CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1

BRING HOME CLASS QUIZ (ARTICLE VI)

INSTRUCTION: Answer the following questions concisely. No need
to use the TRAC method; comprehensive one-liners will get full credit. Use
simple sentencesi.e., avoid run-on, compound, long-winded and
convoluted sentencesin explaining your answers.
A. Officers of the Houses
1. Who are the officers of the Houses of Congress expressly mentioned
in Sec. 16(1) of Article VI? In the present Congress, who are the
respective officers of the Houses, and what are their respective
functions?
The officers of the Houses of the Congress that are expressly
mentioned in Sec. 16(1), Article VI of the Constitution are the Senate
President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. They are elected
by majority vote of all the respective members of their respective houses.
The current Senate President is Senator Aquilino Koko Pimentel III and
the current Speaker of the House of Representatives is Pantaleon Alvarez.
The Senate Presidents main task is to preside over the sessions of the Senate
on the days and at the hours designated by it while the Speaker of the House
of Representative serves as the political and administrative head of the
House. (Abing, Hanilet)
2. Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over a dispute on who
should be the rightful Senate President or House Speaker?
Under the prior constitution, the Supreme Court will have no
jurisdiction over a dispute on who should be the rightful Senate President or
House Speaker. The court ruled in Avelino v Cuenco that the political nature
of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to
elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken
over, by the judiciary, in view of the separation of powers.
However, the expanded judicial powers as written in the 1987
Constitution, the Supreme Court may determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. While the
choosing of the Senate President or the Speaker is a political question, the
Supreme Court may intervene if grave abuse of discretion is manifested.
(Andrino, Dann)
3. Do members of the House, who do not vote for the Senate President
or the House Speaker, ipso facto constitute the minority, who could then
elect the minority leader?
While the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must
be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members
thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall
ipso facto constitute the minority, who could thereby elect the minority
leader. Notably, Rules I and II of the Rules of the Senate do not provide for
the positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an open
clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of
creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. However, such offices, by
tradition and long practice, are actually extant. Verily, no law or regulation
states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority
leader. All that the Charter says is that Each House shall choose such other
officers as it may deem necessary. The method of choosing who will be such
other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative
conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such
method must be prescribed by the Senate itself. (Adolfo, Anna)
B. Quorum
4. Under Sec. 16(2) of Article VI, what is the quorum requirement for a
House of Congress to conduct business? If there is no quorum due to
absences, what is the remedy of those who are present? May those who
are present compel the attendance of a member unable to attend the
session due to incarceration pursuant to a criminal case?
The quorum requirement for the House of Congress to conduct
business under Section 16(2) of Article VI is a majority of each House.
However, if there are absences, a smaller number may adjourn from day to
day and may compel the attendance of the absent members.

No, those who are present cannot compel the attendance of a member
unable to attend the session due to incarceration pursuant to a criminal case.

It may be stated that for emergency or compelling temporary leaves

from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the
authorities or upon court orders. However, in the case of Trillianes v.
Pimentel, the court ruled that, all prisoners whether under preventive
detention or serving final sentence cannot practice their profession nor
engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive,
while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.
Furthermore, the performance of legitimate and even essential duties by
public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.
(Balce, Joaquin)
5. Assuming there is a quorum, what is the vote requirement for the
approval of a bill during 2nd and 3rd reading? May Congress provide
for a super-majority requirement before a statute may be amended or
repealed?
Within a quorum, the vote requirement to approve a bill during 2nd
and 3rd reading is a vote from the majority of the Members present.
 No, the congress cannot provide for a super-majority requirement
before a statute be amended or repealed.

In the case of Kida V. Senate, the Supreme Court nullified a law

requiring a supermajority vote of two thirds of all the members of
congress for purposes of amending or repealing. The said provision gave the
said law the character of an irrepealably law by requiring more than what the
constitution demands. It significantly constricts the future legislators' room
for action and flexibility.
Thus, the congress cannot provide for a super-majority vote
requirement before statute be amended or repealed. (Balongcas, Michael
Rey)
C. Journals
6. In a court litigation, may the judge go beyond what is reflected in the
journals of the Houses of Congress and inquire into what really
happened in the plenary?

No, the judge may not go beyond the journals. In the pronouncement
in US v. PONS the court did not look beyond the journals of congress
because it is already clear and explicit. To go inquire into the veracity of the
journals would mean interference to the legislative functions of congress.
(Barolo, Donna)
7. What is meant by the enrolled bill doctrine? Is this still good law?
Under the enrolled bill doctrine, once a bill passes a legislative body
and is signed into law, the courts assume that all rules of procedure in the
enactment process were properly followed. ANSWER 7.2: Apparently, this
rule is not appropriate in today's modern and developing judicial philosophy.
The fact that the number and complexity of lawsuits may increase is not
persuasive if one is mindful that the overriding purpose of our judicial
system is to discover the truth and see that justice is done. The existence of
difficulties and complexities should not deter this pursuit and we reject any
doctrine or presumption that so provides. (Bello, Maria Lourdes)
D. The Electoral Tribunals
8. What are the requisites for the exercise of the Electoral Tribunals of
their respective jurisdictions?
Section 17, Article 6 of the Constitution provides that the exercise of
the Electoral Tribunals of their respective jurisdictions begins only after the
candidate is considered as either a Member of the House of Representatives
or a Senator. Jurisdiction also provides that a candidate is considered a
Member of the House of Representatives with the concurrence of three
requisites: (a) a valid proclamation; (b) a proper oath; and (c) assumption of
office. (Bongat, Shailah)
9. May an issue previously raised before the COMELEC be raised again
before the Electoral Tribunals?
YES, issues raised before the COMELEC may be raised again before
the Electoral Tribunals.
The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides under Article VI, Section 17
thereof that the HRET and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the
sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of their respective members.
The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and
complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the
jurisdiction of these Tribunals which is conferred upon the HRET and the
SET after elections and the proclamation of the winning candidates. A
candidate who has not been proclaimed and who has not taken his oath of
office cannot be said to be a member of the House of Representatives. In an
existing jurisprudence of the Supreme Court a petition for quo warrant to is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET, even if, the COMELEC had
already passed upon in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the issue
of the qualification of the Member of the House of Representatives while the
latter was still a candidate.
Ergo, issues raised before the COMELEC may be raised again before
the Electoral Tribunals. (Canoy, Vladimir)
10. Under Sec. 17 of Article VI, what is the composition of the Electoral
Tribunals? How are their respective legislative and judicial components
chosen?
Under Sec. 17 of Article VI the electoral tribunals shall be composed
of 9 members, 3 from the judiciary and 6 from the legislation.

The three components from the judiciary shall be Justices of the

Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice and the remaining six
components from the legislative shall be Members of the Senate or the
House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the
basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties
or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein.
The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
(Chiongbian, Joshua)
11. May a member-legislator of an Electoral Tribunal be replaced by
another member-legislator at any time and for just any cause?
Replacing a member-legislator in the Electoral Tribunal cannot be
done at any time or just for any cause because in replacing its member, it
must be done in accordance with the Constitution. To do so would imperil
the independence of the Electoral Tribunal if its members would just be
replaced by another member-legislator at the whim. As enunciated in
Bondoc v. Pineda, the Electoral Tribunals, although not separate from the
Senate or the House of Representatives as the case may be, are independent
from the aforementioned government bodies.

Political Parties could, if allowed, reshuffle the membership of the

Electoral Tribunal to suite their own designs and destroy the independence
of said tribunal. In fact, the same was attempted in the aforementioned case.
As such, a valid cause must be presented in order for the replacement to
happen. (Colina, Mervin)

12. Do the respective leaderships of the Houses of Congress have control

and supervision over the Electoral Tribunals?
No, the respective leaderships of the House of Congress don't have
control and supervision over the Electoral Tribunal.

Section 17, Article VI explicitly states that the Electoral Tribunals of

the Senate and the House of Representatives shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. The usage of the word sole means that the Electoral Tribunals
are independent from the Houses of Congress and, by extension, the
leaderships of thereof.
Angara v. Electoral Commission portrayed the independence of the
Electoral Commission, which is the predecessor of the present Electoral
Tribunals. In said case, it was made clear that the Electoral Commission is
not subservient to the proclamations of the National Assembly when it
comes to electoral contest and related concerns as these rests solely under
the jurisdiction of the Electoral Commission. (Cuizon, Rachelle)
13. May the rules governing the exercise of an Electoral Tribunals
functions be prescribed by a statute enacted by Congress and not by the
rules promulgated by the Tribunal itself?
In Lazatin v. HRET, the courts stated that the Congress has no
power to enact statutes pertaining to the rules that governs the exercise of the
functions of an Electoral Tribunal as the latter is independent of the former.
The Electoral Tribunals, the HRET in Lazatin v. HRET, is the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
Members of the House of Representatives or the Senate. It follows that the
Electoral Tribunals should author its own rules as it is within its jurisdiction.
(Delfin, Jan Cyril)
E. The Commission on Appointments
14. Under Sec. 18 of Article VI, what is the composition of the
Commission on Appointments? How are the members of the Senate and
House contingents to the Commission on Appointments chosen?
Under Sec. 18 of Article VI, the composition of the Commission on
Appointments consists of the Senate President, twelve Senators and twelve
Members of the House of Representatives. The members of the Senate and
House contingents to the Commission on Appointments are elected by each
House, respectively, on the basis of proportional representation of the
political parties therein. (Diabordo, Quennie)
15. Under Sec. 18 of Article VI, how does the Commission on
Appointments vote? What are the legal effects once the Commission on
Appointments confirms an appointment? Rejects an appointment?
Bypasses an appointment?
a. Under the Sec. 18 of Article VI, the commission on appointments rule by
a majority vote of all the members.
b. If the commission confirms an appointment, the official is allowed to
commence or continue discharging the duties related to the office.
c. If the commission rejects the appointment, the official is no longer
allowed to
discharge the duties related to the office, and the president has to appoint
someone else.
d. If the commission bypasses the official, the president can re-appoint that
person. (Fabroa, Charles)
16. Who are the officials covered by the power of consent of the
Commission on Appointments?
Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the heads of
the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and
other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution
(1987) are the officials who are covered by the power of consent of the
Commission on Appointments. (Fua, Angela)
17. Does the President need to get the consent of the Commission on
Appointments if he removes from office an officer subject to the power
of confirmation of the latter?
The President does not need to get the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. A president can either make a nomination or an appointment.
Either action involves the commission. If the President removes an officer
from office who is subject to the power of confirmation of the commission,
this action does not involve the commission to decide. The President, in the
exercise of that power, had carefully considered the fitness and
qualifications of nominees or appointees. To this end, the Rules of the
Commission's Statement of Policy provides that, the commission hereby
declares as its policy that the powers vested in it by the Constitution shall be
discharged with only one impelling motive, which is the efficient and
harmonious functioning of the government, to assure that the President has
exercised the power to appoint wisely by appointing only those who are fit
and qualified. (Gomez, Ross)
18. What is an ad interim appointment? A temporary appointment?
May the President validly refuse to submit to the Commission on
Appointments an ad interim appointment? A temporary appointment?
In Summers vs. Ozaeta, decided on October 25, 1948, the Supreme
Court defined an ad interim appointment as one made in pursuance of
paragraph (4), Section 10, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides
that the President shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress. It is an appointment permanent in nature,
and the circumstance that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. An ad
interim appointment is disapproved certainly for a reason other than that its
provisional period has expired. Said appointment is of course distinguishable
from an acting appointment which is merely temporary, good until another
permanent appointment is issued.
A temporary appointment, on the other hand, is one where the President
designates an officer who meets all the requirements for the position to
which he is being appointed except the appropriate civil service eligibility.
The appointee shall be replaced when the qualified civil service eligible is
available. It is temporary in nature, often done after a sudden vacancy, for
the said vacancy must be filled immediately.
While a temporary appointment is not subject to review and the
subsequent approval or disapproval by the Commission on Appointments, an
ad interim is. Therefore, the President may not validly refuse to submit to
the Commission on Appointments an ad interim appointment. (Labastida,
Bia)
F. Law-making power
19. What is the meaning of originate exclusively in Sec. 24 of Article
VI? What is the extent of the Senates power to propose or concur with
amendments in Sec. 24?
The phrase exclusively originate in Sec. 24 Art. VI means that all
appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public
debt, bills of local application, and private bills, are supposed to be initiated
by the House of Representatives. The Senate is, however, allowed much
leeway in the exercise of its power to propose or concur with amendments to
the bills initiated by the House of Representatives. A senate committee to
which a bill is referred may do any of the following:
1. to endorse the bill without changes;
2. to make changes in the bill omitting or adding sections or altering its
language;
 3. to make and endorse an entirely new bill as a substitute, in which case
it will be known as a committee bill; or (4) to make no report at all.
(Layese, Jose)
20. What is meant by the one subject, one bill rule under Sec. 26(1) of
Article VI? Should the title of a bill comprehensively state all the
contents of the bill?
(a)
The one subject, one bill rule in the Constitution is a necessary
requirement that all bills must hurdle in order to be constitutional. The one
subject, one bill rule means that the body of the bill must be in harmony of
the title that is being used. That the title is sufficient enough to gauge the
possible contents of the provisions that it seeks to represent. As such, any
provision in any given bill or law that is considered inconsistent with the
title of the bill or law in question must be stricken down.
The rule is in place so that the general populace will be fairly
apprised of such laws that are enacted. Fraud in the legislation process may
also be avoided with the usage of the one title, one bill rule. Without said
rule, legislators might approve a law without knowing that some of its
provisions are totally unrelated to the title and might be against their interest
or the interest of the people. Finally, the one subject, one bill rule is used in
order to prevent hodgepodge or logrolling legislation.
(b)
There is no need for the title of the bill to comprehensively state all
the contents of the bill. The Supreme Court has stated that it should be
enough that the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are
germane to that general subject (Tobias v. Abalos). As what can be
surmised above, the provisions need not even be exactly the same matter as
of the title. It only needs to be germane, or related to the title to satisfy the
one subject, one bill rule. (Libago, Richard)
21. Farias v. Executive Secretary: Does Sec. 14 of R.A. 9006, insofar as
it expressly repeals Sec. 67 of B.P. 881 violate the one subject, one bill
rule?
No, it does not violate the one subject one title.
The Constitution provides that, every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the omnibus election
code, which imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office
other than the one they are holding to the other provisions of Republic Act
No. 9006, otherwise known as the Fair Election Act, which deals with the
lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda does not
violate the one subject one title rule. The Supreme Court held that an act
having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any
number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they
are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be
considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and
means of carrying out the general subject; that the title and the objectives of
R.A. 9006 are comprehensive enoughto include subjects other than the
lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda. The
legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election code as a form of
harassment or discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed.
The executive department found cause with Congress when the President of
the Philippines signed the measure into law.
The assailed provisions of R.A. 9006, on Substitution of Candidates
(Sec. 12) and the Repealing Clause (Sec. 14) are indeed germane to the
subject expressed in the title thereof. (Llorico, Lorenza)
22. Tobias v. Abalos: Does R.A. 7675entitled as An Act Converting
the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be
known as the City of Mandaluyongviolate the one subject, one bill
rule?
No, R.A. 7675 does not violate the one subject, one bill rule.
Section 26(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that,
every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall
be expressed in the title thereof.
In the case at bar, the creation of a separate congressional district for
Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its
conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical
consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Furthermore, the
title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily
includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the
creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong. Lastly, a
liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably
adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. This is
promulgated in the case of Sumulong v. Comelec and further elucidated in
Lidasan v. Comelec, which the court ruled that, the constitutional
requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) should be given a
practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient
compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject
and all the provisions are germane to that general subject.
Thus, R.A. 7675 does not violate the one subject, one bill rule.
(Maquilan, Jayson)
23. What is the rationale behind the three-readings-on-separate-days
requirement in Sec. 26(2) of Article VI?
The requirement that every bill should pass three readings on separate
days is enunciated by the constitution to ensure that (a) legislators are fully
informed on the contents of a bill they are supposed to vote upon and (b) to
give them notice that a measure is in progress through the enactment
process; more time and study are thus devoted by the Congress in their
deliberation and consideration of bills, thereby enacting more
comprehensive, well-thought-out laws. Furthermoreit enables them and
other parties interested in the bill to intelligently respond thereto and to put
them on guard against individual personal interests of other legislators,
which were easily materialized under the 1935 Constitution wherein the
three-readings-on-separate-days requirement was not articulated. Bills were
approved in the first, second, and third readings all in one session day only.
As a result, bills were passed into laws without much deliberation, time and
effort from the Congress which led to half-baked legislation, incomplete and
often carried with it flaws supposedly discoverable under a more stringent
measure of review. (Ocampos, Yazsine)
24. Is the determination by the President of what constitutes public
calamity or emergency in Sec. 26(2) of Article VI reviewable by the
Supreme Court?
No, the determination by the President of what constitutes public
calamity or emergency under Sec. 26(2) of Article VI is not reviewable
by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court has held the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law under
Art. VII, Sec. 18, or the existence of a national emergency justifying the
delegation of extraordinary powers to the President under Art. VI, Sec.
23(2), is subject to judicial review because basic rights of individuals may
be at hazard. But the factual basis of presidential certification of bills, which
involves doing away with procedural requirements designed to insure that
bills are duly considered by members of Congress, certainly should elicit a
different standard of review.
Therefore, the determination by the President as to the existence of a
public calamity or emergency constitutes essentially a political question.
(Odias, Del & Vizcayno, Cristen)
25. May the Presidents certification that a bill is urgent be sent only to
one House of Congress?
Yes, the Presidents certification that a bill is urgent may be sent only
to one House of Congress.
Under the case of Kida v. Senate, it shows that the President wrote to
the Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the
immediate enactment of R.A. No. 10153. In this case, the Presidents
certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply
with the three separate readings requirement which follows the ruling in
Tolentino. The House of Representative and the Senate in the exercise of
their legislative discretion gave full recognition to the Presidents
certification and promptly enacted the said law. Hence, the judiciary is not
bound by the acceptance of the Presidents certification by both the House of
Representatives and the Senate.
Therefore, the Presidents certification that a bill is urgent may be sent
only to one House of Congress. (Oporto, Clarisse)
26. What is meant by the no-amendment rule under Sec. 26(2) of Article
VI? Do amendments introduced by the Bicameral Conference
Committeedone to thresh out any variance between the Senate and
House versions of the billviolate this rule?
(a)
The "no-amendment rule" under Section 26(2) of Article VI refers to
the procedure to be followed by each house of Congress with regard to the
third readingof bills initiated in either of the houses of Congress, before said
bill is transmitted to the other house for its concurrence or amendment, that
no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken
immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
(b)
Although not provided for in the Constitution, Congress has
established the so-called Conference Committee, composed of
representatives from the Senate and the House of Representative, which is a
"mechanism for compromising differences" between their respective
versions of a bill or joint resolution.It has been ruled that the committee can
propose an amendment consisting several provisions. In fact, it is within the
power of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely new
provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill. Such
provisions are collectively considered as an amendment in the nature of a
substitute, so long as such amendment is germane to the subject of the bills
before the committee.
Thus it cannot be taken to mean that the introduction by the Bicameral
Conference Committee amendments and modifications to disagreeing
provisions in bills that have been acted upon by both Houses is prohibited.
(Pangalangan, Malou)
27. Under Sec. 27(1) of Article VI, what are the ways by which a bill
may become a law? If the President vetoes a bill, what happens next?
Under sec. 27 (1) of Art.VI,the ways or the methods by which a bill may
become a law are as follows:
(a)
1. When the President approves and signs the bill presented by the Congress;
2. When the President vetoes the bill but the veto is overridden by two-thirds
vote of all the members of each House; and
3. When the President, upon receipt by him of the bill, does not act upon the
measure within thirty days after it shall have been presented to him.
(b)
If the president vetoes a bill, the same with his objections shall be
returned to the House where it originated and shall enter the objections at
large on its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. However, two-thirds vote of
each House will be sufficient to override or invalidate the veto and convert
the bill into law over the Presidents objections. (Quilaquil, Jackie)
28. May the President veto only a provision, and not the entirety, of a
bill? What is meant by item veto? May the President veto a condition
attached to an item of appropriation in an appropriation bill?
(a)
The general rule is that the President must approve a bill entirely or
disapprove the same in toto. The exception applies to appropriation, revenue
and tariff bills, any particular item or items of which may be disapproved
without affecting the item or items to which he does not object.
(b)
Veto means a constitutional right of the president to reject a decision
or proposal made by a law making body.
(c)
No, the President cannot veto a condition or restriction attached to an
item in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill while retaining the particular
item to which such condition or restriction relates; approval of the item
carries with it the approval of the condition attached to it, except only when
such condition is in a nature of an improper provision. (Rosalejos, Joebert)
G. Rule-making power
29. If a House of Congress violates its own rules of procedure, may the
Supreme Court exercise jurisdiction over the controversy?
No, the Supreme Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over controversies
involving violations on internal rules of procedure of Congress. In Osmea v
Pendatun, the Supreme Court said that the theory of Separation of Powers
fastidiously observed by this court. Each department, it has been said, had
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within
its own sphere. Under our form of government, the judicial department has
no power to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative
department, or of either house thereof, taking in pursuance of the power
committed exclusively to that department by the Constitution. Unless such
rules violate fundamental or individual rights, they are within the exclusive
discretion of each House to formulate and interpret their rules of proceedings
and may not be judicially reversed. (Salao, Ralph)
H. Disciplinary power
30. What is the meaning of the phrase disorderly behavior in Sec.
16(3) of Article VI? Is the determination by a House of Congress that an
unparliamentary conduct constitutes disorderly behavior a justiciable
question?
(a)
The phrase disorderly behavior as contemplated in Sec. 16 (3) of
Article VI is left to the prerogative of Congress and cannot as a rule be
judicially reviewed. The matter comes in the category of a political question.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court did not interfere when the legislature
declared that the physical assault by one member against another, or the
delivery of a derogatory speech which the member was unable to
substantiate, constituted "disorderly behavior" and justified the adoption of
disciplinary measures. Other disciplinary measures besides expulsion and
suspension are deletion of unparliamentary remarks from the record, fine,
imprisonment and censure, sometimes called "soft impeachment."
(b)
What constitutes disorderly conduct is within the interpretation of the
legislative body and not the judiciary, because it is a matter that depends
mainly on the factual circumstances of which the House knows best.
Anything to the contrary will amount to encroachment of power. In Osmena
v.Pendatun, the Supreme Court ruled that the House is the judge of what
constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution has
conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on
factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which cannot be
depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the
Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether
a member of the Senates conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it would
thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never
intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. The theory
of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such
situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it has been said,
had exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme
within its own sphere. (Samson, Francis)
31. Under Sec. 16(3) of Article VI, what is the vote requirement for a
legislator to be disciplined by his peers? May a different vote (e.g.
simple majority) be provided by the rules for penalties other than
suspension or expulsion.
(a)
Sec 16(3) of Article VI provides that, the concurrence of two-thirds of
all its members should be met in order to suspend or expel a member
provided that such suspension imposed shall not exceed sixty days.
(b)
Likewise, other disciplinary measures or penalties besides suspension
and expulsion should be concurred by two-thirds of the entire body.
(Saromines, Fatima)
I. Power of inquiry
32. What are the distinctions between the power of legislative inquiry
under Sec. 21 and the question hour under Sec. 22, both of Article VI?
Section 21 (inquiry in aid of legislation) and Section 22 (question
hour) of Article VI of the Constitution are closely related and
complementary to each other, but they do not pertain to the same power of
Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for
legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour,
the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of the oversight
function of Congress. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the
question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. (Sotes,
Aime)
33. May a committee of a House of Congress, and not the House plenary
itself, cite a resource person in contempt during a legislative inquiry?
Yes, a committee of a House of Congress, and not the house plenary
itself, may cite a resource person in contempt during a legislative inquiry.
Article VI, section 21 grants the power of inquiry not only to the
Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective
committees. This is significant because it constitutes a direct conferral of
investigatory power upon the committees and it means that the means which
the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its investigative function
are also available to the Committees. And that the contempt power of the
Congress is founded upon reason and policy and that the power of inquiry
will not be complete if for every contumacious act, Congress has to resort to
judicial interference. (Suazo, Girlie)
34. May a legislative inquiry be validly conducted even without a
proposed legislation stated in the resolution calling for such
investigation?
No, a legislative inquiry must be conducted in aid of legislation under
doctrine of Separation of Powers.
Jurisprudence provides that legislative power remains limited in the
sense that it is substantive and constitutional limitations which circumscribe
both the exercise of the power itself and allowable subjects of legislation.
Broad as it is, the power is not, however, without limitations. Since Congress
may only investigate into the areas in which it may potentially legislate or
appropriate, it cannot inquire into matters which are within the exclusive
province of one of the other branches of the government. Lacking the
judicial power given to the Judiciary, it cannot inquire into matters that are
exclusively the concern of the Judiciary. Neither can it supplant the
Executive in what exclusively belongs to the Executive. (Surposa,
Donabelle)
J. Power of the purse
35. May Congress validly provide in the General Appropriations Act a
much-reduced budget for a government instrumentality (e.g., the
proposed Php1,000.00 budget of the ERC for 2018)?
Yes, the Congress may validly provide in the General Appropriation
Act a much reduced budget for a governmental instrumentality.
Article VI Section 25(1) of our constitution states that The Congress
may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the
operation of the Government as specified in the budget. Our constitution
used the word may which is optional in nature and also there is no
prohibition to reduce the proposed budget made by the President.
Hence, it is discretionary to the Congress whether to increase or
decrease the proposed budget. (Tac-an, Gerald)
36. What are the requisites for the application of the power of
augmentation under Sec. 25(5) of Article VI? Why did the Supreme
Court declare President Aquinos Disbursement Acceleration Program
unconstitutional in Araullo v Aquino?
The application of the power of augmentation under Section 25(5),
Article VI of the Philippine Constitution must be made upon a concurrence
of the following requisites, namely:
a) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate,
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to
transfer funds within their respective offices;
b) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the
appropriations for their respective offices; and
c) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices.
The Supreme Court declared President Aquinos Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP) unconstitutional in Araullo v Aquino because
the President cannot substitute his own will for that of Congress to which the
power to spend public wealth resides as provided by law. Moreover, the
DAPs funding came from withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the
implementing agencies, and the declaration of the withdrawn unobligated
allotments and unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the end of the
fiscal year and without complying with the statutory definition of savings
contained in the General Appropriations Acts and the schematic introduction
of cross-boarder transfers or augmentations which is prohibited due to its
being contradictory to the doctrine of separation of powers and Section 25(5)
of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The exercise of the power to augment
shall be strictly construed by virtue of its being an exception to the general
rule that the funding of programs, activities and projects shall be limited to
the amount fixed by Congress for the purpose. Necessarily, savings, their
utilization and their management will also be strictly construed against
expanding the scope of the power to augment. Such a strict interpretation is
essential in order to keep the Executive and other budget implementers
within the limits of their prerogatives during budget execution, and to
prevent them from unduly transgressing Congress power of the purse.
(Tandayag, Allan)
37. How does the pork barrel system work in general? Why was it
declared unconstitutional in Belgica v. Secretary?
Pork Barrel refers to an appropriation of government spending meant
for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a
representative's district or simply, a legislative control of local
appropriations. In the Philippines, it has been commonly referred to as lump-
sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature.
The "Pork Barrel System" is also referred to as the "collusion between
the Legislative and Executive branches of government to accumulate lump-
sum public funds in their offices with unchecked discretionary powers to
determine its distribution as political largesse with the following elements
make up the Pork Barrel System:

a) lump-sum funds are allocated through the appropriations process to an

individual officer;
b) the officer is given sole and broad discretion in determining how the
funds will be used or expended;
c) the guidelines on how to spend or use the funds in the appropriation
are either vague, overbroad or inexistent; and
d) projects funded are intended to benefit a definite constituency in a
particular part of the country and to help the political careers of the
disbursing official by yielding rich patronage benefits.

They further state that the Pork Barrel System is comprised of two (2)
kinds of discretionary public funds: first, the Congressional (or Legislative)
Pork Barrel, currently known as the PDAF; and, second, the Presidential (or
Executive) Pork Barrel, specifically, the Malampaya Funds under PD 910
and the Presidential Social Fund under PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993.
What the court declared unconstitutional is the Congressional Pork Barrel
currently known as the PDAF and not the Presidential Pork Barrel.

The allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a) P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to
P40 million for hard projects (infrastructure projects like roads,
 buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for soft projects
(scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT
development, etc.);
b) P200 million: for each senator; broken down to P100 million for
hard projects, P100 million for soft projects;
c) P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to P100 million
for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects.
It was declared unconstitutional because it violates the principles of
separation of power, non-delegability of legislative power, principles of
checks and balance, and local autonomy. (Tayaban, Nam)

K. Power of taxation
38. What is meant by the terms uniform and equitable and
progressive under Sec. 28(1) of Article VI? (See Tolentino v.
Secretary; Abakada Guro v. Ermita) What about the phrase actually,
directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or religious
purposes in Sec. 28(3) of Article VI?
The meaning of the terms "uniform and equitable" and "progressive"
under section 28 (1) of article VI are as follows:
First, the concept of uniformity in taxation implies that all taxable
articles or properties of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. It
requires the uniform application and operation, without discrimination, of
the tax in every place where the subject of the tax is found. It does not,
however, require absolute identity or equality under all circumstances, but
subject to reasonable classification.
Second, the concept of equity in taxation requires that the
appointment of the tax burden be, more or less, just in the light of the tax
payer's ability to shoulder the tax burden, and if warranted on the benefits
received from the government. Its cornerstone is the taxpayer's ability to
pay.
Third, the term "progressive", refers to the way the tax rate increases
as the taxable amount increases as a system of taxation. In which persons or
corporations are assessed at a greater percentage of their income according
to the theoretical ability to pay. That is, taxpayers pay more in taxes if they
earn more in income.
The phrase actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious,
charitable, or religious purposes in Sec. 28(3) of Article VI referes to an
exemption from real property tax only. This exemption is in favor of
property used exclusively for charitable or educational purposes is not
limited to property actually indispensable therefore, but extends to facilities
which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
said purposes. (Verzosa, Thessa)