05_Case Digests
2_Public International Law
Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom vs Iceland) from the net
Facts. Icelands (D) claim to a 12-mile fisheries limit was recognized by the United Kingdom (P) in 1961 in return
for Icelands (D) agreement that any dispute concerning Icelandic fisheries jurisdiction beyond the 12-mile limit be
referred to the International Court of Justice. An application was filed before the I.C.J. when Iceland (D) proposed
to extend its exclusive fisheries jurisdiction from 12 to 50 miles around its shores in 1972. By postulating that
changes in circumstances since the 12-mile limit was now generally recognized was the ground upon which Iceland
(D) stood to argue that the agreement was no longer valid. Iceland (D) also asserted that there would be a failure
of consideration for the 1961 agreement.
Issue. In order that a change of circumstances may give rise to a ground for invoking the termination of a treaty,
is it necessary that it has resulted in a radical transformation of the extent of the obligation still to be performed?
Held. Yes. In order that a change of circumstances may give rise to the premise calling for the termination of a
treaty, it is necessary that it has resulted in a radical transformation of the extent of the obligations still to be
performed. The change of circumstances alleged by Iceland (D) cannot be said to have transformed radically the
extent of the jurisdictional obligation that was imposed in the 1961 Exchange of Notes.
Recourse to the I.C.J. in the event of a dispute was the original agreement between the parties. The economy of
Iceland (D) is dependent on fishing. The merit of Iceland (D) argument was not reached by the Court in this case,
however, but rather dealt with the jurisdictional issues.
In-depth notes:
Validity and duration of the 1961 Exchange of Notes (paras. 24-45 of the Judgment)
The Court next considers whether, as has been contended the agreement embodied in the 1961 Exchange of Notes
either was initially void or has since ceased to operate.
In the above-mentioned letter of 29 May 1972 the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iceland said that the 1961
Exchange of Notes had taken place at a time when the British Royal Navy had been using force to oppose the 12-
mile fishery limit. The Court, however, notes that the agreement appears to have been freely negotiated on the
basis of perfect equality and freedom of decision on both sides.
In the same letter the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iceland expressed the view that "an undertaking for judicial
settlement cannot be considered to be of a permanent nature" and the Government of Iceland had indeed, in an
aide-memoire of 31 August 1971, asserted that the object and purpose of the provision for recourse to judicial
settlement had been fully achieved. The Court notes that the compromissory clause contains no express provision
regarding duration. In fact, the right of the United Kingdom to challenge before the Court any claim by Iceland to
extend its fisheries zone was subject to the assertion of such a claim and would last so long as Iceland might seek
to implement the 1959 Althing resolution.
In a statement to the Althing (the Parliament of Iceland) on 9 November 1971, the Prime Minister of Iceland
alluded to changes regarding "legal opinion on fisheries jurisdiction". His argument appeared to be that as the
compromissory clause was the price that Iceland had paid at the time for the recognition by the United Kingdom
of the 12-mile limit, the present general recognition of such a limit constituted a change of legal circumstances
that relieved Iceland of its commitment. The Court observes that, on the contrary, since Iceland has received
benefits from those parts of the agreement already executed, it behoves it to comply with its side of the bargain.
1 MHH_2.
The letter and statement just mentioned also drew attention to "the changed circumstances resulting from the
ever-increasing exploitation of the fishery resources in the seas surrounding Iceland". It is, notes the Court,
admitted in international law that if a fundamental change of the circumstances which induced parties to accept
a treaty radically transforms the extent of the obligations undertaken, this may, under certain conditions, afford
the party affected a ground for invoking the termination or suspension of the treaty. It would appear that in the
present case there is a serious difference of views between the Parties as to whether there have been any
fundamental changes in fishing techniques in the waters around Iceland. Such changes would, however, be
relevant only for any eventual decision on the merits. It cannot be said that the change of circumstances alleged
by Iceland has modified the scope of the jurisdictional obligation agreed to in the 1961 Exchange of Notes.
Moreover, any question as to the jurisdiction of the Court, deriving from an alleged lapse of the obligation
through changed circumstances, is for the Court to decide, by virtue of Article 36, paragraph 6, of its Statute.
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (hungary/Slovakia) from the net
In 1977, Hungary (P) and Czechoslovakia (D) signed a Treaty for the construction of dams and other projects along
the Danube River that bordered both nations. Czechoslovakia (D) began work on damming the river in its territory
when Hungary (P) stopped working on the project and negotiation could not resolve the matter which led Hungary
(P) to terminate the Treaty. Hungary (P) based its action on the fact that the damming of the river had been agreed
to only on the ground of a joint operation and sharing of benefits associated with the project, to which
Czechoslovakia (D) had unlawfully unilaterally assumed control of a shared resource.
Issue. Shall watercourse states participate in the use, development and protection of an international watercourse
in an equitable and reasonable manner?
Held. Yes. Watercourse states shall participate in the use, development and protection of an international
watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. Hungary (P) was deprived of its rights to an equitable and
reasonable share of the natural resources of the Danube by Czechoslovakia (D) and also failed to respect the
proportionality that is required by international law. Cooperative administration must be reestablished by the
parties of what remains of the project.
The Courts decision was that the joint regime must be restored. In order to achieve most of the Treatys objectives,
common utilization of shared water resources was necessary. Hence, the defendant was not authorized to proceed
without the plaintiffs consent.
In-depth notes:
Notification by Hungary, on 19 May 1992, of the termination of the 1977 Treaty and related instruments (paras.
89-115)
By the terms of Article 2, paragraph 1 (c), of the Special Agreement, the Court is asked, thirdly, to determine
"What are the legal effects of the notification, on 19 May 1992, of the termination of the Treaty by the
Republic of Hungary".
During the proceedings, Hungary presented five arguments in support of the lawfulness, and thus the
effectiveness, of its notification of termination. These were the existence of a state of necessity; the impossibility
of performance of the Treaty; the occurrence of a fundamental change of circumstances; the material breach of
the Treaty by Czechoslovakia; and, finally, the development of new norms of international environmental law.
Slovakia contested each of these grounds.
 05_Case Digests
1. State of necessity
The Court observes that, even if a state of necessity is found to exist, it is not a ground for the termination of a
treaty. It may only be invoked to exonerate from its responsibility a State which has failed to implement a treaty.
2. Impossibility of performance
The Court finds that it is not necessary to determine whether the term "object" in Article 61 of the Vienna
Convention of 1969 on the Law of Treaties (which speaks of "permanent disappearance or destruction of an object
indispensable for the execution of the treaty" as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from it) can also be
understood to embrace a legal regime as in any event, even if that were the case, it would have to conclude that
in this instance that regime had not definitively ceased to exist. The 1977 Treaty and in particular its Articles 15,
19 and 20 actually made available to the parties the necessary means to proceed at any time, by negotiation, to
the required readjustments between economic imperatives and ecological imperatives.
3. Fundamental change of circumstances
In the Court's view, the prevalent political conditions were not so closely linked to the object and purpose of the
Treaty that they constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties and, in changing, radically altered the
extent of the obligations still to be performed. The same holds good for the economic system in force at the time
of the conclusion of the 1977 Treaty. Nor does the Court consider that new developments in the state of
environmental knowledge and of environmental law can be said to have been completely unforeseen. What is
more, the formulation of Articles 15, 19 and 20 is designed to accommodate change. The changed circumstances
advanced by Hungary are thus, in the Court's view, not of such a nature, either individually or collectively, that
their effect would radically transform the extent of the obligations still to be performed in order to accomplish the
Project.
4. Material breach of the Treaty
Hungary's main argument for invoking a material breach of the Treaty was the construction and putting into
operation of Variant c. The Court pointed out that it had already found that Czechoslovakia violated the Treaty
only when it diverted the waters of the Danube into the bypass canal in October 1992. In constructing the works
which would lead to the putting into operation of Variant C, Czechoslovakia did not act unlawfully. In the Court's
view, therefore, the notification of termination by Hungary on 19 May 1992 was premature. No breach of the
Treaty by Czechoslovakia had yet taken place and consequently Hungary was not entitled to invoke any such
breach of the Treaty as a ground for terminating it when it did.
5. Development of new norms of international environmental law
The Court notes that neither of the Parties contended that new peremptory norms of environmental law had
emerged since the conclusion of the 1977 Treaty; and the Court will consequently not be required to examine the
scope of Article 64 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (which treats of the voidance and termination
of a treaty because of the emergence of a new peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens)). On the
other hand, the Court wishes to point out that newly developed norms of environmental law are relevant for the
implementation of the Treaty and that the parties could, by agreement, incorporate them through the application
of Articles 15, 19 and 20 of the Treaty. These articles do not contain specific obligations of performance but require
the parties, in carrying out their obligations to ensure that the quality of water in the Danube is not impaired and
that nature is protected, to take new environmental norms into consideration when agreeing upon the means to
be specified in the Joint Contractual Plan. By inserting these evolving provisions in the Treaty, the parties
2 MHH_2.2_Public International Law
recognized the potential necessity to adapt the Project. Consequently, the Treaty is not static, and is open to adapt
to emerging norms of international law. By means of Articles 15 and 19, new environmental norms can be
incorporated in the Joint Contractual Plan. The awareness of the vulnerability of the environment and the
recognition that environmental risks have to be assessed on a continuous basis have become much stronger in the
years since the Treaty's conclusion. These new concerns have enhanced the relevance of Articles 15, 19 and 20.
The Court recognizes that both Parties agree on the need to take environmental concerns seriously and to take
the required precautionary measures, but they fundamentally disagree on the consequences this has for the joint
Project. In such a case, third-party involvement may be helpful and instrumental in finding a solution, provided
each of the Parties is flexible in its position.
Finally, the Court is of the view that although it has found that both Hungary and Czechoslovakia failed to comply
with their obligations under the 1977 Treaty, this reciprocal wrongful conduct did not bring the Treaty to an end
nor justify its termination.
In the light of the conclusions it has reached above, the Court finds that the notification of termination by Hungary
of 19 May 1992 did not have the legal effect of terminating the 1977 Treaty and related instruments
Techt vs Hughes
Techts (D) dad who was an American citizen, died intestate in New York. His daughter, Techt (D) had tied the knot
with an Austro-Hungarian citizen and under federal law at the time; she had lost her United States citizenship as a
result. The New York law allowed Techt (D) to take property as inheritance if she were to be an alien friend. When
the court established this fact and that she could claim half the inheritance, her sister appealed on the ground that
she was entitled to the whole property because Techt (D) was an alien enemy. The appeals court found Techt (D)
to be an alien enemy at this time because the U.S. was at war with Austria-Hungary in 1919. Techt (D0 however
based her argument on the terms of the Treaty of 1848 between the U.S. and Austria nationals of either state
could take real property by descent.
Issue. Must the court decide whether the provision involved in a controversy is inconsistent with national policy
or safety in a situation whereby a treaty between belligerents at war has not been denounced?
Held. (Cardozo, J.) Yes. The court must decide whether the provision involved in a controversy is inconsistent with
national policy or safety in a situation whereby a treaty between belligerents at war has not been denounced. If a
treaty is in force, it implies that it is the supreme law of the land. There is nothing incompatible with the policy of
the government, safety of the nation, or the maintenance of the war in the enforcement of this treaty, so as to
sustain Techts (D) title. Affirmed.
The effect of war on the existing treaties of belligerents is an unsettled area of the law and this was noted by the
court. Some have opined that treaties end ipso facto at time of war. But in this case, the court found that treaties
end only to the extent that their execution is incompatible with the war.
In-depth notes:
This, I think, is the principle which must guide the judicial department of the government when called upon to
determine during the progress of a war whether a treaty shall be observed in the absence of some declaration by
the political departments of the government that it has been suspended or annulled. A treaty has a twofold aspect.
In its primary operation, it is a compact between independent states. In its secondary operation, it is a source of
private rights for individuals within states. Granting that the termination of the compact involves the termination
of the rights, it does not follow because there is a privilege to rescind that the privilege has been exercised. The
 05_Case Digests
*243243 question is not what states may do after war has supervened, and this without breach of their duty as
members of the society of nations. The question is what courts are to presume that they have done. "Where the
department authorized to annul a voidable treaty shall deem it most conducive to the national interest that it
should longer continue to be obeyed and observed, no right can be incident to the judiciary to declare it void in a
single instance." President and senate may denounce the treaty, and thus terminate its life. Congress may enact
an inconsistent rule, which will control the action of the courts. The treaty of peace itself may set up new relations,
and terminate earlier compacts either tacitly or expressly. The proposed treaties with Germany and Austria give
the victorious powers the privilege of choosing the treaties which are to be kept in force or abrogated. But until
some one of these things is done, until some one of these events occurs, while war is still flagrant, and the will of
the political departments of the government unrevealed, the courts, as I view their function, play a humbler and
more cautious part. It is not for them to denounce treaties generally, en bloc. Their part it is, as one provision or
another is involved in some actual controversy before them, to determine whether, alone, or by force of
connection with an inseparable scheme, the provision is inconsistent with the policy or safety of the nation in the
emergency of war, and hence presumably intended to be limited to times of peace. The mere fact that other
portions of the treaty are suspended or even abrogated is not conclusive. The treaty does not fall in its entirety
unless it has the character of an indivisible act. To determine whether it has this character, it is not enough to
consider its name or label. No general formula suffices. We must consult in each case the nature and purpose of
the specific articles involved.
Sec 2, Art II, 1987 Constitution
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation, and amity with all nations.
Sec 21, Art VII, 1987 Constitution
No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all
the Members of the Senate.
Sec 5(2)(a), Art VIII, 1987 Constitution
The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide,
final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
Sec 18(7), Art XIII, 1987 Constitution
The Commission on Human Rights shall have the following powers and functions:
Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;
Sec 25, Art XVIII, 1987 Constitution
After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of
America concerning military bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines
except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority
of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the
other contracting State.
3 MHH_2.2_Public International Law
Executive Order No. 459
PROVIDING FOR THE GUIDELINES IN THE NEGOTIATION OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND ITS RATIFICATION
Section 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the negotiations of all treaties
and executive agreements, or any amendment thereto, shall be coordinated with, and made only with the
participation of, the Department of Foreign Affairs in accordance with Executive Order No. 292. It is also declared
the policy of the State that the composition of any Philippine negotiation panel and the designation of the
chairman thereof shall be made in coordination with the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Sec. 2. Definition of Terms.
a. International agreement shall refer to a contract or understanding, regardless of nomenclature,
entered into between the Philippines and another government in written form and governed by
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments.
b. Treaties international agreements entered into by the Philippines which require legislative
concurrence after executive ratification. This term may include compacts like conventions, declarations,
covenants and acts.
c. Executive Agreements similar to treaties except that they do not require legislative concurrence.
d. Full Powers authority granted by a Head of State or Government to a delegation head enabling the
latter to bind his country to the commitments made in the negotiations to be pursued.
e. National Interest advantage or enhanced prestige or benefit to the country as defined by its political
and/or administrative leadership.
f. Provisional Effect recognition by one or both sides of the negotiation process that an agreement be
considered in force pending compliance with domestic requirements for the effectivity of the
agreement.
Sec. 3. Authority to Negotiate. Prior to any international meeting or negotiation of a treaty or executive
agreement, authorization must be secured by the lead agency from the President through the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs. The request for authorization shall be in writing, proposing the composition of the Philippine delegation
and recommending the range of positions to be taken by that delegation. In case of negotiations of agreements,
changes of national policy or those involving international arrangements of a permanent character entered into in
the name of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, the authorization shall be in the form of Full
Powers and formal instructions. In cases of other agreements, a written authorization from the President shall be
sufficient.
Sec. 4. Full Powers. The issuance of Full Powers shall be made by the President of the Philippines who may
delegate this function to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs.
The following persons, however, shall not require Full Powers prior to negotiating or signing a treaty or an
executive agreement, or any amendment thereto, by virtue of the nature of their functions:
a. Secretary of Foreign Affairs;
b. Heads of Philippine diplomatic missions, for the purpose of adopting the text of a treaty or an agreement
between the Philippines and the State to which they are accredited;
c. Representatives accredited by the Philippines to an international conference or to an international
organization or one of its organs, for the purpose of adopting the text of a treaty in that conference,
organization or organ.
 05_Case Digests
Sec. 5. Negotiations.
a. In cases involving negotiations of agreements, the composition of the Philippine panel or delegation shall
be determined by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the
lead agency if it is not the Department of Foreign Affairs.
b. The lead agency in the negotiation of a treaty or an executive agreement, or any amendment thereto,
shall convene a meeting of the panel members prior to the commencement of any negotiations for the
purpose of establishing the parameters of the negotiating position of the panel. No deviation from the
agreed parameters shall be made without prior consultations with the members of the negotiating
panel.
Sec. 6. Entry into Force and Provisional Application of Treaties and Executive Agreements.
a. A treaty or an executive agreement enters into force upon compliance with the domestic requirements
stated in this Order.
b. No treaty or executive agreement shall be given provisional effect unless it is shown that a pressing
national interest will be upheld thereby. The Department of Foreign Affairs, in consultation with the
concerned agencies, shall determine whether a treaty or an executive agreement, or any amendment
thereto, shall be given provisional effect.
Sec. 7. Domestic Requirements for the Entry into Force of a Treaty or an Executive Agreement. The domestic
requirements for the entry into force of a treaty or an executive agreement, or any amendment thereto, shall be
as follows:
A. Executive Agreements.
i. All executive agreements shall be transmitted to the Department of Foreign Affairs after their
signing for the preparation of the ratification papers. The transmittal shall include the highlights of
the agreements and the benefits which will accrue to the Philippines arising from them.
ii. The Department of Foreign Affairs, pursuant to the endorsement by the concerned agency, shall
transmit the agreements to the President of the Philippines for his ratification. The original signed
instrument of ratification shall then be returned to the Department of Foreign Affairs for
appropriate action.
B. Treaties.
i. All treaties, regardless of their designation, shall comply with the requirements provided in sub-
paragraph 1 and 2, item A (Executive Agreements) of this Section. In addition, the Department of
Foreign Affairs shall submit the treaties to the Senate of the Philippines for concurrence in the
ratification by the President. A certified true copy of the treaties, in such numbers as may be
required by the Senate, together with a certified true copy of the ratification instrument, shall
accompany the submission of the treaties to the Senate.
ii. Upon receipt of the concurrence by the Senate, the Department of Foreign Affairs shall comply with
the provision of the treaties in effecting their entry into force.
4 MHH_2.2_Public International Law
Sec. 8. Notice to Concerned Agencies. The Department of Foreign Affairs shall inform the concerned agencies
of the entry into force of the agreement.
Sec. 9. Determination of the Nature of the Agreement. The Department of Foreign Affairs shall determine
whether an agreement is an executive agreement or a treaty.
Sec. 10. Separability Clause. If, for any reason, any part or provision of this Order shall be held unconstitutional
or invalid, other parts or provisions hereof which are not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and
effect.
Sec. 11. Repealing Clause. All executive orders, proclamations, memorandum orders or memorandum circulars
inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Sec. 12. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately upon its approval.
DONE in the City of Manila, Nov 25, 1997.
Taada vs Angara
Facts:
Petitioner sought to have the agreement to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) declared unconstitutional
on the grounds that: (1) that the WTO requires the Philippines .to place nationals and products of member-
countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products. and (2) that the WTO .intrudes, limits and/or impairs.
the constitutional powers of both Congress and the Supreme Court, the instant petition before this Court assails
the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to .develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote
the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods..
Issues:
Whether or not the provisions of the Agreement contravene Sec. 19, Art II and Secs. 10 and 12, Art. XII, of the
Philippine Constitution.
Whether or not the Provisions unduly impair or interfere with Legislative Power.
Whether or not the Provisions unduly impair or interfere with Judicial Power.
Whether or not the Concurrence of the Senate with the WTO Agreement and its Annexes sufficient and/or valid.
Held:
Contravention of the Constitution
The Court held that there was no contravention of the Constitution since Art. II or the Declaration of Principles and
State Policies is not self-executory. Secs. 10 and 12, Art. XII, on the other hand, the Court said:
Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from merely laying down general principles relating to the national economy
and patrimony, should be read and understood in relation to the other sections in said article, especially Secs. 1
and 13 thereof which read:
Sec. 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth;
a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people;
and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all especially the underprivileged.
 05_Case Digests
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development and
agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which
are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against
unfair foreign competition and trade practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given optimum
opportunity to develop. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and
arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity.
The Court further stated that the WTO comes with safeguards to protect weaker economies and that the
Constitution does not rule out foreign competition.
The WTO Agreement and Legislative Power
The court held that:
The point is that, as shown by the foregoing treaties, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the
Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of . . . cooperation and amity with all nations.
The WTO Agreement and Judicial Power
A portion of the decision reads:
By and large, the arguments adduced in connection with our disposition of the third issue derogation of
legislative power will apply to this fourth issue also. Suffice it to say that the reciprocity clause more than justifies
such intrusion, if any actually exists. Besides, Article 34 does not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it
is with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system.
So too, since the Philippine is a signatory to most international conventions on patents, trademarks and copyrights,
the adjustment in legislation and rules of procedure will not be substantial.
Validity of the Concurrence of the Senate with the WTO Agreement and its Annexes
Excerpts from the decision read:
Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and its annexes but not in the other
documents referred to in the Final Act, namely the Ministerial Declaration and Decisions and the Understanding
on Commitments in Financial Services is defective and insufficient and thus constitutes abuse of discretion. They
submit that such concurrence in the WTO Agreement alone is flawed because it is in effect a rejection of the Final
Act, which in turn was the document signed by Secretary Navarro, in representation of the Republic upon authority
of the President. They contend that the second letter of the President to the Senate which enumerated what
constitutes the Final Act should have been the subject of concurrence of the Senate.
5 MHH_2.2_Public International Law
A final act, sometimes called protocol de cloture, is an instrument which records the winding up of the
proceedings of a diplomatic conference and usually includes a reproduction of the texts of treaties, conventions,
recommendations and other acts agreed upon and signed by the plenipotentiaries attending the conference. It
is not the treaty itself. It is rather a summary of the proceedings of a protracted conference which may have taken
place over several years. The text of the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations is contained in just one page in Vol. I of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations. By signing said Final Act, Secretary Navarro as representative of the Republic of the Philippines
undertook:
(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective competent authorities
with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and
(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.
The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required from its
signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement.
The Ministerial Declarations and Decisions were deemed adopted without need for ratification. They were
approved by the ministers by virtue of Article XXV: 1 of GATT which provides that representatives of the members
can meet to give effect to those provisions of this Agreement which invoke joint action, and generally with a view
to facilitating the operation and furthering the objectives of this Agreement. [Footnotes Omitted]
Disposition: Petition was denied.
Pimentel vs Romulo
Facts: On July 17, 1998, the Rome Statute was opened for signature at its headquarter in New York. On December
28, 2000, three days before its deadline for signing, the Philippines through its Charge d Affairs, Enrique A. Manalo
signed the Statute. By its provision, however, it is requiring that it be ratified by the accepting states.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, file this petition to compel the Hon. Alberto Romulo (Executive Secretary) and Hon.
Blas Ople (Department of Foreign Affairs) respondents in this case to transmit the signed document to the
Senate for ratification.
Hon. Alberto Romulo and Hon. Blas Ople, on the other hand, argue that they as representative of the Executive
Department have no duty to transmit the Rome Statute to the Senate for concurrence.
ISSUE: Who has the power to ratify the Rome Statute?
HELD: The President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and
is the countys sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts
as the countrys mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority
to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter
into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations.
The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the
ratification.
 05_Case Digests
Thus, this petition is DISMISSED. This Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the
performance of his official duties.
Reyes vs Bagatsing
See Case Digest 3
Held: The court set aside the denial or the modification of the permit sought and order the respondent official to
grant it. The choice of Luneta and U.S. Embassy for a public rally cannot legally objected to in the absence of clear
and present danger to life or property of the embassy. The Philippines, being a signatory of Vienna Conventions
which calls for the protection of the premises of a diplomatic mission, adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land as cited in Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution.
Le Chemise Lacoste vs Fernandez
Facts: La chemise Lacoste is a French corporation and the actual owner of the trademarks Lacoste,
Chemise Lacoste, Crocodile Device and a composite mark consisting of the word Lacoste and a
representation of a crocodile/alligator, used on clothings and other goods sold in many parts of the world and
which has been marketed in the Philippines (notably by Rustans) since 1964. In 1975 and 1977, Hemandas Q. Co.
was issued certificate of registration for the trademark Chemise Lacoste and Q Crocodile Device both in the
supplemental and Principal Registry. In 1980, La Chemise Lacoste SA filed for the registration of the Crocodile
device and Lacoste. Games and Garments (Gobindram Hemandas, assignee of Hemandas Q.Co.) opposed the
registration of Lacoste.
In 1983, La Chemise Lacoste filed with the NBI a letter-complaint alleging acts of unfair competition committed by
Hemandas and requesting the agencys assistance. A search warrant was issued by the trial court. Various goods
and articles were seized upon the execution of the warrants. Hemandas filed motion to quash the warrants, which
the court granted. The search warrants were recalled, and the goods ordered to be returned. La Chemise Lacoste
filed a petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether the proceedings before the patent office is a prejudicial question that need to be resolved before
the criminal action for unfair competition may be pursued.
Held: No. The proceedings pending before the Patent Office do not partake of the nature of a prejudicial question
which must first be definitely resolved. The case which suspends the criminal action must be a civil case, not a
mere administrative case, which is determinative of the innocence or guilt of the accused. The issue whether a
trademark used is different from anothers trademark is a matter of defense and will be better resolved in the
criminal proceedings before a court of justice instead of raising it as a preliminary matter in an administrative
proceeding.
Inasmuch as the goodwill and reputation of La Chemise Lacoste products date back even before 1964, Hemandas
cannot be allowed to continue the trademark Lacoste for the reason that he was the first registrant in the
Supplemental Register of a trademark used in international commerce. Registration in the Supplemental Register
cannot be given a posture as if the registration is in the Principal Register. It must be noted that one may be
declared an unfair competitor even if his competing trademark is registered. La Chemise Lacoste is world
renowned mark, and by virtue of the 20 November 1980 Memorandum of the Minister of Trade to the director of
6 MHH_2.2_Public International Law
patents in compliance with the Paris Convention for the protection of industrial property, effectively cancels the
registration of contrary claimants to the enumerated marks, which include Lacoste.
In-depth notes:
SC: In upholding the right of the petitioner to maintain the present suit before our courts for unfair competition
or infringement of trademarks of a foreign corporation, we are moreover recognizing our duties and the rights of
foreign states under the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property to which the Philippines and
France are parties. We are simply interpreting and enforcing a solemn international commitment of the Philippines
embodied in a multilateral treaty to which we are a party and which we entered into because it is in our national
interest to do so.
The International Convention is essentially a compact between the various member countries to accord in their
own countries to citizens of the other contracting parties trademark and other rights comparable to those
accorded their own citizens by their domestic law. The underlying principle is that foreign nationals should be
given the same treatment in each of the member countries as that country makes available to its own citizens. In
addition, the Convention sought to create uniformity in certain respects by obligating each member nation 'to
assure to nationals of countries of the Union an effective protection against unfair competition.'
The Convention is not premised upon the Idea that the trade-mark and related laws of each member nation shall
be given extra-territorial application, but on exactly the converse principle that each nation's law shall have only
territorial application. Thus a foreign national of a member nation using his trademark in commerce in the United
States is accorded extensive protection here against infringement and other types of unfair competition by virtue
of United States membership in the Convention. But that protection has its source in, and is subject to the
limitations of, American law, not the law of the foreign national's own country xxx
The memorandum is a clear manifestation of our avowed adherence to a policy of cooperation and amity with all
nations. It is not, as wrongly alleged by the private respondent, a personal policy of Minister Luis Villafuerte which
expires once he leaves the Ministry of Trade. For a treaty or convention is not a mere moral obligation to be
enforced or not at the whims of an incumbent head of a Ministry. It creates a legally binding obligation on the
parties founded on the generally accepted principle of international law of pacta sunt servanda which has been
adopted as part of the law of our land. (Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 3). The memorandum reminds the Director of
Patents of his legal duty to obey both law and treaty. It must also be obeyed.
Ichong vs Hernandez
Facts: Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business opportunities
herein abound (then) particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen
enjoyed a monopoly in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the
Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail
business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened several
treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda).
He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the inco me
generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.
 05_Case Digests
HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all
between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause does
not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under
like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced; and, that the equal
protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class,
if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between
those who fall within such class and those who do not.
For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the
statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be
bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to
operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.
Bayan vs Executive Secretary
Facts:
The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among others, the possible elements of the
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted to a series of conferences and negotiations which culminated on
January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by
Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.
Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998 and on May 27, 1999, the senate approved it by (2/3)
votes.
Cause of Action:
Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987 constitution is applicable and not Section 21,
Article VII.
Following the argument of the petitioner, under they provision cited, the foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities may be allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions are sufficiently met:
a) it must be a treaty,
b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held
for that purpose if so required by congress, and
c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what is requires for such
treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the senate.
ISSUE: Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution?
HELD:
Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops or facilities
should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of section 21,
Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the number of
votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the senate.
7 MHH_2.2_Public International Law
The Constitution, makes no distinction between transient and permanent. We find nothing in section 25,
Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines.
It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under
international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty.
USAFFE Veterans Association vs Treasurer of the Philippines
Romulo-Snyder Agreement (1950): RP Govt undertook to return to the US Govt in 10 annual installments, a total
of about $35M advanced by the US to, but unexpended by, the Natl Defense Forces of the RP.
Oct 1954: The Usaffe Veterans Associations Inc prayed in its complaint before the CFI that said Agreement be
annulled; that payments thereunder be declared illegal; & that defendants as officers of RP be restrained from
disbursing any funds in the Natl Treasury in pursuance of said Agreement.
Usaffe Veterans further asked that the moneys available, instead of being remitted to the US, should be turned
over to the Finance Service of the AFP for the payment of all pending claims of the veterans represented by
plaintiff.
3 PROPOSITIONS OF PLAINTIFF IN COMPLAINT: 1) that the funds to be returned under the Agreement were
funds appropriated by the US Congress for the RP Army, actually delivered to the RP Govt & actually owned by the
said Government; 2) that U.S Secretary Snyder of the Treasury, had no authority to retake such funds from the RP
Govt; 3) The RP Foreign Secretary Carlos P. Romulo had no authority to return or promise to return the aforesaid
sums of money through the Agreement.
The court eventually upheld the validity of the Agreement. Plaintiff appealed.
July 26, 1941: Foreseeing the War in the Pacific, Pres Roosevelt, called into the service of the US Armed Forces,
for the duration of the emergency, all organized mil forces of the Commonwealth. (His order was published here
by Proc No 740 of Pres Quezon on Aug 10, 1941)
October 1941: By 2 special orders, MacArthur, Commanding Gen of USAFFE, placed under his command all the
RP Army units including Phil Constabulary.
Thus, US Congress provided in its Appropriation Act of Dec 17, 1941 (Public Law No. 353): For all expenses
necessary for the mobilization, operation & maintenance of the RP Army, including expenses connected w/ calling
into the service RP mil forces$269,000.00; to remain available til June 30, 1943, w/c shall be available for
payment to the Commonwealth upon its written request, either in advance of or in reimbursement for all or any
part of the estimated or actual costs, as authorized by the USAFFE Commanding Gen, of the necessary expenses
for the purposes aforesaid.
Pursuant to the power reserved to him under Public Law 353, Roosevelt issued EO 9011: 2(a) Necessary
expenditures from funds in the Phil Treasury for the purposes authorized by Public Law 353, will be made by
disbursing officers of the RP Army on the approval of authority of the Commandign General, USAFFE, & such
purposes as he may deem proper
 05_Case Digests
P570,863,000.00 was transferred directly to the AFP by means of vouchers w/c stated Advance of Funds under
Public Law 353 & EO 9011 This was used mostly to discharge in RP the monetary obligations assumed by the US
as a result of the induction of the AFP into the US Army, & its operations beginning in 1941.
There remained unexpended & uncommitted $35M in the possession of the AFP as of Dec 31, 1949. Bec the RP
Govt then badly needed funds, Pres Quirino, through CB Gov Cuaderno, proposed to US officials the retention of
the $35M as a loan, & for its repayment in 10 annual installments. This was the Romulo-Snyder Agreement, signed
in Washington on Nov 6, 1950 by RP Foreign Affairs Sec Romulo, & US Sec of Treasury, John Snyder.
PRESENT ACTION: Usaffes arguments 1) the money delivered by the US to the AFP were straight payments for
mil services; ownership thus vested in RP Govt upon delivery, & consequently, there was nothing to return, nothing
to consider as a loan; 2) the Agreement was void bec there was no loan to be repaid & bec it was not binding on
the RP Govt for lack of authority of the officers who concluded it.
ISSUES
Basic issue: Validity of the Romulo-Snyder Agreement Court cant pass judgment
1. WON there is obligation to repay - YES
2. WON the officers who promised to repay had authority to bind this Govt YES
RATIO:
1. YES
Note that the $269M appropriated in Public Law 353 (see 8th bullet) expressly said that the money is to be
handed to the RP Govt either in advance of or in reimbursement thereof.
In any system of accounting, advances of funds for expenditures contemplate disbursements to be reported, &
credited if approved, against such advances, the unexpended sums to be returned later. Congressional law itself
required accounting in the manner prescribed by US Pres - & said Pres in EO 9011, outlined the procedure
whereby advanced funds shall be accounted for.
It also requires as a condition sine qua non that all expenditures shall first be approved by the USAFFE
Commanding Gen.
These ideas of funds advanced to meet expenditures of the Phil Army as may be approved by the USAFFE
Comm-Gen, in connection w/ the accounting requirement, evidently contradict appellants thesis that the moneys
represented straight payments to RP Govt for its armed services, & passed into the absolute control of such Govt
Instead of returning such amount into one lump sum, our Exec Dept arranged for its repayment in 10 annual
installments. Prima facie such arrangement should raise no valid objection, given the obligation to return.
2. YES (They have authority to bind Govt even w/o Senate concurrence)
8 MHH_2.2_Public International Law
There is no doubt Pres Quirino approved the negotiations. And he had the power to contract budgetary loans
under RA 213, amending RA 16.
The most impt argument, however, rests on the lack of ratification of the Agreement by RP Senate to make it
binding on the Govt.
The ff explanation of the defendant was considered persuasive by the Court
hat an
intl agreement may assume. For the grant of treatymaking power to the Executive & the Senate does not exhaust
the power of the govt over intl relations.
e of Senate.
concerned as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained w/n their powers.
reaties is purely a constl one & has not intl legal significance.
the contracting parties & dealing w/ impt commercial relns betn the 2 countries, is a treaty both internationally
although as an executive agreement it is not technically a treaty requiring the advice & consent of the Senate
ations &
independent of or w/o legislative authorization, w/c may be termed as presl agreements; 2) agreements entered
into in pursuance of acts of Cong, w/c have been designated as Congressional-Executive Agreements
-Snyder Agreement may fall under any of these 2 classes for on Sept 18, 1946, RP Congress
authorized the RP Pres to obtain such loans or incur such indebtedness w/ the US.
he
2nd category, namely, as agreements entered into purely as executive acts w/o leg authorization, w/c usu includes
money agreements.
The Agreement was not submitted to the US Senate either. But the Phil Senates Resolution No. 15 practically
admits the validity & binding force of such Agreement.
Further, the acts of Congress appropriating funds for the yearly installments necessary to comply w/ such
Agreement constitute a ratification thereof, W/C PLACES THE QUESTION OF VALIDITY OUT OF THE COURTS
REACH, NO CONSTL PRINCIPLE HAVING BEEN INVOKED TO RESTRICT CONGRESS PLENARY POEWR TO
APPROPRIATE FUNDS LOAN OR NO LOAN.
HELD: Plaintiff failed to make a clear case for the relief demanded. Petition DENIED.
 05_Case Digests 9 MHH_2.2_Public International Law

Bayan Muna vs Alberto Romulo
Facts: In 2000, the RP, through Charge dAffaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by its terms,
is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the signatory states.
In 2003, via Exchange of Notes with the US government, the RP, represented by then DFA Secretary Ople, finalized
a non-surrender agreement which aimed to protect certain persons of the RP and US from frivolous and
harassment suits that might be brought against them in international tribunals.
Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying the Agreement and prays
that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and effect.
The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent Congressional
approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history, we have entered executive
agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most favored-nation rights, patent
rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The
validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts.
Executive agreements may be validly entered into without such concurrence. As the President wields vast powers
and influence, her conduct in the external affairs of the nation is, as Bayan would put it, executive altogether.
The right of the President to enter into or ratify binding executive agreements has been confirmed by long practice.

ISSUE: Petition is DISMISSED.

Whether the Respondents abused their discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for concluding the
RP-US Non Surrender Agreement in contravention of the Rome Statute.

Whether the agreement is valid, binding and effective without the concurrence by at least 2/3 of all the members
of the Senate.

HELD: The petition is bereft of merit.

INTERNATIONAL LAW: Rome Statute

First issue

The Agreement does not contravene or undermine, nor does it differ from, the Rome Statute. Far from going
against each other, one complements the other. As a matter of fact, the principle of complementarity underpins
the creation of the ICC. According to Art. 1 of the Statute, the jurisdiction of the ICC is to be complementary to
national criminal jurisdictions [of the signatory states]. the Rome Statute expressly recognizes the primary
jurisdiction of states, like the RP, over serious crimes committed within their respective borders, the
complementary jurisdiction of the ICC coming into play only when the signatory states are unwilling or unable to
prosecute.

Also, under international law, there is a considerable difference between a State-Party and a signatory to a treaty.
Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a signatory state is only obliged to refrain from acts which
would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty. The Philippines is only a signatory to the Rome Statute and not a
State-Party for lack of ratification by the Senate. Thus, it is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat
the object and purpose of the Rome Statute. Any argument obliging the Philippines to follow any provision in the
treaty would be premature. And even assuming that the Philippines is a State-Party, the Rome Statute still
recognizes the primacy of international agreements entered into between States, even when one of the States is
not a State-Party to the Rome Statute.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 2/3 concurrence

Second issue