptible to acquisitive
prescription and, accordingly, eligible for registration under Section 14(2) of P.D. No.
1529, viz:
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by
private persons through prescription. This is brought about by Article 1113, which states
that [a]ll things which are within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription,
and that [p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character
shall not be the object of prescription.
There are two modes of prescription through which immovables may be acquired under
the Civil Code. The first is ordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1117,
requires possession in good faith and with just title; and, under Article 1134, is
completed through possession of ten (10) years. There is nothing in the Civil Code that
bars a person from acquiring patrimonial property of the State through ordinary
acquisitive prescription, nor is there any apparent reason to impose such a rule. At the
same time, there are indispensable requisitesgood faith and just title. The
ascertainment of good faith involves the application of Articles 526, 527, and 528, as well
as Article 1127 of the Civil Code, provisions that more or less speak for themselves.[22]
(Citation omitted and emphasis ours)
The Court nevertheless emphasized that there must be an official declaration by the State
that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public use, public service, or
for the development of national wealth before it can be acquired by prescription; that a
mere declaration by government officials that a land of the public domain is already
alienable and disposable would not suffice for purposes of registration under Section
14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. The Court further stressed that the period of acquisitive
prescription would only begin to run from the time that the State officially declares that
the public dominion property is no longer intended for public use, public service, or for
the development of national wealth.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that [p]roperty of public dominion,
when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the
patrimonial property of the State. It is this provision that controls how public dominion
property may be converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by
prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property which belong to
the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth are public dominion property. For as long as the
property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it
remains property of the public dominion if when it is intended for some public service
or for the development of the national wealth.
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion
property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national
wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express
declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property
of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by
prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared
by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of the
national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such
declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential
Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.
The Court finds no evidence of any official declaration from the state attesting to the
patrimonial character of the subject property. Cortez failed to prove that acquisitive
prescription has begun to run against the State, much less that he has acquired title to
the subject property by virtue thereof. It is of no moment that Cortez and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject property for 57 years at
the time he applied for the registration of title thereto. [I]t is not the notorious, exclusive
and uninterrupted possession and occupation of an alienable and disposable public land
for the mandated periods that converts it to patrimonial. The indispensability of an
official declaration that the property is now held by the State in its private capacity or
placed within the commerce of man for prescription to have any effect against the State
cannot be overemphasized.
29. NOVAI v. RP
FACTS:
TCT No. T-15387, issued in NOVAI's name, covers a 475,009 square-meter parcel of
land situated inside the former Fort Andres Bonifacio Military Reservation (FBMR) in
Taguig, Metro Manila. The property previously formed part of a larger 15,812,684
square-meter parcel of land situated at the former Fort William McKinley, Rizal, which
was covered by TCT No. 61524 issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
On July 12, 1957, then President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 423 "reserving
for military purposes certain parcels of the public domain situated in the municipalities
of Pasig, Taguig, Paraaque, province of Rizal, and Pasay City," which included the
15,812,684 square-meter parcel of land covered by TCT No. 61524.
On September 29, 1965, then Pres. Diosdado Macapagal issued Proclamation No.
461 which excluded from Fort McKinley "a certain portion of land embraced therein,
situated in the municipalities of Taguig and Paraaque, Province of Rizal, and Pasay City,"
with an area of 2,455,310 square meters, and declared the excluded area as "AFP
Officers' Village" to be disposed of under the provisions of Republic Act Nos. 274 and
730. A month after, Pres. Macapagal issued Proclamation No. 478"reserving for the
veterans rehabilitation, medicare and training center site purposes" an area of 537,520
square meters of the land previously declared as AFP Officers' Village under
Proclamation No. 461, and placed the reserved area under the administration of the
Veterans Federation of the Philippines (VFP).
On November 15, 1991, the property was the subject of a Deed of Sale between the
Republic of the Philippines, through former Land Management Bureau (LMB) Director
Abelardo G. Palad, Jr., (Dir. Palad) and petitioner NOVAI. The deed of sale was
subsequently registered and from which TCT No. T-15387 was issued in NOVAI's name.
The Republic sought to cancel NOVAFs title based on the following grounds: (a) the land
covered by NOVAFs title is part of a military reservation; (b) the deed of sale conveying
the property to NOVAI, which became the basis for the issuance of TCT No. 15387, is
fictitious; (c) the LMB has no records of any application made by NOVAI for the purchase
of the property, and of the NOVAFs alleged payment of P14,250,270.00 for the property;
and (d) the presidential proclamation, i.e., Proclamation No. 2487, claimed to have been
issued by then President Corazon C. Aquino in 1991 that authorized the transfer and
titling of the property to NOVAI, is fictitious. NOVAIs answer to the Republic is that the
property was no longer part of the public dominion, as the land had long been segregated
from the military reservation pursuant to Proclamation No. 461, and that it had actually
filed a letter-application for a sales patent over the property with the LMB which
prepared, verified and approved the property's plan and technical description; and that
the LMB delivered to it a copy of the deed of sale, signed and executed by Dir. Palad, after
it had paid a portion of the P14,250,270.00 purchase price, corresponding taxes, and
other charges, with the balance to be paid in installments.
Also, NOVAI contended that, since any alleged irregularities that may have attended the
sale pertained only to formalities, the proper remedy for the Republic was to file an
action for reformation of instrument, not for cancellation of title. In any event, it added
that the Republic's cause of action had prescribed because its title to the property had
already become indefeasible.
The Petition
NOVAI alleges that the CA erred in declaring that: (a) the property is inalienable land of
the public domain, (b) the deed of sale and Proclamation No. 2487 were void and
nonexistent, respectively, (c) the Republic's action for cancellation of title was not barred
by prescription, and (d) the ruling inSouthside was applicable to the present case. In
support of its petition, NOVAI raises the following arguments:
(a) The property is no longer part of the public domain because, by virtue of
Proclamation No. 461, s. of 1965, the property was excluded from the FBMR and made
available for disposition to qualified persons, subject to the provisions of R.A. Nos.
274 and 720 in relation to the Public Land Act;
(b)The deed of sale was, in all respects, valid and enforceable, as it was shown to have
been officially executed by an authorized public officer under the provisions of the
Public Land Act, and celebrated with all the formalities of a notarial certification;
(c) Proclamation No. 2487 is to be presumed valid until proven otherwise; that the
Republic carried the burden of proving that Proclamation No. 2487 was a forgery, and
that it failed to discharge this burden;
(d)The CA should not have considered as evidence the testimony of Senator Franklin
Drilon on the nonexistence of Proclamation No. 2487 because such testimony was
given by Senator Drilon in another case17 and was not formally offered in evidence by
the Republic during the trial of the present case before the RTC;
(e) The action for cancellation of title filed by the Republic is already barred by
prescription because it was filed only on December 23, 1993, or close to two (2) years
from the issuance of NOVAI's title on January 9, 1992; and
(f) The case of Southside is not a cognate or companion case to the present case because
the two cases involve completely dissimilar factual and doctrinal bases; thus, the
Court's observations and ruling in Southside should not be applied to the present case.
The Republic's Comment to the Petition
Procedurally, the Republic assails the propriety of the issues raised by NOVAI, such as
"whether Proclamation No. 2487 and the signature of LMB Director Palad on the assailed
deed of sale are forged or fictitious," and "whether the Republic had presented adequate
evidence to establish the spuriousness of the subject proclamation," which are factual in
nature and not allowed in a Rule 45 petition. On the petition's substance, the Republic
counters that:
(a) The property is inalienable public land incapable of private appropriation because,
while the property formed part of the area segregated from the FBMR under
Proclamation No. 461, it was subsequently reserved for a specific public use or
purpose under Proclamation No. 478;
(b)Proclamation No. 2487, which purportedly revoked Proclamation No. 478, does not
legally exist and thus cannot be presumed valid and constitutional unless proven
otherwise; the presumption of validity and constitutionality of a law applies only
where there is no dispute as to the authenticity and due execution of the law in issue;
(c) The deed of sale executed by NOVAI and by Dir. Palad was undeniably forged, as Dir.
Palad categorically denied having signed the deed of sale, and a handwriting expert
from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) confirmed that Dir. Palad's signature
was indeed a forgery;18
(d)NOVAI, a private corporation, is disqualified from purchasing the property because
R.A. Nos. 274 and 730, and the Public Land Act only allow the sale of alienable and
disposable public lands to natural persons, not juridical persons; and
(e) The Court's decision in Southside applies to the present case because of the strong
factual and evidentiary relationship between the two cases.
ISSUES:
A. The property is non-disposable land of the public domain reserved for public or quasi-
public use or purpose
We agree with the CA that the property remains a part of the public domain that could
not have been validly disposed of in NOVAI's favor. While the parties disagree on the
character and nature of the property at the time of the questioned sale, they agree,
however, that the property formed part of the FBMR - a military reservation belonging to
the public domain.
Under Section 6 of C.A. No. 141(Public Land Act), the President, upon recommendation of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, may, from time to time,classify lands
of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands, and
transfer these lands from one class to another for purposes of their administration and
disposition. Section 8 excludes (by implication) from disposition or concession, public
lands which have been reserved for public or quasi-public uses; appropriated by the
Government; or in any manner have become private property, or those on which a
private right authorized and recognized by the Act or any other valid law may be
claimed. Further, Section 8 authorizes the President to suspend the concession or
disposition of lands previously declared open to disposition, until again declared open to
disposition by his proclamation or by act of Congress. Lands of the public domain
classified as alienable and disposable are further classified, under Section 9 of C.A. No.
141, according to their use or purpose into: (1) agricultural; (2) residential, commercial,
industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (3) educational, charitable, or other
similar purposes; and (4) reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public uses.
Section 83 of C.A. No. 141 defines public domain lands classified as reservations for
public and quasi-public uses as "any tract or tracts of land of the public domain reserved
tract or tracts of lands shall be non-alienable and shall not be subject to occupation,
entry, sale, lease or other disposition until again declared alienable under the provisions
of [CA No. 141] or by proclamation of the President. Once these parcels of lands are
actually acquired by private persons, either by sale, grant, or other modes of disposition,
they are removed from the mass of land of the public domain and become, by operation
of law, their private property.
Complementing and reinforcing this interpretation - that lands designated as
reservations for public and quasi-public uses are non-alienable and non-disposable and
retain their character as land of the public domain is the Civil Code with its provisions on
Property that deal with lands in general. We find these provisions significant to our
discussion and interpretation as lands are property, whether they are public lands or
private lands.In this regard, Article 419 of the Civil Code classifies property as either of
public dominion or of private ownership. Article 420de fines property of the public
dominion as those which are intended for public use or, while not intended for public
use, belong to the State and are intended for some public service. Article 421, on the
other hand, defines patrimonial property as all other property of the State which is not of
the character stated in Article 420. While Article 422 states that public dominion
property which is no longer intended for public use or service shall form part of the
State's patrimonial property. Thus, from the perspective of the general Civil Code
provisions on Property, lands which are intended for public use or public service such as
reservations for public or quasi-public uses are property of the public dominion and
remain to be so as long as they remain reserved.
To be subject to sale, occupation or other disposition, lands of the public domain
designated as reservations must first be withdrawn, by act of Congress or by
proclamation of the President, from the public or quasi-public use for which it has been
reserved or otherwise positively declared to have been converted to patrimonial
property, pursuant to Sections 8 and 88 of C.A. No. 141 and Article 422 of the Civil
Code.40 Without such express declaration or positive governmental act, the reserved
public domain lands remain to be public dominion property of the State.41cralawrednad
As Proclamation No. 2487 does not legally exist and therefore could not have validly
revoked Proclamation No. 478, we find, as the CA also correctly did, that Proclamation
No. 478 stands as the most recent manifestation of the State's intention to reserve the
property anew for some public or quasi-public use or purpose. Thus, consistent with
Sections 88, in relation with Section 8, of C.A. No. 141 and Article 420 of the Civil Code, as
discussed above, the property which was classified again as reservation for public or
quasi-public use or purpose is non-alienable and not subject to disposition; it also
remains property of the public dominion; hence, non-alienable and non-disposable land
of the public domain. As a consequence, when R.A. No. 7227 took effect in 1992, the
property subject of this case, which does not fall among the areas specifically designated
as exempt from the law's operation67 was, by legal fiat, transferred to the BCDA's
authority.
B. As the property remains a reserved public domain land, its sale and the title issued
pursuant to the sale are void
As the property remains a reserved public domain land, it is outside the commerce of
man. Property which are intended for public or quasi- public use or for some public
purpose are public dominion property of the State68 and are outside the commerce of
man. NOVAI, therefore, could not have validly purchased the property in 1991.
Since the sale of the property, in this case, is void, the title issued to NOVAI is similarly
void ab initio. It is a well-settled doctrine that registration under the Torrens System
does not, by itself, vest title as it is not a mode of acquiring ownership; 71 that registration
under the Torrens System merely confirms the registrant's already existing title.
Accordingly, the indefeasibility of a Torrens title does not apply in this case and does not
attach to NOVAI's title. The principle of indefeasibility does not apply when the sale of
the property and the title based thereon are null and void. Hence, the Republic's action to
declare the nullity of NOVAI's void title has not prescribed.
NOVAI insists that the deed of sale carries the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties as it bears all the earmarks of a valid deed of sale and is
duly notarized. In this case, the evidence on record shows not only that the property was
reserved for public use or purpose, and thus, non-disposable - a fact that on its own
defeats all the evidence which the petitioner may have had to support the validity of the
sale - but also shows that the sale and the circumstances leading to it are void in form
and in substance, the disputable presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties certainly cannot apply.
C. Even assuming that Proclamation No. 2487 legally exists, the sale of the property to
NOVAI is illegal.
1. Dir. Palad did not have the authority to sell and convey the property. The subject deed of
sale points to Proclamation No. 2487, purportedly amending Proclamation No. 478, in
relation with Act No. 3038,75 as legal basis for authorizing the sale. Section 1 of Act No.
3038 authorizes the sale or lease only: (i) of land of the private domain, not land of the
public domain; and (ii) by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, not by the
LMB Director. Section 277 of the said Act, in fact, specifically exempts from its coverage
"land necessary for the public service." As the sale was executed by the LMB Director
covering the property that was reserved for the use of the VRMTC, it, therefore, clearly
violated the provisions of Act No. 3038.
3. The evidence on record and the highly suspect circumstances surrounding the sale fully
supports the conclusion that the property's sale to NOVAI is fictitious, thus, void. We note
the following irregularities that attended the sale of the property to NOVAI:
The absence, on file with the LMB, of any request for approval of any survey plan or of an
approved survey plan in NOVAI's name covering the property.79 The approved survey
plan relating to Lot 3, SWO-13-000183 subject of NOVAI's TCT No. 15387 pertains to the
AFPOVAI under Proclamation No. 461;80cralawrednad
The technical description, which the DENR prepared for the property as covered by TCT
No. T-15387, was issued upon NOVAI's request only for purposes of reference, not for
registration of title, and was based on the approved survey plan of the
AFPOVAI;81cralawrednad
There is no record of any public land application filed by NOVAI with the LMB or with the
DENR Office for the purchase of the property or of any parcel of land in Metro
Manila;82cralawrednad
LMB Dir. Palad categorically denied signing and executing the deed of
sale;83cralawrednad
The findings of the NBI handwriting; expert, detailed in the Questioned Documents
Report No. 815-1093 dated October 29, 1993,84 revealed that the, signature of LMB
Director Palad as it appeared on the Deed of Sale and his standard/sample signature as
they appeared on the submitted comparison documents "were not written by one and
the same person,"85 and concluded that "[t]he questioned signature of 'ABELARDG G.
PALAD, JR.' xxx is a TRACED FORGERY by carbon process;"86 and
Lastly, the LMB Cashier's Office did not receive the amount of P14,250,270.00 allegedly
paid by NOVAI as consideration for the property. The receipts87 - O.R. No. 8282851 dated
November 28, 1991, for P160,000.00 and O.R. No. 317024 dated December 23, 1992, for
P200,000.00 - which NOVAI presented as evidence of its alleged payment bore official
receipt numbers which were not among the series of official receipts issued by the
National Printing Office to the LMB, and in fact, were not among the series used by the
LMB on the pertinent dates.88
In sum, we find - based on the facts, the law, and jurisprudence - that the property, at the
time of the sale, was a reserved public domain land. Its sale, therefore, and the
corresponding title issued in favor of petitioner NOVAI, is void.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the present petition for review on certiorari. No
reversible error attended the decision dated December 28, 2006, and the resolution
dated March 28, 2007, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 85179.
30. Dream Village Neighborhood Assoc., Inc. v. BCDA
FACTS: Petitioner Dream Village Neighborhood Association, Inc. (Dream Village) claims
to represent more than 2,000 families who have been occupying a 78,466-square meter
lot in Western Bicutan, Taguig City since 1985 "in the concept of owners continuously,
exclusively and notoriously."
On October 16, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 172
amending Proclamation No. 2476 by limiting to Lots 1 and 2 of the survey Swo-13-
000298 the areas in Western Bicutan open for disposition.
Now charging the Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) of wrongfully
asserting title to Dream Village and unlawfully subjecting its members to summary
demolition, resulting in unrest and tensions among the residents, on November 22, 1999,
the latter filed a letter-complaint with the COSLAP to seek its assistance in the
verification survey of the subject 78,466-sq m property, which they claimed is within Lot
1 of Swo-13-000298 and thus is covered by Proclamation No. 172. They claim that they
have been occupying the area for thirty (30) years "in the concept of owners
continuously, exclusively and notoriously for several years," and have built their houses
of sturdy materials thereon and introduced paved roads, drainage and recreational and
religious facilities. Dream Village, thus, asserts that the lot is not among those transferred
to the BCDA under R.A. No. 7227, and therefore patent applications by the occupants
should be processed by the Land Management Bureau (LMB).
On April 1, 2004, the COSLAP received the final report of the verification survey and a
blueprint copy of the survey plan from Atty. Rizaldy Barcelo, Regional Technical Director
for Lands of DENR. Specifically, Item No. 3 of the DENR report states:
3. Lot-1, Swo-000298 is inside Proclamation 172. Dream Village Neighborhood
Association, Inc. is outside Lot-1, Swo-13-000298 and inside Lot-10, 11 & Portion of Lot
13, Swo-00-0001302 with an actual area of 78,466 square meters. Likewise, the area
actually is outside Swo-00-0001302 of BCDA.
On the basis of the DENRs verification survey report, the COSLAP resolved that Dream
Village lies outside of BCDA, and particularly, outside of Swo-00-0001302, and thus
directed the LMB of the DENR to process the applications of Dream Villages members for
sales patent, noting that in view of the length of time that they "have been openly,
continuously and notoriously occupying the subject property in the concept of an owner,
x x x they are qualified to apply for sales patent on their respective occupied lots
pursuant to R.A. Nos. 274 and 730 in relation to the provisions of the Public Land Act."
The CA in its Decision dated September 10, 2009 ruled that the COSLAP has no
jurisdiction over the complaint because the question of whether Dream Village is within
the areas declared as available for disposition in Proclamation No. 172 is beyond its
competence to determine, even as the land in dispute has been under a private title since
1906, and presently its title is held by a government agency, the BCDA, in contrast to the
case of Baaga relied upon by Dream Village, where the disputed land was part of the
public domain and the disputants were applicants for sales patent thereto.
Dream Villages motion for reconsideration was denied in the appellate courts Order of
July 13, 2010, thus the petition for Review in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the area occupied by Dream Village, on the basis of the DENRs
verification survey report, that sits on the abandoned C-5 Road, which lies outside the
area of BCDA, declared in Proclamation Nos. 2476 and 172 as alienable and disposable.
HELD: NO. The petition is DENIED.
The mere fact that the original plan for C-5 Road to cross Swo-00-0001302 was
abandoned by deviating it northward to traverse the southern part of Libingan ng mga
Bayani does not signify abandonment by the government of the bypassed lots, nor that
these lots would then become alienable and disposable. They remain under the title of
the BCDA, even as it is significant that under Section 8(d) of R.A. No. 7227, a relocation
site of 30.5 has. was to be reserved for families affected by the construction of C-5 Road.
It is nowhere claimed that Lots 10, 11 and 13 of Swo-00-0001302 are part of the said
relocation site. These lots border C-5 Road in the south, making them commercially
valuable to BCDA, a farther argument against a claim that the government has
abandoned them to Dream Village.
Article 1113 of the Civil Code provides that "property of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription."
Thus, under Article 422 of the Civil Code, public domain lands become patrimonial
property only if there is a declaration that these are alienable or disposable, together
with an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no
longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth. Only when the
property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of
property of the public dominion begin to run.
31. VILLANUEVA vs. CASTANEDA
G.R. No. L-61311, September 2l, 1987
FACTS:
In 1961, the municipal council of San Fernando adopted Resolution No. 218 authorizing
24 members of Fernandino United Merchants and Traders Association to construct
permanent stalls and sell in the subject property within the vicinity of the public market.
The Resolution was protested and Civil Case No. 2040 was filed. CFI issued writ of
preliminary injunction to prevent the construction of stalls.
While the case was pending, the municipal council adopted Resolution No. 29 which
declared the subject area as a parking place and as the public plaza of the municipality.
CFI decided Civil Case No. 2040 and held that the subject land was public in nature and
was beyond the commerce of man. The preliminary injunction was made permanent.
The decision was apparently not enforced, for the petitioners were not evicted from the
place. They were assigned specific areas and were made to pay daily fees to the
municipal government for use of the area.
 good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof,
On January 12, 1982 (more than 13 years after CFI decision), the Association of and for the protection of property therein." This authority was validly exercised in this
Concerned Citizens and Consumers of San Fernando filed a petition for the immediate case through the adoption of Resolution No. 29, series of 1964, by the municipal council
implementation of Resolution No. 29, to restore the subject property "to its original and of San Fernando.
customary use as a public plaza.
Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution could have
After investigation was conducted by the municipal attorney, Macalino, officer in-charge effectively terminated the agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be
surrendered or bargained away through the medium of a contract. In fact, every contract
of the office of the mayor, issued a resolution ordering the demolition of the stalls in the
affecting the public interest suffers a congenital infirmity in that it contains an implied
subject area.
reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. This power can
be activated at any time to change the provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it
Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition with the CFI, which was denied.
entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not
militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the paramount
Hence, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the SC. Petitioners argued that
police power.
they had right to occupy the area by virtue of lease contracts entered into with the
municipal government, and later, by virtue of space allocations made in their favor for
which they paid daily fees. The municipality denied that they entered into said
32. HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN VS. REPUBLIC
agreements. It argued that even if the leases were valid, the same could be terminated at
September 3, 2013
will because rent was collected daily.
33. SANCHEZ VS. MUNICIPALITY OF ASINGAN
ISSUE:
G.R. No. L-17635 March 30, 1963
Whether or not the vendors had the right to occupy and make use of the property.
FACTS: The facts as found by the trial court are as follows: The defendant municipality,
appellee herein, is the owner of a triangular strip of land situated between the site of the
HELD:
municipal school building and the provincial road, measuring 42 x 26-1/2 x 46 meters.
On that land appellants, with the knowledge and implied consent of the municipality,
No. A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and so cannot be the subject of lease
constructed temporary stores and buildings of light materials shortly after the end of the
or any other contractual undertaking. The town plaza cannot be used for the
last war. Between 1952 and 1959 they paid rents to appellee. When a new local
construction of market stalls, specially of residences, and that such structures constitute
administration took over after the elections of November 1959 the municipal council
a nuisance subject to abatement according to law. Town plazas are properties of public
passed a resolution notifying the occupants of the land that the same was needed for
dominion, to be devoted to public use and to be made available to the public in general.
certain public purposes, such as parking space, expansion of school grounds, widening of
They are outside the common of man and cannot be disposed of or even leased by the
the road and waiting area for pedestrians. Appellants were therefore advised to vacate
municipality to private parties.
on or before May 15, 1960, some five (5) months after the date of notice. Instead of
moving, however, appellants filed a petition for prohibition with the court a quo on May
Applying this well-settled doctrine, we rule that the petitioners had no right in the first
10, 1960 to prevent the municipality from ejecting them from the land, with the
place to occupy the disputed premises and cannot insist in remaining there now on the
alternative prayer that should they be ejected, appellee be ordered to reimburse to them
strength of their alleged lease contracts.
the rents which they had paid, in the total sum of P1,178.20. There was also a demand for
damages and attorney's fees. After trial, the court dismissed the petition and ordered
Since the occupation of the place by the vendors, it had deteriorated to the prejudice of
appellants to vacate the land, with costs.
the community. Stalls, being made of flammable materials, became a potential fire trap;
access to and from the market was obstructed; there were aggravated health and
I: 1. WON the land in question belongs to the province of Pangasinan
sanitation problems; flow of traffic was obstructed; stallholders in the public market
2. WON Sanchez have the right to be reimbursed in case they should be ejected
were deprived of a sizable volume of business; the people were deprived of the use of the
place as a public plaza.
Held:
1. The land is owned by Municipality of Pangasinan. This is a factual conclusion that is no
The problems caused by the usurpation of the place by the petitioners are covered by the
longer open to review in the present appeal. The additional statement by the court "that
police power as delegated to the municipality under the general welfare clause. This
it is part of the broad shoulder of the provincial road" does not make the land provincial
authorizes the municipal council "to enact such ordinances and make such regulations,
property, such
not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers
statement being merely descriptive of its location and not indicative of its ownership..
and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to
provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace,
2. the land in question is patrimonial character, not being included in any of the
categories of municipal properties for public use enumerated in Article 424 of the Civil
Code, namely: "municipal streets, squares, fountains, public waters, promenades and
public works for public service in said municipality." There is indeed nothing in the
decision appealed from or in the briefs of the parties to show that the land was devoted
to any of those purposes when appellants began their occupancy. Consequently, the
implied agreement of lease with them was not null and void, although terminable upon
the notice as appellee herein elected to terminate it. That being so, there is no ground on
which reimbursement of the rents may be ordered.
34. MUNICIPALITY OF CAVITE V. ROJAS G.R. NO. 9069
Facts:
The municipal council of Cavite by Resolution No. 10, leased to Rojas some 70 or 80
square meters of Plaza Soledad, on condition that she pay rent quarterly in advance
according to the schedule fixed in Ordinance No. 43, series of 1903 and that she obligate
herself to vacate said land within 60 days subsequent to notification to that effect. Upon
such notification, however, she refused to vacate the land, forcing the municipality to file
a complaint before the CFI to order her to vacate the land. After a hearing of the case, the
CFI dismissed the complaint.
Issues:
(1) Is the contract valid?
(2) If in the negative, what are the obligations of the parties?
Held: (1) No. Article 1271 of the Old Civil Code, prescribes that everything which is not
outside the commerce of man may be the object of a contract, and plazas and streets are
outside of this commerce. Communal things that cannot be sold because they are by their
very nature outside of commerce are those for public use, such as the plazas, streets,
common lands, rivers, fountains, etc.
(2) Rojas must restore and deliver possession of the land described in the complaint to
the municipality of Cavite, which in its turn must restore to her all the sums it may have
received from her in the nature of rentals just as soon as she restores the land
improperly leased.
35. LEDESMA VS. MUN. OF ILOILO et al
G.R. No. L-26337 Dec. 17, 1926
FACTS:
-Lopez owns lot 228. In March 1915, Lopez sold to the City of Iloilo a PART of said lot,
now numbered 537 and 703, payable in 10 years
a TCT was issued in favor of Lopez, including 537 and 703 (The inclusion of said lots in
said TCT was evidently an error on the part of someone connected with the office of the
registrar of titles)
Lopez sold to Kalaw and wife said lot 228, including lots 537 and 703 evidently by
mistake. It is said that the inclusion of said lots 537 and 703 was a mistake because
Lopez as well as Kalaw and wife were ignorant of the fact that said lots were included in
that TCT.
Lopez, representing. Kalaw, sold said lots (228, 537 and 703) to J. Ledesma, which sale
was ratified by the couple. Later a TCT was issued in favor of J. Ledesma. According to the
admissions of J. Ledesma lots 537 and 703 were included by mistake
J. Ledesma sold a portion of the lot. Lot 228 was made into two lots, 228-A and 228-B.
Lot 228-A remained the property of J. Ledesma. Said lots 537 and 703, according to said
TCT, remained the property of J. Ledesma.
J. Ledesma sold to the appellant herein lots Nos. 228-A, 537, and 703. Again, according
to J. Ledesma, lots 537 and 703 were included in the transfer of lot No. 228-A to C.
Ledesma by mistake.
This action was commenced in CFI of Iloilo. Its purpose was to recover from defendant
the municipality of Iloilo a sum as the value of the two lots Nos. 537 and 703 which, the
plaintiff claimed, the defendant municipality had illegally appropriated, together with
damages and costs.
The recovery of said sums was opposed by the defendants upon the ground that the
plaintiff and appellant was not and never had been the owner of said lots Nos. 537 and
703. The other defendants answered the petition and supported the contention of the
municipality.
After hearing the evidence upon the issue presented, the CFI absolved the defendants
from all liability under the complaint. From that judgment the plaintiff appealed
The theory of the appellant is that, by reason of the fact that said lots 537 and 703 had
been included in the registered title of Lopez in 1915, and Lopez included in each
succeeding transfer of title to him said lots, that he was the indisputable owner thereof,
and because the City of Iloilo had appropriated said lots, that he was entitled to recover
the value of said lots together with damages.
ISSUE:
WON the inclusion of lots 537 and 703 in the TCT of C. Ledesma made him the owner of
such properties
HELD: NO
An examination of the records shows that as early as April, 1915, said lots had been
turned over by Lopez to the City of Iloilo under a contract of sale for street purposes.
That fact was well known. The said lots had been included as a part of the streets in the
City of Iloilo. The same were therefore illegally included, in accordance with the
provisions of section 39 of Act No. 496, in the certificate of title issued to Lopez. That fact
was recognized by Lopez as well as by each of the subsequent purchasers of said lots.
The simple possession of a certificate of title, under the Torrens system, does not
necessarily make the possessor a true owner of all the property described therein. If a
person obtains a title, under the Torrens system, which include by mistake or oversight
land which cannot be registered under the Torrens system, he does not, by virtue of said
certificate alone, becomes the owner of the lands illegally included.
The inclusion of public highways in a certificate of title does not thereby necessarily give
to the holder of such certificate said public highways. The appellant, therefore, even
though a part of said streets (lots 537 and 703) had been included in the original
certificate of title and in the subsequent transfer of title, did not become the owner of
said lots and is not therefore entitled to recover their value from the City of Iloilo nor the
damages prayed for.

36. UNITED CHURCH BOARD FOR WORLD MINISTRIES as owner of BROKENSHIRE
MEMORIAL HOSPITAL,
vs.HON. JUDGE ALEJANDRO E. SEBASTIAN G.R. No. L-34672 March 30,1988
FACTS: David Jacobson was an American citizen who had been a resident of the
Philippines for more than thirty years and up to the time of his death in 1970. 1 He left a
will in which he "devised and bequeathed" to the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital 60% of
his shares of stocks in the Tagdangua Plantation Co., inc. which was incorporated under
Philippine law in 1948. 2 This corporation was the registered owner of a tract of land in
Pantuhan Davao del Norte, with a total area of about 445 hectares acquired by virtue of a
sales patent issued to it in 11953 . 3
Judge Alejandro E. Sebastian disallowed the above-described legacy on the ground that it
was in effect an alienation of private agricultural land in favor of a transferee which was
not qualified under the Constitution of 1935. 4 The finding was that the Brokenshire
Memorial Hospital was owned by the United Church Board for World Ministries
(UCBWM) ,the herein petitioner, which was a non-stock corporation organized in the
United States by virtue of a charter granted by the state legislature of Massachussets .
The basis of this ruling was Article XII, Sections I and 5 of the 1935 Constitution, which
barred foreigners, including Americans, from acquiring agricultural lands in this country
except only by hereditary succession.
I: WON UCBWM is qualified to accept the legacy of David Jacobson.
Held: Even on the assumption that the UCBWN was really the owner of the Hospital at
the time of the effectivity of the will and that the devise was for that reason
unenforceable, the defect in the will should be deemed rectified by the subsequent
transfer of the property to the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital, Inc. Our consistent ruling
on this matter is that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently
becomes a citizen or transfers it to a ctitizen, the flaw in the original transaction is
considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.
Thus, in Sarsosa vda. de Barsobia v. Cuenco, 13 where a Filipino citizen sold her land to an
alien who later sold it to a Filipino, we held that the invalidity of the initial transfer to the
alien was corrected by the subsequent transfer of the property to a citizen.
WHEREFORE, the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital, Inc. is hereby substituted for the
United Church Board for World Ministries as petitioner in this case and DECLARED to be
qualified to accept the legacy of the late David Jacobson. The petition as thus modified is
GRANTED. The order of the respondent judge dated December 9, 1971, and his
Resolution dated December 9, 1971, are SET ASIDE.
37. JG Summit Holdings Inc. vs. CA
G.R. No. 124293, November 20, 2000
FACTS:
The National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), a government
corporation, entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with Kawasaki Heavy
Industries, Ltd. for the construction, operation and management of the Subic National
Shipyard, Inc., later became the Philippine Shipyard and Engineering Corporation
(PHILSECO). Under the JVA, NIDC and Kawasaki would maintain a shareholding
proportion of 60%-40% and that the parties have the right of first refusal in case of a
sale.
Through a series of transfers, NIDCs rights, title and interest in PHILSECO eventually
went to the National Government. In the interest of national economy, it was decided
that PHILSECO should be privatized by selling 87.67% of its total outstanding capital
stock to private entities. After negotiations, it was agreed that Kawasakis right of first
refusal under the JVA be exchanged for the right to top by five percent the highest bid
for said shares. Kawasaki that Philyards Holdings, Inc. (PHI), in which it was a
stockholder, would exercise this right in its stead.
During bidding, Kawasaki/PHI Consortium is the losing bidder. Even so, because of the
right to top by 5% percent the highest bid, it was able to top JG Summits bid. JG Summit
protested, contending that PHILSECO, as a shipyard is a public utility and, hence, must
observe the 60%-40% Filipino-foreign capitalization. By buying 87.67% of PHILSECOs
capital stock at bidding, Kawasaki/PHI in effect now owns more than 40% of the stock.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PHILSECO is a public utility
Whether or not Kawasaki/PHI can purchase beyond 40% of PHILSECOs stocks
HELD:
In arguing that PHILSECO, as a shipyard, was a public utility, JG Summit relied on sec. 13,
CA No. 146. On the other hand, Kawasaki/PHI argued that PD No. 666 explicitly stated
that a shipyard was not a public utility. But the SC stated that sec. 1 of PD No. 666 was
expressly repealed by sec. 20, BP Blg. 391 and when BP Blg. 391 was subsequently
repealed by EO 226, the latter law did not revive sec. 1 of PD No. 666. Therefore, the law
that states that a shipyard is a public utility still stands.
A shipyard such as PHILSECO being a public utility as provided by law is therefore
required to comply with the 60%-40% capitalization under the Constitution. Likewise,
the JVA between NIDC and Kawasaki manifests an intention of the parties to abide by this
constitutional mandate. Thus, under the JVA, should the NIDC opt to sell its shares of
stock to a third party, Kawasaki could only exercise its right of first refusal to the extent
that its total shares of stock would not exceed 40% of the entire shares of stock. The
NIDC, on the other hand, may purchase even beyond 60% of the total shares. As a
government corporation and necessarily a 100% Filipino-owned corporation, there is
nothing to prevent its purchase of stocks even beyond 60% of the capitalization as the
Constitution clearly limits only foreign capitalization.
Kawasaki was bound by its contractual obligation under the JVA that limits its right of
first refusal to 40% of the total capitalization of PHILSECO. Thus, Kawasaki cannot
purchase beyond 40% of the capitalization of the joint venture on account of both
constitutional and contractual proscriptions.
Laurel vs abrogar
Facts: Petitioner charged with theft. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash (with Motion to
Defer Arraignment), on the ground that the factual allegations in the Amended Information
do not constitute the felony of theft. The trial court denied the Motion to Quash the
Amended Information, as well petitioners subsequent Motion for Reconsideration. In the
above-quoted Decision, this Court held that the Amended Information does not contain
material allegations charging petitioner with theft of personal property since international
long distance calls and the business of providing telecommunication or telephone services
are not personal properties under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. PLDT further
insists that the Revised Penal Code should be interpreted in the context of the Civil Codes
definition of real and personal property. The enumeration of real properties in Article 415
of the Civil Code is exclusive such that all those not included therein are personal
properties. Since Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code used the words personal property
without qualification, it follows that all personal properties as understood in the context of
the Civil Code, may be the subject of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.
PLDT alleges that the international calls and business of providing telecommunication or
telephone service are personal properties capable of appropriation and can be objects of
theft.
Issue: Whether the long distance call and the business of providing telecommunication is
a personal property which is an element of theft?
Rule: Interest in business was not specifically enumerated as personal property in the Civil
Code in force at the time the above decision was rendered. Yet, interest in business was
declared to be personal property since it is capable of appropriation and not included in
the enumeration of real properties. Article 414 of the Civil Code provides that all things
which are or may be the object of appropriation are considered either real property or
personal property.Business is likewise not enumerated as personal property under the
Civil Code. Just like interest in business, however, it may be appropriated. Following the
ruling in Strochecker v. Ramirez, business should also be classified as personal property.
Since it is not included in the exclusive enumeration of real properties under Article 415, it
is therefore personal property
Issue:whether sugar quotas are real (immovable) or personal properties.
While respondent's arguments are thought-provoking, they cannot stand against the
positive mandate of the pertinent statute. The Sugar Limitation Law (Act 4166, as
amended) provides SEC. 9. The allotment corresponding to each piece of land under
the provisions of this Act shall be deemed to be an improvement attaching to the land
entitled thereto .... and Republic Act No. 1825 similarly provides SEC. 4. The
production allowance or quotas corresponding to each piece of land under the provisions
of this Act shall be deemed to be an improvement attaching to the land entitled thereto ....
And Executive Order No. 873 defines "plantation" as follows: (a) The term 'plantation'
means any specific area of land under sole or undivided ownership to which is attached
an allotment of centrifugal sugar. Thus, under express provisions of law, the sugar quota
allocations are accessories to land, and can not have independent existence away from a
plantation, although the latter may vary. Indeed, this Court held in the case of Abelarde vs.
Lopez, 74 Phil. 344, that even if a contract of sale of haciendas omitted "the right, title,
interest, participation, action (and) rent" which the grantors had or might have in relation to
the parcels of land sold, the sale would include the quotas, it being provided in Section 9,
Act 4166, that the allotment is deemed an improvement attached to the land, and that at
the time the contract of sale was signed the land devoted to sugar were practically of no
use without the sugar allotment. As an improvement attached to land, by express
provision of law, though not physically so united, the sugar quotas are inseparable
therefrom, just like servitudes and other real rights over an immovable. Article 415 of the
Civil Code, in enumerating what are immovable properties, names 10. Contracts for
public works, and servitudes and other real rights over immovable property.

Presbitero vs Fernandez

Facts: It appears that during the lifetime of Esperidion Presbitero, judgment was rendered
against him by the Court of Appeals on October 14, 1959, in CA-G.R. No. 20879, ... to
execute in favor of the plaintiff, within 30 days from the time this judgment becomes final, a
deed of reconveyance of Lot No. 788 of the cadastral survey of Valladolid, free from all
liens and encumbrances, and another deed of reconveyance of a 7-hectare portion of Lot
No. 608 of the same cadastral survey, also free from all liens and encumbrances, or, upon
failure to do so, to pay to the plaintiff the value of each of the said properties, as may be
determined by the Court a quo upon evidence to be presented by the parties before it. The
defendant is further adjudged to pay to the plaintiff the value of the products received by
him from the 5-hectare portion equivalent to 20 cavans of palay per hectare every year, or
125 cavans yearly, at the rate of P10.00 per cavan, from 1951 until possession of the said
5-hectare portion is finally delivered to the plaintiff with legal interest thereon from the time
the complaint was filed; and to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P1,000.00 by way of
attorney's fees, plus costs. Thereafter, plaintiff's counsel, in a letter dated December 8,
1959, sought in vain to amicably settle the case through petitioner's son, Ricardo
Presbitero. When no response was forthcoming, said counsel asked for, and the court a
quo ordered on June 9, 1960, the issuance of a partial writ of execution for the sum of
P12,250.00. On the following day, June 10, 1960, said counsel, in another friendly letter,
reiterated his previous suggestion for an amicable settlement, but the same produced no
fruitful result. Thereupon, on June 21, 1960, the sheriff levied upon and garnished the
sugar quotas allotted to plantation