Barcelon vs Baker

Doctrine: Whenever the Constitution or a statute gives a discretionary power to any person, to
be exercised by him upon his own opinion of certain facts, such person is to be considered the
sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts has been recognized in this case.
The authority to suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus is exclusively vested in the
legislative and executive branches of the government and their decision is final and
conclusive upon the Judicial Department and upon all persons.

Facts:

This case was an application for a writ of habeas corpus applied by Felix and Cohn, attorneys of
law, which alleged that Barcelon is detained and restrained of his liberty at the town of
Batangas, and that the detention and restraint of the said applicant is wholly without legal
authority and not under or by virtue of any process issued by any court. Respondents admit that
they are detaining the body of the said Felix Barcelon, but deny the right of the court to inquire
into the reasons therefore by virtue of the resolution issued by the Philippine Commission and
the executive order of the Governor-General suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the Provinces of Cavite and Batangas. The Philippine Bill section 5 provides that the
Governor-General is hereby authorized to suspend writ of habeas corpus in the said provinces
because of the fact that certain organized bands of ladrones in said provinces were in open
insurrection against the constituted authorities; and the said bands, or parts of them, and some
of their leaders, were still in open resistance to the constituted authorities.

Issue:

Whether or not the judicial department of the Government may investigate the facts upon which
the legislative and executive branches of the Government acted in providing for the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the province of Cavite and Batangas

Held:

NO. It is the duty of the legislative branch of the Government to make such laws and regulations
as will effectually conserve peace and good order and protect the lives and property of the
citizens of the State. It is the duty of the Governor-General to take such steps as he deems wise
and necessary for the purpose of enforcing such laws. If the judicial department of the
Government, or any officer in the Government, has a right to contest the orders of the President
or of the Governor-General under the conditions above supposed, before complying with such
orders, then the hands of the President or the Governor-General may be tied until the very
object of the rebels or insurrectors or invaders has been accomplished.

IN THIS CASE, Congress had authority to provide that the President, or the Governor-General,
with the approval of the Philippine Commission, might suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in cases of rebellion, insurrection, or invasion, when the public safety might
require it.

G.R. No. L-4221, August 30, 1952

MARCELO D. MONTENEGRO, petitioner-appellant,vs.GEN. MARIANO CASTAÑEDA, and

COLONEL EULOGIO BALAO, respondents-appellees.

Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ Habeas Corpus as a Political Question being a
Prerogative by the President

October 18, 1950, Maximino, the son of the petitioner, Marcelo Montenegro and others were

arrested at Manila for being involved with a communistic organization in the commission of acts

of rebellion, insurrection or sedition.

Oct 21, Marcelo, submitted an application for a writ of habeas corpus seeking the release of his

son for he is still under the custody of General Castañeda and Colonel Balao (the respondents).

Oct. 22, President Elpidio Quirino , issued proclamation No. 210, suspending the privilege

of the writ of habeas corpus in some parts of Luzon in order to stifle the emergence of

the Hukbalahap guerillas. 

Marcelo then filed before the court to release his son from the respondent’s custody because

there was no cause in arresting him and that the said proclamation should not be applied to

Maximino because he had been arrested before the promulgation of the said proclamation and

it would go against the prohibition against bill of attainder.

Castaňeda et al argued that the court has no judicial authority over the matter invoking the PP

and the previous ruling in Barcelon vs Baker.

Appeal of Montenegro:

1. That proclamation is unconstitutional “because it partakes of bill of attainder, or

an ex post facto law; and unlawfully includes sedition which under the
 Constitution is not a ground for suspension.

H: the argument is devoid of merit. The prohibition applies only to statutes. A bill of attainder

is a legislative act, which inflicts punishment without judicial trial. The writ was in accordance

with the powers vested in the President by the constitution, and it is deemed an exception to the

general prohibition against ex post facto laws and bills of attainder (if there’s conflict between

prohibition and suspension).

Although under the constitution, grounds for suspension of the privilege of writ are invasion,

insurrection, rebellion or imminent danger and clearly sedition is not included, it will not

invalidate the whole proclamation and is considered immaterial in the case, because Maximino

is confined not only for sedition but for graver offense of rebellion and insurrection. And also, the

order of suspension affects the power of the courts and operates immediately on all petitions

therein pending at the time of its promulgation.

2. There is no state of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof,” the

only situations permitting discontinuance of the writ of habeas corpus

H: During this period, there are intermittent sorties and lightning attacks by organized bands in

different places” which he argues (Montenegro) as, “such sorties are occasional, localized and

transitory”, which is just overt insurrection and rebellion not cases of invasion, insurrection,

rebellion or imminent danger. Here, President concluded in the proclamation, and the other

connected therewith, that “there is actual danger rebellion which may extend throughout the

country.” Such declaration implying much more than imminent danger of rebellion amply justifies

the suspension of the writ.

Delegate Francisco: “that it should not be necessary that there exist a rebellion, insurrection or
invasion in order that habeas corpus may be suspended. It should be sufficient that there exists
not a danger but an imminent danger, and the word, imminent, should be maintained. When
there exists an imminent danger, the State requires for its protection and for that of all the
citizens the suspension of habeas corpus.”

Whether or not Montenegro’s petition should be granted.

DENIED.

In RE Petition for Habeas Corpus of Rolando Abadilla. Abadilla vs. Ramos [GR L-79173, 1
December 1987]

Facts:
On 27 January 1987, a group of officers and enlisted men of the AFP seized control of the
radiotelevision broadcasting facilities of the Republic Broadcasting System (GMA-Channel 7)
located in Quezon City, ostensibly for the purpose of toppling the existing constitutional
government. While the takeover might have been a prelude to similar operations throughout the
national capital, it did not succeed. On 29 January 1987, the mutineers surrendered to the
military authorities and the possession of the facility was restored to the owners and managers
thereof. Soon thereafter, the military authorities conducted an investigation of the matter. On 18
April 1987, a group of enlisted men staged a mutiny inside the Fort Bonifacio military facility in
Makati, Metropolitan Manila. The mutiny, dubbed as "The Black Saturday Revolt," did not
succeed either.
After the incident, the military authorities also conducted an investigation. The first investigation
was concluded on 12 March 1987. The investigation disclosed that Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla
of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) of the AFP was one of the leaders of the unsuccessful
takeover of the GMA radiotelevision facilities. The Board of Officers investigating the matter
recommended that the case of Colonel Abadilla be endorsed for pre-trial investigation and that
the appropriate charges be filed against him for violation of Article of War 67 (Mutiny or Sedition
1, Article of War 94) in relation to Article 139 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 1 of PD
1866, and such other offenses that may be warranted by the evidence. Accordingly, a charge
sheet was prepared against the Colonel. The investigation conducted on "The Black Saturday
Revolt" ended on 27 May 1987. It was found at said investigation that Colonel Abadilla was also
involved in the mutiny. The Board of Officers conducting the investigation also recommended
that the case be endorsed for pre-trial investigation and that the appropriate charges be filed
against the Colonel. The Colonel was likewise charged, accordingly. Colonel Abadilla was at
large when both investigations were conducted. On 4 May 1987 or some two weeks before the
second investigation was concluded, Major General Renato De Villa, Commanding General of
the PC and Vice Chief of Staff of the AFP issued an Order for the arrest and confinement of
Colonel Abadilla. On 21 May 1987, AFP Chief of Staff General Fidel V. Ramos issued General
Orders 342 dropping Colonel Abadilla from the rolls of regular officers of the AFP. On 7 July
1987, the Assistant City Fiscal of Quezon City filed an Information for Slight Physical Injuries
with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metropolitan Manila in Quezon City against Colonel Abadilla
(Criminal Case 0237558). On 27 July 1987, a combined element of the Philippine Army and
Philippine Constabulary arrested Colonel Abadilla. He was detained first in Camp Crame in
Quezon City and later, up to the present, in Fort Bonifacio in Makati. On 30 July 1987, another
Information, this time for violation of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition)
was filed by the Assistant City Fiscal of Quezon City against Colonel Abadilla. The case was
assigned to Branch 104 of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City (Criminal Case Q-53382).
On the same date, Mrs. Susan S. Abadilla, the spouse of Colonel Abadilla together with their
minor children June Elizabeth, Rolando, Jr. Daphine Jennifer, Ma. Theresa, Anna Rosanna,
Vincent Marcus and Bart Joseph, went to the Supreme Court and filed the Petition for habeas
corpus, challenging the validity of the detention of Colonel Abadilla.

Issue: Whether Colonel Abadilla's confinement is illegal because under Article of War 70, a
person subject to military law can be detained only if he is charged with a crime or a serious
offense under the Articles of War.

Held: Article of War 2 enumerates who are subject to military law. In March, 1987, Colonel
Abadilla was a military officer. Under this Article, he was subject to military law. Section 10 of
the Manual for CourtsMartial, AFP, which discusses court-martial jurisdiction in general, states
the general rule to be "The general rule is that court-martial jurisdiction over officers, cadets,
soldiers, and others in the military service of the Philippines ceases on discharge or other
separation from such service, and that jurisdiction as to an offense committed during a period of
service thus terminated is not revived by a reentry into the military service."

Attention is called to the exception mentioned in the last sentence of the Section, to wit "So
also, where a dishonorably discharged general prisoner is tried for an offense committed while a
soldier and prior to his dishonorable discharge, such discharge does not terminate his
amenability to trial for the offense." This exception applies to the case of Colonel Abadilla
inasmuch as he is at present confined in Fort Bonifacio upon the orders of his superior officers,
and his having been dropped from the rolls of officers amounts to a dishonorable discharge.
Section 1 (b) of PD 1860, as amended, even acknowledges instances where military jurisdiction
fully attaches on an individual even after he shall have been separated from active service,
which provdes that "all persons subject to military law under Article 2 of the aforecited Articles of
War who commit any crime or offense shall be exclusively tried by courts-martial or their case
disposed of under the said Articles of War; Provided, that in either of the aforementioned
situations, the case shall be disposed of or tried by the proper civil or judicial authorities when
court-martial jurisdiction over the offense has prescribed under Article 38 of Commonwealth Act
No. 408, as amended, or court-martial jurisdiction over the person of the accused military or
Integrated National Police can no longer be exercised by virtue of their separation from the
active service without jurisdiction having duly attached beforehand unless otherwise provided by
law." Colonel Abadilla has been charged by the military authorities for violation of Article of War
67 (Mutiny or Sedition) which is a serious offense, and the corresponding charge sheets have
been prepared against him, which satisfies the requirement of Article of War 70, which provides
that a person subject to military law can be detained only if he is charged with a crime or a
serious offense under the Articles of War. Thus, as the detention of Colonel Abadilla under the
circumstances is not illegal, the Petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed for lack of merit
PEOPLE VS. JUDGE DONATO [198 SCRA 130; G.R. NO.79269; 5 JUN 1991]

Facts: Private respondent and his co-accused were charged of rebellion on October 2, 1986 for
acts committed before and after February 1986. Private respondent filed with a Motion to Quash
alleging that: (a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no jurisdiction
over the offense charged; (c) the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants;
and (d) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished. This was denied. May 9, 1987
Respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed that the respondent is not entitled to bail
anymore since rebellion became a capital offense under PD 1996, 942 and 1834 amending
ART. 135 of RPC. On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing,
among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of
the Revised Penal Code as it existed before the amendatory decrees. Judge Donato now
granted the bail, which was fixed at P30,000.00 and imposed a condition that he shall report to
the court once every two months within the first ten days of every period thereof. Petitioner filed
a supplemental motion for reconsideration indirectly asking the court to deny bail to and to allow
it to present evidence in support thereof considering the "inevitable probability that the accused
will not comply with this main condition of his bail. It was contended that:

1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee from
detention when arrested; (Chairman of CPP-NPA)
2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address;
3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his arrest and
presented a Driver's License to substantiate his false identity;
4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a false address;
5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner whose identity
and address were also found to be false;
6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of P250,000.00 was
offered and paid for his arrest.

This however was denied. Hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not the private respondent has the right to bail.

Held: Yes. Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. It is absolute since the crime is not a
capital offense, therefore prosecution has no right to present evidence. It is only when it is a
capital offense that the right becomes discretionary. However it was wrong for the Judge to
change the amount of bail from 30K to 50K without hearing the prosecution.

Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990, providing a penalty of reclusion perpetua

to the crime of rebellion, is not applicable to the accused as it is not favorable to him.

Accused validly waived his right to bail in another case(petition for habeas corpus). Agreements
were made therein: accused to remain under custody, whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz
and Jose Milo Concepcion will be released immediately, with a condition that they will submit
themselves in the jurisdiction of the court. Said petition for HC was dismissed. Bail is the
security given for the release of a person in custody of the law. Ergo, there was a waiver. We
hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a
right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public
order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law.

Enrile vs Salazar

Enrile vs Salazar
G.R. No. 92163
June 5, 1990

Facts:

In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was
arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of
Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941.

The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of
prosecutors charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio
Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly
committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10,
1990.

Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila,
without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest
warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in
Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern
Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.

On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for
habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990),
alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights.

Issue:

Was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail
or vindicating its denial?
Held:

The complaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the
statute books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be
complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed
as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed
charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple
rebellion.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's
reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary
corollary that the information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of
simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct
proposition.

The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the
petitioner's right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original
jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was for
petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a
right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that
remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have
been invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if
appropriate relief was also available there.

The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the
questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco
and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are
entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to
petitioners being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered
remanded to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners.
Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied
with this Court shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.

IN RE: PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF CAPT. GARY ALEJANO ET AL

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF CAPT. GARY ALEJANO,
et al. vs.GEN. PEDRO CABUAY, GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, SEC. ANGELO REYES, and
SEC. ROILO GOLEZG.R. No. 160792 August 25, 2005

FACTS: Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained
junior officers, entered and took control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments
(“Oakwood”), an upscale apartment complex, located in the business district of Makati City. The
soldiers disarmed the security officers of Oakwood and planted explosive devices in its
immediate surroundings. The junior officers publicly renounced their support for the
administration and called for the resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and several
cabinet members.

Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after
several negotiations with government emissaries. The soldiers later defused the explosive
devices they had earlier planted. The soldiers then returned to their barracks. On 31 July 2003,
Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a directive to all the Major Service
Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP Detention Center. The
transfer took place while military and civilian authorities were investigating the soldiers’
involvement in the Oakwood incident.

On 1 August 2003, government prosecutors filed an Information for coup d’etat with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61, against the soldiers involved in the 27 July 2003
Oakwood incident. The government prosecutors accused the soldiers of coup d’etat as defined
and penalized under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, as amended.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784. The trial court later issued the
Commitment Orders giving custody of junior officers Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes IV (“Trillanes”) and
Capt. Gerardo Gambala to the Commanding Officers of ISAFP. On 2 August 2003, Gen. Abaya
issued a directive to all Major Service Commanders to take into custody the military personnel
under their command who took part in the Oakwood incident except the detained junior officers
who were to remain under the custody of ISAFP.
Petitioners filed a petition for Habeas Corpus before the CA, however the same was denied.
The Court of Appeals found the petition bereft of merit. The appellate court pointed out that the
detainees are already charged of coup d’etat before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Habeas
corpus is unavailing in this case as the detainees’ confinement is under a valid indictment, the
legality of which the detainees and petitioners do not even question.

ISSUE: WON the denial of the petition for Habeas Corpus was valid

HELD: YES
For obvious reasons, the duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus necessarily includes the
determination of the propriety of the remedy. If a court finds the alleged cause of the detention
unlawful, then it should issue the writ and release the detainees. In the present case, after
hearing the case, the Court of Appeals found that habeas corpus is inapplicable. After actively
participating in the hearing before the Court of Appeals, petitioners are estopped from claiming
that the appellate court had no jurisdiction to inquire into the merits of their petition.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the remedy of habeas corpus is not the proper
remedy to address the detainees’ complaint against the regulations and conditions in the
ISAFP Detention Center. The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into
the cause of detention of a person. The purpose of the writ is to determine whether a
person is being illegally deprived of his liberty.If the inquiry reveals that the detention is
illegal, the court orders the release of the person. If, however, the detention is proven
lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate.
The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. It is not a writ of error. Neither can it substitute for
an appeal.A mere allegation of a violation of one’s constitutional right is not sufficient. The
courts will extend the scope of the writ only if any of the following circumstances is present: (a)
there is a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the unlawful restraint of a person; (b)
the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty is imposed and
such sentence is void as to the excess.
AS TO DENIAL OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL: The scheduled visiting hours provide reasonable
access to the detainees, giving petitioners sufficient time to confer with the detainees. The
detainees’ right to counsel is not undermined by the scheduled visits. Even in the hearings
before the Senate and the Feliciano Commission, petitioners were given time to confer with the
detainees, a fact that petitioners themselves admit.23 Thus, at no point were the detainees
denied their right to counsel.

Gonzales vs. Hechanova

No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred

in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. (Sec. 21, Art. VII, 1987
Constitution)
Facts: 
Executive Secretary Hechanova authorized the importation of foreign rice to be purchased from
private sources. Gonzales, a rice planter, and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
Association, filed a petition questioning said act because Republic Act No. 3452 which allegedly
repeals or amends Republic Act No. 2207 — explicitly prohibits the importation of foreign rice by
the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency.

Hechanova countered that the importation is authorized by the President for military stock pile
purposes (the president is duty-bound to prepare for the challenge of threats of war
or emergency without waiting for special authority). He also contends that there is no prohibition
on importation made by the “Government itself”. He also further that the Government has
already entered into 2 contracts with Vietnam and Burma; that these contracts constitute valid
executive agreements under international law; and, that such agreements became binding and
effective upon signing thereof by the representatives of both parties. Hechanova also maintains
that the status of petitioner as a rice planter does not give him sufficient interest to file the
petition herein and secure the relief therein prayed for and that Gonzales has not exhausted all
administrative remedies available to him before coming to court".

Issues:

1. Does Gonzales have sufficient interest to file the case?

2. Whether exhaustion of administrative remedies is required in this case

3. What is the nature of the government contracts with Vietnam and Burma? Are they valid?

4. May an international agreement be invalidated by our courts?

Held:

1. Yes. Apart from prohibiting the importation of rice and corn, RA 3452 declares that "the policy
of the Government" is to "engage in the purchase of these basic foods directly from those
tenants, farmers, growers, producers and landowners in the Philippines who wish to dispose of
their products at a price that will afford them a fair and just return for their labor and capital
investment. ... ." Pursuant to this provision, petitioner, as a planter with a rice land of substantial
proportion, is entitled to a chance to sell to the Government the rice it now seeks to buy abroad.
Moreover, since the purchase of said commodity will have to be effected with public
funds mainly raised by taxation, and as a rice producer and landowner petitioner must
necessarily be a taxpayer, it follows that he has sufficient personality and interest to seek
judicial assistance with a view to restraining what he believes to be an attempt to unlawfully
disburse said funds.

2. No. The principle requiring the previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is

not applicable where the question in dispute is purely a legal one", or where the controverted
act is "patently illegal" or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or where
the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an alter-ego of the President bear the
implied or assumed approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him, or where there
are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. The case at bar fails under
each one of the foregoing exceptions to the general rule.
3. The parties to said contracts do not appear to have regarded the same as executive
agreements. But, even assuming that said contracts may properly considered as executive
agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a constitutional viewpoint,
said agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452.
Although the President may, under the American constitutional system enter into executive
agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive agreement, enter
into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto. Under the Constitution,
the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not
interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his
veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of law, by
indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of
the very act prohibited by said laws.

Under Commonwealth Act No. 138, in all purchases by the Government, including those made
by and/or for the armed forces, preference shall be given to materials produced in the
Philippines. The importation involved in the case at bar violates this general policy of
our Government, aside from the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452.

4.  Yes. The Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing,
in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme Court may not be deprived "of its
jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error as
the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in — (1)
All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order
or regulation is in question". In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a
treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to
an act of Congress.

[ GR No. L-11511, Nov 28, 1958 ]

TAN SIN v. DEPORTATION BOARD

104 Phil. 868

FACTS:
The petitioner is a Chinese citizen residing at Pasay City allowed to reside in the Philippines as
a permanent resident. Sometime in 1953 he was charged with, and on 7 December 1953
convicted of, the crime of estafa in the Court of First Instance of Manila, and sentenced to suffer
4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor, to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P650, to
suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs (case No. 21717).
The Court did not recommend to the President his deportation after service of the sentence. The
petitioner served his sentence in the national penitentiary but before his release on 7 December
1955 from confinement, charges against him were filed on 29 November 1955 by a special
prosecutor in the Deportation Board alleging the fact of his conviction by final judgment of, the
crime of estafa and service of sentence therefor, and praying that after hearing the Board
recommended to the President his deportation as an undesirable alien (case No. R-567). The
Deportation Board ordered that he be detained upon release from confinement pending the
termination of the deportation proceedings instituted against him. On 5 December 1955 the
petitioner filed in the Deportation Board a petition for bail. The Board granted his petition. After
posting a cash bond in the sum of P1,000 and a surety bond of P5,000 with the Bureau of
Immigration he was released from custody in the afternoon of 7 December 1955. On 9 February
1956 the petitioner filed in the Deportation Board a motion to dismiss. The Board denied his
motion. Hence this petition filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the parties had
submitted their respective memoranda, the Court rendered judgment denying the petitioner's
petition. He has appealed.
The appellant contends that it is Congress and not the President of the Republic that has
absolute and inherent power to deport aliens; that the power to deport aliens may be exercised
by the President of the Republic only for reasons provided by law, namely, section 37,
Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 144 and 503, and after hearing
as provided for in section 69, Revised Administrative Code; and that although he was convicted
by final judgment of the crime of estafa, still section 37(a), clause 3, Commonwealth Act No.
613, as amended, does not apply to him, because he was convicted only once of the crime of
estafa, which conviction happened on the thirtieth year after his entry to the Philippines, and the
sentence imposed upon him was only for 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor.

Issue:

WON the power to deport aliens is lodged to the President?

HELD:
on 5 January 1951 the President of the Republic promulgated Executive Order No. 398, 47 Off.
Gaz., 6, reorganizing the Deportation Board.[1] Paragraph 1, sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of the
said executive order provides:
(a) The Deportation Board, motu proprio or upon complaint of any person, is authorized to
conduct investigations in the manner prescribed in section 69 of the Revised Administrative
Code to determine whether a subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines is an
undesirable alien or not, and thereafter to recommend to the President of the Philippines the
deportation of such alien.
(b) The Deportation Board, motu proprio or upon the filing of the formal charges by the Special
Prosecutor of the Board, shall issue the warrant of arrest against the alien or aliens complained
of.

In Tan Tong vs. Deportation Board, (96 Phil., 934), speaking of the power of the President of the
Republic to deport aliens, this Court said:
* * * The power to deport aliens is lodged in the President of the Republic of the
Philippines. As an act of state, it is vested in the Executive by virtue of his office, subject
only to the regulations prescribed in Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code or to
such future legislation as may be promulgated on the subject. (In re McCulloch Dick, 38
Phil. 41.) There is no provision in the Constitution nor act of the legislature defining the power,
as it is evident that it is the intention of the law to grant to the Chief Executive full discretion to
determine whether an alien's residence in the country is so undesirable as to affect or injure the
security, welfare or interest of the state. The adjudication of facts upon which deportation is
predicated also devolves on the Chief Executive whose decision is final and executory. (In re
McCulloch Dick, supra.)

Section 37, Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, merely enumerates the grounds for
which an alien may be arrested upon warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any
officer designated by him for the purpose: and after determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation, an alien may be deported upon
warrant issued by the Commissioner of Immigration. The fact that the ground upon which the
appellant is sought to be deported is not among those mentioned in the law cited by him, does
not mean that the power to deport an alien whose stay in the Philippines has become
undesirable for causes not mentioned therein, has been withdrawn, from the President or
abrogated by the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended. Section 52 of the last
mentioned Act expressly provides that section 69 of Act No. 2711 (Revised Administrative
Code) shall continue to remain in force and effect.
The order of the Deportation Board to hold the appellant in custody pending determination of the
deportation proceedings instituted against him is legal. Temporary detention is a necessary step
in the process of exclusion or expulsion of an undesirable alien and pending arrangements for
his deportation, the Government has the right to hold him under confinement for a reasonable
length of time.[1]
The Deportation Board has been legally constituted by the President of the Republic and
vested with the power to issue warrants of arrest to apprehend undesirable aliens, and
after investigation conducted in the manner prescribed in section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code, to recommend their deportation if found undesirable. The appellant
has been taken into custody for the purpose of determining whether he is an undesirable
alien.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

BAYAN v. ZAMORA
G. R. No. 138570
October 10, 2000

Facts:
The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among others, the possible
elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted to a series of conferences and
negotiations which culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos
approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and United States
Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.

Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998 and on May 27, 1999, the senate
approved it by (2/3) votes.

Cause of Action:
Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987 constitution is applicable
and not Section 21, Article VII.

Following the argument of the petitioner, under they provision cited, the “foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities” may be allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions are
sufficiently met:
a) it must be a treaty,
b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum held for that purpose if so required by congress, and
c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.

Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what is
requires for such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all
the members of the senate.

ISSUE: Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article
XVIII of the Constitution?

HELD:
Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases,
troops or facilities should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense,
however, the provisions of section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue
and for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid
concurrence of the senate.

The Constitution, makes no distinction between “transient” and “permanent.” We find nothing in
section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed
permanently in the Philippines.

It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement
because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty.

RENE A.V. SAGUISAG v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, GR No. 212426,

2016-07-26
Facts:
petitioners respectfully pray that the Honorable Court RECONSIDER, REVERSE, AND SET -
ASIDE its Decision dated January 12, 2016, and issue a new Decision GRANTING the instant
consolidated petitions by declaring the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)
entered into by the respondents for the Philippine government, with the United States of
America, UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID and to permanently enjoin its implementation.
petitioners claim this Court erred when it ruled that EDCA was not a treaty.[5] In connection to
this, petitioners move that EDCA must be in the form of a treaty in order to comply with the
constitutional restriction under Section 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution on foreign
military bases, troops, and facilities.[6] Additionally, they reiterate their arguments on the issues
of telecommunications, taxation, and nuclear weapons.[7]
Petitioners assert that this Court contradicted itself when it interpreted the word "allowed in" to
refer to the initial entry of foreign bases, troops, and facilities, based on the fact that the plain
meaning of the provision in question referred to prohibiting the return of foreign bases, troops,
and facilities except under a treaty concurred in by the Senate
Secondly, by interpreting "allowed in" as referring to an initial entry, the Court has simply applied
the plain meaning of the words in the particular provision.[10] Necessarily, once entry has been
established by a subsisting treaty, latter instances of entry need not be embodied by a separate
treaty. After all, the Constitution did not state that foreign military bases, troops, and facilities
shall not subsist or exist in the Philippines.
Issues:
constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the
Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America (U.S.)
Ruling:
we find that EDCA did not go beyond the framework. The entry of US troops has long been
authorized under a valid and subsisting treaty, which is the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).
[14] Reading the VFA along with the longstanding Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT)[15] led this
Court to the conclusion that an executive agreement such as the EDCA was well within the
bounds of the obligations imposed by both treaties.
Thus, we find no reason for EDCA to be declared unconstitutional. It fully conforms to the
Philippines' legal regime through the MDT and VFA. It also fully conforms to the government's
continued policy to enhance our military capability in the face of various military and
humanitarian issues that may arise. This Motion for Reconsideration has not raised any
additional legal arguments that warrant revisiting the Decision.