You are on page 1of 144

POLITICALLAWREVIEW

VOLUMEII

BasedontheoutlineofJusticeVicenteV.Mendoza

May1996RevisedEdition

_______________

CompiledbyJoseSalvadorY.Mirasol

UpdatedbyUPLawBatch1995

UpdatedandEnlargedbyRodellA.Molina
UPLawBatch1996

ThisworkisdedicatedtothemembersofUPLawBatch1996,towhichI
belong, especially to the members of Prof. Barlongay's class in Political Law
Review,withoutwhoseencouragementandsupport,thisworkwouldnothavebeen
accomplished.

SpecialthankstoLianneTanforlendingmeherdisketteinPoliticalLaw
ReviewasupdatedbyUPLawBatch1995,ShirleyAlineaandRaquelRuizfor
lendingmetheirnotes,NonLerrer,BuddyCarale,TJMattaandIreneIsidorofor
patientlyprintingthiswork.

TotheLordAlmighty,thisworkislovinglydedicated

RAM

_______________

II.THECONSTITUTIONALCOMMISSIONS
IndependentConstitutionalCommissions

Art.IX,A,Sec.1. TheConstitutionalCommissions,whichshallbeindependent,aretheCivil
Service Commission(CSC). the Commission onElections and(COMELEC), andthe Commission on
Audit(COA).

A.CivilServiceCommission

1.CompositionandqualificationsofCommissioners

Art.IX,B,Sec.1. (1) ThecivilserviceshallbeadministeredbytheCivilServiceCommission


composedofaChairmanandtwoCommissionerswhoshallbenaturalborncitizensofthePhilippines
and,atthetimeoftheirappointment,atleastthirtyfiveyearsofage,withprovencapacityforpublic
administration,andmustnothavebeencandidatesforanyelectivepositionintheelectionsimmediately
precedingtheirappointment.

Art.VII,sec.13.xxx
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the
PresidentshallnotduringhistenurebeappointedasMembersoftheConstitutionalCommissions,orthe
OfficeoftheOmbudsman,orasSecretaries,Undersecretaries,chairmenorheadsofbureausoroffices,
includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsandtheirsubsidiaries.

2.AppointmentandtermofOffice

Art.IX,B,Sec.1.xxx
(2)TheChairmanandtheCommissionersshallbeappointedbythePresidentwiththeconsentof
the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed,theChairmanshallholdofficeforsevenyears,aCommissionerforfiveyears,andanother
Commissionerforthreeyears,withoutreappointment.Appointmenttoanyvacancyshallbeonlyforthe
unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporaryoractingcapacity.

Transitionalterms

Of the first appointment, the Chairman shall serve for 7 years, without reappointment. Of the
Commissioners,thefollowingperiodsapply:

1Commissionerfor5years;anotherfor3yearswithoutreappointment
3.AppointmentofpersonnelofCSC

Art.IX,A,Sec.4.TheConstitutionalCommissionsshallappointtheirofficialsandemployeesin
accordancewithlaw.

4.Salary

Art. XVIII, Sec. 17. Until the Congress provides otherwise xxx the Chairmen of the
ConstitutionalCommissions(shallreceiveanannualsalaryof)twohundredfourthousandpesoseach;
andtheMembersoftheConstitutionalCommissions,onehundredeightythousandpesoseach.

Art.IX,A,Sec.3.ThesalaryoftheChairmanandtheCommissionersshallbefixedbylawand
shallnotbedecreasedduringtheirtenure.

Thesalary,ofcourse,canbeincreasedandtheincreasecantakeeffectatonce,since,liketheJudiciary,
theConstitutionalCommissionshavenotpartinthepassageofsuchalaw.

5.Disqualifications

Art.IX,A,Sec.2.NoMemberofaConstitutionalCommissionshall,duringhistenure,holdany
otherofficeoremployment. Neithershallheengageinthepracticeofanyprofessionorintheactive
managementorcontrolofanybusinesswhichinanywaymaybeaffectedbythefunctionsofhisoffice,
norshallhebefinanciallyinterested,directlyorindirectly,inanycontractwith,orinanyfranchiseor
privilege granted bythe Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including
governmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries.

NomembersofaConstitutionalCommissionshallduringhis"tenure":

a.Holdanyotherofficeoremployment.

Thisissimilartotheprohibitionagainstexecutiveofficers.Itappliestobothpublicandprivateoffices
andemployment.

b.Engageinthepracticeofanyprofession.

c.Engageintheactivemanagementorcontrolofanybusinesswhichinanywaymaybeaffectedbythe
functionsofhisoffice.

d.Befinanciallyinterested,directlyorindirectly,inanycontractwith,orinanyfranchiseorprivilege
granted by, the Government, its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including GOCCs or their
subsidiaries.

6.Impeachment

Art.XI,Sec.2.xxx[T]hemembersoftheConstitutionalCommissionsxxxmayberemovedfrom
office,onimpeachmentfor,andconvictionof,culpableviolationoftheConstitution,treason,bribery,
graftandcorruption,otherhighcrimes,orbetrayalofpublictrust.xxx

7.FunctionsoftheCSC

Art. IX, B, Sec. 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the
Government,shallestablishacareerserviceandadoptmeasurestopromotemorale,efficiency,integrity,
responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and
rewards system, integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and
institutionalizeamanagementclimateconducivetopublicaccountability.ItshallsubmittothePresident
andtheCongressanannualreportonitspersonnelprogram.

Art.IX,A,Sec.7.EachCommissionshalldecidebyamajorityvoteofallitsMembersanycaseor
matterbroughtbeforeitwithinsixtydaysfromthedateofitssubmissionfordecisionorresolution.A
caseormatterisdeemedsubmittedfordecisionorresolutionuponthefilingofthelastpleading,brief,or
memorandumrequiredbytherulesoftheCommissionorbytheCommissionitself. Unlessotherwise
providedbythisConstitutionorbylaw,anydecision,orderorrulingofeachCommissionmaybebrought
totheSupreme Court on certiorari bythe aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of acopy
thereof.

Id.,Section8.EachCommissionshallperformsuchotherfunctionsasmaybeprovidedbylaw.

8.ScopeoftheCivilService

Art.IX,B,Sec.2(1)Thecivilserviceembracesallbranches,subdivisions,instrumentalities,and
agenciesoftheGovernment,includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationswithoriginalchart
ers.
Art. XII, Sec. 16. xxx. Governmentowned or controlled corporations may be created or
establishedbyspecialchartersintheinterestofthecommongoodandsubjecttothetestofeconomic
viability.

NationalServiceCorp.v.NLRC,168SCRA125(1988) ThecivilservicedoesnotincludeGovernment
ownedorcontrolledcorporations(GOCC)whichareorganizedassubsidiariesofGOCCunderthegeneral
corporationlaw.

F: EugenioCredowasanemployeeoftheNationalServiceCorporation. Sheclaimsshewasillegallydismissed.
NLRC ruledorderingher reinstatement. NASECO argues thatNLRC has nojurisdictionto orderherreinstatement.
NASECOasagovernmentcorporationbyvirtueofitsbeingasubsidiaryoftheNIDC,whichiswhollyownedbythePhil.
NationalBankwhichisinturnaGOCC,thetermsandconditionsofemploymentofitsemployeesaregovernedbythe
CivilServiceLawcitingNationalHousingvJuco.

ISSUE:W/NemployeesofNASECO,aGOCCwithoutoriginalcharter,aregovernedbytheCivilServiceLaw.

HELD:NO.TheholdinginNHCvJucoshouldnotbegivenretroactiveeffect,thatistocasesthatarosebefore
itspromulgationofJan17,1985.TodootherwisewouldbeoppressivetoCredoandotheremployeessimilarly
situated because under the 1973 Consti but prior to the ruling in NHC v Juco, this court recognized the
applicabilityoftheLaborjurisdictionoverdisputesinvolvingtermsandconditionsofemploymentinGOCC's,
amongthemNASECO.
InthematterofcoveragebythecivilserviceofGOCC,the1987Constistarklydiffersfromthe1973
constiwhereNHCvJucowasbased. Itprovidesthatthe"civilserviceembracesallbranches,subdivisions,
instrumentalities,andagenciesoftheGovernment,includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationwith
originalcharter."Thereforebyclearimplication,thecivilservicedoesnotincludeGOCCwhichareorganized
assubsidiariesofGOCCunderthegeneralcorporationlaw.Adapted.

TradeUnionsofthePhilippinesandAlliedServices(TUPAS)VS.NHA,173SCRA33

F: RespondentNHCisacorporationorganizedin1959undertheUniformCharterofGovernmentCorporations.Its
sharesofstockhavebeen100%ownedbytheGovernmentfromitsincorporation.PetitionerTUPASisalegitimatelabor
organization with a chapter in NHC. TUPAS filed a petition for certification election with DOLE. It was denied.
Adapted.

HELD: Thecivilservicenowcoversonlygovtownedorcontrolledcorporationsw/originalorlegislative
charters,thatisthosecreatedbyanactofCongressofbyspeciallaw,andnotthoseincorporatedunderand
pursuanttoagenerallegislation.
xxx
Thereis,therefore,noimpedimenttotheholdingofacertificationelectionamongtheworkersofNHC
foritisclearthattheyarecoveredbytheLaborCode,theNHCbeingagovtownedand/orcontrolledcorp.w/o
anoriginalcharter.RAM.

AllianceofGovernmentWorkersvMinisterofLaborandEmployment,124SCRA1(1983)

F: Petitionerisafederationofunionsingovtownedcorps.andingovtschools.ItpetitionedtheSCforarulingthat
PD851,requiring"allemployers...topaytheiremployeesreceivingabasicsalaryofnotmorethanP1,000amonth...a
13thmonthpay,"appliestogovtemployees.VV.

HELD:NO.Itisanoldruleofstatutoryconstructionthatrestrictivestatutesandactsw/cimposeburdenson
thepublictreasuryorw/cdiminishrightsandinterests,nomatterhowbroadtheirtermsdonotembracethe
Sovereign,unlesstheSovereignisspecificallymentioned.TheRepublicofthePhil.asasovereigncannotbe
coveredbyageneraltermlike"employer"unlessthelanguageusedinthelawisclearandspecifictothateffect.

ISSUE2:Maygovernmentemployeesactthroughalaborfederationwhichusesthecollectivebargainingpower
tosecureincreasedcompensationforitsmembers?

HELD:NO.ThetermsandconditionsofemploymentintheGovernmentincludinganypoliticalsubdivisionor
instrumentalitythereofaregovernedbylaw. Andthisiseffectedthroughstatutesoradministrativecirculars,
rulesandregulationsandnotthroughCollectiveBargainingagreements.
Underthepresentconstitution,(1973),GOCC'sarenowpartofthecivilservice,thus,notallowedtouse
concertedactivitiestogetotherbenefitsorhighersalariesdifferentfromthatprovidedbylawandregulation.
Adapted.

OVERRULED:

GovernmentownedorcontrolledCorporations,ConsideredandDefined.

NationalHousingCorp.v.Juco,134SCRA172(1985)

F: Juco was an employee ofthe NHA. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal w/ MOLE but his case was
dismissedbythelaborarbiteronthegroundthattheNHAisagovtownedcorp.andjurisdictionoveritsemployeesis
vestedintheCSC. Onappeal,theNLRCreversedthedecisionandremandedthecasetothelaborarbiterforfurther
proceedings.NHAinturnappealedtotheSC.VV.

ISSUE:AreemployeesoftheNationalHousingCorporation,aGOCCwithoutoriginalcharter,coveredbythe
LaborCodeorbylawsandregulationsgoverningthecivilservice?

HELD:Sec.11,ArtXIIBoftheConstitutionspecificallyprovides:"TheCivilServiceembraceseverybranch,
agency,subdivisionandinstrumentalityoftheGovernment,includingeverygovernmentownedandcontrolled
corporation.
TheinclusionofGOCCwithintheembraceofthecivilserviceshowsadeliberateeffortattheframers
topluganearlierloopholewhichallowedGOCCtoavoidthefullconsequencesofthecivilservicesystem.All
officesandfirmsofthegovernmentarecovered.
ThisconstiprovisionhasbeenimplementedbystatutePD807isunequivocalthatpersonnelofGOCC
belongtothecivilserviceandsubjecttocivilservicerequirements.
"Every"meanseachoneofagroup,withoutexception.ThiscasereferstoaGOCC.Itdoesnotcover
casesinvolvingprivatefirmstakenoverbythegovernmentinforeclosureorsimilarproceedings.Adapted.

xxx
ForpurposesofcoverageintheCivilService,employeesofgovtownedorcontrolledcorps.whether
createdbyspeciallaworformedassubsidiariesarecoveredbytheCivilServiceLaw,nottheLaborCode,and
thefactthatpvt.corps.ownedorcontrolledbythegovtmaybecreatedbyspecialcharterdoesnotmeanthat
suchcorps.notcreatedbyspeciallawarenotcoveredbytheCivilService.
xxx
Theinfirmityoftheresp'spositionliesinitspermittingthecircumventionoremasculationofSec.1,
Art.XIIB[nowArtIX,B,Sec.2(1)]oftheConsti.Itwouldbepossibleforaregularministryofgovttocreate
ahostofsubsidiarycorps.undertheCorp.Codefundedbyawillinglegislature. Agovtownedcorp.could
createseveralsubsidiarycorps.Thesesubsidiarycorps.wouldenjoythebestoftwoworlds.Theirofficialsand
employeeswouldbeprivilegedindividuals,freefromthestrictaccountabilityrequiredbytheCivilServiceDec.
andtheregulationsoftheCOA. Theirincomeswouldnotbesubjecttothecompetitiverestraintintheopen
marketnortothetermsandconditionsofcivilserviceemployment.Conceivably,allgovtownedorcontrolled
corps. could be created, no longer by special charters, but through incorp. under the general law. The
Constitutional amendment including such corps. in the embrace of the civil service would cease to have
application.Certainly,suchasituationcannotbeallowed.VV.

Quimpov.Tanodbayan,146SCRA137 TanodbayanHasJurisdictionoverallGovernmentOwnedFirms
RegardlessofHowOrganized.

F: F.Quimpofiledacomplaintw/theTanodbayan(TB)chargingG.DimaanoandD.Remo,managerandanalystof
Petrophil, w/viol. ofRA3019fortheirrefusaltopayQuimpo'sfeesassurveyor. TheTBdismissedthecomplaint,
however,onthegroundthathisjurisdictionextendedonlytogovtownedcorps.organizedunderaspeciallaw.Petrophilis
acorp.organizedundertheGen.Corp.Code;itwasacquiredbythegovttocarryoutitsoilandgasolineprograms.
Quimpofiledapetitionforcertiorari,questioningthedecisionoftheTB.ThenewTBconfessedjudgment.VV.

ISSUE:WONPETROPHILisagovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationwhoseemployeesfallwithinthe
jurisdictionalpurviewoftheTanodbayanforpurposesoftheAntigraftandCorruptPracticesAct?

HELD: YES. UpholdtheTanodbayanjurisdiction. WhileitmaybethatPETROPHILwasnotoriginally


"created"asaGOCC,PETROPHILbecameasubsidiaryofPNOCandthusshedoffitsprivatestatus.Itisnow
fundedandownedbythegovernmentasinfact,itwasacquiredtoperformfunctionsrelatedtogovernmental
programsandpoliciesonoil.Itwasacquirednottemporarilybutasapermanentadjuncttoperformessential
governmentrelatedfunctions.Adapted.

xxx
Themeaningthusgivento"govtownedorcontrolledcorps."forpurposesofthecivilserviceprovision
[Art.IX,B,Sec.2(1)]shouldlikewiseapplyforpurposesoftheTBandSBprovisions[Art.XI,Secs.4and
12],otherwise,incongruitywouldresult;andagovtownedcorp.couldcreateasmanysubsidiarycorps.under
theCorp.Codeitwishes,w/cwouldthenbefreefromstrictaccountabilityandcouldescapetheliabilitiesand
responsibilitiesprovidedbylaw.xxx

a.Terms,conditionsofemploymentintheCivilService

(1)OathofallegiancetotheConstitution

Art.IX,B,Sec.4.Allpublicofficersandemployeesshalltakeanoathoraffirmationtouphold
anddefendtheConstitution.

Art.XI,Sec.18.PublicofficersandemployeesowetheStateandthisConstitutionallegianceatall
times,andanypublicofficeroremployeewhoseekstochangehiscitizenshiporacquirethestatusofan
immigrantofanothercountryduringhistenureshallbedealtwithbylaw.

(2)MeritSystem

(a)Appointmentoflameducks

Art.IX,B,Sec.6. Nocandidatewhohaslostinanyelectionshall,withinoneyearaftersuch
election, be appointed to any office in the Government, or any governmentowned or controlled
corporationsorinanyoftheirsubsidiaries.

(b)Banonholdingmultiplepositions

Art.IX,B,Sec.7. Noelectiveofficial shallbeeligibleforappointment ordesignation inany


capacitytoanypublicofficeorpositionduringhistenure.
Unlessotherwiseallowedbylaworbytheprimaryfunctionsofhisposition,noappointiveofficial
shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentalitythereof,includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries.

Art.VII,Sec.13.ThePresident,VicePresident,theMembersoftheCabinet,andtheirdeputies
orassistantsshallnot,unlessotherwiseprovidedinthisConstitution,holdanyotherofficeoremployment
during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other
profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any
franchise,orspecialprivilegegrantedbytheGovernmentoranysubdivision,agency,orinstrumentality
thereof,includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries.Theyshallstrictly
avoidconflictofinterestintheconductoftheiroffice.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the
PresidentshallnotduringhistenurebeappointedasMembersoftheConstitutionalCommissions,orthe
OfficeoftheOmbudsman,orasSecretaries,Undersecretaries,chairmenorheadsofbureausoroffices,
includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsandtheirsubsidiaries.

Art.VI,Sec.13. NoSenatororMemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesmayholdanyother
officeoremploymentintheGovernment,oranysubdivision,agencyorinstrumentalitythereof,including
governmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries,duringhistermwithoutforfeitinghis
seat.Neithershallhebeappointedtoanyofficewhichmayhavebeencreatedortheemolumentsthereof
increasedduringthetermforwhichhewaselected.

Art.VIII,Secs.8(1)(3)and12

Art.VIII,Sec.8.(1)AJudicialandBarCouncilisherebycreatedunderthesupervisionofthe
SupremeCourtcomposedoftheChiefJustice,as exofficio Chairman,theSecretaryofJusticeanda
representativeoftheCongressasexofficioMembers,arepresentativeoftheIntegratedBar,aprofessor
oflaw,aretiredMemberoftheSupremeCourt,andarepresentativeoftheprivatesector.
xxx
(3)TheClerkoftheSupremeCourtshallbetheSecretaryexofficiooftheCouncilandshallkeep
arecordofitsproceedings.

Sec.12.TheMembersoftheSupremeCourtandofothercourtsestablishedbylawshallnotbe
designatedtoanyagencyperformingquasijudicialoradministrativefunctions.

CLUvExecutiveSecretary,194SCRA317(1991)

F: ThepetitionerchallengedEx.OrderNo.284whichineffectallowedCabinetmembers,theirundersecretariesand
asst.secretariesandotherappointiveofficialsoftheExecutiveDepartmenttoholdotherpositionsinthegovt.,albeit,
subjectofthelimitationsimposedtherein. Therespondents,inrefutingthepetitioners'argumentthatthemeasurewas
violativeofArt.VIII,Sec.13,invokedArt.IXB,Sec.7,allowingtheholdingofmultiplepositionsbytheappointive
officialifallowedbylaworbythepressingfunctionsofhispositions.

HELD:Byostensiblyrestrictingtheno.ofpositionsthatCabinetmembers,undersecretariesorasst.secretaries
mayholdinadditiontotheirprimarypositiontonotmorethan2positionsinthegovt.andGOCCs,EO284
actuallyallowsthemtoholdmultipleofficesoremploymentindirectcontraventionoftheexpressmandateof
Art.VIII,Sec.13prohibitingthemfromdoingso,unlessotherwiseprovidedinthe1987Constitutionitself.If
maximumbenefitsaretobederivedfromadept.head'sabilityandexpertise,heshouldbeallowedtoattendto
hisdutiesandresponsibilitieswithoutthedistractionofothergovt.officesoremployment.
xxx
ThestricterprohibitionappliedtothePres.andhisofficialfamilyunderSec.13,Art.VIIascompared
totheprohibitionapplicabletoappointiveofficialsingeneralunderArt.IX,B,Sec.7,par.2areproofofthe
intentofthe1987Consti.totreatthemasaclassbyitselfandtoimposeuponsaidclassstricterprohibitions.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or
employmentinthegovtduringtheirtenurewhensuchisallowedbylaworbytheprimaryfunctionsoftheir
positions,membersoftheCabinet,theirdeputiesandassistantsmaydosoonlywhenexpresslyauthorizedby
theConsti.itself.xxx
However,theprohibitionagainstholdingdualormultipleofficesoremploymentunderArt.VII,Sec.13
mustnotbeconstruedasapplyingtopostsoccupiedbytheExecutiveofficialsspecifiedthereinw/oaddition
compensationinan exofficio capacityasprovidedbylawandasrequiredbytheprimaryfunctionsofsaid
official'soffice.Thereasonisthatthesepostsdonotcomprise"anyotheroffice"w/inthecontemplationofthe
constitutional prohibition butareproperlyan imposition ofadditional duties andfunction on saidofficials.
Adapted.

Floresv.Drilon,223SCRA568(1993)

F: MayorRichardGordonofOlongapoCitywasappointedChairmanandChiefExecutiveOfficeroftheSubicBay
MetropolitanAuthority(SBMA)underSec.13,par(d)ofRA7227"BasesConversionandDevelopmentActof1992.

ISSUE:W/NprovisoinSec13par(d)ofRA7227whichstates,"Provided,howeverthatforthefirstyearofits
operationsfromtheeffectivityofthisAct,themayoroftheCityofOlongaposhallbeappointedasthechairman
andchiefexecutiveofficeroftheSubicAuthority,"violatestheconstitutionalproscriptionagainstappointment
ordesignationofelectiveofficialstoothergovernmentposts.

HELD:YES.Sec7ofArtIXBoftheConstiprovides:

"Noelectiveofficialshallbelegibleforappointmentordesignationinanycapacitytoanypublicoffice
orpositionduringhistenure."

Inthecaseatbar,thesubjectprovisodirectsthePresidenttoappointanelectiveofficial,i.e.Mayorof
OlongapoCity,toothergovernmentalpost.Sincethisispreciselywhattheconstitutionalproscriptionseeksto
prevent,itneedsnostretchingoftheimaginationtoconcludethattheprovisocontravenesSec.7,1stparofArt
IXB. Whilethesecondpar.authorizestheholdingofmultipleofficesbyanappointiveposition,thereisno
exceptiontothefirstparagraphexceptasareparticularlyrecognizedintheConstitutionitself.
Futhermore,theprovisoisalegislativeencroachmentonappointingauthoritytoonlyoneeligiblei.e.
theincumbentMayorofOlongapoCity.Theconfermentoftheappointingpowerisaperfectlyvalidlegislative
actbuttheprovisolimitinghischoicetooneisanencroachmenttohisprerogative.
Thus,MayorGordonisineligibleforappointmentthroughouthistenurebutmayresignfirstfromhis
electiveofficebeforehemaybeconsideredforappointment.Hehasachoice.
Sec.13par(d)isdeclaredunconstitutionalandtheappointmentofMayorGordonisinvalidbuthis
previousactsasChairmanofSBMAshallbeconsideredthatofadefactoofficer.Adapted.

(3)Standardizationofpayandbandoublecompensation

Standardizationofpay

Art. IX, B, Sec. 5. The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of
governmentofficialsandemployees,includingthoseingovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationswith
original charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the
qualificationsrequiredfortheirpositions.

Banondoublecompensation

Art.IX,B,Sec.8. Noelectiveorappointivepublicofficeroremployeeshallreceiveadditional,
double,orindirectcompensation,unlessspecificallyauthorizedbylaw,noracceptwithouttheconsentof
theCongress,anypresent,emolument,office,ortitleofanykindfromanyforeigngovernment.
Pensionsorgratuitiesshallnotbeconsideredasadditional,double,orindirectcompensation.

Sec.56.AdditionalorDoubleCompensation.Noelectiveorappointivepublicofficeroremployee
shallreceiveadditionalordoublecompensationunlessspecificallyauthorizedbylawnoracceptwithout
theconsentofthePresident,anypresent,emolument,office,ortitleofanykindfromanyforeignstate.
Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double or indirect compensation.
(BookV,TitleI,Chapter8,AdministrativeCodeof1987.)

(4)Banonpartisanpoliticalactivities

Art.IX,B,Sec.2.xxx
(4) No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any
electioneeringorpartisanpoliticalcampaign.

Comparewith

Art.XVI,Sec.5.xxx
(3)Professionalisminthearmedforcesandadequateremunerationandbenefitsofitsmembers
shallbeaprimeconcernoftheState.Thearmedforcesshallbeinsulatedfrompartisanpolitics.
Nomemberofthemilitaryshallengagedirectlyorindirectlyinanypartisanpoliticalactivity
excepttovote.
Caillesv.Bonifacio,65Phil328(1938)

F: ThisisaquowarrantopetitiontooustrespondentBonifaciofromtheofficeofProvincialGovernorofLaguna.It
iscontendedthatatthetimehefiledhiscertificateofcandidacyandwaselectedtooffice,respondentwasaCaptaininthe
PhilippineArmyandforthisreason,isineligibletothatoffice.

HELD:Section2,Art.XIofthe1935Const.(similartothe1987provision)prohibitsmembersoftheArmed
Forcesfromengaginginanypartisanpoliticalactivityorotherwisetakingpartinanyelectionexcepttovote,but
itdoesnotexviterminigrantorconferuponthemtherightofsuffrage.AsSection431oftheElectionLaw,as
amendeddisqualifiesfromvotingonlymembersintheactiveserviceofthePhilippineArmyandnoclaimis
madethatthisdiscriminationisviolativeoftheConstitution,itfollowsthattherespondent,beinginthereserve
force,isnotdisqualifiedfromvoting.Therespondentbeingaqualifiedelectorandthepossessionbyhimofthe
otherqualificationsprescribedforanelectiveprovincialofficenotbeingchallenged,heisnotineligibletothe
officeofprovincialgovernortowhichhehasbeenelected.
Theconstitutionalprovisionmentionedcontemplatesonlythoseintheactiveserviceotherwiseitwould
leadtowidespreaddisqualificationofthemajorityoftheablebodiedmenwhoarepartofthereservecorpsof
thearmedforcesfromvotingandfrombeingvotedupon.
Raisond'etreforthedisqualification:MembersofthearmedforcesareservantsoftheStateandnotthe
agentsofanypoliticalgroup.Adapted.

Santosv.Yatco,590G548(1959)

F: ThisispetitionforprohibitionseekingtoenjointheenforcementoftheorderofJudgeYatcodisallowingthen
SecretaryofDefenseAlejoSantosfromcampaigningpersonallyforGovernorTomasMartinintheprovinceofBulacan.

Thepetitionwasgrantedfortheff.reasons:

The position of department secretaries is not embraced and included within the terms officers and
employeesintheCivilService;
WhenSantos,aNacionalistacampaignedforGov.Martin,acandidateoftheNacionalistaParty,hewas
actingasamemberoftheCabinetindiscussingtheissuesbeforetheelectorateanddefendingtheactuationsof
theAdministrationtowhichhebelongs;
The question of impropriety as distinct from illegality of such campaign because of its deleterious
influenceuponthemembersofthearmedforces,whoareadministrativelysubordinatedtotheSecretaryof
NationalDefenseandwhoareoftencalleduponbytheCOMELECtoaidintheconductoforderlyandimpartial
elections,isnotjusticiablebythecourt.Adapted.
(5)Removalorsuspensiononlyforcause

Art.IX,B,2.xx
(3) Noofficeroremployeeofthecivilserviceshallberemovedorsuspendedexceptforcause
providedbylaw.

DelosSantosvMallare,87Phil289

F: EduardodelosSantos,petitioner,wasappointedCityEngineerofBaguioon7/16/46bythePres.Hethenbegan
theexerciseofthedutiesandfunctionsoftheposition.On6/1/50,GilMallarewasextendedanadinterimappointmentby
thePres.tothesameposition,afterw/c,on6/3,theUndersec.oftheDPW&CommunicationsdirectedSantostoreportto
theBureauofPublicWorksforanotherassignment.Santosrefusedtovacatetheoffice,andwhentheCityMayorandthe
otherofficialsnamedasMallare'scodefendantsignoredhimandpaidMallarethesalarycorrespondingtotheposition,he
commencedtheseproceedings.

HELD:TheprovisionofSec.2545oftheRev.Admin.CodethatthePres.mayremoveatpleasureanyofthe
saidappointiveofficersisincompatiblew/theconstitutionalinhibitionthat"NoofficeroremployeeintheCivil
Serviceshallberemovedorsuspendedexceptforcauseasprovidedbylaw."WethereforedeclareSec.2545of
theRACasrepealedbytheConsti.andceasedtobeoperativefromthetimethatinstrumentcameintoeffect.

Forcauseasprovidedbylaw.Thephrase"forcause"inconnectionw/removalsofpublicofficershas
acquiredawelldefinedconcept. "Itmeansforreasonsw/cthelawandsoundpublicpolicyrecognizedas
sufficientwarrantforremoval,thatis,legalcause, and notmerelycausesw/c theappointing powerinthe
exerciseofdiscretionmaydeemsufficient.Itisimpliedthatofficersmaynotberemovedatthemerewillof
thosevestedw/thepowerofremoval,orw/oanycause. Moreover,thecausemustrelatetoandaffectthe
administrationoftheoffice,andmustberestrictedtosomethingofasubstantialnaturedirectlyaffectingthe
rightsandinterestsofthepublic."

Threespecifiedclassesofpositionspolicydetermining,primarilyconfidentialandhighlytechnical
areexcludedfromthemeritsystemanddismissalatpleasureofofficersandemployeesappointedthereinis
allowedbytheConsti.xxx
Theofficeofcityengineerisneitherprimarilyconfidential,policydetermining,norhighlytechnical.
Primarilyconfidential.Thelatterphrasedenotesnotonlyconfidenceintheaptitudeoftheappointee
for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy w/c insures freedom of intercourse without
embarrassmentorfreedomfrommisgivingsofbetrayalsofpersonaltrustorconfidentialmattersofstate.
Policydetermining.Noristhepositionofcityengineerpolicydetermining.Acityengineerdoesnot
formulateamethodofactionforthegovtoranyofitssubdivisions.Hisjobistoexecutepolicy,nottomakeit.
Highlytechnical.Finally,thepositionofcityengineeristechnicalbutnothighlyso.Acityengineer
isnotrequirednorishesupposedtopossesatechnicalskillortraininginthesupremeorsuperiordegree,w/cis
thesenseinw/c"highlytechnical"is,webelieve,employedintheConsti.RAM.

Corpusv.Cuaderno,13SCRA591(1965)
F: MarianoCorpuswastheSpecialAssistanttotheGovernor,InChargeoftheExportDepartmentoftheCentral
Bank,apositiondeclaredbythePresidentofthePhilippinesashighlytechnicalinnature.Hewasadministrativelycharged
byseveralcoemployeesintheexportdepartmentwithdishonesty,incompetence,neglectofdutyandviolationofinternal
regulationsoftheCentralBank. Hewassuspendedfromofficewhileaninvestigationwasbeingconductedoverhis
complaint. Theinvestigating committeefoundnobasisuponwhichtorecommendhimfordisciplinaryaction,hence,
recommended that he be immediately reinstated to his office. Despite such recommendation, the Monetary Board
approvedaresolutiondismissingCorpusfromOfficeonthegroundthatthelatter'scontinuanceinofficeisprejudicialto
thebestinterestsofCentralBank.Corpusmovedtoreconsidersaidresolutionbutthesamewasdenied.Hefiledanaction
withtheRTCwhichdeclaredtheresolutionnullandvoid.
CentralBankappealsandallegesthatofficersholdingtechnicalpositionsmayberemovedatanytimeforlackof
confidencebytheappointingpowerandthatsuchremovalisimplicitinSec.1Art.XIIoftheConstitutionwhichprovide
that:"xxxAppointmentsintheCivilService,EXCEPTastothosewhicharepolicydetermining,primarilyconfidential
orhighlytechnicalinnature,shallbemadeonlyaccordingtomeritandfitness."CBalsoarguesthatforthethreeclasses
ofpositionsreferredtointheConstitution,lackofconfidenceoftheonemakingtheappointmentconstitutessufficientand
legitimatecauseofremoval.

ISSUE: W/N the removal of Respondent by resolution of the Monetary Board on the ground of loss of
confidencewasvaliddespitethefactthatthecommitteewhichinvestigatedthechargesagainsthimfoundno
basisforhisremoval

HELD:NO.Theremovalofrespondentonthegroundoflossofconfidenceisaclearandevidentafterthought
resortedtowhenthechargessubjectmatteroftheinvestigationwerenotprovedorsubstantiated.Itwasamere
pretexttocuretheinability tosubstantiate thechargesuponwhichtheinvestigation proceeded. Thecourt
therefore dismissed the reason of "loss of confidence" for the dismissal of Corpus. That being so, the
constitutionalmandatethatNoofficerintheCivilServiceshallberemovedorsuspendedexceptforcauseas
provided bylawmust be applied. Persons holding positions which are highly technical in nature mustbe
affordedtheConstitutionalsafeguardrequiringremovaltobeforcauseasprovidedbylaw,andifthedismissal
for"lossofconfidence"beallowed,itmusthavebasisinfact,whichdoesnotexistinthecaseatbar.
TheexemptionofthethreepositionsadvertedtoearlierfromtherulerequiringAPPOINTMENTStobe
madeonthebasisofMeritandfitnessDOESNOTEXEMPTsuchpositionsfromtheoperationoftherulethat
noofficerintheCivilServiceshallberemovedexceptforcauseasprovidedforbylaw.Thisruleisabsolute,in
fact,theCBCharterprovidedforthesameabsoluterule.
Furthermore,theCivilServiceLawwhichclassifiedCorpus'positionasnoncompetitiveprovidesthat
suchpositionsareprotectedbytheCivilServiceLawandthathisremovalmustonlybeforcauserecognizedby
law(GarciavExec.Secretary.)
Whilethetenureofofficialsholdingprimarilyconfidentialpositionsendsuponlossofconfidence,the
tenureofofficialsholdinghighlytechnicalpostsdoesnotenduponmerelossofconfidence.TheConsti.clearly
distinguishedtheprimarilyconfidentialfromthehighlytechnical,andtoapplythelossofconfidenceruletothe
latterincumbentsistoignoreanderasethedifferentiationexpresslymadebyourfundamentalcharter.Officers
holdinghighlytechnicalpositionsholdofficeonthebasisoftheirspecialskillsandqualifications.Thecourt
alsosaidthatifmechanicsandengineersenjoysecurityoftenurewithmorereasonshouldahighlytechnical
officer,asRespondentCorpus,beprotectedbytheConstitutionalprovisiononsecurityoftenure.RAM.

Inglesv.Mutuc,26SCRA171(1968)
F: Plaintiffshereinarecivilserviceeligibles,holdingpositionsundertheOfficeofthePresident.Aboutthesecond
weekofJanuary,1962,plaintiffsreceivedacommunicationfromExecutiveSec.Mutucadvisingthemthattheirservicesin
thegovernmentwereterminated.TheyappealedtothePresidentbutsaidappealwasdenied.Theyfiledanactionagainst
theExec.Sec.allegingthattheyhadbeenremovedfromofficewithoutjustcauseandwithoutdueprocess.Defendant,on
theotherhand,averredthatthepositionswhichplaintiffswerethenoccupyingwereprimarilyconfidentialinnatureand
therefore,theirappointmentsweresubjecttoremovalatthepleasureoftheappointingpower.

ISSUE: W/Nplaintiffsareoccupyingpositionswhichareprimarilyconfidentialandthereforearesubjectto
removalatthepleasureoftheappointingauthority.

HELD:NO.Thefactthattheplaintiffsheldofficeforthe"president'sPrivateOffice"undersubdivisionentitled
"privatesecretaries"andthattheyhandled"confidentialMatters"eveniftheyonlyperformedclericalworkdo
notmakethemofficersandemployeesoccupyinghighlyconfidentialoffices.Thereisnothingintheitemsofthe
plaintiffs(whowereclerksandsecretaries)toindicatethattheirrespectivepositionsare"primarilyconfidential"
innature. Thefactthattheyhandled attimes "confidential matters" does notsuffice tocharacterizetheir
positionsasprimarilyconfidential.NoofficeroremployeeintheCivilServiceshallberemovedorsuspended
exceptforcauseasprovidedforbylawandsinceplaintiffspositionswereprotectedbythisprovision,their
removalwithoutcausewasthereforeillegal.Adapted.
xxx

Officer holding position primarily confidential in nature; Statement in De los Santos v. Mallare
declaredasmereobiter. Theassumptionthatanofficerholdingapositionw/cisprimarilyconfidentialin
nature is "subject to removal at the pleasure of the appointing power," is inaccurate. This assumption is
evidentlybased upona statement inDe losSantosv.Mallare tothe effect that "three specified classes of
positions policydetermining, primarily confidential and highly technical are excluded from the merit
systemand dismissalatpleasureofofficersandemployeesappointedthereinisallowedbytheConsti. xxx.
Thiswas,however,amereobiter,bec.,theofficeinvolvedinsaidcasethatofCityEngineerofBaguiodid
notbelongtoanyoftheexceptedclasses,and,hence,itwasnotnecessarytodeterminewhetheritsincumbents
wereremovableornotatthepleasureoftheappointingpower.Whatismore,saidobiter,ifdetachedfromthe
contextofthedecisionofw/citformspart,wouldbeinconsistentw/theconstitutionalcommandtotheeffect
that"noofficeroremployeeintheCivilServiceshallberemovedorsuspendedexceptforcauseasprovidedby
law"anditisconcededthatoneholdingintheGovtaprimarilyconfidentialpositionis"intheCivilService."

Meaning of "term merely expires"; Distinguished from "removal" and "dismissal." When an
incumbentofaprimarilyconfidentialpositionholdsofficeatthepleasureoftheappointingpower,andthat
pleasureturnsintodispleasure,theincumbentis not "removed"or"dismissed"fromofficehistermmerely
"expires,"inmuchthesamewayasanofficer,whoserighttheretoceasesuponexpirationofthefixedtermfor
w/chehadbeenappointedorelected,isnotandcannotbedeemed"removed"or"dismissed"therefrom,upon
theexpirationofsaidterm.Themaindifferencebet.theformerprimarilyconfidentialofficerandthelatter
isthatthelatter'stermisfixedordefinite,whereasthatoftheformerisnotprefixed,butindefinite,atthetime
ofhisappointmentorelection,andbecomesfixedanddeterminedwhentheappointingpowerexpressesits
decisiontoputanendtotheservicesoftheincumbent.Whenthiseventtakesplace,thelatterisnot"removed"
or"dismissed"fromofficehistermmerely"expired."RAM.
[NOTE:TheCourtinthiscaseruledthattheoneholdinginthegovernmentaprimarilyconfidential
positionis"intheCivilService"andthat"officersintheunclassifiedaswellasthoseintheclassifiedservice"
areprotectedbytheprovisionintheorganiclawthat"noofficershallberemovedfromofficewithoutcauseas
providedbylaw".Whileincumbentofaprimarilyconfidentialpositionholdsofficeatthepleasureonlyofthe
appointingpowerandsuchpleasureturnsintodispleasure,theincumbentisnot"removedordismissed"butthat
histerm,merelyexpires.]

Cristobalv.Melchor,78SCRA175ACivilServiceEmployeeisNotBarredbyLachesifbeforeBringingSuit
HeContinuouslyPressedHisClaimforReinstatement.

F: Cristobal,athirdgradecivilserviceeligible,wasemployedasaprivateSecretaryintheOfficeofthePresidentof
thePhilippines.InJanuary1962,heandsomeothersweregivennoticeofterminationoftheirserviceseffectiveJanuary1,
1962.OnMarch24,1962,fiveoftheemployeesconcernedfiledanactionwiththeCFI,whichculminatedinanSCruling
orderingtheirreinstatement(InglesvMutuc).Cristobal,however,wasnotapartytothecasebecauseduringthependency
ofsuchcase,hesoughtreinstatementandinfact,theExec.SecretaryandseveralotherExec.secretariespromisedtolook
forplacementforhim.AftertheSupremeCourtrenderedthedecisionintheMutuccase,CristobalwrotethePresident
requestingreinstatement.ThisrequestwasdeniedinfivesuccessivelettersfromtheOfficeofthePresident,thelastletter
declaredthematter"definitelyclosed". CristobalfiledanactionintheCFI(nowRTC)ofManila. Thedismissalwas
basedonRule66oftheRulesofCourt(QuoWarranto)whichprovidesthatanactionforquowarrantomaynotbefiled
unlesscommencedwithinoneyearafterthecauseoftheouster.SinceCristobaldidnotbringtheactionuntilafterthe
lapseofnineyears,hiscasewasbarredbylaches.

HELD: Cristobalisnotguiltyoflaches.Hesoughtreconsiderationofhisseparationfromtheserviceand
althoughhedidnotjoinintheInglescourtaction,hecontinuedtopresshisrequestforreinstatementduringthe
pendencyofthecase.InfactSecretaryMutucassuredhimthathewouldworkforhisreinstatement. The
continuedpromisenotonlyofMutucbutofthesubsequentSecretariesledCristobaltowaitbutdepitewaiting
forsuchalongtime,hisreinstatementnevercameabout.ItwouldbetheheightofinequityifafterCristobal
reliedandreposedhisfaithandtrustonthewordandpromisesoftheformerExec.Secretaries,thecourtwould
rulethathehadlosthisrighttoseekreliefbecauseofthelapseoftime.
Cristobal,justlikethePlaintiffsintheInglesvMutuccase,wasnotholdinganofficecharacterizedas
"highly confidential", he was performing purely clerical work although he handled "confidential matters"
occasionally.Heisthereforeprotectedinhistenureandmaynotbethereforeremovedwithoutjustcause.Heis
entitledtobackwagesforfiveyearsalthoughhehadbeendismissedfornineyears,applyingbyanalogythe
awardofbackwagesincasesofunfairlaborpractice.Adapted.

(6)RightofSelfOrganization

Art. III, Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors,toformunions,associations,orsocietiesforpurposesnotcontrarytolawshallnotbeabridged.

Art.IX,B,Sec.2.xxx
(5)Therighttoselforganizationshallnotbedeniedtogovernmentemployees.

(notinVV'soutline)

Sec.38. Coverage. (1) Allgovernmentemployees, including those ingovernmentownedor


controlledcorporationswithoriginalcharters,canform,joinorassistemployees'organizationsoftheir
ownchoosingforthefurtheranceandprotectionoftheirinterests. Theycanalsoform,inconjunction
withappropriategovernmentauthorities,labormanagementcommittees,workcouncilsandotherforms
ofworkers'participationschemestoachievethesameobjectives.
(2) TheprovisionsofthisChaptershallnotapplytothemembersoftheArmedForcesofthe
Philippines,includingpoliceofficers,policemen,firemenandjailguards. (BookV,TitleI,SubtitleA,
Chapter6,AdministrativeCodeof1987.)

AllianceofGovernmentWorkersvMinisterofLabor,124SCRA1(1983)

F: supra.

HELD:Thedismissalofthispetitionshouldnot,byanymeans,beinterpretedtoimplythatworkersingovt
ownedorcontrolledcorporationsorinstatecollegesanduniversitiesmaynotenjoyfreedomofassociation.
Theseworkerswhomthepetitionerspurporttorepresenthavetherighttoformassociationsorsocietiesfor
purposes not contrary to law. But they may not join associations w/c impose the obligation to engage in
concertedactivitiesinordertogetsalaries,fringebenefits,andotheremolumentshigherthanordifferentfrom
thoseprovidedbylawandregulation.

NationalServiceCorp.vNLRC,168SCRA122(1988),supra.

TUPASvNHA,173SCRA33(1989),supra.

ISSUE:W/NemployeesofNHChaveundoubtedlytherighttoformunions.

HELD:Therighttounionizeisnowexplicitlyrecognizedandgrantedtobothemployeesinbothgovernmental
andtheprivatesectors.Thereisnoimpedimenttotheholdingofacertificateofelectionamongtheworkersof
NHCforitisclearthattheyarecoveredbytheLaborCode,forNHCisaGOCCwithoutanoriginalcharter.
StatutoryimplementationoftheConsti(par5sec2artIXB)isfoundinArt244oftheLaborCode.Adapted.

(7)Righttostrike

SSS Employees Association v CA, 175 SCRA 690 [Public Sector LaborManagement has jurisdiction of
disputeconcerningtermsandconditions(ofemployment)butnotdamagesarisingfromactsofaunion.]

F:SSSfiledw/theRTCQCacomplaintfordamagesw/aprayerforawritofprelinj.againstpetitionersSSSEA,alleging
thatthe officers and members of the latter staged anillegal strike andbarricaded the entrances to the SSS building
preventingnonstrikingemployeesfromreportingtoworkandSSSmembersfromtransactingbusinessw/SSS.ThePublic
SectorLaborManagementCouncilorderedthestrikerstoreturntoworkbutthestrikersrefusedtodoso. TheSSSEA
wentonstrikebec.SSSfailedtoactontheunion'sdemands.
Petitionersfiledamotiontodismissthecomplaintforlackofjurisdiction,w/cmotionwasdenied.Therestraining
orderw/cwaspreviouslyissuedwasconvertedintoaninjunctionafterfindingthestrikeillegal.Petitionersappealedthe
casetotheCA.ThelatterheldthatsincetheemployeesofSSSaregovtemployees,theyarenotallowedtostrike.

HELD:EmployeesintheCivilServicemaynotresorttostrikes,walkoutsandothertemporaryworkstoppages,
likeworkersintheprivatesector,inordertopressuretheGovt.toaccedetotheirdemands.Asnowprovided
underSec.4,RuleIIIoftheRulesandRegulationstoGoverntheExerciseoftheRightofGovt.EEstoSelf
Organizationwhichtookeffectaftertheinitialdisputearose,thetermsandconditionsofemploymentinthe
Govt,includinganypoliticalsubdivisionorinstrumentalitythereofandgovt.ownedandcontrolledcorporations
withoriginalcharters,aregovernedbylawandemployeesthereinshallnotstrikeforthepurposeofsecuring
changesthereof.
ThestatementofthecourtinAllianceofGovtWorkersv.MinisterofLaborandEmployment(124
SCRA1)isrelevantasitfurnishestherationalefordistinguishingbet.workersintheprivatesectorandgovt
employeesw/regardtotherighttostrike?

Sincethetermsandconditionsofgovt.employmentarefixedbylaw,govt.workerscannotuse
thesameweaponsemployedbyworkersintheprivatesectortosecureconcessionsfromtheiremployers.
Theprinciplebehindlaborunionisminprivateindustryisthatindustrialpeacecannotbesecuredthrough
compulsionoflaw.Relationsbet.privateemployersandtheiremployeesrestonanessentiallyvoluntary
basis. Subjecttotheminimumrequirementsofwagelawsandotherlaborandwelfarelegislation,the
termsandconditionsofemploymentintheunionizedprivatesectoraresettledthroughtheprocessof
collective bargaining. In govt employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly given
delegatedpower,theadministrativeheadsofgovtw/cfixthetermsandconditionsofemployment.And
thisiseffectedthroughstatutesoradministrativecirculars,rules,andregulations,notthroughCBA's.

EO180,w/c providesguidelines fortheexerciseoftherighttoorganizeofgovt employees, while


clinging to the same philosophy, has, however, relaxed the rule to allow negotiation where the terms and
conditionsofemploymentinvolvedarenotamongthosefixedbylaw.

Govtemployeesmay,therefore,throughtheirunionsorassociations,eitherpetitiontheCongressforthe
bettermentofthetermsandconditionsofemploymentwhicharew/intheambitoflegislationornegotiatew/the
appropriategovtagenciesfortheimprovementofthosew/arenotfixedbylaw. Iftherebeanyunresolved
grievances,thedisputemaybereferredtothePublicSectorLaborManagementCouncilforappropriateaction.
RAM.

Issue:W/NtheRTCcanenjointheSSSEAfromstriking.

Held:Yes.EO180veststhePublicSectorLaborManagementCouncilwithjurisdictionoverunresolvedlabor
disputesinvolvinggovernmentemployees. Clearly,theNLRChasnojurisdictionoverthedispute. TheRTC
was not precluded, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction under BP 129, as amended, from assuming
jurisdictionovertheSSS'scomplaintfordamagesandissuingtheinjunctivewritprayedfortherein.Unlikethe
NLRC,thePSLMCouncilhasnotbeengrantedbylawauthoritytoissuewritsofinjunctioninlabordisputes
withinitsjurisdiction.Thus,sinceitistheCouncilandtheNLRCthathasjurisdictionovertheinstantlabor
dispute,resorttogeneralcourtsoflawfortheissuanceofawritofinjunctiontoenjointhestrikeisappropriate.
Adapted.

ManilaPublicSchoolTeachersAssociationv.Laguio,200SCRA323(1991)

F: OnSeptember17,1990,Monday,atleast800publicschoolteachersproceededtothenationalofficeoftheDECS
andairedtheirgrievances.ThemassactioncontinuedintotheweekdespitetheDECSSecretary'sRETURNTOWORK
order.TheSecretaryfiledadministrativechargesagainsttheprotestingteachers.TheSecretaryrenderedthequestioned
decisions in the administrative proceeding. He dismissed some teachers and placed others in under suspension. Two
separate petitions werefiledtoassailthevalidity ofthe returntoworkorder andhis decisions in the administrative
proceeding.

ISSUE:WHETHERORNOTTHEMASSACTIONSARECONSIDEREDASSTRIKES?

HELD: Yes.Themassactionsconstitutedaconcertedandunauthorizedstoppageof,orabsencefromwork,
whichitwastheteachers'dutytoperform,undertakenforessentiallyeconomicreasons.

ISSUE:WHETHERORNOTPUBLICSCHOOLTEACHERSCANSTRIKE?

HELD:No.Employeesofthepublicservicedonothavetherighttostrikealthoughtheyhavetherighttoself
organizationandnegotiatewithappropriategovernmentagenciesfortheimprovementofworkingconditions.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT DUE PROCESS WAS OBSERVED DURING THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS?

HELD:Thiscourtisacourtoflastresort.Itresolvesquestionsoflawwherethereisnodisputeofthefactsor
thatthefactshavebeenalreadydeterminedbythelowertribunals.Itisnotatrieroffacts.Itcannotresolvethe
issuewhichrequirestheestablishmentofsomefacts.Theremedyisforthepetitionerstoparticipateinthe
administrativeproceedings. Iftheylost, they mayappealto theCivilServiceCommission. Ifpending said
administrativeproceedings,immediaterecoursetojudicialauthoritywasbelievednecessary,recourseiswiththe
RTCwheretherewouldbeopportunitytoproverelevantfacts.Adapted.

9.ReviewofthedecisionsoftheCSC

Art.IX,A,Sec.7.EachCommissionshalldecidebyamajorityvoteofallitsMembersanycaseor
matterbroughtbeforeitwithinsixtydaysfromthedateofitssubmissionfordecisionorresolution.A
caseormatterisdeemedsubmittedfordecisionorresolutionuponthefilingofthelastpleading,brief,or
memorandumrequiredbytherulesoftheCommissionorbytheCommissionitself. Unlessotherwise
providedbythisConstitutionorbylaw,anydecision,order,orrulingofeachCommissionmaybebrought
totheSupreme Court on certiorari bythe aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of acopy
thereof.

BARLONGAYCASES:

Dariov.Mison,176SCRA84(1989)

Manalansangv.CSC,,203SCRA797(1991)

F: ThisisaresolutionoftheCourt enbanc denyingpetitioner'ssecondmotionforreconsideration. TheCourt


wishes,however,todevoteafewwordstooneissueraisedbythepetitionerw/cappearsofsufficientimportancetomerit
separatetreatmentanddisposition:thatconcerningtheeffectofthefilingofamotionforreconsiderationofadecision,or
finalorderorresolutionoftheCSConthe30dayperiodprescribedfortakinganappealtherefrom.Adapted.

HELD:TheCourtholdsthatthethirtydayperiodprescribedbySec.7,PartA,Art.IXoftheConsti.shallbe
interruptedfromthetimeamotionforreconsiderationistimelyandproperlyfiled untilnoticeoftheorder
overrulingthemotionshallhavebeenservedupontheaccusedorhiscounsel.Inotherwords,incomputingthe
periodofappealfromtheCSC,thetimeduringw/camotionforreconsiderorsetasideitsjudgment,orderor
resolutionhasbeenpendingshallbededucted,unlesssuchmotionfailstherequirementssettherefor.RAM.

Mancitav.Barcinas,216SCRA772(1992)

F: On 10/15/90, Mayor Divinigracia, Jr., who had succeeded Mayor Prila, informed pvt. resp. Nacario that her
servicesasMPDCwouldbeterminatedeffective11/16/90topavethewayforthereinstatementofpetitioner(w/cCSC
ordered.)
xxx
Meanwhile,on11/8/90,pvt.resp.Nacariofiledw/theRTCofPili,CamarinesSur,apetitionfordeclaratoryrelief
andprohibitionw/prel.inj.againstCSCxxx
Asprayedforbythepetitioner(nowpvt.resp.Nacario),theresp.Judgeissuedonthesamedayatemporary
restrainingorderandsetthehearingoftheapplicationforawritofprel.inj.on11/22/90. Petitionerfiledamotionto
dismissthepetitiononthegroundthatthecourtaquohasnojurisdictiontorule,passuponorreviewafinaljudgment,
orderordecisionoftheCSC.On2/25/91,resp.Judgeissuedanorderdenyingthemotion.MFRwasalsodeniedHence,
thispetitionforcertiorari.

HELD:TheCSC,undertheConsti.,isthesinglearbiterofallcontestsrelatingtothecivilserviceandassuch,
itsjudgmentsareunappealableandsubjectonlytothisCourt'scertiorarijurisdiction.(Lopezv.CSC,et.al,195
SCRA777.)
Sincethedecision,order,orrulingoftheCSCissubjecttoreviewonlybythisCourtoncertiorariunder
Rule65,ROC,theRTChasnojurisdictionoverthecivilcase,anactionw/cseeksareviewofadecisionofthe
CSC.RAM.
10.FiscalAutonomy

Art. IX, A, Sec. 5. The Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual
appropriationsshallbeautomaticallyandregularlyreleased.

ApprovalofappointmentsbytheCSC

BARLONGAYCASES:

Barrozov.CSC,198SCRA487

F: On11/10/88,DavidBorjaretiredasCityEngineerofBaguio. Atthattime,petitionerTeodoroBarrozowasa
SeniorCivilEngineerofDPWHassignedtotheofficeoftheCityEngineerofBaguioandresp.V.JulianwastheAsst.
CityEngineerofBaguio.On12/27/88,MayorLaboextendedtoBarrozoapermanentappointmentasCityEngineerof
Baguio. On2/16/89,afterhisprotestwasrejectedbyMayorLabo,pvt.resp.JulianappealedtotheMSPBoftheCSC,
claimingthatasaqualifiednextinrankofficer,hehadapreemptiverightoverBarrozo. TheCSCCordilleraAdmin.
Region,tow/ctheappealwasreferred,declaredBarrozo'sappointmentvoidforbeingviolativeofCivilServicepromotion
rules.MFRwasdenied.CSC,onappeal,affirmedthedecision.Adapted.

HELD: TheCSChasnopowerofappointmentexceptoveritsownpersonnel.Neitherdoesithavetheauthority
to review the appointments made by other officers except only to ascertain if the appointee possesses the
requiredqualifications.Thedeterminationofwhoamongaspirantswiththeminimumstatutoryqualifications
shouldbepreferredbelongstotheappointingauthorityandnottheCSC.Itcannotdisallowanappointmentbec.
itbelievesanotherpersonisbetterqualifiedandmushlesscanitdirecttheappointmentofitsownchoice.
xxx
Thelawdoesnotabsolutelyrequirethatthepersonwhoisnextinrankshallbepromotedtofilla
vacancy.Infact,thevacancymaybefillednotonlybypromotionbut"bytransferofpresentemployeesinthe
govt service, by reinstatement, by reemployment of persons separated through reduction in force, or by
appointmentofpersonsw/thecivilserviceeligibilityappropriatetotheposition.WhattheCivilServiceAct
providesisthatifavacancyisfilledbypromotion,thepersonholdingthatpositionnextinrankthereto"shallbe
consideredforpromotion."
xxx
Onewhoisnextinrankisentitledtopreferentialconsiderationforpromotiontothehighervacancybut
itdoesnotnecessarilyfollowthatheandnooneelsecanbeappointed.Theruleneithergrantsavestedright
totheholdernorimposesaministerialdutyontheappointingauthoritytopromotesuchpersontothenext
higherposition.RAM.

B.COMMISSIONONELECTIONS

1.CompositionandqualificationsofCommissioners
Art.IX,C,Sec.1.(1) ThereshallbeaCommissiononElectionscomposedofaChairmanandsix
Commissioners who shall be naturalborn citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirtyfive years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been
candidatesforanyelectivepositionintheimmediatelyprecedingelections.However,amajoritythereof,
includingtheChairman,shallbemembersofthePhilippineBarwhohavebeenengagedinthepracticeof
lawforatleasttenyears.

Art.VII,Sec.13.xxx
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the
PresidentshallnotduringhistenurebeappointedasMembersoftheConstitutionalCommissions,orthe
OfficeoftheOmbudsman,orasSecretaries,Undersecretaries,chairmenorheadsofbureausoroffices,
includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsandtheirsubsidiaries.

Cayetanov.Monsod,201SCRA210

F: MonsodwasnominatedbyPresidentAquinoasChairmanoftheComelec.TheCommissiononAppointments
confirmedtheappointmentdespiteCayetano'sobjection,basedonMonsod'sallegedlackoftherequiredqualificationof
10yearlawpractice.Cayetanofiledthiscertiorariandprohibition.

ISSUE:W/NMONSODHASBEENENGAGEDINTHEPRACTICEOFLAWFOR1OYEARS?

HELD:YES.Thepracticeoflawisnotlimitedtotheconductofcasesorlitigationincourt.Itembracesthe
preparationofpleadingsandotherpapersincidenttoactionsandspecialproceedings,themanagementofsuch
actionsandproceedingsonbehalfofclients,andotherworkswheretheworkdoneinvolvesthedeterminationof
thetrainedlegalmindofthelegaleffectoffactsandconditions(PLAvs.Agrava.)
Therecordsofthe1986constitutionalcommissionshowthattheinterpretationofthetermpracticeof
lawwasliberalastoconsiderlawyersemployedintheCommissionofAuditasengagedinthepracticeoflaw
providedthattheyusetheirlegalknowledgeortalentintheirrespectivework.
ThecourtalsocitedanarticleintheJanuary11,1989issueoftheBusinessStar,thatlawyersnowadays
havetheirownspecializedfieldssuchastaxlawyers,prosecutors,etc.,thatbecauseofthedemandsoftheir
specialization, lawyers engage in other works or functions to meet them. These days, for example, most
corporationlawyersareinvolvedinmanagementpolicyformulation.
Therefore,Monsod,whopassedthebarin1960,workedwiththeWorldBankGroupfrom19631970,
thenworkedforaninvestmentbanktill1986,becamememberoftheCONCOMin1986,andalsobecamea
memberoftheDavideCommissionin1990,canbeconsideredtohavebeenengagedinthepracticeoflawas
lawyereconomist,lawyermanager,lawyerentrepreneur,etc.

ISSUE:W/NTHECOMMISSIONONAPPOINTMENTSCOMMITTEDGRAVEABUSEOFDISCRETION
INCONFIRMINGMONSOD'SAPPOINTMENT?

HELD: NO. The power of the COA to give consent to the nomination of the Comelec Chairman by the
presidentismandatedbytheconstitution.Thepowerofappointmentisessentiallywithinthediscretionofwhom
itissovestedsubjecttotheonlyconditionthattheappointeeshouldpossessthequalificationrequiredbylaw.
Fromtheevidence,thereisnooccasionfortheSCtoexerciseitscorrectivepowersincethereisnosuchgrave
abuseofdiscretiononthepartoftheCA.Adapted.

2.AppointmentandtermofofficeofCommissioners;Ruleagainstreappointment

Art.IX,C,Sec.1.xxx
(2)TheChairmanandtheCommissionersshallbeappointedbythePresidentwiththeconsentof
the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed,threeMembers shallholdofficeforsevenyears,twoMembers forfiveyears,andthelast
Members forthreeyears,withoutreappointment. Appointmenttoanyvacancyshallbe onlyforthe
unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporaryoractingcapacity.

NacionalistaPartyv.AngeloBautista,85PHIL103(1949)

F: PresidentQuirinodesignatedtheSolicitorGeneralasActingmemberoftheComelecinNovember,1949.The
NacionalistaPartyfiledthisprohibitiononthefollowinggrounds:(1)theSGdidnotresignfromtheofficeoftheSolicitor
General;(2)thereisnovacancyintheComelecbecausetheretirementoftheComelecmembercausingthevacancy,was
acceptedbythe Presidentin badfaith; and(3)thefunctions ofa SolicitorGeneralareincompatible withthoseofa
Comelecmember.

ISSUE:W/NTHEDESIGNATIONWASVALID?

HELD:NO,itwasnot.BythenatureoftheComelec'sfunctions,theComelecmustbeindependent.Members
arenotallowedtoperformotherfunctions,powersanddutiestopreserveitsimpartiality.TheSolicitorGeneral's
duties also require an undivided time and attention for efficiency. Furthermore, when there is a vacancy,
appointmentispreferredtodesignation.

ISSUE:W/NPROHIBITIONWOULDLIE?

HELD: NO. The case is by nature a quo warranto proceeding because it questions the legality of the
respondent'sdesignationorhisrighttooffice.Theproceedingisinstitutedbytheotherpartyclaiming the
positionoccupiedand/ortheSolicitorGeneral.Prohibitionhowever,hasadifferentpurpose,whichistoprevent
theusurpationofjurisdictionbyasubordinatecourt.
AlthoughthereisnootherpartywhoclaimsarightoverthepositionoccupiednorwilltheSGfilea
caseagainsthimself,thecourtmustgranttheremedyofaquowarrantoproceedingbecausetheSG'scontinued
occupancyasmemberoftheComelecisillegal.Adapted.

Brillantesv.Yorac,192SCRA358(DEC.18,1990)

F: AssociateCommissionerHaydeeYoracwasappointedbyPres.AquinoasActingChairmanoftheCommission
onElections,inplaceofChairmanHilarioDavide,whohadbeennamedchairmanofthefactfindingcommissionto
investigatetheDec.1989coupd'tatattempt.

ISSUE:WONtheappointmentisunconstitutional

HELD:NO.Art.IXA,Section1,oftheConstitutionexpresslydescribesalltheConstitutionalCommissionsas
"independent".Althoughessentiallyexecutiveinnature,theyarenotunderthecontrolofthePresidentofthe
Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own
proceedingsundertheapplicablelawsanditsownrulesandintheexerciseofitsowndiscretion.Itsdecisions,
ordersandrulingsaresubjectonlytoreviewoncertioraribytheSCasprovidedbytheConstitutioninArt.IX
A,Section7.
Thechoiceofatemporarychairmanintheabsenceoftheregularchairmancomesunderthatdiscretion.
Thatdiscretioncannotbeexercisedforit,evenwithitsconsent,bythePresidentofthePhilippines.Adapted.

NPv.Vera,85Phil149

F: This is an action brought by the Nacionalista Party against De Vera on the ground that his appointment as
ChairmanoftheCOMELECisaviolationoftheConstitutionparticularlyArt.X,Sec.1ofthe1935Constitutionwhich
providesthatthemembersoftheCOMELECshallholdofficefornineyearswithoutreappointment.

Held:TheprohibitionagainstreappointmentcomesasacontinuationoftherequirementthattheCommission
shallholdofficeforatermofnineyears.Reappointmentisnotprohibitedprovidedhistermwillnotexceed
nineyearsinall.
InJuly1945,threeCommissionerswereappointed.DeVerawasappointedforthreeyears.Ifhewere
tosucceedhimself,hecannotbereappointedtodosobecausethatwouldprecludetheappointmentofanew
memberafter3yearsandwouldfurthermoreincreasehistermto12yearssinceupontheexpirationofhisterm,
hissuccessormustbeappointedfornineyears.
Butinthiscase,deVera'sappointmentwasbyvirtueofthedeathoftheChairmanin1947andhewas
promotedtooccupythechairmanshipoftheCommissionfortheunexpiredtermonly.Thus,thisisnotoffensive
totheConstitutionbecauseitdoesnotincreasedeVera'stermofofficetomorethannineyearsnordoesit
precludetheappointmentofanewmemberupontheexpirationofthefirsttermofthreeyears.Adapted.

Republicv.Imperial,96Phil770

F: ThisisaquowarrantoproceedingtotestthelegalityofthecontinuanceinofficeofImperialasChairmanand
PerezasmemberofCOMELEC.
WhenChairmandeVeradiedinAugust1951,beforetheexpirationofthemaximumtermofnineyearsofthe
ChairmanoftheCommission,ImperialwasappointedChairmantosucceeddeVera.Hisappointmentprovidedforaterm
expiringJuly12,1960.TheSGcontendedthatthetermforwhichhewilllegallyserveasChairmanlegallyexpiredonJuly
12,1954,theexpirationofthe9yeartermforwhichthefirstChairmanwasappointed.
ComelecmemberPerezontheotherhand,wasappointedforatermof9yearsexpiringon24November1958.
The SG contended that his term legally expired on July 12, 1951, the expiration of the term of 6 years for which
CommissionerEnage,hispredecessorwasappointed.

Held: ThetermscannotbeginfromthefirstappointmentsmadeinJuly12,1945butfromthedateofthe
organizationoftheCOMELECunderCA657onJune21,1941.Thus,thetermofofficeofthefirstChairman,
LopezVitobeganonJune21,1941andendedJune20,1950.ThatofmemberEnagebeganonJune21,1941to
June20,1944(butthiswasnotfilled). Sincethefirst3yeartermhadalreadyexpiredin1944,theappointment
ofDeVeraonJune12,1945mustbeforthefulltermofnineyears(June1944toJune1953).Thefirstvacancy
occurredbytheexpirationofthetermofEnage.Hissuccessor,Perez,wasnamedforafull9yeartermwhich
shallhavestartedonJune1947toJune1956.
ThesecondvacancyhappeneduponthedeathofLopezVitoonMay1947.Tosucceedhim,deVera
appointedandlastedonlyuptoJune1950,theunexpiredperiodofLopezVito'sterm.Thus,onJune1950,a
vacancyoccurredwhichDeVeracouldnolongerfillbecausehisappointmentwasexpresslyprohibitedbythe
Constitution.Thus,thenextChairmanwasrespondentImperialwhosetermof9yearsmustbedeemedtohave
beganonJune21,1990toexpireonJune20,1959.Adapted.

3.Appointmentofpersonnel

Art.IX,A,Sec.4.TheConstitutionalCommissionsshallappointtheirofficialsandemployeesin
accordancewithlaw.

4.Salary

Art.IX,A,Sec.3.ThesalaryoftheChairmanandtheCommissionersshallbefixedbylawand
shallnotbedecreasedduringtheirtenure.

Art. XVIII, Sec. 17. Until the Congress provides otherwise x x x the Chairmen of the
ConstitutionalCommissions(shallreceive),twohundredfourthousandpesoseach;andtheMembersof
theConstitutionalCommissions,onehundredeightythousandpesoseach.

Thesalary,ofcourse,canbeincreasedandtheincreasecantakeeffectatonce,since,liketheJudiciary,
theConstitutionalCommissionshavenotpartinthepassageofsuchalaw.

5.Disqualifications
Art.IX,A,Sec.2.NoMemberofaConstitutionalCommissionshall,duringhistenure,holdany
otherofficeoremployment. Neithershallheengageinthepracticeofanyprofessionorintheactive
managementorcontrolofanybusinesswhichinanywaymaybeaffectedbythefunctionsofhisoffice,
norshallhebefinanciallyinterested,directlyorindirectly,inanycontractwith,orinanyfranchiseor
privilege granted bythe Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including
governmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries.

NomembersofaConstitutionalCommissionshallduringhis"tenure":(IX,V,2)

a.Holdanyotherofficeoremployment.

Thisissimilartotheprohibitionagainstexecutiveofficers.Itappliestobothpublicandprivateoffices
andemployment.

b.Engageinthepracticeofanyprofession.

c.Engageintheactivemanagementorcontrolofanybusinesswhichinanywaymaybeaffectedbythe
functionsofhisoffice.

d.Befinanciallyinterested,directlyorindirectly,inanycontractwith,orinanyfranchiseorprivilege
granted by, the Government, its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including GOCCs or their
subsidiaries.

6.Impeachment

Art.XI,Sec.2.ThemembersoftheConstitutionalCommissionsmayberemovedfromoffice,on
impeachmentfor,andconvictionof,culpableviolationoftheConstitution,treason,bribery,graftandcor
ruptionandotherhighcrimes,orbetrayalofpublictrust.

7.PowersandfunctionsoftheCOMELEC

TheCommissiononElectionsshallexercisethefollowingpowersandfunctions:

a.Enforceelectionlaws

Art.IX,C,Sec.2.(1) Enforceandadministeralllawsandregulationsrelativetotheconductof
anelection,plebiscite, initiative,referendum,andrecall.
Sanchezv.COMELEC,114SCRA454

F: Sanchez,amayoraltycandidate,wholostinthe1980SanFernando,Pampangaelections,filedwiththeComeleca
petitiontonullifythesaidelectionsduetolargescaleterrorism,whichtookplaceafterthepeoplehadcasttheirvotes.The
Comelec,afterhearing,issuedtheresolutionwhichorderedthenullificationoftheelectionsandthecertificationofthe
failureofelectionstothepresidentorprimeministerforremediallegislationandtheappointmentofmunicipalofficials.
Thewinningmayoraltycandidatequestionedthevalidityoftheresolution.

ISSUE: W/NTHECOMELECHASTHEPOWERTO NULLIFYELECTIONSON THEGROUND OF


POSTELECTIONTERRORISM?

HELD: YES,ithas.TheComelecisnowthesolejudgeofallcontestsrelatingtotheelections,returnsand
qualificationsofallmembersoftheBatasangPambansa,electiveprovincialandcityofficials.Inlinewithits
duty to protect and preserve the integrity of the elections, the Comelec must be deemed possessed of the
authoritytoannulelectionswherethewillofthevotershasbeendefeatedandthepurityofelectionssullied.The
factthatthefailureofelectionswasduetoterrorismafterthevoteswerecastisnotmaterial.

ISSUE:W/NTHECOMELECHASTHEPOWERTOCALLSPECIALELECTIONS?

HELD:YES.TheComelec,beingthesolejudgeofelections,returnsandqualifications,hasthepowertocall
specialelections.DuringthetimetheComelecwasnotthesolejudge,thepresident,uponcertificationtohimby
theComelecofafailureofelections,hadthepowertocallspecialelections.TheComelechasthedutytotake
necessarystepstocompletetheelections,thatis,toseetoitthattherealwinnersareproclaimed.Butwhenthe
winnerscannotbedeterminedfromtheelections,whichwasmarredbymassiveandpervasiveterrorism,the
Comelecmustcallforaspecialelectioninordertoproclaimtherealwinners.Adapted.

b.Decideadministrativequestionspertainingtoelectionexcepttherighttovote

Art.IX,C,Sec.2.xxx
(3)Decide,exceptthoseinvolvingtherighttovote, all questions affecting elections, including
determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and
inspectors,andregistrationofvoters.

c.Petitionforinclusionorexclusionofvoters

Art.IX,C,Sec.2.xxx
(6) File,uponaverifiedcomplaint,oronitsowninitiative,petitionsincourtforinclusionor
exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws,
includingactsoromissionsconstitutingelectionfrauds,offensesandmalpractices.

OmnibusElectionCode
RighttoVote

TherighttovotemaybechallengedintheMTCby:

a)aproceedingchallengingtherightofavotertoberegistered;
b)anactioninstitutedbyavoterforreinstatement;
c)proceedingfiledbyanindividualtoexcludeanyvoterwhosenameappearsinthelistofvoters.

Therearedateswhichthelawallotsfortheregistrationofvoters.Anyperson,under136,duringthis
periodmaychallengetheregistrationofvotersonthegroundsofthequalificationsanddisqualificationsinthe
exerciseoftherightofsuffrage.

Qualifications(Articles5,117)
a)Filipinocitizen
b)18yearsold
c)ResidentofthePhils.,foroneyearandofthemunicipalitywhereheproposestovotefor6months.

Disqualifications(Art.118)

a)Thoseconvictedbyfinaljudgmentandhavebeensentencedtoimprisonmentforatleastoneyearandsuch
disqualificationshasnotbeenremovedbyabsolutepardonoramnesty. Thisdisqualificationlastsfor5years
unlessrestoredbyabsolutepardonoramnesty.(CristobalvLabrador)
b)Thoseconvictedofcrimesinvolvingthenationalsecurity,ordisloyaltytothegovernment,rebellion,sedition,
subversion,etc.
c)Insanityorincompetency

InclusionProceedings

IftheBoardofRegistrationcancelsthenameofavoter,hecanfileintheMTCapetitionforanorderto
includehisnameinthelistofvotersortoreinstatehim.Actionmustbefiledwithin20daysformthelastdayof
registration.AppealcanbemadetotheRTCwithin5days,andthedecisionshallbefinalandunappealableand
nomotionforreconsiderationshallbeallowed.

ExclusionProceedings(Articles138,139,142)

ApetitionforexclusionmustbefiledwiththeMTCwithin20daysfromthelastdayofregistration.

d.Prosecuteelectionlawviolators

Art.IX,C,Sec.2.xxx
(6) File,uponaverifiedcomplaint,oronitsowninitiative,petitionsincourtforinclusionor
exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws,
includingactsoromissionsconstitutingelectionfrauds,offensesandmalpractices.

BPBlg.881,Sec.265

Sec.265.Prosecution.TheCommissionshall,throughitsdulyauthorizedlegalofficers,havetheexclusive
powertoconductpreliminaryinvestigationofallelectionoffensespunishableunderthisCode,andtoprosecutethe
same.TheCommissionmayavailoftheassistanceofotherprosecutingarmsofthegovernment:Provided,however,
That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within four months from his filing the
complaint, he may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for proper
investigationandprosecution,ifwarranted.

EO134,Sec.11,February27,1987

Sec.11. Prosecution. TheCommissionshall,throughitsdulyauthorizedlegalofficers,haveexclusive


powerto conduct preliminary investigation ofall election offenses punishable as provided forin thepreceding
section,andtoprosecutethesame:Provided,ThatintheeventthattheCommissionfailstoactonanycomplaint
withintwo(2)monthsfromfiling,thecomplainantmayfilethecomplaintwiththeOfficeoftheFiscalorwiththe
DepartmentofJusticeforproperinvestigationsandprosecution,ifwarranted.
TheCommissionmayavailoftheassistanceofotherprosecutingarmsofthegovernment.

DeJesusv.People,120SCRA760

In De Jesus v People, 120 SCRA 760 (1983), it was ruled that a government official (COMELEC
Registrar) who violated the election law ( tampering with returns to make it appear that there were more
registeredvoters)mustbeprosecutedbytheCOMELEC,beforetheRTC,nottheSandiganbayan. The1978
ElectionCodeisclearthattheCOMELECshallhavethepowertoconductpreliminaryinvestigationsofall
electionoffenses,andthattheRTChasexclusiveoriginaljurisdictiontotryanddecidesuchcases.Itisnotthe
characterorpersonalityoftheoffender(publicofficial)butthecrimecommitted(violationofelectionlaw)that
determinesjurisdiction.Thisprovisionofthe1978ElectionCodehasbeenintegratedinthe1987Constitution.
Adapted.

Corpuzv.Tanodbayan,149SCRA281

F: ThecomplaintforelectioneeringagainsttheDirectorofTradeet.al.,filedbeforetheComelecwaswithdrawnand
later on refiled with the Tanodbayan. The Comelec Legal Assistance Office moved to enter its appearance for the
complainants.TheTanodbayandeniedthemotiononthegroundthatithasexclusiveauthoritytoprosecutetheelection
offensesofpublicofficials.

ISSUE: WHETHERORNOT THETANODBAYANHASEXCLUSIVEAUTHORITYTOPROSECUTE


ELECTIONOFFENSES?
HELD: NO. There is no constitutional provision granting the Tanodbayan, either explicitly or implicitly,
authority to prosecute, investigate and hear election offenses. Instead the constitution granted such power
exclusivelytotheComelecinordertoinsureafree,orderlyandhonestelections.Itisthenatureoftheoffense
thatdeterminestheexclusivejurisdictionoftheComelecregardlessofwhotheoffenderis,whetheraprivate
individualorapublicofficer.Adapted.

Peoplev.Basilia,179SCRA87

F: ThreecomplaintswerefiledwiththeprovincialfiscalallegingviolationsoftheOmnibusElectionCode.After
conductingpreliminaryinvestigation,thefiscalfiledtheinformationwiththeRTC.Thejudge,motuproprio,dismissedthe
informationonthegroundthattheComelechastheexclusiveauthoritytoconductpreliminaryinvestigationandprosecute
electionoffenses.Hencethisreview.

ISSUE: W/N FISCALS MAY CONDUCT PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTE


ELECTIONOFFENSES?

HELD: YES, they may. Although the Comelec is granted the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary
investigationandprosecuteelectionoffenses,itisalsoauthorizedbytheOmnibusElectionCodetoavailitself
of theassistance ofother prosecuting armsof government. To ensurecredible elections, the Comelec may
deputizelawenforcementagenciesandinstrumentalities,whetherbeforeorafterelections.Pursuanttosuch
authority granted by law, the Comelec issued Resolution no 1862 providing that fiscals may conduct
preliminaryinvestigationsandprosecuteelectionoffenses.Adapted.

Peoplev.Inting,187SCRA788(1990)

*ENBANC

F: In 1988, Mrs. Barba filed a letter complaint against OIC Mayor Regalado of Tanjay, Negros Or. with the
COMELEC,forallegedlytransferringher,apermanentNursingAttendant,intheofficeoftheMayortoaveryremote
barangayandwithoutobtainingpriorpermissionorclearancefromtheCOMELECasrequiredbylaw.
TheCOMELECdirectedtheProvincialElectionSupervisorofDumagueteCity(Atty.Lituanas)to,amongothers,
conductthepreliminaryinvestigationofthecase.SaiddirectivewaspursuanttoaCOMELECresolutionwhichinturn,is
basedontheconstitutionalmandatethattheCOMELECischargedwiththeenforcementandadministrationofalllaws
relativetotheconductofelections.
Afterapreliminaryinvestigation,Atty.Lituanasfounda primafacie case.Hence,hefiledwiththerespondent
RTCofDumagueteCityacriminalcaseagainsttheOICMayor.TheRTCissuedawarrantofarrestagainsttheaccused
whichwaslatercancelledonthegroundthatAtty.LituanasisnotauthorizedtodetermineprobablecausepursuanttoSec.
2,Art.IIIofthe1987Constitution.Thecourtstatedthatit"willgiveduecoursetotheinformationfiledifthesamehasthe
writtenapprovaloftheProvincialFiscalafterwhichtheprosecutionofthecaseshallbeunderthesupervisionandcontrol
ofthelatter."
Atty. Lituanas failed to comply with the condition. Hence the RTC quashed the information. A motion for
reconsiderationwasdenied.
Hence,thispetition.
ISSUE: W/NapreliminaryinvestigationconductedbyaProvincialElectionSupervisorinvolvingelection
offenses have to be coursed through the Provincial Fiscal, before the RTC may take cognizance of the
investigationanddeterminewhetherornotprobablecauseexists.

HELD:NO.TheCourtemphasizestheimportantfeaturesoftheconstitutionalmandatethat"xxxnosearch
warrantorwarrantofarrestshallissueexceptuponprobablecausetobedeterminedpersonallybythejudge
xxx."(Art.III,Sec.2,Constitution)
First,thedeterminationofprobablecauseisafunctionoftheJudge.ItisnotfortheProv'lFiscalnorfor
theElectionSupervisortoascertain.OnlytheJudgeandtheJudgealonemakesthisdetermination.
Second,thepreliminaryinquirymadebyaProsecutordoesnotbindthejudge.Itmerelyassistshimto
makethedeterminationofprobablecause.ThejudgedoesnothavetofollowwhattheProsecutorpresentsto
him.Itisthereport,theaffidavits,thetranscriptsofstenographicnotes,andallothersuppportingdocuments
behindtheProsecutor'scertificationw/carematerialinassistingthejudgetomakehisdetermination.
Third,judgesandprosecutorsalikeshoulddistinguishthepreliminaryinquiryw/cdeterminesprobable
causefortheissuanceofawarrantofarrestfromthepreliminaryinvestigationproperwhichascertainswhether
theoffendershouldbeheldfortrialorreleased.Evenifthetwoinquiriesareconductedinthecourseofoneand
thesameproceeding,thereshouldbenoconfusionabouttheobjectives.Thedeterminationofprobablecausefor
the warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation properwhether or not there is
reasonablegroundtobelievethattheaccusedisguiltyoftheoffensechargedand,thereforewhetherornothe
shouldbesubjectedtotrialisthefunctionoftheprosecutor.
ArticleIXC,Sec.2oftheConstitutionprovides:
"Sec.2.TheCommissiononElectionsshallexercisethe
followingpowersandfunctions:
(1)Enforceandadministeralllawsandregulationsrelativetotheconductofanelection,plebiscite,
initiative,referendum,andrecall.
xxxxxxxxxx
(6)File,uponaverifiedcomplaint,oronitsowninitiative,petitionsincourtforinclusionorexclusion
ofvotes,investigateand,whereappropriate,prosecutecasesofviolationofelectionlaws,includingactsor
omissionconstitutingelectionfrauds,offenses,andmalpractices."

Ineffect,the1987ConstitutionmandatestheCOMELECnotonlytoinvestigatebutalsotoprosecute
cases of violation of election laws. This means that the COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary
investigationsincasesinvolvingelectionoffensesforthepurposeofhelpingthejudgedetermineprobablecause
andforfilinganinformationincourt.ThispowerisexclusivewiththeCOMELEC.
Hence,theProv'lFiscal,assuch,assumesnoroleintheprosecutionofelectionoffenses.IftheFiscal
filesaninformationcharginganelectionoffenseorprosecutesaviolationofelectionlaw,itisbecausehehas
beendeputizedbytheCOMELEC.Hedoesnotdosounderthesoleauthorityofhisoffice.
It is onlyafter a preliminary examination conducted by the COMELEC through its officials or its
deputiesthatSec.2,Art.IIIofthe1987Constitutioncomesin.Thisisso,because,whentheapplicationfora
warrantofarrestismadeandtheinformationisfiledwiththecourt,thejudgewillthendeterminewhetheror
notaprobablecauseexistsfortheissuanceofawarrantofarrest.Adapted.
Peoplev.Delgado,189SCRA715(1990)

F: Uponrecommendationoftheprovincialelectionsupervisor,whoconductedapreliminaryinvestigationofthe
allegedelectionoffensesofDelgado,et.al,theComelecfiledaninformationagainstthelatter.Therespondentsmovedfor
reconsideration and the suspension of the warrants of arrests on the ground that no preliminary investigation was
conducted.Thetrialcourtorderedforreinvestigation.TheComelecopposedtheorderonthegroundthatonlytheSCmay
reviewthedecisions,orders,resolutionsoftheComelec.ThetrialcourtdeniedtheComelecmotion.Hencethiscertiorari.

ISSUE:W/NTHECOMELECACTIONMAYBEREVIEWEDONLYONCERTIORARIBYTHESC?

HELD:NO.Accordingtotheconstitution,theComelechasthefollowingfunctions:(1)enforcementofelection
laws;(2)decisionofelectioncontests;(3)decisionofadministrativequestions;(4)deputizinglawenforcement
agencies; (5) registration of political parties; and (6) improvement of elections. What are reviewable on
certioraribytheSCarethoseorders,decisions,etc.,renderedinactionsorproceedingsbeforetheComelecin
theexerciseofitsadjudicatoryorquasijudicialpowers.ThusdecisionsoftheComeleconelectioncontestsor
onadministrativequestionsaresubjecttojudicialreviewonlybytheSC.Inthiscase,noComelecadjudicatory
powerisexercised.Asapublicprosecutor,theComelechastheexclusiveauthoritytoconductpreliminary
investigationandprosecuteoffensespunishableundertheelectioncodebeforethecompetentcourt.Butwhen
theComelecfilestheinformation,thesubsequentdispositionofthecaseissubjecttothecourt'sapproval.The
Comeleccan'tconductreinvestigationunlesssoorderedbythatcourtnorrefuseitsorderofreinvestigation.
Adapted.

e. Recommend pardon, amnesty, parole or suspension of sentence of election law


violators

Art.IX,C,Sec.5.Nopardon,amnesty,parole,orsuspensionofsentenceforviolationofelection
laws,rules,andregulationsshallbegrantedbythePresidentwithoutthefavorablerecommendationof
theCommission.

f.Deputizelawenforcementagentsandrecommendtheirremoval

Art.IX,C,Sec.2.xxx
(4)Deputize,withtheconcurrenceofthePresident, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalitiesoftheGovernment, includingtheArmedForcesofthePhilippines, fortheexclusive
purposeofensuringfree,orderly,honest,peaceful,andcredibleelections.
xxx
(8)RecommendtothePresidenttheremovalofanyofficeroremployeeithasdeputized,orthe
impositionofanyotherdisciplinaryaction,forviolationordisregard,ordisobediencetoitsdirective,
orderordecision.
xxx
g.Registrationofpoliticalparties,organizationsandcoalitionsandACCREDITATION
ofcitizens'arms

Art.IX,C,Sec.2.xxx
(5) Register,aftersufficientpublication,politicalparties,organizations,orcoalitionswhich,in
additiontootherrequirements,mustpresenttheirplatformorprogramofgovernment;andaccredit
citizens'armsoftheCommissiononElections.Religiousdenominationsandsectsshallnotberegistered.
Thosewhichseektoachievetheirgoalsthroughviolenceorunlawfulmeans,orrefusetoupholdand
adheretothisConstitution,orwhicharesupportedbyanyforeigngovernmentshalllikewiseberefused
registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties,
organizations,coalitions,orcandidatesrelatedtoelectionsconstituteinterferenceinnationalaffairs,and,
when accepted, shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of their registration with the
Commissions,inadditiontootherpenaltiesthatmaybeprescribedbylaw.

Thefollowingshallnotberegistered:

a.Religiousdenominationsandsects.
b.Thoseseekingtoachievetheirgoalsthroughviolenceorunlawfulmeans.
c.ThoserefusingtoupholdandadheretothisConstitution.
d. Those which are supported by any foreign government. Financial contributions from foreign
governmentandtheiragenciestopoliticalpartiesorcandidatesrelatedtoelectionsconstitute"interferencein
nationalaffairs,"andwhenaccepted,shallbeanadditionalgroundforcancellationofregistration,inadditionto
otherpenaltiesthelawmayprescribe.

Art.IX,C,Sec.7. Novotescastinfavorofapoliticalparty,organization,orcoalitionshallbe
valid,exceptforthoseregisteredunderthepartylistsystemasprovidedinthisConstitution.

Art.IX,C,Sec.8.Politicalparties,ororganizationsorcoalitionsregisteredunderthepartylist
systems,shallnotbepresentedinthevoters'registrationboards,boardsofelectioninspectors,boardsof
canvassers,orothersimilarbodies.However,theyshallbeentitledtoappointpollwatchersinaccordance
withlaw.

Art.VI,Sec.5.xxx
(2) The partylist representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representativesincludingthoseunderthepartylist.Forthreeconsecutivetermsaftertheratificationof
thisConstitution,onehalfoftheseatsallocatedtothepartylistrepresentativesshallbefilled,asprovided
bylaw,byselectionorelectionfromlabor,peasant,urbanpoor,indigenousculturalcommunities,women,
youth,andsuchothersectorsasmaybeprovidedbylaw,exceptthereligioussector.

Art.XVIII,Sec.7. Untilalawispassed,thePresidentmayfillbyappointmentfromalistof
nomineesbytherespectivesectorstheseatsreservedforsectoralrepresentationinparagraph2,Section5
ofArticleVIoftheConstitution.

h.Regulationofpublicutilitiesandmediaofinformation

Art.IX,C,Sec.4. TheCommissionmay,duringtheelectionperiod,superviseorregulatethe
enjoymentofutilizationofallfranchisesorpermitsfortheoperationortransportationandotherpublic
utilities,mediaofcommunicationorinformation,allgrants,specialprivileges,orconcessionsgrantedby
theGovernmentoranysubdivision,agency,orinstrumentalitythereof,includinganygovernmentowned
orcontrolledcorporationoritssubsidiary. Suchsupervisionorregulation shallaimtoensureequal
opportunity,time,andspace,andtherighttoreply,includingreasonable,equalratestherefor,forpublic
informationcampaignsandforumsamongcandidatesinconnectionwiththeobjectiveofholdingfree,
orderly,honest,peaceful,andcredibleelections.

Suchsupervisionorregulationshallaimtoensure(i)equalopportunity,timeandspace,(ii)therightto
reply,includingreasonableequalratestherefor,forpublicinformationcampaignsandfromamongcandidates,in
connectionwiththeobjectofholdingfree,orderly,honest,peacefulandcredibleelections.

NationalPressClubV.COMELEC,176SCRA84

F: Petitionershereinwererepresentativesofmassmediawhichwerepreventedfromsellinganddonating
spaceorairtimeforpoliticaladvertisementsunderRA6646.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6646 constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to freedom of
expression.

RULING:NO.TheComelechasbeenexpresslyauthorizedbytheConstitutiontosuperviseorregulate
theenjoymentorutilizationofthefranchisesorpermitsfortheoperationofmediaofcommunicationand
information.Thefundamentalpurposesofsuchpoweraretoensure"equalopportunity,time,andspace,
andtherighttoreply,"aswellasuniformandreasonableratesofchargesfortheuseofsuchmedia
facilities,inconnectionwith"publicinformationcampaignsandforumsamoongcandidates."
Ofcourse,thelawlimitstherightoffreespeechandofaccesstomassmediaofthecandidates
themselves.Thelimitationhowever,bearsaclearandreasonableconnectionwiththeobjectivesetoutin
theConstitution.Foritispreciselyintheunlimitedpurchaseofprintspaceandradioandtelevisiontime
thattheresourcesofthefinanciallyaffluentcandidatesarelikelytomakeacrucialdifference.Charo.
Adiongv.COMELEC,207SCRA712

F: Petitoner,Adiong,a1992senatorialcandidate,assailsComelecResolutionNo.2347insofarasitprohibits
thepostingofdecalsandstickersonmobileplaces,publicorprivate,andlimitstheirlocationorpublicationto
authorizedpostiingareas.

ISSUE:Whetherornottheresolutionisconstitutional.

RULING:NO.Theprohibitionundulyinfringesonthecitizen'sfundamentalrightoffreespeech.Thereis
nopublicinterestsubstantialenoughtowarrantthekindofrestrictioninvolvedinthiscase.Thepostingof
decalsamdstickersinmobileplacesdoesnotendangeranysubstantialgovernmentorpublicinterest.
Undertheclearandpresentdangerrule,notonlymustthedangerbepatentlyclearandpressinglypresent
buttheevilsoughttobeavoided,mustbesosubstantiveastojustifyaclampoverone'smouthora
writinginstrumenttobestilled.
Significantly,thefreedomofexpressioncurtailedbytheprohibitionisnotsomuchthatofthe
candidate orthepoliticalparty.Theregulationstrikesatthefreedomofanindividualtoexpresshis
preference and,bydisplayingitonhiscar,toconvinceotherstoagreewithhim.Astickermaybe
furnishedbyacandidatebutoncethecarowneragreestohaveitplacedonhisprivate vehichle,the
expressionbecomesastatementbytheowner,primarilyhisownandnotofanybodyelse.
Morever,Therestrictionissobroadthatitencompasseseventhecitizen'sprivateproperty,which
in this case is a privately owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal right
guaranteedundertheConstitutionisviolatedwhichisthatnopersonshallbedeprivedofhisproperty
withoutdueproocessoflaw.Charo.

Art.IX,C,Sec.9.UnlessotherwisefixedbytheCommissioninspecialcases,theelectionperiod
shallcommenceninetydaysbeforethedayofelectionandshallendthirtydaysthereafter.

i.Decideelectioncontests

Art.IX,C,Sec.2.xxx
(2)Exerciseexclusiveoriginaljurisdictionoverall contestsrelatingtotheelections,returnsand
qualificationsofallelectiveregional,provincial,andcityofficials,andappellatejurisdictionover
all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involvingelectivebarangayofficialsdecidedbytrialcourtsoflimitedjurisdiction.
Decisions,finalorders,orrulingsoftheCommissiononelectioncontestsinvolving
electivemunicipalandbarangayofficesshallbefinal,executory,andnotappealable.

Art.IX,C,Sec.3. TheCommissiononElectionsmaysit enbanc orintwodivisions,andshall


promulgate its rules of procedures in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre
proclamationcontroversies.Allsuchelectioncasesshallbeheardanddecidedindivision,providedthat
motionsforreconsiderationofdecisionsshallbedecidedbytheCommissionenbanc.

RA7166,Sec.22

Sec.22.ElectionContestsforMunicipalOffices.Allelectioncontestsinvolvingmunicipaloffices
with the Regional Trial Court shall be decided expeditiously. The decision may be appealed to the
Commissionwithinfive(5)daysfrompromulgationorreceiptofacopythereofbytheaggrievedparty.
TheCommissionshalldecidetheappealwithinsixty(60)daysafteritissubmittedfordecision,butnot
laterthansix(6)monthsafterthefilingoftheappeal,whichdecisionshallbefinal,unappealable,and
executory.

"Contests"

Priortotheproclamationofthewinningcandidate,thecaseisdeemedtobestillinitsadministrative
stage,andsoistoberesolvedbytheCOMELECunderitspowertoadministerallelectionlaws,andnotunder
itsauthorityasthesolejudgeofelectioncontests. Onlyafterawinnerhasbeenproclaimedcantherebea
"contest",withacontestantwhoseeksnotonlytoousttheintruderbutalsotohavehimselfinstalledintooffice.

UndertheOmnibusElectionCode(OEC),apreproclamationcontroversyconcernstheregularityof
proceedingsofaboardofcanvassers.Itincludesthequestionsof:i)thelegalityofthecompositionoftheBoard
ofCanvassers,andii)questionsoffraudulentelectionreturns.

Candidatesforpublicofficeusuallygrabtheproclamationtobeabletotaketheoffice,andthusanyone
filinganelectoralcontestagainstthepersonwouldnowfindhimselfatadisadvantagebecausehisopponentis
nowenjoyingthepoweroftheoffice.(Lagumbay v COMELEC). Thus,thepurposeofapreproclamation
contestistopreventtheproclamationofhisopponent.

i.MunicipaloriginalwiththeRTC;appealtotheCOMELEC

II.Barangayoriginalwithinferiorcourt;appealtoCOMELEC

Javier v. COMELEC, 144 SCRA 194 (1986) Under the 1973 Constitution, even PreProclamation
ControversiesInvolvingMembersoftheBatasangPambansaMustbeDecidedbytheCOMELECenbanc.

F: PetitionerEvelioJavierfiledapetitionfor certiorari toannuladecisionoftheCOMELEC'sSecondDivision


proclaimingArturoPacificadorelectedmemberoftheBPrepresentingAntiqueProvince. Hecontendedthatunderthe
1973Consti.,allcontests,involvingmembersoftheBP,mustbedecidedbytheCOMELECenbanc.
Art.XII,C,Sec.2(2)ofthe1973Consti.providedthattheCOMELEC"(shall)bethesolejudgeofallcontests
relatingtotheelection,returnsandqualificationsofallmembersoftheBPandelectiveprovincialandcityofficials."Sec.
3,ontheotherhand,providedthat"Allelection casesmaybeheardanddecidedbydivisionsexcept contests involving
membersoftheBP,w/cshallbeheardanddecidedenbanc."TheformerSol.Gen.arguedthatthecontroversyinthiscase
isstillintheadmin.stageandsoistoberesolvedbytheCOMELECunderitspowertoadministerallelectionlaws,not
underitsauthorityassolejudgeofelectioncontests,bec.untiloneofthecandidateswasproclaimed,therecouldbeno
contest,inw/cthecontestantseeksnotonlytoousttheintruderbutalsotohavehimselfinductedintooffice.Ontheother
hand,thenewSolGensoughtthedismissalofthecaseasmootandacademiconthegroundthatthepetitionerhadbeen
killedapparentlyforpoliticalreasonandthattheBPhadbeenabolishedaftertheFeb.1986Revolution.

HELD:xxx
(2) Itisworthobservingthatthespecialprocedureforthesettlementofwhatarenowcalled"pre
proclamationcontroversies"isarelativelyrecentinnovationinourlaws,havingbeenintroducedonlyin1978,
throughthe1978ElectionCode.Bef.thattime,allproceedingsaffectingtheelection,returnsandqualifications
ofpublicofficerscameunderthecompletejurisdictionofthecompetentcourtortribunalfrombeginningtoend
andintheexerciseofjudicialpoweronly.Itthereforecouldnothavebeentheintentionoftheframersin1935,
whentheCommonwealthcharterwasimposed,todividetheelectoralprocessintothepreproclamationstage
andthepostproclamationstageandtoprovideforaseparatejurisdictionforeachstage,consideringthefirst
admin.andthesecondjuridical.
Contests. Theword"contests"shouldnotbegivenarestrictivemeaning;onthecontrary,itshould
receivethewidestpossiblescopeconformablytotherulethatthewordsusedintheConsti.shouldbeinterpreted
liberally.Asemployedinthe1973Consti.,thetermshouldbeunderstoodasreferringtoanymatterinvolving
thetitleorclaimoftitletoanelectiveoffice,madebef.orafterproclamationofthewinner,whetherornotthe
contestantisclaimingtheofficeindispute.
Elections, returnsandqualifications. Thephrase"elections, returnsandqualifications"shouldbe
interpretedinitstotalityasreferringtoallmattersaffectingthevalidityofthecontestee'stitle. Butifitis
necessarytospecify,wecansaythatelectionreferstotheconductofthepolls,includingthelistingofvoters,
holdingofelectoralcampaign,andcastingandcountingofvotes."returns"tothecanvassofthereturnsandthe
proclamationofthewinners,includingquestionsconcerningthecompositionoftheboardofcanvassersandthe
authenticity of the election returns; and "qualifications" to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto
proceedingagainsttheproclaimedwinner,suchashisdisloyalty,orineligibility,ortheinadequacyofhiscertifi
cateofcandidacy.

Ascorrectlyobservedbythepetitioner,thepurposeofSec.3inrequiringthatcasesinvolvingmembers
oftheBPbeheardanddecidedbytheCommissionenbancwastoinsurethemostcarefulconsiderationofsuch
cases. Obviously,thatobjectivecouldnotbeachievediftheCommissioncouldact enbanc onlyafterthe
proclamationhadbeenmade,foritmightthenbetoolatealready.Weareonlytoofamiliarw/the"grabthe
proclamationanddelaytheprotest"strategyinthefrustrationofthepopularwillandthevirtualdefeatofthe
realwinnersintheelection.VV.

ThejurisdictionoftheCOMELECasthejudgeofelectioncontestsinvolvingtheelection,returns,and
qualificationsofelectiveofficialshasbeenbeerestrictedtoelectivelocalofficialsunderthe1987Constitution.
ThejudgeinthePresidentialElection,asnoted,isthe SCactingasElectoralTribunal. Thejudgeinthe
Congressionalelections,istherespectiveElectoralTribunaloftheSenateandHouseofRepresentatives.

Pimentelv.COMELEC,101SCRA769(1986)

*ENBANC

F: Herein petitioners arethe contestants while herein private respondents are the contestees in 3electioncases
pendingbeforetheCFIofQuirino.
Petitionersallegeintheirelectionproteststhattheyweredulycertifiedcandidatesformayor,vicemayorand
membersoftheSangguniangBayanofDiffun,Quirino,inthegeneralelectionsofJanuary30,1980,buttheywerenot
consideredassuchbytheMunicipalBoardofCanvasserswhodidnotcountthevotescastintheirfavorandproceeded
insteadtoproclaimtheprivaterespondentsasthedulyelectedofficialsofDiffun.
Theprivaterespondentsfiledtheiroppositiontosuchprotests.Theyalsofileda"JointMotiontoLimitReception
ofEvidencePursuanttoMaterialAllegationsintheProtests,"whichwasdenied.Accordingly,theCFIorderedtheopening
of the ballot boxesandthecounting ofthevotesas reflected in the ballots and notin theelectionreturns. Private
respondentsfiledw/theCOMELECapetitionforcertiorariandprohibitionwithpreliminaryinjunctionseekingtorestrain
theCFIfromenforcingitsorders.TheCOMELEC,onMay25,1980,issuedaresolutionrestrainingtheCFIfromenforcing
itsorder.Consequently,theCFIissuedanorderpursuanttotheCOMELEC'sresolution.
Thus,petitionersfiledthispresentpetitionfor certiorari andprohibitionw/preliminarymandatoryinjunction
seekingtoannulthesaidCOMELEC'sresolution.Petitionersallege,amongothers,thattheCOMELEChasnojurisdiction
to take cognizance of the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the private respondents questioning an
interlocutoryorderissuedbytheCFI,muchlesstorestrainsaidcourtfromenforcingsaidorder.
On the other hand, private respondents contend that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition for
certiorari,prohibitionandmandamusinvolvingelectioncasesassupportedbythefollowing:thatthe1978ElectionCode
grantstheCOMELECthepowerto"prescribetherulestogoverntheprocedureandothermattersrelatingtoelection
contests";thatunderSec.4,Rule65oftheROC,petitionsfor certiorari,prohibitionandmandamus"mayalsobefiled
with the Court of Appeals if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction"; that since the COMELEC exercises appellate
jurisdictionoverelectioncasesfiledw/theCFIinvolvingmunicipaloffices,pursuanttothe1978ElectionCode,said
Commissionisthusvestedw/jurisdictionoverpetitionsforcertiorari,prohibitionandmandamus,applyingbyanalogythe
quotedprovisionofSec.4,Rule65oftheROC.

ISSUES: W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
involvingelectioncasesfiledw/theCFI.

HELD:NONE
SettledistherulethatjurisdictionisconferredonlybytheConstitutionorthelaw.Thus,itcannotbe
conferredbytheRulesofCourtw/careneitherconstitutionalprovisionsnorlegislativeenactmentsbutmere
proceduralrulespromulgatedbytheSCintheexerciseofitspowertoprescribe"rulesconcerningpleading,
practiceandproceduresinallcourts."
Accordingly,theaforequotedprovisionofSec.4,Rule65oftheROC,cannotbeconstruedasagrantof
jurisdiction tothe Court of Appeals over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus involving cases
appealable toit.Muchlesscansuchprovision beinterpreted,byanalogy,asagranttotheCOMELECof
jurisdictionoverpetitionsfor certiorari,prohibitionor mandamus involvingelectioncasescognizablebythe
CFIandappealabletosaidCommission.
While itistruethattheCAhasjurisdiction overpetitions for certiorari,prohibition or mandamus
involvingcasesappealabletoit,thegrantofjurisdictionisnotbyvirtueoftheROC,butbyexpresslegislative
fiat,namely,Sec.30oftheJudiciaryAct.
NosuchlegislativegrantofjurisdictionexistsinthecaseoftheCOMELEC.Consequently,respondents'
contentioncannotbesustained.Adapted.

Garciav.DeJesus,206SCRA779

*ENBANC

F: Twoelectioncasesareconsolidatedhereinforbothcasesinvolvedthesameissue,whichis,thejurisdictionofthe
COMELECtoissueWritsofCertiorari,ProhibitionandMandamusinelectoralcontests.
In the Antipolo case, petitioners Garcia and O'Hara were the winning candidates for mayor and vicemayor
respectivelyofAntipolo,Rizalinthe1988LocalElections.
PrivaterespondentsDeJesusandDavidinstitutedanelectionprotestbeforetheRTC.TheRTCorderedforthe
examinationoftheballotsandtherecountingofthevotes.ThepetitionersfiledaMotiontoDismissOpeningofBallot
Boxesand/ortoDismisstheProtest.Consequently,theRTCissuedanorderlimitingtheopeningoftheballotboxes.
Themotionforreconsiderationfiledbyprivaterespondentswasdenied.TherespondentsthenfiledaPetitionfor
CertiorariandMandamusbeforetheCOMELEC.PetitionersobjectedtheassumptionofjurisdictionbytheCOMELEC.
TheCOMELEC,nevertheless,directedtheRTCtoopenalltheballotboxes.
IntheIsabelacase,respondentNeyrawasproclaimedmayorofIsabelaoverpetitionerUyin thesamelocal
election.
PetitionerUyfiledanelectionprotestbeforetheRTC.TheRTCinturn,declaredUythewinner.Neyrafileda
NoticeofAppeal,whileUyfiledaMotionforExecutionPendingAppeal. Later,NeyrafiledbeforetheCOMELEC,a
petitionfor Certiorari and/orProhibition,seekingtoenjointheRTCfromfurtheractingonUy'sMotionforExecution.
TheRTCgrantedUy'sMotionforExecution,whiletheCOMELEClater,onmotionbyNeyra,declaredasnullandvoidthe
writofExecutiongrantedbytheRTC.

ISSUES: 1.W/NtheCOMELEChasthepowertoissueWritsof Certiorari,Prohibitionand Mandamus in


electoralcontests.

HELD:NONE.IntheabsenceofanyspecificconfermentupontheCOMELEC,eitherbytheConstitutionor
bylegislativefiat,theCOMELECisbereftofjurisdictiontoissuesaidWrits.
ItistheCOMELECalone,invokingitsconstitutionally(Rep.v.Feliciano,Garciav.DeJesus,Peo.v.
Dramayo)investedappellatejurisdictionandrulemakingpower,thatarrogateuntoitselftheauthoritytoissue
the aforementioned Writs, in Rule 28, Sec. 1 of its Rules of Procedure. However, neither the appellate
jurisdictionoftheCOMELECnoritsrulemakingpowerjustifiessuchselfconfermentofauthority.
Jurisdictionorthelegalpowertohearanddetermineacauseofactionmustexistasamatteroflaw.It
maybeclassifiedintooriginalandappellatejurisdictions.OriginaljurisdictionisthepoweroftheCourttotake
judicialcognizanceofacaseinstitutedforjudicialactionforthefirsttimeunderconditionsprovidedbylaw.
AppellatejurisdictionistheauthorityofaCourthigherinranktoreexaminethefinalorderorjudgmentofa
lowercourtw/ctriedthecasenowelevatedforjudicialreview.
InthePhilippinesetting,theauthoritytoissueWritsofCertiorari,ProhibitionandMandamusinvolves
theexerciseoforiginaljurisdiction.Thus,suchauthorityhasalwaysbeenexpresslyconferred,eitherbythe
Constitutionorbylaw.Itisneverderivedbyimplication.
Significantly,whattheConstitutiongrantedtheCOMELECwasappellatejurisdiction.TheConstitution
makes no mention of any power given the COMELEC to exercise original jurisdiction over Petitions for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus unlike in the case of the SC which was specifically conferred such
authority.Theimmutabledoctrinebeingthatjurisdictionisfixedbylaw,thepowertoissuesuchWritscannot
impliedfromthemereexistenceofappellatejurisdiction.
Althoughtheremaybeauthoritiesinotherjurisdictionsw/cmaintainthatsuchWritsareinherentinthe
power of higher Courts exercising appellate jurisdiction, the same refers to judicial tribunals, w/c the
COMELECisnot.Whatthisagencyexercisesareadministrativeandquasijudicialpowers.
Certiorariisa"writfromasuperiorcourttoaninferiorcourtortribunalcommandingthelattertosend
uptherecordofaparticularcase."ThefunctionofaWritof Certiorari istokeepaninferiorcourtw/nthe
boundsofitsjurisdictionortopreventitfromcommittingsuchagraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtoexcess
ofjurisdiction.ThegrantofappellatejurisdictiontotheCOMELECdoesnotnecessarilymakeita"superior
court"visvisRTCs.

2.W/NRTCscanorderexecutionpendingappealinelectioncontestsdecidedbyitinvolvingelective
municipalofficials.

HELD:YES.
TheCOMELECisbereftofauthoritytodepriveRTCsofthecompetencetoorderexecutionpending
appeal.Forone,itisessentiallyajudicialprerogative.Foranother,itisapronouncementoftheCOMELEC
aloneinitsproceduralrules,w/obenefitofstatute,unlikeinthepast.
There is no express provision of law, therefore, disauthorizing executions pending appeal, and the
COMELEC,initsproceduralrulesalone,shouldnotbeallowedtodivestRTCsofthatauthority.Itdeprivesthe
prevailingpartyofasubstantiverighttomoveforsuchreliefcontrarytotheconstitutionalmandatethatthose
Rulescannotdiminishnormodifysubstantiverights.
Section2,Rule39oftheROC,w/callowsRTCstoorderexecutionspendingappealupongoodreasons
statedinaspecialorder,maybemadetoapplysuppletorilytoelectioncontestsdecidedbythem.IntheIsabela
case, good reasons exist w/c justified the RTC's order, granting execution pending appeal. Among others
mentionedbytheRTCarethecombinedconsiderations ofthenearexpirationofthetermofoffice,public
interest,thependencyoftheelectioncontestformorethan3years,andthatUyhadfiledabond.Adapted.

Veloriav.COMELEC,211SCRA907

*ENBANC

F: PetitionersVeloria,et.al.,aswellasprivaterespondentsSales,et.al.werecandidatesformayor,vicemayorand
membersoftheSangguniangBayanofManaoag,Pangasinan,inthe1988localelections.
Theprivaterespondentsweredeclaredaswinners.Dissatisfied,thepetitionersfiledelectionprotestw/theRTCof
Ardent,Pangasinan.TheRTCorderedtherevisionofballots.
Priv.repondentsfiledaMotiontoDismissonthegroundthattheRTChadnotacquiredjurisdictionoverthe
electionprotest.Suchmotionwasgrantedleadingtothedismissalofthecase.
However, instead of perfecting an appeal w/n 5 days as provided by law, the petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,whichwasdenied.Thepetitionersinturn,filedaNoticeofAppeal,whichwasgivenduecourse.
Theprivaterespondentssoughtrecoursew/theCOMELECbyapetitionfor Certiorari andProhibition w/a
PrayerforaWritofPreliminaryInjunctiontoannultheordergivingduecoursetotheappeal.
TheCOMELECenbancgrantedthepetition.Hence,thisspecialcivilactionofCertiorariandProhibitionw/a
PrayerfroaWritofpreliminaryinjunctionfiledbythepetitioners.

ISSUE:W/NtheCOMELEChasjurisdictiontogranttheprivaterespondents'petitionforcertiorari.

HELD:NONE.
ThereisnomeritinthispetitionforreviewfortheCOMELECcorrectlyfoundthatthepetitioners'
appealfromthecourt's orderdismissing their election protestwasindeedtardy.It wastardybecause their
motionforreconsiderationdidnotsuspendtheirperiodtoappeal.Thepetitioners'relianceonSec.4,Rule19of
theCOMELECRULESOFPROCEDUREw/cprovides: "Amotiontoreconsideradecision,resolution,
order,orrulingwhennot proforma,suspendstherunningoftheperiodtoelevatethemattertothe
SupremeCourt."ismisplaced.The"motionforreconsideration"referredtoaboveisthemotionforrecon.filed
intheCOMELEC,notinthetrialcourtwhereamotionforrecon.isnotentertained.
Nevertheless, this petition for certiorari must be granted, for the COMELEC does not possess
jurisdiction to grant the private respondents' petition for certiorari. The SC in the consolidated cases of
GARCIAv.COMELECandUYv.COMELEC(GARCIAV.DEJESUS206SCRA779),theSCruledthatthe
COMELEC has not been given, by the Constitution nor by law, jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibitionandmandamus.
"Significantly, what the Constitution granted the COMELEC was appellate jurisdiction. The
Constitution makes no mention of any power given the COMELEC to exercise original jurisdiction over
petitionsforCertiorari,ProhibitionandMandamus.Theimmutabledoctrinebeingthatjurisdictionisfixedby
law,thepowertoissuesuchwritscannotbeimpliedfromthemereexistenceofappellatejurisdictionxxx."
(GARCIAv.DEJESUS)
Inviewofsuchpronouncement,anoriginalspecialcivilactionofcertiorari,prohibitionormandamus
againstaRTCinanelectioncontestmaybefiledintheCourtofAppealsorintheSCbeingtheonlycourts
givensuchoriginaljurisdictionundertheConstitutionandthelaw.Adapted.

8.Rulemaking

Art.IX,A,Sec.6.EachCommissionenbancmaypromulgateitsownrulesconcerningpleadings
andpracticebeforeitorbeforeanyofitsoffices. Suchruleshowevershallnotdiminish,increaseor
modifysubstantiverights.

Art.IX,C,Sec.3. TheCommissiononElectionsmaysit enbanc orintwodivisions,andshall


promulgate its rules of procedures in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre
proclamationcontroversies.Allsuchelectioncasesshallbeheardanddecidedindivision,providedthat
motionsforreconsiderationofdecisionsshallbedecidedbytheCommissionenbanc.

9.Otherfunctions
Art.IX,A,Sec.8.EachCommissionshallperformsuchotherfunctionsasmaybeprovidedby
law.

10.ActasNationalBoardofCanvassersforSenators

EO144,Sec.2,March2,1987

Sec.2.BoardofCanvassers.TheChairmanandMembersoftheCommissiononElectionssittingenbanc
shallbetheNationalBoardofCanvassersfortheelectionofSenators. Itshallcanvassallcertificatesofcanvass
comingfromandpreparedbythedistrict,provincial,andcityboardsofcanvassers(ofthosecitieswhichcomprise
oneormorelegislativedistricts.)
Furthermore, thereshall bea board of canvassers for each province, city, municipality and district of
MetropolitanManila,asfollows:
(a)Provincialboardofcanvassers.Theprovincialboardofcanvassersshallbecomposedoftheprovincial
electionsupervisororaseniorlawyerintheregionalofficeoftheCommission,aschairman,theprovincialfiscal,as
vicechairman,andtheprovincialsuperintendentofschools,asmembers.
Thisboardshallcanvasscertificatesofcanvassfromthemunicipalitiesandthecitieswhichdonotcomprise
atleastonelegislativedistrict. ItshallproclaimaselectedthecandidatesfortheHouseofRepresentativeswho
obtainedthehighestnumberofvotesintherespectivelegislativedistricts.
Withrespecttotheelectionofsenators,theprovincialboardofcanvassersshallprepareinduplicatea
certificateofcanvasssupportedbyastatementofvotesreceivedbyeachcandidateineachmunicipality/city,and
transmitthefirstcopythereoftotheCommissiononElectionsforcanvassing.Thesecondcopyshallbekeptbythe
provincialelectionsupervisor.
(b) CityBoardsofCanvassersforcitiescomprisingoneormorelegislativedistricts. Thecityboardof
canvassersforcitiescomprisingoneormorelegislativedistrictsshallbecomposedofthecityelectionregistraror
lawyeroftheCommission,aschairman,thecityfiscal,asvicechairman,andthecitysuperintendentofschoolsas
member.
Thisboardshallcanvasselectionreturnscomingfromthepollingplaceswithinthejurisdictionofthecity,
andshallproclaimaselectedthecandidateorcandidatesfortheHouseofRepresentativeswhoobtainedthehighest
numberofvotesinthelegislativedistrictorrespectivelegislativedistricts.
With respect to the election of senators, this board shall prepare in duplicate certificate of canvass
supportedbyastatementofvotesreceivedbyeachcandidateineachpollingplaceandtransmitthefirstcopytothe
CommissiononElectionsforcanvassing.Thesecondcopyshallbekeptbythecityelectionregistrar.
(c)DistrictBoardofCanvassers.Thedistrictboardofcanvassersshallbecomposedofalawyerofthe
Commission, as chairman, and a ranking fiscal in the district, as vicechairman, and the most district school
supervisorinthedistrict,asmember,tobeappointedbytheCommissionuponconsultationwiththeDepartmentof
JusticeandtheDepartmentofEducation,CultureandSportsrespectively.
This boardshall canvass election returns comingfromthepollingplaceswithinthejurisdictionofthe
districtandshallproclaimaselectedthecandidatefortheHouseofRepresentativeswhoobtainedthehighest
numberofvotesinthelegislativedistrict.
With respect to the election for senators, the same procedure shall be followed by this board as that
observedbythecityboardofcanvassersforcitiescomprisingoneormorelegislativedistricts.
(d)City/MunicipalBoardofCanvassers.Thecity(forcitiesnotcomprisingatleastonelegislativedistrict)
ormunicipalboardofcanvassersshallbecomposedofthecity/municipalelectionregistrar,aschairman,thecity
fiscal/municipaltreasurer,asthecasemaybe,asvicechairman,andthecitysuperintendent/districtsupervisoror
inhisabsenceanypublicschoolprincipal,asthecasemaybe,asmember.
Theboardshallcanvasselectionreturnscomingfromthepollingplaceswithinitsjurisdiction,butshallnot
proclaimanywinnerintheelectionforMembersoftheHouseofRepresentativesorforSenators.
Thisboardshallprepareintriplicateacertificateofcanvasssupportedbyastatementofvotesreceivedby
eachcandidateineachpollingplace,andtransmitthefirstcopythereoftotheprovincialboardofcanvassersfor
canvassing.ThesecondcopyshallbetransmittedtotheCommissionforrecordpurposesandthethirdcopyshallbe
keptbythecity/municipalelectionregistrar.

11.ReviewofCOMELECdecisions,orders,andresolutions

Art.IX,C,Sec.2.xxx
(2)Exerciseexclusiveoriginaljurisdictionoverallcontestsrelatingtotheelections,returns,and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
contestsinvolvingelectivemunicipalofficialsdecidedbytrialcourtsofgeneraljurisdiction,orinvolving
electivebarangayofficialsdecidedbycourtsoflimitedjurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective
municipalandbarangayofficesshallbefinal,executory,andnotappealable.

Art.IX,A,Sec.7. EachCommissionshalldecidebyamajorityofallitsMembersanycaseor
matterbroughtbeforeitwithinsixtydaysfromthedateofitssubmissionfordecisionorresolution.A
caseormatterisdeemedsubmittedfordecisionorresolutionuponthefilingofthelastpleading,briefor
memorandumrequiredbytherulesoftheCommissionorbytheCommissionitself. Unlessotherwise
providedbythisConstitutionorbylaw,anydecision,order,orrulingofeachCommissionmaybebrought
totheSupreme Court on certiorari bythe aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of acopy
thereof.

Floresv.COMELEC,184S484(1990)

F: RFwasproclaimedaspunongbarangay.HiselectionwasprotestedbyNR.TheMunicipalCircuitTrialCourt
sustainedNR&installedhimaspunongbarangay.RFappealedtotheRTCw/caffirmedthechallengeddecision.RFthen
wenttotheCOMELECbuthisappealwasdismissedonthegroundthattheCOMELEChadnopowertoreviewthe
decisionoftheRTCbasedinSec.9ofRA6679(LocalGov'tCode)

Issue:W/intheCOMELEChasjurisdiction

Held:UnderArtIXC,Sec2(2)oftheConsti,theCOMELECshallhavejurisdiction,hence,Sec.9ofRA6679
insofarasitprovidesthatthedecisionofthemunicipalormetropolitancourtinabarangaycaseshouldbe
appealedtotheRTCmustbedeclaredunconstitutional.
Phadarighttopresumethelawasvalid. HencehisappealtotheRTCwouldbeconsideredasan
appealtotheCOMELEC. DecisionsoftheCOMELEConelectioncontestsinvolvingmunicipal&barangay
officershallbefinal&unappealablewithrespecttoquestionsoffact&notoflaw.ArtIX6Sec2(2)ofthe
ConstiwasnotintendedtodiverttheSCofitsauthoritytoresolvequestionsoflawasinherentinthejudicial
powerconferreduponitbytheConsti.Adapted.

Galidov.COMELEC,193S78(1991)

F: InanelectioncontestinvolvingtheelectedmayorofGarciaHernandez,Bohol.TheCOMELECdeclaredGaleon
asthedulyelectedmayor.Fifteenballotsinthenameofhisrival,Galido,wasinvalidatedforbeingmarkedballots.
Galidofiledthepetitionfor certiorari &injunction wprayerforarestrainingorder. Galeonmovedforthe
dismissalofthepetitiononthegroundthataccordingtotheConsti,ArtIX(C)Sec2(2),finaldecisions,ordersorrulings
oftheCOMELECinelectioncontestsinvolvingelectivemunicipalofficesarefinal&executory&notappealable.Galido
citedArtIX(A)Sec.7w/csaidthatthedecisionmaybebroughttotheSC.

Issue:W/ndecisionsoftheCOMELECareappealable

Held:Yes.Thefactthatdecisions,finalordersorrulingsoftheCOMELECincontestsinvolvingexecutory&
notappealabledoesnotprecludearecoursetotheSCbywayofaspecialcivilactionofcertiorari.
AstudyofthecasewouldhowevershowthattheCOMELECcommittedNOgraveabuseofdiscretion
inrenderingthequestioneddecision.Adapted.

Riverav.COMELEC,199S178(1991)

F: PetitionerRivera&privaterespondentGarciawerecandidatesforthepositionofmayorduringthelocalelections
inJan1988. Inanelectioncontestbetween,Garciawasproclaimedmayor. Riveraappealedthesaiddecisionbutsaid
decisionwasaffirmedbytheCOMELEC.RfiledapetitionwiththeSCseekingannulmentoftheCOMELECdecision.
He contends that the decisionhas not yetbecome final & executory. G however contends that the decisions of the
COMELEConelectioncontestsinvolvingelectivemunicipal&barangayofficialsarefinal,executory&notappealable.

Issue:W/ndecisionsoftheCOMELEConelectioncontestsinvolvingelectivemunicipal&barangayofficials
areunappealble

Held: No. Thefactthatdecisions,finalordersorrulingsofthe COMELECincontestsinvolvingelective


municipal&barangayofficialsarefinal,executoryandnotappealabledoesnotprecludearecoursetotheSCby
wayofaspecialactionofcertiorari.(Galidov.Comelec.)Adapted.

12.FiscalAutonomy

Art. IX, A, Sec. 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual
appropriationsshallbeautomaticallyandregularlyreleased.
C.CommissiononAudit

1.CompositionandQualifications

Art.IX,D,Sec.1.(1)ThereshallbeaCommissiononAuditcomposedofaChairmanandtwo
Commissioners, who shall be naturalborn citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment,atleastthirtyfiveyearsofage,certifiedpublicaccountantswithnotlessthantenyearsof
auditingexperience,ormembersofthePhilippineBarwhohavebeenengagedinthepracticeoflawforat
leasttenyears,andmustnothavebeencandidatesforanyelectivepositionintheelectionsimmediately
preceding their appointment. At no time shall all Members of the Commission belong to the same
profession.

Art.VII,sec.13.xxx
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the
PresidentshallnotduringhistenurebeappointedasMembersoftheConstitutionalCommissions,orthe
OfficeoftheOmbudsman,orasSecretaries,Undersecretaries,chairmenorheadsofbureausoroffices,
includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsandtheirsubsidiaries.

2.AppointmentandTermofCommissioners

Art.IX,D,Sec.1.xxx
(2)TheChairmanandtheCommissionersshallbeappointedbythePresidentwiththeconsentof
the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed,theChairmanshallholdofficeforsevenyears,oneCommissionerforfiveyears,andtheother
Commissionerforthreeyears,withoutreappointment.Appointmenttoanyvacancyshallbeonlyforthe
unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designatedinatemporaryoractingcapacity.

3.AppointmentofCOApersonnel

Art.IX,A,Sec.4.TheConstitutionalCommissionsshallappointtheirofficialsandemployeesin
accordancewithlaw.

4.Salary

Art.IX,A,Sec.3.ThesalaryoftheChairmanandtheCommissionersshallbefixedbylawand
shallnotbedecreasedduringtheirtenure.

Art. XVIII, Sec. 17. Until the Congress provides otherwise x x x and the Chairmen of the
ConstitutionalCommissions(shallreceive),twohundredfourthousandpesoseach;andtheMembersof
theConstitutionalCommissions,onehundredeightythousandpesoseach.
Thesalary,ofcourse,canbeincreasedandtheincreasecantakeeffectatonce,since,liketheJudiciary,
theConstitutionalCommissionshavenopartinthepassageofsuchalaw.

5.Disqualifications

Art.IX,A,Sec.2.NoMemberofaConstitutionalCommissionshall,duringhistenure,holdany
otherofficeoremployment. Neithershallheengageinthepracticeofanyprofessionorintheactive
managementorcontrolofanybusinesswhichinanywaymaybeaffectedbythefunctionsofhisoffice,
norshallhebefinanciallyinterested,directlyorindirectly,inanycontractwith,orinanyfranchiseor
privilege granted bythe Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including
governmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries.

NomembersofaConstitutionalCommissionshallduringhis"tenure":

a.Holdanyotherofficeoremployment.

Thisissimilartotheprohibitionagainstexecutiveofficers.Itappliestobothpublicandprivateoffices
andemployment.

b.Engageinthepracticeofanyprofession.

c.Engageintheactivemanagementorcontrolofanybusinesswhichinanywaymaybeaffectedbythe
functionsofhisoffice.

d.Befinanciallyinterested,directlyorindirectly,inanycontractwith,orinanyfranchiseorprivilege
granted by, the Government, its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including GOCCs or their
subsidiaries.

6.Impeachment

Art.XI,Sec.2.ThemembersoftheConstitutionalCommissionsmayberemovedfromoffice,on
impeachmentfor,andconvictionof,culpableviolationoftheConstitution,treason,bribery,graftandcor
ruptionandotherhighcrimes,orbetrayalofpublictrust.

7.Powersandfunctions

Art.IX,D,Sec.2.TheCommissiononAuditshallhavethepower,authority,anddutytoexamine,
audit,andsettleallaccountspertainingtotherevenueandreceiptsof,andexpendituresorusesoffunds
andproperty,ownedorheldintrustby,orpertainingto,theGovernment,oranyofitssubdivisions,
agencies, or instrumentalities, including governmentowned and controlled corporations with original
charters,andonapostauditbasis: (a)constitutional bodies,commissionsandofficesthathavebeen
grantedfiscalautonomyunderthisConstitution;(b)autonomousstatecollegesanduniversities;(c)other
governmentowned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such nongovernmental
entitiesreceivingsubsidyorequity,directlyorindirectly,fromorthroughthegovernment,whichare
requiredbylawofthegrantinginstitutiontosubmittosuchauditasaconditionofsubsidyorequity.
However,wheretheinternalcontrolsystemoftheauditedagenciesisinadequate,theCommissionmay
adopt such measures, including temporary or special preaudit, as are necessary and appropriate to
correctthedeficiencies.ItshallkeepthegeneralaccountsoftheGovernmentand,forsuchperiodasmay
beprovidedbylaw,preservethevouchersandothersupportingpaperspertainingthereto.
TheCommissionshallhaveexclusiveauthority,subjecttothelimitationsinthisArticle,todefine
the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and
disallowanceofirregular,unnecessary,excessive,extravagant,orunconscionableexpenditures,orusesof
governmentfundsandproperties.

Art. IX, D, Sec. 3. No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its
subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the
CommissiononAudit.

Art.VI,Sec.20. TherecordsandbooksofaccountsoftheCongressshallbepreservedandbe
opentothepublicinaccordancewithlaw,andsuchbooksshallbeauditedbytheCommissiononAudit
whichshallpublishannuallyanitemizedlistofamountspaidtoandexpensesincurredforeachmember.

8.Rulemaking

Art.IX,A,Sec.6.EachCommissionenbancmaypromulgateitsownrulesconcerningpleadings
andpracticebeforeitorbeforeanyofitsoffices. Suchruleshowevershallnotdiminish,increaseor
modifysubstantiverights.

9.Otherfunctions

Art.IX,A,Sec.8.EachCommissionshallperformsuchotherfunctionsasmaybeprovidedby
law.

10.ReviewofdecisionsofCOA
Art.IX,A,Sec.7.EachCommissionshalldecidebyamajorityvoteofallitsMembersanycaseor
matterbroughtbeforeitwithinsixtydaysfromthedateofitssubmissionfordecisionorresolution.A
caseormatterisdeemedsubmittedfordecisionorresolutionuponthefilingofthelastpleading,brief,or
memorandumrequiredbytherulesoftheCommissionorbytheCommissionitself. Unlessotherwise
providedbythisConstitutionorbylaw,anydecision,order,orrulingofeachCommissionmaybebrought
totheSupreme Court on certiorari by theaggrieved party within thirty days from receipt ofa copy
thereof.

10.FiscalAutonomy

Art. IX, A, Sec. 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual
appropriationsshallbeautomaticallyandregularlyreleased.

D.Sandiganbayan

Art. XI, Sec. 4. The present antigraft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to
functionandexerciseitsjurisdictionasnoworhereaftermaybeprovidedbylaw.

PD1606,asamendedbyRepublicAct7975

Nunezv.Sandiganbayan,111SCRA433DecreeCreatingSandiganbayanIsValid.

F: TheconstitutionalityofthelawcreatingtheSandiganbayanwasquestionedasbeingviolativeof(a)dueprocess
andequalprotection(sinceprivatepersonschargedwithestafaormalversationareguaranteedtherighttoappealfirstto
theCAandthereaftertotheSC,whileprivatepersonschargedwithpublicofficersbeforetheSBareallowedonlyone
appeal,andthatis,totheSC),and(b)noexpostfactorule(sincebeforethepromulgationofPD1606,therighttoappeal
totheCAandthentotheSCwasalreadysecuredbySecs.17and29oftheJudiciaryActof1948).Adapted.

HELD:(1)TheclaimthatPD1606deprivespetitioneroftheequalprotectionofthelawishardlyconvincing
consideringthattheDecreeisbasedonavalidclassification.TheConsti.providesforthecreationofaspecial
court,knownasSandiganbayan(SB),andtheruleissettledthatthegeneralguaranteesoftheBillofRights,
amongw/carethedueprocessandequalprotectionclauses,mustgivewaytospecificprovisions,suchasthe
provisiononthecreationoftheSB.

(2) Ithardlycanbearguedthataparticularmodeofprocedureprovidedinastatutecanbecomethe
vestedrightofanyperson."Anaccusedhasnovestedrightinparticularmodesofprocedureasindetermining
whetherparticularstatutesbytheiroperationtakefromanaccusedanyrightthatwasregarded,atthetimeofthe
adoptionoftheConsti.,asvitalfortheprotectionoflifeandliberty,andw/cheenjoyedatthetimeofthe
commissionoftheoffensechargedagainsthim.

WouldtheomissionoftheCAasanintermediatetribunal,deprivethose,likethepetitioner,whoare
chargedintheSB,ofarightthatisvitaltotheprotectionoftheirliberty?Itsanswermustbeinthenegative.
Theinnocenceofguiltoftheaccusedispasseduponbya3judgedivisionoftheSB.Moreover,aunanimous
voteisrequired,otherwise,thePresidingJusticedesignatestwootherJusticesfromamongthemembersofthe
SB to sit temporarily in a division of 5 until a decision is rendered w/ the concurrence of 3 Justices. If
convicted,theaccusedcanseekareviewintheSConaquestionoflaworthesubstantialityoftheevidence.
PetitionermakesmuchofthefactsthatthereisnoreviewbytheSCoffacts. Whatcannotbetoostrongly
emphasizedisthattheSC,indeterminingwhethertogiveduecoursetoapetitionforreviewofadecisionofthe
SB,mustbeconvincedthattheconstitutionalpresumptionofinnocencehasbeenovercome.Thus,itcannotbe
saidthatthereisnowayofscrutinizingwhetherthequantumofevidencerequiredforconvictionincriminal
caseshavebeensatisfied.VV.

Makasiar,J.,concurringanddissenting:

Thedissentingopinionnotedthediscriminationintreatmentascontentedbyallowingonlyoneappeal,
andonlybywayof certiorari whichisbasedonmeresubstantialevidenceandnotproofbeyondreasonable
doubt.Adapted.

E.OfficeoftheOmbudsman

SeealsoPD1603,July18,1979
RA6770,Nov.17,1989

1.Composition

Art.XI,Sec.5.ThereisherebycreatedtheindependentOfficeoftheOmbudsman,composedof
theOmbudsmantobeknownasTanodbayan,oneoverallDeputyandatleastoneDeputyeachforLuzon,
Visayas,andMindanao.AseparateDeputyforthemilitaryestablishmentmaylikewisebeappointed.

2.Qualifications

Art.XI,Sec.8. TheOmbudsmanandhisDeputiesshallbenaturalborncitizensofthe
Philippines, andat thetime oftheirappointment, atleastfortyyearsold,ofrecognized probityand
independence,andmembersofthePhilippineBar,andmustnothavebeencandidatesforanyelective
officeintheimmediatelyprecedingelection.TheOmbudsmanmusthavefortenyearsormorebeena
judgeorengagedinthepracticeoflawinthePhilippines.
During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same disqualifications and prohibitions as
providedforinSection2ofArticleIXAofthisConstitution.

3.AppointmentandTerm
Appointment

Art.XI,Sec.9.TheOmbudsmanandhisDeputiesshallbeappointedbythePresidentfromalist
ofatleastsixnomineespreparedbytheJudicialandBarCouncil,andfromalistofthreenomineesfor
everyvacancythereafter.Suchappointmentsshallrequirenoconfirmation.Allvacanciesshallbefilled
withinthreemonthsaftertheyoccur.

Term

Id., Sec.11. TheOmbudsmanandhisDeputies shallserveforatermofsevenyearswithout


reappointment.Theyshallnotbequalifiedtorunforanyofficeintheelectionimmediatelysucceeding
theircessationfromoffice.

4.Rankandsalary

Id.,Sec.10.TheOmbudsmanandhisDeputiesshallhavetherankofChairmanandMembers,
respectively,oftheConstitutionalCommissions,andtheyshallreceivethesamesalary,whichshallnotbe
decreasedduringtheirtermofoffice.

5.Disqualifications

Art.IX,Sec.8.xxx
During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same disqualifications and prohibitions as
providedforinSection2ofArticleIXAofthisConstitution.

Art.IX,A,Sec.2.NoMemberofaConstitutionalCommissionshall,duringhistenure,holdany
otherofficeoremployment. Neithershallheengageinthepracticeofanyprofessionorintheactive
managementorcontrolofanybusinesswhichinanywaymaybeaffectedbythefunctionsofhisoffice,
norshallhebefinanciallyinterested,directlyorindirectly,inanycontractwith,orinanyfranchiseor
privilege granted bythe Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including
governmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries.

(notinVV'soutline)

Art.XI,Sec.16.Noloan,guaranty,orotherformoffinancialaccommodationforanybusiness
purposemaybegranted,directlyorindirectlybyanygovernmentownedorcontrolledbankorfinancial
institution to the President, Vice President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme
Court,andtheConstitutionalCommissions,theOmbudsman,ortoanyfirmorentityinwhichtheyhave
controllinginterest,duringtheirtenure.

6.Jurisdiction

Id.,Sec.12.TheOmbudsmanandhisDeputies,asprotectorsofthepeople,shallactpromptlyon
complaintsfiledinanyformormanneragainstpublicofficialsoremployeesofthegovernment,orany
subdivision,agencyorinstrumentalitythereof,includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporations
andshall,inappropriatecases,notifythecomplainantsoftheactiontakenandtheresultthereof.

Quimpov.Tanodbayan,146SCRA137(1986) TanodbayanHasJurisdictionoverallGovernmentOwned
FirmsRegardlessofHowOrganized.

F: F. Quimpofiledacomplaintw/theTanodbayan(TB)chargingGregDimaanoandDannyRemo,managerand
analyst ofPetrophil, w/viol. of RA 3019fortheirrefusaltopay Quimpo's fees assurveyor. The TB dismissed the
complaint,however,onthegroundthathisjurisdictionextendedonlytogovtownedcorpsorganizedunderaspeciallaw.
PETROPHILisacorp.organizedundertheGen.Corp.Code;itwasacquiredbythegovttocarryoutitsoilandgasoline
programs.Quimpofiledapetitionforcertiorari,questioningthedecisionoftheTB.ThenewTBconfessedjudgment.

HELD:(1)InNHAv.Juco,134S172(1984),itwasheldthatforpurposesofcoverageintheCivilService,
employeesofgovtownedorcontrolledcorps.whethercreatedbyspeciallaworformedassubsidiariesare
coveredbytheCSlaw,nottheLaborCode,andthefactthatpvt.corps.ownedorcontrolledbythegovtmaybe
createdbyspecialcharterdoesnotmeanthatsuchcorps.notcreatedbyspeciallawarenotcoveredbytheCivil
Service.(Thisrulinghassincebeenoverruled.)

(2)Themeaningthusgivento"govtownedorcontrolledcorps."forpurposesoftheCS[Art.IX,B,
Sec.2(1)]provisionshouldlikewiseapplyforpurposesoftheTBandtheSBprovisions[Art.XI,secs.4and
12],otherwise,incongruitywouldresult;andagovtownedcorp.couldcreateasmanysubsidiarycorps.under
theCorp.Codeasitwishes,w/cwouldthenbefreefromstrictaccountabilityandcouldescapetheliabilities
andresponsibilitiesprovidedforbylaw.xxx[T]herecanbenogainsayingthatasofthedateofitsacquisition
bytheGovt,utilizingpublicfunds,PETROPHIL,whileretainingitsowncorporateexistence,becameagovt
ownedorcontrolledcorp.w/intheconstitutionalprecept. Itsemployees,thereforearepublicservantsfalling
w/intheinvestigatoryandprosecutoryjurisdictionoftheTBforpurposesoftheRA3019.VV.

7.Powersandfunctions

Art.XI,Sec.13. TheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanshallhavethefollowingpowers,functionsand
duties:
(1) Investigateonitsownoroncomplaintanyactoromissionofanypublicofficial,employee,
officeoragency,whensuchactoromissionappearstobeillegal,unjust,improper,orinefficient
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the
Government,oranysubdivision,agencyorinstrumentalitythereof,aswellasofanygovernmentowned
orcontrolledcorporationwithoriginalcharter;toperformandexpediteanyactordutyrequiredbylaw,
ortostop,prevent,andcorrectanyabuseorimproprietyintheperformanceofduties.
(3)Directtheofficerconcernedtotakeappropriateactionagainstapublicofficialoremployeeat
fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure
compliancetherewith.
(4)Directtheofficerconcernedinanyappropriatecase,andsubjecttosuchlimitationsasmaybe
providedbylaw,tofurnishitwithcopiesofdocumentsrelatingtocontractsortransactionsenteredinto
byhisofficeinvolvingdisbursementoruseofpublicfundsorproperties,andreportanyirregularityto
theCommissiononAuditforappropriateaction.
(5)Requestanygovernmentagencyforassistanceandinformationnecessaryinthedischargeof
itsresponsibilities,andtoexamine,ifnecessary,pertinentrecordsanddocuments.
(6) Publicizematterscoveredbyitsinvestigationwhencircumstancessowarrantandwithdue
prudence.
(7)Determinethecausesofinefficiency,redtape,mismanagement,fraudandcorruptioninthe
Governmentandmakerecommendationsfortheireliminationandtheobservanceofhighstandardsof
ethicsandefficiency.
(8)Promulgateitsrulesofprocedureandexercisesuchotherpowersorperformsuchfunctionsor
dutiesasmaybeprovidedbylaw.

Barlongay:ThefunctionsoftheOmbudsmanmaybedividedintofour:(1)Investigatory;(2)Prosecutory;(3)
Disciplinary;and(4)Assistory.

8.FiscalAutonomy

Id., Sec.14. TheOffice ofthe Ombudsmanshallenjoy fiscal autonomy. Its approved annual
appropriationsshallbeautomaticallyandregularlyrelease.

9.Appointmentofpersonnel

Id.,Sec.6.TheofficialsandemployeesoftheOfficeoftheOmbudsman,otherthantheDeputies,
shallbeappointedbytheOmbudsmanaccordingtotheCivilServiceLaw.

E.OfficeoftheSpecialProsecutor

Id., Sec. 7. The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the Office of the Special
Prosecutor.Itshallcontinuetofunctionandexerciseitspowersasnoworhereaftermaybeprovidedby
law,exceptthoseconferredontheOfficeoftheOmbudsmancreatedunderthisConstitution.

Zaldivarv.Sandiganbayan,160SCRA843(1988)andResolution,May19,1988

F: Petitioner,governorofAntique,filedapetitionforcertiorari,prohibitionandmandamustorestrainthe
Sandiganbayan&TanodbayanRaulGonzalesfromproceedingwiththeprosecution&hearingofcriminalcases
againsthimonthegroundthatsaidcaseswerefiledbytheTanodbayanw/olegal&constitutionalauthority
since under the 1987 Consti., it is only the Ombudsman who has the authority to file cases with the
Sandiganbayan.

HELD: (1) Wefindthepetitionsimpressedw/merit. UnderArt.XI,Sec.13,par.1oftheConsti.,the


Ombudsman(asdistinguishedw/theincumbentTB)ischargedw/thedutyto:
"Investigateonitsown,oroncomplaintbyanyperson,anyactoromissionofanypublicofficial,employee,office
oragency,whensuchactoromissionappearstobeillegal,unjust,improperorinefficient."
Ontheotherhand,Art.XI,Sec.7oftheConsti.providesthat

"TheexistingTanodbayanshallhereafterbeknownastheOfficeoftheSpecialProsecutor.Itshallcontinueto
functionandexerciseitspowersasnoworhereaftermaybeprovidedbylaw,exceptthoseconferredontheOfficeofthe
OmbudsmancreatedunderthisConstitution."

Now,then,inasmuchastheaforementioneddutyisgiventotheOmbudsman,theincumbentTB(now
calledSp.Pros.)isclearlywithoutauthoritytoconductprel.investigationsandtodirectthefilingofcrim.cases,
exceptuponordersoftheOmbudsman.ThisrighttodosowaslosteffectiveFeb.2,1987

ResolutionontheMotionforReconsideration,May19,1988

(1) Thepowerofinvestigationconferred ontheOmbudsman coversbothadministrativeand crim.


offenses.Accordingly,theSpPros.cannotclaimthatheretainsthespecificpowerofprel.investigationwhile
concedingthegeneralpowerofinvestigationtotheOmbudsman.Thegreaterpowerembracesthelesser.

(2)Thefactthattheinformationsfiledbytheresp.fromFeb.2,1987,wereinvalidbec.theywerenot
authorizedbytheOmbudsman,isnotajurisdictionaldefect.TheInformationscouldhavebeenchallengedina
motiontoquashunderR117,ROConthegroundoflackofauthorityonthepartoftheofficerfilingthesame.
Ifthisgroundwasnotinvoked,itisdeemedwaivedunderSec.8ofthesameRule.xxx
Atanyrate,tosettlethisquestion,weherebyrulethatthedecisionofthisCourtinthiscaseshallbe
givenprospectiveapplicationonlyfromApril27,1988.xxx
To recapitulate, the Court holds that, in the interest of justice, its ruling in 4/27/88 shall apply
prospectivelytocasesfiledinCourtpriortosaidresolutionandpendingtrialnortoconvictionsoracquittals
pronouncedtherein.Theexceptioniswheretherehasbeenatimelyobjectionandaspecificchallenge,asinthis
case, where the Court ordered the nullification of the Info. filed for lack of authority on the part of resp.
Gonzales.VV.

SeePDNo.1630,secs.10,1215(administrativeinvestigations)andsec.17(criminalinvestigations)

Sec.10.Powers.TheTanodbayanshallhavethefollowingpowers:
(a)Hemayinvestigate,oncomplaintbyanypersonoronhisownmotionorinitiative,anyadministrative
actwhetheramountingtoanycriminaloffenseornotofanyadministrativeagencyincludinganygovernmentowned
orcontrolledcorporations;
(b)Hemayprescribethemethodsbywhichcomplaintsaretobemade,received,andactedupon;hemay
determinethescopeandmannerofinvestigationstobemade;and,subjecttotherequirementsofthisDecree,he
maydeterminetheform,frequency,anddistributionofhisconclusionsandrecommendations;
(c)Hemayrequestandunlessashereinprovidedforheshallbegivenbyeachadministrativeagencythe
assistanceandinformationhedeemsnecessarytothedischargeofhisresponsibilities;hemayexaminetherecords
anddocumentsofalladministrativeagencies;andhemayenterandinspectpremiseswithinanyadministrative
agency's control, provided, however, that, where the President in writing certifies that such information,
examinationorinspectionmightprejudicethenationalinterestorviolateexistinglaw,theTanodbayanshalldesist.
Allinformationsoobtainedshallbeconfidential,unlessthePresident,intheinterestofpublic service,decides
otherwise;
(d) He may issue a subpoena to compel any person to appear, give sworn testimony, or produce
documentaryorotherevidencetheTanodbayandeemsrelevanttoamatterunderhisinquiry;
(e)Ifafterpreliminaryinvestigationhefindsaprimafaciecase,hemayfilethenecessaryinformationor
complaintwiththeSandiganbayanoranypropercourtoradministrativeagencyandprosecutethecase;
(f)Hemayfileandprosecutecivilandadministrativecasesinvolvinggraftandcorruptpracticesandsuch
other offensescommitted bypublic officers and employees, including those ingovernmentowned orcontrolled
corporations,inrelationtotheiroffice;
(g)Hemayundertake,participatein,orcooperatewithgeneralstudiesorinquiries,whetherornotrelated
toanyparticularadministrativeagencyoranyparticularadministrativeact,ifhebelievesthattheymayenhance
knowledgeaboutorleadtoimprovementsinthefunctioningofadministrativeagencies.
Incarryingouthisfunctions,theTanodbayanmaywiththeapprovalofthePresident,deputizeorcallupon
anyofficial oremployeeofthegovernment oranyagency oroffice and duringsuch deputation theofficial or
employeeconcernedshallbeunderthesupervisionandcontroloftheTanodbayan.

Sec.12. MattersappropriateforInvestigation. (a)Inselectingmattersforhisattention,theTanodbayan


shouldalsoaddresshimselftoanadministrativeactthatmightbe
1.contrarytolaworregulation;
2.unreasonable,unfair,oppressive,orinconsistentwiththegeneralcourseofanadministrativeagency's
functioning;
3.mistakeninlaworarbitraryinascertainmentoffacts;
4.improperinmotivationorbasedonirrelevantconsiderations;
5.unclearorinadequatelyexplainedwhenreasonsshouldhavebeenrevealed;
6.inefficientlyperformed;or
7.otherwiseobjectionable

(b)TheTanodbayanmayconcernhimselfalsowithstrengtheningproceduresandpracticeswhichlessen
theriskofoccurrenceofanyobjectionableadministrativeacts.
Sec.13.ActiononComplaints.(a)TheTanodbayanmayreceiveacomplaintfromanysourceconcerning
anadministrativeact. Atnoexpensetothecomplainant,hemayconductasuitableinvestigationintothethings
complainedof.
(b) After completing his consideration of a complaint, whether or not it has been investigated, the
Tanodbayan shallsuitablyinformthecomplainantand,whenappropriate,theadministrativeagencyoragencies
involved.
(c) Alettertothe Tanodbayan fromapersoninaplaceofdetentionorinahospitalorotherinstitution
underthecontrolofanadministrativeagencyshallbeimmediatelyforwarded,unopenedtotheTanodbayan.

Sec.14.ConsultationwithAgency.Beforeannouncingaconclusionorrecommendationthatcriticizesan
administrativeagencyoranyperson,theTanodbayanshallconsultwiththatagencyorperson.

Sec. 15. Recommendations. (a) If, having considered a complaint and whatever material he deems
pertinent,theTanodbayanisoftheopinionthatanadministrativeagencyshould(1)considerthematterfurther,(2)
modifyorcancelanadministrativeact,(3)alteraregulationorruling,(4)explainfullytheadministrativeactin
question, or (5) take any other step, he shall state his recommendations to the administrative agency. If the
Tanodbayansorequests,theagencyshall,withinthetimehehasspecified,informhimabouttheactiontakenonhis
recommendationsorthereasonsfornotcomplyingwiththem.
(b) Ifthe Tanodbayan believesthatanadministrativeactionhasbeendictatedbylawswhoseresultsare
unfairorotherwiseobjectionable,heshallbringtotheofthePresidentandtheNationalAssembly(Congress)his
viewsconcerningdesirablestatutorychange.

Sec.17. InvestigationandProsecutionofCases. TheOfficeofthe Tanodbayan shallhavetheexclusive


authoritytoconduct preliminaryinvestigation ofall cases cognizablebythe Sandiganbayan tofile information
thereforandtodirectandcontroltheprosecutionofsaidcases.The Tanodbayanmayutilizethepersonnelofhis
officeand/orwiththeapprovalofthePresident,designateordeputizeanyfiscal,stateprosecutororlawyerinthe
governmentservicetoactasspecialinvestigatororprosecutortoassisthimintheinvestigationandprosecutionof
saidcases. Thosedesignatedordeputizedtoassisthim ashereinprovidedshallbeunderhissupervisionand
control.
Nopublicityshallbeallowedduringthependencyofsuchpreliminaryinvestigationandthenameofthe
complainantandtheaccusedshallnotbemadepublicuntilaninformationisfiledbytheTanodbayan.
TheTanodbayan,hisinvestigatorsandprosecutors,whetherregularmembersofhisstaffordesignatedby
himashereinprovided,shallhavetheauthoritytoadministeroaths,toissuesubpoenaducestecum,tosummonand
compelwitnessestoappearandtestifyunderoathbeforethemand/ortobringbooks,documentsandotherthings
under their control, and to secure the attendance or presence of any absent or recalcitrant witness through
applicationbeforethe Sandiganbayan orbeforeanyinferiororsuperiorcourthavingjurisdictionoftheplace
wherethewitnessesorevidenceisfound.
TheresolutionsandactionsoftheTanodbayanshallnotbesubjecttoreviewbyanyadministrativeagency.

G.CentralMonetaryAuthority
1.Compositionandqualifications

Art.XII,Sec.20. TheCongressshallestablishanindependentcentralmonetaryauthority,the
membersofwhosegoverningboardmustbenaturalbornFilipinocitizens,ofknownprobity,integrity,
andpatriotism,themajorityofwhomshallcomefromtheprivatesector.Theyshallalsobesubjectto
suchotherqualificationsanddisabilitiesasmaybeprescribedbylaw.Theauthorityshallprovidepolicy
directionintheareasofmoney,banking,andcredit. Itshallhavesupervisionovertheoperationsof
banksandexercisesuchregulatorypowersasmaybeprovidedbylawovertheoperationsoffinance
companiesandotherinstitutionsperformingsimilarfunctions.
Until the Congress otherwise provides, the Central Bank of the Philippines, operating under
existinglaws,shallfunctionasthecentralmonetaryauthority.

JoaquinBernas,THECONSTITUTIONOFTHEREPUBLICOFTHEPHILIPPINESAcommentary,1988
firstedition,vol.II(hereinafterIIBernas):

AnIndependentCentralMonetaryAuthority.Theimportantconceptis"independent."Thishasreference
toallformsofunduecontrolorinfluencewhetherforeignorlocal.xxx
Asenvisioned,whatseemstobeenvisionedisthediminutionofgovtcontrolonmonetarypolicybec.
thebodywillbecomposedofamajorityfromtheprivatesector,w/ccanincludepeoplefromthelaborand
peasantsector.

2.Functions

Id.,Sec.20,supra.

Id.,Sec.21.Foreignloansmayonlybeincurredinaccordancewithlawandtheregulationofthe
monetaryauthority. InformationonforeignloansobtainedorguaranteedbytheGovernmentshallbe
madeavailabletothepublic.

SeeRA7653

H.EconomicandPlanningAgency

Id.,Sec.9.TheCongressmayestablishanindependenteconomicandplanningagencyheadedby
the President, which shall, after consultations with the appropriate public agencies, various private
sectors,andlocalgovernmentunits,recommendtoCongress,andimplementcontinuingintegratedand
coordinatedprogramsandpoliciesfornationaldevelopment.
UntiltheCongressprovidesotherwise,theNationalEconomicandDevelopmentAuthorityshall
functionastheindependentplanningagencyofthegovernment.

Id.,Sec.10. TheCongressshall,uponrecommendationoftheeconomicandplanningagency,
whenthenationalinterestdictates,reservetocitizensofthePhilippinesortocorporationorassociations
atleastsixtypercentumofwhosecapitalisownedbysuchcitizens,orsuchhigherpercentageasCongress
mayprescribe,certainareasofinvestments.TheCongressshallenactmeasuresthatwillencouragethe
formationandoperationofenterpriseswhosecapitaliswhollyownedbyFilipinos.
Inthegrantofrights,privileges,andconcessionscoveringthenationaleconomyandpatrimony,
theStateshallgivepreferencetoqualifiedFilipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national
jurisdictionandinaccordancewithitsnationalgoalsandpriorities.

I.NationalCommissions

1.CommissiononHumanRights

a.CompositionandQualifications

Art.XIII,Sec.17.(1)ThereisherebycreatedanindependentofficecalledtheCommissionon
HumanRights.
(2)TheCommissionshallbecomposedofaChairmanandfourMemberswhomustbenatural
borncitizensofthePhilippinesandamajorityofwhomshallbemembersoftheBar.Thetermofoffice
andotherqualificationsanddisabilitiesoftheMembersoftheCommissionshallbeprovidedbylaw.
(3) UntilthisCommissionisconstituted,theexistingPresidentialCommitteeonHumanRights
shallcontinuetoexerciseitspresentfunctionsandpowers.
(4)TheapprovedannualappropriationsoftheCommissionshallbeautomaticallyandregularly
released.

b.PowersandFunctions

Art. XIII, Sec. 18. The Commission on Human Rights shall have the following powers and
functions:
(1) Investigate,onitsownoroncomplaintbyanyparty,allformsofhumanrightsviolations
involvingcivilandpoliticalrights;
(2)Adoptitsoperationalguidelinesandrulesofprocedure,andciteforcontemptforviolations
thereofinaccordancewiththeRulesofCourt;
(3)Provideappropriatelegalmeasuresfortheprotectionofhumanrightsofallpersonswithin
thePhilippines,aswellasFilipinosresidingabroad,andprovideforpreventivemeasuresandlegalaid
servicestotheunderprivilegedwhosehumanrightshavebeenviolatedorneedprotection;
(4)Exercisevisitorialpowersoverjails,prisons,ordetentionfacilities;
(5)Establishacontinuingprogramofresearch,education,andinformationtoenhancerespectfor
theprimacyofhumanrights;
(6) RecommendtotheCongresseffectivemeasurestopromotehumanrightsandprovidefor
compensationtovictimsofviolationsofhumanrights,ortheirfamilies;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on
humanrights;
(8) Grant immunity fromprosecution toany person whosetestimony orwhosepossession of
documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation
conducedbyitorunderitsauthority;
(9)Requesttheassistanceofanydepartment,bureau,office,oragencyintheperformanceofits
functions;
(10)Appointitsofficersandemployerinaccordancewithlaw;and
(11)Performsuchotherdutiesandfunctionsasmaybeprovidedbylaw.

Id.,Sec.19.TheCongressmayprovideforothercasesofviolationsofhumanrightsthatshould
fallwithintheauthorityoftheCommission,takingintoaccountitsrecommendations.

IIBernas:

FunctionsoftheCommission.TheprincipalfunctionsoftheCHRisinvestigatory.Infact,intermsoflaw
enforcement,thisprettymuchisthelimitofitsfunction.Beyondinvestigation,itwillhavetorelyontheJustice
Dept.w/chasfullcontroloverprosecutions. Thus,underSec.18(9),itcanonly requestassistancefrom
executiveoffices.
xxx

OperationalMeasures. Theauthoritytosetits"operationalguidelines"wasadoptedinlieuofauthorityto
"setitsownpriorities"inordertoavoidthesuspicionthattheCHRmightnarrowthescopeofitsinvestigationto
militaryviolationsofhumanrightsonly.

LegalMeasures. Whatthelegalmeasuresarew/ctheCHRmayadoptunderSec.18(3)wasexplainedas
includingthepowertoissuedirectivesforthepreservationof"thebodyofthedetaineeandtopreventthe
authorities from hiding it, or from torturing or transferring the body until further orders of the court, w/o
prejudicetotherightoftheaggrievedpartytopetitionfortheissuanceofawritofhabeascorpus..."xxxThe
Commission,however,hasnopowertoorderthereleaseofadetainee.

BARLONGAYCASES:

Carinov.CommissiononHumanRights,204SCRA483(1991)
ThethresholdquestioniswhetherofnottheCHRhasthepowerundertheConsti.toadjudicate;whether
ornot,likeacourtofjustice,orevenaquasijudicialagency,ithasjurisdictionoradjudicatorypowersorthe
power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights
violationsinvolvingcivilorpoliticalrights.

TheCourtdeclarestheCHRtohavenosuchpowerxxxThemostthatmaybeconcededtotheCHRin
thewayofadjudicativepoweristhatitmay investigate,i.e.,receiveevidenceandmakefindingsoffactas
regardsclaimedhumanrightsviolationsinvolvingcivilandpoliticalrights.Butfactfindingisnotadjudication,
andcannotbelikenedtothejudicialfunction ofacourtofjustice,orevenaquasijudicialagencyorofficial.
xxxTobeconsideredajudicialfunction,thefacultyorreceivingevidenceandmakingfactualconclusionsina
controversymustbeaccompaniedbytheauthorityofapplyingthelawtothosefactualconclusionstotheend
thatthecontroversymaybedecidedordeterminedauthoritatively,finallyanddefinitely,subjecttosuchappeals
ormodesofreviewasmaybeprovidedbylaw.Thisfunction,torepeat,theCHRdoesnothave.

Investigate. Thelegalmeaningof"investigate"is"(t)ofollowupstepbystepbypatientinquiryor
observation.Totraceortrack;tosearchinto;toexamineandinquireintow/careandaccuracy;tofindoutby
carefulinquisition;examination;thetakingofevidence;alegalinquiry;toinquire;tomakeaninvestigation,"
"investigation"beinginturndescribedas"(a)nadministrativefunction,theexerciseofw/cordinarilydoesnot
requireahearingxxxaninquiry,judicialorotherwise,forthediscoveryandcollectionoffactsconcerninga
certainmatterormatters.

Adjudicate.Inthelegalsense,"adjudicate"means:"Tosettleintheexerciseofjudicialauthority.To
determinefinally.Synonymousw/adjudgeinitsstrictsense;"and"adjudge"means:"Topassonjudicially,to
decide,settleordecree,ortosentenceorcondemnxxxImpliesajudicialdeterminationofafact,andtheentry
ofjudgement."RAM.

EPZAv.CHR,208SCRA125

F: On5/30/80,PD1980wasissuedreservinganddesignatingcertainparcelsoflandinRosarioandGen.Trias
Cavite,asthe"CaviteEPZA.Forpurposesofdevt,theareawasdividedintoPhasesItoIV.AparcelinPhaseIVwas
boughtbytheFiloilRefineryCorp.,w/cinturnsoldittoEPZA.
Bef.EPZAcouldtakepossessionofthearea,severalindividualshadenteredthepremisesandplantedagricultural
productsthereinw/opermissionfromEPZAoritspredecessor.Toconvincetheintruderstodepartpeacefully,EPZA,in
1981,paidP10,000financialassistancetothosewhoacceptedthesameandsignedquitclaims.AmongthemwereTeresita
VallesandAlfredoAledia,fatherorresp.LoretoAledia.
After10yrs.,resp.T.Valles,LoretoAlediaandPedroOrdonezfiledintheresp.CHRajointcomplaintpraying
for"justiceandotherreliefsandremedies."
xxx
On5/17/91,theCHRissuedanorderofinjunctioncommandingEPZA,the125thPNPCo.andGov.Remullaand
theirsubordinatestodesistfromcommittingfurtheractsofdemolition,terrorism,andharassmentuntilfurtherordersfrom
theCHRandtoappearbef.theCHR.SubsequentordersofinjunctionwereissuedbyCHR.Themotionfiledw/EPZA
fortheliftingoftheorderofinjunctionwasdenied. MFRwaslikewisedenied. Hence,petitionerfiledinthisCourta
specialcivilactionofcertiorariandprohibition,w/aprayerfortheissuanceofarestrainingorderand/orprel.inj.,alleging
thatCHRactedinexcessofitsjurisdictionandw/graveabuseofdiscretioninissuingtherestrainingorderandinjunctive
writxxx

ISSUE: DoestheCHRhavejurisdictiontoissueawritofinjunctionorrestrainingorderagainstsupposed
violatorsofhumanrights,tocompelthemtoceaseanddesistfromcontinuingtheactscomplainedof.?

HELD: No. Theconstitutionalprovision directing theCHRdirecting theCHRto"provide forpreventive


measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need
protection" maynotbeconstrued toconferjurisdiction ontheCHRtoissue arestraining orderorwritof
injunctionfor,ifthatweretheintention,theConsti.wouldhaveexpresslysaidso.Jurisdictionisonlyconferred
bytheConsti.orbylaw."xxx
Evidently,the"preventivemeasuresandlegalaidservices"mentionedintheConsti.refertoextrajudicial
andjudicialremedies(includingprel.writofinjunction)w/ctheCHRmayseekfromthepropercourtson
behalfofthevictimsofhumanrightsviolations.Notbeingacourtofjustice,theCHRitselfhasnotjurisdiction
toissuethewrit,forawritofpre.inj.mayonlybeissued"bythejudgeofanycourtinw/ctheactionispending
(w/inhisdistrict),orbyaJusticeoftheCA,oroftheSC.ItmayalsobegrantedbyajudgeofaRTCinany
actionpendinginaninferiorcourtw/inhisdistrict.RAM.

c.FiscalAutonomy

Art.XII,Sec.17.(4)TheapprovedannualappropriationsoftheCommission(onHumanRights)
shallbeautomaticallyandregularlyreleased.

2.NationalLanguageCommission

Art. XIV, Sec. 9. The Congress shall establish a national language commission composed of
representatives of various regions and disciplines which shall undertake, coordinate, and promote
researchesforthedevelopment,propagationandpresentationofFilipinoandotherlanguages.

3.NationalPoliceCommission

Art.XVI,Sec.6.TheStateshallestablishandmaintainonepoliceforce,whichshallbenational
inscopeandcivilianincharacter,tobeadministeredandcontrolledbyanationalpolicecommission.The
authorityoflocalexecutivesoverthepoliceunitsintheirjurisdictionshallbeprovidedbylaw.

BARLONGAYCASES:

Carpiov.ExecutiveSecretary,206SCRA290(1992)
F: ThePetitioner,ascitizen,taxpayerandmemberofthePhil.Bar,filedapetitiontodeclaretheunconstitutionality
ofRA6975,"AnActEstablishingthePhilippineNationalPoliceUnderaReorganizedDILGandForOtherPurposes."

HELD:1. AstotheviewthatRA6975emasculatedtheNPCbylimitingitspowertoadministrativecontrol
overthePNP,thuscontrolremainedw/theDept.Sec.underwhomboththeNPCandthePNPwereplaced.

Itisanacceptedprincipleinconsti.lawthatthePres.hascontrolofallexecutivedepartments,bureaus,
andoffices. Thispresidentialpowerofcontrolovertheexecutivebranchofgovtextendsoverallexecutive
officersxxx
AsacorollaryruleistheDoctrineof QualifiedPoliticalAgency. AsthePres.cannotbeexpectedto
exercisehiscontrolpowersallatthesametimeandinperson,hewillhavetodelegatesomeofthemtohis
Cabinetmembers.
Underthisdoctrine,allexecutiveandadministrativeorganizationsareadjunctsoftheExec.Dept.,the
headsofvariousexec.depts.areassistantsandagentsoftheChiefExec.,andexceptincaseswheretheChief
Exec.isrequiredbytheConstiorlawtoactinpersonortheexigenciesofthesituationdemandthatheact
personally,themultifariousexecutiveandadministrativefunctionsoftheChiefExec.areperformedbyand
throughtheexec.depts.,andtheactsoftheSecretariesofsuchdepts.,performedandpromulgatedintheregular
courseofbusinessare,unlessdisapprovedorreprobatedbythePres.,presumptivelytheactsoftheChiefExec.
Thus,thePresident'spowerofcontrolisdirectlyexercisedbyhimovertheCabinetmemberswho,in
turn,andbyhisauthority,controlthebureausandotherofficesundertheirrespectivejurisdictionsintheexec.
dept.
Additionally,thecircumstancethattheNPCandthePNPareplacedunderthereorganizedDILGis
merelyanadministrativerealignmentthatwouldbolsterasystemofcoordinationandcooperationamongthe
citizenry,localexecutivesandtheintegratedlawenforcementagenciesandpublicsafetyagenciescreatedunder
RA6975,thefundingofthePNPbeinginlargepartsubsidizedbythenationalgovt.

2.AstotheissuethatinmanifestderogationofthepowerofcontroloftheNPCoverthePNP,RA6975vested
thepowertochoosethePNPProv'lDirectorandtheChiefofPoliceinGovernorsandMayors,respectively;the
powerofoperational"supervisionandcontrol"overpoliceunitsincityandmunicipalmayors.

Thereisnousurpationbec.underthisverysameprovision,itisclearthatthelocalexecutivesareonly
actingasrepresentativesoftheNPC.Assuchdeputies,theyareanswerabletotheNPCfortheiractionsinthe
exerciseoftheirfunctionsunderthatsection.

3.AstotheissuethatinmanifestderogationofthepowerofcontroloftheNPCoverthePNP,RA6975vested
intheCSC,participationinappointmentstothepositionsofSeniorSupt.toDeputyDirectorGen.aswellasthe
administration.ofqualifyingentranceexaminations.

Sec.31(a),(b),(c)andSec.32ofsaidActpreciselyunderscorestheciviliancharacterofthePNPand
willundoubtedlyprofessionalizethesame.

4.AstotheissuethatinmanifestderogationofthepowerofcontroloftheNPCoverthePNP,RA6975vested
disciplinarypowersoverthePNPmembersinthePeople'sLawEnforcementBoards(PLEB)andincityand
municipalmayors.
Pursuant to Sec. 20 (c) of the Act, the NPC exercises appellate jurisdiction, through the regional
appellateboard,overdecisionsofboththePLEBandthesaidmayors.Further,itistheCommissionw/cshall
issuetheimplementingguidelinesandprocedurestobeadoptedbythePLEBfortheconductofitshearings,and
itmayassigntheNPChearingofficertoactaslegalconsultantsofthePLEBs.
xxxThepurposeoftheestablishmentofPLEBistoprofessionalizethePNP.

5.AstotheissuethatSec.12ofthelawconstitutesanencroachmentupon,interferencew/,andanabdication
bythePres.ofexec.controlandcommanderinchiefpowers.

Sec.12givesmuscletoandenforcesthepropositionthatthenationalpolicedoesnotfallunderthe
CommanderinChiefpowersofthePres.Thisissosincethepoliceforce,notbeingintegratedw/themilitary,is
notpartoftheAFP.Asacivilianagencyofthegovt,itproperlycomesw/intheandissubjecttotheexerciseby
thePres.ofthepowerofexec.control.xxx

6.Astotheissuethatthecreationof"ASpecialOversightCommittee"underSec.84oftheAct,especiallythe
inclusion of some legislators as members is an unconstitutional encroachment upon and diminution of the
President'spowerofcontroloverallexec.depts.,bureausandoffices.

TheCommitissimplyan adhoc ortransitorybody,establishedandtaskedsolelyw/planning and


overseeingtheimmediatetransfer,merger,and/orabsorptionintotheDILGofthe"involvedagencies."

7.The3ConstitutionalCommissions(CSC,COA&COMELEC)andtheadditionalcommissioncreatedbythe
Consti(CHR)areallindependentoftheExecutive;buttheNAPOLCOMisnot.Infact,itwasstressedduring
theCONCOMdeliberationsthatthiscommissionwouldbeunderthePres.,andhencemaybecontrolledbythe
Pres.,throughhisorheralterego,theSec.oftheInteriorandLocalGovt.Adapted.

NAPOLCOMv.DeGuzman,229SCRA801(1994)

F: ThecaseatbarhaditsoriginintheimplementationofthecompulsoryretirementofPNPofficersasmandatedin
Sec.39,RA6975.Amongothers,theActprovidesforauniformretirementsystemforPNPmembersxxxforofficer(s)
andnonofficer(s)upontheattainmentofage56.BasedonSec.39ofthesaidAct,petitionerssentnoticesofretirementto
privaterespondentswhoareallmembersofthedefunctPCandhavereachedtheageof56.
Inresponse,pvt.resps.filedacomplainton12/19/91fordeclaratoryorderand/orinjunctionbef.theRTC.In
theircomplaint,resps.averthattheageofretirementsetat56cannotbeappliedtothemsincetheyarealsocoveredbySec.
89ofthesamelaww/cprovidedforatransitionperiodoffouryrs.followingtheeffectivityoftheActinsettingthe
retirementage.xxxItisthesubmissionofresps.thattheterm"INP"includesboththeformermembersofthePCandthe
localpoliceforcewhowereearlierconstitutedastheINP.Ontheotherhand,thebeliefofthepetitionersthatthe4yr.
transitionperiodprovidedinSec.89appliesonlytothelocalpoliceforceswhopreviouslyretired,compulsorilyatage60
forthoseinranksofPolice/FireLt.orhigher;whiletheretirementageforthePChadalreadybeensetat56undertheAFP
law.
xxx

ISSUE:DoestheRA6975distinguishINPfromthePC?
HELD:Fromacarefulperusalofsomeprovisionsofthelaw(Secs.23,85and86),itappearstherefore,thatthe
useofthetermINPisnotsynonymousw/thePC.Haditbeenotherwise,thestatutecouldhavejustmadea
uniformreferencetothemembersofthewholePNPforretirementpurposesandnotjusttheINP.Thelawitself
distinguishesINPfromthePCanditcannotbeconstruedthat"INP"asusedinSec.89includesthemembersof
thePC.
Ascontrarytothepronouncementofresp.judgethatthelawfailedtodefinewhoconstitutestheINP.
Sec.90ofthelawstatesthat"xxxTheIntegratedNationalPolice,whichistheciviliancomponentofthePC
INPxxx."
xxx
ThelegislativeintenttoclassifytheINPinsuchmannerthatSec.89isapplicableonlytothelocal
policeforceisclear.Thequestionnowisw/ntheclassificationisvalid.Thetestforthisisreasonablenesssuch
thatitmustconformtotheff.requisites: (1) itmustbebaseduponsubstantialdistinctions;(2) itmustbe
germanetothepurposeofthelaw;(3)Itmustnotbelimitedtoexistingconditionsonly;and(4)itmustapply
equallytoallmembersofthesameclass.
Theclassificationisbaseduponsubstantialdistinctions.ThePC,bef.theeffectivityofthelaw,were
alreadyretirableatage56whilethelocalpoliceforceat60andgovernedbydifferentlaws.Thedistinctionis
relevantforthepurposeofthestatute,w/cistoenablethelocalpoliceforcetoplanfortheirretirementw/c
wouldbeearlierthanusualbec.ofthenewlaw.Sec.89ismerelytransitory,remedialinnature,andlosesits
forceandeffectoncethe4yr.transitoryperiodhaselapsed.Finally,itappliestoalllocalpoliceofficers.xxx
RAM.

HimaganV.PEOPLE,237SCRA538(1994)

F: Petitioner,apolicemanassignedw/themedicalco.ofthePNPHQatCampCatitigan,DavaoCitywas
implicatedinthekillingofBenjaminMachitar,Jr.andtheattemptedmurderofBernabeMachitar. Afterthe
informationsformurderandattemptedmurderwerefiledw/theRTC,thetrialcourtissuedanordersuspending
petitioneruntilterminationofthecaseonthebasisofSec.47ofRA6975,w/cprovides:

Sec.47.PreventiveSuspensionPendingCriminalCase.Uponthefilingofacomplaintorinformationsufficient
informandsubstanceagainstamemberofthePNPforgravefelonieswherethepenaltyimposedbylawissix(6)years
andone(1)dayormore,thecourtshallimmediatelysuspendtheaccusedfromofficeuntilthecaseisterminated.Such
caseshallbesubjecttocontinuoustrialandshallbeterminatedwithinninety(90)daysfromarraignmentoftheaccused.

PetitionerfiledamotiontolifttheorderforhissuspensionrelyingonSec.42ofPD807,thathis
suspensionshouldbelimitedto90daysandalso,onourrulinginDelosov.SB,andLaynov.SB.Themotion
andthesubsequentMFRweredenied.Hence,thispetitionforcertiorariandmandamus.

HELD:Wefindthepetitiontobedevoidofmerit.
(1)Thelanguageofthefirstsentenceisclear,plainandfreefromambiguity.xxxThesecondsentence
xxprovidingthetrialmustbeterminatedw/in90daysfromarraignmentdoesnotqualifyorlimitthefirst
sentence.The2canstandindependentlyofeachother.Thefirstreferstotheperiodofsuspension.The2nd
dealsw/thetimeframew/inw/cthetrialshouldbefinished.
Supposethetrialisnotterminatedw/inthe90dayperiod,shouldthesuspensionofaccusedbelifted?
Certainlyno.Whilethelawusesthemandatoryword"shall"bef.thephrase"beterminatedw/in90days,"there
isnothinginthelawthatsuggeststhatthepreventivesuspensionoftheaccusedwillbeliftedifthetrialisnot
terminatedw/inthatperiod.Butthisisw/oprejudicetotheadministrativesanctions,and,inappropriatecases
wherethefactssowarrant,tocriminalorcivilliabilityofthejudge.Shouldthetrialbeunreasonablydelayed
w/othefaultoftheaccused,hemayaskforthedismissalofthecase.Shouldthisberefused,hecancompelits
dismissalbycertiorari,prohibitionormandamus,orsecurehislibertyby

(2)PetitionermisappliesSec.42ofPD807.Ameticulousreadingofthesectionclearlyshowsthatit
referstotheliftingofthepreventivesuspensioninpendingadmin.investigation,notincrim.cases,ashere.xxx
Sec.91ofRA6975w/cstatesthattheCSlawanditsimplementingrulesshallapplytomembersofthePNP
insofarastheprovisions,rulesandregulationsarenotinconsistentw/RA6975.

(3)Thepetitioner'srelianceonLaynoandDelosoismisplaced.xxxSec.13ofRA3019uponw/cthe
preventivesuspensionoftheaccusedinLaynoandDelosowasbasedwassilentw/respecttothedurationofthe
preventivesuspension,suchthatthesuspensionoftheaccusedthereinforaprolongedandunreasonablelength
oftimeraisedadueprocessquestion.Notsointheinstantcase.Petitionerischargedw/murderundertheRPC
anditisundisputedthathefallssquarelyunderSec.47RA6975w/ccategoricallystatesthathis suspension
shalllastuntilthecaseisterminated.

(4)ThedeliberationsoftheBicameralConferenceCommitteeonNationalDefenserelativetothebill
thatbecameRA6975revealthelegislativeintent toplaceonpreventivesuspension amemberofthePNP
charged w/ grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six yrs. of imprisonment and w/c
suspensioncontinuesuntilthecaseagainsthimisterminated.RAM.

4.CommissiononIndigenousCulturalCommunities

Art.XVI,Sec.12.TheCongressmaycreateaconsultativebodytoadvisethePresidentonpolicies
affectingindigenousculturalcommunities,themajorityofthemembersofwhichshallcomefromsuch
communities.

UPDATED1/15/96
RAM

III.LOCALGOVERNMENTS

A.Localgovernmentunits
IIBernas:

LocalGovernmentUnits. "Localgovernment"hasbeendescribedas"apoliticalsubdivisionofanationor
statewhichisconstitutedbylawandhassubstantialcontroloflocalaffairs.Inauunitarysystemofgovt,such
asthegovtunderthePhil.Consti.,localgovtcanonlybeaninfrasovereignsubdivisionofonesovereignnation.
Itcannotbeanimperiuminimperio.

Structureoflocalgovernmentunits

(notinVV'soutline)
Art.X,Sec.1.TheterritorialandpoliticalsubdivisionsoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesarethe
provinces,cities,municipalities,andbarangays.ThereshallbeautonomousregionsinMuslimMindanao
andtheCordillerasashereinafterprovided.

TheterritorialandpoliticalsubdivisionsoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesarethe(a)provinces,(b)
cities,(c)municipalitiesand(d)barangays.

IIBernas:

TheconstitutionalsignificanceofSec.1isthatprovinces,cities,municipalitiesandbarangayshavebeenfixedas
thestandardterritorialandpoliticalsubdivisionsofthePhils.Tothesethe1987Consti.addedthe"autonomous
regions." This manner of subdividing the Phils. cannot go out of existence except by a constitutional
amendment.

Art.II,Sec.25.TheStateshallensuretheautonomyoflocalgovernments.

Art.X,Sec.2.Theterritorialandpoliticalsubdivisionsshallenjoylocalautonomy.

IIBernas:Localautonomyasaconceptisrelativeandsimplymeans,asindicatedinSec.3,decentralization.
Themeasureofdecentralizationforthelocalunits,however,willbelessthanfortheautonomousregions.

Ganzonv.CA,200SCRA271(1991).Localautonomymeans"amoreresponsiveandaccountablelocalgovt
structureinstitutedthroughasystemofdecentralization. TheConsti.doesnothingmorethantobreakupthe
monopolyofthenationalgovtovertheaffairsoflocalgovts."toliberatelocalgovtsfromtheimperialismof
Mla."Autonomy,howeverisnotmeanttoendtherelationofpartnershipandinterdependencebet.thecentral
administrationandlocalgovtunits,orotherwise,tousherinaregimeoffederalism.xxx
Decentralizationmeansdevolutionofnationaladministration,butnotpower,tothelocallevels.

1.GeneralsupervisionoflocalgovernmentsbythePresident
Art. X, Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and
municipalitieswithrespecttocomponentbarangaysshallensurethattheactsoftheircomponentunits
arewithinthescopeoftheirprescribedpowersandfunctions.

Id.,Sec.16.ThePresidentshallexercisegeneralsupervisionoverautonomousregionstoensure
thatlawsarefaithfullyexecuted.

Supervision Defined. Supervision means overseeing or the power of an officer to see that subordinate
officersperformtheirduties.Ifthelatterfailorneglecttofulfillthem,theformermaytakesuchactionorstep
asprescribedbylawtomakethemperformtheirduties.(Ganzonv.CA,200SCRA271.)

2.LocalGovernmentCode

Art.X,Sec.3.TheCongressshallenactalocalgovernmentcodewhichshallprovideforamore
responsiveandaccountablelocalgovernmentstructureinstitutedthroughasystemofdecentralization
with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications,
elections,appointmentandremoval,term,salaries,powersandfunctionsanddutiesoflocalofficials,and
allothermattersrelatingtotheorganizationandoperationofthelocalunits.

RepublicAct7160,"LocalGovernmentCodeof1991"

LocalGovernmentCode

TheCongressshallenactalocalgovernmentcodewhichshall:

(1) Provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure, instituted through a
systemofdecentralization,witheffectivemechanismofrecall,initiative,andreferendum.

(2)Allocateamongthedifferentlocalgovernmentunitstheirpowers,responsibilitiesandresources.

Legislativebodiesoflocalgovernmentsshallhavesectoralrepresentationasmaybeprovidedbylaw.
(Art.X,Sec.9)

(3) Provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and
functionsandduties,oflocalofficials.

Thetermofofficeofelectivelocalofficialsexceptbarangayofficialswhichshallbedeterminedbylaw,
shallbe3years.

Nosuchofficialshallserveformorethan3consecutiveterms.

Voluntaryrenunciationoftheofficeforanylengthoftimeshallnotbeconsideredaninterruptioninthe
continuityofhisserviceforthefulltermforwhichhewaselected.(Art.X,Sec.8)

The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which may be
simultaneouswiththeelectionofthemembersofCongress.(Art.XVIII,Sec.1.)

(4)Allothermattersrelatingtotheorganizationandoperationofthelocalunits.(Art.X,Sec.3.)

ValidityofCreationofMunicipalityBeforetheLocalGovernmentCode.

Torralbav.MunicipalityofSibagat,147SCRA390(1987)

F: ThepetitionersquestionthevalidityofBP56creatingthemunicipality(mun.)ofSibagatinAgusanProvince,on
thegroundthatitwasnotpassedinaccordancew/thecriteriaoftheLGCasrequiredbyArt.IX,Sec.3ofthe1973Consti.
(nowArt.IX,Sec.10oftheConsti.)

HELD:TheLGCtookeffecton2/10/83,whereasBP56tookeffecton2/1/80.TheConsti.doesnotmakethe
enactmentoftheLGCaconditionsinequanonforthecreationofanewmun.,butonlythatitmustbeapproved
bythepeopleintheareaorareasaffected.UnlikeinthecaseofTanv.COMELEC,thereisnoquestionhere
thataplebiscitewasheldinsuchareaanditslegalityisnotquestioned.VV.

a.Termofofficeoflocalofficials,exceptbarangayofficials

Art.X,Sec.8.Thetermofofficeofelectivelocalofficials,exceptbarangayofficials,whichshall
bedeterminedbylaw,shallbethreeyearsandnosuchofficialshallserveformorethanthreeconsecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruptioninthecontinuityofhisserviceforthefulltermofwhichhewaselected.

XVIII,Sec.1.xxx
ThefirstlocalelectionshallbeheldonadatetobedeterminedbythePresident,whichmaybe
simultaneouswiththeelectionoftheMembersoftheCongress. Itshallincludetheelectionofallthe
MembersofthecityormunicipalcouncilsintheMetropolitanManilaarea.

b.Termofofficeofbarangayofficials

Art.X,Sec.8.Thetermofofficeofelectivelocalofficials,exceptbarangayofficials,whichshall
bedeterminedbylaw,shallbethreeyearsandnosuchofficialshallserveformorethanthreeconsecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruptioninthecontinuityofhisserviceforthefulltermofwhichhewaselected.

RepublicActNo.6679,Sec.1inconjunctionwithSec.43(c),RA7160

Sec.1.TheelectionsofbarangayofficialssetonthesecondMondayofNovember1988byRepublicActNo.
6653areherebypostponedandresettoMarch28,1989.Theyshallserveatermwhichshallbeginonthefirstday
ofMay1989andendingonthethirtyfirstdayofMay1994.
ThereshallbeheldaregularelectionofbarangayofficialsonthesecondMondayofMay1994andonthe
samedayeveryfive(5)yearsthereafter.Theirtermshallbeforfive(5)yearswhichshallbeginonthefirstdayof
Junefollowingtheelectionanduntiltheirsuccessorsshallhavebeenelectedandqualified: Provided,Thatno
barangayofficialshallserveformorethanthree(3)successiveterms.
Thebarangayelectionsshallbenonpartisanandshallbeconductedinanexpeditiousandinexpensive
manner.(RA6679)

Sec.43.TermofOffice.xxx
xxx
(c)Thetermofofficeofbarangayofficialsandmembersofthesangguniangkabataanshallbeforthree(3)
years,whichshallbeginaftertheregularelectionofbarangayofficialsonthesecondMondayof1994.(RA7160.)

c.LocalLegislativeBodies

Art.X,Sec.9.Legislativebodiesoflocalgovernmentsshallhavesectoralrepresentationasmaybe
prescribedbylaw.

d.Creation,abolition,divisionormergeroflocalgovernmentunits

Art.X,Sec.10. Noprovince,city,municipality,orbarangaymaybecreated,divided,merged,
abolished,oritsboundarysubstantiallyaltered,exceptinaccordancewiththecriteriaestablishedinthe
localgovernmentcodeandsubjecttoapprovalbyamajorityofthevotescastinaplebisciteinthepolitical
unitsdirectlyaffected.

RepublicAct7160,Secs.610

Sec.6. AuthoritytoCreateLocalGovernmentUnits. Alocalgovernmentunitmaybecreated,divided,


merged, abolished, or its boundaries substantially altered either by law enacted by Congress in the case of a
province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision, or by ordinance passed by the sanggunian
panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod concerned in the case of a barangay located within its territorial
jurisdiction,subjecttosuchlimitationsandrequirementsprescribedinthisCode.

Sec.7.CreationandConversionAsageneralrule,thecreationofalocalgovernmentunitoritsconversion
fromoneleveltoanotherlevelshallbebasedonverifiableindicatorsofviabilityandprojectedcapacitytoprovide
services,towit:
(a)Income.Itmustbesufficient,basedonacceptablestandards,toprovideforallessentialgovernment
facilitiesandservicesandspecialfunctionscommensuratewiththesizeofitspopulation,asexpectedofthelocal
governmentunitconcerned;
(b) Population. It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the territorial
jurisdictionofthelocalgovernmentunitconcerned;and
(c)LandArea.Itmustbecontiguous,unlessitcomprisestwo(2)ormoreislandsorisseparatedbya
local government unit independent of the others; properly identified by metes and bounds with technical
descriptions;andsufficienttoprovideforsuchbasicservicesandfacilitiestomeettherequirementsofitspopulace.
CompliancewiththeforegoingindicatorsshallbeattestedtobytheDepartmentofFinance(DOF),the
NationalStatisticsOffice(NSO),andtheLandsManagementBureau(LMB)oftheDepartmentofEnvironment
andNaturalResources(DENR.)

Sec.8.DivisionandMerger.Divisionandmergerofexistinglocalgovernmentunitsshallcomplywiththe
samerequirementshereinprescribedfortheircreation:Provided,however,Thatsuchdivisionshallnotreducethe
income, population, or land area of the local government unit or units concerned to less than the minimum
requirements prescribed in this Code: Provided, further, That the income classification of the original local
governmentunitorunitsshallnotfallbelowitscurrentincomeclassificationpriortosuchdivision.
The income classification of local government units shall be updated within six (6) months from the
effectivityofthisCodetoreflectthechangesintheirfinancialpositionresultingfromtheincreasedrevenuesas
providedherein.

Sec.9.AbolitionofLocalGovernmentUnits.Alocalgovernmentunitmaybeabolishedwhenitsincome,
population or land area has been irreversibly reduced to less than the minimum standards prescribed for its
creationunderBookIIIofthisCode,ascertifiedbythenationalagenciesmentionedinSection7hereoftoCongress
ortothesanggunianconcerned,asthecasemaybe.
Thelaworordinanceabolishingalocalgovernmentunitshallspecifytheprovince,city,municipality,or
barangaywithwhichthelocalgovernmentunitsoughttobeabolishedwillbeincorporatedormerged.

Sec. 10. Plebiscite Requirement. No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of
boundariesoflocalgovernmentunitsshalltakeeffectunlessapprovedbyamajorityofthevotescastinaplebiscite
calledforthepurposeinthepoliticalunitorunitsdirectlyaffected. Saidplebisciteshallbeconductedbythe
CommissiononElections(Comelec)withinonehundredtwenty(120)daysfromthedateofeffectivityofthelawor
ordinanceeffectingsuchaction,unlesssaidlaworordinancefixesanotherdate.

In Tan v COMELEC,142SCRA727(1986),theSCruledthattheplebiscitetobeconductedinthe
creationofanewprovince(NegrosdelNorte)mustbeconductednotonlyamongtheconstituentsofthenew
province, butalsotheconstituents ofthoseunitstobeleftbehind. Inotherwords,theplebiscite mustbe
conductedamongtheinhabitantsofboththeoldandnewtowns.Thereasonis,theoldtownsareasdirectly
affectedbythecreationofthenewprovincefortheymayloseincomeorotherbenefit.

Tanv.COMELEC,142SCRA727(1986)

F: PromptedbytheenactmentofBP885w/cwasenactedtocreatethenewProvinceofProvinceofNegros
delNorte,petitionersherein,whoareresidentsoftheProv.ofNegrosOccidental,inthevariouscitiesand
municipalitiestherein,filedw/thisCourtacaseforprohibitionforthepurposesofstoppingresps.COMELEC
fromconductingtheplebiscitew/cwasscheduledtobeheldfor1/3/86. Petitionerscontendthatthelawis
unconstitutionalanditisnotincompleteaccordw/theLGCasinArtXI,Sec.3ofour(1973)Consti.xxxThe
plebiscitesoughttobeenjoinedbythemwasheldasscheduledbuttherearestillseriousissuesraisedinthe
instantcaseaffectingthelegality,constitutionalityandvalidityofsuchexercisew/cshouldproperlybepassed
uponandresolvedbythisCourt.
TheplebiscitewasconfinedonlytotheinhabitantsoftheterritoryofNegrosdelNorte. Bec.ofthe
exclusionsofthevotersfromtherestoftheprovinceofNegrosOcc.,petitionersfoundneedtochangetheprayer
oftheirpetitiontotheendthattheconstitutionalissuesw/ctheyhaveraisedintheactionwillbeventilatedand
givenfinalresolution.

HELD:WenowstatethattherulinginthecasesofLopezv.COMELECandParedesv.Hon.Exec.Sec.,etal.
sanctioningtheexclusionofthevotersbelongingtoanexistingpoliticalunitfromw/cthenewpoliticalunitwill
be derived, from participating in the plebiscite conducted for the purpose of determining the formation of
anotherpoliticalunit,isherebyabandoned.

1.Factthattheplebiscitewhichthepetitionatbarsoughttostophadalreadybeenheldandofficialsof
the new province appointed does not make the petition moot, as the petition raises issues an issue of
constitutionaldimension.TheConsti.makesitimperativethattherebefirstobtained"theapprovalofamajority
ofvotesintheplebisciteintheunitorunitsaffected"wheneveraprovinceiscreated,dividedormergedand
thereissubstantialalterationoftheboundaries. Itisthusinescapabletoconcludethattheboundariesofthe
existing province of Negros Occ. would necessarily be substantially altered by the division of its existing
boundariesinorderthattherecanbecreatedtheproposednewprovinceofNegrosdelNorte.Plainandsimple
logicwilldemonstratethatthe2politicalunitswouldbeaffected. Thefirstwouldbetheparentprovinceof
NegrosOccbec.itsboundarieswouldbesubstantiallyaltered.Theotheraffectedentitywouldbecomposedof
thoseintheareasubtractedfromthemotherprovincetoconstitutetheproposedprovinceofNegrosdelNorte.
2. Aplebisciteforcreatinganewprovinceshouldincludetheparticipationoftheresidentsofthe
motherprovincefortheplebiscitetoconformtotheconstitutionalrequirements. Noamountofrhetorical
flourishescanjustifyexclusionoftheparentprovinceintheplebiscitebec.ofanallegedintentonthepartofthe
authorsandimplementorsofthechallengedstatutetocarryoutwhatisclaimedtobeamandatetoguarantee
andpromoteautonomyoflocalgovt.units.Theallegedgoodintentionscannotprevailandoverrulethecardinal
preceptthatwhatourConsti.categoricallydirectstobedoneorimposeasarequirementmustfirstbeobserved,
respectedandcompliedw/.

3.ThecreatedprovincedoesnotevensatisfythearearequirementprescribedinSec.197oftheLGC.
Tothisissue,itiseventhesubmissionoftherespondentsthatinthisregardthemarginalseaw/inthethreemile
limitshouldbeconsideredindeterminingtheextentoftheterritoryofthenewprovince.Suchaninterpretation
isstrained,incorrectandfallacious.

Useoftheword"territory"inSec.197oftheLGCrefersonlytothelandmass,nottothewaters,
comprisingthepoliticalentity.Assostatedthereinthe"territoryneednotbecontiguousifitcomprisestwoor
moreislands."TheuseofthewordterritoryinthisparticularprovisionoftheLGCandintheverylastsentence
thereof,clearlyreflectsthat"territory"asthereinused,hasreferenceonlytothemassoflandareaandexcludes
thewatersoverw/cthepoliticalunitexercisescontrol. Saidsentencestatesthatthe"territoryneednotbe
contiguous."Contiguousmeans(a)inphysicalcontact;(b)touchingalongallormostofoneside;(c)near,
next,oradjacent."Contiguous"whenemployedasanadjectiveisonlyusedwhenitdescribesphysicalcontact,
oratouchingofsidesof2solidmassesofmatter.xxxInthecontextofthesentenceabove,whatneednotbe
contiguousisthe"territory"thephysicalmassoflandarea.Therewouldarisenoneedforthelegislatorsto
usethewordcontiguous iftheyhadintendedthattheterm"territory"embracenotonlylandareabutalso
territorialwaters.

e.MetropolitanPoliticalSubdivisions

Art.X,Sec.11. TheCongressmay,bylaw,createspecial metropolitanpolitical subdivisions,


subjecttoaplebisciteassetforthinSection10hereof. Thecomponentcitiesandmunicipalitiesshall
retaintheirbasicautonomyandshallbeentitledtotheirownlocalexecutivesandlegislativeassemblies.
The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created shall be limited to basic
servicesrequiringcoordination.
Art. XVIII, Sec. 8. Until otherwise provided by Congress, the President may constitute the
Metropolitan Authority to be composed of the heads of all local government units comprising the
MetropolitanArea.

SeeRA7924

Art.XVIII,Sec.1.xxx
xxx ThefirstlocalelectionswhichshallbeheldonadatetobedeterminedbythePresident
xxx.ItshallincludetheelectionofallmembersofthecityormunicipalcouncilsintheMetropolitanarea.

IIBernas: Thearea ofjurisdiction ofthemetropolitan political subdivision willnotbethetotality of the


concernsofmunicipalgovt.butonlybasicservices. Assuchitwillbeajuridicalentityw/mun.powers
police, eminent domain, and taxation powers exercised by alegislative assemblytotheextent needed for
providingbasicservices.

f.Righttovote

Id.,Sec.12.Citiesthatarehighlyurbanized,asdeterminedbylaw,andcomponentcitieswhose
chartersprohibit theirvotersfromvotingforprovincial electiveofficials,shallbe independent ofthe
province.Thevotersofcomponentcitieswithinaprovince,whosecharterscontainnosuchprohibition,
shallnotbedeprivedoftheirrighttovoteforelectiveprovincialofficials.

RepublicAct7160,Sec.451

Sec.451. Cities,Classified. Acitymayeitherbecomponentorhighlyurbanized: Provided,however,


ThatthecriteriaestablishedinthisCodeshallnotaffecttheclassificationandcorporatestatusofexistingcities.
Independentcomponentcitiesarethosecomponentcitieswhosechartersprohibittheirvotersfromvoting
forprovincialelectiveofficials.Independentcomponentcitiesshallbeindependentoftheprovince.

UndertheLocalGovernmentCode,ahighlyurbanizedcitymusthaveapopulationofatleast150,000
people,andanannualincomeofP30million.(Sec.166)

Inhighlyurbanizedcities,thevotersdonotvoteintheprovincialelections,thecityisindependentof
theprovince.

Incomponentcities,itdependsifthecharterprohibitsvotersfromvotingintheprovincialelection,then
theycannotparticipateintheprovincialelection.Thatthecitypaystotheprovinceisnobasisforthecomplaint.
If,ontheotherhand,theircharterdoesnotexpresslyprohibit(itdoesnothavetoallow),thentheycanvotein
theprovincialelection.

CenizavCOMELEC,95SCRA703(1980)exemplifiesthecaseinwhichacomponentcitythatisnot
highlyurbanized(Mandaue)becauseofitsincomecannotvoteintheprovincialelection(Cebu)becauseits
charterprohibitsthevotersfromvotingunlikeothercomponentcitieswhosechartersdonotcontainasimilar
prohibition.

Theclassificationofcitiesintohighlyurbanizedcitieswouldshowwhetheritiscapableofsupportof
provincialgovernments,thusjustifyingtheprohibitiontovoteforprovincialofficials.
ClassificationofCitiesinto"HighlyUrbanized"and"Component"Cities.

Cenizav.COMELEC,95SCRA763(1980)

F: BP51calledfortheelectionoflocalofficialson1/30/80and,inconnectiontherewith,classifiedcharteredcities
into"highlyurbanized"and"component"citiesonthebasisoftheirregularincome(P40M). Theregisteredvotersof
componentcitiescouldvoteintheelectionoftheprovinceofw/cthatcityisacomponentistheirchartersoprovided,
whilevotersinthehighlyurbanizedcitieswerenotallowedtoparticipatenorvoteintheelectionsoftheprovinceinw/c
suchcitiesarelocated.CebuCitywasclassifiedasahighlyurbanizedcitywhileMandaue,w/lessthanP40Mincomewas
classifiedasacomponentcity,butitsvotersbec.ofitscharterprovisionswerenotallowedtovoteintheelectionsofthe
CebuProvince.Petitioners,asTPsandregisteredvotersofCebuandMandauecities,filedanactiontostoptheelectionin
theaffectedprovincestoallowvoterstovoteinprovincialelections.

HELD:(1)TheclassificationofcitiesinBP51isbasedonsubstantialdistinction.Therevenueofacitywould
showwhetheritiscapableofindep.existence. Citiesw/smallerincomeneedthecontinuedsupportofthe
provincialgovtsthusjustifyingthecontinuedparticipationofthevotersintheelectionofprovincialofficials.It
istruethatMandaueisclassifiedasacomponentcitybutbec.oftheprovisionofitscharteritsregisteredvoters
arenotallowedtovoteintheelectionsoftheProv.ofCebu,whiletheothercomponentcitiesareallowedtodo
so.Butthisdifferenceintreatmentisamatteroflegislativediscretion.
(2)Theprohibitionagainsttheimpositionofburdensontherightofsuffragereferstosuchirrelevant
requirementsaspolltax,etc.
(3)Highlyurbanizedcitiesareindep.oftheprovinceintheadmin.oftheiraffairs.Suchbeingthecase
itisbutjustandpropertolimittheselectionandelectionofprovincialofficialstothevotersoftheprovince
whoseinterestareaffectedandexcludethevotersofhighlyurbanizedcities
(4)ThecharterofMandauew/ctookeffecton6/21/69didnothavetoberatifiedbytheresidentsasthe
requirementorratificationintheConsti(1973)wasprospectiveincharacter. (5)NeithercanBP51andthe
CharterofMandauebesaidtohavebeenenactedforagerrymanderingpurpose."Gerrymandering"isaterm
employedtodescribeanapportionmentofrepresentativedistrictssocontrivedastogiveanunfairadvantagetoa
partyinpower.Thestatutesheredonotinvolveanapportionment.Norhasitbeenshownthattheexclusionof
votersintheaffectedcitiesgiveanunfairadvantagetocandidatesofthepartyinpower.xxxVV. .

3.PowersofLocalGovernments

a.Revenueandtaxingpower

Art.X,Sec.5. Eachlocalgovernment unitshallhavethepowertocreateitsownsourcesof


revenuesandtolevytaxes,fees,andchargessubjecttosuchguidelinesandlimitationsasCongressmay
provide,consistentwiththebasicpolicyoflocalautonomy. Suchtaxes,fees,andchargesshallaccrue
exclusivelytothelocalgovernments.

IIBernas: Sec.5doesnotchangethedoctrinethatmunicipalcorporationsdonotpossesinherentpowersof
taxation.Whatitdoesistoconfermunicipalcorps.ageneralpowertolevytaxesandotherwisecreatesources
ofrevenue.Theynolongerhavetowaitforastatutorygrantofthesepowers.Thepoweroflegislativeauthority
relativetothefiscalpowersofLGUshasbeenreducedtotheauthoritytoimposelimitationsonmun.powers.
Moreover,theselimitationsmustbe"consistentw/thebasicpolicyoflocalautonomy."

b.Shareinnationaltaxes

Id.,Sec.6.Localgovernmentunitsshallhaveajustshare,asdeterminedbylaw,inthenational
taxeswhichshallbeautomaticallyreleasedtothem.

c.Shareintheproceedsofnationalwealth

Id., Sec. 7. Local governments shall be entitled to an equitable share in the proceeds of the
utilizationanddevelopmentofthenationalwealthwithintheirrespectiveareas,inthemannerprovided
bylaw,includingsharingthesamewiththeinhabitantsbywayofdirectbenefits.

d.Coordinationofefforts,servicesandresourcesforcommonbenefit

Id.,Sec.13.Localgovernmentunitsmaygroupthemselves,consolidateorcoordinatetheirefforts,
services,andresourcesforpurposescommonlybeneficialtotheminaccordancewithlaw.

RA7160,Sec.33

Sec. 33. Cooperative Undertakings Among Local Government Units. Local Government units may,
throughappropriateordinances,groupthemselves,consolidate,orcoordinatetheirefforts,services,andresources
forpurposescommonlybeneficialtothem.Insupportofsuchundertakings,thelocalgovernmentunitsinvolved
may,uponapprovalbythesangguniangconcernedafterapublichearingconductedforthepurposes,contribute
funds,realestate,equipment,andotherkindsofpropertyandappointorassignpersonnelundersuchtermsand
conditionsasmaybeagreeduponbytheparticipatinglocalunitsthroughMemorandaofAgreement.

4.TheTwoAutonomousRegions

a.Creation

Art.X,Sec.15. Thereshallbecreated autonomousregionsinMuslimMindanaoandinthe


Cordillerasconsistingofprovinces,cities,municipalities,andgeographicalareassharingcommonand
distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristicswhichtheframeworkofthisConstitutionandthenationalsovereigntyaswellasterritorial
integrityoftheRepublicofthePhilippines.
Id., Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the
assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representatives
appointedbythePresidentfromalistofnomineesfrommultisectoralbodies.Theorganicactshalldefine
thebasicstructureofgovernmentfortheregionconsistingoftheexecutivedepartmentandlegislative
assembly,bothofwhichshallbeelectiveandrepresentativeoftheconstituentpoliticalunits.Theorganic
acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction
consistentwiththeprovisionsofthisConstitutionandnationallaws.
Thecreationoftheautonomousregionshallbeeffectivewhenapprovedbymajorityofthevotes
castbytheconstituentunitsinaplebiscitecalledforthepurpose,providedthatonlyprovinces,cities,and
geographicareasvotingfavorablyinsuchplebisciteshallbeincludedintheautonomousregion.

Id.,Sec.19.ThefirstCongresselectedunderthisConstitutionshall,withineighteenmonthsfrom
thetimeoforganization ofbothHouses,passtheorganicactsfortheautonomousregionsinMuslim
MindanaoandtheCordilleras.

IIBernas: Intheprocessofdeterminingtheterritorythatwillcomprisetheautonomousregions,thereare3
steps:(1)thereisapreliminaryadministrativedeterminationofwhatareasshouldbeconsideredforinclusion
intheautonomousregion;(2)CongressthroughtheOrganicActmakesadeterminationofwhatareasshouldbe
includedandthereforeshouldparticipateintheplebiscite;(3)Plebiscitecanfurthermodifythedetermination
madebytheOrganicActbec.Sec.18saysthat"onlyprovinces,etc.votingfavorablyinsuchplebisciteshallbe
includedintheautonomousregion.

Abbasv.COMELEC,179SCRA287(1989)

F: Thepresentcontroversyrelatestotheplebiscitein13provincesand9citiesinMindanaoandPalawanscheduled
for11/19/89,inimplementationofRA6734providingforanOrganicActfortheAutonomousRegioninMuslinMindanao.
TheseconsolidatedpetitionspraythattheCourt:(1)enjointheCOMELECfromconductingtheplebisciteandtheSec.of
Budget from releasing funds to the COMELEC for that purpose; and (2) declare RA 6734, or parts thereof,
unconstitutional.
TheargumentsagainstRA6734raisedbypetitionersmaygenerallybecategorizedintoeitheroftheff:
I.Thatcertainprovisionsofthelawconflictw/theTripoliAgreement.
II.ThatRA6734,orpartsthereor,violatestheConsti.

HELD: I. WefinditneithernecessarynordeterminativeofthecasetoruleonthenatureoftheTripoli
AgreementanditsbindingeffectonthePhilGovtwhetherunderpublicinternationalorinternalPhil.law.Itis
nowtheConsti.itselfthatprovidesforthecreationofanautonomousregioninMuslimMindanao.

II.Petitionercontendsthatthetenoroftheaboveprovisionmakesthecreationofanautonomousregion
absolute,suchthatevenifonly2provincesvoteinfavorofautonomy,suchanautonomousregionwouldstillbe
createdxxx.
HELD: UndertheConsti.andRA6734,thecreationoftheautonomousregionshalltakeeffectonlywhen
approvedbyamajorityofthevotescastbytheconstituentunitsinaplebiscite,andonlythoseprovincesand
citieswhereamajorityvoteinfavoroftheOrganicActshallbeincludedintheautonomousregion.xxxThe
singleplebiscitewillbedeterminativeof(1)whetherthereshallbeanautonomousregioninMuslimMindanao
and(2)whichprovincesandcities,amongthoseenumeratedinRA6734shallcompriseit.

Q: TheConstimakeseffectivethecreationoftheautonomousregionuponapproval"bymajority
ofthevotescastbytheconstituentunitsinaplebiscitecalledforthepurpose."Thequestionis:Doesitreferto
amajority ofthetotalvotescast in theplebiscite inallthe constituent units, oramajority ineachofthe
constituentunits,orboth?

A: IftheframersoftheConsti.intendedtorequireapprovalofamajorityofallthevotescastinthe
plebiscite,theywouldhavesoindicated.Thus,inArt.XVIII,Sec.27,itisprovidedthat"[t]hisConsti.shall
takeeffectimmediatelyuponitsratificationbyamajorityofthevotescastinaplebisciteheldforthepurpose
xxx."Comparingthisw/theprovisiononthecreationofautonomousregion,w/creads:

"The creation of autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the
constituentunitsinaplebisciteheldforthepurposexxx(Art.X,Sec.18,par.2.)

itwillreadilybeseenthatthecreationoftheautonomousregionismadetodepend,notonthetotalmajority
voteintheplebiscite,butonthewillofthemajorityineachoftheconstituentunitsandtheprovisounderscores
this.xxxItisthusclearthatwhatisrequiredbytheConsti.isasimplemajorityofvotesapprovingtheOrganic
Actinindividualconstituentunitsputtogether,aswellasintheindividualconstituentunits.

[Barlongay:Whatisrequiredissimplemajorityandnotdoublemajority]
SeparationofPowers.TheascertainmentbyCongressoftheareasthatsharecommonattributesisw/in
theexclusiverealmofthelegislature'sdiscretionandanyreviewofthisascertainmentwouldhavetogointothe
wisdomofthelaw.

xxx

Thepowertomergeadministrativeregionsisapowerwhichhastraditionallybeenlodgedw/thePres.
tofacilitatetheexerciseofthepowerofgen.supervisionoverlocalgovts.Noconflictbet.thepowerofthePres.
tomergeadministrativeregionsw/theConstitutionalprovisionrequiringplebisciteinthemergeroflocalgovt
units.WhatisreferredtoinRA6734isthemergerofadmin.regions.RegionsItoXIIandtheNCR,are(mere)
groupingsofcontiguousprovincesforadmin.purposes,w/cwasmadeaspartofthelawoftheland.Admin.
regionsarenotterritorialandpoliticalsubdivisions.Whilethepowertomergeadmin.regionsisnotexpressly
providedforintheConsti.,itisapowerw/chastraditionallybeenlodgedw/thePres.tofacilitatetheexerciseof
thepowerofgen.supervisionoverloc.govts.xxxRAM.

Ordillov.COMELEC,192SCRA100(1990)
F: On1/30/90,thepeopleoftheprovincesofBenguet,Mt.Prov.,Ifugao,andKalingaApayaoandtheCityofBaguio
casttheirvotesinaplebisciteheldpursuanttoRA6766w/cwasanActProvidingforanOrganicActfortheCordillera
AutonomousRegion.TheCOMELECresultsoftheplebisciteshowedthatthecreationoftheRegionwasapprovedbya
majorityofthevotesinonlytheIfugaoProv.andwasoverwhelminglyrejectedintherestoftheprovincesandcityabove
mentioned. Consequently, the COMELEC, issued a resolution stating that the Organic Act for the Region has been
approvedand/orratifiedbymajorityofthevotescastonlyintheprovinceofIfugao.xxx
Petitionersfiledapetitionw/theCOMELECtodeclarethenonratificationoftheOrganicActfortheRegion.
ThepetitionersmaintainthattherecanbenovalidCordilleraAutonomousRegioninonlyoneprov.astheConsti.andRA
6676requirethatthesaidRegionbecomposedofmorethanoneconstituentunit.

HELD:Thesoleprov.ofIfugaocannotvalidlyconstitutetheCordilleraAutonomousRegion.LookingatArt
X,Sec.15,thekeywordsprovinces,cities,municipalities,andgeographicalareasconnotethat"region"isto
bemadeupofmorethanoneconstituentunit.Theterm"region"usedinitsordinarysensemeans2ormore
provinces. Thisissupportedbythefactthat13regionsintow/cthePhilsisdividedforadmin.purposesare
groupingsofcontiguousprovinces.Ifugaoisaprov.initself.Tobecomepartofaregion,itmustjoinother
provinces,cities,municipalities,andgeographicalareas.xxx

TheentiretyofRA6766creatingtheCARisinfusedw/provisionsw/cruleagainstthesoleprovinceof
IfugaoconstitutingtheRegion.

Art.III,Secs.1&2ofthelawprovidethattheCARistobeadministeredbytheCordilleragovt
consistingoftheRegionalGovtandlocalgovtunits.
Fromthesesections,itcanbegleanedthatCongressneverintendedthatasingleprovincemayconstitute
theautonomousregion.Otherwise,wewouldbefacedw/theabsurdsituationofhaving2setsofofficials,aset
ofprovincialofficialsandanothersetofofficialsexercisingtheirexecutiveandlegislativepowersoverexactly
thesamesmallarea.
Art.V,Secs.1&4ofRA6766vestthelegislativepowerintheCordilleraAssemblywhosemembers
shallbeelectedfromregionalassemblydistrictsapportionedamongprovincesandcitiescomposingoftheCAR.
Ifwefollowresp'sposition,themembersofsuchCordilleraAssemblyshallthenbeelectedonlyfrom
the province of Ifugao creating an awkward predicament of having 2 legislative bodies the Cordillera
AssemblyandtheSangguniangPanlalawiganexercisingtheirlegislativepowersovertheprov.ofIfugao.

xxx

Art.XII,Sec.10ofthelawcreatesaRegionalPlanningandDevtBd.composedoftheCordilleraGov.,
alltheprovincialgovernorsandcitymayorsortheirrepresentatives,2membersoftheCordilleraAssembly,and
membersfromthepvt.sector.TheBdhasacounterpartintheprovinciallevelcalledtheProvincialPlanning
andDevt.Coordinator.TheBd.'sfunctionsarealmostsimilartothoseoftheProvincialCoordinator's.

Art. XXI, Sec. 13 (B) (c) allotting the huge amount of P10M to the Regional Govt for its initial
organizationalrequirementscannotbeconstruedasfundingonlyaloneandsmallprovince.

OtherProvisionsw/careeitherviolatedorw/ccannotbecompliedw/.Sec.16ofArt.Vicallsfora
Regional Chairman on Appointments w/ the Speaker as Chairman and 6 members coming from different
provincesandcitiesintheRegion. Underrespondent'sview,theComm.wouldhaveaChairmanandonly1
member.Itwouldneverhaveaquorom.Sec.3ofArtVIcallsforcabinetmembers,asfaraspracticable,to
comefromvariousprovincesandcitiesoftheRegion.Sec.1ofArt.IIcreatesasystemoftribalcourtsforthe
variousindigenousculturalcommunities oftheRegion. Sec.9ofArt.XVrequiresthedevtofacommon
regionallanguagebaseduponthevariouslanguagesanddialectsintheregionw/cregionallanguageinturnis
expectedtoenrichthenationallanguage.RAM.

b.Powersofautonomousregions

Art.X,Sec.20.WithinitsterritorialjurisdictionandsubjecttotheprovisionsofthisConstitution
andnationallaws,theorganicactofautonomousregionsshallprovideforlegislativepowersover:
(1)Administrativeorganizations;
(2)Creationofsourcesofrevenues;
(3)Ancestraldomainandnaturalresources;
(4)Personal,family,andpropertyrelations;
(5)Regionalurbanandruralplanningdevelopment;
(6)Economic,social,andtourismdevelopment;
(7)Educationalpolicies;
(8)Preservationanddevelopmentoftheculturalheritage;and
(9)Suchothermattersasmaybeauthorizedbylawforthepromotionofthegeneralwelfareof
thepeopleoftheregion.

Id.,Sec.21.Thepreservationofpeaceandorderwithintheregionshallbetheresponsibilityof
thelocalpoliceagencieswhichshallbeorganized,maintained,supervised,andutilizedinaccordancewith
applicable laws. The defense and security of the region shall be the responsibility of the National
Government.

c.GeneralsupervisionbythePresident

Art. X, Sec. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to
ensurethatlawsarefaithfullyexecuted.

LegalSuccession

Benitov.COMELEC,235SCRA436

F: Petitioner Benito and deceased Ogca were candidates for mayor in the mun. of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur.
COMELECDeputy(Makinug)forthatareafiledapetitionfordisqualificationagainstOgcaallegingthataton4/28/92,
whileinsideabilliardhall,Ogcaaskedhimtoworkfortheformer'sreelection.However,whenMakinugrefused,Ogca
struckhimontheheadw/abilliardcue.Subsequently,theRegionalElectionDirectorofCotabatoCityissuedaresolution
statingthattherewasaprimafaciecaseagainstOgcaandthelatterwasprobablyguiltyofthechargesinthepetitionfor
disqualification.Thereafter,nothingmorewasheardofthepetition.Thereafter,theelectionswereheld,w/Ogcareceiving
thehighestnumberofvotesforthemayoraltyposition.xxx[O]n5/20/92,Ogcawaskilledinanambush.Onthesame
date,petitioner,probablynotawareofhisopponent'sdeathfiledamotiontosuspendtheprocl.ofOgcaaselectedmayorof
Balabagan,contendingthattherewasstrongevidenceofguiltagainsthiminthedisqualificationcase. Themotionwas
denied.xxx
TheMunicipalBoardofCanvasserswhenaskedtoexcludefromtallying,countingandcanvassingallvotesfor
andinthenameofthedeceasedmayoraltycandidateruledinfavoroftheprayer. xxx On6/30/92,theMun.Bd.of
CanvassersproclaimedpetitionerBenitoasthedulyelectedmayorofthemunicipalityofBalabagan.

HELD:Theprocl.ofpetitionerBenitowasnotavalidprocl.Itappearsfromtherecordthatduringthe5/11/92
elections,thedeceasedOgcaobtainedatotalvoteof3,699asagainstpetitioner's2,644.Thereupon,itwasthe
dutyoftheMun.Bd.ofCanvasserstoproclaimaswinnerthecandidatewhoobtainedthehighestnumberof
votes. However,theMun.Bd.ofCanvassers,insteadofperformingwhatwasincumbentuponit,thatis,to
proclaimOgcaaswinnerbutw/theinfo.thathedied,togivewaytolegalsuccessiontooffice,wentonto
proclaimhereinpetitioner.Thiscannotbecountenanced.
xxx
Thefactthatthecandidatewhoobtainedthehighestnumberofvotesdies,orislaterdeclaredtobe
disqualifiedornoteligiblefortheofficetow/chewaselecteddoesnotnecessarilyentitlethecandidatewho
obtainedthe2ndhighestnumberofvotestobedeclaredthewinneroftheelectiveoffice. Fortoallowthe
defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the mayoralty despite his rejection by the electorate is to
disenfranchise the electorate w/o anyfault on their part and to undermine the importance and meaning of
democracyandthepeople'srighttoelectofficialsoftheirchoice.RAM.

IV.ACCOUNTABILITYOFPUBLICOFFICERS

A.PublicOfficeisapublictrust

Art.XI,Sec.1.PublicOfficeisapublictrust.PublicOfficersandemployeesmust,atalltimes,
beaccountabletothepeople,servethemwithutmostresponsibility,integrity,loyaltyandefficiency,act
withpatriotismandjustice,andleadmodestlives.

N.B.LocalGovernmentCodeof1991,Sec.40(f)andSec.60(g)[reelectivelocalofficialswhoapplyfor
foreigncitizenshiporpermanentresidenceinforeigncountries.

Sec.40. Disqualifications. Thefollowingpersonsaredisqualifiedfromrunningforanyelectivelocal


position:
xxx
(f) Permanentresidentsinaforeigncountryorthosewhohaveacquiredtherighttoresideabroadand
continuetoavailofthesamerightaftertheeffectivityofthisCodexxx
Sec.60. GroundsforDisciplinaryAction. Anelectivelocalofficialmaybedisciplined,suspended,or
removedfromofficeonanyofthefollowinggrounds:
xxx
(g) Applicationfor,oracquisitionof,foreigncitizenshiporresidenceorthestatusofanimmigrantof
anothercountryxxx

Art.IX,B,Sec.4.Allpublicofficersandemployeesshalltakeanoathoraffirmationtouphold
anddefendthisConstitution.

SeeCodeofConductandEthicalStandardsforPublicOfficialsandEmployees(Rep.Act6713,effectiveMarch
25,1989)

B.DisclosureofAssets,LiabilitiesandNetWorth

Art. XI, Sec. 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often
thereafterasmayberequiredbylaw,submitadeclarationunderoathofhisassets,liabilities,andnet
worth. In the case of the President, VicePresident, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the
Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices, and officers of the
armedforceswithgeneralorflagrank,thedeclarationshallbedisclosedtothepublicinthemanner
providedbylaw.

C.BanonFinancialAccommodations

Art.XI,Sec.16. Noloan,guaranty,orotherformoffinancialaccommodationforanybusiness
purposemaybegranted,directlyorindirectly,byanygovernmentownedorcontrolledbankorfinancial
institutiontothePresident,theVicePresident,theMembersoftheCabinet,theCongress,theSupreme
Court,andtheConstitutionalCommissions,theOmbudsman,ortoanyfirmorentityinwhichtheyhave
controllinginterest,duringtheirtenure.

D.AgenciesforInsuringPublicAccountability

1.CongressImpeachment

Cruz,PhilippinePoliticalLaw:Impeachmenthasbeendefinedasamethodofnationalinquestintotheconduct
ofpublicmen.Corwindescribesitas"themostformidableweaponinthearsenalofdemocracy.xxx[I]tisan
extraordinarymeansofremovalexercisedbythelegislatureoveraselectednumberofofficials,thepurpose
beingtoensurethehighestcareintheirindictmentandconvictionandtheimpositionofspecialpenaltiesincase
ofafindingofguilt,takingintoaccountthedegreeofnatureoftheoffensecommittedandthehighstatusofthe
wrongdoers.

Art.XI,Sec.2.ThePresident,theVicePresident,theMembersoftheSupremeCourt,the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on
impeachmentfor,andconvictionof,culpableviolationoftheConstitution,treason,bribery,graftand
corruption,otherhighcrimes,orbetrayalorpublictrust.Allotherpublicofficersandemployeesmaybe
removedfromofficeasprovidedbylaw,butnotbyimpeachment.

Art.XI,Sec.3. (1) TheHouseofRepresentativesshallhavetheexclusivepowertoinitiateall


casesofimpeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
RepresentativesorbyanycitizenuponresolutionofendorsementbyanyMemberthereof,whichshallbe
includedintheOrderofBusinesswithintensessiondays,andreferredtotheproperCommitteewithin
threesessiondaysthereafter.TheCommittee,afterhearing,andbyamajorityvoteofallitsMembers,
shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the
correspondingresolution.TheresolutionshallbecalendaredforconsiderationbytheHousewithinten
sessiondaysfromreceiptthereof.
(3)AvoteofatleastonethirdofalltheMembersoftheHouseshallbenecessaryeithertoaffirm
a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary
resolution.ThevoteofeachMembershallberecorded.
(4)Incasetheverifiedcomplaintorresolutionofimpeachmentisfiledbyatleastonethirdofall
theMembersoftheHouse,thesameshallconstitutetheArticlesofImpeachment,andtrialbytheSenate
shallforthwithproceed.
(5)Noimpeachmentproceedingsshallbeinitiatedagainstthesameofficialmorethanoncewithin
aperiodofoneyear.
(6)TheSenateshallhavethesolepowertotryanddecideallcasesofimpeachment.Whensitting
forthatpurpose,theSenatorsshallbeonoathoraffirmation.WhenthePresidentofthePhilippinesison
trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be
convictedwithouttheconcurrenceoftwothirdsofalltheMembersoftheSenate.
(7) Judgmentincasesofimpeachmentshallnotextendfurtherthanremovalfromofficeand
disqualificationtoholdanyofficeundertheRepublicofthePhilippines,butthepartyconvictedshall
neverthelessbeliableandsubjecttoprosecution,trial,andpunishmentaccordingtolaw.

Lecarozv.Sandiganbayan,128SCRA324(1988),supra.

ThebroadpoweroftheNewConsti.veststheresp.court(Sandiganbayan)withjurisdictionover"public
officers and employees, including those in govtowned or controlled corporations." there are, exceptions,
however,likeconstitutionalofficers,particularlythosedeclaredtoberemovablebyimpeachment.
Art. XIII, Sec. 2 of the 1973 Consti (now Art. XI, Sec. 2.) proscribes removal from office of the
constitutionalofficersmentionedtherein)byanyothermethod;otherwise,toallowapublicofficerwhomaybe
removedsolelybyimpeachmenttobechargedcriminallywhileholdinghisofficewithanoffensethatcarries
thepenaltyofremovalfromoffice,wouldbeviolativeoftheclearmandateofthefundamentallaw.
xxx
Judgmentincasesofimpeachmentshallbelimitedtoremovalfromofficeanddisqualificationtohold
anyofficeofhonor,trust,orprofitundertheRepublicofthePhils.,butthepartyconvictedshallneverthelessbe
liableandsubjecttoprosecution,trialandpunishment,inaccordancew/law.xxx[T]heeffectofimpeachment
islimitedtothelossofpositionanddisqualificationtoholdanyofficeofhonor,trust,orprofitunderthe
Republic. Itisequallymanifestthatthepartythusconvictedmaybeproceededagainst,triedandthereafter
punishedinaccordancew/law. Theclearimplicationis,thepartyconvictedintheimpeachmentproceeding
shallneverthelessbeliableandsubjecttoprosecution,trialandpunishmentaccordingtolaw;andthatifthe
samedoesnotresultinaconvictionandtheofficialisnottherebyremoved,thefilingofacriminalaction"in
accordancew/law"maynotprosper.RAM.

2.Sandiganbayan

Art. XI, Sec. 4. The present antigraft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to
functionandexerciseitsjurisdictionasnoworhereaftermaybeprovidedbylaw.

3.OmbudsmanknownasTanodbayan

Art.XI,Sec.5.ThereisherebycreatedtheindependentOfficeoftheOmbudsman,composedof
theOmbudsmantobeknownasTanodbayan,oneoverallDeputyandatleastoneDeputyeachforLuzon,
Visayas,andMindanao.AseparateDeputyforthemilitaryestablishmentmaylikewisebeappointed.

Id., Sec. 6. The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the Office of the Special
Prosecutor.Itshallcontinuetofunctionandexerciseitspowersasnoworhereaftermaybeprovidedby
law,exceptthoseconferredontheOfficeoftheOmbudsmancreatedunderthisConstitution.

Id.,Sec.8. TheOmbudsmanandhisDeputiesshallbenaturalborncitizensofthePhilippines,
andatthetimeoftheirappointment,atleastfortyyearsold,ofrecognizedprobityandindependence,and
members of the Philippine Bar, and must not have been candidates for any elective office in the
immediatelypreceding election. The Ombudsman must have for ten years or more been a judge or
engagedinthepracticeoflawinthePhilippines.
During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same disqualifications and prohibitions as
providedforinSection2ofArticleIXAofthisConstitution.
Id.,Sec.9.TheOmbudsmanandhisDeputiesshallbeappointedbythePresidentfromalistofat
leastsixnomineespreparedbytheJudicialandBarCouncil,andfromalistofthreenomineesforevery
vacancythereafter.Suchappointmentsshallrequirenoconfirmation.Allvacanciesshallbefilledwithin
threemonthsaftertheyoccur.

Id.,Sec.10.TheOmbudsmanandhisDeputiesshallhavetherankofChairmanandMembers,
respectively,oftheConstitutionalCommissions,andtheyshallreceivethesamesalary,whichshallnotbe
decreasedduringtheirtermofoffice.

Id., Sec.11. TheOmbudsmanandhisDeputies shallserveforatermofsevenyearswithout


reappointment.Theyshallnotbequalifiedtorunforanyofficeintheelectionimmediatelysucceeding
theircessationfromoffice.

Id.,Sec.12.TheOmbudsmanandhisDeputies,asprotectorsofthepeople,shallactpromptlyon
complaintsfiledinanyformormanneragainstpublicofficialsoremployeesofthegovernment,orany
subdivision,agencyorinstrumentalitythereof,includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporations
andshall,inappropriatecases,notifythecomplainantsoftheactiontakenandtheresultthereof.

Id.,Sec.13.TheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanshallhavethefollowingpowers,functions,duties:
(1) Investigateonitsownoroncomplaintanyactoromissionofanypublicofficial,employee,
officeoragency,whensuchactoromissionappearstobeillegal,unjust,improper,orinefficient
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the
Government,oranysubdivision,agencyorinstrumentalitythereof,aswellasofanygovernmentowned
orcontrolledcorporationwithoriginalcharter;toperformandexpediteanyactordutyrequiredbylaw,
ortostop,prevent,andcorrectanyabuseorimproprietyintheperformanceofduties.
(3)Directtheofficerconcernedtotakeappropriateactionagainstapublicofficialoremployeeat
fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure
compliancetherewith.
(4)Directtheofficerconcernedinanyappropriatecase,andsubjecttosuchlimitationsasmaybe
providedbylaw,tofurnishitwithcopiesofdocumentsrelatingtocontractsortransactionsenteredinto
byhisofficeinvolvingdisbursementoruseofpublicfundsorproperties,andreportanyirregularityto
theCommissiononAuditforappropriateaction.
(5)Requestanygovernmentagencyforassistanceandinformationnecessaryinthedischargeof
itsresponsibilities,andtoexamine,ifnecessary,pertinentrecordsanddocuments.
(6) Publicizematterscoveredbyitsinvestigationwhencircumstancessowarrantandwithdue
prudence.
(7)Determinethecausesofinefficiency,redtape,mismanagement,fraudandcorruptioninthe
Governmentandmakerecommendationsfortheireliminationandtheobservanceofhighstandardsof
ethicsandefficiency.
(8)Promulgateitsrulesofprocedureandexercisesuchotherpowersorperformsuchfunctionsor
dutiesasmaybeprovidedbylaw.

Id., Sec.14. TheOffice ofthe Ombudsmanshallenjoy fiscal autonomy. Its approved annual
appropriationsshallbeautomaticallyandregularlyrelease.

4.OfficeofSpecialProsecutor

Id., Sec. 7. The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the Office of the Special
Prosecutor.Itshallcontinuetofunctionandexerciseitspowersasnoworhereaftermaybeprovidedby
law,exceptthoseconferredontheOfficeoftheOmbudsmancreatedunderthisConstitution.

Zaldivarv.Sandiganbayan,160SCRA843(1988)andResolution,May19,1988

F: Petitioner,governorofAntique,filedapetitionforcertiorari,prohibitionandmandamustorestrainthe
Sandiganbayan&TanodbayanRaulGonzalesfromproceedingwiththeprosecution&hearingofcriminalcases
againsthimonthegroundthatsaidcaseswerefiledbytheTanodbayanw/olegal&constitutionalauthority
since under the 1987 Consti., it is only the Ombudsman who has the authority to file cases with the
Sandiganbayan.

HELD: (1) Wefindthepetitionsimpressedw/merit. UnderArt.XI,Sec.13,par.1oftheConsti.,the


Ombudsman(asdistinguishedw/theincumbentTB)ischargedw/thedutyto:

"Investigateonitsown,oroncomplaintbyanyperson,anyactoromissionofanypublicofficial,employee,office
oragency,whensuchactoromissionappearstobeillegal,unjust,improperorinefficient."

Ontheotherhand,Art.XI,Sec.7oftheConsti.providesthat

"TheexistingTanodbayanshallhereafterbeknownastheOfficeoftheSpecialProsecutor.Itshallcontinueto
functionandexerciseitspowersasnoworhereaftermaybeprovidedbylaw,exceptthoseconferredontheOfficeofthe
OmbudsmancreatedunderthisConstitution."

Now,then,inasmuchastheaforementioneddutyisgiventotheOmbudsman,theincumbentTB(now
calledSp.Pros.)isclearlywithoutauthoritytoconductprel.investigationsandtodirectthefilingofcrim.cases,
exceptuponordersoftheOmbudsman.ThisrighttodosowaslosteffectiveFeb.2,1987
ResolutionontheMotionforReconsideration,May19,1988

(1) Thepowerofinvestigationconferred ontheOmbudsman coversbothadministrativeand crim.


offenses.Accordingly,theSpPros.cannotclaimthatheretainsthespecificpowerofprel.investigationwhile
concedingthegeneralpowerofinvestigationtotheOmbudsman.Thegreaterpowerembracesthelesser.

(2)Thefactthattheinformationsfiledbytheresp.fromFeb.2,1987,wereinvalidbec.theywerenot
authorizedbytheOmbudsman,isnotajurisdictionaldefect.TheInformationscouldhavebeenchallengedina
motiontoquashunderR117,ROConthegroundoflackofauthorityonthepartoftheofficerfilingthesame.
Ifthisgroundwasnotinvoked,itisdeemedwaivedunderSec.8ofthesameRule.xxx
Atanyrate,tosettlethisquestion,weherebyrulethatthedecisionofthisCourtinthiscaseshallbe
givenprospectiveapplicationonlyfromApril27,1988.xxx
To recapitulate, the Court holds that, in the interest of justice, its ruling in 4/27/88 shall apply
prospectivelytocasesfiledinCourtpriortosaidresolutionandpendingtrialnortoconvictionsoracquittals
pronouncedtherein.Theexceptioniswheretherehasbeenatimelyobjectionandaspecificchallenge,asinthis
case, where the Court ordered the nullification of the Info. filed for lack of authority on the part of resp.
Gonzales.VV.

5.CivilServiceCommission(asaddedbyProf.Barlongay)

UPDATED1/16/96
RAM

V.THENATIONALECONOMYANDPATRIMONY

A.Goal

Art. XII, Sec. 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of
opportunities,incomeandwealth;asustainedincreaseintheamountofgoodsandservicesproducedby
thenationforthebenefitofthepeople;andanexpandingproductivityasthekeytoraisingthequalityof
lifeforall,especiallytheunderprivileged.
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural
development andagrarian reform, throughindustriesthat makefull andefficient use of humanand
naturalresources,andwhicharecompetitiveinbothdomesticandforeignmarkets.However,theState
shallprotectFilipinoenterprisesagainstunfairforeigncompetitionandtradepractices.
Inthepursuitofthesegoals,allsectorsoftheeconomyandallregionsofthecountryshallbe
givenoptimumopportunitytodevelop. Privateenterprises,includingcorporations,cooperatives,and
similarcollectiveorganizations,shallbeencouragedtobroadenthebaseoftheirownership.

IIBernas:ThreebasicdirectionsmaybegleanedfromSec.1:(1)itsetsthegoalofdynamicproductivityand
a more equitable distribution of what is produced; (2) it seeks complementarity bet. industrialization and
agriculturaldevt;(3)itisprotectiveofthingsFilipino.xxx

Industrializationandfullemploymentbasedonsoundagriculturaldevelopmentandagrarianreform.
What is envisioned by the provision is not necessarily agriculturallyrelated industrialization but rather
industrializationthatistheresultofreleasinglockedupcapitalthroughagrarianreform. xxx Moreover,the
policydoesnotmeanahardboundrulethatagriculturaldevtmusthavepriorityoverindustrialization.Whatis
envisionedisaflexibleandrationalrelationshipbet.the2asdictatedbythecommongood.

Mirasolnotes:

Thegoalsofthenationaleconomyare:

(1)Amoreequitabledistributionofopportunities,income,andwealth.

(2)Asustainedincreasedbytheamountofgoodsandservicesproducedbythenationforthebenefitof
thepeople;and

(3) An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the
underprivileged.

B.NaturalResources

1.CitizenshipRequirement

Art.XII,Sec.2. Alllandsofthepublicdomain,waters,minerals,coal,petroleum,andother
mineraloils,allforcesofpotentialenergy,fisheries,forestsortimber,wildlife,floraandfauna,andother
naturalresourcesareownedbytheState. Withtheexceptionofagriculturallands,allothernatural
resourcesshallnotbealienated.Theexploration,development,andutilizationofnaturalresourcesshall
beunderthefullcontrolandsupervisionoftheState.TheStatemaydirectlyundertakesuchactivities,or
itmayenterintocoproduction,jointventure,orproductionsharingagreementswithFilipinocitizens,or
corporationsorassociationsatleastsixty percentum ofwhosecapitalisownedbysuchcitizens. Such
agreementsmaybeforaperiodnotexceedingtwentyfiveyears,renewablefornotmorethantwentyfive
years,andundersuchtermsandconditionsasmaybeprovidedbylaw. Incasesofwaterrightsfor
irrigation,watersupply,fisheries,orindustrialusesotherthanthedevelopmentofwaterpower,beneficial
usemaybethemeasureandlimitofthegrant.
TheStateshallprotectthenation'smarinewealthinitsarchipelagicwaters,territorialsea,and
exclusiveeconomiczone,andreserveitsuseandenjoymentexclusivelytoFilipinocitizens.
TheCongressmay,bylaw,allowsmallscaleutilizationofnaturalresourcesbyFilipinocitizens,as
wellascooperativefishfarming,withprioritytosubsistencefishermenandfishworkersinrivers,lakes,
bays,andlagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreignowned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance for largescale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals,
petroleum,andothermineraloilsaccordingtothegeneraltermsandconditionsprovidedbylaw,based
onrealcontributionstotheeconomicgrowthandgeneralwelfareofthecountry.Insuchagreements,the
Stateshallpromotethedevelopmentanduseoflocalscientificandtechnicalresources.
ThePresidentshallnotifytheCongressofeverycontractenteredintoinaccordancewiththis
provision,withinthirtydaysfromitsexecution.

II Bernas: If natural resources, except agricultural land, cannot be alienated, how can they be explored,
developedorutilized? xxxAdistinctionmustbemadebet.alienablelandsandinalienablelands. Alienable
landsmaybethesubjectoflease,andtherulesarefoundinSec.3.xxxInalienablelands,however,canonlybe
developedandutilizeddirectlybytheStateorinconjunctionw/qualifiedindividualsorcorps.through"co
production, joint venture, or productionsharing" and thus "full control and supervision of the State" is
preserved.
Howsoevernaturalresourcesmightbeexploitedordeveloped,therighttodosoisreservedfor"Filipino
citizens,orcorps.,orassociationsatleastsixtypercentumofwhosecapitalisownedbysuchcitizens

Id.,Sec.7.Saveincasesofhereditarysuccession,noprivatelandsshallbetransferredorconveyed
excepttoindividuals,corporations,orassociationsqualifiedtoacquireorholdlandsofthepublicdomain.

Takingintoaccounttherequirementsofconservation,ecology,anddevelopment, andsubjecttothe
requirementsofagrarianreform,theCongressshalldeterminebylaw,thesizeoflandsofthepublicdomain
whichmaybeacquired,developed,held,orleasedandtheconditionstherefor.

Exploration,Development,andUtilization

a.All(a)landsofthepublicdomain,(b)waters,(c)mineraloils,(d)allforcesofpotentialenergy,(e)
fisheries,(f)forestortimber,(g)wildlife,(h)floraandfauna,and(i)othernaturalresourcesareownedbythe
State.(ThisistheRegalianDoctrine.)

b.Allnaturalresources,withtheexceptionofagriculturallands,shallnotbealienated.

c.Theexploration,development,andutilizationornaturalresourcesshallbeunderthefullcontroland
supervisionoftheState(astheownerthereof.)
d.Insoexploring,developingorutilizingitsnaturalresources,theStatehastwooptions:

One,itmayundertakesuchactivitiesdirectly,or

Two,itmayenterinto(a)coproduction,(b)jointventure,or(c)productionsharingagreementwith
Filipinocitizens,orcorporationsorassociationswithatleast60%Filipinocapital.

In thecase ofthe second option, anysuch agreements aresubject tothe following limitations and
qualifications:

(A)AstoTermsandConditions

(i) Suchagreements(fortheexploration,developmentorutilizationofnaturalresourcesexcluding
waterrightsotherthanthedevelopmentofwaterpower)maybeforaperiodnotmorethan25years,andunder
suchtermsandconditionsasmaybeprovidedbylaw.

(ii)Butincasesofwaterrightsfor(a)irrigation,(b)watersupply,(c)fisheries,or(d)industrialuses
otherthanthedevelopmentofwaterpower.Beneficialusemaybethemeasureandlimitofthegrant.

(B)Astowhomaygrantwhatprivilegedtowhom

(i) TheStateshallprotectthenation's(marinewealthinitsarchipelagicwaters,territorialsea,and
exclusive economic zone, and shall reserve its use and enjoyment "exclusively" to Filipino citizens.
(Corporations,eventhoughownedbyFilipinosarenotincluded.)

WhoState

WhatMarineWealth

WhomFilipinoCitizensonly

(ii)TheCongressmay,bylaw,allowsmallscaleutilizationofnaturalresourcesbyFilipinocitizens.It
mayalsoallowcooperativefishfarmingwithprioritytosubsistencefishermenandfishworkersinrivers,lakes,
bays,andlagoons.

WhoCongress

Whatsmallscaleutilizationofthenaturalresources

WhomFilipinoCitizensonly

(iii) The President may enter into agreements with foreignowned corporations involving either
"technicalorfinancialassistance"for"largescale"exploration,developmentandutilizationof(a)minerals,(b)
petroleum,(c)othermineraloils,accordingtothegeneraltermsandconditionsprovidedbylaw.
Suchagreementsshall(i)bebasedon"real"contributionstoeconomicgrowthandthegeneralwelfare
ofthecountry,and(ii)promotethedevelopmentanduseoflocalscientificandtechnicalresources.

ThePresidentshallnotifytheCongressofeverycontractenteredintoinaccordancewiththisprovision
within30daysfromitsexecution.

WhoPresident

Whatminerals,petroleum,othermineraloils;

Whomforeignownedcorporations

Thisisreally"servicecontracts"overagain."Technically",thisprovision"falls"underthegeneralrule
thattheStatemayenterintocoproduction,jointventureorproductionsharingagreementsonlywhichFilipino
citizensor60%Filipinocorporations,sincewhatininvolvedhereisonly"technicalorfinancialassistance"for
the exploration, development and utilization of these specific natural resources, and not the exploration,
development,andutilizationthemselves.Inreality,however,itisanexceptiontothegeneralrule.

Notmorethan12hectaresthereofby(i)purchase,(ii)homesteador(iii)grant,(Art.XII,Sec.3,parI.)

ThemannerofacquiringalienablelandsofthepublicdomainisgovernedbyCom.ActNo.141(Public
LandAct),whichprescribes5waysofacquiringsuchlands.

Homestead

Thisisavailabletocitizens,atleast18yearsofage(orlessifaheadofthefamily)residentofthe
Philippines,andnottheownerof24(now12)hectaresinthePhilippines.

StepsforApplication:

One,theapplicationisfiledwiththeBureauofLands,uponpaymentofanominalfilingfee.

Two,theBureauofLandsconductsaninvestigationtofindoutifthelandisalienable,ifitisfreefrom
adverseclaimorbetterrightsofprioroccupants,ifthereispossessioninfact,andiftheapplicanthasthe
qualificationsoflaw.Areportisthenmade,whichisthebasisforan"orderofapproval'.

Three,uponapproval,theapplicantismadepracticallytheownershortoftitle.Itisconditionedonthe
following;(a)Thatheenterthelandwithin6monthsfromthedateofapproval,ifhehasnotyetdoneso;(b)
Thatwithin5years,hemustcultivateatleast20%ofthelandandmustestablishhisresidenceonthelandsitself
orinthemunicipalitywhereitislocatedand(c)Thatheprovescompliancewiththecultivationandresidence
requirementsaswellashisnonviolationoftheprovisionsofthelaw,throughaswornstatementknownasthe
"finalproofpaper".ThisissubmittedtotheBureauwhichthenconductsanocularinspectionandthensubmits
afinalreport.
Fourth,afavorablereportgivesrisetoan"orderofissuanceofapatent".Itisonlyatthispointwhenhis
titleisvested,evenifthepapertitleisnotyetinhisname,ortheapplicantisstillsingleatthispoint,oris
alreadyawidower,thepropertyiscapital.Ifheismarriedalready,itisconjugalproperty

PublicLands

Taking into account the requirements or conservation, ecology and development are subject to the
requirementsofagrarianreform,theCongressshalldetermine,bylaw,thesizeoflandsofthepublicdomain
whichmaybeacquired,developed,heldorleased,andtheconditionstherefore.(Art.XII,Sec.3,par2)

MarineWealth

TheStateshallprotectthenation'smarinewealthinitsarchipelagicwaters,territorialsea,andexecutive
economiczone.(Art.XII,Sec.2.par2.)

2.Classification,Size,andConditionsforGrantofPublicLands

Art.XII,Sec.3. Landsofthepublicdomainareclassifiedintoagricultural,forestortimber,
minerallands,andnationalparks.Agriculturallandsofthepublicdomainmaybefurtherclassifiedby
lawaccordingtotheusestowhichtheymaybedevoted.Alienablelandsofthepublicdomainshallbe
limitedtoagriculturallands. Privatecorporationsorassociationsmaynotholdsuchalienablelandsof
thepublicdomainexceptbylease,foraperiodnotexceedingtwentyfiveyears,renewablefornotmore
thantwentyfiveyears,andnottoexceedonethousandhectaresinarea.CitizensofthePhilippinesmay
leasenotmorethanfivehundredhectares,oracquirenotmorethantwelvehectaresthereofbypurchase,
homestead,orgrant.
Takingintoaccounttherequirementsofconservation,ecology,anddevelopment,andsubjectto
therequirementsofagrarianreform,theCongressshalldetermine,bylaw,thesizeoflandsofthepublic
domainwhichmaybeacquired,developed,held,orleasedandtheconditionsthereof.

IIBernas: ThefirstruleestablishedinSec.3isthatonlyagriculturallandsofthepublicdomainmaybe
alienated.
Thesecondruleisthatonlyqualifiedindividualsmayacquirealienablelandsofthepublicdomain.
The third rule establishes the size of the land w/c may be acquired by individuals or leased by
individualsorcorps.
ThefourthrulelimitsthediscretionofCongresstoopenpubliclandsforleaseoracquisition.

Disqualification of private corporations. One purpose of this constitutional prohibition is to equitably


diffuselandownershiportoencourageownercultivatorshipandeconomicfamilysizefarmsandtherebyprevent
therecurrenceofhugelandholdingsbycorps.orprivatepersons.Itwasalsoaimedagainstundueexploitation
ofourpubliclandsandnaturalresourcesbylargecorps.

xxx

Nocitizenshiplimitation?TheimpressionmightbegiventhatSec.3opensutilizationofalienablelandsto
foreignindividualsorforeigncorps.bec.Sec.3makesnomentionofcitizenshiprequirement. Butalienable
landsarepartofthenaturalresourcesandthegen.ruleontheutilizationofallnaturalresourcescanbefoundin
Sec.2. xxx Thus,theutilizationofalienablelandsisopenonlytothosequalifiedunderSec.2andinthe
mannerprescribedbySec.2.

MirasolNotes:

PublicLands

a.Classification

Landsofthepublicdomainareclassifiedintoagricultural,forestortimber,minerallands,andnational
parks.Agriculturallandsofthepublicdomainmaybefurtherclassifiedbylawaccordingtowhichtheymaybe
devoted.

b.Alienability

Withtheexceptionofagriculturallands,allothernaturalresourcesareownedbytheState.(Art.XII,
Sec.2)

Alienablelandsofthepublicdomainshallbelimitedtoagriculturallands.(Art.XII,Sec.3.)

Ifthepubliclandisnonalienablewhichisthecaseifitisforestortimber,mineralland,ornational
parks,thenitcannotbeheldbyanyone.Thegeneralruleonnaturalresourcesappliesandthatis,thattheState
canonlyenterintocoproduction,jointventuresorproductionsharingagreementswithFilipinocitizensor60%
Filipinoownedcorporationsfortheexploitation,developmentandutilizationoftheselands.

Butifthepubliclandisalienable,thatis,agricultural,thenitmaybeheldbyaprivateperson,naturalor
juridical,inaccordancewiththefollowingrules.

c.WhoMayHoldAlienableLandsofthePublicDomain

(i)Corporations:Lease

Privatecorporationorassociationsmaynotholdalienablelandsofthepublicdomainexceptbylease.

Limitations:
i.Period:Notmorethan25years,renewablefornotmorethan25years.

ii.Size:Nottoexceed1,000hectaresinarea.

Asworded,itwouldseemthatevenforeigncorporationsmaybecomethelesseesofalienablelandsof
thepublicdomain,because(Art.XII,Sec.3)doesnotspecifythe60%Filipinoownedrequirement. Itis
unlike the case for the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources other than public
agricultural lands, in which the Constitution specifies the ownership requirement. Whether this is a mere
oversightinavalidquestion,consideringthenationalistsintentoftheConstitution,ontheonehand,andthe
presenceofantinationalistfarmers,ontheotherhand.

(ii)FilipinoCitizens:AcquireorLease

CitizensofthePhilippinesmay(a)leasenomorethan500hectares,(subjecttothesameconditionsas
inFilipinocorporations)or(b)notmorethan12hectaresthereofbypurchase,homesteadorgrant.

SaleorPurchase

ThisisavailabletoFilipinocitizens,oflegalage,andnottheownerofmorethan12hectares.

The land is sold at public auction to the highest bidder, even if there are applications for sale or
purchase.Theapplicant,however,isgranted"preferentialrights"topurchasetheland,inthefollowingmanner.

Asealedbiddingisfirstconducted.Ifheisthehighestbidder,thelandisawardedtohim.Ifthereare2
ormorehighestbids,andthebidoftheapplicantisoneofthen,heispreferred.Iftheapplicant'sbidisnot
amongthehighest,thebiddingwasconvertedintoanopenbidding.

Intheopenbidding,ifthehighestbidisnotthatoftheapplicant,heisaskedneverthelessifhewantsto
watchthehighestbid.Ifhedoes,heisthenrequiredtopay10%oftheprice.

Theawardisconditionedonhisabilitytocultivate20%ofthelandwithin5years,andhispaymentof
the10%deposit,thebalanceofwhichispayablein10equalannualinstallments.Noresidenceisrequired.

Uponcompliancewiththeseconditions,heisthenentitledtoapatent.

AdministrativeLegalizationofImperfectTitle

Theapplicant"must(a)beanaturalborncitizen,(b)byhimselfofhispredecessorininteresthave
occupiedthelandandcultivateditsinceJuly4,1945(assetbytheParedesLawof1955)and(c)notbethe
ownerofmorethan24(now12)hectares.Thereisnoagerequirement.

Mostunregisteredlandsbelongtothiscategory:publiclandsbutwithimperfecttitledusuallyprovenby
taxdeclaration.Sincetheseareneitherpublicnorprivate,theoccupantsaregiventhechancetoperfecttheir
titleadministratively,afterwhichhecanapplytohavehistitleregistered.

JudicialConfirmationofImperfectorIncompleteTitle

Theapplicantmust(a)beaFilipinocitizen,(b)havebeeninopen,continuos,exclusive,andnotorious
possessionofpublicagriculturalland,underabonafideclaimoftitlesinceJune12,1945(originallyJuly26,
1894,Further,underR.A.1942,anapplicantwasentitledifhecouldprove30yearsofsuchoccupationpriorto
filing.ButthiswascutofftoJune12,1945byP.D.1073)

Thelaworiginallyallowedatotalgrantof144hectares,asagainstadministrativelegalizationwhich
granted24hectares.The1987Constitutionisdeemedtohavelimitedthisto12hectares.

Query:Maycorporationsacquirelandsofthepublicdomain?

Answer:Therulehasalwaysbeeninthenegative.However,therealissueiswhethercorporationscanbethe
transfereesoflandstowhichatransferorisentitledtoeitheranadministrativelegalizationofimperfecttitleora
judicialconfirmationofimperfectorincompletetitle,priortotheactualgrantthereofinaccordancewiththe
proceedingsrequiredbythePublicLandAct?Inotherwords,canthecorporationitselfmakeapplicationforthe
grantonthegroundthatwhenitacquiredthelandfromitspossessor,suchpossessortransferorifheappliedfor
agrantwouldhavequalifiedwithoutdoubt?

Underthepresentstateofjurisprudencein Director of Lands V. IAC and Acme Plywood and Veneer


Co...(Dec.1986),acaseinvolvingtheapplicationforconfirmationoftitlebyAcmewhichpossessedtheland
since1961,afteracquiringitfromtheDumagatsofIsabelawhointurnpossesseditsincetimeimmemorial,the
answerisintheaffirmative.

AccordingtotheSC,althoughacorporationcanonlyholdalienablepubliclandsbylease,itcanacquire
fromprivateindividualswhoarecitizensandhadbeeninopen,continuos,exclusiveandnotoriouspossession
ofalienable(oragricultural)publiclands,intheconceptofanownerforatleast30years.Whenitdoes,itdoes
notviolatetheConstitutionprovisionsincewhatitisacquiringisreallyalreadyaprivateland.

For an individual who has satisfied the requirements under sec. 48 (b) of the Public Land Act is
conclusivelypresumedtohaveperformedalltheactsneededforatitle,andisthusentitledtotheissuanceof
one.Thatindividualacquiresavestedrighttothepublicland,andso,byoperationoflaw,thelandisdeemed
isolatedfrompublicdomainandeffectivelybecomesprivateland.Thusthecorporationcanfilethetitleforthe
actualissuanceoftitleisbutamereformalitytotheperfectionofarightalreadypreviouslyacquired,accrued,
andvested,uponthecompletionofpossessionfor30years.Whenacorporationappliesforthetitle,itisnot
acquiringpubliclandsbutmerelyformalizingitsacquisitionofaprivateland.

Thisoverrulesthecaseof Meralco V. Castro Bartolome,114SCRA799(1982),acaseinvolving2


residentiallotsof65sq.metersinTanay,whichMeralcoboughtin1976fromonewho,byhimselfandhis
predecesssorsininterest,possessedthelandinsince1941.
Inthiscase,theSCruledthatiftheindividualinpossessionofthelandneglectedtoapplytothecourt
forconfirmationofimperfecttitle,andinthemeantimesoldthislandtoacorporation,thecorporationcannot
laterbringanactiontoconfirmtheimperfecttitle,becausethelandhasnotceasedtothepublic,andunderthe
lawaswellastheConstitution,corporationsmaynotacquirealienablepubliclands.

ThisalsooverrulesRepublicV.Villanueva,114SCRA675(1982),acaseinvolvingacorporationsole
(INK)whichappliedforjudicialconfirmationoftitleforalanditacquiredfromoneinpossessionfor30years.

Meralcov.CastroBartolome,114SCRA799(1982)

CorporationsMayLeaseButNotAcquirePublicLands

F: TheMeralco,adomesticcorp.,appliedfortheconfirmationofitstitleto2residentiallotsw/atotallandareaof
165sqm.locatedinTanay,Rizal,butitsapplicationwasdismissedonthegroundthatundertheConsti.(nowArt.XII,
sec.3),nopvt.corp.orasso.mayholdlandsofthepublicdomainexceptbyleasenottoexceed1,000hectares.Thelots
wereformerlypossessedbyO.Ramosin1941.TheyweresoldtoRafaelPiguingin'47andsoldbythelattertoMeralcoin
'76.Meralco'sapplic.wasfiledpursuanttosec.48(b)ofthePublicLandLaww/cprovidesthatFilipinocitizens,who"by
themselvesorthroughtheirpredecessorsininteresthavebeenincontinuous,exclusive,andnotoriouspossession,and
occupationofagriculturallandsofthepublicdomain,underabonafideclaimofownershipforatleast30yrs.immediately
precedingthefilingoftheapplicationforconfirmationoftitleexceptwhenpreventedbywarorforcemajeur.Theseshall
beconclusivelypresumedtohaveperformedalltheconditionsessentialtoaGovtgrantandshallbeentitledtoacert.of
titleundertheprovisionsofthischapter."

HELD:(1)Asbet.theStateandMeralco,thelandisstillpublicland.Itwouldceasetobepubliclandonly
upontheissuanceofthecert.oftitleunderSec.48(b)ofthePublicLandLaw.SinceMeralcoisajuridical
person,itisdisqualifiedtoapplyforitsregistration.TherulinginSusiv.Razon,48Phil424,totheeffectthat
anopen,continuousandadversepossessionofthelandfromtimeimmemorialconfersontheindividualandhis
precedessorininteresteffectivetitledoesnotapplyheresinceMeralcoanditspredecessorsininteresthavenot
beeninpossessionofthelandsincetimeimmemorial.
(2)TheargumentthatifMeralco'spredecessorininterestcanapplyunderSec.48(b),socanthecorp
dothesameinrepresentation,isuntenablebec.Meralco'spredecessorsininterestdidnotacquireavestedright
astheydidnotfileanapplic.,w/cisaconditionprecedent.VV.

Republicv.Villanueva,114SCRA875(1982)

ReligiousCorporationsAreDisqualifiedfromAcquiringPublicLands

F: On9/13/77,theIglesianiKristo(INK)appliedforregistrationof2lots,invokingtheprovisionsofthePublic
LandLaw:
Sec.48.ThefollowingdescribedcitizensofthePhils.,occupyingthelandsofthepublicdomainorclaimingto
ownanysuchlandsoraninteresttherein,butwhosetitleshavenotbeenperfectedorcompleted,mayapplytotheCFIof
theprovincewherethelandislocatedforconfirmationoftheirclaimsandtheissuanceofacert.oftitlethereforunderthe
LRA,towit...
"(b)Thosewhobythemselvesorthroughtheirpredecessorsininteresthavebeenincontinuous,exclusive,and
notoriouspossession,andoccupationofagriculturallandsofthepublicdomain,underabonafideclaimofownershipfor
atleast30yrs.immediatelyprecedingthefilingoftheapplicationforconfirmationoftitleexceptwhenpreventedbywaror
forcemajeur.TheseshallbeconclusivelypresumedtohaveperformedalltheconditionsessentialtoaGovtgrantandshall
beentitledtoacert.oftitleundertheprovisionsofthischapter."
FromthedecisionoftheCFIorderingregistrationofthe2lots,thegovtappealed.

HELD:TheINK,asacorp.soleorajuridicalperson,isdisqualifiedtoacquireorholdalienablelandsofthe
publicdomain,likethelotsinquestion,bec.oftheconsti.prohibitionmentionedandbec.thesaidchurchisnot
entitledtoavailitselfofthebenefitsofSec.48(b)w/cappliesonlytoFilipinocitizensofnaturalpersons.A
corp.solehasnonationality.
Thecontentionthatthe2lotsarepvt.lands,followingtherulelaiddowninSusiv.Razonisnotcorrect.
What was considered pvt. lands there was a parcel of land possessed by a Filipino citizen since time
immemorial.Thelotssoughttoberegisteredinthiscasedonotfallw/inthatcategory.Theyarestillpublic
lands.
"AlllandsthatwerenotacquiredfromtheGovt,eitherbypurchaseorbygrant,belongtothepublic
domain. Anexceptiontotherulewouldbeanylandthatshouldhavebeeninthepossession ofthesame
occupant and of his predecessorsininterest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the
presumptionthatthelandhadneverbeenpartofthepublicdomainorthatithadbeenapvt.prop.evenbef.the
Spanishconquest.VV.

DirectorofLandsv.IAC,146SCRA509(1986)

PublicLandsPossessedExclusivelyBecomesPrivateByMereLapseofatLeast30Years.

F: In1962,AcmePlywood&VeneerCo.,acquiredfrommembersoftheDumagattribeaparceloflandw/anareaof
481,390sq.m.,inMaconacon,Isabela.On7/17/81Acmeappliedfortheconfirmationofitsimperfecttitletotheland,on
thebasisofitspossessionfrom1962andthatoftheDumagatsandthelatter'sancestors,w/cwasfromtimeimmemorial.
TheCFIorderedtheregistrationofthelandinfavorofAcme.ItsdecisionwasaffirmedbytheIAC.However,theDirector
ofLandsappealedtotheSConthegroundthatundertheConsti.(nowArt.XII,Sec.3of)Acmecouldnotownlandsof
thepublicdomain.

HELD:TheCourtxxxisoftheview,andsoholds,thatthemajorityrulinginMeralcomustbereconsidered
andnolongerdeemedtobebindingprecedent. Thecorrectrule,asenunciatedinthelineofcasesalready
referredto,isthatalienablelandheldbyapossessor,personallyorthroughhispredecessorininterestopenly,
continuouslyandexclusivelyfortheprescribedstatutoryperiod(30yrs.underthePublicLandAct,asamended)
isconvertedtopvt.prop.bythemerelapseorcompletionofsaidperiod, ipsojure. Thelandsubjectofthis
appealwasalreadyprivatepropertyatthetimeitwasacquiredfromtheInfielsbyAcme. Acmeacquireda
registrabletitle,therebeingatthetimenoprohibitionagainstsaidcorp'sholdingorowningpvt.land.VV.

Republicv.CourtofAppeals,155SCRA344(1987)
F: Initsapplicationforregistrationbef.thetrialcourt,resp.CirculoBantayanoFoundation(CBF)allegedthatitis
theownerinfeesimpleorthroughapossessoryinfo.titleofaparceloflandincludingthebuildingsandimprovements
thereonsituatedatPoblacion,Bantayan,Cebuthroughpurchaseon12/5/74fromtheheirs(representedbyAnunciacion
Escario)ofthelatePedroEscario,Sr.,whointurninheritedsaidlandfromhisfatherMargarito;thatthesaidlandis
assessed for taxation purposes of P7,850 for 1978; that the same is occupied and possessed openly, continuously,
notoriouslyandpeacefullyintheconceptofownersformorethan40yrs.byapplicantanditspredecessorsininterest.
Petitioneropposedtheapplicationallegingthatpvt.resp.didnothavetitleinfeesimpleorimperfecttitletothe
landanditwasdisqualifiedunderthe1973Consti.,beingacorp.,toownlandsofthepublicdomain.xxxThetrialcourt
ruledinfavorofCBF.TheCAaffirmedthetrialcourt'sdecision.Hence,thispetitionforreview.

ISSUE:W/nprivateresp.isqualifiedunderthe1973orthe1987Consti.toacquireandsubsequentlyregisterin
itsnamethedisputedlot.

HELD:Itistruethatunderboththe1973and1987Consti,apvt.corp.(evenifadomesticone)cannotacquire
(andthereforecannotregister)landsofthepublicdomain,butinthepresentcase,thelandinvolved,atthetime
it was acquired by the corp. in 1974, was no longer part of the public domain; long years of exclusive,
continuous,andadversepossessionofthesamebyitspredecessorsininteresthadgivenownershipthereofipso
jure tosaidpredecessors,enablingthelattertoconveytitletosaidcorp. True,theCorp.'sacquisitionwasin
1974,orafterthe1973Constiwasalreadyineffect.Butthenasofthattime,thelandwasnolongerpublicland.
Itwasprivateland.RAM.

3.Conservationofforestlandsandnationalparks

Art.XII,Sec.4. TheCongressshall,assoonaspossibledeterminebylawthespecificlimitsof
forestlandsandnationalparks,markingclearlytheirboundariesontheground.Thereafter,suchforest
landsandnationalparksshallbeconservedandmaynotbeincreasednordecreaseexceptbylaw.The
Congressshallprovideforsuchperiodasitmaydetermine,measurestoprohibitlogginginendangered
forestsandwatershedareas.

4.Protectionofancestrallandsofindigenousculturalcommunities

Art.XII,Sec.5.TheState,subjecttotheprovisionsofthisConstitutionandnationaldevelopment
policiesandprograms,shallprotecttherightsofindigenousculturalcommunitiestotheirancestrallands
toensuretheireconomic,social,andculturalwellbeing.
TheCongressmayprovidefortheapplicabilityofcustomarylawsgoverningpropertytightsor
relationsindeterminingtheownershipandextentofancestraldomain.

IIBernas: TheancestrallandsreferredtoinSec.5includeboththoseoutsideantthoseinsideautonomous
regions.xxx
Thephrase"ancestraldomain"isabroaderconceptthan"ancestrallands."Theformerincludeslandnot
yetoccupied,suchasdeepforests,butw/cgenerallyisregardedasbelongingtoaculturalregion."Ancestral
lands"arethosew/chavebeensubjectedtooccupation.

C.PrivateLands

1.Citizenshiprequirement

Whomayacquireprivatelandsbytransferorconveyance?

Art.XII,Sec.7. Saveincasesofhereditarysuccession,noprivatelandsshallbetransferredor
conveyedexcepttoindividuals, corporations,or associations qualified toacquireor holdlandsofthe
publicdomain.

IIBernas: MayaFilipinoprivatecorp.acquireprivateland? Theanswermustbethatpvt.corps.canstill


acquireprivatelandsinceSec.7makescapacitytoacquireprivatelanddependentoncapacityto"acquireor
holdlandsofthepublicdomain."Theprovisionusesthedisjunctive"or."Eithercapacitytoacquirelandsof
thepublicdomainorcapacityotherwisetoholdsuchlandconferscapacitytoacquireprivateland.

MirasolNotes:

Alienablelandsofthepublicdomainshallbelimitedtoagriculturallands. Privatecorporationsor
associationsmaynotholdsuchalienablelandsofthepublicdomainexceptbylease...CitizensofthePhilippines
maylease...oracquire...(Art.XII,Sec.3,par1.)

Notwithstandingtheprovisionsofsection7,anaturalborncitizenofthePhilippineswhohaslosthis
Philippinescitizenship,maybeatransfereeofprivatelands,subjecttolimitationsprovidedbylaw.(Art.XII,
Sec.8.)

As a general rule, the acquisition of private lands is limited to individuals or corporations (and
associationswhoarequalifiedtoacquireorholdslandofthepublicdomain).Theseare:

a. CitizensofthePhilippinesbecausetheyarequalifiedtobothacquireandleases(hold)alienable
landsundersec.3.

b."PrivateCorporations"becausetheyarequalifiedtoholdalienablepubliclandsundersec.3byway
oflease. Theissueiswhethertheterm"privatecorporation"islimitedto60%Filipinoownedcorporation,
whichshouldbetheintentoftheConstitution,asinthecaseofothernaturalresources.Ifnot,thenevenforeign
corporationscanpurchaseprivatelands,notonlyleasealienablepubliclands.

Allothers,includingaliens,cannotbethetransfereeorconveyeeorprivatelandsexcept:

a.Aliensincasesofhereditarysuccession(Art.XII,Sec.7.)Thisislimitedtocompulsoryandlegal
successionanddoesnotincludetestamentarysuccession,asruledinRamirezv.Ramirez.

b.AnaturalborncitizenwholosthisPhilippinecitizenship.(Art.XII,Sec.8.)Thelawprovidesthat
theymayownnotmorethan2lotsof1000sq.m.ifurbanor2000sq.m.ifrural.

Statusofcontractofsaleofprivatelandtothosewhoarenotqualifiedtoholdthem.

TherulingsoftheSContheissuecanbesummarizedthus:Althoughthesaleofprivatelandstoaliens
notallowedtoacquirethemisvoid,thevendororhissuccessorsininterestcannolongerseekrecoveryifinthe
meantimethelandhasfallenintothehandsofonewhoisnotdisqualifiedtoacquirethem.

LandSoldtoanAlienCannotbeRecoveredIfintheMeantimeHehadSoldIttoAFilipinoorHeHasBecomea
Citizen.

Godinesv.PakLuen,120SCRA223(1983)

F: JoseGodinessoldaparceloflandinJolotoFongPakLuen,aChinesecitizen.On1/11/63,PakLueninturnsold
thelandtoTrinidadS.Navato,aFilipino.On9/30/66,theheirsofGodinesbroughtsuittorecoverthelandontheground
thatthesaletoPakLuenwasnullandvoid. TheCFIdismissedthecaseonthegroundthattheactionhasprescribed.
Hence,thisappeal.

HELD: The Krivenko ruling that "under the Consti aliens may not acquire private or agricultural lands
includingresidentiallands"isadeclarationofanimperativeconstitutionalpolicy. Consequently,prescription
mayneverbeinvokedtodefendthatw/ctheConsti.prohibits.Butneithercanthevendororhisheirsrelyonan
argumentbasedonimprescriptibilitybec.thelandisnowinthehandsofaFilipinocitizen.Ifthebanonaliens
fromacquiringnotonlyagriculturalbutalsourbanlandsistopreservethenation'slandsforfuturegenerations
ofFilipino,thataimorpurposewouldnotbethwartedifinthemeantimethelandissoldtoFilipinocitizens.
xxx.VV.

Yapv.Grajeda,121SCRA244(1983)

F: OnApril12,1939,MaximoKicoexecutedadeedofabsoluteSaleinfavorofpet.,YapwhowastheaChinese
NationaloveraresidentiallotinAlbay.Afternearly15yearsfollowingthesale,YapwasadmittedasaFilipinoCitizen.
OnDec1,1967,pet.cededthemajorportionofthelottohissonwhowasalsoaFilipinocitizen.Resp.vendorsalmost30
yearsafterthesalefiledanactiontorecoverthesaidproperty.Thetrialcountorderedreconveyancedeclaringthesaleas
null&voidasbeingviolativeofSec.5Art.XIII1935Consti.beinganabsolute&unqualifiedprohibitionofAliens
acquiringpriv.agrilands.

ISSUE:WONtheconveyancewasvalidatedoritsvoidnaturealteredbythesubsequentnaturalizationofthe
vendor

HELD:YES.AsheldinSarosaVda.deBusabiav.Areneo(113SCRA547),themandatoryprovisionofthe
`35Consti.isanexpressionofpublicpolicytoconservelandsontheFilipinosxxx.Sincethelitigatedprop.is
nowinthebandsofanaturalizedFil.,heisnolongeradisqualifiedvendors. Asanaturalizedcitizen,heis
constitutionallyqualifiedtoownthesubjectproperty.Therewouldnolongerbeanypublicpolicytobeserved
inallowingrecoveryofpropinthebandofaqualifiedperson.
Further,asheldinVasquezv.LiSengGrap(96Phil.447),"xxxifthebanonaliensfromacquiringnot
onlyagriculturalbutalsourbanlandsxxxistopreservethenation'slandforfuturegenerationsofFilipinos,that
aimorpurposewouldnotbewastedbutachievedbymakinglawfultheacquisitionofrealestatebyalienswho
becameFilipinocitizensbynaturalization."Adapted.

Tejidov.Zamacoma,138SCRA78(1985)

F: Theappellantsbroughtanactionfortherecoveryof18parcelsoflandinLaCarlota,NegrosOcc.,claimingthat
theconveyanceofthelandsbytheirpredecessorsininterestwaybackink1926wasvoidbec.thepersontowhomthey
wereconveyed,thelatePedroUriarte,wasaSpanishcitizens.However,thetrialcourtdismissedthecaseontheground
thattheprohibitionin1935Consti.againstaliensholdingpublicorpvt.landsinthePhils.tookeffectonlyon11/15/35.
Hence,thisappeal.

HELD:Theappealhasnomerit.Bef.theeffectivityofthe1935Consti.,therewasnobanonaliensowning
privatelandsinthePhils.TheprohibitioninAct2874againstaliensappliedonlytopublicagriculturallandsor
landsofthepublicdomain.Art.III,Sec.5ofthe1935Consti.,w/cineffectprohibitedthetransferofpvt.lands
to aliens, cannot be retroactively applied to contracts in this case w/c was entered into bef. its effectivity,
otherwise,theappelleeswouldbedeprivedofpropertyw/odueprocessoflaw.Moreover,sincethelandsare
nowinthehandsofFilipinocitizens,thereisnopublicpolicytobeservedbyallowingtheappellantstorecover
thelands.VV.

Mossv.DirectorofLands,80SCRA269(1977)

RightsAcquiredbyAmericanCitizensundertheOriginalOrdinancetotheConstitutionDoNotLapse.

F: EugeneMoss&AlberCassidy,AmericannationalspurchasedatenhectareislandonJan.20,1945fromFilipino
vendors.InanactiontoquiettitlebyMossvs.Cassidy,MosswasadjudgedsoleownerinadecisiondatedMarch27,1962.
Hesubsequentlydeclaredthelandfortaxationpurpose&paidrealtytaxesthereon. OnApril3,1965Mossfiledon
applicationfortheregistrationofsaidlandw/cwasdeniedbytheTCT.holdingthatMoss,beinganAmericancitizen,was
disqualifiedtoacquirelandsundersec.5Art.XIII1935Consti,asheldinKrivenkov.Reg.ofdeeds.

ISSUE:WONMossisdisqualified.NO.

HELD: Whilealiensaredisqualifiedtoacquirelandsunderthe1935Consti.,citizensoftheUScanacquire
landslikeFil.citizens.Theordinanceappendedtothe1935Consti.byResolutionno.39oftheNat'lAssembly
datedSept.15,1939&approvedbythePres.oftheUSonNov.10,1939,providesthatcitizens&corps.ofthe
USshallenjoyintheCommonwealthofthePhils. Allthecivilrightsofthecitizens&corps.respectively,
thereof.ThisOrdinancewasmadepartofthe1935Consti.asdirectedbySec.2oftheTydingsMcDuffieLaw.
TheproclamationofPhil.Indep.onJuly4,1946didnotimpairMoss'proprietaryrts.overthesaidlandbec.the
1935Consti.providesthatuponproclamationofPhil.independence,"allexistingpropertyrightsofcitizensor
corps.oftheUSshallbeacknowledged,respected&safeguardedtothesameextentasprop.rights.ofcitizenof
thePhils.[sec.1(1)Art.XVII.]ThiswasimplementedonArt.VIoftheTreatyofGeneralrelationsbet.theUS
&thePhils.Adapted.

Republicv.Quasha,46SCRA160(1972)

UndertheParityAmendmenttoourConstitution,citizensoftheUnitedStatesandcorporationsandbusiness
enterprisesownedorcontrolled bythemcannotacquireandown,saveincasesofhereditarysuccession,
privateagriculturallandsinthePhilippinesandthatallotherrightsacquiredbythemundersaidamendment
willexpireon3July1974.

F: Quasha,anAmericancitizen,purchasedonNov.26,1954alandwithpermanentimprovementsthereon,atForbes
Park,Makati.OnMarch19,1968hefiledpetitionfordeclarationofhisrightsunderParityAmendmentbecauseofficialsof
Phil.Gov'tclaimedthatonexpirationofParityAmendmentonJuly3,1974,therightsacquiredbyUScitizensoverlands
willceaseandbeofnofurtherforceandeffect.QuashasoughtadeclarationofhisrightsundertheParityAmendment,
said pltff. contending that the ownership of properties during the effectivity of the Parity Amendment continues
notwithstandingtheterminationandeffectivityoftheAmendment.

ISSUE:WhatarerightsofQuasha,ifany,overtheland?

HELD:(1)UnderParityAmendment,QuashacouldnotacquireownershipofFobresParklandbecause"parity"
betweenFilipinosandAmericansreferredonlytotwomatters:
(a)disposition,exploitation,dev'tandutilizationofagricultural,timber,andminerallandsofthe
publicdomainandothernaturalresourcesofPhils.(Sec.1,Art.XIII'35Consti.)
(b)operationofpublicutilities(Sec.8,Art.XIV.)

xxx

NootherprovisionofourConsti.wasreferredtobythe"ParityAmendment";norSec.2ofArt.XIIIof
the1935Consti.limitingthemaximumareaofpublicagriculturallandsthatcouldbeheldbyindividualsor
corporationsorassociations;norSec.5restrictingthetransferorassignmentofprivateagriculturallandsto
thosequalifiedtoacquireorholdlandsofthepublicdomain(w/cundertheoriginalSec.1ofArt.XIImeant
Filipinos exclusively) save in cases of hereditary succession. these sections 2 and 5 were therefore left
untouchedandallowedtocontinueinoperationasoriginallyintendedbytheConsti.'sframers.

(2)Assumingownershipcouldbeacquired,allrightsconferredunderParityAmendmentweresubject
tooneandthesameresolutoryterm:theyaretolastduringeffectivityoftheExec.Agreemententeredintoon
July4,1946,butinnocasetoextendbeyondJuly3,1974.

(3)TherightofAmericanstoacquireprivateagriculturallandsinthePhilsvanishedwiththeadventof
theRepubliconJuly4,1946.Theonlyexceptionishereditarysuccession.Adapted.
Whenthecasewasdecidedin1972,theexpirationoftheParityRightshadnotyettakenplace. The
pronouncementofJBLReyesinthiscasewasovertakenbythe1973Constitutionwhichprovidedthat"therights
andprivilegesgrantedtocitizensorcorporationsownedbycitizensoftheU.S.undertheordinancesappended
tothe1935Constitution(grantingtocitizensandcorporationsoftheU.S.allthecivilrightsofthecitizensand
corporations,duringtheCommonwealthperiod)shallautomaticallyterminateonJuly3,1974.Titlestoprivate
landsacquiredbysuchpersonsbeforesuchdateshallbevalidasagainstprivatepersonsonly.(Art.XVII,Sec.
11.) (ThusonlytheStatecanquestionsuchtitles,AFilipinoisbarredfrombringingandactiontorecovera
privatelandhesoldtoanAmerican.)

QuashaandMossCompared. ThedifferencebetweenQuashaandMossisthatMossacquiredthe
privatelandduringtheCommonwealthperiod,andwasthusgovernedbytheoriginalOrdinanceappendedto
the1935Constitution,whileQuashaboughttheprivatelandin1954duringtheregimeoftheParityRights.

2.Exceptions

(a)AcquisitionbyLEGALSuccession

PD471

FIXINGAMAXIMUMPERIODFORTHEDURATIONOF
LEASESOFPRIVATELANDSTOALIENS

WHEREAS,theConstitutionbanstheacquisitionbyaliensandalienownedentitiesofpublicandprivatelands;
WHEREAS,leasesofunreasonablylongdurationwouldamounttoavirtualtransferofownershipinviolationof
theintentoftheConstitutionalprohibition;
WHEREAS,thereisacompellingneedtofixareasonablemaximumperiodforthedurationofleasesorprivate
landstoaliensandtoenforcecompliancethereofbypunishingviolations;
NOW,THEREFORE,I,FERDINANDE.MARCOS,PresidentofthePhilippines,byvirtueofthepowersvested
inmebytheConstitution,doherebyorderanddecree:

Sec.1. Themaximum periodallowableforthe durationofleasesorprivatelands toaliens or alienowned


corporations,associations,orentitiesnotqualifiedtoacquireprivatelandsinthePhilippinesshallbetwentyfiveyears,
renewableforanotherperiodoftwentyfiveyearsuponmutualagreementofbothlessorandlessee.

Sec.2.Anycontractoragreementmadeorexecutedinviolationofthisdecreeshallbenullandvoidabinitio,
andbothpartiestotheagreementshallbepunishedbyafineofnotlessthanfivehundrednormorethanonethousand
pesos,orbyimprisonmentoffromsix monthstooneyear,orbothinthediscretionofthecourt, Provided,thatthe
presidentormanagersanddirectorsortrusteesofcorporations,associationsorpartnershipsviolatingthisdecreeshallbe
criminallyliableinlieuthereof.

Sec.3.Thisdecreeshalltakeeffectimmediately.
DoneintheCityofManila,this24thdayofMay,intheyearofOurLord,nineteenhundredandseventyfour.

Ramirezv.Vda.deRamirez,111SCRA704(1982)

F: TheappellantsclaimthattheusufructoverrealpropertiesoftheestateinfavorofWanda,whowasanAustrian
livinginSpain,isvoidbec.itviolatestheconstitutionalprohibitionagainsttheacquisitionoflandsbyaliens.
TheCourtaquoupheldthevalidityoftheusufructgiventoWandaonthegroundthattheConsti.coversnotonly
successionbyoperationoflawbutalsotestamentarysuccession.

HELD:WeareoftheopinionthattheConstitutionalprovisionw/cenablesalienstoacquireprivatelandsdoes
notextendtotestamentarysuccessionforotherwisetheprohibitionwillbefornaughtandmeaningless. Any
alienwouldbeabletocircumventtheprohibitionbypayingmoneytoaPhil.landownerinexchangeforadevise
ofapieceofland.
Thisopinion,notwithstanding,weupholdtheusufructinfavorofWandabec.ausufruct,albeitareal
right,doesnotvesttitletothelandintheusufructuaryanditisthevestingoftitletolandinfavorofaliensw/cis
proscribedbytheConsti.RAM.

(b)AcquisitionbyformerNATURALBORNcitizens

Art.XII,Sec.8.NotwithstandingtheprovisionsofSection7ofthisArticle,anaturalborncitizen
ofthePhilippineswhohaslosthisPhilippinecitizenshipmaybeatransfereeofprivatelands,subjectto
limitationsprovidedbylaw.

BP185

BATASANGPAMBANSABLG.185

ANACTTOIMPLEMENTSECTIONFIFTEENOFARTICLEIVOFTHECONSTITUTIONANDFOROTHER
PURPOSES.

BeitenactedbytheBatasangPambansainsessionassembled:

Sec.1. InimplementationofSectionfifteenofArticleXIVoftheConstitution,anaturalborncitizenofthe
PhilippineswhohaslosthisPhilippinecitizenshipmaybeatransfereeofprivateland,forusebyhimashisresidence,
subjecttotheprovisionsofthisAct.

Sec.2.AnynaturalborncitizenofthePhilippineswhohaslosthisPhilippinecitizenshipandwhohasthelegal
capacitytoenterintoacontractunderPhilippinelawsmaybeatransfereeofaprivatelanduptoamaximumareaofone
thousandsquaremeters,inthecaseofurbanland,oronehectareinthecaseofruralland,tobeusedbyhimashis
residence.Inthecaseofmarriedcouples,oneofthemmayavailoftheprivilegehereingranted:Provided,Thatifboth
shallavailofthesame,thetotalareaacquiredshallnotexceedthemaximumhereinfixed.
Incasethetransfereealreadyownsurbanorrurallandsforresidentialpurposes,heshallstillbeentitledtobea
transfereeofadditionalurbanorrurallandsforresidentialpurposeswhich,whenaddedtothosealreadyownedbyhim,
shallnotexceedthemaximumareashereinauthorized.

Sec.3. AtransfereeunderthisActmayacquirenotmorethantwolotswhichshouldbesituatedindifferent
municipalitiesorcitiesanywhereinthePhilippines:Provided,Thatthetotalareathereofshallnotexceedonethousand
squaremetersinthecaseofurbanlandsoronehectareinthecaseofrurallandsforusebyhimashisresidence. A
transfereewhohasalreadyacquiredurbanlandshallbedisqualifiedfromacquiringruralland,andviceversa.

Sec.4.AsusedinthisAct

(a)AnaturalborncitizenisonewhoisacitizenofthePhilippinesfrombirthwithouthavingtoperformanyact
toacquireorperfecthisPhilippinecitizenship;

(b)Urbanareasshallinclude:

(1)Intheirentirety,allmunicipalcorporationswhich,whetherdesignatedascharteredcities,provincial
capitalsornot,haveapopulationdensityofatleast1,000personspersquarekilometer;

(2)Poblacionesorcentraldistrictsofmunicipalitiesandcitieswhichhaveapopulationdensityofatleast
500personspersquarekilometer;

(3)Poblacionesorcentraldistricts(notincludedin1and2)regardlessofpopulationsizewhicharethe
following:

(a)Streetpattern,i.e.,networkofstreetineitheratparallelorrightangleorientation;
(b) At least six establishments (commercial, manufacturing, recreational and/ or personal
services);and
(c)Atleastthreeofthefollowing:

1.Atownhall,churchorchapelwithreligiousservicesatleastonceamonth;
2.Apublicplaza,parkorcemetery;
3. Amarketplaceorbuildingwheretradingactivitiesarecarriedonatleastoncea
week;and
4.Apublicbuildinglikeaschool,hospital,puericultureandhealthcenterorlibrary.

(4)Barangayshavingatleast1,000inhabitantswhichmeettheconditionssetforthinsubparagraph(3)
orparagraph(b)above,andinwhichtheoccupationoftheinhabitantsispredominantlyotherthanfarmingor
fishing.

(c)AllotherareasofthePhilippineswhichdonotmeettheconditionsintheprecedingdefinitionofurbanareas
shallbeconsideredasruralareas.

Sec.5.TransferasamodeofacquisitionofprivatelandunderthisActreferstoeithervoluntaryorinvoluntary
sale,deviseordonation.Involuntarysalesshallincludetaxdelinquency,foreclosuresandexecutionsofjudgment.

Sec.6.Inadditiontotherequirementsprovidedforinotherlawsfortheregistrationoftitlestolands,noprivate
landshallbetransferredunderthisAct,unlessthetransfereeshallsubmittotheregisterofdeedsoftheprovinceorcity
wherethepropertyislocatedaswornstatementshowingthedateandplaceofhisbirth;thenamesandaddressesofhis
parents,ofhisspouseandchildren,ifany;thearea,thelocationandthemodeofacquisitionofhislandholdingsinthe
Philippines,ifany;hisintentiontoresidepermanentlyinthePhilippines,thedatehelosthisPhilippinecitizenshipandthe
countryofwhichheispresentlyacitizen;andsuchotherinformationasmayberequiredunderSection8ofthisAct.

Sec.7.ThetransfereeshallnotusethelandsacquiredunderthisActforanypurposeotherthanforhisresidence.
Violationsofthissection,anymisrepresentationintheswornstatementrequiredunderSection6hereof,anyacquisition
throughfraudulentmeans orfailuretoresidepermanentlyin thelandacquiredwithintwoyearsfrom theacquisition
thereof,exceptwhensuchfailureiscausedbyforcemajeure,shall,inadditiontoanyliabilityundertheRevisedPenalcode
anddeportationinappropriatecases,bepenalizedforforfeitureofsuchlandsandtheirimprovementstotheNational
Government.Forthispurpose,theSolicitorGeneralorhisrepresentativeshallinstituteescheatproceedings.
Anytransfereeliableunderthissectionshallmoreoverbeforeverbarredfromfurtheravailingoftheprivilege
grantedunderthisAct.

Sec.8.TheMinister(nowSecretary)ofJusticeshallissuesuchrulesandregulationsasmaybenecessarytocarry
outtheprovisionsofthisAct. Suchrulesandregulationsshalltakeeffectfifteendaysfollowingitspublicationina
newspaperofgeneralcirculationinthePhilippines.

Sec.9.IfanypartofthisActshallbedeclaredunconstitutional,theremainingprovisionsnottherebyaffected
shallremaininfullforceandeffect.

Sec.10.ThisActshalltakeeffectuponitsapproval.

Approved,March16,1982.

ReadRepublicv.CA,235SCRA567(1994)

3.AgrarianReform

Art.XIII,Sec.4.TheStateshall,bylaw,undertakeanagrarianreformprogramfoundedonthe
rightoffarmersandregularfarmworkers,whoarelandless,toowndirectlyorcollectivelythelandsthey
tillor,incaseofotherfarmworkers,toreceiveajustshareofthefruitsthereof. Tothisend,theState
shallencourageandundertakethejustdistributionofagriculturallands,subjecttosuchprioritiesand
reasonableretentionlimitsasCongressmayprescribe,takingintoaccountecological,developmental,or
equityconsiderations,andsubjecttothepaymentofjustcompensation.Indeterminingretentionlimits,
the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for
voluntarylandsharing.

Sec.5. TheStateshallrecognizetherightoffarmers,farmworkers,andlandowners,aswellas
cooperatives,andotherindependentfarmers'organizationstoparticipateintheplanning,organization,
and management of the program, and shall provide support to agriculture through appropriate
technologyandresearch,andadequatefinancial,production,marketing,andothersupportservices.

Sec. 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever
applicableinaccordancewithlaw,inthedispositionorutilizationofothernaturalresources,including
lands of the public domainunder lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights,
homesteadrightsofsmallsettlers,andtherightsofindigenouscommunitiestotheirancestrallands.
TheStatemayresettlelandlessfarmersandfarmworkersinitsownagriculturalestateswhich
shallbedistributedtotheminthemannerprovidedbylaw.

Sec.7.TheStateshallprotecttherightsofsubsistencefishermen,especiallyoflocalcommunities,
tothepreferentialuseofthecommunalmarineandfishingresources,bothinlandandoffshore.Itshall
provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial,
production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and
conservesuchresources.Theprotectionshallextendtooffshorefishinggroundsofsubsistencefishermen
againstforeignintrusion. Fishworkersshallreceiveajustsharefromtheirlaborintheutilizationof
marineandfishingresources.

Sec.8. TheStateshallprovideincentivestolandownerstoinvesttheproceedsoftheagrarian
reformprogramtopromoteindustrialization,employmentcreation,andprivatization ofpublicsector
enterprises. Financial instruments used as payment for their lands shall be honored as equity in
enterprisesoftheirchoice.

4.Urbanlandreformandhousing

Art.XIII,Sec.9.TheStateshallbylaw,andforthecommongood,undertakeincooperationwith
theprivatesector,acontinuingprogramofurbanlandreformandhousingwhichwillmakeavailableat
affordable cost, decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban
centersandresettlementareas.Itshallalsopromoteadequateemploymentopportunitiestosuchcitizens.
Intheimplementationofsuchprogram,theStateshallrespecttherightsofsmallpropertyowners.

Sec.10.Urbanorruralpoordwellersshallnotbeevictednortheirdwellingsdemolished,except
inaccordancewithlawandinajustandhumanemanner.
Noresettlement ofurbanorruraldwellersshallbeundertakenwithoutadequateconsultation
withthemandthecommunitieswheretheyaretoberelocated.

D.Leasetoforeignersofprivatelandsvalid
SmithBell&Co.v.RegisterofDeeds,96Phil53(1954)

E.DurationofLease

Article1643.Intheleaseofthings,oneofthepartiesbindshimselftogivetoanothertheenjoymentoruse
ofathingforapricecertain,andforaperiodwhichmaybedefiniteorindefinite.However,noleaseformorethan
ninetynineyearsshallbevalid.(NewCivilCode.)

F.Regulationofeconomicactivities

1.Rationale

SocialisticEconomy

Art.XII,Sec. 6. Theuseofproperty bearsa social function, andall economic agentsshall


contributetothecommongood. Individualsandprivategroups,includingcorporations,cooperatives,
and similar collective organizations shall have the right to own, establish, and operate economic
enterprises,subjecttothedutyoftheStatetopromotedistributivejusticeandtointervenewhenthe
commongoodsodemands.

The Constitution announces the policy of free enterprise tempered by state intervention when the
commongoodsorequires.Theeconomictheoryisoneinbetweenpurecapitalismandpuresocialism,witha
tendencytowardssocialism.

NationalisticEconomy

Art. XII, Sec. 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic
materials,andlocallyproducedgoods,andadoptmeasuresthathelpmakethemcompetitive.
Art.XII,Sec.13.TheStateshallpursueatradepolicythatservesthegeneralwelfareandutilizes
allformsandarrangementsofexchangeonthebasisofequalityandreciprocity.

2TheNEDAanddevelopmentprogram

ArticleXII,Sec.9.TheCongressmayestablishanindependenteconomicplanningagencyheaded
bythePresident,whichshall,afterconsultationswiththeappropriatepublicagencies,variousprivate
sectors,andlocalgovernmentunits,recommendtoCongress,andimplementcontinuingintegratedand
coordinatedprogramsandpoliciesfornationaldevelopment.
Until Congress provides otherwise, the National Economic and Development Authority shall
functionsastheindependentplanningagencyofthegovernment.

IIBernas: The1987Consti.hasmadethecreationoftheindependenteconomicplanningagencyoptional.
Commissioner Villegas explained that there was a consensus in the Committee that an economic planning
agency should not be constitutionalized since formal economic planning is not an indispensable part of
managingthenationaleconomy. xxx CommissionerMondsodaddedthat"ifwearegoingforlessgovtand
moreprivatesectorinitiative,lateronitmaynotbenecessarytohaveaplanningagency.

Sec.10.TheCongressshall,uponrecommendationoftheeconomicandplanningagency,when
thenationalinterestdictates,reservetocitizensofthePhilippinesortocorporationsorassociationsat
leastsixtypercentumofwhosecapitalisownedbysuchcitizens,orsuchhigherpercentageasCongress
mayprescribe,certainareasofinvestments.TheCongressshallenactmeasuresthatwillencouragethe
formationandoperationenterpriseswhosecapitaliswhollyownedbyFilipinos.
Inthegrantofrights,privilegesandconcessionscoveringthenationaleconomyandpatrimony,
theStateshallgivepreferencetoqualifiedFilipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national
jurisdictionandinaccordancewithitsnationalgoalsandpriorities.

3.Organizationandregulationofprivatecorporations

Art. XII, Sec. 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation,
organization,orregulationofprivatecorporations.Governmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsmay
becreatedorestablishedbyspecialchartersintheinterestofthecommongoodandsubjecttothetestof
economicviability.

IIBernas:ThepurposeofthefirstsentenceistoinsulateCongressagainstpressuresfromspecialinterests:"To
permitthelawmakingbodybyspeciallawtoprovidefortheorganizationorformationorregulationofpvt.
corps.,itwasbelievedxxx,wouldineffecttooffertoitthetemptationinmanycasestofavorcertaingroupsto
theprejudiceortotheprejudiceoftheinterestofthecountry.
4.Operationofpublicutilities

Art.XII,Sec.11.Nofranchise,certificate,oranyotherformofauthorizationfortheoperationof
apublicutilityshallbegrantedexcepttocitizensofthePhilippinesortocorporationsorassociations
organizedunderthelawsofthePhilippinesatleastsixtypercentumofwhosecapitalisownedbysuchciti
zens,norshallsuchfranchise,certificate,orauthorizationbeexclusiveincharacterorforalongerperiod
thanfiftyyears.Neithershallanysuchfranchiseorrightbegrantedexceptundertheconditionthatit
shallbesubjecttoamendment,alteration,orrepealbytheCongresswhenthecommongoodsorequires.
TheStateshallencourageequityparticipationinpublicutilitiesbythegeneralpublic.Theparticipation
of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their
proportionateshareinitscapital,andalltheexecutiveandmanagingofficersofsuchcorporationsor
associationmustbecitizensofthePhilippines.

IIBernas:Forthepurposeofthisprovision,acorp.orassociationisconsideredaFilipinoif:(1)itisorganized
underPhil.lawsand(2)atleast60%ofitscapitalisownedbyFilipinocitizens.
xxx
ItshouldbenotedxxxthattheConsti.doesnotprohibitthemereformationofapublicutilitycorp.w/o
therequiredproportionofFilipinocapital.xxxWhatitdoesprohibitisthegrantingofafranchiseorother
formofauthorizationfortheoperationofapublicutilityalreadyinexistencebutw/otherequisiteproportionof
Filipinocapital.

Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may,
duringtheemergencyandunderreasonabletermsprescribedbyit,temporarilytakeoverordirectthe
operationofanyprivatelyownedpublicutilityorbusinessaffectedwithpublicinterest.

5.OnMassMediaandAdvertisingIndustry

A.Policy

Art.XVI,Sec.10. TheStateshallprovidethepolicyenvironmentforthefulldevelopmentof
Filipinocapabilityandtheemergenceofcommunicationstructuressuitabletotheneedsandaspirations
ofthenationandthebalancedflowofinformationinto,outof,andacrossthecountry,inaccordancewith
apolicythatrespectsthefreedomofspeechandofthepress.

B.OwnershipandManagementofMassMedia

Sec.11.(1)Theownership andmanagementofmassmediashallbelimited tocitizens ofthe


Philippines,ortocorporations,cooperativesorassociations,whollyownedandmanagedbysuchcitizens.
TheCongressshallregulateorprohibitmonopoliesincommercialmassmediawhenthepublic
interestsorequires.Nocombinationsinrestraintoftradeorunfaircompetitionthereinshallbeallowed.
xxx

IIBernas: "Massmedia"inSec.11(1)includesradio,televisionandtheprintedmedia. Itdoesnotinclude


commercialtelecommunicationsw/caregovernedaspublicutilitiesunderArt.XII,Sec.11.

C.OwnershipofAdvertisingCompanies

Id., (2)Theadvertisingindustryisimpressedwithpublicinterest,andshallberegulatedbylaw
fortheprotectionofconsumersandthepromotionofthegeneralwelfare
OnlyFilipinocitizensorcorporationsatleastseventypercentumofthecapitalofwhichisowned
bysuchcitizensshallbeallowedtoengageintheadvertisingindustry.
Theparticipationofforeigninvestorsinthegoverningbodyofentitiesinsuchindustryshallbe
limitedtotheirproportionateshareinthecapitalthereof,andalltheexecutiveandmanagingofficersof
suchentitiesmustbecitizensofthePhilippines.

Art.XVIII,Sec.23.Advertisingentitiesaffectedbyparagraph(2),Section11ofArticleXVIof
thisConstitutionshallhavefiveyearsfromitsratificationtocomplyonagraduatedandproportionate
basiswiththeminimumFilipinoownershiprequirementtherein.

6.Practiceofprofessions

Art. XII,Sec. 14. Thesustained development ofa reservoir of national talents consisting of
Filipino scientists, entrepreneurs, professionals, managers, highlevel technical manpower and skilled
workersandcraftsmeninallfieldsshallbepromotedbytheState.TheStateshallencourageappropriate
technologyandregulateitstransferforthenationalbenefit.
ThepracticeofallprofessionsinthePhilippinesshallbelimitedtoFilipinocitizens,saveincases
prescribedbylaw.

7.Stateoperationofprivateenterprises

Art.XII,Sec.17.Intimesofnationalemergency,whenthepublicinterestsorequires,theState
may,duringtheemergencyandunderreasonabletermsprescribedbyit,temporarilytakeoverordirect
theoperationofanyprivatelyownedpublicutilityorbusinessaffectedwithpublicinterest.
Sec.18.TheStatemay,intheinterestofnationalwelfareordefense,establishandoperatevital
industries and, upon payment of just compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities and other
privateenterprisestobeoperatedbytheGovernment.

8.Monopolies,combinations,andunfaircompetition

Art.XII,Sec.19. TheStateshallregulateorprohibitmonopolieswhenthepublicinterestso
requires.Nocombinationsinrestraintoftradeorunfaircompetitionshallbeallowed.

PhilippinePortsAuthorityv.Mendoza,138SCRA632(1985)

F: In1977,thePPAadoptedapolicyofallowingonlyonearrastreoperatorforeveryportinthePhilippines.Incom
pliance with this policy, eleven operators at the Cebu City port merged into one corporation called United South
Dockhandler,Inc. However,otherarrastreoperatorsquestionedtheoneportoneoperatorpolicyandobtainedfromthe
resp.judgeofRTCaninjunctionagainsttheimplementationofthepolicy.PPAappealed.

HELD:(1)ThepowergrantedtoPPAunderPD857,Sec.6(2)(v)toprovideserviceswithintheportdistricts
includesthepowertoadoptthepolicyinquestion.AsheldinAngloFilTradingvLazaro,PPAhasdiscretionto
choosethestevedoringcontractorinaccordancewithreasonablestandards.

(2)ThegrantofpermittoonlyoneoperatordoesnotviolateArt.XIV,Sec.2(nowArt.XII,Sec.10)on
monopolies. Private monopolies are not necessarily prohibited. The use of the word "regulate" in the
Constitutionindicatesthatsomemonopolies,properlyregulatedmaybeallowed."Competitioncanbestregu
lateafreeeconomy.Likeallbasicbeliefs,howeverthatprinciplemustaccommodatehardpracticalexperience.
Thereareareaswhereforspecialreasonstheforceofcompetition,whenleftwhollyfree,mightoperatetoo
destructively tosafeguardthepublicinterest.Publicutilitiesareaninstanceofthatconsideration."(Oleck,
ModernCorporationLaw,Vol.IV,p.197).Inthecaseatbar,theareaaffectedismaritimetransportationinthe
portofCebu.TheoperationsthereofarrastreandstevedoringaffectnotonlythecityofCebu,theprincipalport
oftheSouth,butalsotheeconomyofthewholecountry. Anyprolongeddisjunctionoftheservicesbeing
renderedtherewillprejudicenotonlyinterislandbutalsointernationaltradeandcommerce.
PPA'spolicyofintegrationthroughcompulsorymergermaynotevenbeinthisinstanceconsideredas
promotingamonopolybecausethefactofthematteristhatactuallyUSDIiscomprisedoftheelevenport
servicecontractorswhichpreviouslyusedsaidport.
Petitiongranted.Ordersappealedfromarereversed.VV.

9.Money,bankingandcredit

Art.XII,Sec.20. TheCongressshallestablishanindependentcentralmonetaryauthority,the
membersofwhosegoverningboardmustbenaturalbornFilipinocitizens,ofknownprobity,integrity
andpatriotism,themajorityofwhomshallcomeformtheprivatesector.Theyshallalsobesubjectto
suchotherqualificationsanddisabilitiesasmaybeprescribedbylaw.Theauthorityshallprovidepolicy
directionintheareasofmoney,bankingandcredit.Itshallhavesupervisionovertheoperationsofbanks
andexercisesuchregulatorypowersasmaybeprovidedbylawovertheoperationsoffinancecompanies
andotherinstitutionsperformingsimilarfunctions.
Until the Congress otherwise provides, the Central Bank of the Philippines, operating under
existinglaws,shallfunctionasthecentralmonetaryauthority.

Sec. 21. Foreign loans may only be incurred in accordance with law and the regulation of
monetaryauthority. Informationonforeignloansobtainedorguaranteedbythegovernmentshallbe
madeavailabletothepublic.

10.Cooperatives

Art.XII,Sec.15. TheCongressshallcreateanagencytopromotetheviabilityandgrowthof
cooperativesasinstrumentsforsocialjusticeandeconomicdevelopment.

IIBernas:WhatiscontemplatedhereisalineagencyundertheOfficeofthePres.andoutsidethejurisdiction
oftheDAR.

UPDATED2/17/96
RAM

IV.SOCIALJUSTICEANDHUMANRIGHTS

A.SocialJusticeDefined

Art.XIII,Sec.1. TheCongressshallgivehighestprioritytotheenactment ofmeasuresthat


protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the
commongood.
Tothisend,thestateshallregulatetheacquisition,ownershipanddispositionofpropertyandits
increments.
Calalangv.Williams,70PHILS726(1940)

F: CANo.458authorizesDirectorofPublicWorkswiththeapprovaloftheSecretaryofPublicWorksandComms.
topromulgaterulesandregulationsforregulationandcontrolofuseandtrafficonnationalroads.TheDirector,with
approvalofSecretaryofPubWorksandComm,anduponrecommendationofNat'lTrafficCommission,issuedanorder
closingtoanimaldrawnvehiclescertainpartsofRizalAve.andRosarioStreet.Petitionerchallengesconstitutionalityof
theAct(andorder)asbeinganunduedelegationoflegislativepowers.

ISSUE:W/Nthereisunduedelegation

HELD:No.TheauthoritydelegatedtoDirectorandSecretaryisnottodeterminewhatpublicpolicydemands
butmerelytocarryoutthelegislativepolicylaiddownbytheNat'lAssembly,"topromotesafetransituponand
avoidobstructionon,roadsandstreetsdesignatedasnat'lroads"andtoclosethemtemporarilytoanyorall
classesofvehicles"whenevertheconditionoftheroadorthetrafficmakessuchactionnecessaryoradvisablein
thepublicconvenienceorinterest."Thedelegatedpower,ifatall,isnotthedeterminationofwhatthelaw
shouldbebutmerelytheascertainmentoffactsandcircumstancesonwhichtheapplicationofthelawistobe
predicated.Thisisanadministrativefunctionwhichmustdependondiscretionofanothergovtofficialtowhom
isconfidedthedutyofdeterminingwhetherthereisproperoccasiontoexecutethelaw.Buttheexerciseofsuch
discretioncannotbesaidasmakingthelaw.

ISSUE:W/Nthereisproperexerciseofpolicepower

HELD:Yes.TheActaimstopromotesafetransit,relieffromtrafficcongestionandtoavoidobstructionson
nat'lroadsintheinterestandconvenienceofthepublic.Publicwelfarethenliesatthebottomoftheenactment
ofthelawandthestate,inordertopromotethegeneralwelfare,mayinterferewithpersonalliberty,property,
businessandoccupations.

ISSUE: W/N, as averred by the petitioner, the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the
constitutionalpreceptregardingthepromotionofsocialjusticetoinsurethewellbeingandeconomicsecurityof
allthepeople.Adapted.

HELD:NO.Thepromotionofsocialjusticexxxistobeachievednotthroughamistakensympathytowards
anygivengroup.

"SocialJusticeis'neithercommunism,nordespotism,noratomism,noranarchy,'but
thehumanizationoflawsandtheequalizationofsocialandeconomicforcesbytheStatesothat
justiceinitsrationalandobjectivelysecularconceptionmayatleastbeapproximated.Social
justicemeansthepromotionofthewelfareofallthepeople,theadoptionbytheGovernmentof
measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the component elements of society,
throughthemaintenanceofapropereconomicandsocialequilibriumintheinterrelationsofthe
members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally
justifiable, or extraconstitutionally, the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governmentsonthetimehonoredprincipleofsaluspopuliestsupremalex."

B.AspectsofSocialJustice

1.Labor

Art.XII,Sec.3.TheStateshallaffordfullprotectiontolabor,localandoverseas,organizedand
unorganized,andpromotefullemploymentandequalityofemploymentopportunitiesforall.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to selforganization, collective bargaining and
negotiations,andpeacefulconcertedactivities,includingtherighttostrikeinaccordancewithlaw.They
shallbeentitledtosecurityoftenure,humaneconditionsofwork,andalivingwage. Theyshallalso
participateinpolicyanddecisionmakingprocessesaffectingtheirrightsandbenefitsasmaybeprovided
bylaw.
TheStateshallpromotetheprincipleofsharedresponsibilitybetweenworkersandemployersand
thepreferentialuseofvoluntarymodesinsettlingdisputes,includingconciliation,andshallenforcetheir
mutualcompliancetherewithtofosterindustrialpeace.
TheStateshallregulatetherelationsbetweenworkersandemployers,recognizingtherightof
labortoitsjustshareinthefruitsofproductionandtherightofenterprisestoreasonablereturnson
investments,andtoexpansionandgrowth.

2.Agrarianandnaturalresourcesreform

Art.XIII,Sec.4.TheStateshall,bylaw,undertakeanagrarianreformprogramfoundedonthe
rightoffarmersandregularfarmworkers,whoarelandless,toowndirectlyorcollectivelythelandsthey
tillor,inthecaseofotherfarmworkers,toreceiveajustshareofthefruitsthereof.Tothisend,theState
shallencourageandundertakethejustdistributionofallagriculturallands,subjecttosuchprioritiesand
reasonableretentionlimitsastheCongressmayprescribe,takingintoaccountecological,developmental,
orequity considerations, andsubjecttothepayment ofjustcompensation. Indeterminingretention
limits,theStateshallrespecttherightsofsmalllandowners.TheStateshallfurtherprovideincentivesfor
voluntarylandsharing.

Sec.5. TheStateshallrecognizetherightoffarmers,farmworkers,andlandowners,aswellas
cooperatives,andotherindependentfarmers'organizationstoparticipateintheplanning,organization,
and management of the program, and shall provide support to agriculture through appropriate
technologyandresearch,andadequatefinancialproduction,marketing,andothersupportservices.

Sec. 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever
applicableinaccordancewithlaw,inthedispositionorutilizationofothernaturalresources,including
lands of the public domainunder lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights,
homesteadrightsofsmallsettlers,andtherightsofindigenouscommunitiestotheirancestrallands.
TheStatemayresettlelandlessfarmersandfarmworkersinitsownagriculturalestateswhich
shallbedistributedtotheminthemannerprovidedbylaw.

Sec.7.TheStateshallprotecttherightsofsubsistencefishermen,especiallyoflocalcommunities,
tothepreferentialuseofthecommunalmarineandfishingresources,bothinlandandoffshore.Itshall
provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial,
production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect, develop and
conservesuchresources.Theprotectionshallextendtooffshorefishinggroundsofsubsistencefishermen
againstforeignintrusion. Fishworkersshallreceiveajustsharefromtheirlaborintheutilizationof
marineandfishingresources.

Sec.8. TheStateshallprovideincentivestolandownerstoinvesttheproceedsoftheagrarian
reformprogramtopromoteindustrialization,employmentcreation,andprivatization ofpublicsector
enterprises. Financial instruments used as payment for their lands shall be honored as equity in
enterprisesoftheirchoice.

SeeComprehensiveAgrarianReformLawof1988(RepublicActNo.6657andExecutiveOrderNo.229,July
22,1987.)
AssociationofSmallLandownersofthePhilippinesv.SecretaryofAgrarianReform,175SCRA343(1989)

F: PDNo.27waspromulgatedalongwithmartiallawtoprovideforthecompulsoryacquisitionofprivatelandsfor
distributionamongtenantfarmersandtospecifymaximumretentionlimitsforlandowners.
OnJuly17,1987,Pres.AquinoissuedEONo.228declaringfulllandownershipinfavorofthebeneficiariesofPD
27andprovidingforthevaluationofstillunvaluedlandscoveredbythedecreeaswellasthemanneroftheirpayment.
This was followed by Proclamation No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program, and EO No. 229
providingthemechanicsforitsimplementation.

Subsequently,afteritsformalorganization,CongressenactedRA6657knownastheComprehensiveAgrarian
Reform Law. This law gives the previous enactments suppletory effects inosfar as they are not inconsistent with its
provisions.
These4casesareconsolidatedquestioningtheconstitutionalityoftheabovelaws.

ISSUE:Thedoctrineofjudicialsupremacy.

HELD:Althoughregardedastheweakestofthe3departmentsofthegovt,thejudiciaryisnonethelessvested
with the power to annul the acts of either legislative or executive or both when not conformable to the
fundamentallaw.Thisisthereasonforthesocalledjudicialsupremacy.xxxThedoctrineofseparationof
powersimposesuponthecourtsaproperrestraint,bornofthenatureoftheirfunctionsandoftheirrespectfor
theotherdepartments,instrikingdowntheactsofthelegislativeandtheexecutiveasunconstitutional.xxxThe
theoryisthatbeforetheactwasdoneorthelawwasenacted,earneststudiesweremadebyCongressorthe
President,orboth,toinsurethattheConstitutionwouldnotbebreached.

ISSUE:Essentialrequisitesofajudicialinquiryintoaconstitutionalquestion.
HELD:Theremustbeanactualcaseorcontroversyinvolvingaconflictoflegalrightssusceptibleofjudicial
determination; the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party; and the
resolutionofthequestionisunavoidablynecessarytothedecisionofthecaseitself.Alltheserequirementswere
metinthiscase.

ISSUE:ThepowerofPres.AquinotopromulgateProcl.No.131andEO's228and229.

HELD:Suchpowerwasauthorizedundersec.6oftheTransitoryProvisionsofthe1987Constitution.Thesaid
measureswereissuedbyPres.AquinobeforeCongresswasformallyconvenedandtookoverlegislativepower
fromher.Astatutedoesnotipsofactobecomeinoperativesimplybecauseofthedissolutionofthelegislature
thatenactedit.Bythesametoken,Pres.Aquino'slossoflegislativepowerdidnothavetheeffectofinvalidating
allthemeasuresenactedbyherwhenandaslongasshepossessedit.Moreover,Congresshassubstantially
affirmedthechallengedmeasuresandhasspecificallyprovidedthattheyaresuppletorytoRA6657.

ISSUE:W/Nthecreationofthe50BpesofundunderProcl.No.131andEO229doesnotconformtothe
requirementsofavalidappropriationasspecifiedintheConstitution.

HELD:Procl.No.131isnotanappropriationmeasureevenifitdoesprovideforthecreationofsaidfund,for
thatisnotitsprincipalpurpose.Anappropriationlawisonetheprimarypurposeandspecificpurposeofwhich
istoauthorizethereleaseofpublicfundsfromthetreasury.Thecreationofthefundisonlyincidentaltothe
mainobjectiveoftheproclamation,whichisagrarianreform.

ISSUE: AstoinvalidityofProcl.131andEO229becauseofthelackofretentionlimitsasrequiredbythe
Consti.

HELD:RA6657doesprovideforsuchretentionlimitsnowinsec.6ofthelaw.

ISSUE: W/N EO 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only one subject, to be
expressedinthetitle.

HELD:NO.Thetitleofthebilldoesnothavetobeacatalogueofitscontentsandwillsufficeifthematters
embodiedinthetextarerelevanttoeachotherandmaybeinferredfromthetitle.

ISSUE:PolicepowerandPowerofeminentdomain.

HELD:Recenttrendswouldindicatenotapolarizationbutaminglingofthepolicepowerandthepowerof
eminentdomain,withthelatterbeingusedasanimplementoftheformerlikethepoweroftaxation.
Totheextentthatthemeasuresunderchallengemerelyprescriberetentionlimitsforlandowners,there
isanexerciseofthepolicepowerfortheregulationofprivatepropertyinaccordancewiththeConstitution.But
where,tocarryoutsuchregulation,itbecomesnecessarytodeprivesuchownersofwhateverlandstheymay
owninexcessofthemaximumareaallowed,thereisdefinitelyatakingunderthepowerofeminentdomainfor
whichpaymentofjustcompensationisimperative.Thetakingcontemplatedisnotamerelimitationoftheuse
ofthelandbutrequiresthesurrenderofthetitletoandphysicalpossessionofthesaidexcessandallbeneficial
rightsaccruingtotheownerinfavorofthefarmerbeneficiary.Thisisdefinitelyanexerciseofthepowerof
eminentdomain.

ISSUE:W/Nthereisadenialofequalprotectionbecauseoftheabsenceofretentionlimits.

HELD:Thishasbecomeacademicbecauseofsec.6ofRA6657.

ISSUE:W/Ntherequisitesforavalidclassificationhasbeenviolated.(Thesmallfarmersandsugarplanters
claimtheybelongtoaparticularclasswithparticularinterestsoftheirown.)

HELD:NO.Noevidencehavebeensubmittedthattherequisitesforavalidclassificationhasbeenviolated.
Classificationhasbeendefinedasthegroupingofpersonsorthingssimilartoeachotherincertain
particulars anddifferent fromeachotherinthesesameparticulars.Tobe valid,itmustconformtothe ff.
requirements:
(1)itmustbebasedonsubstantialdistinctions;
(2)itmustbegermanetothepurposesofthelaw;
(3)itmustnotbelimitedtoexistingconditionsonly;
(4)itmustapplyequallytoallthemembersoftheclass.

Alltheserequirementshavebeenmetbythemeasures.
Equalprotectionsimplymeansthatallpersonsorthingssimilarlysituatedmustbetreatedalikebothas
totherightsconferredandtheliabilitiesimposed.Thepetitionershavenotshownthattheybelongtoadifferent
classentitledtoadifferenttreatment

ISSUE:PowerofEminentDomain.

HELD: Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands
intendedforpublicuseuponpaymentofjustcompensationtotheowner.Itisonlywheretheownerisunwilling
tosellorcannotacceptthepriceorotherconditionsofferedbythevendee,thatthepowerofeminentdomain
willcomeintoplaytoasserttheparamountauthorityoftheStateovertheinterestsofthepropertyowner.
Privaterightsmustthenyieldtotheirresistibledemandsofthepublicinterestonthetimehonoredjustification
thatthewelfareofthepeopleisthesupremelaw.
However,thepowerofeminentdomainisnotabsolute.Thelimitationisfoundintheconstitutional
injunctionthat"privatepropertyshallnotbetakenforpublicusewithoutjustcompensation." Basically,the
requirementsforaproperexerciseofthepowerare:
(1)Publicuseand
(2)justcompensation

(1)Astotherequirementofpublicuse:

Itisnotcorrecttosaythatonlypublicagriculturallands(asarguedbypetitioners)maybecoveredby
the CARP as the Constitution calls for "the just distribution of all agricultural lands." In any event, the
distributiontodistributeprivateagriculturallandsundertheCARPwasmadebythelegislativeandexecutive
departmentsintheexerciseoftheirdiscretion.
ThepurposesspecifiedinPD27,Procl.131andRA6657areonlyanelaborationoftheconstitutional
injunctionthattheStateadoptthenecessarymeasures"toencourageandundertakethejustdistributionofall
agriculturallandstoenablefarmerswhoarelandlesstoowndirectlyorcollectivelythelandstheytill.That
publiclawisbindingonus."

(2)Astotherequirementofjustcompensation:

Thereiscompensabletakingwhentheffconditionsconcur:
(a)theexpropriatormustenteraprivateproperty;
(b)Theentrymustbeformorethanamomentaryperiod;
(c)theentrymustbeunderawarrantorcoloroflegalauthority;
(d) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected;and
(e)theutilizationofthepropertyforpublicusemustbeinsuchawayastoousttheowneranddeprive
himofbeneficialenjoymentoftheproperty.

Alltheserequisitesareenvisionedinthequestionedmeasures.

ISSUE: W/N the manner of fixing the just compensation is entrusted to the administrative authorities in
violationofjudicialprerogatives.

HELD:NO.Thedeterminationofjustcompensationisafunctionaddressedtothecourtsofjusticeandnottobe
usurpedbyanyotherbranchorofficialofthegovt.
Sec. 16(d) of the CARP Law shows that although the proceedings are described as summary, the
landownerandotherinterestedpartiesareallowedanopportunitytosubmitevidenceontherealvalueofthe
property.ThedeterminationofthejustcompensationbytheDARisnotfinalandconclusiveuponthelandowner
oranyotherinterestedparty.ThedeterminationbytheDARisonlypreliminaryunlessacceptedbyallparties
concerned.Otherwise,thecourtsofjusticewillstillhavetherighttoreviewwithfinalitythesaiddetermination
intheexerciseofwhatisadmittedlyajudicialfunction.

ISSUE:W/Nsec.18ofRA6657,whichprovidesforthevaluationandmodeofcompensationisunconstitutional
insofarasitrequirestheownersoftheexpropriatedpropertiestoacceptjustcompensationthereforinlessthan
money,whichistheonlymediumofpaymentallowed.

HELD:NO.Thetraditionalmediumforthepaymentofjustcompensationismoneyandnoother.However,we
do not deal here with the traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary
expropriationwhereonlyaspecificpropertyofrelativelylimitedareaissoughttobetakenbytheStatefromits
ownerforaspecificandperhapslocalpurpose.Whatwedealwithhereisarevolutionaryexpropriation.
Theexpropriationbeforeusaffectsallprivateagriculturallandswhereverfoundandofwhateverkindas
longastheyareinexcessofthemaximumretentionlimits.Thiskindofexpropriationisintendednotonlyfor
thebenefitofaparticularcommunitybuttheentireFilipinonation.Finally,itisnolessthantheConstitution
itselfthathasordainedthisrevolutioninthefarms,callingfor"ajustdistribution"amongthefarmersoflands.
Suchaprogramwillinvolvehundredsofbillionsofpesoswhichamountwillnotevenbefullyavailable
atthistime.ItcanthereforebeassumedthattheintentionoftheframersoftheConstitutionwastoallowsuch
mannerofpaymentasisnowprovidedforbytheCARPLaw,particularlythepaymentofthebalance(ifthe
ownercannotbepaidfullyinmoney),oroftheentireamountofthejustcompensation,withotherthingsof
value.
Acceptingthetheorythatpayment ofjustcompensationisnotalwaysrequiredtobemadefullyin
money,theSCfindsthattheproportionofcashpaymenttotheotherthingsofvalueconstituting thetotal
payments,asdeterminedonthebasisoftheareasofthelandsexpropriated,isnotundulyoppressiveuponthe
landowner.
Theothermodesavailabletothelandownerathisoption,arealsonotunreasonablebecausepaymentis
madeinsharesofstock,LBPbonds,otherpropertiesorassets,taxcredits,andotherthingsofvalueequivalent
totheamountofjustcompensation.

ISSUE: W/N the landowner is divested of his property even before actual payment to him in full of just
compensation,incontraventionofawellacceptedprincipleofeminentdomain.

HELD:NO.ItistruethatPD27expresslyorderedtheemancipationoftenantfarmerasofOct.21,1972and
declaredthatheshall"bedeemedasowner"ofaportionoflandconsistingofafamilysizedfarmexceptthat
"notitletothelandownedbyhimwastobeactuallyissuedtohimunlessanduntilhehadbecomeafullpledged
memberofadulyrecognizedfarmers'cooperative.Itwasunderstoodhowever,thatfullpaymentofthejust
compensationalsohadtobemadefirst,conformablytotheconstitutionalrequirement.
WhenEO228statedinitsSec.2that"Allqualifiedfarmerbeneficiariesarenowdeemedfullownersas
ofOct.21,1972ofthelandtheyacquiredbyvirtueofPD27"itwasobviouslyreferringtolandalreadyvalidly
acquiredunderthesaiddecree,afterproofofmembershipinthefarmers'cooperativesandfullpaymentofjust
compensation.Hence,itwasalsoproperundersec.2thatthe"leaserentalspaidtothelandownerbythefarmer
beneficiaryafterOct.21,1972(pendingtransferofownershipafterfullpaymentofjustcompensation),shallbe
consideredasadvancepaymentfortheland.
TheCarpLawconditionsthetransferofpossessionandownershipofthelandtothegovtonreceiptby
thelandownerofthecorrespondingpaymentorthedepositbytheDARofthecompensationincashorLBP
bondswithanaccessiblebank.Untilthen,thetitlealsoremainswiththelandowner.Nooutrightchangeof
ownershipiscontemplatedeither.Adapted.

3.UrbanLandReformAndHousing

Art.XIII,Sec.9.TheStateshallbylaw,andforthecommongood,undertakeincooperationwith
theprivatesector,acontinuingprogramofurbanlandreformandhousingwhichwillmakeavailableat
affordable cost, decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban
centersandresettlementareas.Itshallalsopromoteadequateemploymentopportunitiestosuchcitizens.
Intheimplementationofsuchprogram,theStateshallrespecttherightsofsmallpropertyowners.

Sec.10.Urbanorruralpoordwellersshallnotbeevictednortheirdwellingsdemolished,except
inaccordancewithlawandinajustandhumanemanner.
Noresettlement ofurbanorruraldwellersshallbeundertakenwithoutadequateconsultation
withthemandthecommunitieswheretheyaretoberelocated.
SeePDNo.1517,June11,1978.

4.Health

Sec.11.TheStateshalladoptanintegratedandcomprehensiveapproachtohealthdevelopment
whichshallendeavortomakeessentialgoods,healthandothersocialservicesavailabletoallthepeopleat
affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled,
women,andchildren.TheStateshallendeavortoprovidefreemedicalcaretopaupers.

Sec.12.TheStateshallestablishandmaintainaneffectivefoodanddrugregulatorysystemand
undertakeappropriatehealthmanpowerdevelopmentandresearch,responsivetothecountry'shealth
needsandproblems.

Sec.13. TheStateshallestablishaspecialagencyfordisabledpersonsfortheirrehabilitation,
selfdevelopmentandselfreliance,andtheirintegrationintothemainstreamofsociety.

5.Women

Sec. 14. The State shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful working
conditions,takingintoaccounttheirmaternalfunctions,andsuchfacilitiesandopportunitiesthatwill
enhancetheirwelfareandenablethemtorealizetheirfullpotentialintheserviceofthenation.

C.People'sOrganizations

Sec.15.TheStateshallrespecttheroleofindependentpeople'sorganizationstoenablethepeople
topursueandprotect, within thedemocratic framework,theirlegitimate andcollectiveinterestsand
aspirationsthroughpeacefulandlawfulmeans.
People's organizations are bona fide associations of citizens with demonstrated capacity to
promotethepublicinterestandwithidentifiableleadership,membership,andstructure.

Sec.16.Therightofthepeopleandtheirorganizationstoeffectiveandreasonableparticipation
atalllevelsofsocial,political,andeconomicdecisionmakingshallnotbeabridged.TheStateshall,by
law,facilitatetheestablishmentofadequateconsultationmechanisms.

D.HumanRights

Art.XIII,Sec.17.(1)ThereisherebycreatedanindependentofficecalledtheCommissionon
HumanRights.
(2)TheCommissionshallbecomposedofaChairmanandfourMemberswhomustbenatural
borncitizensofthePhilippinesandamajorityofwhomshallbemembersoftheBar.Thetermofoffice
andotherqualificationsanddisabilitiesoftheMembersoftheCommissionshallbeprovidedbylaw.
(3) UntilthisCommissionisconstituted,theexistingPresidentialCommitteeonHumanRights
shallcontinuetoexerciseitspresentfunctionsandpowers.
(4)TheapprovedannualappropriationsoftheCommissionshallbeautomaticallyandregularly
released.

Sec.18.TheCommissiononHumanRightsshallhavethefollowingpowersandfunctions:
(1) Investigate,onitsownoroncomplaintbyanyparty,allformsofhumanrightsviolations
involvingcivilandpoliticalrights;
(2)Adoptitsoperationalguidelinesandrulesofprocedure,andciteforcontemptforviolations
thereofinaccordancewiththeRulesofCourt;
(3)Provideappropriatelegalmeasuresfortheprotectionofhumanrightsofallpersonswithin
thePhilippines,aswellasFilipinosresidingabroad,andprovideforpreventivemeasuresandlegalaid
servicestotheunderprivilegedwhosehumanrightshavebeenviolatedorneedprotection;
(4)Exercisevisitorialpowersoverjails,prisons,ordetentionfacilities;
(5)Establishacontinuingprogramofresearch,education,andinformationtoenhancerespectfor
theprimacyofhumanrights;
(6) RecommendtotheCongresseffectivemeasurestopromotehumanrightsandprovidefor
compensationtovictimsofviolationsofhumanrights,ortheirfamilies;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on
humanrights;
(8) Grant immunity fromprosecution toany person whosetestimony orwhosepossession of
documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation
conducedbyitorunderitsauthority;
(9)Requesttheassistanceofanydepartment,bureau,office,oragencyintheperformanceofits
functions;
(10)Appointitsofficersandemployerinaccordancewithlaw;and
(11)Performsuchotherdutiesandfunctionsasmaybe providedbylaw.

Sec.19.TheCongressmayprovideforothercasesofviolationsofhumanrightsthatshouldfall
withintheauthorityoftheCommission,takingintoaccountitsrecommendations.

VII.ESTACS(Education,Science,Technology,Arts,CultureandSports)

A.Education
1.RightToEducation

Art.XIV,Sec.1.Thestateshallprotectandpromotetherightofallcitizenstoqualityeducation
atalllevels,andshalltakeappropriatestepstomakesucheducationaccessibletoall.

InVillarv.TIP,135SRCA706(1985),SCsaidthatwhiletherighttocollegeeducationisasocial,
economic,andagricultural right,itisavailableonly"onthebasisofmerit",asprovided,inArt.26ofthe
DeclarationofHumanRights.Accordingly,therefusalofadmissionofstudentactivitieswithmarkedacademic
deficiencies(failureincertainsubjects)isvalid;buttherefusaltothosewho,withoutincurringdeficiencies,
werejustexercisingtheirconstitutionalrightoffreespeechandpeaceableassembly,isunjustified.

InTangonanv.CruzPano,137SCRA(1985),theSCruledthatpartoftherightofacademic(institutional
freedomistherightofinstitutionsofhigherlearningtodecideforitselfhowbesttoattainthesearchfortruth,
which includes the choice of students, free from outside coercion or interference, save possibly when the
overridingpublicwelfarecallsforsomerestraint.Thus,itupheldtherefusaloftheCapitolMedicalCenter
SchoolforNursingtoadmitpetitionerforherfailureinPsychiatricNursing,whichsubjectshefailedtotakeup
inanotherschoolwhenshetriedtobribetheDeaninthatschool.

Villarv.TIP,136SCRA706(1985)

F: ThepetitionerswerestudentsoftheTechnologicalInstituteofthePhils.(TIP).Theyfiledanactionforcertiorari
andprohibition,allegingthattheTIPhaddeniedthemenrollmentbec.oftheirinvolvementinstudentdemonstrationsand
activism. Ontheotherhand,theTIPclaimedthatthestudentsweredeniedenrollmentbec.ofacademicdeficiencies.
TheirrecordsshowedthatRufinoSalconandRemeoGuilatcoeachfailedin1subjectinthefirstsemesteroftheSY1984
1985.VenecioVillarfailedin2subjectsinthefirstsemofSY19831984.InocencioRecitispassedallsubjectsinthefirst
semof19831984butfailed1subjectinthe2ndsem.ofthatyearandthenextyearhehad2failinggrades.Ontheother
hand,NovertoBarretofailedin5subjectsinthe1stsemofSY19831984andinyear19841985,heagainfailedin6
subjects.EdgardodeLeonhad3failinggradesinthe1stsemoftheSY19841985.ReglobanLaxamanahad5failing
gradesandnopassinggradeinthe1stsemofthe19841985SY.VV.

ISSUE:W/Ntheexerciseofthefreedomofassemblyonthepartofcertainstudentsofresp.TIPcouldbea
basisfortheirbeingbannedfromenrollment.

HELD:NO.AsinReyesv.Bagatsing,theinvocationoftherighttofreedomofpeaceablesassemblycarriesw/
ittheimplicationthattherighttofullspeechhasalsobeendisregarded.Bothareembracedintheconceptof
freedom ofexpression w/c isthelibertytodiscuss publicly&truthfully,anymatter ofpublic interestw/o
censorshiporpunishment&w/cisnottobelimitednordeniedexceptonashowingofaclear&presentdanger
ofasubstantiveevilthatthestatehasarighttoprevent.
Theacademicfreedomenjoyedby"institutionsofhigherlearning"includestherighttosetacademic
standardstodetermineunderwhatcircumstancesfailinggradessufficeinexpulsionofstudents. However,it
cannotbeutilizedtodiscriminateagainstthosestudentswhoexercisethisconstitutional rightstopeaceable
assembly&fullspeech.Ifitdoesso,thenthereisalegitimateguidancebythestudentsprejudiced,theirright
totheequalprotectionclausebeingdisregarded.

ISSUE:W/Ntheconstitutionalprovisionastothestatemaintaining"asystemoffullpublicelem.educ.&in
areaswherefinancespermit,est.&maintainasystemofthepub.educ.uptohighschoollevelexcludesthe
exerciseofthatitincolleges&universities.

HELD: The Constitutional provision does not per se exclude the exercise of that right. in colleges &
universities.Itisonlyatthemostareflectionofthelackofsufficientfundsforsuchadulytobeobligatoryin
thecaseofstudentsincolleges&Universities.Asfarastherightitselfisconcerned,Art.26oftheUniversal
DeclarationofHRsprovides:"Everyonehastherighttoeducation.Educ.shallbefullattheleastintheelem.
&fundamentalstages.xxxTechnical&professionaleduc.shallbemadegenerallyavailable&highereduc.shall
beequallyaccessibletoallonthebasisofmerit."
Hence,tothatextent,thereisjustificationforexcluding3ofthepets.bec.oftheirmarkedacademic
deficiency.Adapted.

Righttoqualityeducationavailableonlyonthebasisofmerit.Whiletherighttocollegeeducationis
asocial,economicandculturalright,itisavailableonly"onthebasisofmerit,"asprovidedinArt.26ofthe
DeclarationofHumanRights. Accordingly,bec.ofmarkedacademicdeficiency,thedenialofenrollmentto
Barreto,DeLeonandLaxamanawasjustified.However,w/regardtoVillar,Salcon,GuitlatcoandRecitis,the
refusaloftheTIPtoallowthemtoenrollwasunjustified. Theycouldnotbeexpelledforexercisingtheir
constitutional right of free speech and peaceable assembly. As J. Fortas said, students do not shed their
constitutionalrightsattheschoolhousegate.VV.

Tangonanv.CruzPano,137SCRA245(1985)

F: PetitionerbroughtsuitformandamustocompeltheCapitolMedicalCenterSchoolofNursingtoadmitherforthe
academic year 19761977. She hadbeen previously provisionally admitted theprevious schoolyear, but she failed in
PsychiatricNursing.Shetriedtotakethecourseagaininanotherschool,butshewasrefusedadmissionbec.shetriedto
bribethedeanoftheschool.WhenshetriedtoreenrolattheCapitolMedicalCenter,shewasdeniedadmission.She
broughtthematteroncertiorari.VV.

ISSUE:WONtheschoolcanbecompelledbythecourttoreadmitpetitioner.NO.

HELD:Anydutyonthepartoftheschooltoenrolpet.isnotmerelyaministerialdutybutonew/cinvolvesthe
exerciseofdiscretionnotcompellablebyMandamus.Capitolwasperfectlyjustifiedinrefusingtoadmither,its
refusal(being)sanctionedbytheManualofRegulationsofPriv.Schoolsw/cconsidersacademicdelinquency&
violationofdisciplinaryregulationsasvalidgroundsforrefusingenrollmentofastudent.Adapted.
Further,tograntrelieftopet.wouldbedoingviolencetotheacademicfreedomenjoyedbyCapitol
enshrinedunderAct.XVsec.8(2)Consti.Academicfreedomincludesnotonlythefreedomofprofessionally
qualifiedpersonstoinquire,discover,publish&teachthetruthastheyseeitinthefieldoftheircompetence
subjecttonocontrolorauthorityexceptofrationalmethodsbyw/ctruthsandconclusions aresoughtand
establishedinthesedisciplines,butalsotherightoftheschoolorcollegetodecideforitselfhowbesttoattain
themthegrantbeingtoinstitutionsofhigherlearningfreefromoutsidecoercionorinterferencesavepossibly
when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide spread of autonomy certainly
extendingtothechoiceofstudents.Saidconstitutionalprovisionisnottobeconstruedinaniggardlymanneror
inagrudgingfashion.Thatwouldbetofrustrateitspurposeandnullifyitsintent.VV.

2.Educationalmandateofthestate

Art.XIV,Sec.2.Thestateshall:
(1)Establish,maintain,andsupportacomplete,adequate,andintegratedsystemofeducation,
relevanttotheneedsofthepeopleandsociety;
(2)Establishandmaintainasystemoffreepubliceducationintheelementaryandhighschool
levels. Without limiting the natural right of parents to reach their children, elementary, education is
compulsoryforallchildrenofschoolage;
(3)Establishandmaintainasystemofscholarshipgrants,studentloanprogram,subsidies,and
other incentives, which shall be available to deserving students in both public and private schools,
especiallytotheunderprivileged;
(4) Encouragenonformal,informal,andindigenouslearningsystems,aswellasselflearning,
independent,andoutofschoolstudyprograms,particularlytothosethatrespondtocommunityneeds;
and
(5)Provideadultcitizens,thedisabled,andoutofschoolyouthwithtrainingincivics,vocational
efficiency,andotherskills.

(6) Sec.5.(1)TheStateshalltakeintoaccountregionalandsectoralneedsandconditions,and
encouragelocalplanninginthedevelopmentofeducationalpoliciesandprograms.

(7) Sec.5.(5)Assignthehighestbudgetaryprioritytoeducation,andensurethatteachingwill
attractandretainitsrightfulshareofthebestavailabletalentsthroughadequateremunerationandother
meansofjobsatisfactionandfulfillment.

(8)Sec.5.(2)Adademicfreedomshallbeenjoyedinallinstitutionsofhigherlearning.

Academicfreedomistherightofthefacultytopursue,investigate,andpublishinhisfieldofinquiry,
withoutfearofecclesiastical,civil,orpoliticalreprisal,exceptonlythejudgmentofhiscompetencebyhisown
peers.
Institutionalautonomyistherightoftheinstitutionofhigherlearningtosetitownpoliciesonhowto
achieveitseducationalgoals.

(9) Sec.5.(3)Everycitizenhasarighttoselectaprofessionorcourseofstudy,subjecttofair,
reasonable,andequitableandacademicrequirement.

(10)Sec.5.(4)TheStateshallenhancetherightofteacherstoprofessionaladvancement.Non
teachingacademicandnonacademicpersonnelshallenjoytheprotectionoftheState.
UniversityofthePhilippinesv.Ayson,176SCRA571(1989)

F: Sometimein1972,theUPBoardofRegentsapprovedtheestablishmentofUPCollegeofBaguioHighSchool
(UPCBHS)aspartofthegraduateprogramineducationtoserveasalaboratoryanddemonstrationschoolforprospective
teachersprovidedthatitbeaselfsupportingunitandshouldnotentailanysubsidyfromthebudgetofUP.xxx
xxxIn1989,theUPBoardofRegentsapprovedthephaseoutofUPCBHSasUPCBdoesnotofferprogramsin
educationthusthepurposeforwhichitwascreatedwasnotservedanditwasnotselfsupporting. Theprincipalof
UPCBHSfiledaninjunctionwithRTCBaguiowhichwasgranted.MFRbyUPdeniedhence,thispetition.

ISSUE:IssecondarypubliceducationdemandableinaninstitutionofhigherlearningsuchastheUniv.ofthe
Phils.?
(Academicfreedom[Art.XIVsec.5(2)]vs.righttofreepublicsecondaryeducation[Art.XIVsec.2(2)]

HELD:Weruleinthenegative.ItisbeyondcavilthatUP,aninstitutionofhigherlearning,enjoysacademic
freedomtheinstitutionalkind.

ScopeofacademicfreedomasrecognizedintheConstitution. Itisthebusinessofauniversityto
providethatatmospherew/cismostconductivetospeculation,experimentalandcreation.Itisanatmospherein
w/cthereprevailsthe'fouressentialfreedoms'ofauniversitytodetermineforitselfonacademicgroundswho
mayteach,whatmaybetaught,howitshallbetaught,andwhomaybeadmittedtostudy.

RA6655(FreePublicSecondaryEducationActof1988),includesinitscoveragestatecollegesand
universitiesofferingsecondarycourses. xxx Atthisjuncture,itmustbepointedoutthattheUPCBHSwas
establishedsubjecttoanumberofconditionalities,e.g.,itmustbeselfsupporting,itcanserveasafeederforthe
UPatBaguio,itcanserveasalaboratoryanddemonstrationschoolforprospectiveteachers,failinginw/cthe
Universitycanorderitsabolitiononacademicgrounds,speciallywherethepurposeforw/citwasestablished
wasnotsatisfied.
UPwascreatedunderitscharter(Act1870)toprovideadvancedtertiaryandnotsecondaryeducation.
Sec.2ofAct1870statesthat"thepurposeofUPshallbetoprovideadvanceinstructioninliterature,philosophy,
thesciencesandarts,andtogiveprofessionalandtechnicaltraining."Itisapparentthatsecondaryeducationis
notthemandatedfunctionofUP;consequently,itcanvalidlyphaseoutorabolishUPCBHSespeciallysowhen
therequirementsforitscontinuancehavenotbeenmet,RA6655(FreePublic2ndaryEducationActof1988)
notwithstanding.
xxx
RA6655implementsthepolicyoftheStatetoprovidefreepublicsecondaryeducationandveststhe
formulationofasecondarypubliceducationcurriculum,thenationalizationofpublicsecondaryschoolsandthe
implementationoftherulesandregulationsthereofupontheSec.ofDECS.xxxHowever,thismandateisnot
directedtoinstitutionsofhigherlearninglikeUPbuttogovtthroughtheDECS. Asaninstitutionofhigher
learningenjoyingacademicfreedom,UPcannotbecompelledtoprovideforsecondaryeducation. However,
shouldUPoperateahighschoolintheexerciseofitsacademicfreedom,RA6655requiresthatthestudents
enrolledtherein"shallbefreefrompaymentoftuitionandotherschoolfees."RAM.
Alcuazv.PSBA,178SCRA135(1989)

F: Tamayo, Encarnacion & Magtalas, teachers from PSBA, were dismissed from work due to findings of the
investigationthattheyparticipatedintheunlawfuldemonstration.Theyallegethattheyhavebeenarbitrarilyandwantonly
terminated.

HELD:NO,theywerenot.Fulltimeteacherswhohaverenderedsatisfactoryservicefor3yrs.areconsidered
permanentandthuscannorberemovedfromofficeexceptforjustcauseandafterdueprocess. Although
Tamayohasservedfor31/2yrs.,hisservicescannotbedeemedsatisfactoryasheparticipatedintheunlawful
demonstration.Theothertwohaveonlyservedfor21/2yrs.Thus,validlyterminated.
TheCourtrespectstherightofthestudentstoresorttoralliesanddemonstrationsfortheredressoftheir
grievancesandaspartoftheirfreedomtospeechandtoassemble.However,suchralliesanddemonstrations
and assemblies should be conducted peacefully and without resort to intimidation, coercion and violence.
Academicfreedom inallitsforms,demandsthefulldisplayofdiscipline. Toholdotherwisewouldbeto
subvertfreedomintodegeneratelicense.Adapted.

Guingonav.Carague,196SCRA221(1991)

F: UnderPres.Aquino'sadministration,PetitionersSenatorsGuingona&PimentelquestiontheConstitutionalityof
the automatic appropriations for debt service in the amount of P86.8 B in the 1990 budget. The said automatic
appropriationfordebtserviceisauthorizedbyPD81,PD1177&PD1967,allpromulgatedbyformerPres.Marcos.
PD1177,Sec.31Automaticappropriations.Allexpendituresforprincipal&interestonpublicdebt,nationalgovt
guaranteesofobligationsw/caredrawnupon,areautomaticallyappropriatedprovidedthatnoobligationsshallbeincurred
or payments made from funds thus authomatically appropriated except as issued in the form of regular budgetary
allotments.
PD 1967, Sec. 1. There is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise
appropriatedsuchamountsasmaybenecessarytoeffectpaymentsonforeignordomesticloansxxx
PetitionersseekthedeclarationoftheunconstitutionalityofPD81,Sec.31ofPD1177andPD1967.Adapted.

ISSUE:IstheappropriationofP86BillionintheP233Billionof1990budgetviolativeofSec.5,Art.XIVof
theConstitution?

HELD: WhileitistruethatunderSec.5(5),Art.XIVoftheConsti.,Congressismandatedto"assignthe
highestbudgetaryprioritytoeducation"inorderto"insurethatteachingwillattractandretainitsrightfulshare
ofthebestavailabletalentsthroughadequateremunerationandothermeansofjobsatisfactionandfulfillment,"
itdoesnottherebyfollowthatthehandsoftheCongressaresohamstrungastodepriveitthepowertorespond
totheimperativesofthenationalinterestandfortheattainmentofotherstatepoliciesorobjectives.
Asaptlyobserved byrespondents, since1985, thebudget for education hastripled toupgrade and
improvethefacilityofthepublicschoolsystem.Thecompensationforteachershasbeendoubled.Theamount
setasidefortheDECSundertheGeneralAppropriationsActisthehighestbudgetaryallocationamongall
departmentbudgets.Thisisclearcompliancew/theaforesaidconstitutionalmandateaccordinghighestpriority
toeducation.
Havingfaithfullycompliedtherewith,Congressiscertainlynotw/oanypower,guidedonlybyitsgood
judgment,toprovideanappropriation,thatcanreasonablyserviceourenormousdebt,thegreaterportionofw/c
wasinheritedfromthepreviousadministration.Itisnotonlyamatterofhonorandtoprotectthecreditstanding
ofthecountry.Moreespecially,theverysurvivalofoureconomyisatstake.RAM.

3.TheEducationalSystem

ArticleXIV,Section3.(1)AlleducationalinstitutionsshallincludethestudyoftheConstitutionas
partofthecurricula.
(2)Theyshallinculcatepatriotismandnationalism,fosterloveofhumanity,respectforhuman
rights,appreciationoftheroleofnationalheroesinthehistoricaldevelopmentofthecountry,teachthe
rights and duties of citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral character and
personal discipline, encourage critical and creative thinking, broaden scientific and technological
knowledge,andpromotevocationalefficiency.
(3)Attheoptionexpressedinwritingbytheparentsorguardians,religionshallbeallowedtobe
taughttheirchildrenorwardsinpublicelementaryandhighschoolswithintheregularclasshoursby
instructorsdesignatedorapprovedbythereligiousauthoritiesofthereligiontowhichthechildrenor
wardsbelong,withoutadditionalcosttotheGovernment.

StateSupervision

Sec.4.(1)TheStaterecognizesthecomplementary,rolesofpublicandprivateinstitutionsinthe
educational system, and shall exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of all educational
institutions.

RequirementsforEducationalInstitutions

Sec.4.(2)Educationalinstitutionsotherthanthoseestablishedbyreligiousgroupsandmission
boards,shallbeownedsolelybycitizensofthePhilippinecitizensorcorporationsorassociationsatleast
sixty percentumofthecapitalofwhichisownedbysuchcitizens.TheCongressmay,however,require
increasedFilipinoequityparticipationinalleducationalinstitutions.
ThecontrolandadministrationofeducationalinstitutionsshallbevestedinFilipinos.
Noeducationalinstitutionshallbeestablishedexclusivelyforaliens,andnogroupofaliensshall
comprisemorethanonethirdoftheenrollmentinanyschool.Theprovisionsofthissubsectionshallnot
applytoschoolsestablishedforforeigndiplomaticpersonnelandtheirdependents,andunlessotherwise
providedbylaw,forotherforeigntemporaryresidents.

(In general, then, there are 3 requirements for any educational institution: (1) ownership, (2)
management,and(3)studentpopulation.Inthecaseofschoolsforforeigndiplomats,andforeigntemporary
residents,however,these3requirementsaredispensedwith)
TaxationofEducationalInstitutions

Sec.4.(3)Allrevenuesandassetsofnonstock,nonprofiteducationalinstitutionsusedactually
directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties. Upon the
dissolutionorcessationofthecorporateexistenceofsuchinstitutions,theirassetsshallbedisposedofin
themannerprovidedbylaw.
Proprietaryeducationalinstitutions,includingthosecooperativelyowned,maylikewisebeentitled
tosuchexemptions,subjecttosuchlimitationsprovidedbylaw,includingrestrictionsondividendsand
provisionsforreinvestment.

Alllands,buildings,andimprovementsactually,directly,andexclusivelyusedforreligious,charitable,
oreducationalpurposesshallbeexemptfromtaxation.[Art.VI,Sec.28(3)]

Art.XIV,Sec.4(3),anewprovision,referstoincometax(revenues)andpropertytax(assets),Art.VI,
Sec.28(3),anoldprovision,refersonlytorealpropertytax(lands,buildings,andimprovements).

A) Educational institutions, whether nonstock and nonprofit or proprietary, whether sectarian or


secularfallunderArt.VI,Sec.28(3)andareexemptfromrealpropertytax.

But additionallyif an educational institution is nonstock and nonprofit, whether it is sectarian or


secular,itfallsunderArt.XIV,Sec.4(3),andsoisexemptfromtaxesonitsrevenuesand,assets(assumingthat
theseareactually,directly,andexclusivelyusedforeducationalpurposes).

Ifitisproprietary,itwouldfallunderArt.VI,Sec.28(3)andArt.XIV,Sec.4(3),par.2.Thismeans
thatitmaybeentitledtocertainexemptionsbylaw,butitisalwaysexemptfromrealpropertytaxonitslands,
buildingsandimprovementsactually,directlyandexclusivelyforeducationalpurposes.

Sec. 4. (4) Subject to conditions described by law, all grants, endowments, donations or
contributionsusedactually,directly,andexclusivelyforeducationalpurposesshallbeexemptfromtax.

Thisreferstodonor'sandgifttaxesmadeouttoeducationalinstitutions.Whethernonstockandnon
profitorproprietor/sectarianorsecular,solongasthepropertyisactually,directly,andexclusivelyusedfor
educationalpurposes.

MandatesofEducationalInstitutions

(1)Includethestudyoftheconstitutionaspartofthecurricula.[Art.XIV,Sec.3(1)]

(2)Developthetotalpersonthroughthefollowing:
(NationalisticMandates)

(a) Inculcatepatriotismandnationalism,(b)fosterloveofhumanity,(c)(foster)respectforhuman
rights,(d)(foster)appreciationoftherolesofnationalheroesinthehistoricaldevelopmentofthecountry,(e)
teachestherightsanddutiesofcitizenship.

(MoralSpiritualMandates)

(f)Strengthenethicalandspiritualvalues,(g)developmoralcharacterandpersonaldiscipline.

(IntellectualMandates)

(h)Encouragecriticalandcreativethinking,(i)broadenscientificandtechnologicalknowledge,and(j)
promotevocationalefficiency.[Art.XIV,Sec.3(2)]

(3) Allowtheteachingofreligioninpublicelementaryandhighschoolsattheoptionexpressedin
writing bytheparents orguardians totheir childrenorwardswithintheregularclass hours by instructors
designatedorapprovedbythereligiousauthoritiesofthereligiontowhichthechildrenorwardsbelong,without
additionalcosttothegovernment.[Id.,Sec.3(3)]

Thisisthefirsttimethatthisisallowedbytheconstitution.UndertheAdministrativeCode,theteaching
ofreligionwasallowed,butonlyoutsideofclasshours.IfweviewthisprovisionwithArt.359oftheCivil
Codewhichallowstheintegrationofreligioninthecurriculumuponcertainconditions,thenstudentsmaynow
evenbegradedandmayfailtheirreligionsubjects.

(4) Undertake regular sports activities in all educational institutions throughout the country in
cooperationwithathleticclubsandothersectors.[Art.XIV,Sec.19(2)]

B.Language

ArticleXIV,Sec.6.ThenationallanguageofthePhilippinesisFilipino.Asitevolves,itshallbe
furtherdevelopedandenrichedonthebasisofexistingPhilippineandotherlanguages.
SubjecttoprovisionsoflawandastheCongressmaydeemappropriate,theGovernmentshall
take steps to initiate and sustain the use of Filipino as a medium of official communication and as
languageofinstructionintheeducationalsystem.

Sec.7.Forpurposesofcommunicationandinstruction,theofficiallanguagesofthePhilippines
areFilipinoand,untilotherwiseprovidedbylaw,English.
The regional languages are the auxiliary official languages in the regions and shall serve as
auxiliarymediaofinstructiontherein.
SpanishandArabicshallbepromotedonavoluntaryandoptionalbasis.

Sec.8.ThisConstitutionshallbepromulgatedinFilipinoandEnglishandshallbetranslatedinto
majorregionallanguages,Arabic,andSpanish.

Sec.9.TheCongressshallestablishanationallanguagecommissioncomposedofrepresentatives
of various regions and disciplines which shall undertake, coordinate, and promote researches for the
development,propagation,andpreservationofFilipinoandotherlanguages.

1.NationalLanguage:Filipino
2.OfficialLanguages:FilipinoandEnglish
3.Auxiliaryofficiallanguages:RegionalLanguages
4.Voluntaryandoptionallanguages:SpanishandArabic

TheCongressshallestablishanationallanguagecommissioncomposedofrepresentativesofvarious
regions and disciplines which shall undertake, coordinate, and promote researches for the development,
propagation,andpreservationofFilipinoandotherlanguages.(Art.XIV,Sec.4.)

C.ScienceandTechnology

Policy

Art.XIV,Sec.10. Scienceandtechnologyareessentialfornationaldevelopmentandprogress.
TheStateshallgiveprioritytoresearchanddevelopment,invention,innovation,andtheirutilization;and
toscienceandtechnologyeducation,training,andservices.Itshallsupportindigenous,appropriateand
selfreliant scientific and technological capabilities and their application to the country's productive
systemsandnationallife.

Incentives

Sec.11.TheCongressmayprovideforincentivesincludingtax,deduction,toencourageprivate
participationinprogramofbasicandappliedscientificresearch. Scholarships,grantsinaid,orother
forms of incentives, shall be provided to deserving science students, researchers, scientists, inventors,
technologists,andspeciallygiftedcitizens.

Technologytransfer
Sec.12.TheStateshallregulatethetransferandpromotetheadaptationoftechnologyfromall
sources for the national benefit. It shall encourage the widest participation of private groups, local
governments, and communitybased organizations in the generation and utilization of science and
technology.

IntellectualProperty

Sec.13.TheStateshallprotectandsecuretheexclusiverightsofscientists,inventors,artists,and
other gifted citizens, to their intellectual property and creations, particularly when beneficial to the
people,forsuchperiodasmaybeprovidedbylaw.

D.ArtsandCulture

Guidingpolicy

Sec.14.TheStateshallfosterthepreservation,enrichment,anddynamicevolutionofaFilipino
national culture, based on the principle of unity in diversity in a climate of artistic and intellectual
expression.

ArtsandLetters

Sec.15.ArtsandlettersshallenjoythepatronageoftheState.TheStateshallconserve,promote,
andpopularizethenation'shistoricalandculturalheritageandresources,aswellasartisticcreations.

Nationaltreasures

Sec. 16. All the country's artistic and historic wealth constitutes the cultural treasure of the
nationalandshallbeundertheprotectionoftheStatewhichmayregulateit'sdisposition.

IndigenousCultures

Sec. 17. The State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of indigenous cultural
communitiestopreserveanddeveloptheircultures,traditions,andinstitutions. Itshallconsiderthese
rightsintheformulationofnationplanandpolicies.
Culturalopportunities

Sec.18.(1)Thestateshallensureequalaccesstoculturalopportunitiesthroughtheeducational
system, public or private cultural entities, scholarship, grants, and other incentives and community
culturalcenters,andotherpublicvenues.
(2)Thestateshallencourageandsupportresearchesandstudiesontheartsandculture.

E.Sports

Sec.19.(1) Thestateshallpromotephysicaleducation,andencouragesportsprogram,league
competitions, and amateur sports, including training for international competitions, to foster self
discipline,teamwork,andexcellenceforthedevelopmentofahealthyandalertcitizenry.
(2)Alleducationalinstitutionsshallundertakeregularsportsactivitiesthroughoutthecountryin
cooperationwithathleticclubsandothersectors.

VII.GENERALPROVISIONS

A.Ontheflag

ArticleXVI,Sec.1.TheflagofthePhilippinesshallbered,whiteandblue,withasunandthree
stars,asconsecratedandhonoredbythepeopleandrecognizedbylaw.

ActNo.2928,March26,1920,AnActtoAdoptAnOfficialFlagforTheGovernmentofthePhilippineIslands,
PrescribingTheRulesforItsUse,AndProvidePenaltiesforTheViolationsofSaidRules.

Texasv.Johnson,491US397(June21,1989)

Flagburningwhendonetoexpressdissentisprotectedspeech.

F: RespondentJohnsonparticipatedinapoliticaldemonstrationwhereheburnedanAmericanflagwhileprotesters
chanted.Noonewasphysicallyinjuredorthreatenedwithinjury,althoughseveralwitnesseswereseriouslyoffendedby
theflagburning. JohnsonwasconvictedofdesecrationofaveneratedobjectinviolationofaTexasstatutewhich(1)
prohibitedthedesecrationof,amongotherthings,astateornationalflag,and(2)defineddesecrationasthephysical
mistreatmentofsuchobjectsinawaywhichtheactorknowswillseriouslyoffendoneormorepersonslikelytoobserveor
discovertheact.Astatecourtofappealsaffirmed.TheCourtofCriminalAppealsofTexasreversed,holdingthatthe
desecrationstatuteasappliedviolatedthedefendant'srighttofreedomofspeechundertheFederalConstitution'sFirst
Amendment,becausethestatute(1)wastoobroadforFirstAmendmentpurposesasitrelatedtobreachesofthepeace,and
(2)wasnotadequatelysupportedbythestate'spurportedinterestinpreservingasymbolofunity.

ISSUE:Whethertheflagdesecrationstatuteisunconstitutional
HELD:YES.DecisionAffirmed.
Johnson's conviction wasinconsistent with theFirst Amendment undertheparticular circumstances
because(1)Johnson'sconductwassufficientlyimbuedwithelementsofcommunicationtoimplicatetheFirst
Amendment,giventhatthisflagburningwastheculminationofapoliticaldemonstrationandthatthestate
concededthattheprotester'sconductwasexpressive;(2)thestate'sinterestinpreventingbreachesofthepeace
was not implicated on the record in this case, since (a) no disturbance of the peace actually occurred or
threatenedtooccurbecauseoftheflagburning,(b)itcannotbepresumedthatanaudiencewhichtakesserious
offenseataparticularexpressionisnecessarilylikelytodisturbthepeace,and(c)theflagburningdoesnotfall
withinthesmallclassof"fightingwords"thatarelikelytoprovoketheaveragepersontoretaliationandthereby
causeabreachofthepeace;and(3)thestate'sassertedinterestinpreservingtheflagasasymbolofnationhood
andnationalunitydoesnotjustifytheconviction,since(a)theattemptedrestrictiononexpressioniscontent
based,andthussubjecttothemostexactingscrutiny,giventhattheflagdesecrationstatuteisaimednotat
protectingthephysicalintegrityoftheflaginallcircumstances,butonlyagainstimpairmentsthatwouldcause
seriousoffensestoothersandisaimedatprotectingonlookersfrombeingoffendedbytheideasexpressedbythe
prohibitedactivity,and(b)althoughthestatehasalegitimateinterestinencouragingpropertreatmentofthe
flag,itmaynotfosteritsownviewoftheflagbyprohibitingexpressiveconductrelatingtoitandbycriminally
punishingapersonforburningtheflagasameansofpoliticalprotest.

Rehnquist,White,O'Connor,JJ.,DissentingOpinion:

(1)TheTexasstatuteisnotinvalidundertheFirstAmendmentasappliedinthiscase,because(a)the
AmericanFlaghascometobethevisiblesymbolembodyingournationandisnotsimplyanotherideaorpoint
ofviewcompetingforrecognitioninthemarketplaceofideas,andthepublicburningoftheAmericanflagin
thiscasewasnoessentialpartofanyexpositionofideasandhadatendencytoinciteabreachofthepeace;and
(2)thestatuteisnotunconstitutionallyvagueoroverbroad.

Stevens,J.,DissentingOpinion:

(1)Sanctioningthedesecrationoftheflagwilltarnishitsvalueasanationalsymbol,atarnishwhichis
notjustifiedbythetrivialburdenonfreeexpressionthatisoccasionedbyrequiringthatalternativemodesof
expression beemployed; (2)theflagdesecration statute doesnotprescribe orthodox viewsorcompelany
conductorexpressionofrespectforanyideaorsymbol;and(3)thedefendant wasprosecutednotforhis
criticismofgovernmentpolicies,butforthemethodhechosetoexpressthoseviews,andaprohibitionagainst
that methodis supported by a legitimate interest in preserving the quality of an important national asset.
Adapted.

Ebranilagv.DivisionSuperintendentofSchoolsofCebu,219SCRA256(1993)

ConscientiousObjectorscannotbecompelledtosalutetheflag.

F: AllthepetitionersinthesecaseswereexpelledfromtheirclassesbythepublicschoolauthoritiesinCebufor
refusingtosalutetheflag,sincethenationalanthemandrecitethepatrioticpledgeasrequiredbyRA1265andbyDept.
OrderNo.8datedJuly21,1955oftheDECSmakingtheflagceremonycompulsoryinalleducationalinstitutions.

ISSUE: W/Nschoolchildren whoaremembers ofareligious sectknownasJehovah'sWitnesses maybe


expelledfromschool(bothprivateandpublic),forrefusing,onaccountoftheirreligiousbeliefs,totakepartin
theflagceremonywhichincludesplaying(byaband)orsingingthePhil.NationalAnthem,salutingthePhil.
flagandrecitingthepatrioticpledge.

HELD:NO.
Theideathatonemaybecompelledtosalutetheflag,singthenationalanthem,andrecitethepatriotic
pledge,duringaflagceremonyonpainofbeingdismissedfromone'sjoborofbeingexpelledfromschool,is
alientotheconscienceofthepresentgenerationofFilipinoswhocuttheirteethontheBillofRightsw/c
guaranteestheirrightstofreespeechandthefreeexerciseofreligiousprofessionandworship.
xxx
xxxForcingasmallreligiousgroup,throughtheironhandofthelaw,toparticipateinaceremonythat
violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for duly constituted
authorities.
xxx
The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is the
existenceofagraveandpresentdangerofacharacterbothgraveandimminent,ofaseriouseviltopublicsafety,
moral,healthoranyotherlegitimatepublicinterest,thatthestatehasarightanddutytoprevent.Absentsucha
threattopublicsafety,theexpulsionofthepets.fromtheschoolsisnotjustified.
xxx
Althoughpetitionersdonotparticipateinthecompulsoryflagceremony,theydonotengageinexternal
actsorbehaviorthatwouldoffendtheircountrymenwhobelieveinexercisingtheirloveofcountrythroughthe
observanceoftheflagceremony.Theyquietlystandatattentionduringtheceremonytoshowtheirrespectfor
therightofthosewhochoosetoparticipateinthesolemnproceedings.Asthereisnodisruption,expulsionis
unwarranted.
However,iftheyshouldcommitbreachesofpeacebyactionthatoffendthesensibilities,bothreligious
andpatriotic,ofotherpersons,theschoolauthoritieshavethepowertodisciplinethem.Adapted.

B.OntheName,AnthemandSeal

Art.XVI,Sec.2.TheCongressmay,bylaw,adoptanewnameforthecountry,anationalanthem,
oranationalseal,whichshallallbetrulyreflectiveandsymbolicoftheideals,history,andtraditionsof
thepeople.Suchlawshalltakeeffectonlyuponitsratificationbythepeopleinanationalreferendum.

Com.Act382,Sept.5,1938

COMMONWEALTHACTNO.382

ANACTTOADOPTTHEORIGINALAUTHENTICFORMOFTHEPHILIPPINENATIONALANTHEMANDTO
APPROPRIATEFUNDSFORITSPRINTINGANDFREEDISTRIBUTION.

TopreservethemusicaladaptationandmotiveintheoriginalauthenticcompositionofthePhilippineNational
Anthemassetbyitsauthor,JulianFelipe,andtoattainuniformperformancethereofinthePhilippines:

BeitenactedbytheNationalAssemblyofthePhilippines:

Sec.1.ThemusicalarrangementandcompositionofthePhilippineNationalAnthemassetbyitsauthor,Julian
Felipe,isadopted.
Sec.2.Thereisappropriated,outoftheunappropriatedfundsintheNationalTreasury,thesumoffivehundred
pesosforthepreparation,printingandfreedistributionofcopiesofthePhilippineNationalAnthemasadjustedtoits
originalauthenticoutline.
Sec.3.TheNationalLibraryofthePhilippinesisentrustedwiththeaccomplishmenthereof.
Sec.4.ThisActshalltakeeffectonitsapproval.
Approved,September5,1938.

C.OntheArmedForcesofthePhilippines

1.Conceptofcitizenarmy

Art.XVI,Sec.4.TheArmedForcesofthePhilippinesshallbecomposedofacitizenarmedforce
whichshallundergomilitarytrainingandserve,asmaybeprovidedbylaw.Itshallkeeparegularforce
necessaryforthesecurityoftheState.

2.RegulationofTheArmedForces

Sec.5.(1) Allmembersofthearmedforcesshalltakeanoathoraffirmationtoupholdand
defendthisConstitution.
(2) TheStateshallstrengthenthepatrioticspiritandnationalistconsciousnessofthemilitary,
andrespectforpeople'srightsintheperformanceoftheirduty.
(3)Professionalisminthearmedforcesandadequateremunerationandbenefitsofitsmembers
shallbeaprimeconcernoftheState.Thearmedforcesshallbeinsulatedfrompartisanpolitics.
Nomemberofthemilitaryshallengagedirectlyorindirectlyinanypartisanpoliticalactivity,
excepttovote.
(4) No member ofthe armed forces inthe activeservice shall, atany time, be appointed or
designated in any capacity to a civilian position in the Government including governmentowned or
controlledcorporationsoranyoftheirsubsidiaries.
(5)Lawsonretirementofmilitaryofficersshallnotallowextensionoftheirservice.
(6) The officers and men of the regular force of the armed forces shall be recruited
proportionatelyfromallprovincesandcitiesasfaraspracticable.
(7) The tour of duty of the Chief of Staff of the armed forces shall not exceed three years.
However,intimesofwarorothernationalemergencydeclaredbytheCongress,thePresidentmayextend
suchtourofduty.
Art.XVIII,Sec.24.Privatearmiesandotherarmedgroupsnotrecognizedbydulyconstituted
authority shall be dismantled. All paramilitary forces including Civilian Home Defense Forces not
consistent with the citizen armed force established in this Constitution shall be dissolved or, where
appropriate,convertedintotheregularforce.

D.OntheNationalPolice

Art.XVI,Sec.6.TheStateshallestablishandmaintainonepoliceforce,whichshallbenational
inscopeandcivilianincharacter,tobeadministeredandcontrolledbyanationalpolicecommission.The
authorityoflocalexecutivesoverthepoliceunitsintheirjurisdictionshallbeprovidedbylaw.

E.OnRetirementandOtherBenefits

1.Warveterans

Sec. 7. The State shall provide immediate and adequate care, benefits, and other forms of
assistance to war veterans and veterans of military campaigns, their surviving spouses and orphans.
Funds shall be provided therefor and due consideration shall be given them in the disposition of
agriculturallandsofthepublicdomainand,inappropriatecases,intheutilizationofnaturalresources.

2.Governmentandprivatesectorretirees

Sec.8.TheStateshall,fromtimetotime,reviewtoupgradethepensionsandotherbenefitsdue
toretireesofboththegovernmentandtheprivatesectors.

F.OnConsumerProtection

Sec. 9. TheState shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or
hazardousproducts.
IX.THEAMENDINGPROCESS

Cruz,PhilippinePoliticalLaw,1991ed.(hereinafterCruz):

AmendmentandRevision. Art.XVIIprovidesthattheConsti.maybechangedeitherbyamendmentor
revision.
Amendmentreferstoisolatedorpiecemealchangeonly,asdistinguishedfromrevision,whichisa
revamporrewritingofthewholeinstrument.

Procedure.TwostepsareinvolvedintheamendmentorrevisionoftheConsti.Thefirstistheproposaland
thesecondistheratification.

A.Proposal

Art.XVII,Section1.Anyamendmentto,orrevisionof,thisConstitutionmaybeproposedby:
(1)TheCongress,uponavoteofthreefourthsofallitsMembers;or
(2)Aconstitutionalconvention.

Cruz:Thechoiceofthemethodofproposalliesintheexclusivediscretionofthelegislature.

Sec.2.AmendmentstothisConstitutionmaylikewisebedirectlyproposedbythepeoplethrough
initiativeuponapetitionofatleasttwelvepercentumofthetotalnumberofregisteredvoters,ofwhich
everylegislativedistrictmustberepresentedbyatleastthreepercentumoftheregisteredvoterstherein.
Noamendmentunderthissectionshallbeauthorizedwithinfiveyearsfollowingtheratificationofthis
Constitutionnoroftenerthanonceeveryfiveyearsthereafter.
TheCongressshallprovidefortheimplementationoftheexerciseofthisright.

Gonzalesv.COMELEC,21SCRA774(1967)

F: On3/16/67,theSenateandtheHReps.passedtheff.resolutions:
(1)R.B.H.(ResolutionofBothHouses)No.1proposingthatSec.5,ArtVIoftheConsti.beamendedsoasto
increasethemembershipoftheHRepsfromamaximumof120toamaximumof180,tobeapportionedamongtheseveral
provincesasnearlyasmaybeaccordingtothenumberoftheirrespectiveinhabitants,althougheachprovinceshallhaveat
least1member;
(2)R.B.H.No.2,callingaconventiontoproposeamendmentstosaidConsti.,theconventiontobecomposedof2
electivedelegatesfromeachrepresentativedistrict,tobe"electedinthegeneralelectionstobeheldonthesecondTues.of
Nov.,1971;"and
(3)R.B.HNo.3proposingthatSec.16,Art.VIofthesameConsti.beamendedastoauthorizetheSenatorsof
theMembersoftheHRepstobecomedelegatestotheaforementionedconstitutionalconventions,w/oforfeitingtheir
respectiveseatsinCongress.
Subsequently,Congresspassedabill,w/c,uponapprovalofthePres.,on6/17/67,becameRA4913,providingthat
theamendmentstotheConsti.proposedintheaforementionedResolutionsNos.1and3besubmitted,forapprovalbythe
people,atthegeneralelectionsw/cshallbeheldon11/14/67.

ISSUE NO. 1: Alternatives Available to Congress. Atty. Juan David, as amicus curiae, maintains that
CongressmayeitherproposeamendmentstotheConsti.orcallaconventionforthatpurpose,butitcannotdo
both,atthesametime.

HELD:Thistheoryisbaseduponthefactthatthe2alternativesareconnectedintheConsti.bythedisjunctive
"or."Suchbasisis,however,aweakone,intheabsenceofothercircumstancessupportingtheconclusiondrawn
bytheamicuscuriae

ISSUENO.2:MayConstitutionalAmendmentsbesubmittedforratificationinageneralelection?

HELD:Yes.The1935Consti.provides:

Art.XV,Sec.1.TheCongressinjointsessionassembled,byavoteofthreefourthsofalltheMembersofthe
SenateandoftheHouseofRepresentativesvotingseparately,mayproposeamendmentstothisConstitutionorcalla
conventionforthepurpose.SuchamendmentsshallbevalidaspartofthisConstitutionwhenapprovedbyamajorityof
thevotescastatanelectionatwhichtheamendmentsaresubmittedtothepeoplefortheirratification.

Thereisinthisprovisionnothingtoindicatethatthe"election"thereinreferredtoisa"special,"not
generalelection.Thecircumstancethat3previousamendmentstotheConsti.hadbeensubmittedtothepeople
forratificationinspecialelectionsmerelyshowsthatCongressdeemeditbesttodosounderthecircumstances
then obtaining. It does not negateits authority tosubmit proposed amendments forratification in general
elections.

ISSUENO.3:WouldthesubmissionnowoftheContestedAmendmentstothePeopleViolatetheSpiritofthe
Constitution?

HELD:No.xxxAlegislationcannotbenullifiedbyreasonofthefailureofcertainsectorsofthecommunity
todiscussitsufficiently. Itsconstitutionalityorunconstitutionalitydependsuponnootherfactorsthanthose
existingatthetimeoftheenactmentthereof,unaffectedbytheactsoromissionsoflawenforcingagencies,
particularlythosethattakeplacesubsequentlytothepassageorapprovalofthelaw.
xxx
Thedetermination oftheconditions underw/c theproposed amendments shallbe submittedtothe
peopleisconcededlyamatterw/cfallsw/inthelegislativesphere.Wedonotbelieveithasbeensatisfactorily
shownthatCongresshasexceededthelimitsthereofinenactingRA4913.xxx

J.Sanchez,Dissenting:

In order that the proposed amendments could be considered to have been properly submitted, "the
people must be afforded opportunity to mull over the original provisions, compare them w/ the proposed
amendments,andtrytoreachaconclusionasthedictatesoftheirconsciencesuggest,freefromtheincubusof
extraneousorpossiblyinsidiousinfluence. Theremustbeafairsubmission,intelligentconsentorrejection."
Suchfairsubmissionwouldbepossibleonlyiftheplebiscitewerescheduledonaspecialdate.RAM.

1.ByCongress

Art.VII,Section1.Anyamendmentto,orrevisionof,thisConstitutionmaybeproposedby:
(1)TheCongress,uponavoteofthreefourthsofallitsMembers;or
(2)Aconstitutionalconvention.

1935Constitution,Art.XV

Art.XV,Sec.1. TheCongressinjointsessionassembled,byavoteofthreefourthsofallthe
MembersoftheSenateandoftheHouseofRepresentativesvotingseparately,mayproposeamendments
tothisConstitutionorcallaconventionforthepurpose.Suchamendmentsshallbevalidaspartofthis
Constitutionwhenapprovedbyamajorityofthevotescastatanelectionatwhichtheamendmentsare
submittedtothepeoplefortheirratification.

Gonzalesv.COMELEC,supra.

2.ByConstitutionalConvention

Sec. 3. The Congress may, by a vote of twothirds of all its Members, call a constitutional
convention,orbyamajorityvoteofallitsMembers,submittotheelectoratethequestionofcallingsucha
convention.

3.ByThePeoplethroughInitiative

RA6735,Secs.5(b)&9(b)

Sec.5.Requirements.xxx
(b)Apetitionforaninitiativeonthe1987Constitutionmusthaveatleasttwelvepercentum(12%)ofthe
totalnumberofregisteredvotersassignatories,ofwhicheverylegislativedistrictmustberepresentedbyatleast
threepercentum(3%)oftheregisteredvoterstherein.InitiativeontheConstitutionmaybeexercisedonlyafterfive
(5)yearsfromtheratificationofthe1987Constitutionandonlyonceeveryfive(5)yearsthereafter.
Sec.9.EffectivityofInitiativeorReferendumProposition.xxx
(b) ThepropositioninaninitiativeontheConstitutionapprovedbyamajorityofthevotescastinthe
plebisciteshallbecomeeffectiveastothedayoftheplebiscite.

B.Ratification

1.InCaseofAmendmentProposedbyCongressorConvention

Art.XVII,Sec.4. Anyamendmentto,orrevisionof,thisConstitutionunderSection1hereof
shallbevalidwhenratifiedbyamajorityofthevotescastinaplebiscitewhichshallbeheldnotearlier
thansixtydaysnorlaterthanninetydaysaftertheapprovalofsuchamendmentorrevision.
xxx

2.InCaseofAmendmentProposedthroughInitiative

Sec.4.xxx
AnyamendmentunderSection2hereofshallbevalidwhenratifiedbyamajorityofthevotescast
in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the
certificationbytheCommissiononElectionsofthesufficiencyofthepetition.

3. PlebiscitetoBeCalledbyCongressAndSupervisedbyCOMELECButTheInitiativeon
ConstitutionWillBeCalledByCOMELEC.

C.Theoriesregardingthepositionoftheconstitutionalconventioninoursystemofgovernment

Cruz: Position of the Constitutional Convention. There are 3 theories on the relative position of the
constitutionalconventionvisvistheregulardepartmentsofthegovernment:
1.TheoryofConventionalSovereignty.Thefirstholdsthattheconstitutionalconventionissupreme
overtheotherdepartmentsofthegovtbec.thepowersitexercisesareinthenatureofsovereignpowers.
2. Thesecondtheoryconsiderstheconstitutionalconventioninferiortotheotherdepartmentsofthe
govtsinceitismerelyacreationofthelegislature.(LegislativeControlTheory.)
3.Thethirddeclaresthataslongasitexistsandconfinesitselfw/inthesphereofitsjurisdiction,the
constitutionalconventionmustbeconsideredindependentofandcoequalw/theotherdepartmentsofthegovt.
(CoequalityTheory.)

Thethirdofthesetheories,w/cisthemostpopular,hasbeenobservedinthisjurisdictionsincethecase
ofMabanagv.LopezVito,78Phil.1.

Tolentinov.COMELEC,41SCRA702(1971)
F: Thisisapetitionforprohibitionprincipallytorestraintheresp.COMELECfromundertakingtoholdaplebiscite
on11/8/71atw/ctheproposedconstitutionalamendmentreducingthevotingageinSec.1ofArtVofthe1935Consti.to
18yrs.shallbesubmittedforratificationbythepeoplepursuanttoOrganicResolutionNo.1oftheConConof1971and
thesubsequentimplementingresolutions,bydeclaringsaidresolutionstobew/otheforceandeffectoflawinsofaras
theydirecttheholdingofsuchplebisciteandbyalsodeclaringtheactsoftheresp.COMELECperformedandtobedone
byitinobediencetotheaforesaidConContobenullandvoid,forbeingviolativeoftheConsti.
xxx
ThemainthrustofthepetitionisthatOrganicResolutionNo.1andtheotherimplementingresolutionsthereof
subsequentlyapprovedbytheConConhavenoforceandeffectaslawsinsofarastheyprovidefortheholdingofa
plebiscitecoincidentw/theelectionof8senatorsandallcity,provincialandmunicipalofficialstobeheldon11/8/71,
hencealloftheComelec'sactsinobediencethereofandtendingtocarryouttheholdingoftheplebiscitedirectedbysaid
resolutionsarenullandvoid,onthegroundthatthecallingandholdingofsuchaplebisciteis,bytheConsti.,apower
lodgedexclusivelyinCongress,asalegislativebody,andmaynotbeexercisedbytheConvention,andthat,underSec.1,
Art. XV of the1935 Consti., theproposed amendment in question cannot bepresentedto thepeople forratification
separatelyfromeachandalloftheotheramendmentstobedraftedandproposedbytheConvention.

ISSUE:Inthecaseatbar,theultimatequestionis:IsthereanylimitationorconditioninSec.1,Art.XVofthe
Consti.w/cisviolatedbytheactoftheconventionofcallingforaplebisciteonthesoleamendmentcontainedin
OrganicResolutionNo.1?

HELD: TheCourtholdsthatthereis,anditistheconditionandlimitationthatalltheamendmentstobe
proposedbythesameConventionmustbesubmittedtothepeopleinasingle"election"orplebiscite.
InorderthataplebiscitefortheratificationofanamendmenttotheConsti.maybevalidlyheld,itmust
provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the
amendmentperseaswellasitsrelationtotheotherpartsoftheConsti.w/w/cithastoformaharmonious
whole. Inthecontextofthepresentstateofthings,wheretheConventionhashardlystartedconsideringthe
meritsofhundreds,ifnotthousands,ofproposalstoamendtheexistingConsti.,topresenttothepeopleany
singleproposalorafewofthemcannotcomplyw/thisrequirement.UnderSec.1,Art.XVoftheConsti.,a
proposaltoamendtheConsti.,shouldbesubmittedtothepeoplenotseparatelyfrombuttogetherw/allthe
otheramendmentstobeproposedbythispresentConvention.

Limitstothepowerofaconstitutionalconvention. Astomattersnotrelatedtoitsinternaloperation
andtheperformanceofitsassignedmissionstoproposeamendments totheConsti.,theconventionandits
officersandmembersareallsubjecttoalltheprovisionsoftheexistingConsti.Nowweholdthatevenastoits
lattertaskofproposingamendmentstotheConsti.,itissubjecttotheprovisionsofSec.1ofArt.XV.Thismust
beso,bec.itisplaintousthattheframersoftheConsti.tookcarethattheprocessofamendingthesameshould
notbeundertakenw/thesameeaseandfacilityinchanginganordinarylegislation.RAM.

D.JudicialReviewofTheAmendingProcess

Gonzalesv.COMELEC,supra.

Theissuew/naResolutionofCongressactingasaconstituentassemblyviolatestheConstitutionis
essentiallyajusticiable,notpolitical(question),andhence,subjecttojudicialreview.

Nature of Power to Amend the Constitution. The power to amend the Consti. or to propose
amendmentstheretoisnotincludedinthegeneralgrantoflegislativepowerstoCongress. Itisapartofthe
inherentpowersofthepeopleastherepositoryofsovereigntyinarepublicanstate,suchasourstomake,
andhence,toamendtheirownfundamentallaw.CongressmayproposeamendmentstotheConsti.merelybec.
thesameexplicitlygrantssuchpower.Hence,whenexercisingthesame,itissaidthatSenatorsandMembersof
theHReps.act,notasmembersofCongressbutascompetentelementsofaconstituentassembly.Whenacting
assuch,themembersofCongressderivetheirauthorityfromtheConsti.,unlikethepeople,whenperforming
thesamefunction,fortheirauthoritydoesnotemanatefromtheConsti.theyaretheverysourceofallpowers
ofgovt,includingtheConstitutionitself.
Since,whenproposing,asaconstituentassembly,amendmentstotheConsti.,themembersofCongress
derivetheirauthorityfromtheFundamentalLaw,itfollows,necessarily,thattheydonothavethefinalsayon
w/ntheiractsarew/inorbeyondconstitutionallimits.Otherwise,theycouldbrushasideandsetthesameat
naught,contrarytothebasictenetthatoursisagovtoflawsandnotofmen,andtotherigidnatureofour
Consti.xxx

Judicial power to nullify executive or legislative acts, not violative of principle of separation of
powers.ThesystemofchecksandbalancesunderlyingthejudicialpowertostrikedownactsoftheExecutive
oroftheCongresstranscendingtheconfinessetforthinthefundamentallawisnotinderogationofpowers,
pursuanttow/ceachdept.issupremew/initsownsphere.

Tolentinov.COMELEC,supra.

ISSUE:W/NSChasjurisdictionoveractsofConstitutionalConvention?

HELD:YES.
ThecourtsmayreviewthevalidityofanactoftheConstitutionalConventionproposingaparticular
amendmenttotheConsti.xxx
Powertoreviewactsoftheconstitutionalconvention.Aconstitutionalconventionissupremew/inthe
domainofitslegitimateauthority.Arevolutionaryconventionw/cdraftsthefirstConsti.ofanentirelynewgovt
born either of war or liberation from a mother country or of a revolution against an existing govt or of a
bloodlessseizureofpower alacoupd'etat iscompletelyw/orestraintandomnipotent. The1971ConCon,
however,cameintobeingonlybyvirtueoftheprovisionsofthe1935Consti.
True it is that once convened, this convention became endowed w/ extraordinary powers generally
beyondthecontrolofanydeptoftheexistinggovt,butthecompassofsuchpowerscanbecanbecoextensive
onlywiththepurposeforwhichitwascalledandastheamendmentsitmayproposecannothaveanyeffectas
partoftheConsti.untilthesameareratifiedbythepeople,itnecessarilyfollowsthattheactsoftheConvention,
itsofficersandmembers,arenotimmunefromattackonconstitutionalgrounds.ThepresentConstiisinfull
forceandeffectinitsentiretyandineveryoneanditsparts,theexistenceoftheConventionnotwithstanding,and
operatesevenwithinthewallsofthatassembly.AstheConstiConventionissubjecttotheConstitutionandthe
ruleoflaw,thusuponprinciple,reasonofauthority,itiswithinthepower,asitisthesolemndutyofthecourt,
undertheexistingConsti(1935)toresolvetheissuesinthiscase.
Rationaleforthepowerofjudicialreview.InupholdingthejurisdictionoftheCourtoverthecaseat
bar,itisnotbec.theCourtissuperiortotheConConorthattheConventionissubjecttothecontrolofthe
Court,butsimplybec.boththeConConandtheCourtaresubjecttotheConsti.andtheruleoflaw,and"upon
principle,reasonandauthority,"perJ.Laurel,itisw/inthepower,asitisthesolemndutyoftheCourtunderthe
existingConsti.,toresolvetheissuesinw/cpetitioner,respondentsandintervenorshavejoinedinthiscase.
RAM.

Javellanav.ExecutiveSecretary,50SCRA30(1973.)

Byvirtueofthemajorityofsixvotesw/fourdissentingvotes,allthecasesweredismissed.Thisbeing
thevoteofthemajority,thereisnofurtherjudicialobstacletotheNewConstitutionbeingconsideredinforce
andeffect.

Art.VIII,Sec.1. ThejudicialpowershallbevestedinoneSupremeCourtandinsuchlower
courtsasmaybeestablishedbylaw.
xxx

E.WhenWillProposedAmendmentsTakeEffect?

CompareArt.XVII,Sec.4withArt.XVIII,Sec.27

Art.XVII,Sec.4. Anyamendmentto,orrevisionof,thisConstitutionunderSection1hereof
shallbevalidwhenratifiedbyamajorityofthevotescastinaplebiscitewhichshallbeheldnotearlier
thansixtydaysnorlaterthanninetydaysaftertheapprovalofsuchamendmentorrevision.
AnyamendmentunderSection2hereofshallbevalidwhenratifiedbyamajorityofthevotescast
in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the
certificationbytheCommissiononElectionsofthesufficiencyofthepetition.

Art. XVIII, Sec. 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon ratification by a
majority of the votes case in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous
Constitutions.
xxx

Recall DeLeonvEsguerra,153SCRA602(1987)whichheldthat: The1987Constitutiontookeffect on


February2,1987,thedateoftheplebiscitenotonFebruary11,1987,thedateofProclamationNo.58,which
proclaimedthattheConstitutionwasratifiedbythepeople.
UPDATED1/25/96
REVISED5/13/96
RAM

You might also like