Blaquera vs. Alcala G.R. No.

109406, September 11, 1998

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: On Feb. 21, 1992, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 268 which granted each official and employee of the government
the productivity incentive benefits in a maximum amount equivalent to 30% of the employees one month basic salary
but which amount not be less than P2, 000.00. Said AO provided that the productivity incentive benefits shall be granted
only for the year 1991. Accordingly, all heads of agencies, including government boards of government-owned or
controlledcorporations and financial institutions, are strictly prohibited from granting productivity incentive benefits for
the year 1992 and future years pending the result of a comprehensive study being undertaken by the Office of the Pres.

The petitioners, who are officials and employees of several government departments and agencies, were paid
incentive benefits for the year 1992. Then, on Jan. 19, 1993, then Pres. Ramos issued AO 29 authorizing the grant of
productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000.00 and reiterating the prohibition
under Sec. 7 of AO 268, enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits without prior approval of the President.
Sec. 4 of AO 29 directed all departments, offices and agencies which authorized payment of productivity incentive bonus
for the year 1992 in excess of P1, 000.00 to immediately cause the refund of the excess. In compliance therewith, the
heads of the departments or agencies of the government concerned caused the deduction from petitioners salaries or
allowances of the amounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments.

Issue: Whether or not AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the validexercise of presidential control over the executive
departments

Held: The Pres. is the head of the government. Governmental power and authority are exercised and implemented
through him. His power includes the control of executive departments as provided under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the
Constitution.

Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The Pres. can, by virtue of
his power of control, review, modify, alter or nullify any action or decision of his subordinate in the executive
departments, bureau or offices under him.

When the Pres. issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive benefits,enjoining heads of government agencies from
granting incentive benefitswithout approval from him and directing the refund of the excess over the prescribed
amount, the Pres. was just exercising his power of control over executive departments.

The Pres. issued subject AOs to regulate the grant of productivity incentive benefits and to
prevent discontent, dissatisfaction and demoralization among government personnel by committing limitedresources of
government for the equal payment of incentives and awards. The Pres. was only exercising his power of control by
modifying the acts of the heads of the government agencies who granted incentive benefits to their employees without
appropriate clearance from the Office of the Pres., thereby resulting in the uneven distribution of
government resources.

The Presidents duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of executive departments.

DADOLE VS COA
G.R. No. 125350 December 3 2002

FACTS:

1|Page
Acting on the DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 55, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of disallowances to RTC and
MTC Judges, in excess of the amount (maximum of P1000 and P700 in provinces and cities and municipalities,
respectively) authorized by said circular. The additional monthly allowances of the judges shall be reduced to P1000
each. They were also asked to reimbursed the amount they received in excess of P1000 from the last six months.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Local Budget Circular No. 55 void for going beyond the supervisory powers of the President.

RULING:
Yes. Although the Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units, the exercise of local autonomy remains
subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of supervision by the President. Sec 4 Art X of 1987
Constitution: "The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. x x x" The said
provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control.

The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos of the President. As such, they are
subject to the power of control of the President; he will see to it that the local governments or their officials were
performing their duties as provided by the Constitution and by statutes, at whose will and behest they can be removed
from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed. They are subject to the President's
supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. The
President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a LGU if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to
law. This is the scope of the President's supervisory powers over LGUs

DENR VS DENR EMPLOYEES

Posted by kaye lee on 12:43 PM
G.R. No. 149724 [Alter ego of the President, Qualified Political Agency Doctrine]

FACTS:
DENR Reg 12 Employees filed a petition for nullity of the memorandum order issued by the Regional Exec. Director of
DENR, directing the immediate transfer of the DENR 12 Regional Offices from Cotabato to Koronadal City. The
memorandum was issued pursuant to DENR Executive Order issued by the DENR Secretary.

Issue:
Whether or not DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR Region 12 Office.

RULING: The qualified political agency doctrine, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular
course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive. It is corollary to the control power of the President as provided for under Art. VII Sec. 17 of the 1987
Constitution: "The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed."

In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional
Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an
alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the same.

Case Digest: Judge Angeles v. Hon. Gaite, et al.

G.R. No. 176596 : March 23, 2011

JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES, Petitioner,v. HON. MANUEL E. GAITE,Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs,
Office of the President; HON. RAUL GONZALES, Secretary, and HON. JOVENCITO ZU, Chief State Prosecutor, both of the
2|Page
Department of Justice (DOJ);HON. RAMON R. GARCIA(Substituted byHon. JOSEPH LOPEZ), City Prosecutor,ACP MARLINA
N. MANUEL, andACP ADELIZA H. MAGNO-GUINGOYON, all of the Manila Prosecution Service; and SSP EMMANUEL
VELASCO, Department of Justice, Respondents.

PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:

It appears that sometime in June 1999, petitioner was charged of child abuse by her grandniece Maria Mercedes Vistan.
The preliminary investigation of the complaint was assigned to State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco (respondent
Velasco) of the Department of Justice (DOJ). Respondent Velasco then filed a case against petitioner for 21 counts of
Child Abuse under Republic Act (RA) No. 7610 but the same was ordered to be withdrawn by the DOJ Secretary upon the
filing of a petition for review by petitioner.

Petitioner then filed with the DOJ an administrative complaint for Gross Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law,
Incompetence and Manifest Bad Faith against respondent Velasco, which the DOJ subsequently dismissed. Petitioner
then filed a Petition for Review with the Office of the President (OP) assailing the DOJs Resolutions dismissing the
administrative complaint she filed against respondent Velasco. The OP asked respondent Velasco to file his comment
thereto.

In his comment, respondent Velasco stated matters and information provided by unimpeachable sources from the
judiciary, schoolmates and close friends of Judge ANGELES, which according to the latter is a direct attack on her
character and reputation as a public servant.

On the basis of such statements, petitioner filed a Complaint for four counts of libel against respondent Velasco.
However, Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) Adeliza Magno-Gingoyon recommended the dismissal of petitioners complaint
for Libel due to insufficiency of evidence and/or lack of merit. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed with the DOJ Secretary a
Petition for Review assailing the dismissal of her complaint for Libel as well as her motion for reconsideration. The
Petition for Review was dismissed by Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zu (CSP Zu)

Petitioner filed a Petition for Review before the OP questioning the DOJ Resolutions dismissing her petition. The OP
dismissed the petition, citing MC No. 58, stating that no appeal from or petition for review of the decision or resolution
of the Secretary of Justice on preliminary investigation of criminal cases shall be entertained by the Office of the
President, except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. An appeal or petition not clearly
falling within the jurisdiction of the Office of the President, as set forth above, shall be dismissed outright.

Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43assailing the OP orders. In denying the petition, the CA
applied the doctrine laid down in Carpio v. Executive Secretary regarding the power of control of the President over all
executive branches of the government, in relation to the doctrine of qualified political agency. The CA then ruled that
the OP, relying on MC No. 58, dismissed petitioner's petition for review and exercised its prerogative not to disapprove
or overturn the DOJ Secretary's resolutions, thus, approving the acts or decision of the DOJ Secretary, being her alter
ego.

Upon denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed this present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in its application of doctrine of qualified political agency

HELD: No. CA Decision Affirmed.

Political Law- doctrine of qualified political agency

3|Page
Petitioner argues in the main that Memorandum Circular No. 58 is an invalid regulation, because it diminishes the power
of control of the President and bestows upon the Secretary of Justice, a subordinate officer, almost unfettered power.
This argument is absurd.

Under this doctrine, which primarily recognizes the establishment of a single executive, "all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department; the heads of the various executive departments are assistants
and agents of the Chief Executive; and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law
to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts
of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive." The CA cannot be
deemed to have committed any error in upholding the Office of the President's reliance on the Memorandum Circular as
it merely interpreted and applied the law as it should be.

It is quite evident from the foregoing that the President himself set the limits of his power to review
decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice in order to expedite the disposition of cases. Petitioner's
argument that the Memorandum Circular unduly expands the power of the Secretary of Justice to the extent of
rendering even the Chief Executive helpless to rectify whatever errors or abuses the former may commit in the exercise
of his discretion is purely speculative to say the least.

Petitioner cannot second-guess the President's power and the President's own judgment to delegate whatever it is he
deems necessary to delegate in order to achieve proper and speedy administration of justice, especially that such
delegation is upon a cabinet secretary - his own alter ego.

In the case at bar, the power of the President to review the Decision of the Secretary of Justice dealing with the
preliminary investigation of cases cannot be considered as falling within the same exceptional class which cannot be
delegated. Besides, the President has not fully abdicated his power of control as Memorandum Circular No. 58 allows an
appeal if the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua or higher.

Certainly, it would be unreasonable to impose upon the President the task of reviewing all preliminary investigations
decided by the Secretary of Justice. To do so will unduly hamper the other important duties of the President by having to
scrutinize each and every decision of the Secretary of Justice notwithstanding the latter's expertise in said matter.

Petitioner's contention that Memorandum Circular No. 58 violates both the Constitution and Section 1, Chapter 1, Book
III of EO No. 292, for depriving the President of his power of control over the executive departments deserves scant
consideration.

In the first place, Memorandum Circular No. 58 was promulgated by the Office of the President and it is settled that the
acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive Memorandum Circular
No. 58 has not been reprobated by the President; therefore, it goes without saying that the said Memorandum Circular
has the approval of the President.

DENIED

CASE DIGEST: OCAMPO, et al. v. ENRIQUEZ, etc. (THE MARCOS BURIAL CASE)

CONSOLIDATED WITH: G.R. No. 225984, 226097, 226116, 226117, 226120, & 226294

FACTS:
4|Page
President Duterte allowed the burial of President Marcos's remains in the Libingan ng Mga Bayani (LNMB). He ordered
herein respondent's superior to prepare the burial.

ISSUE:

Would respondents gravely abuse their discretion in allowing Marcos' burial in the LNMB?
Would Marcos' burial be violative of the 1987 Constitution, jurisprudence and the law?

HELD:

It is not. The Supreme Court found for the respondents.

It is the President's discretion to allow who should be buried in the LNMB. In fact, even Congress may and can enact a
law allowing anyone to be buried therein. Since the LNMB is under the authority of the AFP and the Commander-in-
Chief of the AFP is the President, it is within the President's discretion to allow or disallow the burial of anyone in the
LNMB.

The Pantheon Law does not cover the LNMB. It is merely a national shrine converted into a memorial shrine. Hence,
anyone buried therein would not be treated as a hero and would not be labeled as one who is worth emulating or who is
an inspiration to the youth.

IBP VS ZAMORA
Posted by kaye lee on 11:27 PM
G.R. No. 141284 August 15 2000 [Judicial Review; Civilian supremacy clause]

FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President Estrada, in verbal
directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and
campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines
to assist the PNP in law enforcement.

ISSUE:
1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review.
2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the constitutional provisions on civilian
supremacy over the military.

RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the
following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and
substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.

2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the
Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the
5|Page
Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and
manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines
and render logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military
authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not
unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an insidious incursion of the military in
the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.

Saturday, October 20, 2012

Lacson Vs. Perez Case Digest
Lacson Vs. Perez

357 SCRA 756 G.R. No. 147780

May 10, 2001

Facts: President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38) on May 1, 2001 as well as
General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrests of several
alleged leaders and promoters of the rebellion were thereafter effected. Petitioner filed for prohibition, injunction,
mandamus and habeas corpus with an application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. Petitioners assail the declaration of Proc. No. 38 and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by
virtue thereof. Petitioners furthermore pray that the appropriate court, wherein the information against them were
filed, would desist arraignment and trial until this instant petition is resolved. They also contend that they are allegedly
faced with impending warrantless arrests and unlawful restraint being that hold departure orders were issued against
them.

Issue: Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantless arrests and hold departure orders
allegedly effected by the same.

Held: President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006, accordingly the instant petition
has been rendered moot and academic. Respondents have declared that the Justice Department and the police
authorities intend to obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to and until May 1,
2001. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons
suspected of rebellion in suppressing the rebellion if the circumstances so warrant, thus the warrantless arrests are not
based on Proc. No. 38. Petitioners prayer for mandamus and prohibition is improper at this time because an individual
warrantlessly arrested has adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, providing for preliminary
investigation, Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, providing for the period in which a warrantlessly arrested person
must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities, otherwise the officer responsible for such may be penalized for the
delay of the same. If the detention should have no legal ground, the arresting officer can be charged with arbitrary
detention, not prejudicial to claim of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners were neither assailing the
validity of the subject hold departure orders, nor were they expressing any intention to leave the country in the near
future. To declare the hold departure orders null and void ab initio must be made in the proper proceedings initiated for
that purpose. Petitioners prayer for relief regarding their alleged impending warrantless arrests is premature being that
no complaints have been filed against them for any crime, furthermore, the writ of habeas corpus is uncalled for since
its purpose is to relieve unlawful restraint which Petitioners are not subjected to.

Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking earlier adverted to, together with
their agents, representatives, and all persons acting in their behalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting Petitioners
without the required judicial warrants for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege
of Malacaang.

6|Page
SANLAKAS Vs. Executive Secretary Case Digest
SANLAKAS Vs. Executive Secretary

421 SCRA 656 G.R. No. 159085

February 3, 2004

Facts: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP, acting
upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati.
Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the government,
demanding the resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of
Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines
was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went back to their barracks in the
evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation
No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued.

In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the Constitution does not require the
declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that there is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS
Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention of
the report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report to
Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the presidential issuances
cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the
President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending
that there was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel
v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional
implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion.

Issue:

Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional?

Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit?

Held: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional. Section
18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The President in addition to its Commander-in-
Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive powers. It is not disputed that the President has full
discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While
the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave
abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President
acted without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as there was no indication that
military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The
issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since the President, in declaring a state of
rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-
in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as
opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is
unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable
under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present.

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the
question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
7|Page
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions. Based on the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members have
no legal standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing
to challenge the subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the
extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

Randolf S. David v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006 (and other consolidated cases)
DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

I. THE FACTS

On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA People Power I, President
Arroyo issued PP 1017, implemented by G.O. No. 5, declaring a state of national emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine
Constitution which states that: The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to
prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless
violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders
and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the
Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.

In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause
behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New Peoples
Army, and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.They considered
the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reins of government as a clear and present danger.

Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February 24, 2006 on their way to EDSA. Meanwhile,
the offices of the newspaper Daily Tribune, which was perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was searched without warrant at
about 1:00 A.M. on February 25, 2006. Seized from the premises in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune
except the security guard of the building were several materials for publication. The law enforcers, a composite team
of PNP and AFP officers, cited as basis of the warrantless arrests and the warrantless search and seizure was Presidential
Proclamation 1017 issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the exercise of her constitutional power to call
out the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.

II. THE ISSUE

1. Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, valid?
2. Was the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribunes officesconducted pursuant to PP 1017 valid?

III. THE RULING

[The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.]

8|Page
1. NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, were NOT valid.

[S]earches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or
warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides [for the following
circumstances of valid warrantless arrests]:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
x x x.

Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit warrantless arrests] justifies petitioner Davids warrantless
arrest. During the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the arresting officers
could invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the invective Oust Gloria Nowand
their erroneous assumption that petitioner David was the leader of the rally.Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor
ordered his immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not
wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition.

2. NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribunes officesconducted pursuant to PP 1017 was NOT valid.

[T]he search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises] is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
lays down the steps in the conduct of search and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of
a house, room, or any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his
family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the
same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless the property is
on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any
time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives

n October 1950, Montenegros son was arrested by military agents. Three days after the arrest, PP 210 was proclaimed
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Montenegro then filed before the court to have his son be set free
for his arrest was w/o cause and that the said PP should not be applied retroactively to his son for it would then
constitute a violation of the constitutional prohibition against bill of attainders. Montenegro then filed a petition for the
writ of habeas corpus demanding the detainers to bring his sons body and explain his detention. Castaeda et al argued
that the court has no judicial authority over the matter invoking the PP and the previous ruling in Barcelon vs Baker.
ISSUE: Whether or not Montenegros petition should be granted.
HELD: As ruled by the SC in the Barcelon case, Montenegros petition is likewise denied. The constitutional authority of
the President to suspend in case of imminent danger of invasion, insurrection or rebellion under Article 7 may not
correctly be placed in doubt.

In July 1982, Sabino Padilla, together w/ 8 others who were having a conference in a house in Bayombong, NV, were
arrested by members of the PC. The raid of the house was authorized by a search warrant issued by Judge Sayo.
Josefina, mother of Sabino, opposed the arrest averring that no warrant of arrest was issued but rather it was just a
warrant of arrest hence the arrest of her son and the others was w/o just cause. Sabino and companions together with 4
9|Page
others were later transferred to a facility only the PCs know. Josefina petitioned the court for the issuance of the writ of
habeas corpus.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrests done against Sabino et al is valid.
HELD: In a complete about face, the SC decision in the Lansang Case was reversed and the ruling in the Barcelon Case &
the Montenegro Case was again reinstated. The questioned power of the president to suspend the privilege of the
WoHC was once again held as discretionary in the president. The SC again reiterated that the suspension of the writ was
a political question to be resolved solely by the president. It was also noted that the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the governments campaign to
suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the
continuance of the rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be released, they
would, without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the success of government efforts
to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or insurrection.

NOTE: This ruling was abrogated by Sec 18, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution which expressly constitutionalized the Lansang
Doctrine. Note as well that under Art 3 (Sec 13) of the Constitution it is stated that the right to bail shall not be
impaired even if the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.

Philip Sigfrid Fortun v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012 (and other consolidated cases)

DECISION
(En Banc)

ABAD, J.:

I. THE FACTS

On November 23, 2009, heavily armed men believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family of Maguindanao gunned down
and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians. In response to this carnage, President Arroyo issued on November
24, 2009 PP 1946 declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City.

On December 4, 2009, President Arroyo issued PP 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus in Maguindanao except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. On December 6,
2009, President Arroyo submitted her report to Congress. On December 9, 2009, Congress convened in joint session to
review the validity of the Presidents action. But two days later, or on December 12, 2009, before Congress could act,
the President issued PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

II. THE ISSUES

Did the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the [privilege of the] writ in Maguindanao, render the
issues moot and academic?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions on the ground that they have become MOOT and ACADEMIC.]

YES, the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the [privilege of the] writ in Maguindanao, rendered the
issues moot and academic

Prudence and respect for the co-equal departments of the government dictate that the Court should be cautious in
entertaining actions that assail the constitutionality of the acts of the Executive or the Legislative department. The issue

10 | P a g e
of constitutionality, said the Court in Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, must be the very issue of the case,
that the resolution of such issue is unavoidable.

The issue of the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959 is not unavoidable for two reasons:

One. President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus before the joint houses of Congress could fulfill their automatic duty to review and validate or invalidate the
same. xxx.

xxx xxx xxx

[U]nder the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial
law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense
jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain the
same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that the President does not have.

Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to
exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express
duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The
constitutional validity of the Presidents proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a
political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court.

xxx xxx xxx

Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of Congress, which had in fact convened,
could act on the same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court has nothing to
review. The lifting of martial law and restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao was a
supervening event that obliterated any justiciable controversy.

Two. Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus in just eight days, they have not been meaningfully implemented. The military did not take over the
operation and control of local government units in Maguindanao. The President did not issue any law or decree
affecting Maguindanao that should ordinarily be enacted by Congress. No indiscriminate mass arrest had been
reported. Those who were arrested during the period were either released or promptly charged in court. Indeed, no
petition for habeas corpus had been filed with the Court respecting arrests made in those eight days. The point is that
the President intended by her action to address an uprising in a relatively small and sparsely populated province. In her
judgment, the rebellion was localized and swiftly disintegrated in the face of a determined and amply armed
government presence.

xxx xxx xxx

xxx. In a real sense, the proclamation and the suspension never took off. The Congress itself adjourned without
touching the matter, it having become moot and academic.

CASE DIGEST: REPRESENTATIVE LAGMAN, etc. v. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY MEDIALDEA, et al.

FACTS: Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216
declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.

ADVERTISEMENT Work from home! Be an online English tutor. Earn at least PHP100/hour.
11 | P a g e
Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President submitted to Congress on May 25,
2017, a written Report on the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216. The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao
has been plagued with rebellion and lawless violence which only escalated and worsened with the passing of time.

The President went on to explain that on May 23, 2017, a government operation to capture the high-ranking officers of
the Abu Sayyaf IP (ASG) and the Maute Group was conducted. These groups, which have been unleashing havoc in
Mindanao, however, confronted the government operation by intensifying their efforts at sowing violence aimed not
only against the government authorities and its facilities but likewise against civilians and their properties. In particular,
the President chronicled in his Report the events which took place on May 23, 2017 in Marawi City which impelled him
to declare a state of martial law and suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus

The Report highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City and the crucial and significant role it plays in Mindanao, and
the Philippines as a whole. In addition, the Report pointed out the possible tragic repercussions once Marawi City falls
under the control of the lawless groups.

President Duterte concluded, "While the government is presently conducting legitimate operations to address the on-
going rebellion, if not the seeds of invasion, public safety necessitates the continued implementation of martial law and
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao until such time that the rebellion
is completely quelled."

After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued P.S. Resolution No. 390 expressing full support to
the martial law proclamation and finding Proclamation No. 216 "to be satisfactory, constitutional and in accordance with
the law". In the same Resolution, the Senate declared that it found "no compelling reason to revoke the same".

The Lagman Group, the Cullamat Group and the Mohamad Group petitioned (Petitions) the Supreme Court, questioning
the factual basis of President Duterte's Proclamation of martial law. The OSG sided with President Duterte.

ISSUES:

ADVERTISEMENT Work from home! Be an online English tutor. Earn at least PHP100/hour.

[1] Are the Petitions the proper proceeding to invoke the SC's power of review over proclamations of martial law?
[2] Is the President required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in his appreciation of facts?
[3] Is the President required to obtain the favorable recommendation thereon bf the Secretary of National Defense?
[4] Is the President is required to take into account only the situation at the time ff the proclamation, even if subsequent
events prove the situati n to have not been accurately reported?
[5] Is the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of tlie factual basis [of] the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is independent of the actual actiorls that have been taken by
Congress jointly or separately
[6] Whether or not there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habea~ corpus; a. What are the parameters for review? b. Who has the burden of proof? I !I c.
What is the threshold of evidence?
[7] Whether the exercise of the power of judicial review by this Couj involves the calibration of graduated powers
granted the President ~~ Commander-in-Chief, namely calling out powers, suspension of th~ privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, and declaration of martial law
[8] Whether or not Proclamation No. 216 of23 May 2017 may be considered, vague and thus null and void: a. with its
inclusion of "other rebel groups;" or b. since it has no guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the
entire Mindanao region;
[9] Whether or not the armed hostilities mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and in the Report of the President to
Congress are sufficient [bases]: a. for the existence of actual rebellion; or b. for a declaration of martial law or the
12 | P a g e
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao 1 region;
[10] Whether or not terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism are equivalent to actual rebellion and the requirements
of public safety sufficient to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and
[11] Whether or not nullifying Proclamation No. 216 of23 May 2017 will: a. have the effect of recalling Proclamation No.
55 s. 2016; or b. also nullify the acts of the President in calling out the armed forces to quell lawless violence in Marawi
and other parts of the Mindanao region.
HELD:

[0] The Constitution only requires that questions regarding the validity and factual basis of a proclamation of martial law
or a suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus be raised by any citizen, considering the transcendental
importance of such questions.

[1] Yes, the Petitions invoke the proper proceedings as contemplated by the Constitution. "The Supreme Court may
review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from filing."

ADVERTISEMENT Work from home! Be an online English tutor. Earn at least PHP100/hour.

Jurisdiction is conferred by law. The Constitution confers the Supreme Court the power to review martial law
proclamations.

A petition for certiorari is not the proper petition. The power of the Supreme Court to review the factual basis of martial
law proclamations is not limited by Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution. It's a completely different
proceeding not limited by lack of or abuses of discretion.

The factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not a
political question but precisely within the ambit of judicial review.

In fine, the phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" appearing on the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII refers to
any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of the
Chief Executive's emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a matter
to be resolved by the Court.

[2] The power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is
independent of the actions taken by Congress. The framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the judicial power to
review to be exercised independently from the congressional power to revoke.

The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen on the ground
of lack of sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by
Congress are not only totally different but likewise independent from each other although, concededly, they have the
same trajectory, which is, the nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the power of the Court to
review can be exercised independently from the power of revocation of Congress.

[3] The judicial power to review the sufficiency of factual basis of the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not extend to the calibration of the President's decision of which among his
graduated powers he will avail of in a given situation.

These extraordinary powers are conferred by the Constitution with the President as Commander-in-Chief; it therefore
13 | P a g e
necessarily follows that the power and prerogative to determine whether the situation warrants a mere exercise of the
calling out power; or whether the situation demands suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; or
whether it calls for the declaration of martial law, also lies, at least initially, with the President. The power to choose,
initially, which among these extraordinary powers to wield in a given set of conditions, is a judgment call on the part of
the President. As Commander-in-Chief, his powers are broad enough to include his prerogative to address exigencies or
threats that endanger the government, and the very integrity of the State.

It is thus beyond doubt that the power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the President's decision
pertaining to which extraordinary power to avail given a set of facts or conditions. To do so would be tantamount to an
incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least initially,
lies with the President.

[4] There is no vagueness because the whereas clauses of the Proclamation explain the meaning of "other rebel groups."
Also, the vagueness doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or,
as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. Vagueness doctrine applies only in free speech cases.

Moreover, lack of guidelines/operational parameters does not make Proclamation No. 216 vague. Clearly, therefore,
there is no need for the Court to determine the constitutionality of the implementing and/or operational guidelines,
general orders, arrest orders and other orders issued after the proclamation for being irrelevant to its review. Thus, any
act committed under the said orders in violation of the Constitution and the laws, such as criminal acts or human rights
violations, should be resolved in a separate proceeding. Finally, there is a risk that if the Court wades into these areas, it
would be deemed as trespassing into the sphere that is reserved exclusively for Congress in the exercise of its power to
revoke.

[5] The calling out power is in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; nullification of Proclamation No. 216 will not affect Proclamation No. 55. The
Court's ruling in these cases will not, in any way, affect the President's declaration of a state of national emergency on
account of lawless violence in Mindanao through Proclamation No. 55 dated September 4, 2016, where he called upon
the Armed Forces and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to undertake such measures to suppress any and all forms of
lawless violence in the Mindanao region, and to prevent such lawless violence from spreading and escalating elsewhere
in the Philippines.

In other words, the President may exercise the power to call out the Armed Forces independently of the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to declare martial law, although, of course, it may also be a
prelude to a possible future exercise of the latter powers, as in this case.

[6] After all, the Court's review is confined to the sufficiency, not accuracy, of the information at hand during the
declaration or suspension; subsequent events do not have any bearing insofar as the Court's review is concerned. In any
event, safeguards under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution are in place to cover such a situation, e.g., the martial
law period is good only for 60 days; Congress may choose to revoke it even immediately after the proclamation is made;
and, this Court may investigate the factual background of the declaration.

Hence, the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus finds no application in this case. Falsities of and/or inaccuracies in
some of the facts stated in the proclamation and the written report are not enough reasons for the Court to invalidate
the declaration and/or suspension as long as there are other facts in the proclamation and the written Report that
support the conclusion that there is an actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires the declaration and/or
suspension. In sum, the Court's power to review is limited to the determination of whether the President in declaring
martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus had sufficient factual basis. Thus, our review would
be limited to an examination on whether the President acted within the bounds set by the Constitution, i.e., whether
the facts in his possession prior to and at the time of the declaration or suspension are sufficient for him to declare
martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
14 | P a g e
[7] To summarize, the parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows: l) actual rebellion or
invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the first two requirements must concur; and 3) there is probable cause for the
President to believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion.

[8] There is sufficient factual basis for the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

At this juncture, it bears to emphasize that the purpose of judicial review is not the determination of accuracy or
veracity of the facts upon which the President anchored his declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus; rather, only the sufficiency of the factual basis as to convince the President that there is
probable cause that rebellion exists. It must also be reiterated that martial law is a matter of urgency and much leeway
and flexibility should be accorded the President As such, he is not expected to completely validate all the information he
has received before declaring martial law or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

Moreover, the alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces and parcels of the Report; along with these
alleged false data is arsenal of other independent facts showing that more likely than not, actua1 rebellion exists, and
public safety requires the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. To
be precise, the alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are only five out of the seven statements bulleted in the
President's Report. Notably, in the interpellation by Justice Francis H. Jardeleza during the second day of the oral
argument, petitioner Lagman admitted that he was not aware or that he had no personal knowledge of the other
incidents cited.241 As it thus stands, there is no question or challenge with respect to the reliability of the other
incidents, which by themselves are ample to preclude the conclusion that the President's report is unreliable and that
Proclamation No. 216 was without sufficient factual basis. Verily, there is no credence to petitioners' claim that the
bases for the President's imposition of martial law and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus were mostly inaccurate,
simulated, false and/or hyperbolic.

[9] Public safety requires the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
in the whole of Mindanao.

nvasion or rebellion alone may justify resort to the calling out power but definitely not the declaration of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. For a declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus to be valid, there must be a concurrence of actual rebellion or invasion and the public safety
requirement. In his Report, the President noted that the acts of violence perpetrated by the ASG and the Maute Group
were directed not only against government forces or establishments but likewise against civilians and their
properties.242 In addition and in relation to the armed hostilities, bomb threats were issued;243 road blockades and
checkpoints were set up; 244 schools and churches were burned;245 civilian hostages were taken and killed;246 non-
Muslims or Christians were targeted;247 young male Muslims were forced to join their group; 248 medical services and
delivery of basic services were hampered;249 reinforcements of government troops and civilian movement were
hindered;250 and the security of the entire Mindanao Island was compromised.

Indeed, martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ ff habeas corpus are necessary for the protection of
the security of the natil.; suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is "precautiona , and although it might
[curtail] certain rights of individuals, [it] is for t e purpose of defending and protecting the security of the state or the
entire country and our sovereign people".253 Commissioner Ople referred to the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus as a "form of immobilization" or "as a means of immobilizing potential internal enemies" "especially in
areas like Mindanao."

To be sure, the facts mentioned in the Proclamation and the Report are far from being exhaustive or all-encompassing.
At this juncture, it may not be amiss to state that as Commander-in-Chief, the President has possession of documents
and information classified as "confidential", the contents of which cannot be included in the Proclamation or Report for
reasons of national security. These documents may contain information detailing the position of government troops and
15 | P a g e
rebels, stock of firearms or ammunitions, ground commands and operations, names of suspects and sympathizers, etc. ,
In fact, during the closed door session held by the Court, some information came to light, although not mentioned in the
Proclamation or Report. But then again, the discretion whether to include the same in the Proclamation or Report is the
judgment call of the President. In fact, petitioners concede to this. During the oral argument, petitioner Lagman
admitted that "the assertion of facts [in the Proclamation and Report] is the call of the Preside

It is beyond cavil that the President can rely on intelligence repo1s and classified documents. "It is for the President as
[C]ommander-in- [C]hief of the Armed Forces to appraise these [classified evidence qr documents/]reports and be
satisfied that the public safety demands thb suspension of the writ."256 Significantly, respect to these so-called
classifietl documents is accorded even "when [the] authors of or witnesses to thes~ 257 I documents may not be
revealed."

The Court has no machinery or tool equal to that of the Commander-in-Chief to ably and properly assess the ground
conditions.

Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution states that "[i]n case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it,
[the President] may x x x suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof
under martial law." Clearly, the Constitution grants to the President the discretion to determine the territorial coverage
of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. He may put the entire Philippines or only
a part thereof under martial law.

This is both an acknowledgement and a recognition that it is the Executive Department, particularly the President as
Commander-in-Chief, who is the repository of vital, classified, and live information necessary for and relevant in
calibrating the territorial application of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It,
too, is a concession that the President has the tactical and military support, and thus has a more informed
understanding of what is happening on the ground. Thus, the Constitution imposed a limitation on the period of
application, which is 60 days, unless sooner nullified, revoked or extended, but not on the territorial scope or area of
coverage; it merely stated "the Philippines or any part thereof," depending on the assessment of the President.

The Constitution has provided sufficient safeguards against possible abuses of Commander-inChief's powers; further
curtailment of Presidential powers should not only be discouraged but also avoided.

The Court can only act within the confines of its power. For the Court to overreach is to infringe upon another's territory.
Clearly, the power to determine the scope of territorial application belongs to the President. "The Court cannot indulge
in judicial legislation without violating the principle of separation of powers, and, hence, undermining the foundation of
our republican system."281

To reiterate, the Court is not equipped with the competence and logistical machinery to determine the strategical value
of other places in the military's efforts to quell the rebellion and restore peace. It would be engaging in an act of
adventurism if it dares to embark on a mission of deciphering the territorial metes and bounds of martial law. To be
blunt about it, hours after the proclamation of martial law none of the members of this Court could have divined that
more than ten thousand souls would be forced to evacuate to Iligan and Cagayan de Oro and that the military would
have to secure those places also; none of us could have predicted that Cayamora Maute would be arrested in Davao City
or that his wife Ominta ' Romato Maute would be apprehended in Masiu, Lanao del Sur; and, none of us had an inkling
that the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) would launch an attack in Cotabato City.

VICENTE GARCIA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE HONORABLE MINISTER, LAND TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS, THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, TELECOM REGIONAL OFFICE NO. IV, respondents.
16 | P a g e
G.R. No. 75025 September 14, 1993

Facts:
Herein petitioner Vicente Garcia was employed as a Supervising lineman at the Bureau of Telecommunications. He was
accused of stealing some materials in their company. Thus, public respondents filed a criminal case against him for
qualified theft before a court and on the same ground respondents also filed an administrative case in which petitioner
was found guilty and was later dismissed from the service. With respect to the criminal offense, petitioner was acquitted
by the court due to insufficiency of evidence. Petitioner was then reinstated from his work and is now claiming before
the COA for his back salaries from the time of his dismissal up to present. But COA on the other hand reluctantly denied
his pleadings. Meanwhile, petitioner was extended an executive clemency (absolute pardon) by the President. Still,
respondent COA strongly refused to give due course to petitioners claim.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is entitled to the payment of back wages after having been reinstated pursuant to the grant
of executive clemency.

Holding:
The Court ruled initially by explaining the mandate of Sec 19 Article VII of the Constitution and further articulates that
the bestowal of executive clemency on petitioner in effect completely obliterated the adverse effects of the
administrative decision which found him guilty of dishonesty and ordered his separation from the service. This can be
inferred from the executive clemency itself exculpating petitioner from the administrative charge and thereby directing
his reinstatement, which is rendered automatic by the grant of the pardon. This signifies that petitioner need no longer
apply to be reinstated to his former employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the
clemency.

PEOPLE VS SALLE, JR.FACTS:

Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky Mengote were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt and each issentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay an indemnity. The appellantsseasonably filed their Notice of Appeal. On 24
March 1993, the Court accepted the appeal. On 6 January1994, however, appellant Francisco Salle, Jr. filed an Urgent
Motion to Withdraw Appeal. They weregranted a conditional pardon that with their acceptance of the conditional
pardon, the appellants will bereleased from confinement, the appellants impliedly admitted their guilt and accepted
their sentence,and hence, the appeal should be dismissed. They were discharged from the New Bilibid Prison on 28
December 1993. Atty. Lao further in
formed the Court that appellant Ricky Mengote left for his provincewithout consulting her. She then prays that the
Court grant Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal andconsider it withdrawn upon his acceptance of the conditional
pardon. Mengote has not filed a motion towithdraw his appeal.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Mengotes conditional pardon

is valid?
RULING:
No. Since pardon is given only to one whose conviction is final, pardon has no effect until theperson withdraws his
appeal and thereby allows his conviction to be final and Mengote has not filed amotion to withdraw his appeal.
WHEREFORE, counsel for accused-appellant Ricky Mengote y Cuntadois hereby given thirty (30) days from notice hereof
within which to secure from the latter the withdrawal of his appeal and to submit it to this Court. The conditional
pardon granted the said appellant shall bedeemed to take effect only upon the grant of such withdrawal. In case of non-
compliance with thisResolution, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections must exert every possible effort to take back
into hiscustody the said appellant, for which purpose he may seek the assistance of the Philippine National Police or the
National Bureau of Investigation.
17 | P a g e


Title : LEO ECHEGARAY vs SECRETARY OF JUSTICECitation : G.R. No. 132601January 19, 1999Ponente : PUNO, J.Facts :The
Supreme Court issued a TRO On January 4, 1999, staying the execution of petitioner LeoEchegaray scheduled on that
same day.The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the actionof the SC not
only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of theexecutive to grant
reprieve.Issue:Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary RestrainingOrder on
the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already beenrendered .Held:No. The
respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of thePresident to grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures afterconviction by final judgment. The provision, however,
cannot be interpreted as denying the power ofcourts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their
finality.The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convictdo not exclude
each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.For the public respondents therefore
to contend that only the Executive can protect the right tolife of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the
principle of co-equal and coordinate powersof the three branches of our government

Pimentel v. Executive Secretary Digest

G.R. No. 158088 July 6, 2005

Facts:
1. The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of
Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to the Senate of the
Philippinesfor its concurrence pursuant to Sec. 21, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution.

2. The Rome Statute established the Int'l Criminal Court which will have jurisdiction over the most serious crimes as
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression as defined by the Statute. The Philippines
through the Chargie du Affairs in UN. The provisions of the Statute however require that it be subject to ratification,
acceptance or approval of the signatory state.

3. Petitioners contend that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic and international law, is a function of the
Senate, hence it is the duty of the Executive Department to transmit the signed copy to the senate to allow it to exercise
its discretion.

Issue: Whether or not the Exec. Secretary and the DFA have the ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of
the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine mission to the U.N. even without the signature of the President.

The Supreme Court held NO.

1. The President as the head of state is the sole organ and authorized in the external relations and he is also the
country's sole representative with foreign nations, He is the mouthpiece with respect to the country's foreign affairs.
2. In treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states and enter into treaties but this
power is limited by the Constitution with the 2/3 required vote of all the members of the Senate for the treaty to be
valid. (Sec. 21, Art VII).
3. The legislative branch part is essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations, to ensure
the nation's pursuit of political maturity and growth.

18 | P a g e
PILA Case Digest: Lim V. Executive Secretary (2002)
G.R. No. 151445 April 11, 2002
Lim v. Executive Secretary

Lessons Applicable: Locus Standi, International Law v. Muncipal Law, Certiorari, Incorporation Clause, Treaties

Laws Applicable: Constitution

FACTS:
Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) signed in 1999, personnel from the armed forces of the United States
of America started arriving in Mindanao to take partin "Balikatan 02-1 on January 2002. The Balikatan 02-1 exercises
involves the simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense
agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951. The exercise is rooted from the international
anti-terrorism campaign declared by President George W. Bush in reaction to the 3 commercial aircrafts hijacking that
smashed into twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon building in Washington, D.C.
allegedly by the al-Qaeda headed by the Osama bin Laden that occurred on September 11, 2001. Arthur D. Lim and
Paulino P. Ersando as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition attacking the
constitutionality of the joint exercise. Partylists Sanlakas and Partido Ng Manggagawa as residents of Zamboanga and
Sulu directly affected by the operations filed a petition-in-intervention.

The Solicitor General commented the prematurity of the action as it is based only on a fear of future violation of the
Terms of Reference and impropriety of availing of certiorari to ascertain a question of fact specifically interpretation of
the VFA whether it is covers "Balikatan 02-1 and no question of constitutionality is involved. Moreover, there is lack of
locus standi since it does not involve tax spending and there is no proof of direct personal injury.

ISSUE: W/N the petition and the petition-in-intervention should prosper.

HELD: NO. Petition and the petition-in-intervention are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of a new
petition sufficient in form and substance in the proper Regional Trial Court - Supreme Court is not a trier of facts

Doctrine of Importance to the Public

Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty, under the
1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the
limits of the Constitution and the laws that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed
aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition.

Although courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question based on the doctrine of separation of
powers, which enjoins upon the department of the government a becoming respect for each other's act, this Court
nevertheless resolves to take cognizance of the instant petition.
Interpretation of Treaty
The VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in "activities," the exact meaning of
which was left undefined. The expression is ambiguous, permitting a wide scope of undertakings subject only to the
approval of the Philippine government. The sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that
United States personnel must "abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular,
from any political activity." All other activities, in other words, are fair game.
To aid in this, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 31 SECTION 3 and Article 32 contains provisos
governing interpretations of international agreements. It is clear from the foregoing that the cardinal rule of
interpretation must involve an examination of the text, which is presumed to verbalize the parties' intentions. The
Convention likewise dictates what may be used as aids to deduce the meaning of terms, which it refers to as the context
of the treaty, as well as other elements may be taken into account alongside the aforesaid context. According to
Professor Briggs, writer on the Convention, the distinction between the general rule of interpretation and the
19 | P a g e
supplementary means of interpretation is intended rather to ensure that the supplementary means do not constitute an
alternative, autonomous method of interpretation divorced from the general rule.
The meaning of the word activities" was deliberately made that way to give both parties a certain leeway in
negotiation. Thus, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. Both the history and intent of the Mutual
Defense Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion that combat-related activities -as opposed to combat itself -such as
the one subject of the instant petition, are indeed authorized.
The Terms of Reference are explicit enough. Paragraph 8 of section I stipulates that US exercise participants may not
engage in combat "except in self-defense." ." The indirect violation is actually petitioners' worry, that in reality,
"Balikatan 02-1" is actually a war principally conducted by the United States government, and that the provision on self-
defense serves only as camouflage to conceal the true nature of the exercise. A clear pronouncement on this matter
thereby becomes crucial. In our considered opinion, neither the MDT nor the VFA allow foreign troops to engage in an
offensive war on Philippine territory. Under the salutary proscription stated in Article 2 of the Charter of the United
Nations.
Both the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement, as in all other treaties and international agreements
to which the Philippines is a party, must be read in the context of the 1987 Constitution especially Sec. 2, 7 and 8 of
Article 2: Declaration of Principles and State Policies in this case. The Constitution also regulates the foreign relations
powers of the Chief Executive when it provides that "[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective
unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate." Even more pointedly Sec. 25 on Transitory
Provisions which shows antipathy towards foreign military presence in the country, or of foreign influence in
general. Hence, foreign troops are allowed entry into the Philippines only by way of direct exception.
International Law vs. Fundamental Law and Municipal Laws
Conflict arises then between the fundamental law and our obligations arising from international agreements.
Philip Morris, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: Withal, the fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land
does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in the municipal sphere. Under the
doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international law are given a standing equal, not
superior, to national legislation.
From the perspective of public international law, a treaty is favored over municipal law pursuant to the principle of
pacta sunt servanda. Hence, "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in
good faith." Further, a party to a treaty is not allowed to "invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its
failure to perform a treaty."
Our Constitution espouses the opposing view as stated in section 5 of Article VIII: The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers: xxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and order of lower courts in:
(A) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
Ichong v. Hernandez: provisions of a treaty are always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, or
that it is subject to the police power of the State
Gonzales v. Hechanova: our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the
fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
The foregoing premises leave us no doubt that US forces are prohibited / from engaging in an offensive war on
Philippine territory.

20 | P a g e