Bioeconomic evaluation of fisheries

enforcement effort using a multifleet

simulation model

Within fisheries the study of compliance and how it can be regulated has focused on
the effects of instrumental approaches in changing individual behaviour, Thus, by modifying
the economic costs and benefits of illegal behaviour (through changes in _ and f)
compliance can be managed to achieve a socially optimal return from the fishery. Generally,
increases in _ carry an associated cost, so that the optimal level of enforcement is attained
when the marginal cost of enforcement is equal to its marginal benefit for a fixed, Quotas are
strictly enforced so that licensed vessels are considered fully compliant. Although significant
in the past, illegal activity is currently negligible (only one illegal vessel observed since
2000), with its decline correlating with increased enforcement in recent years.
This framework includes representations of the underlying biomass dynamics of the
stock, legal and illegal harvests. The legal harvest is determined by prescribed catch quotas
(with some implementation error), estimated by a control rule within the model.
Implementation error for the legal fleet refers to the fact that the prescribed TAC is rarely
taken exactly. Instead there is a small degree of error that can be ascribed to logistical
considerations regarding when fishing should stop for the season. The illegal harvest is
determined by the number of illegal vessels and resultant effort. Illegal vessels enter the
fishery at a constant rate and leave if detected by the FPV, which acts probabilistically within
the model to exclude illegal activity. The exit of illegal vessels from the fishery once
apprehended is justified by the large fines imposed, which usually lead to forfeit of the
vessel.
The full bioeconomic model therefore consists of the following components: an
operating model describing the biomass dynamics of the exploited stock; a harvest control
rule to predict legal catches; a means of predicting illegal fleet dynamics and therefore effort;
a production function relating illegal fishing effort to harvest; and finally bioeconomic
relationships describing the private benefits to both the legal and illegal fleets and overall
social benefit;
all for a given FPV effort.
The model was run over 1000 Monte Carlo iterations, Monte Carlo iterations of the
system were projected for 50 years from 2009 and the performance of each management
regime (FPV days) evaluated using the biomass depletion and social benefit (combination of
legal fishery net revenue and the net cost of the fishery patrol operation), with the associated
level of uncertainty.

Theory and calculations

Biomass dynamic operating model, The model was parameterised to reproduce

historic changes in biomass, as represented by the full age-structured assessment model.
Details of this parameterisation process are described in, giving median and 95% confidence
intervals of r = 0.122 [0.087; 0.169] and K = 109 [89; 130] thousand tonnes. Uncertainty in
these parameters was obtained through parametric bootstrapping.
Legal harvest, Legal catches are set solely by this harvest control rule, which is
applied each year assuming an arbitrary degree of assessment error (CVASM = 0.1), with
uncertainty in the actual catch taken (implementation error) also included in model
predictions. This was estimated from a bootstrap of historic catch statistics, giving CVIMP =
0.01.
 Illegal harvest, Predicting illegal fleet dynamics requires a relationship between FPV
effort and the probability of detecting illegal activity. This forms the basis for the exit of illegal
vessels from the fishery. The entry of legal vessels occurs at a constant mean rate, with
vessels allowed to enter and then leave the fishery in a single year. Whereby harvest is
expressed as a multiplicative function of effort and exploitable biomass. Projections were
initialised with no illegal vessels, corresponding to the currently perceived absence of illegal
activity.
Profit, The illegal profit was estimated in a similar fashion, with the exception that
there were no fixed costs (license fees, port fees or insurance). This is a reasonable
assumption since vessels involved in illegal activities are typically very old (personal
communication with observers) with low opportunity costs compared to the legal fleet. To
account for a lower value product (as a result of fishing in sub-prime locations) and the
flouting of restrictive fishing regulations (such as by-catch mitigation): pIUU < p and cIUU < c.
Bioeconomic relationships, When comparing effort control strategies we report both
the
final values of_ and the discounted sum over the projection period:
50


1
= ( )
1+
=1
where the discount rate 0.02. The discount rate is set at a low level to account for the
strong conservation objectives of CCAMLR (and society as a whole) that considers the
Antarctic ecosystem a high conservation priority.

Results and discussion

the rate of illegal entry will determine the vulnerability of the legal fishery to collapse
at any given level of enforcement effort. Nevertheless, some general conclusions can be
made. First, the legal fishery is more likely to be sustained in the long-term if management is
willing to accommodate reductions in total licence revenue if the fleet shrinks. The
maintenance of the legal fleet not only is of direct economic benefit (as described here) but
in reality also contributes to the deterrence of illegal vessels. Second, our results indicate
that initiatives by management to maintain enforcement have longterm benefits, maintaining
legal fleet size (and therefore social benefit) and resource biomass levels. Taking the long-
term view given by final estimates of social benefit and biomass depletion we have shown
that social benefits can be maintained even at high enforcement expenditure, and that
biomass depletion improves monotonically with increasing FPV days (Fig. 4b). The
enforcement effort for 2007 (the most recent year of available data) was 219 FPV days, and
we therefore conclude that this will likely facilitate both a high economic return and
attainment of CCAMLR management objectives.