Michel de Montaigne

First published Wed Aug 18, 2004; substantive revision Fri Jan 3, 2014

Franois Quesnel, "Montaigne",

c. 1590, drawing (H. 335 x L. 230 mm),
reprinted with permission from the
Montaigne Studies website
The question is not who will hit the ring,
but who will make the best runs at it.

Given the huge breadth of his readings, Montaigne could have been ranked among
the most erudite humanists of the XVIth century. But in the Essays, his aim is above
all to exercise his own judgment properly. Readers who might want to convict him
of ignorance would find nothing to hold against him, he said, for he was exerting his
natural capacities, not borrowed ones. He thought that too much knowledge could
prove a burden, preferring to exert his natural judgment to displaying his erudition.

1. Life
2. Work
3. A Philosophy of Free Judgment
4. Montaigne's Scepticism
5. Montaigne and Relativism
6. Montaigne's Legacy on Charron and Descartes
7. Conclusion
Bibliography
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1. Life
Montaigne (15331592) came from a rich bourgeois family that acquired nobility
after his father fought in Italy in the army of King Francis I of France; he came back
with the firm intention of bringing refined Italian culture to France. He decorated his
Prigord castle in the style of an ancient Roman villa. He also decided that his son
would not learn Latin in school. He arranged instead for a German preceptor and the
household to speak to him exclusively in Latin at home. So the young Montaigne
grew up speaking Latin and reading Vergil, Ovid, and Horace on his own. At the age
of six, he was sent to board at the Collge de Guyenne in Bordeaux, which he later
praised as the best humanist college in France, though he found fault with humanist
colleges in general. Where Montaigne later studied law, or, indeed, whether he ever
studied law at all is not clear. The only thing we know with certainty is that his
father bought him an office in the Court of Prigueux. He then met Etienne de La
Botie with whom he formed an intimate friendship and whose death some years
later, in 1563, left him deeply distraught. Tired of active life, he retired at the age of
only 37 to his father's castle. In the same year, 1571, he was nominated Gentleman
of King Charles IX's Ordinary Chamber, and soon thereafter, also of Henri de
Navarre's Chamber. He received the decoration of the Order of Saint-Michel, a
distinction all the more exceptional as Montaigne's lineage was from recent nobility.
On the title page of the first edition (1580) of the Essays, we read: Essais de
Messire Michel Seigneur de Montaigne, Chevalier de l'ordre du Roy, &
Gentilhomme ordinaire de sa chambre. Initially keen to show off his titles and,
thus, his social standing, Montaigne had the honorifics removed in the second
edition (1582).
Replicating Petrarca's choice in De vita solitaria, Montaigne chose to dedicate
himself to the Muses. In his library, which was quite large for the period, he had
wisdom formulas carved on the wooden beams. They were drawn from, amongst
others, Ecclesiastes, Sextus Empiricus, Lucretius, and other classical authors, whom
he read intensively. To escape fits of melancholy, he began to commit his thoughts
to paper. In 1580, he undertook a journey to Italy, whose main goal was to cure the
pain of his kidney stones at thermal resorts. The journey is related in part by a
secretary, in part by Montaigne himself, in a manuscript that was only discovered
during the XVIIIth century, given the title The Journal of the Journey to Italy, and
forgotten soon after. While Montaigne was taking the baths near Pisa, he learnt of
his election as Mayor of Bordeaux. He was first tempted to refuse out of modesty,
but eventually accepted (he even received a letter from the King urging him to take
the post) and was later re-elected. In his second term he came under criticism for
having abandoned the town during the great plague in an attempt to protect himself
and his family. His time in office was dimmed by the wars of religion between
Catholics and Protestants. Several members of his family converted to
Protestantism, but Montaigne himself remained a Catholic.

2. Work
Montaigne wrote three books of Essays. (Essay was an original name for this kind
of work; it became an appreciated genre soon after.) Three main editions are
recognized: 1580 (at this stage, only the first two books were written), 1588, and
1595. The last edition, which could not be supervised by Montaigne himself, was
edited from the manuscript by his adoptive daughter Marie de Gournay. Till the end
of the XIXth century, the copy text for all new editions was that of 1595; Fortunat
Strowski and shortly after him Pierre Villey dismissed it in favor of the Bordeaux
copy, a text of the 1588 edition supplemented by manuscript additions.[1] Montaigne
enriched his text continuously; he preferred to add for the sake of diversity, rather
than to correct.[2] The unity of the work and the order of every single chapter remain
problematic. We are unable to detect obvious links from one chapter to the next: in
the first book, Montaigne jumps from Idleness (I,8) to Liars (I,9), then from
Prompt or slow speech (I,10) to Prognostications (I,11). The random aspect of
the work, acknowledged by the author himself, has been a challenge for
commentators ever since. Part of the brilliance of the Essays lies in this very ability
to elicit various forms of explanatory coherence whilst at the same time defying
them. The work is so rich and flexible that it accommodates virtually any academic
trend. Yet, it is also so resistant to interpretation that it reveals the limits of each
interpretation.
Critical studies of the Essays have, until recently, been mainly of a literary nature.
However, to consider Montaigne as a writer rather than as a philosopher can be a
way of ignoring a disturbing thinker. Indeed, he shook some fundamental aspects of
Western thought, such as the superiority we assign to man over animals,[3] to
European civilization over Barbarians,[4] or to reason as an alleged universal
standard. A tradition rooted in the 19th century tends to relegate his work to the
status of literary impressionism or to the expression of a frivolous subjectivity. To
do him justice, one needs to bear in mind the inseparable unity of thought and style
in his work. Montaigne's repeated revisions of his text, as modern editions show
with the three letters A, B, C, standing for the three main editions, mirror the
relationship between the activity of his thought and the Essays as a work in progress.
The Essays display both the laboriousness and the delight of thinking.
In Montaigne we have a writer whose work is deeply infused by philosophical
thought. One verse out of sixteen in Lucretius' De natura rerum is quoted in
the Essays.[5] If it is true, as Edmund Husserl said, that philosophy is a shared
endeavor, Montaigne is perhaps the most exemplary of philosophers since his work
extensively borrows and quotes from others. Montaigne managed to internalize a
huge breadth of reading, so that his erudition does not appear as such. He created a
most singular work, yet one that remains deeply rooted in the community of poets,
historians, and philosophers. His decision to use only his own judgment in dealing
with all sorts of matters, his resolutely distant attitude towards memory and
knowledge, his warning that we should not mix God or transcendent principles with
the human world, are some of the key elements that characterize Montaigne's
position. As a humanist, he considered that one has to assimilate the classics, but
above all to display virtue, according to the opinion of Plato, who says that
steadfastness, faith, and sincerity are real philosophy, and the other sciences which
aim at other things are only powder and rouge.[6]

3. A Philosophy of Free Judgment

Montaigne rejects the theoretical or speculative way of philosophizing that prevailed
under the Scholastics ever since the Middle Ages. According to him, science does
not exist, but only a general belief in science. Petrarch had already criticized the
Scholastics for worshiping Aristotle as their God. Siding with the humanists,
Montaigne develops a sharp criticism of science la mode des
Geomtriens,[7] the mos geometricus deemed to be the most rigorous. It is merely a
practice and business of science,[8] he says, which is restricted to the University and
essentially carried out between masters and their disciples. The main problem of this
kind of science is that it makes us spend our time justifying as rational the beliefs we
inherit, instead of calling into question their foundations; it makes us label
fashionable opinions as truth, instead of gauging their strength. Whereas science
should be a free inquiry, it consists only in gibberish discussions on how we should
read Aristotle or Galen.[9] Critical judgment is systematically silenced. Montaigne
demands a thought process that would not be tied down by any doctrinaire principle,
a thought process that would lead to free enquiry.
If we trace back the birth of modern science, we find that Montaigne as a
philosopher was ahead of his time. In 1543, Copernicus put the earth in motion,
depriving man of his cosmological centrality. Yet he nevertheless changed little in
the medieval conception of the world as a sphere. The Copernican world became an
open world only with Thomas Digges (1576) although his sky was still situated in
space, inhabited by gods and angels.[10] One has to wait for Giordano Bruno to find
the first representative of the modern conception of an infinite universe (1584). But
whether Bruno is a modern mind remains controversial (the planets are still animals,
etc). Montaigne, on the contrary, is entirely free from the medieval conception of the
spheres. He owes his cosmological freedom to his deep interest in ancient
philosophers, to Lucretius in particular. In the longest chapter of the Essays, the
Apologie de Raymond Sebond, Montaigne conjures up many opinions, regarding
the nature of the cosmos, or the nature of the soul. He weighs the Epicureans'
opinion that several worlds exist, against that of the unicity of the world put forth by
both Aristotle and Aquinas. He comes out in favor of the former, without ranking his
own evaluation as a truth.
As a humanist, Montaigne conceived of philosophy as morals. In the chapter On
the education of children,[11] education is identified with philosophy, this being
understood as the formation of judgment and manners in everyday life: for
philosophy, which, as the molder of judgment and conduct, will be his principal
lesson, has the privilege of being everywhere at home.[12]Philosophy, which consists
essentially in the use of judgment, is significant to the very ordinary, varied and
undulating[13] process of life. In fact, under the guise of innocuous anecdotes,
Montaigne achieved the humanist revolution in philosophy. He moved from a
conception of philosophy conceived of as theoretical science, to a philosophy
conceived of as the practice of free judgment. Lamenting that philosophy, even
with people of understanding, should be an empty and fantastic name, a thing of no
use and no value,[14] he asserted that philosophy should be the most cheerful
activity. He practised philosophy by setting his judgment to trial, in order to become
aware of its weaknesses, but also to get to know its strength. Every movement
reveals us,[15] but our judgments do so the best. At the beginning of the past century,
one of Montaigne's greatest commentators, Pierre Villey, developed the idea that
Montaigne truly became himself through writing. This idea remains more or less
true, in spite of its obvious link with late romanticist psychology. The Essays remain
an exceptional historical testimony of the progress of privacy and individualism, a
blossoming of subjectivity, an attainment of personal maturity that will be copied,
but maybe never matched since. It seems that Montaigne, who dedicated himself to
freedom of the mind and peacefulness of the soul, did not have any other aim
through writing than cultivating and educating himself. Since philosophy had failed
to determine a secure path towards happiness, he committed each individual to do so
in his own way.[16]
Montaigne wants to escape the stifling of thought by knowledge, a wide-spread
phenomenon which he called pedantism,[17] an idea that he may have gleaned from
the tarnishing of professors by theCommedia dell'arte. He praises one of the most
famous professors of the day, Adrianus Turnebus, for having combined robust
judgment with massive erudition. We have to moderate our thirst for knowledge,
just as we do our appetite for pleasure. Siding here with Callicles against Plato,
Montaigne asserts that a gentleman should not dedicate himself entirely to
philosophy.[18] Practised with restraint, it proves useful, whereas in excess it leads to
eccentricity and insociability.[19]Reflecting on the education of the children of the
aristocracy (chapter I, 26, is dedicated to the countess Diane de Foix, who was then
pregnant), Montaigne departs significantly from a traditional humanist education,
the very one he himself received. Instead of focusing on the ways and means of
making the teaching of Latin more effective, as pedagogues in the wake of Erasmus
usually did, Montaigne stresses the need for action and playful activities. The child
will conform early to social and political customs, but without servility. The use of
judgment in every circumstance, as a warrant for practical intelligence and personal
freedom, has to remain at the core of education. He transfers the major responsibility
of education from the school to everyday life: Wonderful brilliance may be gained
for human judgment by getting to know men.[20] The priority given to the formation
of judgment and character strongly opposes the craving for a powerful memory
during his time . He reserves for himself the freedom to pick up bits of knowledge
here and there, displaying the nonchalance or unconcern intellectually, much in
the same way that Castiglione's courtier would use sprezzatura in social
relationships. Although Montaigne presents this nonchalance as essential to his
nature, his position is not innocent: it allows him to take on the voice now of a Stoic,
and then of a Sceptic, now of an Epicurean and then of a Christian. Although his
views are never fully original, they always bear his unmistakable mark. Montaigne's
thought, which is often rated as modern in so many aspects, remains deeply rooted
in the classical tradition. Montaigne navigates easily through heaps of classical
knowledge, proposing remarkable literary and philosophical innovations along the
way.
Montaigne begins his project to know man by noticing that the same human
behavior can have opposite effects, or that even opposite conducts can have the
same effects: by diverse means we arrive at the same end.[21] Human life cannot be
turned into an object of rational theory. Human conduct does not obey universal
rules, but a great diversity of rules, among which the most accurate still fall short of
the intended mark. Human reason is a tincture infused in about equal strength in all
our opinions and ways, whatever their form: infinite in substance, infinite in
diversity[22] says the chapter on custom. By focusing on anecdotal experience,
Montaigne comes thus to write the masterpiece of modern moral science,
according to the great commentator Hugo Friedrich. He gives up the moral ambition
of telling how men should live, in order to arrive at a non-prejudiced mind for
knowing man as he is. Others form man, I tell of him.[23] Man is ever since
without a definition, as philosopher Marcel Conche commented.[24] In the chapter
Apologie de Raimond Sebond, Montaigne draws from classical and Renaissance
knowledge in order to remind us that, in some parts of the world, we find men that
bear little resemblance to us. Our experience of man and things should not be
perceived as limited by our present standards of judgment. It is a sort of madness
when we settle limits for the possible and the impossible.[25]
Philosophy has failed to secure man a determined idea of his place in the world, or
of his nature. Metaphysical or psychological opinions, indeed far too numerous,
come as a burden more than as a help. Montaigne pursues his quest for knowledge
through experience; the meaning of concepts is not set down by means of a
definition, it is related to common language or to historical examples. One of the
essential elements of experience is the ability to reflect on one's actions and
thoughts. Montaigne is engaging in a case-by-case gnti seauton, know thyself:
although truth in general is not truly an appropriate object for human faculties, we
can reflect on our experience. What counts is not the fact that we eventually know
the truth or not, but rather the way in which we seek it.The question is not who will
hit the ring, but who will make the best runs at it.[26] The aim is to properly exercise
our judgment.
Montaigne's thinking baffles our most common categories. The vision of an ever-
changing world that he developed threatens the being of all things. We have no
communication with being.[27] We wrongly take that which appears for that which is,
and we indulge in a dogmatic, deceptive language that is cut off from an ever-
changing reality. We ought to be more careful with our use of language. Montaigne
would prefer that children be taught other ways of speaking, more appropriate to the
nature of human inquiry, such as What does that mean ?, I do not understand it,
This might be, Is it true?[28] Montaigne himself is fond of these formulas that
soften the boldness of our propositions: perhaps, to some extent, they say, I
think,[29] and the like. Criticism on theory and dogmatism permeates for example his
reflexion on politics. Because social order is too complicated to be mastered by
individual reason, he deems conservatism as the wisest stance.[30]This policy is
grounded on the general evaluation that change is usually more damaging than the
conservation of social institutions. Nevertheless, there may be certain circumstances
that advocate change as a better solution, as history sometimes showed. Reason
being then unable to decide a priori, judgment must come into play and alternate its
views to find the best option.

4. Montaigne's Scepticism
With Cornelius Agrippa, Henri Estienne or Francisco Sanchez, among others,
Montaigne has largely contributed to the rebirth of scepticism during the
XVIth century. His literary encounter with Sextus produced a decisive shock: around
1576, when Montaigne had his own personal medal coined, he had it engraved with
his age, with Epecho , I abstain in Greek, and another Sceptic motto in French:
Que sais-je?: what do I know ? At this period in his life, Montaigne is thought to
have undergone a sceptical crisis, as Pierre Villey famously commented. In fact,
this interpretation dates back to Pascal, for whom scepticism could only be a sort of
momentary frenzy.[31] The Apologie de Raimond Sebond, the longest chapter of
the Essays, bears the sign of intellectual despair that Montaigne manages to shake
off elsewhere. But another interpretation of scepticism formulates it as a strategy
used to comfort fideism: because reason is unable to demonstrate religious
dogmas, we must rely on spiritual revelation and faith. The paradigm of fideism, a
word which Montaigne does not use, has been delivered by Richard Popkin
in History of Scepticism[32]. Montaigne appears here as a founding father of the
Counter Reformation, being the leader of the Nouveaux Pyrrhoniens, for whom
scepticism is used as a means to an end, that is, to neutralize the grip that philosophy
once had on religion.
Commentators now agree upon the fact that Montaigne largely transformed the type
of scepticism he borrowed from Sextus. The two sides of the scale are never
perfectly balanced, since reason always tips the scale in favor of the present at hand.
This imbalance undermines the key mechanism of isosthenia, the equality of
strength of two opposing arguments. Since the suspension of judgment cannot occur
casually, as Sextus Empiricus would like it to, judgment must abstain from giving
its assent. In fact, the sources of Montaigne's scepticism are much wider: his child
readings of Ovid's Metamorphosis, which gave him a deep awareness of change,
the in utramque partem academic debate which he practised at the Collge de
Guyenne (a pro and contra discussion inherited from Aristotle and Cicero), and the
humanist philosophy of action, dealing with the uncertainty of human affairs, shaped
his mind early on. Through them, he learned repeatedly that rational appearances are
deceptive. In most of the chapters of the Essays, Montaigne now and then reverses
his judgment: these sudden shifts of perspective are designed to escape adherence,
and to tackle the matter from another point of view.[33] The Essays mirror a discreet
conduct of judgment, in keeping with the formula iudicio alternante, which we still
find engraved today on the beams of the Prigord castle's library. The aim is not to
ruin arguments by opposing them, as it is the case in the Pyrrhonian antilogy, but
rather to counterbalance a single opinion by taking into account other opinions. In
order to work, each scale of judgment has to be laden. If we take morals, for
example, Montaigne refers to varied moral authorities, one of them being custom
and the other reason. Against every form of dogmatism, Montaigne returns moral
life to its original diversity and inherent uneasiness. Through philosophy, he seeks
full accordance with the diversity of life: As for me, I love life and cultivate it as
God has been pleased to grant it to us.[34]
We find two readings of Montaigne as a Sceptic. The first one concentrates on the
polemical, negative arguments drawn from Sextus Empiricus, at the end of the
Apology. This hard-line scepticism draws the picture of man as humiliated.[35] Its
aim is essentially to fight the pretensions of reason and to annihilate human
knowledge. Truth, being and justice are equally dismissed as unattainable.
Doubt foreshadows here Descartes' Meditations, on the problem of the reality of the
outside world. Dismissing the objective value of one's representations, Montaigne
would have created the long-lasting problem of solipsism. We notice, nevertheless,
that he does not question the reality of things except occasionally at the very end
of the 'Apology' but the value of opinions and men. The second reading of his
scepticism puts forth that Cicero's probabilism is of far greater significance in
shaping the sceptical content of the Essays. After the 1570's, Montaigne no longer
read Sextus; additions show, however, that he took up a more and more extensive
reading of Cicero's philosophical writings. We assume that, in his early search for
polemical arguments against rationalism during the 1570's, Montaigne borrowed
much from Sextus, but as he got tired of the sceptical machinery, and understood
scepticism rather as an ethics of judgment, he went back to Cicero.[36] The paramount
importance of the Academica for XVIthcentury thought has been underlined by
Charles B. Schmitt[37]. In the free enquiry, which Cicero engaged throughout the
varied doctrines, the humanists found an ideal mirror of their own relationship with
the Classics. The Academy, of which I am a follower, gives me the opportunity to
hold an opinion as if it were ours, as soon as it shows itself to be highly probable[38],
wrote Cicero in the De Officiis. Reading Seneca, Montaigne will think as if he were
a member of the Stoa; then changing for Lucretius, he will think as if he had become
an Epicurean, and so on. Doctrines or opinions, beside historical stuff and personal
experiences, make up the nourishment of judgment. Montaigne assimilates opinions,
according to what appears to him as true, without taking it to be absolutely true. He
insists on the dialogical nature of thought, referring to Socrates' way of keeping the
discussion going: The leader of Plato's dialogues, Socrates, is always asking
questions and stirring up discussion, never concluding, never satisfying
().[39] Judgment has to determine the most convincing position, or at least to
determine the strengths and weaknesses of each position. The simple dismissal of
truth would be too dogmatic a position; but if absolute truth is lacking, we still have
the possibility to balance opinions. We have resources enough, to evaluate the
various authorities that we have to deal with in ordinary life.
The original failure of commentators was perhaps in labelling Montaigne's thought
as sceptic without reflecting on the proper meaning of the essay. Montaigne's
exercise of judgment is an exercise of natural judgment, which means that
judgment does not need any principle or any rule as a presupposition. In this way,
many aspects of Montaigne's thinking can be considered as sceptical, although they
were not used for the sake of scepticism. For example, when Montaigne sets down
the exercise of doubt as a good start in education, he understands doubt as part of the
process of the formation of judgment. This process should lead to wisdom,
characterized as always joyful.[40] Montaigne's scepticism is not a desperate one. On
the contrary, it offers the reader a sort of jubilation which relies on the modest but
effective pleasure in dismissing knowledge, thus making room for the exercise of
one's natural faculties.

5. Montaigne and Relativism

Renaissance thinkers strongly felt the necessity to revise their discourse on man. But
no one accentuated this necessity more than Montaigne: what he was looking for,
when reading historians or travellers such as Lopez de Gomara's History of Indies,
was the utmost variety of beliefs and customs that would enrich his image of man.
Neither the Hellenistic Sage, nor the Christian Saint, nor the Renaissance Scholar,
are unquestioned models in the Essays. Instead, Montaigne is considering real men,
who are the product of customs. Here they live on human flesh; there it is an act of
piety to kill one's father at a certain age ().[41] The importance of custom plays a
polemical part: alongside with scepticism, the strength of imagination (chapter I,21)
or Fortune (chapters I,1, I,24, etc.), it contributes to the devaluation of reason and
will. It is bound to destroy our spontaneous confidence that we do know the truth,
and that we live according to justice. During the XVIth century, the jurists of the
French school of law showed that the law is tied up with historical
determinations.[42] In chapter I,23, On custom, Montaigne seems to extrapolate on
this idea : our opinions and conducts being everywhere the product of custom,
references to universal reason, truth, or justice are to be dismissed as illusions.
Pierre Villey was the first to use the terms relativity and relativism, which
proved to be useful tools when commenting on the fact that Montaigne
acknowledges that no universal reason presides over the birth of our beliefs.[43] The
notion of absolute truth, applied to human matters, vitiates the understanding and
wreaks havoc in society. Upon further reflexion, contingent customs impact
everything: in short, to my way of thinking, there is nothing that custom will not or
cannot do.[44] Montaigne calls it Circe's drink.[45] Custom is a sort of witch, whose
spell, among other effects, casts moral illusion. The laws of conscience, which we
say are born from nature, are born of custom. Each man, holding in inward
veneration the opinions and the behavior approved and accepted around him ()[46],
obeys custom in all his actions and thoughts. The power of custom, indeed, not only
guides man in his behavior, but also persuades him of its legitimacy. What is crime
for one person will appear normal to another. In the XVIIth century, Blaise Pascal
will use this argument when challenging the pretension of philosophers of knowing
truth. One century later, David Hume will lay stress on the fact that the power of
custom is all the stronger, specifically because we are not aware of it. What are we
supposed to do, then, if our reason is so flexible that it changes with two degrees of
elevation towards the pole, as Pascal puts it ?[47] For the Jansenist thinker, only one
alternative exists, faith in Jesus Christ. However, it is more complicated in the case
of Montaigne. Getting to know all sorts of customs, through his readings or travels,
he makes an exemplary effort to open his mind. We are all huddled and
concentrated in ourselves, and our vision is reduced to the length of our
nose.[48]Custom's grip is so strong that it is dubious as to whether we are in a
position to become aware of it and shake off its power.
Montaigne was hailed by Claude Lvi-Strauss as the progenitor of the human
sciences, and the pioneer of cultural relativism.[49] However, Montaigne has not been
willing to indulge entirely in relativism. Judgment is at first sight unable to stop the
relativistic discourse, but it is not left without remedy when facing the power of
custom. Exercise of thought is the first counterweight we can make use of, for
example when criticizing an existing law. Customs are not almighty, since their
authority can be reflected upon, evaluated or challenged by individual judgment.
The comparative method can also be applied to the freeing of judgment: although
lacking a universal standard, we can nevertheless stand back from particular
customs, by the mere fact of comparing them. Montaigne thus compares heating or
circulating means between people. In a more tragical way, he denounces the
fanaticism and the cruelty displayed by Christians against one another, during the
civil wars in France, through a comparison with cannibalism: I think there is more
barbarity in eating a man alive than in eating him dead, and in tearing by tortures
and the rack a body still full of feeling ().[50] The meaning of the word barbarity
is not merely relative to a culture or a point of view, since there are degrees of
barbarity. Passing a judgment on cannibals, Montaigne also says: So we may well
call these people barbarians, in respect to the rules of reason, but not in respect to
ourselves, who surpass them in every kind of barbarity ().[51] Judgment is still
endowed with the possibility of postulating universal standards, such as reason or
nature, which help when evaluating actions and behaviors. Although Montaigne
maintains in the Apologie that true reason and true justice are only known by God,
he asserts in other chapters that these standards are somehow accessible to man,
since they allow judgment to consider customs as particular and contingent
rules.[52] In order to criticize the changeable and the relative, we must suppose that
our judgment is still able to bring things back to truth and reason.[53] Man is
everywhere enslaved by custom, but this does not mean that we should accept the
numbing of our mind. Montaigne elaborates a pedagogy, which rests on the practice
of judgment itself. The task of the pupil is not to repeat what the master said, but, on
a given subject of problem, to confront his judgment with the master's one.
Moreover, relativistic readings of the Essays are forced to ignore certain passages
that carry a more rationalistic tone. The violent detriment inflicted by custom
(I,23) is certainly not a praise of custom, but an invitation to escape it. In the same
way that Circe's potion has changed men into pigs, custom turns their intelligence
into stupidity. In the toughest cases, Montaigne's critical use of judgment aims at
giving a good whiplash to the ordinary stupidity of judgment.[54] In many other
places, Montaigne boasts of himself being able to resist vulgar opinion.
Independence of thinking, alongside with clear-mindedness and good faith, are the
first virtues a young gentleman should acquire.

6. Montaigne's Legacy on Charron and

Descartes
Pierre Charron was Montaigne's friend and official heir. In De la sagesse (1601 and
1604), he re-organized many of his master's ideas, setting aside the most disturbing
ones. His work is now usually dismissed as a dogmatic misrepresentation of
Montaigne's thought. Nevertheless, his book was given priority over
the Essays themselves during the whole XVIIth century, especially after
Malebranche's critics conspired to have the Essays included in the Roman Index of
1677. Montaigne's historical influence must be reckoned through the lens of this
mediation. Moreover, Charron's reading is not simply faulty. According to him,
wisdom relies on the readiness of judgment to revise itself towards a more favorable
outcome:[55] this idea is one of the most remarkable readings of the Essays in the
early history of their reception.
The influence Montaigne had on Descartes has been commented upon by many
critics, at least from the XIXth century on, within the context of the birth of modern
science. As a sceptic, calling into question the natural link between mind and things,
Montaigne would have won his position in the modern philosophical landscape. The
scepticism in the Apologie is, no doubt, a main source of solipsism, but
Descartes cannot be called a disciple of Montaigne in the sense that he would have
inherited a doctrine. Above all, he owes the Prigourdin gentleman a way of
educating himself. Far from substituting Montaigne for his Jesuit schoolteachers,
Descartes decided to teach himself from scratch, following the path indicated by
Montaigne to achieve independence and firmness of judgment. The mindset that
Descartes inherited from the Essays appears as something particularly obvious, in
the two first parts of the Discours de la mthode. As the young Descartes left the
Collge de La Flche, he decided to travel, and to test his own value in action. I
employed the rest of my youth to travel, to see courts and armies, to meet people of
varied humors and conditions, to collect varied experiences, to try myself in the
meetings that fortune was offering me ().[56]Education, taken out of a school
context, is presented as an essay of the self through experience. The world, as
pedagogue, has been substituted for books and teachers. This new education allows
Descartes to get rid of the prejudice of overrating his own customs, a widespread
phenomenon that we now call ethnocentrism. Montaigne's legacy becomes
particularly conspicuous when Descartes draws the lesson from his travels, "having
acknowledged that those who have very contrary feelings to ours are not barbarians
or savages, but that many of them make use of reason as much or more so than we
do". And also : It is good to know something of different people, in order to judge
our own with more sanity, and not to think that everything that is against our
customs and habits is ridiculous and against reason, as usually do those who have
never seen anything.[57] Like Montaigne, Descartes begins by philosophizing on life
with no other device than the a discipline of judgment: I was learning not to believe
anything too firmly, of which I had been persuaded through example and
custom.[58] He departs nevertheless from Montaigne when he will equate with error
opinions that are grounded on custom.[59] The latter would not have dared to speak of
error: varied opinions, having more or less authority, are to be weighed upon the
scale of judgment. It is thus not correct to interpret Montaigne's philosophy as a
criticism of prejudice from a Cartesian stance.

7. Conclusion
Montaigne cultivates his liberty by not adhering exclusively to any one idea, while
at the same time exploring them all. In exercising his judgment on various topics, he
trains himself to go off on fresh tracks, starting from something he read or
experienced. For Montaigne this also means calling into question the convictions of
his time, reflecting upon his beliefs and education, and cultivating his own personal
thoughts. His language can be said to obey only one rule, that is, to be an effect of
judgment and sincerity,[60] which is the very one that he demands from the pupil.
His language bears an unmistakable tone but contradicts itself sometimes from one
place to another, perhaps for the very reason that it follows so closely the
movements of thought.
 If being a philosopher means being insensitive to human frailties and to the evils or
to the pleasures which befall us, then Montaigne is not a philosopher. If it means
using a jargon, and being able to enter the world of scholars, then Montaigne is
not one either. Yet, if being a philosopher is being able to judge properly in any
circumstances of life, then the Essays are the exemplary testimony of an author who
wanted to be a philosopher for good. Montaigne is putting his judgment to trial on
whatever subject, in order not only to get to know its value, but also to form and
strengthen it.
He manages thus to offer us a philosophy in accordance with life. As Nietzsche puts
it, that such a man has written, joy on earth has truly increasedIf my task were to
make this earth a home, I would attach myself to him. Or, as Stefan Zweig said, in
a context which was closer to the historical reality experienced by Montaigne
himself : Montaigne helps us answer this one question: How to stay free? How to
preserve our inborn clear-mindedness in front of all the threats and dangers of
fanaticism, how to preserve the humanity of our hearts among the upsurge of
bestiality?

Bibliography
Editions
Essais, F. Strowski (ed.), Paris: Hachette, 1912, Phototypic reproduction of the
Exemplaire de Bordeaux, showing Montaigne's handwritten additions of 1588
1592.
Essais, Pierre Villey (ed.), 3 volumes, Alcan, 19221923, revised by V.-L. Saulnier,
1965. Gives the 3 strata indications, probable dates of composition of the chapters,
and many sources.
Michel de Montaigne. Les Essais, J. Balsamo, C. Magnien-Simonin & M. Magnien
(eds.) (with Notes de lecture and Sentences peintes edited by Alain Legros),
Paris, Pliade, Gallimard, 2007. The Essays are based on the 1595 published
version.
La Thologie naturelle de Raymond Sebond, traduicte nouvellement en Franois par
Messire Michel, Seigneur de Montaigne, Chevalier de l'ordre du Roy et
Gentilhomme ordinaire de sa chambre. Ed. by Dr Armaingaud, Paris: Conard, 1935.
Le Journal de Voyage en Italie de Michel de Montaigne. Ed. by Franois Rigolot,
Paris: PUF, 1992.
Lettres. Ed. by Arthur Armaingaud, Paris, Conard, 1939 (vol. XI, in uvres
compltes, pp. 159266).

Translations in English
The Essayes, tr. by John Florio. London: V. Sims, 1603.
 The Essays, tr. by Charles Cotton. 3 vol., London: T. Basset, M. Gilliflower and W.
Hensman, 16851686.
The Essays, tr. by E.J. Trechmann. 2 vol., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1927.
Michel de Montaigne. The Complete Works. Essays, Travel Journal, Letters, tr. by
Donald M. Frame, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958, renewed 1971 &
1976.
The Complete Essays, tr. by M.A. Screech, London/New York: Penguin, 1993.
The Journal of Montaigne's Travels, tr. by W.G. Watters, 3 vol., London: John
Murray, 1903.
The Diary of Montaigne's Journey to Italy in 1580 and 1581, tr. by E.J. Trechmann.
London: Hogarth Press, 1929.

Secondary Sources
Auerbach, Erich, 1946, l'humaine condition (on Montaigne) in Mimesis: The
Representation of Reality in Western Literature, trans. Willard Trask. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2003 (originally pub. Bern: Francke).
Burke, Peter, 1981, Montaigne, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Compayr, Gabriel, 1908, Montaigne and the Education of the Judgment, trans. J. E.
Mansion, New York: Burt Franklin, 1971.
Conche, Marcel, 1996, Montaigne et la philosophie, Paris: PUF.
Desan, Philippe (dir.), 2007, Dictionnaire de Montaigne, Paris: Champion.
Frame, Donald M., 1984, Montaigne: A Biography, New York: Harcourt/ London:
Hamish Hamilton, 1965/ San Francisco: North Point Press.
Friedrich, Hugo, 1991, Montaigne, Bern: Francke, 1949; Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Fontana, Biancamaria, 2008, Montaignes Politics: Authority and Governance in the
Essays, Geneva: Princeton University Press.
Hoffmann, Georges, 1998, Montaigne's Career, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Horkheimer, Max, 1938, Montaigne und die Funktion der Skepsis, Frankfurt:
Fischer, reprinted 1971.
Imbach, Ruedi, 1983, Et toutefois nostre outrecuidance veut faire passer la divinit
par nostre estamine, l'essai II,12 et la gense de la pense moderne. Construction
d'une thse explicative in Paradigmes de thologie philosophique, O. Hffe et R.
Imbach (eds.), Fribourg.
Ulrich Langer, 2005, The Cambridge Companion to Montaigne, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Leake, R.E., 1981, Concordance des Essais de Montaigne, 2 vol., Genve: Droz.
 Popkin, Richard, 1960, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes,
Assen: Van Gorcum.
Popkin, Richard, 1979, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza,
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Popkin, Richard, 2003, The History of Scepticism from Savonarola to Bayle,
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schmitt, Charles B., 1972, Cicero scepticus: A Study of the Influence of the
Academica in the Renaissance, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Screech, Michael, 1983, Montaigne & Melancholy The Wisdom of the Essays,
London: Duckworth.
Screech, Michael, 1998, Montaigne's Annotated Copy of Lucretius, A transcription
and study of the manuscript, notes and pen-marks, Geneva: Droz.
Starobinski, Jean, 2009, Montaigne in Motion, University of Chicago Press.
Supple, James, 1984, Arms versus Letters, The Military and Literary Ideals in the
Essays, Cambridge: Clarendon Press.
Tournon, Andr, 1983, La glose et l'essai, Paris: H. Champion, reprinted 2001.
Zweig, Stefan, 1960, Montaigne [written 19351941] Frankfurt: Fischer.

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Texts
The complete, searchable text of the Villey-Saulnier edition, from the
ARFTL project at the University of Chicago (French)
Montaigne Studies: An Interdisciplinary Forum, Philippe Desan, ed.,
(University of Chicago).
Portrait Gallery, in Montaigne Studies: An Interdisciplinary Forum

Translations
Montaigne's Essays John Florio's translation (first published 1603, Ben R.
Schneider (ed.), Lawrence University, Wisconsin, from The World's
Classics, 1904, 1910, 1924), published at Renascence Editions, U. Oregon
Related Entries
civic humanism | Descartes, Ren | humanism: in the Renaissance | liberty: positive
and negative |relativism | Sextus Empiricus | skepticism | Stoicism

Como Montaigne vai

mudar sua vida
Ele virou o escritor mais reverenciado pela autoajuda. Mas oferece mais que
um manual de instrues

LUS ANTNIO GIRON

29/08/2013 07h30 - Atualizado em 29/08/2013 11h08

Kindle

inShare

Todo mundo corre loucamente atrs de modelos de vida, comportamento, trabalho e

sucesso. Eis a razo do sucesso duradouro de autoajuda, gnero literrio que tem por
mtodo converter todos os objetos que trata em manual de instrues. Foi assim que Jesus
Cristo se tornou o maior CEO da Histria, o transviado Woody Allen treina os gerentes
da firma a subir na hierarquia e at vira-latas mais sarnentos so promovidos a filsofos
transcendentais. A autoajuda distorce qualquer coisa e serve sobretudo para ajudar os
autores de autoajuda a vender livros. Isso mais que bvio. Para falar novamente no
assunto (quantas vezes j no comparei autoajuda a autoengano?), tomo ttulo desta crnica
emprestado de um livro de autoajuda exemplar, publicado originalmente em 1997 pelo
pensador britnico Alain de Botton:Como Proust pode mudar sua vida (Intrnseca, 256
pginas, R$ 19,90). Substituo Proust por outro autor francs: Michel Eyquem de
Montaigne. Este, sim, vai mudar a sua vida.
O romancista Marcel Proust, diga-se de passagem, no parece reunir credenciais para mudar
a vida de ningum. No s no foi capaz de alterar a sua prpria vida, como passava o dia
no seu quarto, escrevendo, abandonado s doenas. Morreu aos 51 anos porque se recusou a
tratar uma friagem e uma subsequente pneumonia. Para Botton, porm, trata-se de adequar
Proust a seus propsitos curativos. Assim, Botton afirma que o ciclo de sete romances Em
busca do tempo perdido (1913-1924) est longe de ser um livro de memrias, trata-se de
uma histria prtica e universalmente aplicvel como parar de desperdiar a prpria vida e
comear a apreci-la. A est uma maneira redutora de tentar explicar um dos monumentos
da literatura. Se o autor ou o co mais desajustado pode colaborar na construo da
reputao da autoajuda, que dir um autor repleto de bom-senso como Montaigne.
Qualquer adaptao das ideias de Montaigne aos pressupostos da autoajuda se torna uma
tarefa fcil. O resultado que ele se tornou uma espcie de arroz-de-festa dos best-sellers da
autoajuda. Um exemplo o livro Como viver ou uma biografia de Montaigne em uma
pergunta e vinte tentativas de resposta (Objetiva, 512 pginas, R$ 39,90), da inglesa Sarah
Bakewell, lanado no Brasil em 2012. Consiste em uma reflexo menos sobre as ideias de
Montaigne que um guia para viver melhor inspirado em Montaigne. Ele combina com
vinhos, gatos e gastronomia. Foram lanados vrios livros sobre tais assuntos. Um dos
livros de maior sucesso na Frana nas ltimas semanas foi Um t avec Montaigne (Um
vero com Montaigne), do professor Antoine Compagnon, que rene em um pequeno
volume uma srie de 40 programas radiofnicos curtos que ele apresentou sobre Montaigne
na rdio France Internacional em 2012. So plulas de sabedoria que podem ser ingeridas
tanto como autoajuda quanto como parfrases em torno dos textos de Montaigne. O livro de
Compagnon vendido nos supermercados, tamanho o interesse pelas ideias de Montaigne.
Melhor que buscar conselhos com o tot da casa.
>> Mais colunas de Lus Antnio Giron
Montaigne torna-se periodicamente uma fonte de consulta nos mais diversos assuntos,
desde formas de negociar com poderosos ao trato com indgenas, da conversa e da melhor
forma de levar a vida, do cio a filosofar para aprender a morrer. Atualmente, ele parece
mais um homem do sculo XXI que seus contemporneos William Shakespeare, Miguel de
Cervantes e Torquato Tasso trio que, com ele, consolidou o humanismo renascentista
respectivamente no teatro, no romance e na poesia. Shakespeare soa gtico e pessimista em
demasia aos olhos do cidado pragmtico de hoje em dia. Cervantes, um tanto prolixo e
dado a pilhrias. E Tasso, portador de dificuldades mentais e textos protobarrocos.
Montaigne materializa o senso prtico: suas ideias so claras e desprovidas de preconceitos
e seu texto as acompanha, sem nenhuma pretenso de fazer estilo ou, como diz, sem pose
nem artifcio. Como um homem mdio atual, ele encarava a fico com desconfiana.
Dedicou-se no-fico e, dentro dela, a si prprio.
Sua vida fornece todas as tintas. Nascido no Sul da Frana em 1533 e morto em 1592, aos
59 anos, durante uma missa rezada em seu leito, Montaigne foi um cidado exemplar,
nobre, proprietrio de terras e pai de famlia. Aos 38 anos, depois de ter sido membro do
conselho real, magistrado e prefeito nas cidades de Prigueux e Bordeaux e ter viajado pela
Itlia, Alemanha e Sua, ele se retirou da vida pblica para se dedicar a ler e a refletir sobre
a vida e a morte. Exilou-se parcialmente na torre de sua propriedade, a hoje Torre de
Montaigne, onde mantinha uma mesa, uma cama e cerca de mil livros. No deixava de
supervisionar os afazeres dos empregados de sua propriedade l de cima, e at saa de vez
em quando para tomar parte da vida de sua comunidade. Viver na solido para ele era uma
atitude serena e no totalmente triste. Sua solido era um ato de introspeco melhor vivido
longe da companhia de amigos e mulheres, dois de seus principais passatempos, alm dos
livros - que preferia aos outros dois.
Lia muito, principalmente autores antigos gregos e latinos. Mandou inscrever 57 citaes
nas paredes e traves de sua biblioteca, que podem ser lidas hoje pelos turistas. Algumas
chamam ateno porque de alguma forma explicam quem as inscreveu: Quem sabe se
viver o que chamamos de morrer, e morrer viver?, de Eurpides. Podemos dizer
muitas palavras em um sentido e em outro, da Ilada de Homero. Guardar a medida,
observar o limite e seguir a natureza, da Farslia de Lucano. A vida mais doce que a de
no pensar em nada, da tragdia Ajax, de Sfocles.

Munidos apenas desses quatro aforismos, podemos compreender a cabea do nobre senhor:
sua maior preocupao era a morte; no cotidiano, queria manter a razo e a sobriedade, e
buscar entender os outros; em literatura, ser claro e evitar os contorcionismos verbais; viver
sem pensar melhor, mas para ele isso se revelou impossvel. Seu retiro o fez pensar e se
angustiar demais, sem nunca perder a bssola. Foi assim que criou um gnero literrio que
nunca esteve tanto em voga como hoje o ensaio e um tipo de figura que se tornaria
proeminente no sculo XX e hoje vive o ocaso: a do intelectual pblico, o guru a ser
seguido pelas multides de leitores.

Montaigne baseou-se em sua personalidade e sua experincia para abordar qualquer assunto
que lhe chamasse a ateno e, assim, fundar o ensaio. Essais foi como Montaigne intitulou a
srie de textos digressivos que escreveu ao longo de 20 anos, entre 1571 e 1591, e os fez
publicar a partir de 1580, em quatro edies sucessivas. Adverte o leitor no incio do
volume, em nota escrita na primeira edio: Quero que me vejam aqui em meu modo
simples, natural e corrente, sem pose nem artifcio: pois a mim que retrato. Meus defeitos,
minhas imperfeies e minha forma natural de ser ho de se ler ao vivo, tanto quanto a
decncia pblica me permitiu. Pois se eu estivesse entre essas naes que se diz ainda
viverem sob a doce liberdade das leis primitivas da natureza, asseguro-te que teria com
muito gosto me pintado por inteiro e totalmente nu. Ele se refere aqui aos ndios brasileiros
que aportaram em Rouen em 1562, trazidos da baa de Guanabara. O fato o inspirou no
ensaio Sobre os canibais. No texto, critica a decadncia e a corrupo do homem europeu
diante da nobreza asctica e a espontaneidade dos indgenas, exemplos de uma outra
civilizao possvel.

So esses os traos que moldam as ideias de Montaigne tolerncia e s atitudes

politicamente corretas atuais. No foi um intelectual, apesar de ser precursor dos literatos.
Foi um especialista em generalidades, um leigo que escrevia para leigos, como observou o
fillogo alemo Erich Auerbach no ensaio O escritor Montaigne. Como tal, cultivou a
liberdade e a distncia dos seres humanos. Talvez tenha sido egosta, mas a independncia
que mostra em seus textos o distingue da sanha assertiva e exploratria da autoajuda.
Felizmente, apesar da moda, Montaigne se encarrega ele prprio de se esgueirar daqueles
que tentam aprision-lo aos lugares comuns dos manuais. queles que pretendem adot-lo
como modelo, ele parece responder com o braso que fez cunhar em medalhas. Trata-se de
uma balana com dois pratos equilibrados. Abaixo dela, a divisa: Abstenho-me. Cada um
que cuide de mudar a sua vida.
Lus Antnio Giron escreve s quintas-feiras

Revista poca fonte: http://epoca.globo.com/colunas-e-blogs/luis-antonio-

giron/noticia/2013/08/como-bmontaigneb-vai-mudar-sua-vida.html

Montaigne na histria da filosofia

Montaigne o homem que no deixa aprisionar-se pela rede dos adjetivos, nem
consente a separao espetacular do autor e do livro. Je n'ay pas plus faict mon livre,
que mon livre m'a faict: livre consubstantiel son auteur, d'une occupation propre,
membre de ma vie, non d'une occupation et fin tierce et estrangire, comme touts
aultres livres, confessa, e de to ntima camaradagem resulta no sabermos ao certo
se foi Montaigne quem escreveu o livro, se foi o livro quem revelou a Montaigne a
plena conscincia de autor.

Pensamento que se procura em si prprio e atravs da variedade dos homens se

reconhece uno e diferente, se vai desdobrando sobre si mesmo, ondulante e diverso
como diversas so as perspetivas e os ngulos de viso, pari passu que o livro avana,
ele via dilatar-se o territrio da sua conscincia psicolgica e da sua conscincia moral.

Autor e livro marcharam a par, e se certo que foi Montaigne quem lhe redigiu as
pginas, foram as pginas escritas e sempre repensadas que lhe descobriram o homem
que ele era, e, na sua individualidade concreta, la forme entire de l'humaine
condition. Foi esta descoberta do humano atravs de si prprio, ou, por outras
palavras, da integrao da conscincia psicolgica na conscincia moral, que, a meu ver,
impediu Montaigne de se submergir na anedota e no pitoresco do dirio ntimo.

Do dirio ntimo dizia Amiel, autoridade suprema na matria, que era uma maneira de
ocupar a ociosidade e um passatempo simulador do trabalho. Montaigne, porm, ao
escrever, no teve a sensao de desperdiar o tempo em solilquios. Como o tmido
pensador de Genebra, entregou-se expanso de ntimas e s vezes impertinentes
confidncias, mas se se isolara e escrevia porque tinha que dizer e se convencera de
que, mediante as suas reflexes objetivas, conquistaria uma viso da existncia, cujo
conhecimento talvez interessasse ao gnero humano. E assim desembocamos
naturalmente na pergunta que nos vai ocupar durante breves minutos: o que Montaigne
disse e se esforou por conhecer e decidir merece o raro predicado de filsofo?

Montaigne conheceu no sculo XVII a hostilidade de Port-Royal, para quem ele foi o
monstro da sabedoria paganizada, que, se no ignora Deus, pelo menos desconhece
Cristo. No chegou Pascal, no paralelo famoso de Epicteto e de Montaigne, ao exagero
de repartir a variedade infinita dos homens du monde infidle em dois bandos, dos
quais um e outro seriam os detestveis capites?

Depois, passada a crise problemtica do ideal do honnte homme, isto , do homem

de sociedade, acerca do qual vamos ouvir em breve o nosso sbio colega Prof. Plattard,
Montaigne foi o assunto inesgotvel da crtica literria e da erudio, mas s no nosso
sculo foi descoberto pelos historiadores da filosofia. Montaigne filsofo , portanto,
um tema contemporneo, mas este tema um descobrimento ou uma inveno?

O homem ingnuo no compreende que sobre um escritor que nasceu h quatrocentos

anos e cuja existncia recordada por monumentos, edies sbias e populares, e pelos
estudos oficiais, no tenha, como a sua fama, conquistado a unanimidade dos juzos. E
o homem ingnuo, isto , aquele homem que s tolera as respostas precisas e macias,
tem razo.

Simplesmente Montaigne no escreveu para homens ingnuos, nem, sobretudo, os

homens ingnuos devem ler Montaigne. um vinho capitoso para cabeas fracas e ser-
lhes-ia insuportvel este ser escoante e esquivo que depois de dizer sim dir com
insolncia no, para nem sempre descansar sobre o fofo travesseiro do cmodo
talvez. Pensaro que ele fez da incoerncia a intriga urdidora do seu livro, e no pensam
mal, pois precisamente a incoerncia humana, a instabilidade dos costumes e das
opinies, o sal e o po que Montaigne lhes oferece.

Esta incoerncia depara-se-nos logo que procuramos saber se Montaigne considerou o

seu labor como um ofcio de filsofo. Diz-nos algures que no, mas noutra ocasio no
hesita em se apresentar como filsofo impremeditado e fortuito, e tal contraste
instila a suspeita de que o senhor de Montaigne no filosofou: tropeou com a filosofia
e acolheu-a com donaire de gentil-homem, sem se dar cauta diligncia de a desnudar
e vestir de novo.

Que filosofia encontrou este sibarita do esprito, que foi ao mesmo tempo um excelente
burocrata das letras?

quase impossvel extrair da matria constil dos Ensaios uma generalizao global.
Essais se intitula o seu livro, e logo no ttulo se insinua a hesitao de Montaigne, pois
em seu pensar ensaio no era um gnero literrio, que alis criou e os ingleses
definitivamente afeioaram, nem uma composio sistemtica e intelectualmente
coerente. Significava simplesmente, esforo, tentativa, experincia.

O ttulo, em seu prstino sentido, , como vedes, o programa de um sagitrio que prefere
dardejar com argcia de setas bem fabricadas. E com efeito, a construo dos ensaios
no desmente o programa. Factos graves de brao dado com anedotas; juzos meditados
em contubrnio com ditos hilariantes e facetos; glosas marginais em livros clssicos e
contemporneos, entre os quais devemos recordar a Histria do Descobrimento da
ndia, de Ferno Lopes de Castanheda, o glorioso bedel da nossa Universidade, de
mistura com sondagens introspetivas; o narcisismo esttico a par da conceo estoica
da Natureza eis os ingredientes da arte singular deste prosador, que soube converter
a ideia e sua expresso num bloco inimitvel e nico.

Na floresta imensa de factos, anedotas, sentenas e juzos, de glosas e observaes,

ouve-se, porm, um nico canto: a voz de Montaigne, bem timbrada e consciente de
si mesma. Para a modular, no se poupou a leituras, nem a viagens, nem a conversaes,
e para que o leitor se no maravilhasse de ele reportar tudo a si e s de si falar, foi-lhe
dizendo que les aucteurs se communiquent au peuple par quelque marque spciale et
estrangire; moy, le premier, par mon estre universel; comme Michel de Montaigne,
non comme grammairien, ou pote ou jurisconsulte.

Eis-nos, pois, perante o ser universal do ensasta, e a pergunta fcil que h pouco saltou
diante de ns com lpida rapidez volve-se agora nesta outra mais precisa: o ser universal
de Montaigne tem a dedada da criao filosfica?

Pela matria e pelo mtodo de trabalho Montaigne um glosador. um pensador que

comenta factos, que escreve margem de livros velhos e novos, e por consequncia
o antpoda do filsofo. No entanto, as observaes, os comentrios e as glosas
convergem para um nico centro, e este centro a sua conscincia. De sorte que o
problema consiste em saber se o centro aglutinante, para onde tudo converge, o ser
universal de Montaigne, se insere numa concepo original do Mundo e da vida. Graas
s eruditssimas e penetrantes investigaes dos professores Strowsky e Villey e no
posso pronunciar este nome sem me inclinar respeitosamente perante a memria do
sbio, glria da Frana e da cincia universal das letras , sabemos que marcha
cronolgica e literria dos Ensaios, de 1572 a 1592, e ao enriquecimento progressivo das
respectiva fontes, corresponde uma evoluo espiritual na qual as ideias capitais e
normativas no constituem um bloco anterior redao dos Ensaios. Sabemos que, em
1572, um estoico ecltico, cujo acento antigo quebrado pelo Cristianismo e pela
meditao de Plutarco; sabemos que o ceticismo lhe inundou o esprito, em 1576,
quando escreve a Apologia de Raimundo Sebunde, aps a leitura de Sexto Emprico e da
ingesto dos argumentos da Nova Academia; sabemos, finalmente, que nos derradeiros
anos da vida transitou do estoicismo mitigado e do ceticismo universal para o
epicurismo ctico, sobre o qual edificou uma arte de bem-viver no seio da ociosidade
tranquila.

Como vedes, o fundo ideolgico, assim como as ideias condutoras de Montaigne, no

so criao original sua. Dir-se-ia que so telas, nas quais ele debuxa e pinta, mas jamais
pode esquecer-se que quem debuxa e pinta Montaigne e s Montaigne.

Pela dissecao crtica ns descobrimos que sob a estrutura dos seus raciocnios quase
voluptuosos de ctico est a argumentao de Sexto Emprico, mas ao repeti-la
Montaigne solta a voz da modernidade, quando transfere a dvida do puro plano da
razo para o plano da crena e dos valores: Nous appelons valeur en les choses, diz ele,
non ce qu'elles apportent, mais ce que nous y apportons.

A meio caminho da antiguidade e da modernidade, o subjetivismo de Montaigne foi o

eplogo lgico da Renascena.

A Renascena conhecera toda a sorte de dogmatismos e de entusiasmos, mas era acaso

possvel a vida coerente no seio de tanta contradio?

Comeando por duvidar de tudo, Montaigne chegou descoberta da autonomia do

homem, que no carece de dogmatismos teolgicos ou metafsicos, e no h porventura
nesta descoberta a ressurreio consciente do gnthi sauton de Scrates? Il n'y a que
vous, escreve, qui sache si vous tes lche et cruel, ou loyal et dvotieux; les aultres ne
vous voyent point, vous devinent par conjectures incertaines; ils voyent non tant vostre
nature que votre art; par ainsi, ne vous tenez pas leur sentence, tenez vous la votre.

A Renascena vira coisas admirveis e aprendera conhecimentos insuspeitados, mas no

conhecera um mtodo que ministrasse inteligncia a possibilidade de extrair a verdade
do monto de opinies. Montaigne descobre o que ele chama o instrumento
judicatrio, e se certo que o aplica apenas para acentuar a diversidade e as
contradies lgicas, lana terra a semente que o gnio de Descartes vai fazer
frutificar.
Finalmente, da sua introspeo, aventureira e incerta, colhe o contentamento da
conscincia non comme de la conscience d'un ange ou d'un cheval, mais comme de la
conscience d'un homme. No h, porventura, nesta apreenso a matriz da
antropologia filosfica moderna e uma ideia capital no desenvolvimento da tica
contempornea?

No entanto, em meu juzo, Montaigne no foi filsofo, ou, no formoso predicado que o
Sr. Thibaudet lhe atribui, l'homme qui s'appelle Callias. Ele no viveu a vida teortica
do homem Calias, e, por caminhos diversos e mtodo diferente, creio poder dizer, como
o Sr. Van den Bruwaene, que a sua atitude reflexiva est proccupe non pas de savoir
quelles questions il faut poser, et encore moins quelles solutions il faudra donner, mais
elle s'habitue demander surtout comment il faut poser les questions.

No sendo filsofo, o historiador da filosofia, porm, no pode desconhecer este

perturbante semeador de dvidas, que legou Humanidade largo quinho da
problemtica que o sculo XVII, o sculo do Gnio, aspirou resolver, e sua Ptria, pela
unio da mente raciocinante ao corao tranquilo, uma imagem representativa do
esprito francs.

Fonte: http://www.joaquimdecarvalho.org/artigos/artigo/40-Montaigne-na-historia-da-
filosofia

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