Asian Perspective 38 (2014), 219240

In Your Face: Domestic Politics,

Nationalism, and Face in the
Sino-Japanese Islands Dispute

Gregory J. Moore

While Chinas rising power is certainly an important variable in Sino-

Japanese relations, it cannot explain either why the Diaoyu/Senkaku
Islands dispute broke out anew in the fall of 2012 or why the Chi-
nese response was so strong. China read Japans move to national-
ize the islands as an in-your-face move designed to show disrespect
for China and make Japans sovereignty over the islands a fait ac-
compli. In this article I borrow from Robert Putnams notion of two-
level games to argue that there are two levels of face politics going
on in this case: one between domestic actors in Japan and in China,
the other between the two countries. A solution to the territorial
dispute can only be found when both sides face needs are rec-
ognized and met at both levels of analysis. KEYWORDS: China-Japan
relations, Diaoyu, Senkaku, dispute, face.

Islands dispute is often cast as part of the larger drama between

THE SINO-JAPANESE DIAOYU (FOR CHINA)/SENKAKU (FOR JAPAN)

Japan and the United States on one side and China on the other.
The argument for this view is that the territorial dispute has
emerged more recently because Chinas growing power capabili-
ties have reached a point where it now feels confident enough to
press its claims against Japan, and Japan is growing more
assertive simultaneously because it sees China as increasingly
threatening due to Chinas growing power. Is this, however, really
the best way to view the dispute?
I argue in this article that while Chinas rising power is cer-
tainly an important variable in Sino-Japanese relations, it cannot
explain either why the dispute broke out anew in the fall of 2012
or why the Chinese response was so strong. Chinas reaction truly
surprised Tokyos leaders, who had sought to avoid a showdown
with China by preventing nationalist governor Ishihara Shintaro

219
220 In Your Face

from appropriating the islands for the Tokyo Metropolitan Prefec-

ture. China, on the other hand, read Japans move to nationalize
the islands as an in-your-face move, arrogant and aggressive, pur-
posely seeking to disrespect China and make Japans sovereignty
over the islands a fait accompli. I borrow from Robert Putnams
notion of two-level games to argue that two levels of face politics
are going on in this case. One is between domestic actors in
Japanbetween the central government and moderates on the one
hand and Ishihara and the far right on the otherand in China,
between moderates in the government on the one hand and more
anti-Japan forces in the government and among the online com-
munity on the other. The second level at which face politics is in
play is at the bilateral foreign-policy level, between China and
Japan more broadly.
Nationalism is the fuel that feeds the fire in both societies,
making face politics more combustible and political maneuvers at
any level of analysis more difficult. Identities, as Ted Hopf (2012)
has so successfully illustrated, play a key role in setting the stage
for the respective policy decisions that were made in Tokyo and
Beijing. Among the conclusions I reach in my study, perhaps the
most important is that a solution to the territorial dispute can only
be found when both sides face needs are recognized and met
at both levels of analysis.

The Diaoyu/Senkaku Dispute in

Sino-Japanese Relations as a Face Case

The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are a cluster of eight islands located

seventy-six nautical miles (nm) east of Taiwans Pengjia Islet
(also known as Agincourt),1 ninety-two nm north of Japans Ishi-
gaki Island (part of the Ryukyu Island chain), 123 nm northeast of
Taiwan proper, 200 nm east of Chinas mainland, and 200 nm
southwest of Japans Okinawa, the largest island in the Ryukyus
(see map p. 180). The islands, together accounting for a mere 6.3
square kilometers, are uninhabited, though Japan has placed a per-
manent marker on one and patrols them aggressively. After Gov-
ernor Ishihara pledged to purchase three of them for the city of
220 In Your Face

from appropriating the islands for the Tokyo Metropolitan Prefec-

ture. China, on the other hand, read Japans move to nationalize
the islands as an in-your-face move, arrogant and aggressive, pur-
posely seeking to disrespect China and make Japans sovereignty
over the islands a fait accompli. I borrow from Robert Putnams
notion of two-level games to argue that two levels of face politics
are going on in this case. One is between domestic actors in
Japanbetween the central government and moderates on the one
hand and Ishihara and the far right on the otherand in China,
between moderates in the government on the one hand and more
anti-Japan forces in the government and among the online com-
munity on the other. The second level at which face politics is in
play is at the bilateral foreign-policy level, between China and
Japan more broadly.
Nationalism is the fuel that feeds the fire in both societies,
making face politics more combustible and political maneuvers at
any level of analysis more difficult. Identities, as Ted Hopf (2012)
has so successfully illustrated, play a key role in setting the stage
for the respective policy decisions that were made in Tokyo and
Beijing. Among the conclusions I reach in my study, perhaps the
most important is that a solution to the territorial dispute can only
be found when both sides face needs are recognized and met
at both levels of analysis.

The Diaoyu/Senkaku Dispute in

Sino-Japanese Relations as a Face Case

The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are a cluster of eight islands located

seventy-six nautical miles (nm) east of Taiwans Pengjia Islet
(also known as Agincourt),1 ninety-two nm north of Japans Ishi-
gaki Island (part of the Ryukyu Island chain), 123 nm northeast of
Taiwan proper, 200 nm east of Chinas mainland, and 200 nm
southwest of Japans Okinawa, the largest island in the Ryukyus
(see map p. 180). The islands, together accounting for a mere 6.3
square kilometers, are uninhabited, though Japan has placed a per-
manent marker on one and patrols them aggressively. After Gov-
ernor Ishihara pledged to purchase three of them for the city of
 Gregory J. Moore 221

Tokyo (these three had previously been owned by private

Japanese individuals), despite protests from China, the Japanese
government itself then purchased them, in effect nationalizing
them (Associated Press 2012).
The broader dispute in the East China Sea (called the Sea of
Japan by the Japanese) between China and Japan entails two sep-
arate but related issues: competing sovereignty claims over the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and disputes over the different methods
for maritime delimitations between China and Japan. Both sides
have claims to the islands based on particular methods of delim-
iting the boundaries between the states in the neighborhood. The
two different delimitation methodsChina prefers the continental
shelf, Japan prefers the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)have
important implications for their sovereignty claims. Alongside
these arguments, each side has a narrative about its claim to the
islands based on historical records. I briefly consider here the
claims of China (Peoples Republic of China [PRC]) and Japan
(Valencia 2007).

Chinas Claims

China bases its claims to the islands primarily on its method for
delimiting the maritime boundaries between it and Japan,
namely, the natural prolongation of the continental shelf. The
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are inside the natural prolongation of the
continental shelf extending from the Chinese mainland. China
argues that the trough between the continental shelf and the
Ryukyu Islands (and between the Diaoyus and the Ryukyus)
makes it evident that the Ryukyus are attached to Japan but that
Taiwan and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are part of the Chinese
continental shelf.
While Chinas claims to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are
based primarily on the continental shelf argument, China also has
a historical argument that buttresses its claims.2 The Chinese
maintain that they discovered the islands in the fourteenth cen-
tury, incorporating them into their coastal defense network in
1556. The Chinese generally say the islands were part of China all
along, but that China was forced to cede them to Japan, along
222 In Your Face

with Taiwan, in 1895 as a part of the Treaty of Shimonoseki,

marking the end of the first Sino-Japanese War (which China, of
course, lost). Other Chinese concede the Japanese argument that
Japan took the islands in January 1895 prior to the provisions of
the Treaty of Shimonoseki of May 1895, but that in either case the
islands were ceded under duress along with Taiwan, which clearly
was included in the provisions of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. As
with Taiwan, provisions for the return of the islands were
included in the 1943 Cairo Declaration and upheld in the 1945
Potsdam Declaration, agreements reached between the allied pow-
ers, which included China, during World War II.3 The United
States then administered the islands from wars end (1945) until
1971, when the Ryukyus (including Okinawa) and the Senkakus
were given back to Japan to administer. China argues that they
should have reverted to Chinese control at that time.

Japans Claims

Japan argues for maritime delimitations based on the UN Con-

vention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and its 200-mile EEZ,
using straight baselines. Japan proposes using a median line in
cases in which the 200-nm lines of adjacent countries EEZs over-
lap. Japan holds that the UNCLOS 200-nm limit should be the
key means of determining delimitations. Hence, given the islands
proximity to the Ryukyus (ninety-two nm away from the closest
point, Ishigaki Island), Japan claims them as being within its own
territory, inside its 200-nm EEZ as drawn from the Ryukyus.
Japan adds to this a historical argument. It claims that the
islands were unoccupied and unclaimed by Chinas Qing dynasty
and so were incorporated into Japan in 1895 by way of a Japanese
legislative act (January 14). This act was separate from the annex-
ation of Taiwan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki in May of the same
year. Japan maintains that Taiwan was returned to China follow-
ing World War II, but that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were not
because they were not a part of the annexation of Taiwan. Japan
argues that its control of the islands went unchallenged by anyone
from 1895 until 1971, and relates renewed interest in the islands
to a 1968 UN study showing possible oil deposits in the area.
 Gregory J. Moore 223

Only then, Tokyo says, did Beijing begin to show interest in the
islands and make claims to them.
Japan also argues that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were not a
part of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty wherein Japan
renounced its claims to former holdings in Asia that it had
acquired during the war, along with Taiwan and the rest of China.
It notes that the islands were under US administration from 1945
to 1971, along with Okinawa, the rest of the Ryukyus, and Japan
itself from 1945 to 1952. The Japanese point out that when Oki-
nawa and the Ryukyus reverted back to Japanese control in 1971,
the Senkakus were formally included. While Japan understands
that Chinese fishermen frequented the area prior to 1895 and
afterward, it argues that this presence does not diminish Japans
claim to sovereignty over the islands.

On Face Politics and Levels of Analysis

Needs and Norms

In the case of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute, the argument

I present is that the issue of face is important. Individuals, fami-
lies, groups, and states have face needs, conceived of as inter-
ests of a sort, and seek to have these met as their representatives
make their foreign policy choices. Interests are defined here not
exclusively in the material sense as realists tend to perceive them.
Alexander Wendt says about interests, Interests are beliefs about
how to meet needs (1999, 129). Wendt goes on to say that col-
lective self-esteem is a national interest of states (1999, 236).
Needs might be material in nature, but they might also be beliefs
about material factors we believe we need.
Needs are certainly subject to some interpretation. Face can
be considered a need, whether we speak of individuals or states
accepting here provisionally, for convenience sake, realist under-
standings of the unitary or anthropomorphized stateand can also
be defined as something akin to dignity or honor. In his work on
nationalism in China, Peter Gries has also highlighted the role of
face, which he defines as the self revealed to others (Gries
224 In Your Face

2005, 22). He argues that the maintanence of face for groups/

nations is needed to preserve in group positivity and collective
self-esteem (Gries 2005, 22). Classical realist Reinhold Niebuhr
recognized the importance of such factors as well, referring to
group pride and noting that while it might be the glue that holds
groups/nations together, it might also be a serious impediment to
intergroup or international relations (Moore forthcoming).
In international relations a factor such as face would normally
be considered to go against the rational actor model of handling
interest pursuit and choicea model that assumes a universal
sense of rationality. However, Chinese scholar and constructivist
Qin Yaqing has distinguished between rationality and relation-
ality in decisionmaking processes, noting that in Western cultural
contexts, rationality is conceived of as the highest value when
making a choice (Qin 2009).4 In Eastern cultural contexts such as
China, however, he observes a relational approach that stands
above rationality. As I read Qin, this is not to say that relational
approaches are irrational but that they are locally or contextually
rational. The emphasis is on the relationship between the parties
involved rather than on some pure, disinterested, objective,
rational pursuit of interests and goals. Relationality puts the rela-
tionship, or guanxi, between parties above the most expedient,
logical choice in some cases. Face maintenance is part and parcel
of this cognitive or social construction of interest articulation and
interest pursuit, for face and face maintanence are inherently
social (relational or contextual).
In East Asian cultural contexts, respecting one anothers face
and giving face to the other side is expectedand is an important
part of the relationality that holds the society together. Face is part
of what is needed to maintain order, give actors roles to play, and
provide expectations about the appropriateness (or inappropriate-
ness) of certain behavior. Face is rooted in the Confucian social
order that has provided the foundation of East Asian societies for
some two millennia. Face can be given, received, denied, recog-
nized. Face can be ignored and disrespected, or attended to and
honored. A slight to face is a particularly serious affront in East
Asian societies, whether between individuals, families or other
groups, or nations, because it violates the norm of relationality.
 Gregory J. Moore 225

Kwang-kuo Hwang has written extensively about social rela-

tions in Confucian societies and the roles of face. The implica-
tions of his findings are important for Sino-Japanese relations.
Hwang defines face as situated identity, social reputation . . .
the kind of status that has been deliberately accumulated by a per-
son through effort and achievement and with pride during the
course of life (Hwang 2012, 270, 267268). In Confucian social
relations in generalwhich applies to China and Japan, among
other East Asian societies5Hwang finds three kinds of interper-
sonal relations in Confucian social orders. I apply these to inter-
group relations. The three are vertical in-group relations, which
come with expressive ties and involve close relations; horizontal
in-group relations, which come with mixed ties and involve
friends, coworkers, and known nonfamily members; and horizon-
tal out-group relations, which conform with instrumental ties and
involve strangerspeople contacted to accomplish low-iteration
instrumental goals (Hwang 2012).
What Hwang discovers about relations between strangers or
out-groups seems rather sobering or even foreboding as regards
Sino-Japanese relations, though we want to be careful to avoid any
kind of cultural or social-structure determinism here. The nature of
relations between actors in East Asian cultural milieux is shaped
strongly by the social context in which relations take place, which
again underlines Qins point above about the importance of rela-
tionality in East Asian cultural contexts. In East Asian cultural
contexts, foreigners or foreign states are in the horizontal out-
group/instrumental categorythat of strangers, meaning Sino-
Japanese relations. This category applies to relations between
Japanese and Chinese, whether as individuals or as groups and
nations, in all cases making relations difficult to manage.
Despite these distinctions, the incredible culture of hospitality
to guests and visitors in East Asian societies, whether from in-
groups or out-groups, is still apparent. However, this hospitality
applies to situations in which the guest/visitor is invited and care-
fully follows the culturally expected protocol. Departures from
that protocol involving out-group members in Confucian contexts
lead to a quickly deteriorating social situation. Moreover, in con-
texts wherein one or ones group interacts with out-group mem-
226 In Your Face

bers or out-groups in contexts in which there is not an invita-

tion/guest social context, it seems clear that Hwangs horizontal
out-group relations with instrumental ties would dominate. Aside
from diplomatic niceties and state visits by foreign dignitaries,
much of international relations transpires in this nonguest social
context, particularly because the invitation/guest social context
applies primarily to individuals and delegations rather than to
groups and nations.
As support for his conclusions, Hwang cites the work of
Leung (1988), who compared the responses to conflict scenarios
of US and Hong Kong Chinese participants. Hwang says that
Leungs results showed that, if the involved benefits were large
and if the would-be disputant was from an out-group, Chinese
participants were more likely to pursue a conflict than were Amer-
icans (2012, 357). Hwang adds, Chinese emphasize the distinc-
tion between in- and out-group. They value the importance of
in-group harmony, while they are more likely to pursue conflict
with a disputant from an out-group (2012, 357). Hwang also
points out that Chinese had more self-face concern . . . than
Japanese, based on comparative studies (2012, 333).

Two Levels of Face

Hwang notes that face can be socially applied or collectivized, in

that the failure of one member of a family or group can bring loss
of face to the whole family or group. As Wang Zheng (2012) and
others have pointed out, failures in international soccer tourna-
ments or in international competitions like the Olympics can bring
tensions and pressures over face among East Asian nations and
their athletes. Matters of face become more acute between mem-
bers of out-groups, particularly when unresolved historical con-
flicts are added to the mix, as is the case between China and Japan
(at least from Chinas perspective), for example.
Face is important at two levels. I speak here not of two levels
of analysis as in international relations theory but of domestic
politics and foreign policy. The domestic level concerns the rela-
tionship between the state (including its foreign policy) and the
publica vertical face politics because this level involves rela-
 Gregory J. Moore 227

tions between state and society. The second level is bilateral and
horizontal, between one state and another. In this case both sides
of the dyad have face claims or face needs. Whether these needs
are honored becomes a part of the process of relations between
them, and is often symbolic of the state of relations between
them.
In international relations theory, Robert Putnam (1988) has
offered up a useful related framework based on his notion of two-
level games. Putnam notes that foreign policy decisionmakers
must consider factors at two levelsand I note that here, too, we
are talking about the second, foreign policy level of analysis in
both cases: that of domestic politics (what is expedient or prudent
in terms of the domestic political interests of the decisionmakers
or the good of the public), and that of international or bilateral
politics (what is good for the nation).
I argue here that face matters in Sino-Japaneseor, more
broadly, East Asian internationalrelations, and that it matters at
two levels, as described above. In considering foreign policy
choices on the islands issue, decisionmakers in Beijing and Tokyo
have to take into consideration domestic political factors as well
as international/bilateral factors.

Face in Domestic Politics

Tokyo and Beijing both face domestic challenges to what has

since 1972 been an engagement-centric policy toward the
other. Since then the two have been for the most part pragmatic
traders, avoiding the politicization of bilateral relations by Cold
Warera conflicts such as the Vietnam War, differences over
human rights, and other issues that have hampered relations
between China and the West. But the situation is much different
now, a difference that can be traced back to 2005, peaking again
in 2010 with the confrontation between the Japanese trawler and
the Chinese fishing boat, and peaking once more in 2012 with
the dispute over Japans nationalization of the islands. This last
sharp rise continued through 2013 with Chinas establishment of
an Air Defense Identification Zone over the Diaoyu/Senkaku
228 In Your Face

Islands and Prime Minister Abes visit to the Yasakuni Shrine

for Japans war dead.
In Japan and China, tensions are increasing between the state
and disaffected members of society. This increase is true in gen-
eral but more so in China, and it is true as well in terms of how
each handles relations with the other (Reilly 2011). These contes-
tations have put both governments under increasing pressure to be
less flexible and more assertive vis--vis the other, thereby con-
tributing to the difficulty of resolving the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue.
The relevance of state-society tensions was particularly true in
2012, a year of political transitions in both countries, with Chinas
Eighteenth Party Congress and the transition from Hu Jintao to Xi
Jinping in November, and Japans contentious national elections
in December.

Face and Domestic Politics in Japan

Ishihara Shintaro laid the foundation for a crisis in Sino-Japanese

relations in the spring of 2012 when he announced that he would
use funds from his prefectural government to buy three of the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Seeking to block Ishiharas move, Prime
Minister Noda Yoshihiko announced in September 2012 that the
government would nationalize the islands, which is to say that the
government would take them over by purchasing them from the
individuals managing them. This move brought to a boiling point
the extant tension between Japan and China over the islands,
resulting in large-scale demonstrations in China, the burning of
Japanese flags, sabotage to Japanese cars and businesses, and the
cancellation of Chinese government travel and educational pro-
grams with Japan.
In understanding why Sino-Japanese relations reached a boil-
ing point and a new low in the fall of 2012, one must consider
first the domestic political environment in Japan that led to the
nationalization of the islands. I argue that the move was not a
decision taken in Tokyo to poke China in the eye, so to speak.
Rather, it was the result of a contest between moderate and right-
ist elements in the Japanese government and society more broadly
speaking. Ishihara and others believe that Japan should become a
 Gregory J. Moore 229

normal country, disengaging from the US security umbrella and

developing a more robust and self-sustaining military of its own,
possibly including possession of nuclear weapons. He and others
on the Japanese right believe that Japans peace consitution is out
of date and that Japan must move forward to confront what they
see as rising threats from China and North Korea. They believe
China in particular is increasingly encroaching on Japans terri-
tory and territorial waters, most specifically in the case of the
Senkaku Islands and the East China Sea. They believe the gov-
ernment has not been firm enough in dealing with China. Conse-
quently, Ishiharas notion of buying the islands was very popular
among the rightists.
Ishiharas move put the moderate Noda government in a bind.
Noda and his supporters did not want Ishihara to hijack Tokyos
relations with China by provoking China. I do not believe, nor
have I seen any evidence, that Noda ever had any plans to nation-
alize the islands prior to Ishiharas moves, understanding how
sensitive the issue was with China. Noda and the Democratic
Party of Japan (DPJ) had been content with the status quo. How-
ever, after Ishiharas moves, they either had to go along with Ishi-
hara, which made Ishihara look correct and them look weak,
causing a loss of face, or they would have to block Ishihara.6 I
believe they feared that blocking Ishihara but not nationalizing the
islands themselves would make them look weak as well, for they
feared they might be portrayed as Neville Chamberlains by the
Japanese right.
The course that the moderates chose was a middle one in their
eyes. Hoping that the Chinese would understand that they sought
to avoid a showdown with China, Japans moderates chose to
nationalize the islands via the central government, assuring China
there would be no change in the status quo otherwise. If Ishihara
had succeeded in taking over the islands, they feared he would put
on a show of nationalistic zeal, building structures on the islands
and flaunting them before Chinese eyes. By taking possession of
the islands themselves, they sought to take hold of a situation that
otherwise might quickly spin out of control. They sought also to
maintain their partys face in light of upcoming national elections.
If the DPJ lost facedomestically with the right or bilaterally
230 In Your Face

with Chinaor failed to stand firm on the islands and China, the
right side of the political spectrum would gain in the polls, per-
haps costing the DPJ the elections.7

Face and Domestic Politics in China

Unfortunately, the Chinese did not read the situation as the Japan-
ese leadership hoped they would, and things did spin out of con-
trol. The Chinese did not believeor chose not to believe?the
narrative that Tokyo offered, that of trying to avoid a right-wing
takeover of the islands. Beijing chose to portray the nationaliza-
tion of the islands as a blatant, in-your-face move to disregard
Chinas national sense of face, its historical claims to the islands,
and the perhaps uncomfortable but at least stable status quo that
had existed since 1972. Chinese media accounts did not portray
Ishiharas role as key to sparking the nationalization, but rather
portrayed it as the final culmination of a long-standing Japanese
policy to nationalize the islands, forever concretizing Japanese
sovereignty over them.
Why was it portrayed this way in China? The most logical
explanation is that, as was the case with Noda and the Japanese
right, the Chinese government was concerned about an antigov-
ernment backlash if it did not take a firm stand on Japans moves.
As one Chinese academic interlocutor put it to me, The people
have hijacked Chinese foreign policy. James Reilly (2011) and
others (see, e.g., Shen and Breslin 2010) have written about the
rise of online nationalists in China, and the increasing influence
they have in public debates and even in policymaking, despite the
attempts of the Chinese government to stem their influence. While
it is arguably true that the Patriotic Education Campaign has
stoked the fires of Chinese nationalism for years (Zhao 2004), it
is also true, as Reilly, Shen and Breslin, and others have shown,
that nationalism has taken on a life of its own. That reality must
sometimes be disturbing to Chinese policymakers, since it can put
them in a difficult position.
For these policymakers, an uncomfortable analogy exists
between todays situation with Japan and the years surrounding
May 4, 1919, the birthdate of modern Chinese nationalism.
 Gregory J. Moore 231

Chinas May Fourth Movement was catalyzed by anti-Japanese

fervor that is not unlike the popular nationalism that the Chinese
government faces today. When, after signing the Versailles Treaty
and turning over Germanys former concessions in China to
Japaninstead of giving them back to Chinathe Chinese dele-
gation returned home to intense resentment from Chinese nation-
alists. The nationalists turned out in force to protest the Versailles
Treaty and what they saw as Japanese encroachment on Chinese
territory. As the demonstrations increased in fervor, they began to
turn increasingly against an already shaky Chinese government,
threatening in the end to bring it down.
While not often discussed in China, the analogy is uncom-
fortably apt in too many ways. Chinese policymakers cannot
appear to their own citizens to be too soft on Japan. Ordinary Chi-
nese have been presented with too many narratives of national
humiliation and the glories of the present military buildup to
expect anything less than a robust response to what has been pre-
sented to them as encroachment on their territory, whether that be
in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, or anywhere else.
The anti-Japanese demonstrations that took place across
China from September 16 to 18, 2012, were indicative of govern-
ment participation as well as national anger over Japan. Surely the
demonstrations vented real anger, yet demonstrations in China do
not take place without government approval, if not government
organization. These demonstrations had both. However, the emo-
tion displayed by Chinese citizens was not manufactured, nor did
the government need to manufacture it. It was there, stewing. The
government sought to give it a channel to let it vent, lest it turn
inward. The government, of course, also sought to exploit it for
rally-behind-the-flag purposes, and did so successfully.
What must be remembered, however, is that the Chinese gov-
ernment is in an uncomfortable position as regards Japan and the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands debate. It has little room for flexibility
should a conflict break out over the islands. China has, in a sense,
painted itself into a corner with its own nationalist rhetoric. It
cannot back down or risk losing face in the eyes of the public and
raising the danger of protests that, as in the case of May 4, 1919,
could turn from anti-Japan to antiChinese government. The lead-
232 In Your Face

ers in Beijing will not allow protests that might turn against it.
They must maintain their own sense of face even as they seek to
guarantee the nations sense of face. Their survival as a ruling
party depends on it (Wang 2012).

Face at the Sino-Japanese Bilateral Level

Tokyo and Beijing both have important face needs as regards each
governments relations with its respective constituencies. Yet they
both have important face needs vis--vis each other at the bilateral
level as well.

Japans Face Needs vis--vis China

Japan, as an East Asian nation, has face needs. I speak here not
just of the domestic political needs of the Japanese leadership as
discussed above but also of the collective self-esteem of the
Japanese people. Some writers have pointed to the lack of collec-
tive self-esteem in Germany following World War I and the
heavy-handed provisions of the Versailles Treaty, which Adolf
Hitler was later able to exploit. Japan is suffering from existen-
tial angst to some degree as it has gone from seemingly being on
top of the world in the 1980s to suffering from economic collapse
from 1989 to perhaps 2005 and then from the global economic
crisis that began in 2008. Japan is in search of its place in the
world, of its own identity. Given Japans regional impact now and
in the past, and its contemporary global economic reach, interna-
tional relations issues are fundamental to Japans understanding of
its place in the world, particularly given the bad history between
Japan and its neighbors and the continued presence of US forces
in Japan. Japanese losses or perceptions of Japanese losses or Chi-
nese encroachments on what the Japanese see as their territory
would be a blow to the nations identity, its collective self-esteem,
its national face. The people expect their leaders to preserve
Japans territorial integrity and protect national security.
The islands are for the Japanese a litmus test of sorts of
Chinas intentions and the real implications of Chinas rise. As
 Gregory J. Moore 233

long as the Chinese are perceived as aggressive on the islands

issue, the China threat thesis will appear to be reified and
Japans peace constitution will appear outdated, just as those
on the Japanese right now argue. This situation would have
serious implications not only for Japan but for Japans neigh-
bors, as it would likely push Japan hard to the right politically
and militarily.
If weakness is expressed on the islands issue, or is perceived
as such by the Japanese public, it will be a blow to Japans col-
lective self-esteemto its national sense of face. Because the
government does not want this to happen, it will work to prevent
it. Chinese encroachment on the islands and the response it might
elicit in Japan would also be a challenge to Japans identity as a
pacifist, antinuclear weapons state. The Japanese view Chinas
dispatching of fishing boats, patrol boats, and patrol planes to the
Diaoyu/Senkaku area as an in-your-face move. So, too, is Chinas
establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone over parts of
the East China Sea, including the islands. The Japanese perceive
that the Chinese are bent not only on pressing their territory and
territorial claims but on affronting Japans sense of face.

Chinas Face Needs vis--vis Japan

As an East Asian nation, China also has face needs. There is a

growing literature on Chinas national humiliation narrative
(Wang 2012), and an important link exists between that narrative,
the bad history, and national dignity and face, on the one hand,
and Chinas evolving foreign policy on the other (Hasegawa and
Togo 2008; Moore 2010; Wang 2012). Zheng Wang argues that
historical memory is the prime raw material for constructing
Chinas national interest, and in fact that nonmaterial interests
such as historical memory, national dignity, face, and respect from
other countries are just as important as or more important than
traditional material interests (2012, xiii). An affront to national
dignity or lack of respect from other countries is, of course, an
affront to national face. Historical memory in the context of Sino-
Japanese irresolution of historical conflicts is also related to face,
for national humiliation of the sort that China suffered at the
234 In Your Face

hands of Japan in 18941895 and again in 19311945 is perhaps

the greatest sort of affront to a national sense of face that any
nation could experience. Consequently, in matters regarding
Japan, the Chinese are particularly sensitive, given the bad history
between them. As Zheng Wang writes (2012), Through the lens
of historical memory, an event that might otherwise be viewed as
isolated or accidental can be perceived by Chinese leaders as a
new form of humiliation (229).
The Chinese government and people have an increasingly
apparent expectation that their own national strength is sufficient
and that they no longer need to suffer from what they see as fur-
ther territorial encroachments. As described above, the people are
applying increasing pressure on the leadership for a foreign policy
that they see as commensurate with Chinas status in international
affairs. Most people in China believe that it has not yet achieved
the status or face it deserves, given its economic achievements.
China has in the past (1989 in particular) suffered from near-
pariah status, and while those days are gone, China continues to
experience criticism from human rights organizations and sanc-
tions from Western nations because of its nondemocratic status
and lack of fully mature human rights norms. From the Chinese
perspective, for the most part, this lack of status/respect/face is
more importantly a product of what it sees as Western prejudice
against China and Western fears of a powerful China that might
usurp the Western nations longtime status as global leaders and
trendsetters. From Chinas perspective, Japan is a lapdog for
Western interests, US interests in particular.
However, perhaps more importantly here, Japan has not, in
Chinas view, addressed the history issue with sufficient clarity or
sincerity. The Chinese believe that Japan has never fully or faith-
fully apologized for the atrocities of World War II, which has been
a slap in Chinas collective face and is the underlying fabric on
which the present Sino-Japanese island dispute is woven. Add to
that the position of the Japanese government not even to admit the
presence of a dispute over the islandswhich signals that bilat-
eral talks or negotiations are not necessaryand Chinese policy-
makers conclude that Japan has not been sufficiently cognizant, to
say the least, of Chinas face requirements and expectations.
 Gregory J. Moore 235

The Chinese government has, in very recent yearsand in

particular during the Eighteenth Party Congressupped its ante
on maritime disputes, whether in the South China or the East
China Sea. It has passed new laws making its stand more robust
on maritime issues. It has also launched a media campaign to
explain to the public its firm positions on maritime issues, adver-
tising its dispatch of fishing expeditions, maritime surveillance
ships, and planes to the territories in dispute. It is portraying to
the Chinese public a very robust Chinese position. Consequently,
Beijing has left itself less and less room for a flexible response to
contingencies that might arise in these maritime disputes, which
makes for a worrisome situation for all sides.

Toward a Solution

Why have the face needs of the two sides been so disrespected or
underappreciated in recent years? Ted Hopfs recent work (2012)
on societal constructivism sheds some light on matters and gels
well with what has been presented here. Hopf argues that states
foreign policies are driven by identities that have been constructed
and have become predominant. His study focuses on Soviet iden-
tity formation between 1945 and 1953, when Joseph Stalin ruled,
and again in the years immediately following Stalins death. He
concludes that, in Stalins time, the Soviet elites held to a Soviet
identity narrative that Hopf calls a discourse of danger, the
notion that the Soviet state and Communist Party were under
seige at home by enemies domestic and foreign. This translated
into a foreign policy that saw danger in differencethat is, any
socialist model other than the Soviet oneand was quite hostile
toward and distrustful of the West and any other stateseven in
the Eastern Bloc, not to mention Chinathat challenged the
Soviet model. With Stalins death came a new narrative and iden-
tity, a discourse of difference, wherein the Soviet state and
party were seen as more secure and confident, no longer so fear-
ful of difference or divergence domestically, or of enemies within
and without. The post-Stalin Soviet Union adopted a more relaxed
policy toward the nations of the Eastern Bloc, reconciled with
236 In Your Face

Titos Yugoslavia, and loosened tensions with the West (Hopf

2012).
How would this apply to China and Japan in 2012, the time of
the outbreak of the latest Sino-Japanese tensions over the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands? As I argued earlier, Chinas national
identity is one of never forget national humiliation,8 as Wang
(2012) has outlined it. The party-state has constructed it as such,
and by and large it has been embraced by the laobaixing (or aver-
age Zhous) in China. As discussed, Japan plays a particularly
important role in the construction of national humiliation in Chi-
nese history, given Chinas losses in two Sino-Japanese wars and
Japans relatively poor record (when compared to Germany) of
forthright expressions of contrition after the war. Therefore,
applying Hopfs analysis to the construction of national identity in
China, one would expect Beijing to be particularly sensitive to
slights, historical affronts, and, in particular, differences with
Japan, which have been seen as one of the greatest sources of
national humiliation. Indeed, this is exactly what we see.
On the Japanese side, one hegemonic narrative of national
identity appears, which might be called the from sword to
chrysanthemum or pacifist Japanese exceptionalism narrative.9
Japan has created for itself, perhaps with a little help from the
United States,10 a pacifist identity that the vast majority of Japan-
ese have embraced since 1945. Japans foreign policy has, for the
most part, conformed to this pacifist, even politically passive,
understanding of Japans role in the postwar world. Change may
be in the air, however, with the rise of what could be called a
normal country narrative, advocated earlier by Ozawa Kiichi,
more recently by Ishihara Shintaro, and now perhaps by Prime
Minister Abe Shinzo. This new narrative in its various forms
would have Japan reject the near-absolute pacifism of the postwar
past in favor of a normal country posture that embraces Japan-
ese responsibility for its own defense, a more internationally
assertive Japan, and higher defense spending.11 The contest now
is between the still-dominant, mainstream postwar identity and
that of the new challenger, as seen in the discussion of Ishiharas
and Nodas actions on the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue.
Along with these identity implications on both sides is an ele-
 Gregory J. Moore 237

ment of misperception. Noda and the Japanese leadership clearly

underestimated the symbolic importance of the islands to the Chi-
nese when it nationalized them. Tokyo did not appreciate the depth
of the never forget national humiliation narrative in China. Per-
haps it did not care, or Japans leaders simply had to put their
domestic political interests (keeping Ishihara and the right at bay)
over their national interests (finding an appropriate way to deal
with the islands vis--vis China), regardless of their considerations
of Chinas position. My research leads me to believe that Japans
stance was a combination of Japanese leaders not fully appreciat-
ing the importance of the narrative and its meaning for the islands
dispute, and putting domestic political interests ahead of national
interests. On the Chinese side it seems that many people underap-
preciated the gravity of the situation that Prime Minister Noda was
in over the summer and fall of 2012 because of the rightists chal-
lenge to the pacifist narrative, combined with DPJ vulnerabilities
on foreign policy in general. Most Chinese assume the normal-
country narrative has already come to dominate Tokyos foreign
policy making, and truly underappreciateor are completely igno-
rant ofthe dominance in Japan to this day of the pacifist Japan-
ese exceptionalism narrative. They assumed the worst: that Noda
was simply bent on making a power grab of the islands in support
of the Japan as normal country narrative.
What appears to have arisen, consequently, is the perception
in both Beijing and Tokyo of a zero-sum game between China and
Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Zero-sum situations,
whether real or perceived, make resolutions of disputes very dif-
ficult. Such is the case here. Given the domestic and international
political stakes involved for both sides, neither side seems willing
to compromise, or at least to appear to its constituents as having
compromised. Tokyo does not admit that a dispute exists between
China and Japan over the islands. China has emphasized that there
is a dispute by increasing air and sea patrols in the areas sur-
rounding the islands. Japan has done so, too. Both sides have said
to the other, in effect, In your face, for both win important
points at home by doing so. Both have contributed to the con-
struction of a situation wherein they have little flexibility for
reaching a solution to the dispute.
238 In Your Face

What is needed is an appreciation in Tokyo and Beijing of the

others dominant narratives and identities, as well as a way for
Tokyo and Beijing to address their dispute so that both can come
away with a sense that their national face remains intact in any
possible solution that might be reached. Put simply, any solution
to the dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands must address the
face needs of both sides, and the underlying identities that face
protects. A win-win situation in this cultural context must entail a
face-face solution, wherein both sides come away with enough
face to proclaim victory to their constituentsin particular, by
appearing not to have backed down from principles or given any-
thing away in terms of national honor. Drawing from Qin Yaqing
(2009), what must be addressed here are not only the rational
aspects of the case but the relational aspects.

Notes

Gregory J. Moore is associate professor of international relations in the

School of Public Affairs at Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China. He is the
editor of North Korean Nuclear Operationality: Regional Security and Non-
proliferation (2014), and has published in Foreign Policy Analysis, Interna-
tional Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Asian Perspective, the Journal of
Contemporary China, and the Journal of Chinese Political Science. He can
be reached at gregoryjohnmoore@gmail.com.
This research was supported and funded by the Maritime Interdiscipli-
nary Project Leading Fund on Reconciliation, Cooperation, and Social Inte-
gration in Northeast Asia, Zhejiang University.
1. Pengjia Islet is home to the Peng family, which manages a lighthouse
there, and a cohort of some forty members of Taiwans military.
2. Gong (2011) provides a useful overview of Chinas historical
position.
3. The Cairo Declaration does not reference the Diaoyu/Senkaku
Islands specifically, but it does say that the Allies purpose is that Japan
shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or
occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the
territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa,
and The Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.
4. I would add to this the avoidance of real or apparent cognitive dis-
sonance.
5. Huntington (1993) follows this geographical taxonomy of Confucian
influence as well. As a cultural category he is right to assign a separate sta-
 Gregory J. Moore 239

tus to Japan. As a socio-hierarchical category, however, it is logical to

include Japan in a discussion of social relational patterns, and Hwang does
this as well, including Japan in his discussion of Confucian social relations
(Hwang 2012).
6. Numerous interviews I did with some of Japans top China watchers
in the academic, think tank, and defense communities in Tokyo in January
2013 confirm that this is the mainstream perspective that Japans experts
have regarding the reasons for nationalizing the islands.
7. In the end, of course, the DPJ lost the elections to Abe Shinzo and the
Liberal Democratic Party in December 2012.
8. These terms are directly translated from the Chinese term wuwang
guochi, with which all Chinese are familiar.
9. I am alluding to Thomas Bergers seminal piece (1993) on Japans
postwar turn away from a very martial identity. Pacifist exceptionalism is
my term for an identity that has lasted up until the present.
10. It was, after all, the United States that wrote the Japanese constitu-
tion and included the pacifist clause in Article 9. The United States did all
it could to inculcate in the Japanese such an identity after the war.
11. Some forms of the narrative would have the United States sent pack-
ing with Japan standing on its own, while other forms of the argument advo-
cate maintenance of the alliance with the United States but propose a more
robust Japanese military posture of self-defense. Regarding Article 9, too,
some would like to see it removed from the constitution, whereas others
would like to keep it but have it altered so as to be less restraining on Japan
while not altogether rejecting its pacifist language.

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