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Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 43 (2012) 312 brill.nl/jpp

The Descriptive Phenomenological

Psychological Method

Amedeo Giorgi
Saybrook University

Abstract
The author explains that his background was in experimental psychology but that
he wanted to study the whole person and not fragmented psychological processes.
He also desired a non-reductionistic method for studying humans. Fortunately he
came across the work of Edmund Husserl and discovered in the latters thought a
way of researching humans that met the criteria he was seeking. Eventually he
developed a phenomenological method for researching humans in a psychological
way based upon the work of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. This article briefly
describes the method.

Keywords
phenomenology, human science, method, psychology, description

Introduction
My training as a psychologist was experimental, and more specifically, psy-
chophysical. Both of my dissertations were in the field of vision and I was
considered to be an expert in the psychophysics of vision. Moreover, when
I was a graduate student there were only two options: one became a clini-
cian or a researcher. I chose to become a researcher and so I received rigor-
ous training in natural scientific psychology. I knew natural science from
the inside and I practiced it and taught it in the early years of my career.
However, my reasons for choosing psychology as a field of study were
that I wanted to understand the whole human person. I was motivated in
part because I had read Jamess (1950) Principles. However, my graduate
education rarely raised the question of how to study the whole person.

Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2012 DOI: 10.1163/156916212X632934

4 A. Giorgi / Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 43 (2012) 312

Human functions were separated from one another and were studied in
isolated manners. Strong atomistic trends were popular because that was
the strength of the natural scientific approach. After a few years of working
in this fashion, I became restless and began searching for other ways of
fulfilling my vocation as a research psychologist.
To make a long story short, I discovered that there was a Geisteswissen-
schaft tradition and I came across phenomenology. As I probed what the
phenomenological philosophers were saying, especially Husserl, I began to
see possibilities for developing a frame of reference for studying human
experiential and behavioral phenomena that would be both rigorous and
non-reductionistic. The spirit of science would be respected but it would
be implemented with methods and concepts diffferent from the natural sci-
ences because the subject matterhuman persons and relationships
had characteristics diffferent from the object of the natural sciencesthings
and processes. Consequently, in order to found another scientific approach
that would satisfy my interests, I had to dialogue among the perspectives of
psychology, phenomenology and science. However, since my training was
in natural science and I wanted to implement a human science approach, I
also frequently had to reject or modify the criteria of the natural sciences
because as they were articulated they were not appropriate for the study of
human persons.1 In any case, the result was the method that will be briefly
described in this article and that is the subject of discussion in the subse-
quent articles. I think that the best way to introduce the method is to give a
brief description of it and then to comment on each of the key words that
describe the method.
The researcher who wants to employ the descriptive phenomenological
psychological method has to begin by assuming the correct attitude. First
of all, she has to assume the attitude of the phenomenological reduction
which means that she must resist from positing as existing whatever object
or state of afffairs is present to her. The researcher still considers what is
given to her but she treats it as something that is present to her conscious-
ness and she refrains from saying that it actually is the way it presents itself
to her. In addition, she refrains from bringing in non-given past knowledge
to help account for whatever she is present to. She concentrates on the

1)A more detailed description of this process is described in Chapter Two of Giorgi (1985)
and in Giorgi (2009).
 A. Giorgi / Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 43 (2012) 312 5

given as a phenomenon and everything that is said about the phenomenon

is based upon what is given. Since the analysis is intended to be a psycho-
logical one, she also assumes a psychological attitude toward the data.
Finally, the researchers adopted attitude must also include special sensi-
tivity toward the phenomenon being investigated. A diffferent psychologi-
cal sensitivity is required if one is studying guilt as opposed to learning.
Thus, the attitude required for the analysis includes the adoption of the
attitude of the phenomenological reduction, a psychological perspective
and within that double perspective, special sensitivity to the phenomenon
being researched.
However, the reduction utilized in scientific research is not the tran-
scendental phenomenological reduction that philosophers use. The tran-
scendental reduction focuses on consciousness as such and not on human
consciousness and it also considers the acts of human consciousness to be
mere presences just as the objects to which the acts are directed are not
existentially posited. Rather, what Husserl called the psychological phe-
nomenological reduction is employed. With the latter reduction, only the
objects of consciousness are reduced. The acts are considered to belong to
actual human consciousnesses.
Once the attitude described above is set, including the phenomenologi-
cal reduction as described, the following steps are taken: (1) The researcher
first reads the whole description in order to get a sense of the whole. The
phenomenological approach is holistic and so no further steps can be
taken until the researcher has an understanding of what the data are like.
(2) The researcher then goes back to the beginning of the description and
begins to reread it. This time, every time she experiences a transition in
meaning from within the aforementioned attitude, she makes a mark on
the description. This is the process of constituting parts. Most descriptions
are too long to be retained easily and so the constitution of parts helps in
the analysis. These parts are called meaning units and they are arbitrary
and carry no theoretical weight. They are correlated with the attitude of
the researcher. It is assumed that diffferent researchers will have diffferent
meaning units. (3) In the next step, the researcher transforms the data, still
basically in the words of the subject, into expressions that are more directly
revelatory of the psychological import of what the subject said. In other
words the psychological value of what the subject said is made explicit for
the phenomenon being studied. The use of the method of free imaginative
6 A. Giorgi / Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 43 (2012) 312

variation is critical for the completion of this step. Step three is the heart of
the method. (4) The direct and psychologically more sensitive expressions
are then reviewed and with the help of free imaginative variation an essen-
tial structure of the experience is written. (5) The essential structure is then
used to help clarify and interpret the raw data of the research. (Examples of
the application of this method can be found in Giorgi, 1985; Giorgi & Giorgi,
2003; Giorgi & Giorgi, 2008; and Giorgi, 2009.)

Description
A large part of phenomenology is descriptive but this does not rule out
phases where interpretations also take place (Husserl, 1970, 309311). Phe-
nomenology does not dictate to phenomena but rather it wants to under-
stand how phenomena present themselves to consciousness and the
elucidation of this process is a descriptive task. Description is the use of
language to articulate the intentional objects of experience. The process of
describing is similar to what takes place when one interprets but in the
former case the analysis takes into account noetic (acts) factors that are
usually not referred to by interpretive theorists working in the realm of the
social sciences (but they could be). One reason that the act side of the act-
object relation is not noted in interpretation is that in straightforward per-
ception the act is lived through but not noticed. It takes an act of reflection
to detect the meaning-conferring or interpretive act and once it is detected
it can be described.
Another diffference between description and interpretation is that in
description there is an acknowledgement that there is a given that needs
to be described precisely as it appears and nothing is to be added to it nor
subtracted from it.2 Interpretation is a polyvalent word so the sense in
which I am diffferentiating it from description has to be clarified. In this
context what I mean by interpretation is the adoption of a non-given factor
to help account for what is given in experience (e.g., a theoretical stance,
an hypothesis, an assumption, etc.). For example, I may want to give a psy-
choanalytic interpretation of a dream so I describe it with the use of psy-
choanalytic terms initially rather than first providing a nave description of

2)Given is placed in quotation marks because strictly speaking even the given is consti-
tuted by consciousness but it happens at a level much lower than that at which we are
speaking.
 A. Giorgi / Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 43 (2012) 312 7

the dream with a subsequent psychoanalytic interpretation. Again, in Hus-

serls view, the meaningful object requires a meaning-conferring act which
is lived through but discovered only in reflection. Thus while experiencing
provides interpretations regarding our world, they are lived, and it takes an
act of reflection to describe the role of such acts.
Lets take an example. A person was asked to describe a situation in
which he learned something. He picked the time when he learned to drive
a car. Part of his description is as follows: The car seemed like a giant boat.
I had visions of it going out of control or of my crashing into another car. As
I went on to the road and in with trafffic I felt that my car was all over the
roadthat I took up all four lanes. This certainly appears to be a descrip-
tion of the phenomenal world of a learner.
Now we want to understand this moment of the experience, written
from the perspective of the Lifeworld, in a psychologically more sensitive
way. So we assume a phenomenological, psychological and learning sensi-
tive attitude toward the data (more will be said about psychology below),
and with the help of free imaginative variation, we would like to under-
stand what is the essential psychological insight contained in this moment
of the experience. Within a psychological perspective I can say with confi-
dence that the learner experienced the car to be larger than it actually was
while at the same time being aware that his perception of it may have been
exaggerated. The car seemed to take up more space than it should; it was as
though it dominated the road. The learner was also worried about his abil-
ity to control the car adequately. He imagined an extreme negative possi-
bility that was correlated with his insecurity about controlling the car as
needed. Thus I would say that the psychological expression of this segment
of the description would be: In the process of acquiring mastery of driving
a car, S is aware of distorted perceptions of the vehicle and the environ-
ment while simultaneously being aware that the distortions are distortions.
He is also aware that his control of the vehicle is tenuous as he nevertheless
continues to perform adequately.
The learner has given us a straightforward description of an experience.
He is presenting us with objects bestowed with meanings. Even though the
description is from another, a researcher can reflect on the presented
meanings contained in the description and perceive their unity and come
up with an understanding of the world of the other. This is a description of
the world of the other, not an interpretation. The kind of interpretation
that I am diffferentiating description from would be if I posited that the
8 A. Giorgi / Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 43 (2012) 312

learner was a high anxiety type of personality and that was why he was
experiencing so many distortions. However, there is no evidence in the
description that that was the case. That would be bringing in an interpre-
tive assumption in order to help account for the data rather than merely
describing it.
In a larger sense, of course, the psychological analyses we perform are
interpretations. They are psychological interpretations of life-world events
that are broader than the psychological understandings we bring to them.
However, these analyses are done by means of a descriptive method. The
method is descriptive because the researcher posits that there is a specific
expression that will satisfy the problem with which he is confronted (a
good psychological description of the participants lifeworld expression)
but he does not yet know what it is. That is, the intentional object (the
desired expression) is lacking; the act is empty or unfulfilled. He or she
begins the process of imaginative variation, examining various possible
expressions, and then the researcher comes across a description that fits
precisely the intentional act he or she was seeking to fulfill. The fulfilling
expression is then precisely described.

Psychology
Psychology is a discipline whose precise meaning is still not an historical
achievement. There is a vague awareness concerning its subject matter but
mostly it is defined by theoretical perspectives that are strong in certain
areas but less than adequate in covering the full range of phenomena with
which psychology must deal. So what can it possibly mean for a phenome-
nological researcher to assume a psychological perspective? Must he
choose a limited perspective or must he refrain from doing psychological
work until the definition of the field is clarified? Neither of the above
options is satisfactory. Instead, I project the possibility of an integrated,
well-defined psychology based upon the rather primitive notion that psy-
chology has to do with subjectivity in all its forms and so I seek the pres-
ence of subjectively dominated moments that the individual expresses in
the description. When we are rational or objective, subjectivity is efffaced
and objects appear to us as they really are. When subjectivity dominates an
interaction with the world, or is not suffficiently present, that is when psy-
chological phenomena manifest themselves. In other words, psychological
 A. Giorgi / Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 43 (2012) 312 9

phenomena are para-rational, para-objective or para-normal events. Thus,

the learner in the brief example given above had to resist the exaggerated
appearances of the car and the environment and stay grounded in the
objective givens that were co-present with the exaggerations. The approach
taken here may not be the final understanding of psychology but it is hard
to imagine subjectively based achievements being missing from the field.

Phenomenology
Phenomenology in the contemporary sense of the term is the philosophy
initiated by Edmund Husserl at the beginning of the 20th century. Basi-
cally, phenomenology is interested in the activities of consciousness and
the objects that present themselves to consciousness. Husserl realized the
essential relationality of consciousness, that is, consciousness is basically a
medium between a person and the world. Husserl, based upon the teach-
ings of his professor, Brentano, elaborated the notion of intentionality,
which is a characteristic of many acts of consciousness, and it means that
certain acts of consciousness are intrinsically directed towards objects and
the objects may be transcendent to the acts or immanent to them. In either
case, an object is correlated with an act of consciousness and it can be
examined in relation to the act with which it is correlated.
While Husserl started with the relationship between consciousness and
world, as his thought developed he expanded his analyses to include the
body as partaking of consciousness and so more generally, one could say
that there is a relationship between embodied subjectivity and world. This
is the theme that existentially leaning thinkers such as Heidegger (1962)
and Merleau-Ponty (1962) developed in their own ways and so phenome-
nology became diversified. Other variations emerged with the writings of
Scheler (1973), Sartre (1956) and Ricoeur (1976). However, the method being
articulated in this article is largely based upon the work of Husserl, and to
some extent, on the thought of Merleau-Ponty that is consistent with Hus-
serls program. Thus, the method is described as descriptive, not interpre-
tive, and since it deals with human consciousness, it is a pretranscendental
and not a transcendental method.
It is important to emphasize again that Husserls philosophical method
is a transcendental one, which means that he is interested in the qualities
of consciousness as such, not necessarily human consciousness. However,
10 A. Giorgi / Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 43 (2012) 312

psychologically, we are interested in specifically human consciousness,

and because of that limited interest the method being referred to in the fol-
lowing articles is a pretranscendental one. We are interested in how a
human consciousness relates to a specifically human world.
Finally, we should say a few words about method and the notion of sci-
ence. There is often a tension in psychology between the demands of sci-
ence and the goals of practitioners. Usually, scientific research is conducted
under well thought out conditions, with many variables controlled and the
theme of the research well articulated. Practitioners often have to make
spontaneous decisions based upon incomplete data which is usually com-
plemented by past practical experience. The two situations are obviously
not parallel and so the argument is often made by practitioners that the
scientific model is not appropriate for psychologists whose main goal is
praxis and the very idea of method is rejected. I would say that the argu-
ment has some validity if the natural science model is the one being chal-
lenged. However, if a human science model is adopted and a method based
on its values is being sought, then it is possible for most of the tension
between the two situations to disappear. One has to generalize the under-
standing of science so that both natural phenomena and human phenom-
ena are included in its purview. Phenomenological philosophy makes this
generalization possible.
Briefly, for Husserl (1980, 37) science is an infinity of systematically
connected truths explorable in systematic unity and naturally truths
that do not lie at hand but rather are discovered only as fruits of arduous
investigation. Since science requires arduous investigations, systematic
ways of investigating, or methods, are required. In other words, because
secure knowledge requires grounded validations (Husserl, 1970, 64) and
systematic coherence in the theoretical sense (Husserl, 1970, 62, italics in
original) how the knowledge is obtained is equally important as what is
gained, and again that implies methods. For Husserl (1970, 66), a method
means a systematically regulated progress from one bit of knowledge to
another.
It should be obvious that the above characteristics of science are so gen-
eral that they can be implemented in many ways, depending upon what
the object of study is. Far too often, general characteristics of science are
described on the basis of the existing natural sciences which developed in
dialogue with objects of nature. However, when human phenomena are
 A. Giorgi / Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 43 (2012) 312 11

the objects of science it can be argued that the characteristics of science are
diffferent even though the same goals of science are being sought. Of course,
this diffference depends upon ones philosophical anthropology. If one is a
believer in naturalism, then human phenomena are no diffferent from the
objects of nature and so the characteristics of science would remain the
same. However, if one believes that human phenomena are not reducible
to natural phenomena, the conduct of science would not be excluded. It
would involve thinking about validated groundings, theoretical coher-
ences and methods in diffferent ways. That is the opening that a phenom-
enological approach gives the human sciences.

Throughout the above presentation I have used psychology as an example

to show how a phenomenological approach can be used. That is because I
am a psychologist and that was the discipline with which I worked out the
development of the phenomenological psychological method. However, I
want to make clear that the phenomenological method is generic enough
to be applied to any human or social sciencesociology, anthropology,
pedagogy, etc. The only diffference is that one assumes the attitude of the
discipline within which one is working: pedagogical if it is pedagogy, socio-
logical if sociology, etc., instead of a psychological attitude. One would then
have a pedagogical or sociological phenomenological method.

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