Republic of the Philippines maintenance of places of worship, and prayed that judgment be rendered reserving and setting aside
udgment be rendered reserving and setting aside the
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-8451 December 20, 1957
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC ADMINISTRATOR OF DAVAO, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF DAVAO CITY, respondents.
Teodoro Padilla, for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Assistant Solicitor General Jose G. Bautista and Troadio T.
Quianzon, Jr., for respondents.
FELIX, J.:
This is a petition for mandamus filed by the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao seeking the
reversal of a resolution by the Land Registration Commissioner in L.R.C. Consulta No. 14. The facts of the case
are as follows:
On October 4, 1954, Mateo L. Rodis, a Filipino citizen and resident of the City of Davao, executed a deed of
sale of a parcel of land located in the same city covered by Transfer Certificate No. 2263, in favor of the Roman
Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao Inc., s corporation sole organized and existing in accordance with
Philippine Laws, with Msgr. Clovis Thibault, a Canadian citizen, as actual incumbent. When the deed of sale
was presented to Register of Deeds of Davao for registration, the latter.
having in mind a previous resolution of the Fourth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila
wherein the Carmelite Nuns of Davao were made to prepare an affidavit to the effect that 60 per
cent of the members of their corporation were Filipino citizens when they sought to register in favor
of their congregation of deed of donation of a parcel of land
required said corporation sole to submit a similar affidavit declaring that 60 per cent of the members thereof
were Filipino citizens.
The vendee in the letter dated June 28, 1954, expressed willingness to submit an affidavit, both not in the
same tenor as that made the Progress of the Carmelite Nuns because the two cases were not similar, for
whereas the congregation of the Carmelite Nuns had five incorporators, the corporation sole has only one;
that according to their articles of incorporation, the organization of the Carmelite Nuns became the owner of
properties donated to it, whereas the case at bar, the totality of the Catholic population of Davao would
become the owner of the property bought to be registered.
As the Register of Deeds entertained some doubts as to the registerability if the document, the matter was
referred to the Land Registration Commissioner en consulta for resolution in accordance with section 4 of
Republic Act No. 1151. Proper hearing on the matter was conducted by the Commissioner and after the
petitioner corporation had filed its memorandum, a resolution was rendered on September 21, 1954, holding
that in view of the provisions of Section 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Philippine Constitution, the vendee was
not qualified to acquire private lands in the Philippines in the absence of proof that at least 60 per centum of
the capital, property, or assets of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., was actually
owned or controlled by Filipino citizens, there being no question that the present incumbent of the
corporation sole was a Canadian citizen. It was also the opinion of the Land Registration Commissioner that
section 159 of the corporation Law relied upon by the vendee was rendered operative by the aforementioned
provisions of the Constitution with respect to real estate, unless the precise condition set therein that at
least 60 per cent of its capital is owned by Filipino citizens be present, and, therefore, ordered the
Registered Deeds of Davao to deny registration of the deed of sale in the absence of proof of compliance with
such condition.
After the motion to reconsider said resolution was denied, an action for mandamus was instituted with this
Court by said corporation sole, alleging that under the Corporation Law as well as the settled jurisprudence
on the matter, the deed of sale executed by Mateo L. Rodis in favor of petitioner is actually a deed of sale in
favor of the Catholic Church which is qualified to acquire private agricultural lands for the establishment and
resolution of the Land Registration Commissioner in question. In its resolution of November 15, 1954, this
Court gave due course to this petition providing that the procedure prescribed for appeals from the Public
Service Commission of the Securities and Exchange Commissions (Rule 43), be followed.
Section 5 of Article XIII of the Philippine Constitution reads as follows:
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or
assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain in the Philippines.
Section 1 of the same Article also provides the following:
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, water, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to
the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to cititzens of the
Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens, SUBJECT TO ANY EXISTING RIGHT, grant, lease, or concession AT THE TIME OF THE INAUGURATION
OF THE GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED UNDER CONSTITUTION. Natural resources, with the exception of
public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or leases for the exploitation,
development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-
five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases other than the
development and limit of the grant.
In virtue of the foregoing mandates of the Constitution, who are considered "qualified" to acquire and hold
agricultural lands in the Philippines? What is the effect of these constitutional prohibition of the right of a
religious corporation recognized by our Corporation Law and registered as a corporation sole, to possess,
acquire and register real estates in its name when the Head, Manager, Administrator or actual incumbent is
an alien?
Petitioner consistently maintained that a corporation sole, irrespective of the citizenship of its incumbent, is
not prohibited or disqualified to acquire and hold real properties. The Corporation Law and the Canon Law
are explicit in their provisions that a corporation sole or "ordinary" is not the owner of the of the properties
that he may acquire but merely the administrator thereof. The Canon Law also specified that church
temporalities are owned by the Catholic Church as a "moral person" or by the diocess as minor "moral
persons" with the ordinary or bishop as administrator.
And elaborating on the composition of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, petitioner explained that as a
religious society or organization, it is made up of 2 elements or divisions the clergy or religious members
and the faithful or lay members. The 1948 figures of the Bureau of Census showed that there were 277,551
Catholics in Davao and aliens residing therein numbered 3,465. Ever granting that all these foreigners are
Catholics, petitioner contends that Filipino citizens form more than 80 per cent of the entire Catholics
population of that area. As to its clergy and religious composition, counsel for petitioner presented the
Catholic Directory of the Philippines for 1954 (Annex A) which revealed that as of that year, Filipino clergy
and women novices comprise already 60.5 per cent of the group. It was, therefore, allowed that the
constitutional requirement was fully met and satisfied.
Respondents, on the other hand, averred that although it might be true that petitioner is not the owner of the
land purchased, yet he has control over the same, with full power to administer, take possession of, alienate,
transfer, encumber, sell or dispose of any or all lands and their improvements registered in the name of the
corporation sole and can collect, receive, demand or sue for all money or values of any kind that may be kind
that may become due or owing to said corporation, and vested with authority to enter into agreements with
any persons, concerns or entities in connection with said real properties, or in other words, actually
exercising all rights of ownership over the properties. It was their stand that the theory that properties
registered in the name of the corporation sole are held in true for the benefit of the Catholic population of a
place, as of Davao in the case at bar should be sustained because a conglomeration of persons cannot just be
pointed out as the cestui que trust or recipient of the benefits from the property allegedly administered in
their behalf. Neither can it be said that the mass of people referred to as such beneficiary exercise ant right
of ownership over the same. This set-up, respondents argued, falls short of a trust. The respondents instead
tried to prove that in reality, the beneficiary of ecclesiastical properties are not members or faithful of the
church but someone else, by quoting a portion a portion of the ought of fidelity subscribed by a bishop upon
his elevation to the episcopacy wherein he promises to render to the Pontificial Father or his successors an
account of his pastoral office and of all things appertaining to the state of this church.
Respondents likewise advanced the opinion that in construing the constitutional provision calling for 60 per
cent of Filipino citizenship, the criterion of the properties or assets thereof.
In solving the problem thus submitted to our consideration, We can say the following: A corporation sole is a
special form of corporation usually associated with the clergy. Conceived and introduced into the common
law by sheer necessity, this legal creation which was referred to as "that unhappy freak of English law" was
designed to facilitate the exercise of the functions of ownership carried on by the clerics for and on behalf of
the church which was regarded as the property owner (See I Couvier's Law Dictionary, p. 682-683).
A corporation sole consists of one person only, and his successors (who will always be one at a time), in some
particular station, who are incorporated by law in order to give them some legal capacities and advantages,
particularly that of perpetuity, which in their natural persons they could not have had. In this sense, the king
is a sole corporation; so is a bishop, or dens, distinct from their several chapters (Reid vs. Barry, 93 Fla. 849,
112 So. 846).
The provisions of our Corporation law on religious corporations are illuminating and sustain the stand of
petitioner. Section 154 thereof provides:
SEC. 154. For the administration of the temporalities of any religious denomination, society or
church and the management of the estates and the properties thereof, it shall be lawful for the
bishop, chief priest, or presiding either of any such religious denomination, society or church to
become a corporation sole, unless inconsistent wit the rules, regulations or discipline of his religious
denomination, society or church or forbidden by competent authority thereof.
See also the pertinent provisions of the succeeding sections of the same Corporation Law copied hereunder:
SEC. 155. In order to become a corporation sole the bishop, chief priest, or presiding elder of any
religious denomination, society or church must file with the Securities and Exchange Commissioner
articles of incorporation setting forth the following facts:
xxx xxx xxx.
(3) That as such bishop, chief priest, or presiding elder he is charged with the administration of the
temporalities and the management of the estates and properties of his religious denomination,
society, or church within its territorial jurisdiction, describing it;
xxx xxx xxx.
(As amended by Commonwealth Act No. 287).
SEC. 157. From and after the filing with the Securities and Exchange Commissioner of the said
articles of incorporation, which verified by affidavit or affirmation as aforesaid and accompanied by
the copy of the commission, certificate of election, or letters of appointment of the bishop, chief
priest, or presiding elder, duly certified as prescribed in the section immediately preceding such the
bishop, chief priest, or presiding elder, as the case may be, shall become a corporation sole and all
temporalities, estates, and properties the religious denomination, society, or church therefore
administered or managed by him as such bishop, chief priest, or presiding elder, shall be held in trust
by him as a corporation sole, for the use, purpose, behalf, and sole benefit of his religious denomination,
society, or church, including hospitals, schools, colleges, orphan, asylums, parsonages, and
cemeteries thereof. For the filing of such articles of incorporation, the Securities and Exchange
Commissioner shall collect twenty-five pesos. (As amended by Commonwealth Act. No. 287); and.
SEC. 163. The right to administer all temporalities and all property held or owned by a religious
order or society, or by the diocese, synod, or district organization of any religious denomination or
church shall, on its incorporation, pass to the corporation and shall be held in trust for the use,
purpose behalf, and benefit of the religious society, or order so incorporated or of the church of
which the diocese, or district organization is an organized and constituent part.
The Cannon Law contains similar provisions regarding the duties of the corporation sole or ordinary as
administrator of the church properties, as follows:
Al Ordinario local pertenence vigilar diligentemente sobre la administracion de todos los bienes
eclesiasticos que se hallan en su territorio y no estuvieren sustraidos de su jurisdiccion, salvs las
prescriciones legitimas que le concedan mas aamplios derechos.
Teniendo en cuenta los derechos y las legitimas costumbres y circunstancias, procuraran los
Ordinarios regular todo lo concerniente a la administracion de los bienes eclesciasticos, dando las
oportunas instucciones particularles dentro del narco del derecho comun. (Title XXVIII, Codigo de
Derecho Canonico, Lib. III, Canon 1519).1
That leaves no room for doubt that the bishops or archbishops, as the case may be, as corporation's sole are
merely administrators of the church properties that come to their possession, in which they hold in trust for
the church. It can also be said that while it is true that church properties could be administered by a natural
persons, problems regarding succession to said properties can not be avoided to rise upon his death. Through
this legal fiction, however, church properties acquired by the incumbent of a corporation sole pass, by
operation of law, upon his death not his personal heirs but to his successor in office. It could be seen,
therefore, that a corporation sole is created not only to administer the temporalities of the church or religious
society where he belongs but also to hold and transmit the same to his successor in said office. If the
ownership or title to the properties do not pass to the administrators, who are the owners of church
properties?.
Bouscaren and Elis, S.J., authorities on cannon law, on their treatise comment:
In matters regarding property belonging to the Universal Church and to the Apostolic See, the
Supreme Pontiff exercises his office of supreme administrator through the Roman Curia; in matters
regarding other church property, through the administrators of the individual moral persons in the
Church according to that norms, laid down in the Code of Cannon Law. This does not mean, however,
that the Roman Pontiff is the owner of all the church property; but merely that he is the supreme
guardian (Bouscaren and Ellis, Cannon Law, A Text and Commentary, p. 764).
and this Court, citing Campes y Pulido, Legislacion y Jurisprudencia Canonica, ruled in the case of Trinidad
vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 63 Phil. 881, that:
The second question to be decided is in whom the ownership of the properties constituting the
endowment of the ecclesiastical or collative chaplaincies is vested.
Canonists entertain different opinions as to the persons in whom the ownership of the ecclesiastical
properties is vested, with respect to which we shall, for our purpose, confine ourselves to stating
with Donoso that, while many doctors cited by Fagnano believe that it resides in the Roman Pontiff
as Head of the Universal Church, it is more probable that ownership, strictly speaking, does not
reside in the latter, and, consequently, ecclesiastical properties are owned by the churches,
institutions and canonically established private corporations to which said properties have been
donated.
Considering that nowhere can We find any provision conferring ownership of church properties on the Pope
although he appears to be the supreme administrator or guardian of his flock, nor on the corporation sole or
heads of dioceses as they are admittedly mere administrators of said properties, ownership of these
temporalities logically fall and develop upon the church, diocese or congregation acquiring the same.
Although this question of ownership of ecclesiastical properties has off and on been mentioned in several
decisions of the Court yet in no instance was the subject of citizenship of this religious society been passed
upon.
We are not unaware of the opinion expressed by the late Justice Perfecto in his dissent in the case of Agustines
vs. Court of First Instance of Bulacan, 80 Phil. 565, to the effect that "the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila
is only a branch of a universal church by the Pope, with permanent residence in Rome, Italy". There is no
question that the Roman Catholic Church existing in the Philippines is a tributary and part of the international
religious organization, for the word "Roman" clearly expresses its unity with and recognizes the authority of
the Pope in Rome. However, lest We become hasty in drawing conclusions, We have to analyze and take note
of the nature of the government established in the Vatican City, of which it was said:
 GOVERNMENT. In the Roman Catholic Church supreme authority and jurisdiction over clergy and
laity alike as held by the pope who (since the Middle Ages) is elected by the cardinals assembled in
conclave, and holds office until his death or legitimate abdication. . . While the pope is obviously
independent of the laws made, and the officials appointed, by himself or his predecessors, he usually
exercises his administrative authority according to the code of canon law and through the
congregations, tribunals and offices of the Curia Romana. In their respective territories (called
generally dioceses) and over their respective subjects, the patriarchs, metropolitans or archbishops
and bishops exercise a jurisdiction which is called ordinary (as attached by law to an office given to
a person. . . (Collier's Encyclopedia, Vol. 17, p. 93).
While it is true and We have to concede that in the profession of their faith, the Roman Pontiff is the supreme
head; that in the religious matters, in the exercise of their belief, the Catholic congregation of the faithful
throughout the world seeks the guidance and direction of their Spiritual Father in the Vatican, yet it cannot
be said that there is a merger of personalities resultant therein. Neither can it be said that the political and
civil rights of the faithful, inherent or acquired under the laws of their country, are affected by that
relationship with the Pope. The fact that the Roman Catholic Church in almost every country springs from
that society that saw its beginning in Europe and the fact that the clergy of this faith derive their authorities
and receive orders from the Holy See do not give or bestow the citizenship of the Pope upon these branches.
Citizenship is a political right which cannot be acquired by a sort of "radiation". We have to realize that
although there is a fraternity among all the catholic countries and the dioceses therein all over the globe, the
universality that the word "catholic" implies, merely characterize their faith, a uniformity in the practice and
the interpretation of their dogma and in the exercise of their belief, but certainly they are separate and
independent from one another in jurisdiction, governed by different laws under which they are incorporated,
and entirely independent on the others in the management and ownership of their temporalities. To allow
theory that the Roman Catholic Churches all over the world follow the citizenship of their Supreme Head, the
Pontifical Father, would lead to the absurdity of finding the citizens of a country who embrace the Catholic
faith and become members of that religious society, likewise citizens of the Vatican or of Italy. And this is
more so if We consider that the Pope himself may be an Italian or national of any other country of the world.
The same thing be said with regard to the nationality or citizenship of the corporation sole created under the
laws of the Philippines, which is not altered by the change of citizenship of the incumbent bishops or head of
said corporation sole.
We must therefore, declare that although a branch of the Universal Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, every
Roman Catholic Church in different countries, if it exercises its mission and is lawfully incorporated in
accordance with the laws of the country where it is located, is considered an entity or person with all the
rights and privileges granted to such artificial being under the laws of that country, separate and distinct from
the personality of the Roman Pontiff or the Holy See, without prejudice to its religious relations with the latter
which are governed by the Canon Law or their rules and regulations.
We certainly are conscious of the fact that whatever conclusion We may draw on this matter will have a far
reaching influence, nor can We overlook the pages of history that arouse indignation and criticisms against
church landholdings. This nurtured feeling that snowbailed into a strong nationalistic sentiment manifested
itself when the provisions on natural to be embodied in the Philippine Constitution were framed, but all that
has been said on this regard referred more particularly to landholdings of religious corporations known as
"Friar Estates" which have already bee acquired by our government, and not to properties held by
corporations sole which, We repeat, are properties held in trust for the benefit of the faithful residing within
its territorial jurisdiction. Though that same feeling probably precipitated and influenced to a large extent
the doctrine laid down in the celebrated Krivenco decision, We have to take this matter in the light of legal
provisions and jurisprudence actually obtaining, irrespective of sentiments.
The question now left for our determination is whether the Universal Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in
the Philippines, or better still, the corporation sole named the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of
Davao, Inc., is qualified to acquire private agricultural lands in the Philippines pursuant to the provisions of
Article XIII of the Constitution.
We see from sections 1 and 5 of said Article quoted before, that only persons or corporations qualified to
acquire hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines may acquire or be assigned and hold private
agricultural lands. Consequently, the decisive factor in the present controversy hinges on the proposition or
whether or not the petitioner in this case can acquire agricultural lands of the public domain.
From the data secured from the Securities and Exchange Commission, We find that the Roman Catholic
Bishop of Zamboanga was incorporated (as a corporation sole) in September, 1912, principally to administer
its temporalities and manage its properties. Probably due to the ravages of the last war, its articles of
incorporation were reconstructed in the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 8, 1948. At first, this
corporation sole administered all the temporalities of the church existing or located in the island of Mindanao.
Later on, however, new dioceses were formed and new corporations sole were created to correspond with
the territorial jurisdiction of the new dioceses, one of them being petitioner herein, the Roman Catholic
Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., which was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission
on September 12, 1950, and succeeded in the administrative for all the "temporalities" of the Roman Catholic
Church existing in Davao.
According to our Corporation Law, Public Act No. 1549, approved April 1, 1906, a corporation sole.
is organized and composed of a single individual, the head of any religious society or church, for the
ADMINISTRATION of the temporalities of such society or church. By "temporalities" is meant estate
and properties not used exclusively for religious worship. The successor in office of such religious
head or chief priest incorporated as a corporation sole shall become the corporation sole on
ascension to office, and shall be permitted to transact business as such on filing with the Securities
and Exchange Commission a copy of his commission, certificate of election or letter of appointment
duly certified by any notary public or clerk of court of record (Guevara's The Philippine Corporation
Law, p. 223).
The Corporation Law also contains the following provisions:
SECTION 159. Any corporation sole may purchase and hold real estate and personal; property for
its church, charitable, benevolent, or educational purposes, and may receive bequests or gifts of
such purposes. Such corporation may mortgage or sell real property held by it upon obtaining an
order for that purpose from the Court of First Instance of the province in which the property is
situated; but before making the order proof must be made to the satisfaction of the Court that notice
of the application for leave to mortgage or sell has been given by publication or otherwise in such
manner and for such time as said Court or the Judge thereof may have directed, and that it is to the
interest of the corporation that leave to mortgage or sell must be made by petition, duly verified by
the bishop, chief priest, or presiding elder acting as corporation sole, and may be opposed by any
member of the religious denomination, society or church represented by the corporation sole:
Provided, however, That in cases where the rules, regulations, and discipline of the religious
denomination, society or church concerned represented by such corporation sole regulate the
methods of acquiring, holding, selling and mortgaging real estate and personal property, such rules,
regulations, and discipline shall control and the intervention of the Courts shall not be necessary.
It can, therefore, be noticed that the power of a corporation sole to purchase real property, like the power
exercised in the case at bar, it is not restricted although the power to sell or mortgage sometimes is, depending
upon the rules, regulations, and discipline of the church concerned represented by said corporation sole. If
corporations sole can purchase and sell real estate for its church, charitable, benevolent, or educational
purposes, can they register said real properties? As provided by law, lands held in trust for specific purposes
me be subject of registration (section 69, Act 496), and the capacity of a corporation sole, like petitioner
herein, to register lands belonging to it is acknowledged, and title thereto may be issued in its name (Bishop
of Nueva Segovia vs. Insular Government, 26 Phil. 300-1913). Indeed it is absurd that while the corporations
sole that might be in need of acquiring lands for the erection of temples where the faithful can pray, or schools
and cemeteries which they are expressly authorized by law to acquire in connection with the propagation of
the Roman Catholic Apostolic faith or in furtherance of their freedom of religion they could not register said
properties in their name. As professor Javier J. Nepomuceno very well says "Man in his search for the
immortal and imponderable, has, even before the dawn of recorded history, erected temples to the Unknown
God, and there is no doubt that he will continue to do so for all time to come, as long as he continues 'imploring
the aid of Divine Providence'" (Nepomuceno's Corporation Sole, VI Ateneo Law Journal, No. 1, p. 41,
September, 1956). Under the circumstances of this case, We might safely state that even before the
establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth and of the Republic of the Philippines every corporation sole
then organized and registered had by express provision of law the necessary power and qualification to
purchase in its name private lands located in the territory in which it exercised its functions or ministry and
for which it was created, independently of the nationality of its incumbent unique and single member and
head, the bishop of the dioceses. It can be also maintained without fear of being gainsaid that the Roman
Catholic Apostolic Church in the Philippines has no nationality and that the framers of the Constitution, as
will be hereunder explained, did not have in mind the religious corporations sole when they provided that 60
per centum of the capital thereof be owned by Filipino citizens.
There could be no controversy as to the fact that a duly registered corporation sole is an artificial being having
the right of succession and the power, attributes, and properties expressly authorized by law or incident to
its existence (section 1, Corporation Law). In outlining the general powers of a corporation. Public Act. No.
1459 provides among others:
SEC. 13. Every corporation has the power:
(5) To purchase, hold, convey, sell, lease, lot, mortgage, encumber, and otherwise deal with such
real and personal property as the purpose for which the corporation was formed may permit, and
the transaction of the lawful business of the corporation may reasonably and necessarily require,
unless otherwise prescribed in this Act: . . .
In implementation of the same and specially made applicable to a form of corporation recognized by the same
law, Section 159 aforequoted expressly allowed the corporation sole to purchase and hold real as well as
personal properties necessary for the promotion of the objects for which said corporation sole is created.
Respondent Land Registration Commissioner, however, maintained that since the Philippine Constitution is
a later enactment than public Act No. 1459, the provisions of Section 159 in amplification of Section 13
thereof, as regard real properties, should be considered repealed by the former.
There is a reason to believe that when the specific provision of the Constitution invoked by respondent
Commissioner was under consideration, the framers of the same did not have in mind or overlooked this
particular form of corporation. It is undeniable that the naturalization and conservation of our national
resources was one of the dominating objectives of the Convention and in drafting the present Article XII of
the Constitution, the delegates were goaded by the desire (1) to insure their conservation for Filipino
posterity; (2) to serve as an instrument of national defense, helping prevent the extension into the country of
foreign control through peaceful economic penetration; and (3) to prevent making the Philippines a source
of international conflicts with the consequent danger to its internal security and independence (See The
Framing of the Philippine Constitution by Professor Jose M. Aruego, a Delegate to the Constitutional
Convention, Vol. II. P. 592-604). In the same book Delegate Aruego, explaining the reason behind the first
consideration, wrote:
At the time of the framing of Philippine Constitution, Filipino capital had been to be rather shy.
Filipinos hesitated s a general rule to invest a considerable sum of their capital for the development,
exploitation and utilization of the natural resources of the country. They had not as yet been so used
to corporate as the peoples of the west. This general apathy, the delegates knew, would mean the
retardation of the development of the natural resources, unless foreign capital would be encouraged
to come and help in that development. They knew that the naturalization of the natural resources
would certainly not encourage the INVESTMENT OF FOREIGN CAPITAL into them. But there was a
general feeling in the Convention that it was better to have such a development retarded or even
postpone together until such time when the Filipinos would be ready and willing to undertake it
rather than permit the natural resources to be placed under the ownership or control of foreigners
in order that they might be immediately be developed, with the Filipinos of the future serving not
as owners but utmost as tenants or workers under foreign masters. By all means, the delegates
believed, the natural resources should be conserved for Filipino posterity.
It could be distilled from the foregoing that the farmers of the Constitution intended said provisions as barrier
for foreigners or corporations financed by such foreigners to acquire, exploit and develop our natural
resources, saving these undeveloped wealth for our people to clear and enrich when they are already
prepared and capable of doing so. But that is not the case of corporations sole in the Philippines, for, We
repeat, they are mere administrators of the "temporalities" or properties titled in their name and for the
benefit of the members of their respective religion composed of an overwhelming majority of Filipinos. No
mention nor allusion whatsoever is made in the Constitution as to the prohibition against or the liability of
the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines to acquire and hold agricultural lands. Although there were
some discussions on landholdings, they were mostly confined in the inclusion of the provision allowing the
Government to break big landed estates to put an end to absentee landlordism.
But let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that the above referred to inhibitory clause of Section 1 of Article
XIII of the constitution does have bearing on the petitioner's case; even so the clause requiring that at least
60 per centum of the capital of the corporation be owned by Filipinos is subordinated to the petitioner's
aforesaid right already existing at the time of the inauguration of the Commonwealth and the Republic of the
Philippines. In the language of Mr. Justice Jose P. Laurel (a delegate to the Constitutional Convention), in his
concurring opinion of the case of Gold Creek mining Corporation, petitioner vs. Eulogio Rodriguez, Secretary
of Agriculture and Commerce, and Quirico Abadilla, Director of the Bureau of Mines, respondent, 66 Phil. 259:
The saving clause in the section involved of the Constitution was originally embodied in the report
submitted by the Committee on Naturalization and Preservation of Land and Other Natural
Resources to the Constitutional Convention on September 17, 1954. It was later inserted in the first
draft of the Constitution as section 13 of Article XIII thereof, and finally incorporated as we find it
now. Slight have been the changes undergone by the proviso from the time when it comes out of the
committee until it was finally adopted. When first submitted and as inserted to the first draft of the
Constitution it reads: 'subject to any right, grant, lease, or concession existing in respect thereto on
the date of the adoption of the Constitution'. As finally adopted, the proviso reads: 'subject to any
existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government
established under this Constitution'. This recognition is not mere graciousness but springs form the
just character of the government established. The framers of the Constitution were not obscured by
the rhetoric of democracy or swayed to hostility by an intense spirit of nationalism. They well knew
that conservation of our natural resources did not mean destruction or annihilation of acquired
property rights. Withal, they erected a government neither episodic nor stationary but well-nigh
conservative in the protection of property rights. This notwithstanding nationalistic and socialistic
traits discoverable upon even a sudden dip into a variety of the provisions embodied in the
instrument.
The writer of this decision wishes to state at this juncture that during the deliberation of this case he
submitted to the consideration of the Court the question that may be termed the "vested right saving clause"
contained in Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution, but some of the members of this Court either did not
agree with the theory of the writer, or were not ready to take a definite stand on the particular point I am
now to discuss deferring our ruling on such debatable question for a better occasion, inasmuch as the
determination thereof is not absolutely necessary for the solution of the problem involved in this case. In his
desire to face the issues squarely, the writer will endeavor, at least as a disgression, to explain and develop
his theory, not as a lucubration of the Court, but of his own, for he deems it better and convenient to go over
the cycle of reasons that are linked to one another and that step by step lead Us to conclude as We do in the
dispositive part of this decision.
It will be noticed that Section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides, among other things, that "all
agricultural lands of the public domain and their disposition shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines or
to corporations at least 60 per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, SUBJECT TO ANY
EXISTING RIGHT AT THE TIME OF THE INAUGURATION OF THE GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED UNDER THIS
CONSTITUTION."
As recounted by Mr. Justice Laurel in the aforementioned case of Gold Creek Mining Corporation vs.
Rodriguez et al., 66 Phil. 259, "this recognition (in the clause already quoted), is not mere graciousness but
springs from the just character of the government established. The farmers of the Constitution were not obscured
by the rhetoric of democracy or swayed to hostility by an intense spirit of nationalism. They well knew that
conservation of our natural resources did not mean destruction or annihilation of ACQUIRED PROPERTY
RIGHTS".
But respondents' counsel may argue that the preexisting right of acquisition of public or private lands by a
corporation which does not fulfill this 60 per cent requisite, refers to purchases of the Constitution and not
to later transactions. This argument would imply that even assuming that petitioner had at the time of the
enactment of the Constitution the right to purchase real property or right could not be exercised after the
effectivity of our Constitution, because said power or right of corporations sole, like the herein petitioner,
conferred in virtue of the aforequoted provisions of the Corporation Law, could no longer be exercised in
view of the requisite therein prescribed that at least 60 per centum of the capital of the corporation had to be
Filipino. It has been shown before that: (1) the corporation sole, unlike the ordinary corporations which are
formed by no less than 5 incorporators, is composed of only one persons, usually the head or bishop of the
diocese, a unit which is not subject to expansion for the purpose of determining any percentage whatsoever;
(2) the corporation sole is only the administrator and not the owner of the temporalities located in the
territory comprised by said corporation sole; (3) such temporalities are administered for and on behalf of the
faithful residing in the diocese or territory of the corporation sole; and (4) the latter, as such, has no
nationality and the citizenship of the incumbent Ordinary has nothing to do with the operation, management
or administration of the corporation sole, nor effects the citizenship of the faithful connected with their
respective dioceses or corporation sole.
In view of these peculiarities of the corporation sole, it would seem obvious that when the specific provision
of the Constitution invoked by respondent Commissioner (section 1, Art. XIII), was under consideration, the
framers of the same did not have in mind or overlooked this particular form of corporation. If this were so,
as the facts and circumstances already indicated tend to prove it to be so, then the inescapable conclusion
would be that this requirement of at least 60 per cent of Filipino capital was never intended to apply to
corporations sole, and the existence or not a vested right becomes unquestionably immaterial.
But let us assumed that the questioned proviso is material. yet We might say that a reading of said Section 1
will show that it does not refer to any actual acquisition of land up to the right, qualification or power to
acquire and hold private real property. The population of the Philippines, Catholic to a high percentage, is
ever increasing. In the practice of religion of their faithful the corporation sole may be in need of more temples
where to pray, more schools where the children of the congregation could be taught in the principles of their
religion, more hospitals where their sick could be treated, more hallow or consecrated grounds or cemeteries
where Catholics could be buried, many more than those actually existing at the time of the enactment of our
Constitution. This being the case, could it be logically maintained that because the corporation sole which, by
express provision of law, has the power to hold and acquire real estate and personal property of its churches,
charitable benevolent, or educational purposes (section 159, Corporation Law) it has to stop its growth and
restrain its necessities just because the corporation sole is a non-stock corporation composed of only one
person who in his unity does not admit of any percentage, especially when that person is not the owner but
merely an administrator of the temporalities of the corporation sole? The writer leaves the answer to
whoever may read and consider this portion of the decision.
Anyway, as stated before, this question is not a decisive factor in disposing the case, for even if We were to
disregard such saving clause of the Constitution, which reads: subject to any existing right, grant, etc., at the
same time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution, yet We would have, under
the evidence on record, sufficient grounds to uphold petitioner's contention on this matter.
In this case of the Register of Deeds of Rizal vs. Ung Sui Si Temple, 2 G.R. No. L-6776, promulgated May 21,
1955, wherein this question was considered from a different angle, this Court through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
said:
The fact that the appellant religious organization has no capital stock does not suffice to escape the
Constitutional inhibition, since it is admitted that its members are of foreign nationality. The
purpose of the sixty per centum requirement is obviously to ensure that corporation or associations
allowed to acquire agricultural land or to exploit natural resources shall be controlled by Filipinos;
and the spirit of the Constitution demands that in the absence of capital stock, the controlling
membership should be composed of Filipino citizens.
In that case respondent-appellant Ung Siu Si Temple was not a corporation sole but a corporation aggregate,
i.e., an unregistered organization operating through 3 trustees, all of Chinese nationality, and that is why this
Court laid down the doctrine just quoted. With regard to petitioner, which likewise is a non-stock corporation,
the case is different, because it is a registered corporation sole, evidently of no nationality and registered
mainly to administer the temporalities and manage the properties belonging to the faithful of said church
residing in Davao. But even if we were to go over the record to inquire into the composing membership to
determine whether the citizenship requirement is satisfied or not, we would find undeniable proof that the
members of the Roman Catholic Apostolic faith within the territory of Davao are predominantly Filipino
citizens. As indicated before, petitioner has presented evidence to establish that the clergy and lay members
of this religion fully covers the percentage of Filipino citizens required by the Constitution. These facts are
not controverted by respondents and our conclusion in this point is sensibly obvious.
Dissenting OpinionDiscussed. After having developed our theory in the case and arrived at the findings
and conclusions already expressed in this decision. We now deem it proper to analyze and delve into the basic
foundation on which the dissenting opinion stands up. Being aware of the transcendental and far-reaching
effects that Our ruling on the matter might have, this case was thoroughly considered from all points of view,
the Court sparing no effort to solve the delicate problems involved herein.
At the deliberations had to attain this end, two ways were open to a prompt dispatch of the case: (1) the
reversal of the doctrine We laid down in the celebrated Krivenko case by excluding urban lots and properties
from the group of the term "private agricultural lands" use in this section 5, Article XIII of the Constitution;
and (2) by driving Our reasons to a point that might indirectly cause the appointment of Filipino bishops or
Ordinary to head the corporations sole created to administer the temporalities of the Roman Catholic Church
in the Philippines. With regard to the first way, a great majority of the members of this Court were not yet
prepared nor agreeable to follow that course, for reasons that are obvious. As to the second way, it seems to
be misleading because the nationality of the head of a diocese constituted as a corporation sole has no
material bearing on the functions of the latter, which are limited to the administration of the temporalities of
the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the Philippines.
Upon going over the grounds on which the dissenting opinion is based, it may be noticed that its author
lingered on the outskirts of the issues, thus throwing the main points in controversy out of focus. Of course
We fully agree, as stated by Professor Aruego, that the framers of our Constitution had at heart to insure the
conservation of the natural resources of Our motherland of Filipino posterity; to serve them as an instrument
of national defense, helping prevent the extension into the country of foreign control through peaceful
economic penetration; and to prevent making the Philippines a source of international conflicts with the
consequent danger to its internal security and independence. But all these precautions adopted by the
Delegates to Our Constitutional Assembly could have not been intended for or directed against cases like the
one at bar. The emphasis and wonderings on the statement that once the capacity of a corporation sole to
acquire private agricultural lands is admitted there will be no limit to the areas that it may hold and that this
will pave the way for the "revival or revitalization of religious landholdings that proved so troublesome in
our past", cannot even furnish the "penumbra" of a threat to the future of the Filipino people. In the first place,
the right of Filipino citizens, including those of foreign extraction, and Philippine corporations, to acquire
private lands is not subject to any restriction or limit as to quantity or area, and We certainly do not see any
wrong in that. The right of Filipino citizens and corporations to acquire public agricultural lands is already
limited by law. In the second place, corporations sole cannot be considered as aliens because they have no
nationality at all. Corporations sole are, under the law, mere administrators of the temporalities of the Roman
Catholic Church in the Philippines. In the third place, every corporation, be it aggregate or sole, is only entitled
to purchase, convey, sell, lease, let, mortgage, encumber and otherwise deal with real properties when it is
pursuant to or in consonance with the purposes for which the corporation was formed, and when the
transactions of the lawful business of the corporation reasonably and necessarily require such dealing
section 13-(5) of the Corporation Law, Public Act No. 1459 and considering these provisions in conjunction
with Section 159 of the same law which provides that a corporation sole may only "purchase and hold real
estate and personal properties for its church, charitable, benevolent or educational purposes", the above
mentioned fear of revitalization of religious landholdings in the Philippines is absolutely dispelled. The fact
that the law thus expressly authorizes the corporations sole to receive bequests or gifts of real properties
(which were the main source that the friars had to acquire their big haciendas during the Spanish regime), is
a clear indication that the requisite that bequests or gifts of real estate be for charitable, benevolent, or
educational purposes, was, in the opinion of the legislators, considered sufficient and adequate protection
against the revitalization of religious landholdings.
Finally, and as previously stated, We have reason to believe that when the Delegates to the Constitutional
Convention drafted and approved Article XIII of the Constitution they do not have in mind the corporation
sole. We come to this finding because the Constitutional Assembly, composed as it was by a great number of
eminent lawyers and jurists, was like any other legislative body empowered to enact either the Constitution
of the country or any public statute, presumed to know the conditions existing as to particular subject matter
when it enacted a statute (Board of Commerce of Orange Country vs. Bain, 92 S.E. 176; N. C. 377).
Immemorial customs are presumed to have been always in the mind of the Legislature in enacting
legislation. (In re Kruger's Estate, 121 A. 109; 277 P. 326).
The Legislative is presumed to have a knowledge of the state of the law on the subjects upon which
it legislates. (Clover Valley Land and Stock Co. vs. Lamb et al., 187, p. 723,726.)
The Court in construing a statute, will assume that the legislature acted with full knowledge of the
prior legislation on the subject and its construction by the courts. (Johns vs. Town of Sheridan, 89
N. E. 899, 44 Ind. App. 620.).
The Legislature is presumed to have been familiar with the subject with which it was dealing . . . .
(Landers vs. Commonwealth, 101 S. E. 778, 781.).
The Legislature is presumed to know principles of statutory construction. (People vs. Lowell, 230
N. W. 202, 250 Mich. 349, followed in P. vs. Woodworth, 230 N.W. 211, 250 Mich. 436.).
It is not to be presumed that a provision was inserted in a constitution or statute without reason, or
that a result was intended inconsistent with the judgment of men of common sense guided by
reason" (Mitchell vs. Lawden, 123 N.E. 566, 288 Ill. 326.) See City of Decatur vs. German, 142 N. E.
252, 310 Ill. 591, and may other authorities that can be cited in support hereof.
Consequently, the Constitutional Assembly must have known:
1. That a corporation sole is organized by and composed of a single individual, the head of any
religious society or church operating within the zone, area or jurisdiction covered by said
corporation sole (Article 155, Public Act No. 1459);
2. That a corporation sole is a non-stock corporation;
3. That the Ordinary ( the corporation sole proper) does not own the temporalities which he merely
administers;
4. That under the law the nationality of said Ordinary or of any administrator has absolutely no
bearing on the nationality of the person desiring to acquire real property in the Philippines by
purchase or other lawful means other than by hereditary succession, who according to the
Constitution must be a Filipino (sections 1 and 5, Article XIII).
5. That section 159 of the Corporation Law expressly authorized the corporation sole to purchase
and hold real estate for its church, charitable, benevolent or educational purposes, and to receive
bequests or gifts for such purposes;
6. That in approving our Magna Carta the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention, almost all of
whom were Roman Catholics, could not have intended to curtail the propagation of the Roman
Catholic faith or the expansion of the activities of their church, knowing pretty well that with the
growth of our population more places of worship, more schools where our youth could be taught
and trained; more hallow grounds where to bury our dead would be needed in the course of time.
Long before the enactment of our Constitution the law authorized the corporations sole even to receive
bequests or gifts of real estates and this Court could not, without any clear and specific provision of the
Constitution, declare that any real property donated, let as say this year, could no longer be registered in the
name of the corporation sole to which it was conveyed. That would be an absurdity that should not receive
our sanction on the pretext that corporations sole which have no nationality and are non-stock corporations
composed of only one person in the capacity of administrator, have to establish first that at least sixty per
centum of their capital belong to Filipino citizens. The new Civil Code even provides:
ART. 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
Moreover, under the laws of the Philippines, the administrator of the properties of a Filipino can acquire, in
the name of the latter, private lands without any limitation whatsoever, and that is so because the properties
thus acquired are not for and would not belong to the administrator but to the Filipino whom he represents.
But the dissenting Justice inquires: If the Ordinary is only the administrator, for whom does he administer?
And who can alter or overrule his acts? We will forthwith proceed to answer these questions. The
corporations sole by reason of their peculiar constitution and form of operation have no designed owner of
its temporalities, although by the terms of the law it can be safely implied that the Ordinary holds them in
trust for the benefit of the Roman Catholic faithful to their respective locality or diocese. Borrowing the very
words of the law, We may say that the temporalities of every corporation sole are held in trust for the use,
purpose, behalf and benefit of the religious society, or order so incorporated or of the church to which the
diocese, synod, or district organization is an organized and constituent part (section 163 of the Corporation
Law).
In connection with the powers of the Ordinary over the temporalities of the corporation sole, let us see now
what is the meaning and scope of the word "control". According to the Merriam-Webster's New International
Dictionary, 2nd ed., p. 580, on of the acceptations of the word "control" is:
4. To exercise restraining or directing influence over; to dominate; regulate; hence, to hold from
action; to curb; subject; also, Obs. to overpower.
SYN: restrain, rule, govern, guide, direct; check, subdue.
It is true that under section 159 of the Corporation Law, the intervention of the courts is not necessary, to
mortgage or sell real property held by the corporation sole where the rules, regulations and discipline of the
religious denomination, society or church concerned presented by such corporation sole regulates the
methods of acquiring, holding, selling and mortgaging real estate, and that the Roman Catholic faithful
residing in the jurisdiction of the corporation sole has no say either in the manner of acquiring or of selling
real property. It may be also admitted that the faithful of the diocese cannot govern or overrule the acts of
the Ordinary, but all this does not mean that the latter can administer the temporalities of the corporation
sole without check or restraint. We must not forget that when a corporation sole is incorporated under
Philippine laws, the head and only member thereof subjects himself to the jurisdiction of the Philippine courts
of justice and these tribunals can thus entertain grievances arising out of or with respect to the temporalities
of the church which came into the possession of the corporation sole as administrator. It may be alleged that
the courts cannot intervene as to the matters of doctrine or teachings of the Roman Catholic Church. That is
correct, but the courts may step in, at the instance of the faithful for whom the temporalities are being held
in trust, to check undue exercise by the corporation sole of its power as administrator to insure that they are
used for the purpose or purposes for which the corporation sole was created.
American authorities have these to say:
It has been held that the courts have jurisdiction over an action brought by persons claiming to be
members of a church, who allege a wrongful and fraudulent diversion of the church property to uses
foreign to the purposes of the church, since no ecclesiastical question is involved and equity will protect
from wrongful diversion of the property (Hendryx vs. Peoples United Church, 42 Wash. 336, 4 L.R.A.
n.s. 1154).
The courts of the State have no general jurisdiction and control over the officers of such
corporations in respect to the performance of their official duties; but as in respect to the property
which they hold for the corporation, they stand in position of TRUSTEES and the courts may exercise
the same supervision as in other cases of trust (Ramsey vs. Hicks, 174 Ind. 428, 91 N.E. 344, 92 N.E.
164, 30 L.R.A. n.s. 665; Hendryx vs. Peoples United Church, supra.).
 Courts of the state do not interfere with the administration of church rules or discipline unless civil
rights become involved and which must be protected (Morris St., Baptist Church vs. Dart, 67 S.C.
338, 45 S.E. 753, and others). (All cited in Vol. II, Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, p. 960-964.).
If the Constitutional Assembly was aware of all the facts above enumerated and of the provisions of law
relative to existing conditions as to management and operation of corporations sole in the Philippines, and if,
on the other hand, almost all of the Delegates thereto embraced the Roman Catholic faith, can it be imagined
even for an instant that when Article XIII of the Constitution was approved the framers thereof intended to
prevent or curtail from then on the acquisition sole, either by purchase or donation, of real properties that
they might need for the propagation of the faith and for there religious and Christian activities such as the
moral education of the youth, the care, attention and treatment of the sick and the burial of the dead of the
Roman Catholic faithful residing in the jurisdiction of the respective corporations sole? The mere indulgence
in said thought would impress upon Us a feeling of apprehension and absurdity. And that is precisely the leit
motiv that permeates the whole fabric of the dissenting opinion.
It seems from the foregoing that the main problem We are confronted with in this appeal, hinges around the
necessity of a proper and adequate interpretation of sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution. Let Us
then be guided by the principles of statutory construction laid down by the authorities on the matter:
The most important single factor in determining the intention of the people from whom the
constitution emanated is the language in which it is expressed. The words employed are to be taken
in their natural sense, except that legal or technical terms are to be given their technical meaning.
The imperfections of language as a vehicle for conveying meanings result in ambiguities that must
be resolved by result to extraneous aids for discovering the intent of the framers. Among the more
important of these are a consideration of the history of the times when the provision was adopted
and of the purposes aimed at in its adoption. The debates of constitutional convention,
contemporaneous construction, and practical construction by the legislative and executive
departments, especially if long continued, may be resorted to resolve, but not to create, ambiguities.
. . . Consideration of the consequences flowing from alternative constructions of doubtful provisions
constitutes an important interpretative device. . . . The purposes of many of the broadly phrased
constitutional limitations were the promotion of policies that do not lend themselves to definite and
specific formulation. The courts have had to define those policies and have often drawn on natural
law and natural rights theories in doing so. The interpretation of constitutions tends to respond to
changing conceptions of political and social values. The extent to which these extraneous aids affect
the judicial construction of constitutions cannot be formulated in precise rules, but their influence
cannot be ignored in describing the essentials of the process (Rottschaeffer on Constitutional Law,
1939 ed., p. 18-19).
There are times that when even the literal expression of legislation may be inconsistent with the
general objectives of policy behind it, and on the basis of equity or spirit of the statute the courts
rationalize a restricted meaning of the latter. A restricted interpretation is usually applied where
the effect of literal interpretation will make for injustice and absurdity or, in the words of one court,
the language must be so unreasonable 'as to shock general common sense'. (Vol. 3, Sutherland on
Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., 150.).
A constitution is not intended to be a limitation on the development of a country nor an obstruction
to its progress and foreign relations (Moscow Fire Ins. Co. of Moscow, Russia vs. Bank of New York
and Trust Co., 294 N. Y. S.648; 56 N.E. 2d. 745, 293 N.Y. 749).
Although the meaning or principles of a constitution remain fixed and unchanged from the time of
its adoption, a constitution must be construed as if intended to stand for a great length of time, and
it is progressive and not static. Accordingly, it should not receive too narrow or literal an
interpretation but rather the meaning given it should be applied in such manner as to meet new or
changed conditions as they arise (U.S. vs. Lassic, 313 U.S. 299, 85 L. Ed., 1368).
Effect should be given to the purpose indicated by a fair interpretation of the language used and that
construction which effectuates, rather than that which destroys a plain intent or purpose of a
constitutional provision, is not only favored but will be adopted (State ex rel. Randolph Country vs.
Walden, 206 S.W. 2d 979).
It is quite generally held that in arriving at the intent and purpose the construction should be broad
or liberal or equitable, as the better method of ascertaining that intent, rather than technical (Great
Southern Life Ins. Co. vs. City of Austin, 243 S.W. 778).
All these authorities uphold our conviction that the framers of the Constitution had not in mind the
corporations sole, nor intended to apply them the provisions of section 1 and 5 of said Article XIII when they
passed and approved the same. And if it were so as We think it is, herein petitioner, the Roman Catholic
Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., could not be deprived of the right to acquire by purchase or donation
real properties for charitable, benevolent and educational purposes, nor of the right to register the same in
its name with the Register of Deeds of Davao, an indispensable requisite prescribed by the Land Registration
Act for lands covered by the Torrens system.
We leave as the last theme for discussion the much debated question above referred to as "the vested right
saving clause" contained in section 1, Article XIII of the Constitution. The dissenting Justice hurls upon the
personal opinion expressed on the matter by the writer of the decision the most pointed darts of his severe
criticism. We think, however, that this strong dissent should have been spared, because as clearly indicated
before, some members of this Court either did not agree with the theory of the writer or were not ready to
take a definite stand on that particular point, so that there being no majority opinion thereon there was no
need of any dissension therefrom. But as the criticism has been made the writer deems it necessary to say a
few words of explanation.
The writer fully agrees with the dissenting Justice that ordinarily "a capacity to acquire (property) in futuro,
is not in itself a vested or existing property right that the Constitution protects from impairment. For a
property right to be vested (or acquired) there must be a transition from the potential or contingent to the
actual, and the proprietary interest must have attached to a thing; it must have become 'fixed and
established'" (Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498). But the case at bar has to be considered as an exception to
the rule because among the rights granted by section 159 of the Corporation Law was the right to receive
bequests or gifts of real properties for charitable, benevolent and educational purposes. And this right to
receive such bequests or gifts (which implies donations in futuro), is not a mere potentiality that could be
impaired without any specific provision in the Constitution to that effect, especially when the impairment
would disturbingly affect the propagation of the religious faith of the immense majority of the Filipino people
and the curtailment of the activities of their Church. That is why the writer gave us a basis of his contention
what Professor Aruego said in his book "The Framing of the Philippine Constitution" and the enlightening
opinion of Mr. Justice Jose P. Laurel, another Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, in his concurring
opinion in the case of Goldcreek Mining Co. vs. Eulogio Rodriguez et al., 66 Phil. 259. Anyway the majority of
the Court did not deem necessary to pass upon said "vested right saving clause" for the final determination
of this case.
JUDGMENT
Wherefore, the resolution of the respondent Land Registration Commission of September 21, 1954, holding
that in view of the provisions of sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Philippine Constitution the vendee
(petitioner) is not qualified to acquire lands in the Philippines in the absence of proof that at least 60 per
centum of the capital, properties or assets of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc. is
actually owned or controlled by Filipino citizens, and denying the registration of the deed of sale in the
absence of proof of compliance with such requisite, is hereby reversed. Consequently, the respondent
Register of Deeds of the City of Davao is ordered to register the deed of sale executed by Mateo L. Rodis in
favor of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., which is the subject of the present
litigation. No pronouncement is made as to costs. It is so ordered.
Bautista Angelo and Endencia, JJ., concur.
Paras, C.J., and Bengzon, J., concur in the result.
LABRADOR, J., concurring:
The case at bar squarely present this important legal question: Has the bishop or ordinary of the Roman
Catholic Church who is not a Filipino citizen, as corporation sole, the right to register land, belonging to the
Church over which he presides, in view of the Krivenko decision? Mr. Justice Felix sustains the affirmative
view while Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, the negative. As the undersigned understands it, the reason given for this
last view is that the constitutional provision prohibiting land ownership by foreigners also extends to control
because this lies within the scope and purpose of the prohibition.
To our way of thinking, the question at issue depends for its resolution upon another, namely, who is the
owner of the land or property of the Church sought to be registered? Under the Canon Law the parish and the
diocese have the right to acquire and own property.
SEC. 1. La Iglesia catolica y la Sede Apostolica, libre e independientemente de la potestad civil, tiene
derecho innato de adquirir, retener y administrar bienes temporales para el logro de sus propios
fines.
SEC. 2. Tambien las iglesias particulares y demas personas morales erigidas por la autoridad
eclesiastica en persona juridica, tienen derecho, a tenor de los sagrados canones, de adquirir,
retener y administrar bienes temporales. (Canon 1495) (Codigo de Derecho Canonico por Miguelez-
Alonzo-Cabreros, 4a ed., p. 562.).
The Canon Law further states that Church property belongs to the non-collegiate moral person called the
parish, or to the diocese.
In canon law the ownership of ecclesiastical goods belongs to each separate juridical person in the
Church (C. 1499). The property of St. John's Church does not belong to the Pope, the bishop, the
pastor, or even to the people of the parish. It belongs to the non-collegiate moral person called the
parish, which has been lawfully erected. It is not like a stock company. The civil law does not
recognize this canonical principle; it insists on an act of civil incorporation or some other legal
device. (Ready Answers in Canon Law by Rev. P.J. Lydon, DD., 3rd ed., 1948, p. 576.).
Parish. 3. A portion or subdivision of a diocese committed to the spiritual jurisdiction or care of a
priest or minister, called rector or pastor. In the Protestant Episcopal Church, it is a territorial
division usually following civil bounds, as those of a town. In the Roman Catholic Church, it is usually
territorial, but whenever, as in some parts of the United States there are different rites and
languages, the boundaries and jurisdiction are determined by right or language; as, a Ruthenian or
Polish parish. "5. The inhabitants or members of a parish, collectively.
Diocese. 3. Eccl. The circuit or extent of a bishop's jurisdiction; the district in which a bishop has
authority. (Webster's New International Dictionary).
We are aware of the fact that some writers believe that ownership of ecclesiastical properties resides in the
Roman Catholic Pontiff as Head of the Universal Church, but the better opinion seems to be that they do
belong to the parishes and diocese as above indicated.
Canonists entertain different opinions as to the person in whom the ownership of the ecclesiastical
properties is vested, with respect to which we shall, for our purpose, confine ourselves to stating
with Donoso that, while many doctors cited by Fagnano believe that it resides in the Roman Pontiff
as Head of the Universal Church, it is more probable that ownership, strictly speaking, does not
reside in the latter and, consequently, ecclesiastical properties are owned by the churches,
institutions and canonically established private corporations to which said properties have been
donated. (3 Campos y Pulido, Legislacion y Jurisprudencia Canonica, P. 420, cited in Trinidad vs.
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 63 Phil., 881, 888-889.).
The property in question, therefore, appears to belong to the parish or the diocese of Davao. But the Roman
Catholics of Davao are not organized as a juridical person, either under the Canon law or under the Civil Law.
Neither is there any provision in either for their organization as a juridical person. Registration of the
property in the name of the Roman Catholics of Davao is, therefore, impossible.
As under the Civil Law, however, the organization of parishes and dioceses as juridical persons is not
expressly provided for, the corporation law has set up the fiction known as the "corporation sole."
It tolerates the corporation sole wherever and as long as the state law does not permit the legal
incorporation of the parish or diocese. The bishop officially is the legal owner. (Ready Answers in
Canon Law, supra, p. 577.) .
and authorizes it to purchase and hold real estate for the Church.
SEC. 159. Any corporation sole may purchase and hold real estate and personal property for its
church, charitable, benevolent, or educational purposes, and may receive bequests or gifts for such
purposes. Such corporation may mortgage or sell real property held by it upon obtaining an order
for that purpose from the Court of First Instance of the province in which the property is situated;
but before making the order proof must be made to the satisfaction of the court that notice of the
application for leave to mortgage or sell has been given by publication or otherwise in such manner
and for such time as said court or the judge thereof may have directed, and that it is to the interest
of the corporation that leave to mortgage or sell should be granted. The application for leave to
mortgage or sell must be made by petition, duly verified by the bishop, chief priest, or presiding
elder, acting as corporation sole, and may be opposed by any member of the religious denomination,
society, or church represented by the corporation sole: Provided, however, That in cases when the
rules, regulations and discipline of the religious denomination, society or church concerned
represented by such corporation sole regulate the methods of acquiring, holding, selling, and
mortgaging real estate and personal property, such rules, regulations, and discipline shall control
and the intervention of the courts shall not be necessary. (The Corporation Law.)
And in accordance with the above section, temporalities of the Church or of parish or a diocese are allowed
to be registered in the name of the corporation sole for purposes of administration and in trust for the real
owners.
The mere fact that the Corporation Law authorizes the corporation sole to acquire and hold real estate or
other property does not make the latter the real owner thereof, as his tenure of Church property is merely
for the purposes of administration. As stated above, the bishop is only the legal (technical) owner or trustee,
the parish or diocese being the beneficial owner, or cestui que trust.
Having arrived at the conclusion that the property in question belongs actually either to the parish or to the
dioceses of Davao, the next question that possess for solution is, In case of said property, whose nationality
must be considered for the purpose of determining the applicability of the constitutional provision limiting
ownership of land to Filipinos, that of the bishop or chief priest who registers as corporation sole, or that of
the constituents of the parish or diocese who are the beneficial owners of the land? We believe that of a latter
must be considered, and not that of the priest clothed with the corporate fiction and denominated as the
corporation sole. The corporation sole is a mere contrivance to enable a church to acquire, own and manage
properties belonging to the church. It is only a means to an end. The constitutional provision could not have
been meant to apply to the means through which and by which property may be owned or acquired, but to
the ultimate owner of the property. Hence, the citizenship of the priest forming the corporation sole should
be no impediment if the parish or diocese which owns the property is qualified to own and possess the
property.
We can take judicial notice of the fact that a great majority of the constituents of the parish or diocese of
Davao are Roman Catholics. The affidavit demanded is therefore, a mere formality.
The dissenting opinion sustains the proposition that control, not actual ownership, is the factor that
determines whether the constitutional prohibition against alien ownership of lands should or should not
apply. We may assume the correctness of the proposition that the Holy See exercises control cannot be real
and actual but merely theoretical. In any case, the constitutional prohibition is limited by its terms to
ownership and ownership alone. And should the corporation sole abuse its powers and authority in relation
to the administration or disposal of the property contrary to the wishes of the constituents of the parish or
the diocese, the act may always be questioned as ultra vires.
We agree, therefore, with the reversal of the order.
Montemayor and Reyes, A., JJ., concur.
REYES, J.B.L., dissenting:
I regret not being able to assent to the opinion of Mr. Justice Felix. The decision of the Supreme Court in this
case will be of far reaching results, for once the capacity of corporations sole to acquire public and private
agricultural lands is admitted, there will be no limit to the areas they may hold until the Legislature
implements section 3 of Article XIII of the Constitution, empowering it to set a limit to the size of private
agricultural land that may be held; and even then it can only be done without prejudice to rights acquired prior
to the enactment of such law. In other words, even if a limitative law is adopted, it will not affect the
landholdings acquired before the law become effective, no matter how vast the estate should be.
The Constitutional restrictions to the acquisition of agricultural land are well known:
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall
be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum
of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or
concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution.
Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no
license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural
resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-
five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses other
than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the
limit of the grant. (Article XII, Constitution of the Phil.).
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or
assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain in the Philippines. (Art. XII, Constitution of the Phil.).
In requiring corporations or associations to have sixty per cent (60%) of their capital owned by Filipino
citizens, the constitution manifestly disregarded the corporate fiction, i.e., the juridical personality of such
corporations or associations. It went behind the corporate entity and looked at the natural persons that
composed it, and demanded that a clear majority in interest (60%) should be Filipino. To me this was done
to ensure that the control of its properties (not merely the beneficial ownership thereof) remained in Filipino
hands. (Aruego, Framing of the Constitution, Vol. 2. pp. 604, 606.) .
The nationalization of the natural resources of the country was intended (1) to insure their
conservation for Filipino posterity; (2) to serve as an instrument of national defense, helping
prevent the extension into the country of foreign control through peaceful economic penetration;
and (3) to prevent making the Philippines a source of international conflicts with the consequent
danger to its internal security and independence. . . .
The convention permitted aliens to acquire an interest in the natural resources of the country and
in private agricultural lands as component elements of corporations or associations. The maximum
limit of interest that they could hold in a corporation or association would be only forty per centum
of the capital. Accordingly the control of the corporation or association would remain in Filipino
hands.
In its report the committee on nationalization and preservation of lands and other natural resources
recommended that the maximum limit of interest that aliens could hold in a corporation or
association should be only twenty-five per centum of the capital. The purpose of the committee was
to enable Filipino-controlled corporations or associations, if necessary, to interest aliens to join
their technical or managerial staff by giving them a part interest in the same. The sub-committee of
seven embodied this recommendation in the first draft of the Constitution; but in the revised article
on General Provisions, it raised the amount to forty per centum. (emphasis supplied.)
It was in recognition of this basic rule that we held in Register of Deeds vs. Ung Siu Si Temple, 51 Off. Gaz. p.
2866, that if the association had no capital, its controlling membership must be composed of Filipinos. Because
ownership divorced from control is not true ownership.
From these premises it can be deduced that the preliminary question to be decide by the court is the
following: what and who exercises the power of control in the corporation sole known as "The Roman
Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc."?.
Under section 155 of the Corporation Law, the bishop, or other religious head, as corporation sole, is "charged
with the administration of the temporalities of his church." It becomes then pertinent to inquire: if he is only
an administrator, for whom does he administer? And who can alter or overrule his acts?
If his acts as administrator can not be overridden, or altered, except by himself, then obviously the control of
the corporation and its temporalities is in the bishop himself, and he must be a Filipino citizen. If, on the other
hand, the final say as to management, exploitation, encumbrance or disposition of the temporalities resides
in another individual or body of individuals, then the control resides there. To possess constitutional capacity
to acquire agricultural land or other natural resources, that body making the final decision for the corporation
must have at least 60 per cent Filipino membership.
By this test, the body of members professing the Catholic faith in the diocese of Davao does not constitute the
controlling membership. For under the rules of the Roman Catholic Church the faithful can not control the
acts of the Ordinary; they cannot override his decision, just as they do not elect or remove him. Only his
hierarchical superiors can do that; the control is from above, not from below. Hence, the fact that 90 per cent
(or even 100 per cent) of the faithful in the diocese should be composed of Filipino citizens is totally devoid
of significance from the standpoint of the constitutional restrictions in question (see Codex, Canons 1518 and
1530, paragraph 1, No. 3).
Moreover, I do not think that the body of Catholic faithful in the Davao diocese can be taken, for the purpose
here under consideration, as the Church represented by the Ordinary of Davao. That body does not constitute
an entity or unit separate and apart from the rest of the faithful throughout the world that compose the
Roman Catholic Church that has always claimed ecumenical (universal) character. There is nom Catholic
Church of Davao district and independent of the Catholic Church of Manila, Lipa or Rome. All those professing
Catholic faith are members of only one single church or religious group. Thus the Iglesia Filipina
Independiente is not part of the Catholic Church, precisely because of its independence.
If, the, the Catholic Church of Davao is part and parcel of the universal Catholic Church, it can not be
considered separate and apart from it in this case. And if considered with it, obviously the condition of 60 per
cent Filipino membership is not satisfied when all the Catholic faithful in the world are taken into account.
The unity and singleness of the various diocese of the church appears expressly recognized in section 163 of
the Corporation Law, which provides that the corporation (sole) shall hold the temporalities, not for the
diocese; but for the benefit "of the church of which the diocese is an organized or constituent part."
SEC. 163. The right to administer all temporalities and all property held or owned by a religious
order or society, or by the diocese synod, or district organization of any religious denomination or
church shall, on its incorporation, pass to the corporation and shall be held in trust for the use
purpose, behalf, and benefit of the religious society or order so incorporated or of the church of
which the diocese, synod, or district organization is an organized and constituent part.
So that, even from the standpoint of beneficial ownership, the dioceses of Davao can not be viewed as a group
legally isolated from the Catholic Church as a whole.
Nor does court control over the acts of the corporation sole constitute a guarantee of Filipino control that
would satisfy the purposes of the constitution, for the reason that under section 159 (last proviso) of the
Corporation law, the court intervention is dispensed with where the rules and discipline of the church already
regulate the acquisition and disposition of real estate and personal property.
Provided however, that in cases where the rules, regulations and discipline of the religious
denomination, society, or church concerned represented by such corporation sole regulate the
methods of acquiring, holding, selling, and mortgaging real estate and personal property, such rules,
regulations, and discipline shall control and the intervention of the courts shall not be necessary.
(emphasis supplied.)
It is argued that a distinction must be drawn between the lands to be devoted to purely religious purposes
and the lands held in ordinary ownership. But where in the Constitution is such a distinction drawn? Under
it, capacity to acquire agricultural land for the erection of a church is capacity to acquire agricultural lands
for any lawful purpose, whether it be for convents or schools or seminaries or haciendas for their support or
land to be held solely for enjoyment of the revenue. Once the capacity to acquire is granted, the way is paved
for the revitalization of religious landholdings that proved so troublesome in our past. I cannot conceive that
the Constitution intended to revive them.
It is also argued that, before the Constitution was adopted, the corporations sole had, by express statute, the
right to acquire agricultural land; and that the Constitution was not intended to destroy such "acquired
property rights." If followed, the argument destroys the constitutional restrictions. All aliens had a capacity PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
to acquire agricultural land before the Constitution came into effect, because no prohibition existed Chairperson,
previously. Must their right to acquire and hold agricultural land be conceded in spite of the Constitution?. - versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO,
That the law should have expressly conferred capacity to acquire land upon corporations sole was not due AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
any special predilection for them; it was exclusively due to the principle that corporation, as artificial entities, CALLEJO, SR., and
have no inherent rights, but only those granted by the sovereign. Unless conferred, the corporate right would CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
not exist. MUNICIPALITY OF BURUANGA,
Furthermore, a capacity to acquire in futuro, is not in itself a vested existing property right that the AKLAN, represented by the HON.
Constitution protects from impairment. For a property right to be vested (or acquired) there must be a PROTACIO S. OBRIQUE, Promulgated:
transition from the potential, or contingent, to the actual, and the proprietary interest must have attached to Respondent.
a thing, it must have become "fixed or established "(Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498). If mere potentialities
cannot be impaired, then the law would become unchangeable, for every variation in it will reduce some one's March 31, 2006
legal ability to do or not to do. Already in Benguet Consolidated vs. Pineda, 3 52 Off. Gaz. 1961, we have ruled x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
that no one has a vested right in statutory privileges or exemptions. And in the concurring opinion in Gold
Creek Mining Corp. vs. Rodriguez, 66 Phil. 259 (cited by Justice Felix), Mr. Justice Laurel squarely declared DECISION
that "contingency or expectation is neither property right." (cas. cit., p. 269.) Finally, the point is also made
that the Ordinary, as religious corporation sole, has no citizenship, and is not an alien. The answer is that CALLEJO, SR., J.:
under the Constitution of the Republic, it is not enough that the acquirer of agricultural land be not an alien; Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari filed by the Roman Catholic Bishop1[1] of Kalibo,
he must be a Filipino or controlled by Filipinos. Aklan, seeking the partial review of the Decision2[2] dated January 31, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
Wherefore, I am constrained to conclude: G.R. CV No. 52626. Likewise sought to be reviewed is the Resolution dated July 18, 2001 of the appellate court
(1) That the capacity of religious corporations sole to acquire agricultural land depends upon 60 per cent denying the petitioners motion for partial reconsideration.
Filipino membership of the group or body exercising control of the corporation;lawphi1.net
(2) That if control of any such corporation should be vested in a single person, then such person must be a Factual and Procedural Antecedents
Filipino citizen;1awphi1.net
(3) That in the absence of evidence on these points, the order appealed from, denying registration of the Some time in 1990, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo, Aklan, filed with the Regional Trial Court
conveyance, should be affirmed. (RTC) thereof a complaint for declaration of ownership and quieting of title to land with prayer for
Concepcion, J., concur. preliminary injunction against the Municipality of Buruanga, Aklan. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
4164 and raffled to Branch 1 of the said RTC.
Footnotes
1 Translation. Unless by lawful provisions more ample rights are conferred upon him, to the local The complaint alleged, among others, that the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo is the lawful owner
Ordinary pertains the duty to exercise diligence in the administration of all the ecclesiastical and possessor of a parcel of residential and commercial land (Cadastral Lot No. 138) located at the poblacion
properties located within the territory and to avoid their removal from his jurisdiction. of the Municipality of Buruanga, Aklan. The said lot, with an area of 9,545 square meters, is a block bounded
Taking into account the rights and the legitimate customs and circumstances, every Ordinary shall by four streets on all sides. It is more particularly described as follows:
endeavor to regulate everything concerning the administration of the ecclesiastical properties and
shall give, within the bonds of Common Law, timely and particular instructions therefor.
2 97 Phil., 58. A parcel of commercial and residential land known as Cadastral Lot No. 138, GSS-06-00012, located at
3 98 Phil., 711. Poblacion, Buruanga, Aklan, containing an area of NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FORTY- FIVE (9,545)
ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF G.R. No. 149145 SQUARE METERS, more or less. Bounded on the North by Viven Ostan Street; on the East by the Provincial
KALIBO, AKLAN, represented by Road; on the South by Nitoy Sualog Street; and on the West by Emilio Ostan Street, and declared for taxation
BISHOP JUAN N. NILMAR, Present: purposes in the name of the Roman Catholic Church, Buruanga, Aklan, under Tax Declaration No. 6339 (1985)
Petitioner, and assessed at P23,850.00, including the improvements thereon.3[3]

In 1894, the Roman Catholic Church was built in the middle portion of the said lot and has been in existence
since then up to the present.
The complaint further alleged that some time in 1978,4[4] the Municipality of Buruanga constructed its
municipal building on the northeastern portion of the subject lot after it obtained the permission of Fr. Jesus
Patio, then parish priest of Buruanga. The municipality promised to remove all the improvements it
constructed thereon if and when the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo needed the said land.
In October 1989, the said municipal building was razed by fire allegedly perpetrated by members of the New
Peoples Army. On November 25, 1989, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo, through its counsel, wrote to the
Municipal Mayor of Buruanga requesting the officials of the said municipality to refrain from constructing its
new building on the same site because it is the property of the church. Further, it needed the said land for its
social action projects. The letter reads in part:
I am writing you on behalf of my client THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF KALIBO, AKLAN, a corporation
sole and represented by Bishop Juan N. Nilmar requesting you and the Honorable Members of the Municipal
Council (Sangguniang Bayan) to refrain from constructing your new Municipal Building on the same site
where your old Municipal Building was burned down because it is constructed on the property of the Church.
Please be informed that the land of the Church is needed for its social action projects and additional building,
hence, kindly relocate your New Municipal Building in your own land located along Emilio Ostan Street,
known as Cadastral Lot No. 87.
With respect to your other public buildings such as the Rural Hospital, Buruanga Community Medicare
Hospital, the Basketball Court and the Grandstand which are all occupying the Church property, you can
continue using the same land subject to your recognition of the true ownership of the property of the Church
The Roman Catholic Church of Buruanga, Aklan, under the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo, Aklan, the lawful
administrator of all church properties in the Province of Aklan.5[5]
On March 12, 1990, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo wrote the Department of Public Works and
Highways of the said province requesting the said office not to issue any building permit to the Municipal
Mayor and/or the Municipality of Buruanga in connection with the construction of its municipal building on
the land owned by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo.6[6]
These letters went unheeded as the construction of the new municipal building on the same site
proceeded. Consequently, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo filed the complaint a quo and prayed that it
be declared the lawful owner and possessor of Lot 138. It likewise prayed that a temporary restraining order
be issued to enjoin the said municipality and its authorized representatives from constructing the new
municipal building thereon and that the latter be directed to pay damages to the Roman Catholic Bishop of
Kalibo.
In its Answer,7[7] the Municipality of Buruanga, represented by Mayor Protacio Obrique, denied
that the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo ever acquired ownership and possession over the land subject of
the complaint. It raised as affirmative defenses that the said lot was surveyed as property of the municipality
on February 3, 1909 in accordance with Section 58 of Act 926 by A.W. Bushell and approved by the Bureau
of Lands on May 15, 1909.8[8] Thereafter, a decree was issued on March 14, 1919 in favor of the Municipality
of Buruanga under Case No. 12871 of then Court of Land Registration, Bureau of Lands.
It was further alleged that the said land was again surveyed in the name of the Municipality of
Buruanga under Act No. 2259 and denominated as Lot No. 138 GSS-06-00012 from the approved cadastral
map and that the said municipality alone had possessed the said land under the claim of title exclusively for
over fifty (50) years, exclusive of all other rights and adverse to all other claimants.
The Municipality of Buruanga urged the court a quo to dismiss the complaint and, instead, declare
it the absolute and exclusive owner of the disputed lot.
On November 29, 1990, the court a quo issued the Order9[9] appointing Geodetic Engineer Rodrigo
Santiago of the Bureau of Lands as Commissioner and directing him to identify and delineate the lot in
question.
In compliance therewith, Engr. Santiago submitted the Commissioners Report and Sketch stating in part:
That as per order of the court dated November 29, 1990 to delineate the land [in] question, the undersigned
court commissioner notified both parties and the schedule of survey was January 12, 1991 but it was
postponed and moved to January 15 as requested by the representative from the Municipality of Buruanga.
That the land in question involved was pointed to me by the Honorable Mayor of the Municipality of
Buruanga, identified on the plan as [L]ot 138 located at Poblacion Buruanga with survey no. GSS-06-00012
approved by the Director Lands last February 19, 1985, listed as Public Plaza on file in the CENR Office Land
Management Sector, Kalibo, Aklan.
That the Honorable Mayor of the Municipality of Buruanga pointed also the boundary between the Public
Plaza and the Roman Catholic Church.
Consistent with the above technical description, the sketch submitted by Engr. Santiago showed the
delineation of Lot 138 into three parts: Lots 138-A, 138-B and 138-C. The municipal building stood on Lot
138-A; the Roman Catholic Church stood on Lot 138-B and the municipal health center and the Buruanga
Community Medicare building stood on Lot 138-C. It also showed that portions of Lots 138-A and 138-C were
being used as public plaza.
At the pre-trial, the parties stipulated on the following facts:

The Technical Descriptions are as follows: 1. The identity of the lot in question which is Lot 138 consisting of Lots 138-A, 138-B and 138-C as reflected
Lot 138-A (Public Plaza) in the commissioners sketch with an area of 9,544 square meters and subdivided as follows:

corner 1-2 S86 - 03E 65.54 m. Lot 138-A 2,319 square meters
2-3 S03 - 17E 32.36 m. Lot 138-B 3,836 square meters
3-4 N88 - 54W 71.31 m Lot 138-C 3,389 square meters
4-1 N06 - 33E 35.68 m.
2. Lot 138-B is the present site of the Roman Catholic Church of Buruanga.11[11]
containing an area of 2,319 square meters

Lot 138-B (Roman Catholic Church) The parties also agreed that the sole issue for resolution is who between the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo
and the Municipality of Buruanga is the owner of Lot 138.
1-2 S86 - 03E 65.54 m.
2-3 S03 - 17E 32.36 m. After due trial, the court a quo rendered its Decision dated October 30, 1995 declaring the Roman
3-4 N88 - 54W 71.31 m. Catholic Bishop of Kalibo as the lawful owner and possessor of Lot 138-B and the Municipality of Buruanga
4-1 N06 - 33E 35.68 m. as the lawful owner and possessor of Lots 138-A and 138-C, the said lots being public plaza for public use.

containing an area of 3,836 square meters The court a quo found that of the various tax declarations12[12] presented by the Roman Catholic Bishop of
Kalibo to support its claim, only one referred to a portion of Lot 138. Said tax declaration13[13] covered the
Lot 138-C (Public Plaza) church site and the parish house situated within Lot 138-B. The other pieces of evidence14[14] could not be
relied upon because they contained hearsay information relating to the disputed lot that occurred before the
1-2 N81 - 19W 87.70 m. affiants were born. The affidavit executed by Fr. Jesus Patio15[15] stating that he was the one who gave verbal
2-3 N06 - 33E 38.90 m. permission to then Municipal Mayor Pedro Omugtong to construct the municipal building on the vacant lot
3-4 S83 - 17E 80.35 m. owned by the church was not accorded any evidentiary value because he (Fr. Patio) did not testify during the
4-1 S03 - 17E 42.57 m. trial.
containing an area of 3,389 square meters10[10]
On the other hand, the court a quo did not give credence to the Municipality of Buruangas Exhibit 1, a
microfilm enlargement of a plan showing that the land consisting of 12,615 square meters was subject of
Land Registration Case No. 12871. The plan showed that the survey was approved on May 15, 1909 and the
notations therein indicated that a decree was issued on March 14, 1919. But no such decree was shown. It
was further found by the court a quo that the plan was requested from the Bureau of Lands Survey Division
on December 22, 1976. However, the same was not duly certified by the issuing government agency. Even
assuming that the disputed lot was indeed subject of a land registration proceeding and a decree had been
issued therefor in March 1919, the Municipality of Buruanga, despite lapse of decades, failed to take the
necessary judicial steps for the issuance of a title in its name based on the decree. Neither did it take any other
course of action that would render its title thereto indefeasible.
The court a quo, however, gave probative weight to the testimony of Manuel Sualog, Chief of the Lands
Management Section of the Department of Environment and National Resources, who was presented by the
Municipality of Buruanga. Sualog testified that the disputed lot was the public plaza of the said municipality.
Standing thereon are the Roman Catholic Church and its parish house, the new municipal hall, the rural health
center, the barangay community hospital and a basketball court.
During the court a quos ocular inspection conducted on May 7, 1992, the town was celebrating its town fiesta.
It observed that the public was using the whole plaza (in Lots 138-A and 138-C) for the festivities. Also, the
existence of the health centers, basketball court and the municipal hall showed that portions of the disputed
lot were being used by the public.
Upon inspection of the church, the court a quo further observed that it was indeed an old stone structure and
probably built in 1894, the year carved on its left side entrance. It described the church as vintage turn-of-
the century colonial Filipino church architecture. Moss and ficus grow out of its wall crevices. The age of the
church shows that it has been occupying that particular space for almost one hundred (100) years long
enough for the plaintiff to have possessed it in the concept of owner continuously, adversely and publicly
against the whole world.16[16]
The court a quo held that the facts of the present case were similar to those in Harty v. Municipality
of Victoria,17[17] where the Court ruled that:
For the above reasons, x x x it should be held, as we do hereby hold, that the whole of the land not occupied
by the church of the town of Victoria and its parish house, is a public plaza of said town, of public use and that
in consequence thereof, the defendant is absolved of the complaint without any special ruling as to the costs
of both instances.18[18]
The dispositive portion of the court a quos decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo, Aklan, is declared the lawful owner and possessor of Lot 138-B
with an area of 3,836 square meters in the Commissioners Report as against the defendant;
2. Defendant Municipality of Buruanga is declared the lawful owner and possessor of Lot 138-A with an
area of 2,319 square meters and Lot 138-C with an area of 3,389 square meters in the Commissioners Report,
said lots being public plaza destined for public use.19[19]
The Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo seasonably filed its appeal with the Court of Appeals. It sought the
reversal of that portion of the court a quos judgment adjudicating the ownership of Lots 138-A and 138-C to
the Municipality of Buruanga.
During the pendency of the case in the appellate court, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo moved to submit
additional evidence to support its claim of ownership over the entire Lot 138. The additional evidence
consisted of affidavits of old residents of Buruanga stating that the municipal building was constructed on
the disputed lot only in the late 1950s. Prior thereto, the municipal building stood at a place called Sunset
Park, a block totally different from the disputed lot. The said motion was denied by the appellate court on the
ground that the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo had already been accorded full opportunity to present its
evidence in the court a quo.
The Municipality of Buruanga did not file its appellees brief with the CA. On January 31, 2001, the appellate
court rendered the assailed Decision affirming with modification the decision of the court a quo. The CA
affirmed the ownership of the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo over Lot 138-B but reversed the court a quos
ruling relative to the ownership of Lots 138-A and 138-C. The appellate court declared the said lots property
of public dominion, hence, not owned by either of the parties.
The CA stated that the court a quo correctly relied on the ruling in Harty, which was reiterated in Bishop of
Calbayog v. Director of Lands,20[20] where the Court held that the public plaza and public thoroughfare were
not subject to registration by the church. In the latter case, it was ruled that since neither the Church nor the
municipality presented positive proof of ownership or exclusive possession for an appreciable period of time,
and the only indubitable fact was the free and continuous use of the lot in question by the residents of the
town, which had no other public plaza to speak of other than the disputed lot, there was a strong presumption
that the same had been segregated as a public plaza upon the founding of the municipality therein.

As mentioned earlier, the appellate court reversed that portion of the court a quos judgment declaring the
Municipality of Buruanga as the owner of Lots 138-A and 138-C which form part of the public plaza. Citing
Articles 41921[21] and 42022[22] of the Civil Code, the appellate court classified these lots as property of
public dominion; hence, not susceptible to private ownership by the Municipality of Buruanga. The said lots
are merely under its jurisdiction and administration. Being intended for the common and public welfare, they
could not be appropriated either by the State or by private persons.
The dispositive portion of the assailed CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, upon the premises, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Lots 138-
A and 138-C are declared property of public dominion not owned by either of the parties.23[23]
The Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo moved for a partial reconsideration of the appellate courts
ruling that Lots 138-A and 138-C, being the public plaza, are property of public dominion. The Roman Catholic
Bishop of Kalibo averred that the appellate court erred in affirming the finding of the court a quo that these
lots comprise the public plaza. It maintained that it owned the entire Lot 138.
The appellate court denied the motion for partial reconsideration, hence, the recourse to this Court
by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo (the petitioner).
The Petitioners Arguments
The present petition for review on certiorari alleges that:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN RELYING UPON THE CASES OF HARTY V. MUNICIPALITY
OF VICTORIA, TARLAC (13 Phil. 152 [1909]) and BISHOP OF CALBAYOG V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS (45 SCRA 418
[1972]) TO SUPPORT ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE PETITIONER IS NOT THE OWNER OF LOTS 138-A AND
138-C.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT LOTS 138-A AND 138-C [WHICH ARE
WITHIN THE ORIGINAL LOT 138] ARE PROPERTIES OF THE PUBLIC [DOMAIN] AND NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP BY THE PETITIONER.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO RECOGNIZE THAT PETITIONERS
OWNERSHIP OF THE ENTIRE LOT 138 WAS GRANTED AND RECOGNIZED UNDER SPANISH LAW, AND
AFFIRMED IN THE TREATY OF PARIS.24[24]
The petitioner clarifies that it is seeking a partial review of the appellate courts Decision dated
January 31, 2001 classifying Lots 138-A and 138-C as property of public dominion and not susceptible to
private ownership and that the petitioner is not entitled to the possession and ownership thereof. It is not
contesting the portion of the CA decision upholding its ownership over Lot 138-B.
The petitioner opines that the case of Harty, relied upon by the court a quo and the CA to hold that
Lots 138-A and 138-C comprise the public plaza, are inapplicable because the facts therein are not similar to
those of the present case. The petitioner points out that the public plaza referred to in Harty was the lot across
the street from the church lot. It was not referring to the land surrounding the Catholic church and the convent
of the town of Victoria, which was bounded by streets on each of its four sides. Thus, when the Court in Harty
limited the ownership of the church to the land occupied by the church of the town of Victoria and its parish
house, it was not confining the ownership to a portion of the lot on which the church and parish house were
situated. Rather, the Court in Harty referred to the entire lot or block (bounded by a street on each of the four
sides) on which the church and its parish house were erected.
The petitioner asserts that the following facts that have been established support its claim of
ownership over the entire Lot 138 as against the claim of the Municipality of Buruanga (respondent
municipality):
[a] The church is built in the middle of Lot 138 (which is now Lot 138-B). It was built therein in 1894. The
church was almost 100 years old (at the time the case was instituted with the trial court in 1990). x x x
[b] The Municipality of Buruanga is an old municipality constituted or created during the colonial period,
when the Philippine Islands was under the Spanish sovereignty. x x x
[c] No building was built on Lot 138 earlier than or at about the same time as the church. No municipal
building was built around the church for many decades after 1894. x x x
[d] The municipal hall of Buruanga was built on what is now Lot 138-A only in the late 1950s. x x x
[e] It was not controverted by the private respondent that then Mayor Omugtong of Buruanga sought and
obtained the permission of the then parish priest, Fr. Jesus Patino, to allow the municipal government to build
its municipal hall on Lot 138-A in the late 1950s only. x x x
[f] No evidence was adduced by private respondent that it had obtained title of Lot 138-A or 138-C from the
church (the owner of these lots) or that its possession of any portion of Lot 138 was adverse to that of the
church. x x x
[g] When the municipal hall was burned down by the NPA rebels in 1989 the church asked the municipal
government to relocate the municipal hall elsewhere since it (church) needed the lot for itself.
[h] Because the municipal government resisted and for the first time exhibited a possession adverse to the
church, the petitioner promptly filed the instant suit before the lower court for quieting of title to the subject
lot (the entire Lot 138) and to be declared the owner of such property.
[i] The church has been in continuous, open, adverse, notorious possession of the entire Lot 138 in the
concept of owner since at least 1894 until the late 1950s. x x x
[j] No evidence has been shown that Lots 138-A and 138-C were devoted for public use or for use as a public
plaza before 1894 or even at about the time the church was built on Lot 138. x x x
[k] The only evidence as to the supposed character of Lot 138-C as a public plaza is a survey plan allegedly
approved on 15 May 1909 denominated as [GSS]-06-00012, Buruanga Settlement Project, approved only in
1984. Petitioner was not notified of this survey. x x x
[l] The real property tax declaration presented by private respondent to establish its supposed possession
(Exhs. 4, 4-a, and 4-b, Record, pages 45-47) covered the year 1992 only.
[m] Witness Jaime S. Prado, Sr. (who was born on 17 December 1905 and coming to the age of reason when
he was about 10 years old) testified that as far as he can remember (since he was grade 1) he was brought to
mass by his elders at the church of Buruanga, which was the very same church as of the time he testified in
1992, and was active in church activities in that church (e.g., tsn, 9 January 1992, pages 5, 16); that the
property of the church was bounded on all four sides by the very same streets that bounded it at the time he
testified (ibid., at page 6-8).
[n] Private respondent indirectly judicially admitted that it has no title (Torrens or otherwise) to the subject
properties when its star witness (the incumbent Mayor Protacio Obrique of Buruanga) testified that the
properties in the poblacion of Buruanga are not covered by any title (tsn, 27 July 1992, page 5).25[25]
The petitioner contends that the pronouncement in Bishop of Calbayog, cited by the appellate court,
does not support its decision. Instead, it actually supports the petitioners claim of ownership over Lot 138,
including Lots 138-A and 138-C. In the said case, the lot (Lot 2) that was declared by the Court as plaza was a
separate and distinct lot separated from the church lot (Lot 1) by a provincial road. Lot 1, held to be owned
by the church in the said case, included not only the space occupied by the church, belfry, convent, parish
school and nuns residence, but also the empty space which only had concrete benches as improvements
thereon and which was used as a public playground.
The petitioner also cites Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaro v. Director of Lands,26[26] where the Court
recognized that under the Laws of the Indies (Leyes de las Indias), the law in force in the Philippine Islands
during the Spanish regime, the property of the church in the pueblos consisted of one parcel of land which
meant not only the two buildings but also the land adjacent and contiguous to said buildings, that is, the parcel
which by itself constitutes one whole piece of land bounded on its four sides by streets, and within which said
buildings, the church and the convent, are situated.27[27]
According to the petitioner, the appellate court erred in affirming the finding of the court a quo that
Lots 138-A and 138-C comprise the public plaza. Unlike in Harty, no evidence was allegedly adduced to show
that from the time respondent municipality was created these two lots had been set aside for the public.
Harty is not applicable, the petitioner expounds, because it was indubitably established therein that the plaza
was used without let or hindrance by the public and the residents of Victoria ever since its creation. In
contrast, in the present case, there was allegedly no evidence to show that Lots 138-A and 138-C were set
aside as the public plaza, or for any public purpose, when the Municipality of Buruanga was created during
the Spanish period. The evidence, in fact, show that the entire Lot 138, bounded on all its four sides by streets,
belonged to the church and it had continuous use and occupation thereof since 1894 when it constructed its
church in the middle of Lot 138. No such use of Lot 138-A and 138-C as the public plaza for the same length
of time or from 1894 had been shown.
The petitioner assails the reliance by the appellate court on the court a quos statement during its
ocular inspection on Lot 138 in 1992 that it observed that the property was occupied by the Roman Catholic
Church, a parish house, the municipal hall and three of its municipal edifices, and a basketball court. Based
on this observation, the court a quo concluded, and the appellate court affirmed, that Lots 138-A and 138-C
comprise the public plaza. The petitioner objects to this conclusion stating that the same cannot overcome
the evidence in favor of the church as to its ownership over these lots traced back to 1894 when it constructed
the church in the middle of Lot 138 or what is now Lot 138-B.
It reiterates that under the Laws of the Indies, when a municipality was created, the church was
assigned a property consisting of a parcel of land bounded on all its four sides by streets, and that the public
plaza was situated not on the same parcel of land assigned to the church but on a distinct lot separated by a
street from that assigned to the church.
The petitioner likewise argues that even if it, as the owner of the entire Lot 138, allowed respondent
municipality to build its municipal hall on what is now Lot 138-A in the late 1950s by mere tolerance of the
parish priest, it does not necessarily follow that Lot 138-A had become property of public dominion. It does
not allegedly lose its possession or ownership over the property if the possession or use by another of the
same is by mere tolerance.
Respondent municipality, through its Mayor Protacio Obrique during his testimony, allegedly
admitted that respondent municipalitys lot was located in a portion designated as Lot 2 in its Exhibit 1. The
said lot was along the beach and separated from Lot 138 by Emilio Ostan Street. The alleged import of this
admission is that the entire Lot 138 (designated as Lot 1 in Exhibit 1) was assigned solely to the church since
a different lot was assigned to respondent municipality.
The petitioner avers that Buruanga is an ancient Spanish town and that when it was created the Spanish
authorities assigned a distinct and separate lot for its municipal government or pueblo where it could build
its municipal hall or casa real. It could thus be assumed that the casa real of respondent municipality would
be built at about the same time as the church or around 1894. The petitioner contends that nothing in the
evidence suggests that the casa real was built on Lot 138 during the said period. It was only in the late 1950s
that the municipal hall was built thereon upon the permission granted by the parish priest.

Refuting respondent municipalitys view that it is unthinkable that the church would be given a bigger
property than the municipal government, the petitioner submits that such notion is not far fetched
considering that the primary aim of the Spaniards at the time was to spread the Catholic faith to the colonies.
That the entire Lot 138 belonged to the petitioner is allegedly supported by the practice during the Spanish
period, as shown by the layout of the church convent and church plaza in practically all the old towns in the
Philippines and the early cases28[28] decided by the Court, to invariably provide the church with spacious
grounds bounded by the four principal streets of the town.
Even without any document or certificate of title thereto, the petitioner bases its claim of ownership over Lot
138 under the Spanish Law as recognized and affirmed under the Treaty of Paris. It cites Roman Catholic
Apostolic Church v. Municipality of Placer29[29] where the Court recognized that the church is entitled not
only to possession of its properties but to ownership thereof. Bishop of Jaro was again invoked by the
petitioner as the Court explained therein that it did not find it strange that the church was unable to exhibit
a written title to its property since the Laws of the Indies in force during the Spanish regime dictated the
layout of the towns and assigned the locations of the church, square and government administration
buildings. The provisions of the Laws of the Indies pertaining thereto were held to be sufficient to secure the
registration in the name of the church of its land.
The petitioner asserts that even granting arguendo that Lot 138 was not assigned to it during the Spanish
regime or is not owned by it pursuant to the Laws of the Indies, still, it had acquired ipso jure or by operation
of law a government grant, a vested title, to the disputed lot by virtue of its open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation thereof since 1894. In support of this contention, the petitioner cites
Subsection 6 of Section 54 of Act No. 926, which became effective on July 26, 1904, and which provided that:
6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said Act of
Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the
Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the taking effect of this Act, except when prevented by
war or force majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land
under the provisions of this chapter.
It is allegedly clear that as early as July 26, 1904, when Act No. 926 took effect, the petitioner had already
acquired a government grant, a vested title, to Lot 138.
Subsection b of Section 45 of Act No. 2874, approved on November 9, 1919, which amended Act No. 926, is
similarly cited by the petitioner. It provided that:
(b) Those who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership, except as against the Government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and
ninety-four, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter.
On the basis of the foregoing provisions, a land registration proceeding instituted would, according to the
petitioner, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession
claimed is of the required character and length of time, and registration thereunder would not confer title,
but simply recognize a title already vested.
In addition to its arguments on the merits of the case, the petitioner assails the appellate courts denial of its
motion to submit additional evidence which would have showed that the casa real of respondent
municipality, together with its plaza (Sunset Park Plaza), was located on a distinct lot (Lot 2) separated from
Lot 138 by Emilio Ostan Street.
The petitioner urges the Court to reverse and set aside the portion of the appellate courts decision declaring
Lots 138-A and 138-C as property of public dominion and to declare the petitioner the absolute owner of the
entire Lot 138. In the alternative, the petitioner prays that it be allowed to submit additional evidence of its
ownership over Lots 138-A and 138-C.
Respondent Municipalitys Counter-arguments
For its part, respondent municipality contends that, except for the figures 1894 etched on the left wall of the
church, the petitioner has not presented any evidence to show that it had continuous possession of the entire
Lot 138 since the turn of the twentieth century. The petitioner is allegedly of the mistaken belief that because
it possessed Lot 138-B, it must have likewise possessed Lots 138-A and 138-C. Respondent municipality
claims that it is the one that has been exercising acts of exclusive ownership over the disputed lot.
The petitioner has allegedly misread Harty and Bishop of Calbayog in claiming that in cases involving the
church, the lot adjudicated to it invariably consisted of the entire block, bounded by a street on each of the
four sides, and the public plazas were situated in separate blocks. While it may true that many church
properties occupy an entire block in certain municipalities, it is allegedly equally true that other church
properties occupy only portions thereof depending on the exigencies of the locality at the time when the
church was being established.
In those instances that the Court allegedly adjudicated an open space in favor of the church, the local
government was not shown to have exercised dominion over the property and the church has consistently
established some control over it, like the putting up of a religious monument thereon. On the other hand, in
the present case, respondent municipality insists that it has laid adverse claim over Lot 138 as early as 1909
when it applied for title over it and was even issued a decree over the said lot. Respondent municipality places
its actual, public and adverse possession of Lot 138 at the latest in 1958 when it built its old municipal hall
on the said site. Its occupation prior thereto could also be allegedly presumed from its actual possession
thereof.
The petitioner has allegedly failed to establish that the construction of the old municipal building in 1958 was
by mere tolerance on its part. Respondent municipality harps on the failure of the petitioner to present as its
witness Fr. Patio, the parish priest who supposedly gave respondent municipality permission to construct its
municipal building on the disputed lot. Respondent municipality denies ever seeking such permission.
Further, the tax declaration (Exhibit B) of the petitioner only pertained to Lot 138-B proving that its
ownership was limited to the said lot and did not extend to Lots 138-A and 138-C.
Respondent municipality avers that it is already contented with the decision of the appellate court although
the latter allegedly erred in concluding that Lots 138-A and 138-C are property of public dominion without
taking into consideration that respondent municipality applied for the issuance of title covering the disputed
lot and was issued a decree thereto in 1919. The admission of Mayor Obrique, during his testimony, that
respondent municipality owned the lot along the beach (Lot 2) and situated across the street from Lot 138
could not be allegedly taken to mean that the Mayor was disclaiming ownership over Lot 138.
Respondent municipality theorizes that in those cases30[30] that the Court upheld the ownership of the
church over a subject property, the same have ever since remained the property of the church and have been
in its peaceful possession. Further, there were no adverse claimants and the primary issue being resolved
was whether, despite non-compliance with procedural requirements, title may be granted in favor of the
church.
Respondent municipality distinguishes the present case from those cases in that there is an open contest over
the ownership and possession of Lots 138-A and 138-C and respondent municipality has in its favor actual
and adverse possession thereof. It emphasizes that there is nothing in fact and in law that would support the
petitioners bare claim of ownership and possession over Lots 138-A and 138-C. On the contrary, there is
allegedly strong evidence showing respondent municipalitys exercise of proprietary and governmental rights
over the said lots where it has constructed permanent structures, e.g., municipal building, community
hospital, health center, social hall/basketball court, and where public functions are openly conducted.
Respondent municipality urges the Court to dismiss the petition and, instead, to affirm the decision of the
court a quo declaring it the lawful owner and possessor of Lots 138-A and 138-C.
Issue
The substantive issue to be resolved is whether the appellate court correctly declared Lots 138-A and 138-C
as property of public dominion, hence, not susceptible to ownership by either the petitioner and respondent
municipality.
Since respondent municipality no longer sought the review of the assailed decision of the appellate court, the
Court shall mainly resolve the merits of the petitioners claim of ownership over Lots 138-A and 138-C vis--
vis the appellate courts holding that they are of public dominion, hence, not susceptible to private ownership.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is denied.
The Laws of the Indies and the cases cited
by the petitioner do not support its claim
of ownership over Lots 138-A and 138-C
The petitioner anchors its claim of ownership over Lots 138-A and 138-C on its theory that the entire Lot 138,
bounded on all its four sides by streets, was assigned to it as far back as 1894 when the church was built in
the middle of the said lot. The cases it cited allegedly stand for the proposition that under the Laws of the
Indies, when a municipality was created, the church was assigned a property consisting of a parcel of land
bounded on all its (four) sides by streets, and that the public plaza was situated not on the same parcel of
land assigned to the church but on a distinct parcel of land separated from the parcel of land assigned to the
church by a street.31[31]
This allegation fails to persuade. The pertinent provision of the Laws of the Indies relating to the
designation of a parcel of land for the church upon the establishment of a town or pueblo during the Spanish
regime reads:
Ley viij. Que se fabriquen el Templo principal en el sitio, y disposicion, que se ordena, y otras Iglesias, y
Monasterios.
En lugares Mediterrneos no se fabrique el Templo en la plaza, sino algo distante de ella, donde est separado de
otro qualquier edificio, que no pertenezca su comodidad y ordenato, y porque de todas partes sea visto, y mejor
venerado, est algo levantado de suelo, de forma que se haya de entrar por gradas, y entre la plaza mayor, y
Templo se edifiquen las Casas Reales, Cabildo, Concejo, Aduana, y Atarazana, en tal distancia, que autoricen al
Templo, y no le embaracen, y en caso de necesidad se puedan socorrer, y si la poblacion fuere en Costa, dispngase
de forma que en saliendo de Mar sea visto, y su fbrica como defensa del Puerto, sealando solares cerca de l, y no
su continuacion, en que se fabriquen Casas Reales, y tiendas en la plaza para propios, imponiendo algun
moderado tributo en las mercaderas: y asmismo sitios en otras plazas menores para Iglesias Parroquiales, y
Monasterios donde sean convenientes.32[32]
The above provision prescribed that the church be built at some distance from the square, separate
from other buildings in order that it may be better seen and venerated, and raised from the ground with steps
leading to it. It decreed that government administration buildings, including casas reales, be built between
the main square and the church and at such distance as not to shut the church from view. In cases of coastal
towns, the church was to be constructed in such location as to be seen by those coming from the sea and serve
for the defense of the port.
The other provisions of the Laws of the Indies on the establishment of new towns or pueblos in the
archipelago, including the designation of lands for the church, casa reales (municipal buildings) and public
squares, had been discussed by the Court in this wise:
xxx
The executive authorities and other officials who then represented the Spanish Government in these Islands
were obliged to adjust their procedure, in the fulfillment of their duties with regard to the establishment and
laying out of new towns, to the Laws of the Indies, which determined the course that they were to pursue for
such purposes, as may be seen by the following:
Law 6, title 5, book 4, of the Recompilation of the Laws of the Indies, provides, among other things:
"That within the boundaries which may be assigned to it, there must be at least thirty residents, and each one
of them must have a house," etc.
Law 7 of the same title and book contains this provision:
"Whoever wishes to undertake to establish a new town in the manner provided for, of not more than thirty
nor less than ten residents, shall be granted the time and territory necessary for the purpose and under the
same conditions."
It may be affirmed that years afterwards all the modern pueblos of the Archipelago were formed by taking as
a basis for their establishment the barrios already populated by a large number of residents who, under the
agreement to build the church of the new pueblo, the court-house and afterwards the schoolhouse, obtained
from the General Government the administrative separation of their barrio from the pueblo on which it
depended and in whose territory it was previously comprised. In such cases procedure analogous to that
prescribed by the Laws of the Indies was observed.
For the establishment, then, of new pueblos, the administrative authority of the province, in representation
of the Governor-General, designated the territory for their location and extension and the metes and bounds
of the same; and before the allotting the lands among the new settlers, a special demarcation was made of the
places which were to serve as the public square of the pueblo, for the erection of the church, and as sites for
the public buildings, among others, the municipal building or the casa real, as well as of the lands which were
to constitute the commons, pastures, and propios of the municipality and the streets and roads which were
to intersect the new town were laid out, as may be seen by the following laws:
Law 7, title 7, book 4, of the Recompilation of the Laws of the Indies, provides:
"The district or territory to be given for settlement by composition shall be allotted in the following manner:
There shall first be set apart the portion required for the lots of the pueblo, the exido or public lands, and
pastures amply sufficient for the stock which the residents may have, and as much more as propios del lugar
or common lands of the locality; the rest of the territory and district shall be divided into four parts one of
them, of his choice, shall be for him who takes upon himself the obligation to found the pueblo, and the other
three shall be apportioned equally among the settlers."
Law 8, of the same title and book, prescribes, among other things:
"That, between the main square and the church, there shall be constructed the casas reales or municipal
buildings, the cabildo, concejo, customs buildings," etc.
Law 14 of the said title and book, also directs among other things:
"That the viceroys shall have set aside such lands as to them appear suitable as the common lands (propios)
of the pueblos that have none, therewith to assist in the payment of the salaries of the corregidores, and
sufficient public lands (exidos) and pasture lands as provided for and prescribed by law."
Law 1, title 13 of the aforesaid book, provides the following:
"Such viceroys and governors as have due authority shall designate to each villa and lugar newly founded and
settled the lands and lots which they may need and may be given to them, without detriment to a third party,
as propios, and a statement shall be sent to us of what was designated and given to each, in order that we may
have such action approved."33[33]
Nowhere in the above provisions was it stated that the parcel of land designated for the church of the town
or pueblo was, in all cases, to be an entire block or bounded on all its four sides by streets. The petitioner thus
erroneously asseverates that the said ancient laws sustain its claim of ownership over the entire Lot 138.
Neither can it find support in the cases that it cited. A careful review of these cases reveal that, in those
instances where the Court upheld the claim of the church over a parcel of land vis--vis that of the municipality
or national government, the ownership and possession by the church of the same had been indubitably
established by its exclusive exercise thereon of proprietary acts or acts of dominion.
For example, in Bishop of Calbayog v. Director of Lands,34[34] which according to the petitioner supports its
case, the Court adjudicated in favor of the church the ownership of Lot 1 (except the portion thereof occupied
by a public thoroughfare) including not only the space occupied by the church, belfry, convent, parish school
and nuns residence, but also the empty space which only had concrete benches as improvements thereon.
With respect to the empty space (eastern portion of Lot 1), the Court noted the following:
x x x The eastern portion of Lot 1, the area in contention, is an empty space except for concrete benches along
the perimeter. A partly cemented path runs across this lot from east to west leading up to the front or entrance
of the church and appears to be an extension of Anunciacion St., which runs from the bank of the Catarman
river up to Mendiola St. In the middle of this path, half-way between Mendiola St. and the church, is a statue
of the Sacred Heart of Jesus.
xxx
x x x The Roman Catholic Church had made no improvements on this eastern portion of Lot 1, which at
present is being used as a public playground, although a bandstand stood there for about three years after it
was constructed in 1926 by the members of an orchestra which was organized by a Fr. Ranera and which
used to give musical performances on the bandstand. On the feast of Corpus Christi the parishioners would
construct an altar on this lot and hold the procession there.35[35]
It is apparent that the Court adjudicated to the church the ownership of Lot 1 (except a portion
thereof which was a public thoroughfare) because the latter was able to establish that it had exercised acts
of possession or ownership over the same including over its empty space. In particular, the empty space was
used for religious functions, such as the Feast of Corpus Christi and the procession held on the occasion and
the church did not ask for any permit from the local authorities whenever it used the said space for such
activities.

In the present case, the petitioner has not shown that, at one time after the church was built in 1894
in the middle of Lot 138 (now Lot 138-B), it exercised acts of ownership or possession over Lots 138-A and
138-C as well.
It must be emphasized that the petitioners allegation that it merely tolerated the construction of not
only the municipal building but also the other improvements thereon, e.g., the rural health center, Buruanga
community Medicare hospital, basketball court, Rizal monument and grandstand, has remained
unsubstantiated. The affidavit of Fr. Patio was correctly not given any credence since he was not presented
on the witness stand; thus, considered hearsay. Hearsay evidence is generally excluded because the party
against whom it is presented is deprived of his right and opportunity to cross-examine the person to whom
the statement or writing is attributed.36[36]
The testimony of Mr. Jaime S. Prado, Sr., an octogenarian and resident of Buruanga, cannot likewise
be given any credence because it consisted only of a bare assertion that the church building and the land on
which it was built, bounded by streets on all its four sides, were the petitioners property.37[37] He based this
statement on the fact that as a child he heard masses at the church with his parents. This assertion, without
more or without any corroborative evidence, is not sufficient to establish the petitioners ownership over Lots
138-A and 138-C especially in light of the fact that Mr. Prado is not competent to testify on the matter because
he had no actual personal knowledge with respect to any transactions involving Lot 138:
FISCAL DEL ROSARIO:
Q Now, when you were President of the Parish Council, have you access of any documents relating to
church properties in Buruanga, Aklan?
A Never.
Q Now, you have stated that the boundaries of the property of the [R]oman [C]atholic [C]hurch in
Buruanga, Aklan has previous names thus, the present name of Viven Ostan, Nitoy Sualog and Emilio Ostan
is at present now. My question is, what was the previous names of these roads?
A Of Nitoy Sualog, that was Malilipayon Street. The Provincial road street, before that was Kaaganhon
street, West, Emilio Ostan, before that was Kahaponanon Street and instead of Viven Ostan, that was
Kabulakan Street.
Q So, you will agree with me Mr. Witness so, that previous names is not in any way related to the
names of former parish priest[s] of Buruanga, Aklan or saints, am I right?
A No, sir.
Q You know very well Rev. Jesus Patinio and Mayor Pedro Omugtong?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, do you remember if there was any transaction of them during your lifetime?
A This Padre Patinio and I were close friends. Mr. Omugtong met Patinio[,] talked together about the
land they agreed[,] and I dont know what is there (sic) agreement but the building was constructed then.
Q Were you present during the talked (sic) of Rev. Jesus Patinio and Mayor Pedro Omugtong?
A No, sir.Q You identified in this Exhibit F as Municipal Hall, Rural Health Unit Hospital, the Buruanga
Community Hospital, Basketball Court and the Grandstand. Now, my question is, are these buildings
constructed by the [R]oman [C]atholic [C]hurch?
A Not one.38[38]
Even the affidavits of the other residents of Buruanga, which were also properly considered hearsay, made
no mention of any instance where the petitioner exercised acts of dominion over Lots 138-A and 138-C. These
affidavits uniformly stated:
That we have been residing in this Municipality since birth and that we have full knowledge of the site where
the church now stands;
That during the Pre-Spanish time, the site of the town proper was swampy, fishermen used to fish in the
swamp, trees of different kinds grows (sic) along the beach;
That when the Spaniards arrived in our town, they introduced education and religion;
That because there was no site for the church, the Spaniards forced the inhabitants to work for the filling up
of the swamp, men are hauling stones[,] and women[,] sand and gravel;
That after so many years of hard labor the swamp was filled up and then the friars build a church in the center
of the town;
That as far as we are concerned the site where the church now stand and the surrounding area and the site
where the present Municipal building now stands is even the part of the property of the church and not the
property of the municipality as allege (sic) by the Mayor;
That we execute this affidavit with our own free act and voluntary deed.39[39]
The information proffered by these affidavits could not have been based on the personal knowledge of the
affiants because they obviously were not yet born when the events they narrated took place.40[40]
Like in Bishop of Calbayog, the Court in Hacbang v. Director of Lands41[41] adjudicated to the church the
ownership of two parcels of land, designated as Lots 1 and 2 despite the opposition of the Director of Lands
who claimed that a portion on the eastern part of Lot 1 and the entire Lot 2 were public plazas. The Court
affirmed the ownership of the church over these lots upon the following findings:
It is inferred from the foregoing facts which are held to have been indisputably established by the evidence,
that the disputed portion of lot No. 1 as well as the entire lot No. 2 belongs to the Roman Catholic Apostolic
Church of the Diocese of Samar and Leyte. It cannot be denied that said church, for more than half a century,
was in the possession of said lands together with the church, belfry and convent which existed first on lot No.
1 and later provisionally on lot No. 2. The fact that the catholic cemetery was located on lot No. 2 and that the
stone posts and pillars were later erected thereon, thereby converting it into a place for the celebration of the
Way of the Cross, conclusively proves that the property belonged to the church and that the latter's
possession has constantly been under claim of ownership.
x x x [I]t must be presumed upon these facts that said portion formed part of the parcels of land assigned and
adjudicated by the authorities to the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in said town for the erection of the
church, belfry, convent and cemetery, all of which, as everybody knows, are necessary for the practice and
celebration of the cults of said religion.42[42]
The proprietary acts exercised by the church over the disputed lots consisted of the construction thereon of
the church, belfry, convent and cemetery. Moreover, it conducted thereon the Way of the Cross and other
religious celebrations.
Unlike in the Bishop of Calbayog and Hacbang, in the present case, the petitioner has not shown that it
exercised proprietary acts or acts of dominion over Lots 138-A and 138-C, to the exclusion of others, to
buttress its claim of ownership over these lots.
Neither can the petitioner rely on Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaro v. Director of Lands43[43] where the Court
categorically made the finding that the lot in question (Lot 3) had been in the possession of the church, as
owner, for a time sufficiently long for purposes of prescription. In a prior case44[44] involving the said lot,
the Court adjudged that the church was entitled to the possession of the following property situated in the
Municipality of Sibalom: The Church of Sibalom, the convent, contiguous to the same, and the land occupied
by these two buildings.
The Court interpreted the phrase "land occupied by the church and its convent" to mean not only the two
buildings, but also the land adjacent and contiguous to said buildings, that is, the parcel which by itself
constitutes one whole piece of land bounded on its four sides by streets, and within which said buildings, the
church and the convent, are situated.45[45]
Significantly, the parcel of land that was adjudicated in favor of the church was the land adjacent and
contiguous to said buildings, i.e., church and convent. The word adjacent has been defined as follows:
The word adjacent is of Latin derivation. An examination of its original use clearly indicates that in order that
things shall be adjacent they shall be thrown near together.
Webster in his International Dictionary defines adjacent as lying near, close or contiguous; neighboring;
bordering upon; and gives as synonyms the words adjoining, contiguous, near.
Roque Barcia in his Diccionario General Etimolgico de la Lengua Espaola, in defining the word adjacent, uses
as synonyms inmediato, junto, prximo. Things cannot be inmediatas, juntas, prximas where other objects
intervene.
Vicente Salva in his Nuevo Diccionario Francs-Espaol defines the word adjacent as qui est situ aupres, aux
environs.
Black in his Law Dictionary defines adjacent as lying near or close to; contiguous. The difference between
adjacent and adjoining seems to be that the former implies that two objects are not widely separated, though
they may not actually touch.
Harpers Latin Dictionary as revised by Lewis and Short, in defining the word ad-jaceo, which is equivalent to
the English word adjacent, says it means to lie at or near, to be contiguous to, to border upon.
The Universal Encyclopedia defines an adjacent angle as an angle contiguous to another, so that one side is
common to both angles.
In the case of Miller v. Cabell (81 Ky., 184) it was held that where a change of venue was taken to an adjacent
county it must be taken to an adjoining county.
In the case of Camp Hill Borough (142 Penn. State, 517), it was held that the word adjacent meant adjoining
or contiguous.
In the case of In re Municipality, etc. (7 La. Ann., 76), the court said: We think the word adjacent, applied to
lots, is synonymous with the word contiguous.

In the case of the People v. Schemerhorne (19 Barber [N.Y.], 576), the court said: The interpretations given
to the adjacent by Walker are lying close, bordering upon something.46[46]
Blacks Law Dictionary defines contiguous as in close proximity; neighboring; adjoining; near in succession;
in actual close contact; touching in at a point or along a boundary; bounded or traversed by.47[47]
Applying the foregoing definitions, the land adjacent and contiguous to the church and the parish house in the
present case is the land comprising Lot 138-B. On the other hand, Lots 138-A and 138-C are the lands adjacent
and contiguous to the municipal building, rural health center, Buruanga community Medicare hospital,
basketball court, Rizal monument and grandstand thereon.
Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaro therefore is not squarely applicable to the present case because of significant
factual differences. Specifically, in the former, the buildings or structures on the disputed land all belonged
to the church; hence, this fact was construed by the Court in favor of the church as constituting its exercise of
acts of dominion over the land adjacent and contiguous to these buildings. On the other hand, the municipal
building, rural health center, Buruanga community Medicare hospital, basketball court, Rizal monument and
grandstand, all standing on Lots 138-A and 138-C, are not owned by the petitioner. Moreover, the petitioner
has not shown that it had, at any time, exercised acts of dominion over these lots. Consequently, given its
tenuous claim of ownership, Lots 138-A and 138-C, the lands adjacent and contiguous to the buildings and
improvements which admittedly do not belong to the petitioner, cannot be adjudicated to the latter under
the circumstances.
Seminary of San Carlos v. Municipality of Cebu,48[48] cited in Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaro, is also unavailing
to the petitioner because the Court, among others, simply explained therein that the word church refers to
the land upon which the church stands, and not to the church building itself. In the present case, the petitioners
ownership has not been limited by the court a quo and the appellate court to the church structure itself but
also as including Lot 138-B, on which it stands.
In Roman Catholic Apostolic Church v. Municipality of Placer,49[49] the Court definitively recognized the
juridical personality and proprietary rights of the church citing the Treaty of Paris50[50] and other pertinent
Spanish laws. It held therein that the church not only was entitled to the possession of the church, convent
and cemetery of Placer but was also the lawful owner thereof.
It bears stressing that the crux in the foregoing cases, particularly Bishop of Calbayog, Hacbang and Jaro, is
that the church had indubitably established its exercise of exclusive proprietary acts on the lots that were
subject of the controversy. The same cannot be said with respect to the petitioner in relation to Lots 138-A
and 138-C. In fact, not one of the enumeration ([a] to [n]) made by the petitioner in its Petition for Review as
allegedly showing its ownership over Lots 138-A and 138-C categorically establishes that it exercised thereon
exclusive proprietary acts or acts of dominion.
The ruling in Harty v. Municipality of
Victoria is applicable to the present case
Contrary to the stance taken by the petitioner, the ruling in Harty v. Municipality of Victoria51[51] is
applicable to the present case. The said case involved the dispute between the church and the Municipality
of Victoria over the parcel of land that surrounded the parish church of the said town, and which was called
the public plaza of the same. The Court therein held that the whole of the land not occupied by the church of
the town of Victoria and its parish house, is a public plaza of the said town, of public use. It justified its
conclusion, thus:
xxx
From the evidence presented by both parties it appears that the town of Victoria, which was formerly only a
barrio of the town of Tarlac and known as Canarum, was converted into a town in 1855, and named Victoria;
to this end they must have laid out the streets and the plaza of the town, in the center of which were situated
the church and parish house from the commencement, and at the expiration of about twelve years the parish
of said town was constituted and the priest, who was to perform the office of curate, was appointed; that from
the very beginning, the large tract of land that surrounds the church and the parish house was known as a
public plaza, destined to the use of all the residents of the recently founded town; public performances and
religious processions were held thereon without hindrance either on the part of the local authorities or of the
curate of said town.
It must be assumed that the principal residents of the old barrio, being interested in the conversion of the
barrio into a civil town, arranged in such a way that the barrio, as the center of the future town which was
subsequently called Victoria, should have streets and a public plaza with its church and parish house, and
also a tribunal or building destined for the use of the municipality and the local official at the time called the
gobernadorcillo and later on capitan municipal, as has occurred in the foundation of all the towns in these
Islands, under the old administrative laws.
It may be true that the father of the witness Casimiro Taedo, who owned the space of land where the church
and parish house were erected, had voluntarily donated it to the Catholic Church, the only one known at the
time, but proper proof is lacking that the donation affirmed by the said Taedo comprehended the whole of
the large tract which at the present time constitutes the plaza of the town.
It was a custom observed by all the towns established administratively in these Islands under the old Laws
of the Indies, that on their creation, a certain amount of land was always reserved for plazas, commons, and
special and communal property, and as it is unquestionable that the said large space of land was left vacant
in the center of the town of Victoria when it was constituted as a civil town, more than twelve years prior to
the appointment of a permanent curate therein, there are good grounds to suppose that the late Vicente
Taedo donated the land now occupied by the church and parish house in said municipality for religious
purposes, or to the church, but not to the parish curate, because at the time there was no curate at the new
town of Victoria.
Even though all the remaining space of land which now forms the great plaza of the town of Victoria had been
owned by the said Taedo, it must be presumed that he waived his right thereto for the benefit of the
townspeople, since from the creation or establishment of the town, down to the present day, all the residents,
including the curate of said town, have enjoyed the free use of said plaza; it has not been satisfactorily shown
that the municipality or the principales of the town of Victoria had donated the whole of said land to the curate
of Victoria or to the Catholic Church, as alleged, nor could it have been so donated, it being a public plaza
destined to public use and was not private ownership, or patrimony of the town of Victoria, or of the Province
of Tarlac.
It should be noted that, among other things, plazas destined to the public use are not subject to prescription.
(Art. 1936, Civil Code.) That both the curates and the gobernadorcillos of the said town procured fruit trees
and plants to be set out in the plaza, does not constitute an act of private ownership, but evidences the public
use thereof, or perhaps the intention to improve and embellish the said plaza for the benefit of the
townspeople.
Certain it is that the plaintiff has not proven that the Catholic Church or the parish of Victoria was the owner
or proprietor of the said extensive piece of land which now forms the public plaza of said town, nor that it
was in possession thereof under the form and conditions required by law, inasmuch as it has been fully
proven that said plaza has been used without let or hindrance by the public and the residents of the town of
Victoria ever since its creation. For the above reasons, it is our opinion that the judgment appealed from
should be reversed, and that it should be held, as we do hereby hold, that the whole of the land not occupied
by the church of the town of Victoria and its parish house, is a public plaza of the said town, of public use, and
that in consequence thereof, the defendant is absolved of the complaint without any special ruling as to the
costs of both instances.52[52]
The petitioner argues against the applicability of Harty as it makes much of the fact that the disputed lot
therein was situated across the street from the church lot. When the Court therein limited the ownership of
the church to the land occupied by the church of the town of Victoria and its parish house, it did not allegedly
confine its ownership to a portion of the lot on which the church and parish house were situated but to the
block occupied by these structures.
To the Courts mind, however, whether the disputed lot was on the same block as the church or separated
therefrom by a street was not the crucial factor which constrained the Court in Harty to rule against the
churchs claim of ownership over the said property. Rather, it was the fact that the church was not able to
prove its ownership or possession thereof. The ruling on this point is reiterated below:
Certain it is that the plaintiff has not proven that the Catholic Church or the parish of Victoria was the owner
or proprietor of the said extensive piece of land which now forms the public plaza of said town, nor that it
was in possession thereof under the form and conditions required by law, x x x53[53]
As applied to the present case, that Lots 138-A and 138-C are on the same block as the lot on which the church
and its parish house stand do not necessarily make them (Lots 138-A and 138-C) also the property of the
petitioner absent any evidence that its ownership or possession extended to these lots and under the
conditions required by law.
Contrary to its submission, the petitioner had
not acquired ipso jure or by operation of law
a government grant or title to the entire Lot 138
The petitioner submits that even granting arguendo that the entire Lot 138 was not assigned to it during the
Spanish regime or it is not the owner thereof pursuant to the Laws of the Indies, its open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of Lot 138 since 1894 and for many decades thereafter
vests ipso jure or by operation of law upon the petitioner a government grant, a vested title, to the subject
property. It cites Subsection 6 of Section 54 of Act No. 92654[54] and Subsection b of Section 45 of Act No.
2874.55[55]
This contention is likewise not persuasive.
One of the important requisites for the application of the pertinent provisions of Act No. 926 and Act No. 2874
is the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land by the applicant.
Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party
would naturally exercise over his own property.56[56] The phrase possession and occupation was explained
as follows:
It must be underscored that the law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated
by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the order [sic].
Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law
adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken
together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the
fact that for one to qualify under paragraph (b) of the aforesaid section, his possession of the land must not
be mere fiction. As this Court stated, through then Mr. Justice Jose P. Laurel, in Lasam v. The Director of Lands:
x x x Counsel for the applicant invokes the doctrine laid down by us in Ramos v. Director of Lands. But it
should be observed that the application of the doctrine of constructive possession in that case is subject to
certain qualifications, and this court was careful to observe that among these qualifications is one particularly
relating to the size of the tract in controversy with reference to the portion actually in possession of the
claimant. While, therefore, possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on
every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession, possession under paragraph 6 of
section 54 of Act No. 926, as amended by paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, is not gained by mere
nominal claim. The mere planting of a sign or symbol of possession cannot justify a Magellan-like claim of
dominion over an immense tract of territory. Possession as a means of acquiring ownership, while it may be
constructive, is not a mere fiction. x x x
xxx
Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is continuous when
uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show
exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when
it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood.
Use of land is adverse when it is open and notorious.57[57]
Indisputably, the petitioner has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of Lot 138-B since 1894 as evidenced by the church structure built thereon. However, the record is bereft of
any evidence that would tend to show that such possession and occupation extended to Lots 138-A and 138-
C beginning the same period. No single instance of the exercise by the petitioner of proprietary acts or acts of
dominion over these lots was established. Its unsubstantiated claim that the construction of the municipal
building as well as the subsequent improvements thereon, e.g., the rural health center, Buruanga community
Medicare hospital, basketball court, Rizal monument and grandstand, was by its tolerance does not constitute
proof of possession and occupation on its (the petitioners) part.
Absent the important requisite of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
thereon since 1894, no government grant or title to Lots 138-A and 138-C had vested upon the petitioner ipso
jure or by operation of law. Possession under paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, as amended by
paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, is not gained by mere nominal claim.58[58]
Lots 138-A and 138-C comprise the public
plaza and are property of public dominion;
hence, not susceptible to private ownership
by the petitioner or respondent municipality
The appellate court correctly declared that Lots 138-A and 138-C comprise the public plaza and are property
of public dominion; hence, may not be the object of appropriation either by the petitioner or respondent
municipality. In support thereof, it cited Bishop of Calbayog ratiocinating:
This ruling [referring to Harty] was, in fact, reiterated in Bishop of Calbayog v. Director of Lands (45 SCRA
418) involving the same question of ownership of the land which surrounded the parish church of the town.
The Supreme Court therein declared that the public plaza and public thoroughfare are not subject to
registration by the church; that since neither the Church nor the municipality presented positive proof of
ownership or exclusive possession for an appreciable period of time, and the only indubitable fact is the free
and continuous use of Lot 2 by residents of Catarman, and the town had no public plaza to speak of other than
the disputed parcel of land, there was a strong presumption that the same had been segregated as a public
plaza upon the founding of the municipality of Catarman. x x x59[59]
As can be gleaned, the above discussion principally pertained to Lot 2, a public plaza the ownership of which
was disputed by the Bishop of Calbayog and the Municipality of Catarman.
The appellate court correctly cited Bishop of Calabayog. However, the ruling therein pertaining to a portion
of Lot 1 occupied by a public thoroughfare is more apropos to the present case. To recall, in the said case, the
application of the Bishop of Calabayog as to the eastern portion of Lot 1 was also being opposed by the
Municipality of Catarman on the ground that it was part of the public plaza. As mentioned earlier, the Court
upheld the ownership of the church over Lot 1 including not only the space occupied by the church, belfry,
convent, parish school and nuns residence, but also the empty space which only had some benches as
improvements thereon. Significantly, the portion of Lot 1 occupied by a public thoroughfare (Nalazon Street)
was ordered excluded from the application for registration filed by the church. The Court therein made the
following findings with respect to the public thoroughfare:
Admittedly Nalazon St. was originally merely a trail used by the parishioners in going to and from the church.
But since 1910, when it was opened and improved as a public thoroughfare by the municipality, it had been
continuously used as such by the townspeople of Catarman without objection from the Church authorities.
The acacia trees along both sides of the street were planted by the municipality in 1920, although these trees
were cut down recently upon order of the priest. There is no proof that the Church merely tolerated and
limited the use of this street for the benefit of its parishioners, considering that the street traverses the entire
length of the poblacion from south to north and that Lot 1, on which the church stands, is located almost at
the center of the poblacion. The street does not stop on Lot 1 but extends north toward the sea, passing along
the lot occupied by the Central Elementary School and the Northern Samar General Hospital. Thus, it is clear
that Nalazon St. inside Lot 1 is used by the residents not only in going to the church but to the public school
and the general hospital north of Lot 1.60[60]
In the present case, the following improvements now stand on Lots 138-A and 138-C: the municipal building,
rural health center, Buruanga community Medicare hospital, basketball court, Rizal monument and
grandstand. Except for the construction of the municipal building, the other improvements were made on
Lots 138-A and 138-C, and continuously used by the public without the petitioners objection. Further, there
is no proof that the petitioner merely tolerated the construction of these improvements. On the other hand,
the free and continuous use by the public of Lots 138-A and 138-C, as found by the court a quo and affirmed
by the appellate court, incontrovertibly establishes that they are property for public use.
On this point, Articles 420, quoted anew below, and 424 of the Civil Code are applicable:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the
State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
Art. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consist of the provincial roads,
city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public
service paid for by said provinces, cities or municipalities.
Property for public use of provinces and towns are governed by the same principles as property of public
dominion of the same character.61[61] The ownership of such property, which has the special characteristics
of a collective ownership for the general use and enjoyment, by virtue of their application to the satisfaction
of the collective needs, is in the social group, whether national, provincial, or municipal.62[62] Their purpose
is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the citizens; they are intended for the common and public
welfare, and so they cannot be the object of appropriation, either by the State or by private persons.63[63]
The appellate court committed no reversible
error in denying the petitioners motion for
reception of evidence
In denying the petitioners motion for reception evidence, the appellate court reasoned that based on the
records, the petitioner was already accorded the full opportunity to present its evidence in the court a quo
and that the evidence to be introduced in the desired hearing would not directly establish its ownership of
the disputed lots.64[64]
The petitioners motion for reception of evidence filed with the appellate court stated that the additional
evidence that it sought to submit consisted of affidavits of old residents of Buruanga attesting to the fact that
the old municipal building was in fact at a place called Sunset Park prior to its transfer to the present
site.65[65] These affidavits would allegedly establish that respondent municipality could not be the owner
of Lots 138-A and 138-C which it had neither possessed nor occupied.66[66]
The appellate court did not err in denying the petitioners motion for reception of evidence. Indeed,
the petitioner was already given full opportunity during the trial in the court a quo to adduce any and all
relevant evidence to substantiate its claim of ownership over the entire Lot 138. In no sense, therefore, may
it be argued that it was denied due process of law.67[67] With the reality that those documents were never
presented and formally offered during the trial in the court a quo, their belated admission for purposes of
having them duly considered in the resolution of the case on appeal would certainly collide with Section 34,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which reads:
SECTION 34. Offer of Evidence. The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The
purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.68[68]
In any case, as correctly stated by the appellate court, these affidavits would not directly establish the
petitioners ownership over Lots 138-A and 138-C.
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 31, 2001
of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated July 18, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 52626 are AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.