Poli Law Review | Dean Candelaria
04 Article XVI-XVIII Page 1 of 36
Article XVI
Sec. 3
1. Indonesia v Vinzons (RS)
GR 154705 | June 26, 2003 | Azcuna J.
Petitioners: Republic of Indonesia, His Excellency Ambassador Soeratmin, Minister Counsellor Kasim
Respondent: James Vinzon, doing business under the name and style of Vinzon Trade and Services
SUMMARY
Petitioners and Vinzon entered into a Maintenance Agreement wherein the latter was
obligated to provide maintenance services to equipment owned by the diplomatic mission of
the Republic of Indonesia here in the Philippines. RTC and CA ruled in favor of Vinzon, ruling
that Indonesia waived its immunity from suit. WN the CA erred in sustaining the trial courts
decision that petitioners have waived their immunity from suit by using as its basis the
abovementioned provision in the Maintenance Agreement. YES. Petition granted; CA
decision set aside.
The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is a necessary
consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States.
Sanders The practical justification for the doctrine of sovereign immunity is that
there can be no legal right against the authority that makes the law on which the
right depends. In the case of foreign States, the rule is derived from the principle
of the sovereign equality of States, as expressed in the maxim par in parem non
habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction
over one another.
The rules of International Law, however, are neither unyielding nor impervious to
change. The increasing need of sovereign States to enter into purely commercial
activities remotely connected with the discharge of their governmental functions
brought about a new concept of sovereign immunity. The mere entering into a
contract by a foreign State with a private party cannot be construed as the
ultimate test of whether or not it is an act jure imperii or jure gestionis. Such act
is only the start of the inquiry.
o Is the foreign State engaged in the regular conduct of a business? If the
foreign State is not engaged regularly in a business or commercial
activity, and in this case it has not been shown to be so engaged, the
particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature.
o If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof,
then it is an act jure imperii.
Hence, the existence alone of a paragraph in a contract stating that any legal
action arising out of the agreement shall be settled according to the laws of the
Philippines and by a specified court of the Philippines is not necessarily a waiver
of sovereign immunity from suit.
FACTS
PFRC to set aside the Decision of the CA dated May 30, 2002 and its Resolution
dated August 16, 2002, in CA-G.R. SP No. 66894 entitled The Republic of
Indonesia, His Excellency Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counselor Azhari
Kasim v. Hon. Cesar Santamaria, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 145, Makati City, and
James Vinzon, doing business under the name and style of Vinzon Trade and
Services.
Bautista Caguioa Chavez Cupin David Dulay Enguio Feble Galon Gammad Gan Gerona Giltendez Gonzales Lambino Lukban Macabulos Magbanua Nitura Oducado Pabilane Quintos Ramos Remollo Rivera Santos Tan Taylo Uy
Compilation 6.
Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered into a
Maintenance Agreement in August 1995 with Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon
Trade and Services.
Maintenance Agreement provided:
o Vinzon shall, for a consideration, maintain specified equipment at the
Embassy Main Building, Embassy Annex Building and the Wisma Duta,
the official residence of Ambassador Soeratmin.
o Equipment covered: air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical
facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps.
o Effectivity: period of four years and will renew itself automatically unless
cancelled by either party by giving thirty days prior written notice from
the date of expiry.
Petitioners claim: sometime prior to the date of expiration of the said agreement,
or before August 1999, they informed Vinzon that the renewal of the agreement
shall be at the discretion of the incoming Chief of Administration, Minister
Counsellor Kasim, who was expected to arrive in February 2000.
3/2000 When Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed the position of Chief of
Administration, he allegedly found Vinzons work and services unsatisfactory and
not in compliance with the standards set in the Maintenance Agreement.
8/31/2000 Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the agreement in a letter.
Petitioners claim, moreover, that they had earlier verbally informed Vinzon of their
decision to terminate the agreement.
Vinzon claims that termination was arbitrary and unlawful. He cites various
circumstances which purportedly negated petitioners alleged dissatisfaction over
respondents services:
o July 2000 Minister Counsellor Kasim still requested Vinzon to assign to
the embassy an additional full-time worker to assist one of his other
workers;
o August 2000 Minister Counsellor Kasim asked Vinzon to donate a prize,
which the latter did, on the occasion of the Indonesian Independence
Day golf tournament; and
o And in a letter dated 8/22/2000 Ambassador Soeratmin thanked
Vinzon for sponsoring a prize and expressed his hope that the cordial
relations happily existing between them will continue to prosper and be
strengthened in the coming years.
12/15/2000 Vinzon filed a complaint against petitioners docketed as Civil Case
No. 18203 in RTC-Makati
2/20/2001 petitioners filed a MTD, alleging that Indonesia, as a foreign sovereign
State, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as a party-defendant
in the Philippines.
o Motion further alleged that Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister
Counsellor Kasim are diplomatic agents as defined under the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations [VCDR] and therefore enjoy
diplomatic immunity.
3/20/2001 In turn, Vinzon filed an Opposition to the said motion alleging that
Indonesia has expressly waived its immunity from suit. He based this claim upon
the following provision in the Maintenance Agreement: Any legal action arising
Poli Law Review | Dean Candelaria Compilation 6.04 Article XVI-XVIII
out of this Maintenance Agreement shall be settled according to the laws of the
Philippines and by the proper court of Makati City, Philippines.
Vinzons Opposition likewise alleged that Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister
Counsellor Kasim can be sued and held liable in their private capacities for tortious
acts done with malice and bad faith.
5/17/2001 trial court denied petitioners MTD; likewise denied the MR filed
after. Petitioners appealed.
CA denied the petition for lack of merit. Denied MR. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: WN the CA erred in sustaining the trial courts decision that petitioners have waived
their immunity from suit by using as its basis the abovementioned provision in the
Maintenance Agreement. YES.
HELD: The petition is impressed with merit. Petition granted. CA decision & resolution set
aside.
RATIO:
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA DID NOT WAIVE ITS IMMUNITY FROM SUIT
International law is founded largely upon the principles of reciprocity, comity,
independence, and equality of States which were adopted as part of the law of our
land under Article II, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is a necessary
consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States.
Sanders v. Veridiano II the practical justification for the doctrine of sovereign
immunity is that there can be no legal right against the authority that makes the
law on which the right depends. In the case of foreign States, the rule is derived
from the principle of the sovereign equality of States, as expressed in the
maxim par in parem non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and
cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary attitude would unduly
vex the peace of nations.
The rules of International Law, however, are neither unyielding nor impervious to
change. The increasing need of sovereign States to enter into purely commercial
activities remotely connected with the discharge of their governmental functions
brought about a new concept of sovereign immunity.
o This concept, the restrictive theory, holds that the immunity of the
sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure
imperii, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis
United States v. Ruiz the conduct of public bidding for the repair of a wharf at a
US Naval Station is an act jure imperii. On the other hand, we considered as an
act jure gestionis the hiring of a cook in the recreation center catering to American
servicemen and the general public at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City, as
well as the bidding for the operation of barber shops in Clark Air Base in Angeles
City.
Apropos the present case, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign State
with a private party cannot be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it
is an act jure imperii or jure gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry.
Bautista Caguioa Chavez Cupin David Dulay Enguio Feble Galon Gammad Gan Gerona Giltendez Gonzales Lambino Lukban Macabulos Magbanua Nitura Oducado Pabilane Quintos Ramos Remollo Rivera Santos Tan Taylo Uy
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o Is the foreign State engaged in the regular conduct of a business? If the
foreign State is not engaged regularly in a business or commercial
activity, and in this case it has not been shown to be so engaged, the
particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature.
o If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof,
then it is an act jure imperii.
Hence, the existence alone of a paragraph in a contract stating that any legal
action arising out of the agreement shall be settled according to the laws of the
Philippines and by a specified court of the Philippines is not necessarily a waiver
of sovereign immunity from suit.
The aforesaid provision contains language not necessarily inconsistent with
sovereign immunity.
On the other hand, such provision may also be meant to apply where the
sovereign party elects to sue in the local courts, or otherwise waives its
immunity by any subsequent act.
The applicability of Philippine laws must be deemed to include Philippine laws in
its totality, including the principle recognizing sovereign immunity. Hence, the
proper court may have no proper action, by way of settling the case, except to
dismiss it.
Submission by a foreign state to local jurisdiction must be clear and unequivocal.
It must be given explicitly or by necessary implication. We find no such waiver in
this case.
Vinzon concedes that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is a sovereign
function. On the other hand, he argues that the actual physical maintenance of
the premises of the diplomatic mission, such as the upkeep of its furnishings and
equipment, is no longer a sovereign function of the State. SC disagrees.
There is no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act jure
imperii.
A sovereign State does not merely establish a diplomatic mission and leave it at
that; the establishment of a diplomatic mission encompasses its maintenance
and upkeep.
Hence, the State may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the
premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy and the living quarters of
its agents and officials.
It is therefore clear that petitioner Republic of Indonesia was acting in pursuit of
a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with Vinzon for the upkeep
or maintenance of the air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities,
water heaters, and water motor pumps of the Indonesian Embassy and the
official residence of the Indonesian ambassador.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment, submits the view that, the Maintenance
Agreement was entered into by the Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of its
governmental functions. In such a case, it cannot be deemed to have waived its
immunity from suit.
o As to the paragraph in the agreement relied upon by respondent, the
Solicitor General states that it was not a waiver of their immunity from
suit but a mere stipulation that in the event they do waive their
immunity, Philippine laws shall govern the resolution of any legal action
Poli Law Review | Dean Candelaria Compilation 6.04 Article XVI-XVIII
arising out of the agreement and the proper court in Makati City shall be
the agreed venue thereof.
PETITIONERS MAY NOT BE SUED IN THEIR PRIVATE CAPACITIES
On the matter of whether or not petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister
Counsellor Kasim may be sued herein in their private capacities, Article 31 of the
VCDR provides: x x x
o 1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal
jurisidiction of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from
its civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of:
o (a) a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the
territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the
sending State for the purposes of the mission;
o (b) an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is
involved as executor, administrator, heir or legatee as a private person
and not on behalf of the sending State;
o (c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity
exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his
official functions. x x x
The act of petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim in
terminating the Maintenance Agreement is not covered by the exceptions
provided in the abovementioned provision.
The Solicitor General believes that said act may fall under subparagraph (c)
thereof, but said provision clearly applies only to a situation where the diplomatic
agent engages in any professional or commercial activity outside official functions,
which is not the case herein.
2. Mobil Philippines v Customs Arrastre (HQ)
G.R. No. L-23139 December 17, 1966 BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Plaintiff-Appellant: MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION, INC.
Defendant-Appellees: CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE and BUREAU of CUSTOMS
SUMMARY: 4 cases of drill parts were shipped via SS Leoville from abroad to port of Manila.
When the shipment arrived, it was discharged to the custody of Customs Arrastre Sevice.
When CAS delivered the shipment to the (broker of) consignee Mobil, it was short of 1 case.
Hence, Mobil sued CAS and BoC for recovery of value of lost case plus damages. Issue: W/N
CAS and BoC may be sued? No.
BoC is under the Dept of Finance with no separate personality from the government. Its
primary function is governmental (assessing and collecting fees from imported articles etc.)
The fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function proprietary in nature
does not necessarily result in its being suable. If the said non-governmental function is
undertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver of the sovereign
immunity from suit extended to such government entity. Arrastre service is a necessary
incident of BoCs governmental function. Although said arrastre function may be deemed
proprietary, it is a necessary incident of the primary and governmental function of the
Bureau of Customs, so that engaging in the same does not necessarily render said Bureau
liable to suit. For otherwise, it could not perform its governmental function without
Bautista Caguioa Chavez Cupin David Dulay Enguio Feble Galon Gammad Gan Gerona Giltendez Gonzales Lambino Lukban Macabulos Magbanua Nitura Oducado Pabilane Quintos Ramos Remollo Rivera Santos Tan Taylo Uy
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necessarily exposing itself to suit. Sovereign immunity, granted as to the end, should not be
denied as to the necessary means to that end.
FACTS:
Four (4) cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad on S.S. "Leoville"
(huhu Atty. Palacios) sometime in November 1962, consigned to Mobil Philippines
Exploration, Inc., Manila.
The shipment arrived at the Port of Manila on April 10, 1963, and was discharged
to the custody of the Customs Arrastre Service [CAS] (the unit of the Bureau of
Customs [BoC] then handling arrastre operations therein)
CAS later delivered to the broker of the consignee three cases only of the
shipment.
Mobil Phils. filed suit in the CFI Manila against the CAS and the BoC to recover the
value of the undelivered case in the amount of P18,493.37 plus other damages.
CAS and BoC filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that not being
persons under the law, they cannot be sued.
CFI: Dismissed the complaint on the ground that neither the CAS nor the BoC is
suable.
Hence, Mobil Phils. appealed.
ISSUE: W/N Customs Arrastre Service and Bureau of Customs may be sued (under the facts
stated)? No.
HELD: WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs
against Mobil.
RATIO:
Mobils Contentions:
Not all government entities are immune from suit
That BoC as operator of the arrastre service at the Port of Manila, is discharging
proprietary functions and as such, can be sued by private individuals.
By authorizing the BoC to engage in arrastre service, the law thereby impliedly
authorizes it to be sued as arrastre operator, for the reason that the nature of this
function (arrastre service) is proprietary, not governmental.
Legal Bases of Mobil:
1. Rules of Court
A defendant in a civil suit must be either a) natural person; b) juridical person or c)
an entity authorized by law to be sued
(Well, CAS and BoC are not juridical persons lalo na natural persons) Thus, insofar
rd
as arrastre operation is concerned, CAS and BoC would be under the 3 category
of "entities authorized by law" to be sued.
It is argued that while there is no law expressly authorizing the BoC to sue or be
sued, still its capacity to be sued is implied from its very power to render arrastre
service at the Port of Manila, which it is alleged, amounts to the transaction of a
private business.
2. Tariff and Customs Code
Poli Law Review | Dean Candelaria Compilation 6.04 Article XVI-XVIII
Tariff and Customs Code provides that the BoC has exclusive supervision and
control over the receiving, handling, custody and delivery of articles on the
wharves at all ports of entry.
It is also stated under the TCC that whenever in his judgment the receiving,
custody etc. of articles can be carried on by private parties with greater efficiency,
the BoC Commissioner may, after public bidding and subject to the approval of the
department head, contract with any private party for such services, and in such
event, the contract may include the sale or lease of government-owned equipment
and facilities used in such service.
3. Jurisprudence
Associated Workers Union, et al. vs. Bureau of Customs, et al.: SC indeed held "that
the foregoing statutory provisions authorizing the grant by contract to any private
party of the right to render said arrastre services necessarily imply that the same
is deemed by Congress to be proprietary or non-governmental function."
>> BUT the SC said that the case cited by Mobil is not applicable in the case at bar. The
issue in the cited case is whether laborers engaged in arrastre service fall under the
concept of employees in the Government employed in governmental functions for
purposes of the right to strike
>> Thus, the ruling therein was that the Court of Industrial Relations had jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case, but not that the Bureau of Customs can be sued.
SC cited the case of Bureau of Printing, et al. vs. Bureau of Printing Employees Association,
et al:
Doctrines:
The fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function proprietary
in nature does not necessarily result in its being suable.
If said non-governmental function is undertaken as an incident to its
governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity
from suit extended to such government entity.
Some info about Bureau of Printing
Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government created by the Admin Code of
1916; It has no corporate existence, and its appropriations are provided for in the
General Appropriations Act.
As such instrumentality of the Government, it operates under the direct
supervision of the Executive Secretary, Office of the President, and is "charged
with the execution of all printing and binding, including work incidental to those
processes, required by the National Government and such other work of the same
character
While the Bureau of Printing is allowed to undertake private printing jobs, it
cannot be pretended that it is thereby an industrial or business concern.
The additional work it executes for private parties is merely incidental to its
function, and although such work may be deemed proprietary in character, there
is no showing that the employees performing said proprietary function are
separate and distinct from those employed in its general governmental functions.
Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical
personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued.
Bautista Caguioa Chavez Cupin David Dulay Enguio Feble Galon Gammad Gan Gerona Giltendez Gonzales Lambino Lukban Macabulos Magbanua Nitura Oducado Pabilane Quintos Ramos Remollo Rivera Santos Tan Taylo Uy
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Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would
actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule
is settled that the Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over
its objection.
Applying the (correctly) cited case to the case at bar
The Bureau of Customs is part of the Department of Finance with NO PERSONALITY of its
own apart from that of the national government.
Its primary function is governmental, that of assessing and collecting lawful
revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees,
charges, fines and penalties
To this function, arrastre service is a necessary incident. (Why? For practical
reasons, said revenues and customs duties cannot be assessed and collected by
simply receiving the importer's/consignee's declaration of merchandise being
imported and imposing the duty provided in the Tariff law. Customs authorities
and officers must see to it that the declaration tallies with the merchandise
actually landed. And this checking up requires that the landed merchandise be
hauled from the ship's side to a suitable place in the customs premises to enable
said customs officers to make it, that is, it requires arrastre operations.)
Although said arrastre function may be deemed proprietary, it is a necessary
incident of the primary and governmental function of the Bureau of Customs, so
that engaging in the same does not necessarily render said Bureau liable to suit.
For otherwise, it could not perform its governmental function without necessarily
exposing itself to suit.
Sovereign immunity, granted as to the end, should not be denied as to the
necessary means to that end.
SC, then, cited another case (National Airports Corporation vs. Teodoro ) and differentiated
such from the case at bar
In Natl Airports case, the Civil Aeronautics Administration was found have for its
prime reason for existence not a governmental but a proprietary function, so that
to it the latter was not a mere incidental function:
Among the general powers of the Civil Aeronautics Administration are to execute
contracts of any kind, to purchase property, and to grant concessions rights, to
charge landing fees, royalties on sales to aircraft of aviation gasoline, accessories
and supplies, and rentals for the use of any property under its management.
These provisions confer upon the Civil Aeronautics Administration the power to
sue and be sued. The power to sue and be sued is implied from the power to
transact private business.
So, whats Mobils remedy?
Mobilshould have filed its present claim to the General Auditing Office, it being for
money under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 327, which state the conditions
under which money claims against the Government may be filed.
Some statutory construction:
Statutory provisions waiving State immunity from suit are strictly construed and
Poli Law Review | Dean Candelaria Compilation 6.04 Article XVI-XVIII
that waiver of immunity, being in derogation of sovereignty, will not be lightly
inferred.
From the provision authorizing the BoC to lease arrastre operations to private
parties, there is no authority to sue the said Bureau in the instances where it
undertakes to conduct said operation itself.
BoC, acting as part of the machinery of the national government in the operation
of the arrastre service, pursuant to express legislative mandate and as a necessary
incident of its prime governmental function, is immune from suit, there being no
statute to the contrary.
3. Del Mar v PVA (VG)
*Unincorporated Agencies
G.R. No. L-27299 June 27, 1973
Petitioner: QUIRICO DEL
Respondent: THE PHILIPPINE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION
Summary: Del Mar files mandamus against Philippine Veterans Administration in Cebu to
compel the latter to pay continue paying him monthly pension with monthly allowances and
the corresponding increase due to the amended law. He fought in WWII, was discharged
and obtained support due to permanent physical disability. Since he was receiving pension
from the US government, PVA discontinued his monthly pension. The issue is WON he can
file a money claim against PVA? Court said yes. The GR is that the government is immune
from suit without its consent. The exception is when the claimant institutes an action against
a functionary who fails to comply with his statutory duty to release the amount claimed from
the public funds already appropriated by statute for the benefit of the said claimant. Also,
section 9 of Republic Act 65, intends to prevent the receipt the same beneficiary of
concurrent or multiple pensions benefits similar to each other in nature and basis, although
coursed through different departments or agencies, but paid out of the funds of the same
Government. Lastly, the law concedes to administrative bodies like the PVA the
authority to act on and decide claims and applications in accordance with their judgment, in
the exercise of their adjudicatory capacity. There is limit, however, applies where there has
been a failure to interpret and apply the statutory provisions in question.
In 1964, Quirico del Mar filed with the CFI of Cebu petition for mandamus (civil case R-
8465) against the Philippine Veterans Administration to compel the latter to continue
paying him monthly life pension of P50 from the date of its cancellation in March 1950
to June 20, 1957, and thereafter, from June 22 1957 of P100 (as increased by Republic
Act 1920).
Aside from that, to pay him as well the monthly living allowance of P10 for each of his
unmarried minor children below eighteen years of age, pursuant to the said RA 1920.
Del Mar also asked for compensatory, moral and exemplary damages.
Del Mar averred that he served during World War II as chief judge advocate of the Cebu
Area Command (a duly recognized guerrilla organization) with the rank of major.
- That he subsequently obtained an honorable discharge from the service on
October 20, 1946 on a certificate of permanent total physical disability
- That PVA granted him a monthly life pension of P50 effective January 28, 1947 and
discontinued payment of his monthly life pension on the ground that his receipt of
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a similar pension from the United States Government precluded him from
receiving any further monthly life pension from the Philippine Government
PVA reiterated its contention that del Mar's receipt of a similar pension from the United
States Government effectively barred him from claiming and receiving from the
Philippine Government monthly life pension as well as the monthly allowances he
claimed for his five living unmarried minor children below eighteen years of age.
- It also asserted that it is discretionary on its part to grant or discontinue the
pension sought by del Mar.
- In addition, it alleged that the action of del Mar was premature because of his
failure to exhaust administrative remedies before invoking judicial intervention,
and that the court a quo was without jurisdiction to try the case as del Mar
demand partakes of a money claim against the PVA a mere agency of the
Philippine Government and, in effect, of a suit against the Government which is
not suitable without its consent. The PVA thus prayed for the dismissal of the
petition.
MAR
After due trial, the CFI granted the case in favor of del Mar.
Hence, the present appeal by the PVA.
ISSUE: WON the lower court has jurisdiction to decide the civil case involving the money
claim against PVA?
HELD: Court grants the petition.
GR: The government is immune from suit without its consent. Exception: When the
claimant institutes an action against a functionary who fails to comply with his statutory
duty to release the amount claimed from the public funds already appropriated by statute
for the benefit of the said claimant.
PVAs argument
The PVA argues that the court a quo was without jurisdiction to try civil case because it
involves a money claim against the said PVA a mere agency of the Government
performing governmental functions with no juridical personality of its own and, in
reality, partakes of an action against the Philippine Government which is immune
from suit without its consent.
It cited Republic of the Philippine vs. Ramolete and Del Mar, to wit:
- ....a charge against the Government where the money involved is part of the
public funds, is a suit against the Government, and the happenstance that the
action is directed against the PVA as an entity and not against the Republic of the
Philippines is of no moment.
- Perforce, the Republic of the Philippines, on matters of administration of all
benefits due to the veterans of revolutions and wars, and to their heirs and
beneficiaries, acts and has to act through its agency and instrumentality, the PVA.
The suit should therefore be regarded as one against the Republic of the
Philippines; the PVA is therefore exempt from the filing of an appeal bond.
However, the SC said that is mistaken. It stated in precise language the sole issue for
resolution in that case, thus:
- The decisive point in the aforementioned case related to the status of the PVA as
an agency or instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines exercising
governmental functions as to be entitled to exemption from the filing of the
Poli Law Review | Dean Candelaria Compilation 6.04 Article XVI-XVIII
appeal bond per section 16 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, not to the nature of
the claim sought to be enforced by the private respondent therein (del Mar)
against the said PVA.
- Thus, in the said case, this Court showed conclusively that the PVA is an entity or
agency of the Republic of the Philippines performing governmental functions.
True, this Court referred to the claim of the private respondent therein as "a claim
for a sum of money against the Government, which claim, if adjudged finally to be
meritorious, would render the Republic of the Philippines liable therefor," since
the funds from which the claim was to be satisfied were funds appropriated by
Congress for the PVA;
- But this Court properly and advisedly omitted any study and consideration of the
question of suitability or non-suitability of the Government in connection
therewith.
The general rule on the on the immunity of the Government from suit without its
consent holds true in all actions resulting in "adverse consequences on the public
treasury, whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of property."
Nonetheless, the rule admits of an exception. It finds no application where a claimant
institutes an action against a functionary who fails to comply with his statutory duty to
release the amount claimed from the public funds already appropriated by statute for
the benefit of the said claimant.
Clearly, this case falls within the exception.
Section 6 of Regulation No. 2 of the "Rules and Regulations on Veterans' Benefits" adopted
by the PVA in enforcing Section 9 of RA 65 is invalid. The said section 6 reads as follows:
- SEC. 6. Effect of receipt of USVA pension benefit termination, reduction. An
award of a similar disability compensation from the US Veterans Administration
shall be a ground for the cancellation of a disability pension granted under the
Regulation.
- Pursuant to the foregoing, the PVA cancelled and discontinued the monthly life
pension of del Mar reasoning that the latter's receipt of a similar pension from the
United States Government precluded his enjoying any like benefit from the
Philippine Government.
- The PVA said that the Regulation on sought to implement section 9 of Republic Act
65, as amended, particularly its excepting clause. Said section 9 reads:
SEC. 9. The persons mentioned in sections one and two hereof who are
permanently incapacitated from work . shall be given a life pension of
one hundred pesos a month, and ten pesos a month for each of his
unmarried minor children below eighteen years of age, unless they are
actually receiving a similar pension from other Government funds, and
shall receive, in addition, the necessary hospitalization and medical care.
- The PVA reads the phrase "from other Government funds" as necessarily including
funds of the United States Government.
Section 9 of Republic Act 65, as amended, in providing for the excepting clause,
obviously intends to prevent the receipt the same beneficiary of concurrent or multiple
pensions benefits similar to each other in nature and basis, although coursed through
different departments or agencies, but paid out of the funds of the same Government.
Any contrary interpretation resulting in the derogation of the interests of the
beneficiary who likewise receives a similar pension paid out funds of other
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Governments, conflicts with the establish axiom ordaining the construction of pension
laws of war veterans in favor of those seeking their benefits.
Section 20 of Republic Act 65, amended states that the power suspend the payment of
the monthly life pension awarded to disabled veteran belongs exclusively to the
President of the Philippines this was not exercised, del Mar can claim.
On the alleged undue interference by the court a quo with the purely discretionary
functions of the PVA in the matter of granting discontinuing the pension benefits.
The law concedes to administrative bodies like the PVA the authority to act
on and decide claims and applications in accordance with their judgment, in the
exercise of their adjudicatory capacity.
Because of their acquired expertise in specific matters within the purview of their
respective jurisdictions, the findings of these administrative bodies merit not only
great weight but also respect and finality.
"There is limit, however, to such a deference paid to the actuations or such bodies,
Clearly, where there has been a failure to interpret and apply the statutory
provisions in question, judicial power should assert itself. Under the theory of
separation of power it is to the judiciary, and to the judiciary alone, that the final
say on questions of law in appropriate cases coming before it is vested."
4. Ministerio v CFI (LC)
GR L-31635 | Aug. 31, 1971 | Fernando, J.
Petitioners: Angel Ministerio and Asuncion Sadaya
Respondents: CFI of Cebu, Presided by Judge Borromeo. The Public Highway Commissioner, and the Auditor General
Summary: Ministerio and Sadaya (Ministerio) are owners of a certain lot that was used by
the Cebu government to widen a road. There was no proceeding instituted, and there was
no payment of just compensation, with no agreement whatsoever. So Ministerio wants to
sue for restoration of possession or for payment of just compensation. CFI ruled against
Ministerio, saying that this was a suit against the Government, and the Government had not
consented to be sued.
SC held that when a State officer, while claming to act for the state, violates or invades
personal nad property rights, under an unconstitutoional act or under an assumption of
authority whiche he does not have, such suit is not against the State within the provision
that the State may not be sued without its consent.
Hence, since there was no proceeding for eminent domain ever established, the
respondents may be sued. Doctrine of immunity cannot be used to wreak injustice upon
citizens.
FACTS
On April 13, 1966, Ministerio and Sadaya (Ministerio) filed a complaint with the CFI
of Cebu, seeking the payment of just compensation for a registered lot.
They alleged that in 1927, the government, through authorized representatives,
took physical and material possession of the lot, and used it to widen Gorordo
Avenue, a national road.
Poli Law Review | Dean Candelaria Compilation 6.04 Article XVI-XVIII Page 7 of 36

o There was no just compensation paid. o To avail of this immunity, it doesnt even need to be named in the case
o There was no agreement, written or verbal. as the party proceeded against.
They alleged that they made repeated demands for the payment of its price or o If it appears that the action would hold the government liable, then the
return of its possession immunity applies.
o Defendants Public Highway Commissioner and Auditor general REFUSED o So even if the defendants named are public officials, with the
to restore possession. government not being named, the immunity would hold.
Appraisal Commmitee, in 1965, appraised the lot at P50 per square meter, or o This is clearly so where a litigation would result in a financial
P52250 total. responsibility for the government
o After this, the complaint was amended either give back possession, or Disbursement of funds
pay just compensation. Loss of property
The PHC and AG, through the OSG (acronyms!) argued that the suit, in reality, was o In these cases, the party that may be adversely affected is the
one against the government. government. Thus, the defense of non-suability may be interposed.
o Thus, it should have been dismissed no consent of the government o Court here cited Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, which essentially reiterates
was shown. what I just said above.
The lower court, respondent in this case, promulgated the decision which is However, it is a different matter where the public official is sued, in his capacity as
currently under review. such, for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of a plaintiff.
o CFI agreed with the PHCs argument. Bureau of Telecommunications v. Aligean
o They said that it was unquestioned that the land was used by the o State authorizes only legal acts by its officers unauthorized acts are
government for road purposes. not acts of the State.
o There was no evidence of whether or not there was a contract, or of Thus, an action against these officers by one whose rights have
payment. been invaded or violated is not a suit against the state which
o CFI said that it may be presumed that when the land was taken, payment requires consent.
was made. o In the same tenor, an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer
There was also no explanation why the case was filed only in on the ground that
1966. While claiming to act for the State;
o Anyway, their main point was this granting that there was no He violates or invades the personal and property rights of the
compensation given, the case is undoubtedly against the national plaintiff;
government, and there was NO SHOWING that the government had Under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of
consented to be sued. authority which he does not have
o While it may be contended that the suit was against the PHC and the AG, o Such suit is not a suit against the State within the constitutional
and not the Government, they are sued in their official capacity. Thus, provision that the State may not be sued without its consent.
suit is still against the government, who shouldve been made a party, Thus, it follows that the CFI should have passed on the plaintiffs right then and
but with its consent. there, for recover of possession, since no proceeding for eminent domain, as
THUS, this petition. required by the then Code of Civil Procedure, was ever instituted.
o If the constitutional mandate that the owner be compensated for
ISSUE property taken for public use were to be respected, then this suit
The principle error assigned is against the CFI for holding that the case should have should not be summarily dismissed.
been dismissed. o The doctrine of immunity from suit CANNOT be used as an instrument
SC: The decision of the lower court CANNOT STAND. for perpetrating injustice on a citizen.
o It must sit. o Had the government followed the procedure indicated by law, there
o And by sit I mean it should be struck down. would have been a complaint filed, and only after payment or tender of
o Hehe. compensation would it have the right to enter and use the land.
o It should not be allowed that precisely due to a failure to abide with the
RATIO requirements of law, that the government would benefit.

The Court here establishes the rules by which suits against the government are However, since restoration would not be convenient of feasible, the only relief
governed, and explains why the suit in this case should prosper. would be for the government to make due compensation.
As a general rule, the government is immune from suit without its consent. o Thus, the SC reversed the CFI decision

Bautista Caguioa Chavez Cupin David Dulay Enguio Feble Galon Gammad Gan Gerona Giltendez Gonzales Lambino Lukban Macabulos Magbanua Nitura Oducado Pabilane Quintos Ramos Remollo Rivera Santos Tan Taylo Uy
Poli Law Review | Dean Candelaria
o It remanded it to the CFI to determine the compensation to which the
petitioners are entitled.
o The rule is to determine due compensation for lands appropriated by
the Government, the basis should be the price or value at the time that
it was taken from the owner and appropriated by the Government.
5. Syquia v Almeda Lopez (JG)
G.R. No. L-1648 | August 17, 1949 | MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Petitioners: PEDRO SYQUIA, GONZALO SYQUIA, and LEOPOLDO
Respondents: NATIVIDAD ALMEDA LOPEZ, Judge of Municipal Court of Manila, CONRADO V. SANCHEZ, Judge of Court
of First Instance of Manila, GEORGE F. MOORE, ET AL.
RECIT-READY:
Plaintiffs, the Syquias are the owners of three apartments in Manila. They executed 3 lease
contracts in favor of the U.S. government for the occupancy of the latters armed forces. The
term is for the duration of the war and 6 months thereafter, unless sooner terminated by
the US. At the time, Moore was the Commanding General of the US Army, while Tillman was
under the command of Moore. Moore had control over the occupancy of the apartment
buildings, while Tillman receives direct orders from Moore. In March 1946, or 6 months after
the war ended, plaintiffs Syquias requested Tillman to cancel the leases. Tillman refused, but
assured the petitioners that the U.S. Government would vacate the premises before
February 1, 1947. This was not complied with. Another formal notice was served upon
Moore, Tillman and other US Army officers occupying the said apartments, but there was
still no compliance. Thus, plaintiffs filed an action in the Municipal Court of Manila for
unlawful detainer. The municipal court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the defendants
and over the subject matter of the action, because the real party in interest was the U.S.
Government. Further, the court said that a foreign government like the United States
Government cannot be sued in the courts of another state without its consent. Plaintiffs
appealed to the Court of Manila, which affirmed the municipal court and added that
plaintiffs in this case are seeking not only to recover possession of the three apartment
houses but also to collect back rents, which may become a charge against the U. S. Treasury.
Thus, plaintiffs filed this petition for mandamus.
1. Whether or not the real party defendant in interest is the Government of the United
States of America -- YES
2. Whether or not courts of the Philippines including the Municipal Court of Manila have
jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful detainer -- NO
Where private parties sue not only to recover possession of property being held by officers
or agents acting in the name of a foreign government (such as US in this case), but also to
collect money claims, which may result into the financial liability of the foreign government,
then the courts of the Philippines cannot exercise jurisdiction without the consent of said
government, because essentially such suit is one against the foreign government.
FACTS:
The plaintiffs named Pedro, Gonzalo, and Leopoldo, all surnamed Syquia, are the
undivided joint owners of three apartment buildings situated in Manila known as
the North Syquia Apartments, South Syquia Apartments and Michel Apartments.
Mid-1945, said plaintiffs executed three lease contracts, one for each of the three
apartments, in favor of the United States of America.
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Compilation 6.04 Article XVI-XVIII Page 8 of 36
o The term for the duration of the war and six months thereafter, unless
sooner terminated by the United States of America.
o The apartment buildings were used for quartering officers of the U. S.
armed forces stationed in the Manila area.
In March 1947, when these court proceedings were commenced, George F. Moore
was the Commanding General of the U. S. Army
o He had control and authority over the occupancy of the said apartment
houses in the name of the United States Government.
Erland A. Tillman was under the command of Moore and was in direct charge and
control of the lease and occupancy of said three apartment buildings.
SYQUIA
But neither Moore nor Tillman occupied any part of the premises in question.
The war ended in September of 1945 when the Japanese surrendered.
In March of 1946 or 6 months thereafter, petitioners requested the return of the
apartment buildings but were advised that the U. S. Army wanted to continue
occupying the premises.
Plaintiffs Syquia requested Tillman to cancel said three leases and to release the
apartment buildings but the latter refused to comply with the request.
Tillman assured the petitioners that the U.S. Government would vacate the
premises before February 1, 1947, but this was not complied with.
So petitioners served formal notice upon defendants Moore and Tillman and 64
other army officers or members of the United States Armed Forces who were then
occupying apartments in said three buildings, demanding (a) cancellation of said
leases; (b) increase in rentals to P300 per month per apartment effective thirty
days from notice; (c) execution of new leases for the three or any one or two of
the said apartment buildings for a definite term, otherwise, (d) release of said
apartment buildings within thirty days of said notice in the event of the failure to
comply with the foregoing demands.
After the expiration of the 30-day without any of the defendants having complied
with plaintiffs' demands, the plaintiffs filed an action in the Municipal Court of
Manila for unlawful detainer.
The municipal court dismissed the action because it found that:
o The court had no jurisdiction over the defendants and over the subject
matter of the action, because the real party in interest was the U.S.
Government.
o There was a previous order stating that the war between the United
States of America and her allies on one side and Germany and Japan on
the other, had not yet terminated and, consequently, the period or term
of the three leases had not yet expired;
o That under the well settled rule of International Law, a foreign
government like the United States Government cannot be sued in the
courts of another state without its consent;
o That although the United States of America has not been named therein
as defendant, it is really the real defendant in this case, as the parties
named as defendants are officers of the United States Army and were
occupying the buildings in question as such and pursuant to orders
received from that Government.
Plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Manila, which affirmed the order of the
municipal court dismissing plaintiffs' complaint.
Poli Law Review | Dean Candelaria Compilation 6.04 Article XVI-XVIII
It ruled that real party defendant in interest is the United States Government itself,
which cannot be sued without its consent, specially by citizens of another country.
o The CFI stated that although in U.S. v. Lee courts have jurisdiction over
cases where private parties sue to recover possession of property being
held by officers or agents acting in the name of the U. S. Government, it
cannot be applied in this case because plaintiffs in this case are seeking
not only to recover possession of the three apartment houses but also to
collect back rents, which may become a charge against the U. S.
Treasury. (affirmed by SC)
Thus, petitioners filed this petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to order the
Municipal Court of Manila to take jurisdiction over the case.
On June 18, 1949, counsel for petitioners informed the court that petitioners had
already received from the U. S. Army Forces the rentals due for the three
apartments, but with the reservation that said acceptance should not be construed
as jeopardizing the other rights of the petitioners against respondents in the case
now pending.
Because of this, counsel for respondents claimed that the case has become moot
since both respondent Moore and Tillman had long left the Islands for other Army
assignments, and that both the possession of the three apartments in question as
well as the rentals for their occupation have already been received by the
petitioners.
Counsel for the petitioners however, insists that a decision be rendered on the
merits, particularly on the question of jurisdiction of the municipal court over the
original action, to serve as a guide in future cases involving cases of similar nature
such as contracts of lease entered into between the Government of the United
States of America on one side and Filipino citizens on the other regarding
properties of the latter.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the real party defendant in interest is the Government of the United
States of America -- YES
2. Whether or not courts of the Philippines including the Municipal Court of Manila have
jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful detainer -- NO
RATIO:
DOCTRINE: Where private parties sue not only to recover possession of property being held
by officers or agents acting in the name of a foreign government (such as US in this case),
but also to collect money claims, which may result into the financial liability of the foreign
government, then the courts of the Philippines cannot exercise jurisdiction without the
consent of said government, because essentially such suit is one against the foreign
government.
The CFI was correct in citing U. S. vs. Lee and U. S. vs. Tindal, supra, wherein it was
held that a private citizen claiming title and right of possession of a certain
property may file a case against the officers and agents of the Government to
recover possession of said property, though in doing so, said officers and agents
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claim that they are acting for the Government. (General Rule; not applicable to this
case)
o In such case the court may entertain such a suit altho the Government
itself is not included as a party-defendant.
o Of course, the Government is not bound or concluded by the decision.
o The philosophy of this ruling is that unless the courts are permitted to
take cognizance and to assume jurisdiction over such a case, a private
citizen would be helpless and without redress and protection of his rights
which may have been invaded by the officers of the government
professing to act in its name.
However, and this is important, where the judgment in such a case would result
not only in the recovery of possession of the property in favor of said citizen but
also in a charge against or financial liability to the Government, then the suit
should be regarded as one against the government itself, and, consequently, it
cannot prosper or be validly entertained by the courts except with the consent of
said Government. (Exception; applicable to this case)
In this case the real party in interest as defendant in the original case is the United
States of America.
o The lessee was the United States of America and the lease agreement
themselves were executed in her name by her officials acting as her
agents.
o The considerations or rentals was always paid by the U. S. Government.
o Any back rentals or increased rentals will have to be paid by the U. S.
Government because the premises were used by officers of her armed
forces.
Moore, Tillman and the army officers who actually occupied the apartments could
not be held individually responsible for the payments of rentals or damages in
relation to the occupancy of the apartment houses in question.
o They had no intervention whatsoever in the execution of the lease
agreements nor in the initial occupancy of the premises.
o Tillman was merely under the control of Moore, his superior officer.
o As to defendant General Moore, when he assumed his command in
Manila, these lease agreement had already been negotiated and
executed and were in actual operation. The three apartment buildings
were occupied by army officers assigned thereto by his predecessors in
office.
o All that he must have done was to assign or billet incoming army officers
to apartments as they were vacated by outgoing officers due to changes
in station.
o As to the army officers, they were merely assigned quarters in the
apartment buildings in question. Said assignments or billets may well be
regarded as orders, and all that those officers did was to obey them, and,
accordingly, occupied the rooms assigned to them.
Because of these we hold that:
o the real party defendant in interest is the Government of the United
States of America;
Poli Law Review | Dean Candelaria Compilation 6.04 Article XVI-XVIII
o that any judgment for back or increased rentals or damages will have to
be paid not by defendants Moore and Tillman and their 64 co-
defendants but by the said U. S. Government.
On the basis of the ruling in the case of Land vs. Dollar, the present action must be
considered as one against the U. S. Government.
It is clear that the courts of the Philippines including the Municipal Court of Manila
have no jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful detainer.
The question of lack of jurisdiction was raised and interposed at the very beginning
of the action.
The U. S. Government has not given its consent to the filing of this suit which is
essentially against her, though not in name.
6. Shauf v CA (QN)
G.R. No. 90314
Nov. 27, 1990
Regalado, J.
Petitioners: Loida Q. Shauf and Jacob Shauf
Respondents: Court of Appeals; Don E. Detwiler; Anthony Persi
Summary:
Loida Shauf was an American of Filipino origin who was highly qualified for the position of
guidance counselor in Clark Air Base. She applied for such position when a vacancy occurred,
however, defendants Detwiler and Persi failed to consider her application. Instead, an
unqualified American, Isaakson, was appointed to the position. Feeling aggrieved, Shauf filed
a complaint for discrimination with the Office of Civilian Personnel Operations, but such was
not decided on. She then filed a complaint for damages based on the discrimination in the
RTC of Angeles City. Defendants argued that they were immune from suit for being
government officials in the performance of their duty. The RTC ruled in favor of Shauf. The
CA ruled that there was indeed discrimination but such was not grave enough to merit the
award of damages. The CA thus reversed the RTC. The SC reversed the CA. It rejected the
defense that Detwiler and Persi were immune from suit due to state immunity from suit. The
doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public
official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of
protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they
are sued in their individual capacity. In this case, defendants are being sued in their personal
capacity for discriminatory acts done. The acts done by Detwiler and Persi were contrary to
law and are not covered by state immunity from suit.
Facts: (Sobrang dami nung facts, pero ito na yung pinaka relevant for our class. If you want
to know all the facts, please refer to the full text.)
Respondent Don Detwiler is the civilian personnel officer of Clark Air Base. He is in
charge of the civilian personnel in the base. Anthony Persi was the education
director.
Petitioner Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin married to an American who is a
member of the US Air Force, applied for the vacant position of Guidance Counselor
in the Base Education Office at Clark Air Base.
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o She has a Master of Arts degree from UST and has completed 34
semester hours in psychology-guidance and 25 quarter hours in human
behavioral science. She has completed all course work for a PhD in
human behavior and counseling. She is a civil service eligible. She has
functioned as Guidance Counselor at Clark Air Base for approximately 4
years at the time of her application in 1976.
o In other words, shes highly qualified.
Because Loida was not selected, she filed an equal employment opportunity
complaint against the private respondents for alleged discrimination against her by
reason of her nationality and sex. This complaint was filed with the Office of
Civilian Personnel Operations.
Quick summary of how the position was filled: (Just skim through this if you want)
o The position of Guidance Counselor, GS 1710-9, became vacant on
October 1976. The Civilian Personnel Division thereafter advertised the
vacancy and asked for applications.
o Three applications were considered. One of which was Loidas. All of
which were referred to Mr. Persi. Persi said that the application of Loida
was lacking a reply to an inquiry attached to the application, thus leading
him to doubt the validity of her work experience. The two other
applicants had the minimum qualifications.
o Parsi returned the three applications to the Civilian Personnel Office
without a selection decision. He also asked the Central Oversea Rotation
and Recruiting Office (CORRO) for the submission of a list of highly
qualified candidates.
o Instead of giving the list to Parsi, CORRO appointed a certain Mr. Edward
B. Isaakson to the position. Parsi accepted the appointment. Isaakson
was however not qualified for the job.
Feeling aggrieved, Loida Shauf wrote the US Civil Service Commission to question
the qualifications of Edward Isaakson. The US CSC found that Isaakson was indeed
not qualified and thus requested Detwiler to remove him from the position.
Detwiler did not comply.
Shauf also wrote the Base Commander of Clark Air Base requesting a hearing on
her complaint for discrimination. Such was held on March 29, 1978.
Before the discrimination complaint was decided, Shauf filed a complaint for
damages on April 27, 1978 against Detwiler and Persi before the RTC of Angeles
City, Branch 56, for the alleged discriminatory acts in maliciously denying her
application.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that as officers of the US
Armed Forces performing official functions, they are immune from suit. Such
motion was denied by the trial court. MR was denied.
o Respondents subsequently filed an Answer which were basically denials
of the allegations.
The trial court ruled in favor of Shauf and awarded actual, moral and exemplary
damages as well as attorneys fees.
Both parties appealed to the CA.
o Shauf says the lower court erred in saying that the actual damages
($39,662.49) could be paid in Philippine Pesos. She also said that the
moral damages (Php100,000) was too small.
Poli Law Review | Dean Candelaria
o Defendants say the RTC erred in not dismissing the case on the ground of
immunity from suit.
The CA reversed the ruling of the RTC.
Issues:
1. WON Detwiler and Persi are immune from suit because of a states immunity from
suit NO
2. WON Detwiler and Persi discriminated against Shauf YES
3. WON the private respondents violated Article XIII, Sec. 3 of the Constitution which
provides for equality of employment opportunities YES
4. WON Shauf is barred from filing suit because of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies NO
Held: WHEREFORE, the challenged decision and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 17932 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Private respondents are hereby
ORDERED, jointly and severally, to pay petitioners the sum of P100,000.00 as moral
damages, P20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees, and the costs of suit.
Ratio:
[MAIN] DETWILER AND PERSI ARE NOT COVERED BY STATE IMMUNITY
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now expressed in Article
XVI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles
of international law.
It is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts
allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties.
o If the judgment against said officials will require the state itself to
perform an affirmative act to satisfy it, such as the appropriation of
money to pay the damages awarded, the suit must be regarded as
against the state itself.
o This rule is not all-encompassing.
It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity
as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of the plaintiff.
o Unauthorized acts of government officials are not acts of the State, and
an action against the officials by one whose rights have been invaded or
violated by such acts is not a suit against the State within the rule of
immunity of the State from suit.
o The doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice.
The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where
the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary
citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government
is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity.
o This situation usually arises where the public official acts without
authority or in excess of the powers vested in him.
o It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in
his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused
by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his
authority or jurisdiction.
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The case of USA v. Guinto explicitly ruled that the US Armed Forces in Clark Air
Base are no exception from this rule.
DETWILER AND PERSI DID DISCRIMINATE AGAINST SHAUF
The lower court found that there is ample evidence to sustain the complaint for
discrimination on account of her sex, color and origin.
o Persi did not even consider the application of Shauf for the position.
o Defendant Persi gave as his excuse that there was a question in his mind
regarding validity of plaintiff Loida Q. Shaufs work experience because
of lack of record. But his assertion is belied by the fact that plaintiff Loida
Q. Shauf had previously been employed as Guidance Counselor at the
Clark Air Base in 1971 and this would have come out if defendant Persi
had taken the trouble of interviewing her.
o Nor can defendant free himself from any blame for the non-appointment
of plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf by claiming that it was CORRO that appointed
Edward B. Isakson. This would not have happened if defendant Persi
adhered to the regulation that limits the appointment to the position of
Guidance Counselor, GS-1710-9 to qualified dependents of military
personnel of the Department of Defense who are locally available like
the plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf. He should not have referred the matter to
CORRO.
o Furthermore, defendant Persi should have protested the appointment of
Edward B. Isakson who was ineligible for the position. He, however,
remained silent because he was satisfied with the appointment.
o Detwilers acts were also found to be discriminatory. He originally denied
the extension of Mrs. Mary Abalateos appointment as guidance
counselor. Her retirement would have created the vacancy allowing
Shauf to be appointed. However, Detwiler extended Abalateos
appointment to bar Shauf from applying for the position.
Such factual findings of the RTC must be accorded great weight on appeal. The CA
affirmed that there were indeed discriminatory acts, but such were not so grave as
to warrant the award for damages.
o Because of this discrepancy, the SC decided to rule on the findings of
fact.
o The SC upheld the factual findings of the RTC which supported the award
for damages.
SHAUFS RIGHT TO EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES WERE VIOLATED
Article XIII, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution provides that the State shall afford
full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and
promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
th
o Such is also provided for in the 14 Amendment of the US Constitution.
The acts committed by Detwiler and Persi violated the basic constitutional right of
Shauf to earn a living which is an integral aspect of the right to life. They must be
held accountable.
Shauf is indeed entitled to moral damages. However, there is no justification for
the award of actual or compensatory damages supposedly based on her unearned
income. The basis used by the plaintiff for such award of actual damages is highly
speculative. She never acquired vested rights on the salary.
SHAUF IS NOT BARRED FROM FILING THE SUIT
Poli Law Review | Dean Candelaria Compilation 6.04 Article XVI-XVIII
Respondents argue that Shauf falied to avail herself of er remedy under the US
federal legislation on equality of opportunity for civilian employees.
This is belief by the fact that the Department of the Air Force wrote Shauf to
inform her of her appeal rights which were the following:
o You may appeal to the Civil Service Commission within 15 calendar days
of receipt of the decision. Your appeal should be addressed to the Civil
Service Commission, Appeals Review Board, 1990 E Street, N.Q.,
Washington, D.C. 20415. The appeal and any representation in support
thereof must be submitted in duplicate.
o In lieu of an appeal to the Commission you may file a civil action in an
appropriate U.S. District Court within 30 days of receipt of the decision.
o If you elect to appeal to the Commissions Appeals Review Board, you
may file a civil action in a U.S. District Court within 30 days of receipt of
the Commissions final decision.
o A civil action may also be filed anytime after 180 days of the date of
initial appeal to the Commission, if a final decision has not been
rendered.
Shaufs appeal to the Appeals Review Board has not been decided. She thus
availed of the last remedy.
Furthermore, it is basic that remedial statutes are to be construed liberally. Such is
the case here because Shauf is entitled to these remedies as a matter of plain and
simple justice.
7. Baer v Tizon (RK)
DONALD BAER, Commander U.S. Naval Base, Subic Bay, Olongapo, Zambales, petitioner, vs.HON. TITO V. TIZON, as
Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, and EDGARDO GENER, respondents.
G.R. No. L-24294 May 3, 1974
SUMMARY: Private respondent Gener was logging areas within the Subic Military Base
pursuant a TLA issued in his name. Subsequently, Petitioner Commander prevented Gener
from logging inside pursuant to the Bases Agreement as security was a concern. Gener then
filed an injunction case in the CFI of Bataan. Petitioner invoked sovereign immunity and
argued that he acted in his official capacity as an agent of Amurrica and therefore any suit
concerning his actions, as such, is a suit against Amurrica. There being no consent, the case
should be dismissed. Respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss, hence the present
certiorari. The SC held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is applicable. The doctrine of
state immunity is not limited to cases which would result in pecuniary charge against the
sovereign or would require the doing of an affirmative act by it. Prevention of sovereign
from doing an affirmative act pertaining directly and immediately to the most important
public function of any governmentthe defense of the stateis equally as untenable as
requiring it to do an affirmative act.
FACTS:
Case: Certiorari questioning the order of Judge Tizon denying motion to dismiss filed by
petitioner Baer in a case filed by private respondent against him on the ground that as
Commander of US Naval Base in Subic, a suit against him is a suit against the United
States (sovereign immunity).
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Private respondent, Gener, is engaged in logging operations in Barrio Mabayo, Morong
Bataan. The American Naval authorities, however, stopped his operation for security
reasons. Thus, private respondent filed an injunction case against petitioner in the CFI
of Bataan which granted a preliminary injunction.
A special entry of appearance was made questioning the jurisdiction of the court and a
motion to dismiss was later filed.
o It was contended that petitioner Baer is the Chief or Head of an
agency/instrumentality of the US with the subject matter of the case being
official acts done by him in behalf of Amurrica.
o Gener, meanwhile, argued that a citizen claiming title and right of possession
to a property may sue as individuals officers/agents of the Govt who are
illegaly withholding the same from him, though in doing so the said
officers/agents claim that they are acting for the Government.
Respondent Judge Tizon then denied the MDT and the MR, hence the petition for
certiorari.
ISSUE: Is the doctrine of immunity from suits applicable
HELD: Yes.
RATIO
1. First, the doctrine of immunity from suits is not unfounded and has been ruled upon on
various occasions by the SC and is applicable here:
a. Here are some of the cases:
i. Raquiza v. Bradford: It is well settled that a foreign army, permitted to
march through a friendly country or to be stationed in it, by permission
of its government or sovereign, is exempt from the civil and criminal
jurisdiction of the place
ii. Tubb and Tedrow v. Griess: Raquiza is not absolute, its possible for
submission to jurisdiction on the part of the foreign power whenever
appropriate.
iii. Syquia v. Almeda Lopez: here plaintiffs as lessors sued the Commanding
General of the United States Army in the Philippines, seeking the
restoration to them of the apartment buildings they owned leased to
United States armed forces stationed in the Manila area. A motion to
dismiss on the ground of non-suability was filed and upheld by
respondent Judge. The matter was taken to this Court in a mandamus
proceeding. It failed. It was the ruling that respondent Judge acted
correctly considering that the "action must be considered as one against
the U.S. Government.
iv. Marvel Building Corporation v. Philippine War Damage Commission:
where respondent, a United States agency established to compensate
damages suffered by the Philippines during World War II was held as
falling within the above doctrine as the suit against it "would eventually
be a charge against or financial liability of the United States Government
because ..., the Commission has no funds of its own for the purpose of
paying money judgments.
b. The solidity of the stand of the petitioner is evident.
i. What was sought and granted by judge is an interference with the
performance of the duties of petitioner in the base area in accordance
Poli Law Review | Dean Candelaria
with the powers possessed by him under the Philippine-American
Military Bases Agreement.
ii. Assuming the Bureau of Forestry could issue TLAs for land within the
base, the Bases Agreement subjects the exercise of rights under the TLA
to the exercise of power, rights and control of the US within the base.
iii. The doctrine of state immunity is not limited to cases which would
result in pecuniary charge against the sovereign or would require the
doing of an affirmative act by it. Prevention of sovereign from doing an
affirmative act pertaining directly and immediately to the most
important public function of any governmentthe defense of the
stateis equally as untenable as requiring it to do an affirmative act.
2. Second, the above should not be misinterpreted as Petitioner having diplomatic
immunity. He may be proceeded against in his personal capacity, or when the action taken
by him cannot be imputed to the government which he represents.
a. In Miquiabas v. Commanding General and Dizon v. Commanding General, the
habeas corpus petitions were granted there being no jurisdiction by the US court
martial.
b. The obstacle in this case is that Amurrica, without its consent, was brought to
court in connection with acts performed by it pursuant to a treaty provision and
thus impressed with governmental character.
3.Third, even more glaring is that Private respondent, Gener, ceased to have any right of
entering the base area. His license TLA license expired and was not renewed.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted, nullifying and setting aside the writ
of preliminary injunction issued by respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 2984 of the Court of
First Instance of Bataan. The injunction issued by this Court on March 18, 1965 enjoining the
enforcement of the aforesaid writ of preliminary injunction of respondent Judge is hereby
made permanent. Costs against private respondent Edgardo Gener.
8. US v Ruiz (JE)
G.R. No. L-35645 | May 22, 1985 | ABAD SANTOS, J.
Petitioners: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT GOHIER
Respondents: HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal and ELIGIO DE
GUZMAN & CO., INC.
SUMMARY: The US government invited submission of bids for various projects during the
time it had a naval base in Subic. The bid was for the repair of a wharf and shoreline due to
typhoon damage. Eligio de Guzma & Co., Inc. submitted its bid and thereafter received a
telegram from Collins which asked for its price proposals and the name of the bonding
company. The company assumed that this was acceptance of the bid however, they received
another letter which stated that the company did not qualify because of the unsatisfactory
performance during a previous project. The company sued U.S. (including the other
petitioners) for specific performance in if not possible anymore, then for damages. A writ of
preliminary injunction was also issued by the trial court to stop the US from engaging
another party to work on the contract. Issue now is whether or not the court has jurisdiction
over the case. SC said now. The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from
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Compilation 6.04 Article XVI-XVIII Page 13 of 36
being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. However, because
the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-between
sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts
(jure gestionis).The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil
(sovereign acts). In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is
devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function
of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to
commercial or business purposes. The correct test for the application of State immunity is
not the conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of the act.
FACTS:
At the time of the case, the US had a naval base in Subic, Zambales per the Military
Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States.
In 1972, the US invited submission of bids for various projects (e.g. repair of the
Alava wharf, repair of NAS cubi shoreline due to typhoon damage). Eligio de
Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent
thereto, the company received from the US two telegrams requesting it to confirm
its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The company
complied with the requests. This telegram was taken by Eligio as an acceptance of
their bid.
The company received a letter which was signed by Wilham I. Collins, Director,
Contracts Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Southwest Pacific,
Department of the Navy of the United States (one of the petitioners). The letter
said that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because
of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the sea
wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay. The letter further
said that the projects had been awarded to third parties.
The company sued the United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway,
William I. Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of
the U.S. Navy. The complaint is to order the U.S. to allow the company to perform
the work on the projects and, in the event that specific performance was no longer
possible, to order the defendants to pay damages. The company also asked for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the U.S. from entering into
contracts with third parties for work on the projects.
US filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which included an opposition to the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The trial court denied the motion
and issued the writ.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case? NO.
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the respondent judge
are set aside and Civil Case No. is dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.
RATIO:
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the
courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary
consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States.
However, because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to
distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and
Poli Law Review | Dean Candelaria Compilation 6.04 Article XVI-XVIII
private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).The result is that State
immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil (sovereign acts).
The lower court judge (Ruiz) considered entering into a contract for the repair of
wharves or shoreline is not a governmental function although it may partake of a
public nature or character. Ruiz relied on the case of Lyons which stated that the
when a state enters into a contract with a private person, the stat can be sued
because it has descended to the level of an individual which has given its consent
to be sued under the contract.
SC said that Lyons cannot be relied upon. In Harry Lyons, Inc. vs. The United States
of America since the ruling on the jurisdiction and waiver of state immunity is just
an obiter and purely gratuitous.
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings
arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial
activities or economic affairs.
A state may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus
be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into
business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of
its sovereign functions.
APPLIED IN THE CASE: In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval
base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the
Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they
are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
The correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a
contract by a State but the legal nature of the act is shown in Syquia vs. Lopez. In
that case the plaintiffs leased three apartment buildings to the United States of
America for the use of its military officials. The plaintiffs sued to recover
possession of the premises on the ground that the term of the leases had expired.
They also asked for increased rentals until the apartments shall have been vacated.
In Syquia,the United States concluded contracts with private individuals but the
contracts notwithstanding the States was not deemed to have given or waived its
consent to be sued for the reason that the contracts were for jure imperii and not
for jure gestionis.
o The U.S. Government has not , given its consent to the filing of this suit
which is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is
not only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own Government
without the latter's consent but it is of a citizen filing an action against a
foreign government without said government's consent, which renders
more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country.
9. Carabao v Agricultural Product Com (IE)
Plaintiff-appellant: CARABAO, INC.
Defendants-appellees: AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION, FRANCISCO P. SAGUITGUIT and/or FAUSTINO
SYCHANGCO
G.R. No. L-29304 |September 30, 1970| TEEHANKEE, J.
SUMMARY:
Carabao Inc, filed in the CFI of Rizal a complaint for recovery of 238,500 representing the
unpaid price of 300 fire extinguishers delivered to Agricultural Productivity Commission. It
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alleged that it had presented a claim against the Auditor General but the latter failed to
decide on the claim for 2 months, therefore under Act 3083 it had acquired a right to file an
original action in the lower court. APC however, alleged that under the Constitution
settlement of all money claims against the govt. had been placed in the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Auditor General and SC is vested with the appellate jurisdiction. So the
issue is w/n Act 3083 is the governing law , the court held that NO, the governing law for
money claims is CA No. 327. The act provides that Auditor General has 60 days to act and
decide on the claim and aggrieved party may appeal within 30 days only to the Supreme
Court. Act 3083 which is utterly incompatible with those of Commonwealth Act must
therefore be deemed superseded and abrogated. Inaction by the AG no longer entitles the
claimant to file a direct suit in the court, the claimants remedy for such inaction is
mandamus. Act 3083 stands now merely as the general law waiving the State's immunity
from suit.
FACTS:
Appeal on questions of law from the lower Court's order of dismissal of the case for lack of
jurisdiction.
10/3/1967 Carabao Inc. filed in the CFI of Rizal its complaint to recover the sum of
P238,500.00 representing the unpaid price of 300 units of fire extinguishers sold and
delivered by it to defendant Agricultural Productivity Commission.
It alleged that it had presented on June 14, 1967 a claim for payment of the sum with
the Auditor General, but that since the latter had failed to decide the claim within two
(2) months from date of its presentation which should have been by August 13, 1967, it
had acquired the right under Act No. 3083 to file the original action for collection in the
lower court.
Defendants moved for the dismissal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter,
o It alleged that under sections 2 and 3, Article XI of the Philippine Constitution,
creating the General Auditing Office as a constitutional office and defining its
functions, in relation to Commonwealth Act No. 327 enacted in 1938 as an
implementing law, and under Rule 44 of the Revised Rules of Court, the
settlement of money claims against the Government of the Philippines has
been placed under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Auditor General to
the exclusion of courts of first instance, while the Supreme Court is vested
with appellate jurisdiction over the Auditor General's decision involving claims
of private persons or entities.
The lower court sustained defendants' dismissal motion and declared itself without
jurisdiction to hear the case.
Upon plaintiff's MR defendants further brought out the fact that the Auditor General
had rendered his decision denying plaintiff's claim on the ground that the alleged
purchase order relied upon by plaintiff was null and void, since there was no obligating
instrument as required by law, besides mentioning the grossly exorbitant price of
P795.00 for each fire extinguisher as compared to the Director of Supply Coordination's
approved purchases of the same fire extinguisher at the price of P199.00, each. The
lower court having maintained its dismissal order, plaintiff instituted the present
appeal.
ISSUE: W/N under Act 3083 is still the governing law with regard to money claims against the
govt. NO!!
Poli Law Review | Dean Candelaria Compilation 6.04 Article XVI-XVIII
HELD: ACCORDINGLY, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against plaintiff-appellant.
As prayed for by defendants-appellees, plaintiff-appellant is ordered to remove immediately the 300
units of fire extinguishers from the warehouse of appellee Agricultural Productivity Commission.
RATIO:
o It is patent that the governing law under which private parties may sue and seek
settlement by the Philippine Government of their money claims pursuant to Article XI,
section 3 of the Philippine Constitution is Commonwealth Act No. 327.
o Section 1 of said Act fixes the period of "sixty days exclusive of Sundays and holidays
after their presentation" within which Auditor General shall act on and decide the
same. Said section further provides that "If said accounts or claims need reference to
other persons, office or offices, or to the party interested, the period shall be counted
from the time the last comment necessary to a proper decision is received by him."
o Under sec. 2 of said Act, the aggrieved private party may appeal, within 30 days from
receipt of the Auditor General's adverse decision only to the Supreme Court, by filing
with the Court a petition for review thereof, as provided in Rule 44 of the Revised Rules
of Court.
o The corresponding provisions of Act 3083 which are utterly incompatible with those of
Commonwealth Act must therefore be deemed superseded and abrogated, under
principle of "leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant" a later statute which is
repugnant to an earlier statute is deemed to have abrogated the earlier one on the
same subject matter.
o Inaction by the Auditor General for the sixty-day period now provided by
Commonwealth Act 327 (exclusive of Sundays and holidays) and of time consumed in
referring the matter to other persons or officers no longer entitles the claimant to file a
direct suit in court, as he was formerly authorized under Act 3083 in the event of the
Auditor General's failure to decide within a flat period of two months.
o Since the Constitution and Commonwealth Act 327 expressly enjoin the Auditor
General to act on and decide the claim within the fixed 60-day period, a claimant's
remedy is to institute mandamus proceedings to compel the rendition of a decision by
the Auditor General in the event of such inaction.
o The CFI no longer have the original jurisdiction to act on such claims, since exclusive
original jurisdiction under Article XI of the Constitution and the implementing Act,
Commonwealth Act 327 is vested in the Auditor General, and appellate jurisdiction is
vested in the President in cases of accountable officers, and in the Supreme Court in
cases of private persons and entities upon proper and timely petitions for review.
o The Court has so indicated in a number of cases that claimants have to prosecute their
money claims against the Government under Commonwealth Act 327, stating that Act
3083 stands now merely as the general law waiving the State's immunity from suit,
subject to the general limitation expressed in Section 7 thereof that "no execution shall
issue upon any judgment rendered by any Court against the Government of the
(Philippines), and that the conditions provided in Commonwealth Act 327 for filing
money claims against the Government must be strictly observed.
o No error was committed, therefore, by the lower court dismissing the case and
declaring itself without jurisdiction over the same.
10. US v Guinto (DU)
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FREDERICK M. SMOUSE AND YVONNE REEVES, petitioners,
HON. ELIODORO B. GUINTO, Presiding Judge, Branch LVII, Regional Trial Court, Angeles City, ROBERTO T. VALENCIA,
EMERENCIANA C. TANGLAO, AND PABLO C. DEL PILAR, respondents.
G.R. No. 76607
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ANTHONY LAMACHIA, T/SGT. USAF, WILFREDO BELSA, PETER ORASCION AND ROSE
CARTALLA, petitioners,
HON. RODOLFO D. RODRIGO, as Presiding Judge of Branch 7, Regional Trial Court (BAGUIO CITY), La Trinidad, Benguet
and FABIAN GENOVE, respondents.
G.R. No. 79470
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, TOMI J. KINGI, DARREL D. DYE and STEVEN F. BOSTICK, petitioners,
HON. JOSEFINA D. CEBALLOS, As Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Capas, Tarlac, and LUIS
BAUTISTA, respondents.
G.R. No. 80018
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, MAJOR GENERAL MICHAEL P. C. CARNS, AIC ERNEST E. RIVENBURGH, AIC ROBIN BLEVINS,
SGT. NOEL A. GONZALES, SGT. THOMAS MITCHELL, SGT. WAYNE L. BENJAMIN, ET AL.,petitioners,
HON. CONCEPCION S. ALARCON VERGARA, as Presiding Judge, Branch 62 REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Angeles City, and
RICKY SANCHEZ, FREDDIE SANCHEZ AKA FREDDIE RIVERA, EDWIN MARIANO, AKA JESSIE DOLORES SANGALANG, ET
AL., respondents.
G.R. No. 80258
February 26, 1990 EN BANC CRUZ, J.
SUMMARY: This is a consolidation of four Cases, check the digest for the pertinent facts. One
case involved bidding out a barbershop contract, another buy-bust operation, another
dismissal of a cook (urine soup), and another alleging that US personnel beat him. The
bottomline is, petitioners are related to the US government as they are working for the
latter in some kind of capacity. The respondents sued the petitioners to claim damages or
some kind of relief. Petitioner requested that the cases be dismissed because they are
covered by the doctrine of state immunity and that the US government has not consented to
be sued. The court said that States cannot be sued without consent under the constitution
and international law. it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for
acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the
judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to
satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages
awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has
not been formally impleaded. But State may waive such doctrine and consent to be sued. It
may be expressed (through a law only) or impliedly as when act involved are private,
commercial or proprietary acts (jure gestionis) (contrast this with sovereign and
governmental acts a.k.a. jure imperii covered by immunity). The court also distinguished
suability and Liability - Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on
the applicable law and the established facts. To be made liable, the State should first
consent to be sued. In this case, the court said that the barbershop contract (case
remanded), the employment contract of the cook for a commercial restaurant (affirmed
dismissal) were performed in the USs proprietary capacity. While the Buy-bust operation,
petitioners were acting in their official capacity as law enforcers thus immune. The last
case, court remanded to determine if petitioner was acting in official capacity.
FACTS
These cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity.
The United States of America was not impleaded in the complaints below but has moved to
dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not consented. It
is now contesting the denial of its motions by the respondent judges.
Poli Law Review | Dean Candelaria Compilation 6.04 Article XVI-XVIII
GR 76607 Barber Shop Contracts
Officers of US Air Force station in Clark Air Base were sued in connection with the
bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base.
Bidding was solicited on Feb 24, 1986. Bidding was won by Ramon Dizon, over the
objection of the private respondents, who claimed that he had made a bid for four
facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area, which was not included in the
invitation to bid.
On June 30, 1986, the private respondents filed a complaint to cancel the award
and to conduct a rebidding.
the respondent court issued an ex parte order directing the individual petitioners
to maintain the status quo but denied the application for a writ of preliminary
injunction of respondent and denied the motion to dismiss of petitioner.
According to TC the transaction involved in this case is a bidding contract, a
commercial transaction which Article XVIII of the RP-US Bases Agreement does not
cover such kind of services falling under the concessionaireship, such as a barber
shop concession.
G.R. No. 79470 - Cooks Urine Soup
Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners for his dismissal
as cook in the U.S. Air Force Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station in
Baguio City
Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables
served to the club customers.
After recommendation from a board of arbitrators, Col. David C. Kimball,
Commander of the 3rd Combat Support Group PACAF, dismissed him.
G.R. No. 80018 - Buy-bust operation
Luis Bautista, who was employed as a barracks boy in Camp O' Donnell, an
extension of Clark Air Base, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted
by the individual petitioners who are officers of the U.S. Air Force and special
agents of the Air Force Office of Special Investigators (AFOSI).
an information for violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act, was filed against Bautista
As a result of the filing of the charge, Bautista was dismissed from his employment.
He then filed a complaint for damages against the individual petitioners herein
claiming that it was because of their acts that he was removed
Mariano Y. Navarro a special counsel assigned to the International Law Division,
Office of the Staff Judge Advocate of Clark Air Base, entered a special appearance
for the defendants and moved for an extension within which to file an "answer
and/or other pleadings."
o His reason was that the Attorney General of the United States had not
yet designated counsel to represent the defendants, who were being
sued for their official acts.
Within the extended period, the defendants, without the assistance of counsel or
authority from the U.S. Department of Justice, filed their answer.
o They alleged therein as affirmative defenses that they had only done
their duty in the enforcement of the laws of the Philippines inside the
American bases pursuant to the RP-US Military Bases Agreement.
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Later, the law firm of Luna, Sison and Manas, having been retained to represent
the defendants, filed with leave of court a motion to withdraw the answer and
dismiss the complaint.
The motion was denied by the respondent judge in his order dated September 11,
1987, which held that the claimed immunity under the Military Bases Agreement
covered only criminal and not civil cases. Moreover, the defendants had come
under the jurisdiction of the court when they submitted their answer.
G.R. No. 80258 Arrest vs Beating
a complaint for damages was filed by the private respondents against the herein
petitioners (except the United States of America), for injuries allegedly sustained
by the plaintiffs as a result of the acts of the defendants.
The defendants deny this and claim the plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were
bitten by the dogs because they were struggling and resisting arrest.
Motion to dismiss was denied with the court saying: The complaint alleged
criminal acts against the individually-named defendants and from the nature of
said acts it could not be said that they are Acts of State, for which immunity should
be invoked.
Issue: W/N the cases should be dismissed for having no consent from the US?
1. In G.R. No. 76607, the petition is DISMISSED and the respondent judge
is directed to proceed with the hearing and decision of Civil Case No.
4772. The temporary restraining order dated December 11, 1986, is
LIFTED.
2. In G.R. No. 79470, the petition is GRANTED and Civil Case No. 829-
R(298) is DISMISSED.
3. In G.R. No. 80018, the petition is GRANTED and Civil Case No. 115-C-87
is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order dated October 14, 1987,
is made permanent.
4. In G.R. No. 80258, the petition is DISMISSED and the respondent court
is directed to proceed with the hearing and decision of Civil Case No.
4996. The temporary restraining order dated October 27, 1987, is
LIFTED.
RATIO
Discussion first of State Immunity
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now expressed in Article
XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles
of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under
Article II, Section 2.
o Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally
accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of
incorporation.
the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification given by Justice Holmes
that "there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on
which the right depends." All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert
jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition would, in the language of a
celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace of nations."
Poli Law Review | Dean Candelaria Compilation 6.04 Article XVI-XVIII
o The doctrine is sometimes derisively called "the royal prerogative of
dishonesty" because of the privilege it grants the state to defeat any
legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its non-suability.
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its
consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts
allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties.
The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to
perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the
amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be
regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. In
such a situation, the state may move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it
has been filed without its consent.
Doctrine of State Immunity admits exception
the doctrine is not absolute and does not say the state may not be sued under any
circumstance. On the contrary, the rule says that the state may not be sued
without its consent, which clearly imports that it may be sued if it consents.
The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or impliedly.
o Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law.
o Consent is implied when the state enters into a contract or it itself
commences litigation.
The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No.
3083, under which the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued
upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or
implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties.
Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands,
o a special law was passed to enable a person to sue the government for
an alleged tort. When the government enters into a contract, it is
deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party
and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied
consent. Waiver is also implied when the government files a complaint,
thus opening itself to a counterclaim.
Express consent is effected only by the will of the legislature through the medium
of a duly enacted statute.
We have held that not all contracts entered into by the government will operate as
a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must be made between its sovereign and
proprietary acts.
As for the filing of a complaint by the government, suability will result only where
the government is claiming affirmative relief from the defendant.
Treaty with the United States/ Jurisprudence on Suit against US
RP-US Bases Treaty. Article III thereof provides
o It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have the rights, power
and authority within the bases which are necessary for the
establishment, use, operation and defense thereof or appropriate for the
control thereof and all the rights, power and authority within the limits
of the territorial waters and air space adjacent to, or in the vicinity of,
the bases which are necessary to provide access to them or appropriate
for their control.
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Baer v. Tizon
o a foreign army, permitted to march through a friendly country or to be
stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign, is exempt
from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place
o Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement, the treaty provisions
should control on such matter, the assumption being that there was a
manifestation of the submission to jurisdiction on the part of the foreign
power whenever appropriate.
Jurisprudence; transactions entered by states.
o Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, where plaintiffs as lessors sued the
Commanding General of the United States Army in the Philippines,
seeking the restoration to them of the apartment buildings they owned
leased to the United States armed forces stationed in the Manila area.
respondent Judge acted correctly in dismissing the case considering that
the 4 action must be considered as one against the U.S. Government that
gave no consent to be sued
o Marvel Building Corporation v. Philippine War Damage Commission,
where respondent, a United States Agency established to compensate
damages suffered by the Philippines during World War II was held as
falling within the above doctrine as the suit against it would eventually
be a charge against or financial liability of the United States Government
o Marquez Lim v. Nelson, involving a complaint for the recovery of a motor
launch, plus damages, the special defense interposed being 'that the
vessel belonged to the United States Government, that the defendants
merely acted as agents of said Government, and that the United States
Government is therefore the real party in interest
o Philippine Alien Property Administration v. Castelo, where it was held
that a suit against Alien Property Custodian and the Attorney General of
the United States involving vested property under the Trading with the
Enemy Act is in substance a suit against the United States.
o United States of America v. Ruiz, where the transaction in question dealt
with the improvement of the wharves in the naval installation at Subic
Bay. As this was a clearly governmental function, we held that the
contract did not operate to divest the United States of its sovereign
immunity from suit.
no question that the United States of America, like any other state, will be deemed
to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its
proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign
or governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied.
When does State Immunity Apply
because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to
distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and
private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State
immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings
arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial
activities or economic affairs
Poli Law Review | Dean Candelaria Compilation 6.04 Article XVI-XVIII
It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign
functions.
SUABILITY v LIABILITY
There seems to be a failure to distinguish between suability and liability and a
misconception that the two terms are synonymous.
Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable
law and the established facts.
o The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it
is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first
consent to be sued.
o Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself
to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only
giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is
liable.
The said article establishes a rule of liability, not suability. The government may be
held liable under this rule only if it first allows itself to be sued through any of the
accepted forms of consent.
Back to the Case
petitioners in the cases, charges against them may not be summarily dismissed on
their mere assertion that their acts are imputable to the United States of America,
which has not given its consent to be sued. In fact, the defendants are sought to be
held answerable for personal torts in which the United States itself is not involved.
If found liable, they and they alone must satisfy the judgment.
GR 76607 Barber Shop Contracts Its commercial transaction, Doctrine of state
immunity is waived
barbershops subject of the concessions granted by the United States government
are commercial enterprises operated by private person's.
o They are not agencies of the United States Armed Forces nor are their
facilities demandable as a matter of right by the American servicemen.
These establishments provide for the grooming needs of their customers and offer
not only the basic haircut and shave (as required in most military organizations)
but such other amenities as shampoo, massage, manicure and other similar
indulgences
all for a fee. And these shop are required to remit fixed commissions to the US
Govt
The evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions
is not before us. This means that the respondent court will have to receive that
evidence first, so it can later determine on the basis thereof if the plaintiffs are
entitled to the relief they seek. REMANDED!
G.R. No. 79470 - Cooks Urine Soup Restaurant was for Commercial purposes which is
not covered by the state immunity
the restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of the nature of
a business enterprise undertaken by the United States government in its
proprietary capacity.
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Such services are not extended to the American servicemen for free as a perquisite
of membership in the Armed Forces of the United States. (it is operated for profit!)
o Neither does it appear that they are exclusively offered to these
servicemen; on the contrary, it is well known that they are available to
the general public as well.
Thus petitioner cannot claim state immunity. The reason is that by entering into
the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary
functions, US impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit.
But these considerations notwithstanding, we hold that the complaint against the
petitioners in the court below must still be dismissed. While suable, the petitioners
are nevertheless not liable.
o It is obvious that the claim for damages cannot be allowed on the
strength of the evidence before us, which we have carefully examined.
o The dismissal was decided upon only after a thorough investigation
where it was established beyond doubt that he had polluted the soup
stock with urine. (unbelievably nauseating act)
G.R. No. 80018 - Buy-bust operation : Petitioners are covered by State Immunity
individually-named petitioners therein were acting in the exercise of their official
functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation against the complainant
and thereafter testified against him at his trial.
Air Force Office of Special Investigators and were charged precisely with the
function of preventing the distribution, possession and use of prohibited drugs and
prosecuting those guilty of such acts.
It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they
cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not
given its consent to be sued.
We reject the conclusion of the trial court that the answer filed by the special
counsel of the Office of the Sheriff Judge Advocate of Clark Air Base was a
submission by the United States government to its jurisdiction. As we noted
25
in Republic v. Purisima, express waiver of immunity cannot be made by a mere
counsel of the government but must be effected through a duly-enacted statute.
Neither does such answer come under the implied forms of consent as earlier
discussed.
in G.R. No. 80258 Arrest vs Beating Remanded
The record is too meager to indicate if the defendants were really discharging their
official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when the incident in
question occurred. Lacking this information, this Court cannot directly decide this
case. The needed inquiry must first be made by the lower court so it may assess
and resolve the conflicting claims of the parties on the basis of the evidence that
has yet to be presented at the trial.
11. Republic v Purisma (KL)
G.R. No. L-36084| 08/31/1977 | Fernando, J. (acting CJ)
Petitioner/s: Republic of the Philippines
Respondents: HONORABLE AMANTE P. PURISIMA, the Presiding Judge of the court of first Instance of Manila (Branch
VII), and YELLOW BALL FREIGHT LINES, INC.
Poli Law Review | Dean Candelaria Compilation 6.04 Article XVI-XVIII
SUMMARY:
This case is about the States immunity from suit. Judge Purisima (improperly)
denied the motion to dismiss of the government entity Rice and Corn
Administration. The SC highlighted the significance and logic of this long-standing
rule. In summary, the rule is there to afford the State government efficiency in its
duty to serve its people. The wide-scope of government activities must not be
hampered by baseless suits against the State. The private entities claiming against
the State can still recover through different means. Lastly, the waiver or consent,
to be effective, must come from the State acting through a duly enacted statute as
pointed out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant
Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had no binding force on the government.
FACTS:
The jurisdictional issued raised by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza on behalf
of the Republic of the Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding
arose from the failure of respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of First
Instance of Manila to apply the well-known and of-reiterated doctrine of the non-
suability of a State, including its offices and agencies, from suit without its consent.
It was so alleged in a motion to dismiss filed by defendant Rice and Corn
Administration in a pending civil suit in the sala of respondent Judge for the
collection of a money claim arising from an alleged breach of contract, the plaintiff
being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc.
Such a motion to dismiss was filed on September 7, 1972. At that time, the leading
case of Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service, were Justice
Bengzon stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a court to pass on the merits of a claim
against any office or entity acting as part of the machinery of the national
government unless consent be shown, had been applied in 53 other decisions.
There is thus more than sufficient basis for an allegation of jurisdiction infirmity
against the order of respondent Judge denying the motion to dismiss dated
October 4, 1972.
What is more, the position of the Republic has been fortified with the explicit
affirmation found in this provision of the present Constitution: "The State may not
be sued without its consent."
ISSUE: Whether Judge Purisima should have granted the motion to dismiss. YES. Petition
GRANTED.
RATIO:
Switzerland General Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Republic of the Philippines: "The doctrine
of non-suability recognized in this jurisdiction even prior to the effectivity of the
[1935] Constitution is a logical corollary of the positivist concept of law which, to
para-phrase Holmes, negates the assertion of any legal right as against the state, in
itself the source of the law on which such a right may be predicated. Nor is this all.
Even if such a principle does give rise to problems, considering the vastly expanded
role of government enabling it to engage in business pursuits to promote the
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general welfare, it is not obeisance to the analytical school of thought alone that
calls for its continued applicability.
Why it must continue to be so, even if the matter be viewed sociologically, was set
forth in Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic thus: "Nonetheless, a
continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as
against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of
governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious
functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the
availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well-known
propensity on the part of our people to go the court, at the least provocation, the
loss of time and energy required to defend against law suits, in the absence of such
a basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very well be
imagined."
Equally so, the next paragraph in the above opinion from the Switzerland General
Insurance Company decision is likewise relevant: "Nor is injustice thereby cause
private parties. They could still proceed to seek collection of their money claims by
pursuing the statutory remedy of having the Auditor General pass upon them
subject to appeal to judicial tribunals for final adjudication.
Provindence Washington Insurance decision: "Thus the doctrine of non-suability of
the government without its consent, as it has operated in practice, hardly lends
itself to the charge that it could be the fruitful parent of injustice, considering the
vast and ever-widening scope of state activities at present being undertaken.
Whatever difficulties for private claimants may still exist, is, from an objective
appraisal of all factors, minimal. In the balancing of interests, so unavoidable in the
determination of what principles must prevail if government is to satisfy the public
weal, the verdict must be, as it has been these so many years, for its continuing
recognition as a fundamental postulate of constitutional law."
Apparently respondent Judge was misled by the terms of the contract between the
private respondent, plaintiff in his sala, and defendant Rice and Corn
Administration which, according to him, anticipated the case of a breach of
contract within the parties and the suits that may thereafter arise. The consent, to
be effective though, must come from the State acting through a duly enacted
statute as pointed out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for
defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had no binding force on the
government.
12. Philippine Agila v Lichauco (MB)
G.R. No. 14236 | May 3, 2006. | Tinga, J.
Resulting Liability
Complainants: Philippine Agila Satellite Inc. (PASI) and Michael De Guzman
Respondent: Josefina Trinidad-Lichauco Undersecretary for Communications, DOTC
SUMMARY:
PASI was established by a consortium of private telecommunications carriers which had
entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the DOTC concerning the planned
launch of a Philippine-owned satellite into outer space. PASI has already undergone
preparations for the launching of its satellites however respondent Lichauco, then DOTC
Poli Law Review | Dean Candelaria Compilation 6.04 Article XVI-XVIII
Undersecretary for Communications, allegedly embarked on a crusade to malign the name
of Michael de Guzman and sabotage the business of PASI by uttering disparaging and
defamatory comments and by awarding their orbital slot to an unknown awardee. PASI filed
a complaint for (1) injunction against her performing any act in relation to orbital slot; (2)
declaration of nullity of award, seeking to nullify the alleged award; and (3) damages against
Lichauco herself for tortuous acts. RTC granted TRO against Lichaucos acts. CA reversed. SC
reinstated RTC:
A suit for acts done in the performance of official functions against an officer of
the government by a private citizen which would result in a charge against or
financial liability to the government must be regarded as a suit against the State.
However, government immunity from suit will not shield the public official being
sued if the government no longer has an interest to protect in the outcome of a
suit; or if the liability of the officer is personal because it arises from a tortious act
in the performance of his/her duties.
st nd
1 and 2 causes of action --- The 2 causes of action are not suits against the
State. Had it been so that petitioner additionally sought damages in relation to said
causes of action, the suit would have been considered as one against the State.
Had the petitioner impleaded the DOTC itself, an unincorporated government
agency, and not Lichauco herself, the suit would have been considered as one
against the State. But no!
rd
3 cause of action --- If proven, they would establish liability on the part of
Lichauco that is not shielded by the doctrine of state immunity from suit. Where
the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law
and injurious to the rights of plaintiff, inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal
acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not
acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights
have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a
suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit.
FACTS:
Philippine Agila Satellite Inc. (PASI) is a duly organized corporation, whose
President and Chief Executive Officer is co-petitioner Michael De Guzman.
o PASI was established by a consortium of private telecommunications
carriers which had entered into a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) with the DOTC concerning the planned launch of a Philippine-
owned satellite into outer space.
PASI avers that after having secured the confirmation from the Philippine
government, it proceeded with preparations for the launching, operation and
management of its satellites.
o However, respondent Lichauco, then DOTC Undersecretary for
Communications, allegedly "embarked on a crusade to malign the name
of Michael de Guzman and sabotage the business of PASI."
o On several occasions, defendant Lichauco then uttered disparaging and
defamatory comments against PASI and de Guzman. These defamatory
remarks triggered efforts from within the plaintiff corporation aimed at
ousting plaintiff de Guzman from his position.
o Lichauco's purported efforts against PASI culminated allegedly in her
offering orbital slot 153 East Longitude for bidding to other parties
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despite the prior assignment to PASI of the said slot. It was later claimed
by PASI that Lichauco subsequently awarded the orbital slot to an entity
whose indentity was unknown.
PASI and De Guzman instituted civil complaint against Lichauco as Acting Secretary
of the DOTC, and the "Unknown Awardee" who was to be the recipient of orbital
slot 153 East Longitude.
RTC issued a TRO against Lichauco
Lichauco filed a Motion to Dismiss primarily on the grounds that:
o the suit is a suit against the State which may not be sued without its
consent;
o that the complaint stated no cause of action;
o petitioners had failed to exhaust administrative remedies by failing to
seek recourse with the Office of the President.
RTC denied the motion to dismiss.
o It characterized the defense of state immunity as "at very least a
contentious issue which cannot be resolved by mere allegations in the
pleadings but which can be best threshed out in a litig[i]ous forum where
parties are accorded enormous opportunity to argue for the
ascertainment of whether the act complained of are indeed within the
parameters and prerogatives of the authority exercising the same." The
RTC also noted that the allegations in the complaint regarding the
ultimate facts sufficiently presented an ultra vires act of Lichauco, and
that she was being sued in her personal capacity. As to the argument
pertaining to the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, the RTC
noted that the principle is not an inflexible rule, and may be dispensed
with when its application would cause great and irreparable damage or
when it would not constitute a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
CA nullified the RTC order.
o The notice of offer signed by herein petitioner allegedly tainted with bad
faith was done in the exercise of and in pursuance of an official duties as
undersecretary. We can therefore conclude that her official acts such as
the said "notice of offer" was with the blessing and prior approval of the
DOTC Secretary himself. Being an official act, it is also protected by the
presumption that the same was performed in good faith and in the
regular performance of official duty. CA went on to cite doctrines:
o Acts in Line of Duty or under Color of Authority. --- As a rule, a public
officer, whether judicial, quasi-judicial, or executive, is not personally
liable to one injured in consequence of an act performed within the
scope of his official authority, and in the line of his official duty. In order
that acts may be done within the scope of official authority, it is not
necessary that they be prescribed by statute, or even that they be
specifically directed or requested by a superior officer, but it is sufficient
if they are done by an officer in relation to matters committed by law to
his control or supervision, or that they have more or less connection with
such matters, or that they are governed by a lawful requirement of the
department under whose authority the officer is acting.
o Error or Mistake in Exercise of Authority. --- Where an officer is invested
with discretion and is empowered to exercise his judgment in matters
Poli Law Review | Dean Candelaria Compilation 6.04 Article XVI-XVIII
brought before him and when so acting he is usually given immunity
from liability to persons who may be injured as the result of an
erroneous or mistaken decision, however, erroneous judgment may be,
provided the acts complained of are done within the scope of the
officer's authority, and without willfulness, malice, or corruption.
ISSUE: (None stated) W/N the present petition is a suit against the State which may not be
sued without its consent --- NO
HELD:
Petition is GRANTED.
CA decision is SET ASIDE
RTC order is REINSTATED. The RTC is ordered to try and decide the case on the
merits.
RATIO:
1. When a suit is considered against the State
The present action was denominated against Lichauco as "acting Secretary of the
[DOTC]."
The hornbook rule is that a suit for acts done in the performance of official
functions against an officer of the government by a private citizen which would
result in a charge against or financial liability to the government must be regarded
as a suit against the State itself, although it has not been formally impleaded.
o However, government immunity from suit will not shield the public
official being sued if the government no longer has an interest to protect
in the outcome of a suit; or
o if the liability of the officer is personal because it arises from a tortious
act in the performance of his/her duties.
As earlier noted, the complaint alleges 3 causes of action against Lichauco: (1)
injunction against her performing any act in relation to orbital slot; (2) declaration
of nullity of award, seeking to nullify the alleged award; and (3) damages against
Lichauco herself.
o Insofar as the first two causes of action are concerned, Lichauco may
have a point when she asserts that they were based on acts which she
performed in her capacity as DOTC Undersecretary.
2. Nevertheless, these 2 causes of action may not be simply dismissed on the basis of state
immunity of suit
The defense of state immunity from suit does not apply since said causes of action
cannot be properly considered as suits against the State in constitutional
contemplation. These causes of action do not seek to impose a charge or financial
liability against the State, but merely the nullification of state action.
The prayers attached to these two causes of action are for the revocation of the
Notice of Bid and the nullification of the purported award, nothing more.
o Had it been so that petitioner additionally sought damages in relation to
said causes of action, the suit would have been considered as one
against the State.
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o Had the petitioner impleaded the DOTC itself, an unincorporated
government agency, and not Lichauco herself, the suit would have been
considered as one against the State. But neither circumstance obtains in
this case.
3. Tortious acts are not protected.
rd
A different set of principles applies to the 3 cause of action, anchored as it is on
alleged acts that are tortious in character or otherwise beyond the scope of
Lichauco's official duties. The complaint alleges that Lichauco uttered several
disparaging and defamatory remarks against petitioners and made false assertions
against them in her letter to the Land Bank President.
If proven, they would establish liability on the part of Lichauco that is not shielded
by the doctrine of state immunity from suit.
Justice Zaldivar --- Where the public official is made to account in his capacity as
such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff, inasmuch as
the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of
government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against
the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by
such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the
rule of immunity of the State from suit. (Emphasis from original)
In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a
State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while
claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property
rights or the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of
authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the
constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent.'
The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used
as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
4. Effect of filing a Motion to Dismiss
Lichauco, in alleging in her Motion to Dismiss that she is shielded by the State's
immunity from suit, hypothetically admitted the truth of the allegations in the
complaint. Such hypothetical admission has to be deemed a concession on her
part that she had performed the tortious or damaging acts against the petitioners,
which if true, would hold her liable for damages.
To establish such assertions of the fact of immunity, a full-blown trial on the merits would be
necessary.
Article XVII
Sec. 2
1. Defensor Santiago v Comelec (CG)
G.R. No. 127325 | March 19, 1997 | DAVIDE, JR., J p:
PETITIONERS: MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN
RESPONDENTS: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their
capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA)
PETITIONERS-INTERVENORS: SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK),
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN)
Poli Law Review | Dean Candelaria Compilation 6.04 Article XVI-XVIII
SUMMARY: Delfin filed a Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective
Officials, by Peoples Initiative. Petitioners herein, joined by intervenors, sought to prohibit
the COMELEC from hearing the case. The first issue was WON RA 6735, the implementing
legislation on the process Initiative, was intended to include initiative on amendments to
the Constitution YES. However, the implementing legislation was incomplete and
inadequate to cover the system. There were only a few provisions that mentioned the
initiative on amendment to the Constitution as opposed to the other laws (National and
Local). No rules were really set, which would have been necessary especially since this is the
Constitution. It actually necessitates more rigorous standards. It cannot be consequently
delegated to the COMELEC because a delegated power cannot be delegated subject to
certain exceptions. It must have been shown that the delegation itself was valid, which was
not the case at bar. The second issue is on the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300.
The court ruled that it was void. It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly
promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does
not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Third, it was ruled that the COMELEC had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. The petition was not a proper initiatory petition
because the 12% signature requirement was not followed. Lastly, it was ruled that the
instant petition is viable despite the pendency in the COMELEC of the Delfin petition. The
case was ripe for judicial determination and Court may brush aside technicalities of
procedure in cases of transcendental importance.
FACTS
The heart of this controversy by way of a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution.
Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift
Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" (hereafter, Delfin Petition)
wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order: (1) Fixing the time and dates for
signature gathering all over the country; (2) Causing the necessary publications of said
Order; and (3) Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all regions of the country to
assist petitioners and volunteers is establishing signing stations.
The provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of
Article VII, and Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution. Attached to the Petition is a
copy of the proposed amendments, with the proposition of lifting the term limits of all
elective government officials.
According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people,
and after it is signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters in the
country it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.
Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, the COMELEC issued an Order (a) directing Delfin
"to cause the publication of the petition, and the notice of hearing in three (3) daily
newspapers of general circulation at his own expense"; and (b) setting the case for
hearing
Senator Roco, on that same day, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the
ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
Petitioners filed this SCA for prohibition raising the following arguments:
Bautista Caguioa Chavez Cupin David Dulay Enguio Feble Galon Gammad Gan Gerona Giltendez Gonzales Lambino Lukban Macabulos Magbanua Nitura Oducado Pabilane Quintos Ramos Remollo Rivera Santos Tan Taylo Uy
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o The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can
only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been
passed. In fact, there is a pending Senate Bill for this;
o R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the
Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide
any subtitle initiative on the Constitution (it is inadequate), unlike in the other
modes of initiative. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of
people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law.
o Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in
print media. This indicates that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional
amendments because the latter take effect only upon ratification and not after
publication.
o COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires insofar as initiative on amendments
to the Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to provide
rules and regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the
Constitution. Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the
implementing law.
o The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not
to revision thereof.
o Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people's initiative; neither
the COMELEC nor any other government department, agency, or office has
realigned funds for the purpose.
Private respondents commented on the petition by saying that (among other things):
o RA 6735 is the enabling law implementing the power of people initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution;
o The pending Senate Bill is just a duplication of RA 6735;
o The lifting of the limitation on the term of office of elective officials provided
under the 1987 Constitution is not a revision of the Constitution, but only an
amendment
o The absence therein of a subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, since subtitles are
not requirements for the validity or sufficiency of law;
o Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that the proposition in an
initiative to amend the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in
the plebiscite shall become effective as of the day of the plebiscite;
o COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires is contradicted by (a) Section 2, Article
IX-C of the Constitution, which grants the COMELEC the power to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall; and (b) Section 20 of R.A. 6735,
which empowers the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.
COMELEC, through the OSG, alleged the validity of the Delfin Petition
DIK, MABINI, IBP and LABAN filed a Motion for Intervention, alleging the same position
as Defensor Santiago.
Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in Intervention. He avers that R.A. No. 6735 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 were both valid but he contends that the respondent
Commission is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Delfin Petition. The said
petition is not the initiatory pleading contemplated under the Constitution, Republic Act
No. 6735, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300.
Poli Law Review | Dean Candelaria Compilation 6.04 Article XVI-XVIII
ISSUES
1. WON RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the Constitution
YES BUT IT IS, UNFORTUNATELY, INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM
2. WON that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is valid NO
3. WON the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over the Delfin Petition
NO
4. WON it is proper for the SC to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending
case before the COMELEC YES
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered a) GRANTING the instant
petition; b) DECLARING R. A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for
subordinate legislation; c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the
Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or
amendments to the Constitution; and d) ORDERING the COMELEC to forthwith DISMISS the
DELFIN petition.
FIRST ISSUE: R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE ON
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY, INADEQUATE TO
COVER THAT SYSTEM.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 2.Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by
the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the
total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No
amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following
the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
However, said provision is not self-executory, as observed from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Committee.
Private Respondents therefore assert that RA 6735 is the implementing legislation of the
said Constitutional mandate. We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals,
intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution.
But a careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer to the question of whether R.A.
No. 6735 is a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to "provide for the
implementation of the exercise of the right
First: Contrary to the assertion of COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an
initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
o Even though it mentions the system of initiative and referendum to directly
propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws,
ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body it is considered as a
delayed afterthought.
o That word is neither germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively
relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances,
and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution.
Bautista Caguioa Chavez Cupin David Dulay Enguio Feble Galon Gammad Gan Gerona Giltendez Gonzales Lambino Lukban Macabulos Magbanua Nitura Oducado Pabilane Quintos Ramos Remollo Rivera Santos Tan Taylo Uy
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Second: Although there are Sections defining initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, mentioning it as one of the 3 systems of initiative, and restating the
constitutional requirements as to the percentage of registered voters who must submit
the proposal, it is still inadequate because the Act does NOT provide for the contents
of a petition for initiative on the Constitution.
o Also, Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other things, statement of the
proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed,
as the case may be. However, It does not include, as among the contents of the
petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of
initiative on the Constitution.
Third: While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Natl.
I&R) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Local I&R), no subtitle is provided
for initiative on the Constitution.
o This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the
Act is initiative and referendum on only national and local laws.
o If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of the
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle
therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or
hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.
o We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is subsumed under the subtitle on Natl. I&R because it is national in
scope.
o Our reading of the Subtitles on Natl. I&R and Local I&R leaves no room for doubt
that the classification is not based on the scope of the initiative involved, but on
its nature and character.
o It is national initiative, if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a national
law, or a law which only Congress can pass. It is local initiative if what is
proposed to be adopted is a law, ordinance, or resolution which only the legislative
bodies of autonomous regions or LGUs can pass.
There were no rules set as to the initiative on amendments to the Constitution. R.A. No.
6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system by merely paying it a reluctant lip
service.
The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated. Empowering the
COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules
and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority.
o Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A.
No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation.
The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
SECOND ISSUE: COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 IS VOID.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to
implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No.
6735.
Reliance on the COMELEC's power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is
misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the
COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where
Poli Law Review | Dean Candelaria Compilation 6.04 Article XVI-XVIII
subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the "completeness" and the
"sufficient standard" tests.
THIRD ISSUE: COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION
The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters (at least
12% of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district is
represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein) as prescribed by the
Constitution and RA 6735. Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be
deemed validly initiated.
FOURTH ISSUE: THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE PENDENCY IN THE
COMELEC OF THE DELFIN PETITION.
Roco claims that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the Delfin Petition because the
said petition is not supported by the required minimum number of signatures of
registered voters. LABAN also asserts that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
refusing to dismiss the Delfin Petition, which does not contain the required number of
signatures. In light of these claims, the instant case may likewise be treated as a special
civil action for certiorari under Section I of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and a case that
is ripe for judicial determination.
In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his Memorandum, this Court
may brush aside technicalities of procedure in cases of transcendental importance.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
PUNO, J.: CONCURRING AND DISSENTING
Concurring: Delfin petition must be dismissed
Dissenting: It is crystalline, from the deliberations of the Constitutional Committee that
the intent of R.A. No. 6735 is to implement the people's initiative to amend the
Constitution, it is our bounden duty to interpret the law as it was intended by the
legislature
VITUG, J.: CONCURRING
The Delfin petition is thus utterly deficient. Instead of complying with the constitutional
imperatives, the petition would rather have much of its burden passed on, in effect, to
the COMELEC.
FRANCISCO, J.: DISSENTING AND CONCURRING
Dissenting: Petitioners view of lack of subtitle in the law on initiative to amend the
constitution manifests selective interpretation of the law. The provisions of Republic Act
No. 6735 may not be interpreted in isolation. The legislative intent behind every law is to
be extracted from the statute as a whole.
Concurring: COMELEC cannot take any action indicative of its having already assumed
jurisdiction over the Delfin petition. It is unaccompanied by the required signatures,
which burden they intended to shift to the COMELEC. This defect notwithstanding, it is
without prejudice to the refiling of their petition once compliance with the required
percentage is satisfactorily shown by private respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.: CONCURRING AND DISSENTING
Bautista Caguioa Chavez Cupin David Dulay Enguio Feble Galon Gammad Gan Gerona Giltendez Gonzales Lambino Lukban Macabulos Magbanua Nitura Oducado Pabilane Quintos Ramos Remollo Rivera Santos Tan Taylo Uy
Page 24 of 36
Concurring: Until and unless an initiatory petition can show the required number of
signatures in this case, 12% of all the registered voters in the Philippines with at least
3% in every legislative district no public funds may be spent and no government
resources may be used in an initiative to amend the Constitution. Verily, the Comelec
cannot even entertain any petition absent such signatures.
Dissenting: While R.A. 6735 may not be a perfect law, it was as the majority openly
concedes intended by the legislature to cover and, I respectfully submit, it contains
enough provisions to effectuate an initiative on the Constitution. No law can completely
and absolutely cover all administrative details. In recognition of this, R.A. 6735 wisely
empowered the Commission on Election "to promulgate such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act." And pursuant thereto, the
Comelec issued its Resolution 2300 on 16 January 1991. The majority argues that while
Resolution 2300 is valid in regard to national laws and local legislations, it is void in
reference to constitutional amendments. There is no basis for such differentiation. The
source of and authority for the Resolution is the same law, R.A. 6735. I respectfully
submit that taken together and interpreted properly and liberally, the Constitution
(particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), R.A. 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 provide more than
sufficient authority to implement, effectuate and realize our people's power to amend
the Constitution.
DEFENSOR SANTIAGO V. COMELEC (MR)
G.R. No. 127325 | June 10, 1997
RESOLUTION: Thirteen (13) Members having taken part in the deliberations, and only six (6)
having voted to grant the motions for reconsideration, said motions should be as they are
hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY, the arguments therein set forth not being sufficient cogency
to persuade the requisite majority of the Court to modify or reverse the Decision of 19
March 1997.
DAVIDE, J:
Contrary to the claim of the movants, these two issues do, in fact, raise the issue of the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 6735. At its core lays the principle of non-delegation of
legislative power and the exceptions thereto, both of which are fixed and invariable
subjects of constitutional law
What we said, in plain and simple language, was that R.A. No. 6735 failed to comply with
the "completeness" and "sufficient standard" tests, hence Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735
authorizing the COMELEC to promulgate implementing rules could not cure the infirmity.
It is settled that the validity and enforceability of a delegation of rule-making power
hinges upon compliance with the aforementioned tests.
The plea then that we hearken to the intent of R.A. No. 6735 in dealing with initiative on
constitutional amendments, or that we apply a liberal construction to give life to an
intent not so expressed in the statute as passed, is but a ploy to tempt us to engage in
judicial legislation.
We need only stress that the system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory. The exercise of the right thereunder
is dependent upon a valid implementing law
Poli Law Review | Dean Candelaria Compilation 6.04 Article XVI-XVIII
PUNO, J.: SEPARATE OPINION
Consistent with my prior stand, I vote to partially grant the motions for reconsideration
that seek a modification of our decision holding that "R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete,
inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on
amendments to the Constitution in concerned" and "declaring void those parts of
Resolution No. 2300 of the COMELEC prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of
the initiative or amendment to the Constitution."
The first overriding concern is the need to recognize the clear intent of Congress in
enacting R.A. No. 6735.
The second overriding concern is the need to comply with our traditional duty to interpret
R.A. No. 6735 to effectuate its intent. R.A. No. 6735 represents the wisdom and the will
of two co-equal branches of government the Legislative and the Executive. Due
respect to these two branches of government demands that we utilize all rules of
statutory construction to effectuate R.A. No. 6735. It has been the teaching of this Court
for ages that when a law admits of two interpretations, one that will sustain it and
another that will invalidate it, the interpretation that will save the law should be
adopted.
The third overriding concern is the need to avoid the danger of over-checking the power
of Congress to make laws, which will put in peril the fundamental principle of separation
of powers. From time immemorial, courts have only invalidated laws that offend the
Constitution.
The fourth overriding concern is the need to enforce the new provision of the provision
of the Constitution giving our people a direct, participatory role in its amendment.
The core issue in this case has been obscured mostly by non-legal arguments. The plain
issue is whether the people should be-given the opportunity to speak and decide on the
need to amend our Constitution. The view that R.A. No. 6735 is not an inadequate law
gives them this rare opportunity. There is now a greater need to know the will of the
people considering the conflicting claims of many that they are the vocal chords of the
people. The voice of the people should be heard directly and a deaf ear should be given
even to those who will dictate their will on the people on the erroneous belief that they
hold an exclusive franchise on righteousness. It should be underscored in scarlet that
the Court is not pushing for any amendment to the Constitution. There is yet no telling
whether the Constitution will be amended thru people's initiative.
FRANCISCO, J: SEPARATE OPINION
I retain the view I have already expressed in my previous Dissenting and Concurring
Opinion in this case.
Private respondents' proposal is a mere "amendment" and not a "revision" of the
constitution. A cursory reading of private respondents' petition and its attached petition
for initiative in the 1987 Constitution filed with the Commission on Elections envisages
the alteration of some specific provisions of the constitution all relating to a single
subject.
The guiding original intention of private respondents is merely to improve on provisions
by adding new ones and suppressing some existing parts thereof. There is nothing from
the records to indicate that private respondents intended to re-examine the entire 1987
Constitution and determine to what extent should the same be altered.
Bautista Caguioa Chavez Cupin David Dulay Enguio Feble Galon Gammad Gan Gerona Giltendez Gonzales Lambino Lukban Macabulos Magbanua Nitura Oducado Pabilane Quintos Ramos Remollo Rivera Santos Tan Taylo Uy
Page 25 of 36
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J: CONCURRING AND DISSENTING
I reiterate my adherence to the position of the majority that the Delfin petition should
be dismissed on the ground that, failing to contain names and/or signatures of "at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters
therein," the Delfin petition is fatally defective, being in violation of Section 2 of Article
XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
I see now that there is an equally compelling and valid rationale which builds and
sustains the interpretation that R.A. No. 6735 is a substantial compliance on the part of
Congress with its constitutional duty and power to "provide for the implementation of
the exercise of this right." The subject matter of R.A. No. 6735 clearly includes a people's
initiative to amend the Constitution.
More importantly, I humbly submit that R.A. No. 6735 does not have to contain every
detail conceivable in the matter of initiative proceedings for the amendment of the
Constitution and that as it provides for the minimum voter percentage requirement, the
essential requisites in the initiatory petition, the five-year time limit on the exercise of
the right of initiative on the Constitution, the special registration day prior to the
plebiscite, and the conduct of signature verification as to the initiatory petition, R.A. No.
6735 sufficiently laid down the necessary minimum standards for a valid and complete
statute treating of the matter of, among others, the initiative proceedings to amend the
Constitution.
R.A. No. 6735 having provided for the basic and indispensable who's, what's, where's,
when's and why's in the matter of the initiative proceedings to amend the Constitution,
the details as to how such proceedings are to be step-by-step undertaken, are properly
left to the Commission on Elections to promulgate in the form of subordinate legislation.
2. Lambino v Comelec (RL)
G.R. No. 174153 & G.R. No. 174299 || October 25, 2006 || CARPIO, J.
Petitioners: RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS || MAR-
LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A.V. SAGUISAG
Respondent: COMELEC
(Check the original for the list of intervenors.)
[I sincerely apologize for the long digest. The case if very detailed. If you dont understand anything, you can personally contact my dad at
091 JOKE LANG. Hahaha ]
SUMMARY:
The Lambino Group filed a petition with the Comelec to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their
initiative petition under RA 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act, alleging therein that
they had the support of 6.3 million individuals constituting at least 12% of all registered
voters, with each legislative district represented by at least 3% of its registered voters. The
petition changes the Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of
government. The Comelec denied this. Hence, the petition in the SC.
The SC held that the initiative petition does not comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on direct proposal by the people, explaining that the full text of the proposed
changes should be attached to the signature sheets to show that the people knew what they
were signing. The Lambino Group failed to prove that such was attached to the signature
sheets during the signature gathering.
Poli Law Review | Dean Candelaria Compilation 6.04 Article XVI-XVIII
DOCTRINE: Furthermore, what the petition contains is actually a REVISION of the
Constitution and not an amendment, as what was stated in their petition, as it affects the
substantial entirety of the Constitution. A change in the form of government would alter the
system of checks and balances in the government as well as the separation of powers. A
peoples initiative cannot be used as a means to revise the Constitution. It can only be
resorted to for amendment purposes. Only through (1) Congress upon three-fourths vote of
all its Members or (2) constitutional convention can the Constitution be revised.
FACTS:
On 15 February 2006, Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino Group"),
with other groups and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an
initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution.
On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold
a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c) and
Section 7 of RA 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act.
They alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals
constituting at least 12% of all registered voters, with each legislative district
represented by at least 3% of its registered voters.
They also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of
the 6.3 million individuals.
The initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of
Article VI and Sections 1-4 of Article VII, and by adding Article XVIII entitled
"Transitory Provisions."
o The changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.
They prayed that after due publication of their petition, the COMELEC should
submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification: Do You
Approve The Amendment Of Articles Vi And Vii Of The 1987 Constitution, Changing
The Form Of Government From The Present Bicameral-Presidential To A
Unicameral-Parliamentary System, And Providing Article Xviii As Transitory
Provisions For The Orderly Shift From One System To The Other?
COMELEC denied the resolution for lack of an enabling law governing initiative
petitions to amend the Constitution, invoking the Santiago v. Comelec case,
declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to
amend the Constitution.
The Lambino Group prayed that the COMELEC Resolution be set aside and to
compel the same to give due course to their petition because the Santiago case
binds only the parties to the same and that the petition is an expressing of the
will of the sovereign people.
In another petition, the Binay Group prayed that the SC ask COMELEC
Commissioners to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt for the
COMELEC's verification of signatures and for "entertaining" the Lambino Group's
petition despite the permanent injunction in Santiago.
The SolGen joined causes with the petitioner, urging that the SC grant the petition
and to treat RA 6735 and its implementing rules as "temporary devises to
implement the system of initiative.
ISSUES:
Bautista Caguioa Chavez Cupin David Dulay Enguio Feble Galon Gammad Gan Gerona Giltendez Gonzales Lambino Lukban Macabulos Magbanua Nitura Oducado Pabilane Quintos Ramos Remollo Rivera Santos Tan Taylo Uy
Page 26 of 36
1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people's
initiativeNO.
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
"incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to
implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the ConstitutionNO.
3. Whether the COMELEC committed GAD in denying due course to the Lambino
Group's petitionNO.
HELD: Petition is without merit. DISMISSED.
RATIO:
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
on Direct Proposal by the People.
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution states that amendments may be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least 12% of the
total number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be
represented by 3% of the registered voters therein.
As explained by the ConCom (pertinent points raised by Mr. Rodriguez and Mr.
Suarez), an amendment is "directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition" only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of
the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy
of the paper that the people signed as their initiative petition.
As admitted by Atty. Lambino during the oral arguments, there is not a single
word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino Group's proposed changes in
the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the
proposed changes is attached to it.
o However, he explained that during the signature gathering from Feb-Aug
2006, they circulated, together with the signature sheets, printed copies
of the draft petition, which they later filed on 25 August 2006 with the
COMELEC.
o But what the group allegedly circulated was the draft of the 30 August
2006 amended petition, not the draft of the 25 August 2006 petition.
The Lambino Group would have this Court believe that they prepared the draft of
the 30 August 2006 amended petition almost seven months earlier in February
2006 when they started gathering signatures.
The Lambino Group never alleged in their petition with the COMELEC that they
circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the signature sheets.
Neither did they allege the same in their petition before the SC.
o It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the Opposition-in-Interventions
that they first claimed that they circulated the "petition for initiative filed
with the COMELEC."
There were also inconsistencies with the written allegations re: what was
presented as compared to what the group allegedly circulated based on their oral
arguments.
Poli Law Review | Dean Candelaria
Even assuming they circulated the amended petition during the signature-
gathering period, the Lambino Group admitted circulating only very limited
copies of the petition.
o Atty. Lambino expressly admitted that they printed only 100,000 copies
of the draft petition.
o Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000 signatories could have
received with certainty one copy each of the petition, assuming a 100
percent distribution with no wastage.
o If they attached one copy of the petition to each signature sheet with a
space for ten signatures, only 100,000 signature sheets could have
circulated with the petition. Hence, the maximum number of people who
saw the petition before they signed the signature sheets would not
exceed 1,000,000.
The inescapable conclusion is that they failed to show to the 6.3 million
signatories the full text of the proposed changes.
In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional because it
dismally fails to comply with the requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution that the initiative must be "directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition."
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision
through Initiatives.
A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of
the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional
convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution.
There are three modes of amending the Constitution: (1) through Congress upon
three-fourths vote of all its Members, (2) constitutional convention and (3)
people's initiative.
o The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction
between "amendment" and "revision" of the Constitution.
Only Congress or a constitutional convention may propose
revisions to the Constitution.
A people's initiative may propose only amendments to the
Constitution.
o This has been the consistent ruling of state supreme courts in the US.
McFadden v. Jordan- The initiative power reserved by the
people by amendment to the Constitution x x x applies only
to the proposing and the adopting or rejecting of 'laws and
amendments to the Constitution' and does not purport to
extend to a constitutional revision.
o In this case, there can be no dispute that a people's initiative can only
propose amendments to the Constitution.
o As the SC of Oklahoma ruled in In re Initiative Petition No. 364 It is a
fundamental principle that a constitution can only be revised or
amended in the manner prescribed by the instrument itself xxx
The question is, does the Lambino Group's initiative constitute an amendment or
revision of the Constitution?
o Definition:
Bautista Caguioa Chavez Cupin David Dulay Enguio Feble Galon Gammad Gan Gerona Giltendez Gonzales Lambino Lukban Macabulos Magbanua Nitura Oducado Pabilane Quintos Ramos Remollo Rivera Santos Tan Taylo Uy
Compilation 6.04 Article XVI-XVIII Page 27 of 36
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle
in the constitution, or alters the substantial entirety of the
constitution,
Amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or
deletes without altering the basic principle involved.
Revision generally affects several provisions of the
constitution, while amendment generally affects only the
specific provision being amended.
o Two-part test (in California):
(1) QUANTITATIVE TEST: asks whether the proposed change is
"so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the
'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or
alteration of numerous existing provisions." The court does not
consider the degree of the change.
(2) QUALITATIVE TEST: The main inquiry is whether the change
will "accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of
our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision."
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative
is a revision and not merely an amendment.
o Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul two
articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive -
affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution.
o Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of
government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to
a unicameral legislature.
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential
to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of
the President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a
revision, not a mere amendment.
o It alters the separation of powers in the Constitution as well as the
checks-and-balances within the legislature.
Father Bernas, S.J wrote that for instance a switch from the presidential system
to a parliamentary system would be a revision because of its over-all impact on
the entire constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system to
a unicameral system be because of its effect on other important provisions of the
Constitution.
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between "amendment" and "revision" is
only one of procedure, not of substance.
o They posit that when a deliberative body drafts and proposes changes to the
Constitution, substantive changes are called "revisions" because members of the
deliberative body work full-time on the changes.
o However, the same substantive changes, when proposed through an initiative, are
called "amendments" because the changes are made by ordinary people who do
not make an "occupation, profession, or vocation" out of such endeavor.
o They in effect argue that if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted
the same proposed changes, the changes would constitute a revision of the
Constitution.
o Thus, they concede that the proposed changes in the present initiative
constitute a revision if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the
changes.
Poli Law Review | Dean Candelaria Compilation 6.04 Article XVI-XVIII
o However, since they are private individuals, the changes are merely amendments
to the Constitution. The Lambino Group trivializes the serious matter of changing
the fundamental law of the land.
The express intent of the framers and the plain language of the
Constitution contradict their theory.
o Any theory advocating that a proposed change involving a radical
structural change in government does not constitute a revision justly
deserves rejection.
Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the
Constitution without affecting any other section or article, the change may
generally be considered an amendment and not a revision. (i.e. reducing voting
age)
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a
revision.
o A change in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a
revision and not an amendment.
o For example, the substitution of the word "republican" with "monarchic"
or "theocratic" in Section 1, Article II radically overhauls the entire
structure of government and the fundamental ideological basis of the
Constitution.
o It must be examined on a case-to-case basis.
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary for failing to comply with the constitutional
requirements. To do so will not change the outcome of the present petition.
The Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a statute if the case
before the Court can be resolved on some other grounds.
Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, this will not change the result here because the present
petition violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
o The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25 August 2006 or the
amended petition of 30 August 2006 filed with the COMELEC.
o Only Atty. Lambino, Atty. Donato, and Atty. Agra signed the petition and
amended petition as counsels for "Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado,
Petitioners."
Also, the petition violates Section 10(a) of RA 6735 stating, "No petition embracing more
than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; x x x."
o The proposed Section 4(4) of the Transitory Provisions, mandating the interim
Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution, is a
subject matter totally unrelated to the shift in the form of government.
o Since the present initiative embraces more than one subject matter, RA 6735
prohibits submission of the initiative petition to the electorate. Thus, even if RA
6735 is valid, the Lambino Group's initiative will still fail.
4. The COMELEC Did Not Commit GAD in Dismissing the Lambino Group's Initiative
The COMELEC merely followed the ruling in Santiago and People's Initiative for Reform,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. COMELEC. For following this Court's ruling, no GAD is
attributable to the COMELEC.
Sec. 4
1. Gonzales v. Comelec (GP)
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Page 28 of 36
G.R. No. L-28196 November 9, 1967
Petitioner: RAMON A. GONZALES
Respondent: COMELEC, DIRECTOR OF PRINTING and AUDITOR GENERAL.
G.R. No. L-28224 November 9, 1967
Petitioner: PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA)
Respondent: COMELEC
Emergency: congress passed 3 resolutions: 1. To amend consti provision to allow house of
rep to have a max of 180 members, from the current max of 120; 2. To call for a convention
to amend the consti; 3. To amend the consti insofar as to allow Senators and House of Rep.
to sit in the convention without forfeiting their congressional seats. RA 4913 was passed in
order to submit resoln 1 and 3 for approval by the people through a general election.
st
Petitioners constest 4 issues, but only 2 apply to our topic. 1 , can congress propose
amendments to the consti and call for a convention at the same time? SC said yes. The use
of the word or in may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for
that purpose doesnt bar congress from availing of both. Note also, subject-matter of R. B.
H. No. 2 is different from that of R B. H. Nos. 1 and 3. Moreover, the amendments proposed
under R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3, will be submitted for ratification several years before those that
may be proposed by the constitutional convention called in R. B. H. No. 2. Again, although
the three (3) resolutions were passed on the same date, they were taken up and put to a
vote separately, or one after the other. In other words, they were not passed at the same
nd
time. 2 , does the approv*al+ by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the
amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification have to be a special election
as claimed by petitioners? NO. SC said general is permissible. The argument that the matter
at hand is of transcendental importance, needing its own special election is a political
question.
Facts:
1. G. R. No. L-28196 is an original action for prohibition, seeking to restrain COMELEC
from enforcing the plebiscite to amend the constitution. and to declare RA 4913
unconstitutional.
2. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the
following resolutions:
a. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5,
Article VI, of the Constitution, be amended so as to increase the
membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as
provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be
apportioned among the several provinces according to the number of
their respective inhabitants, although each province shall have, at least,
one (1) member;
b. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said
Constitution, the convention to be composed of two (2) elective
delegates from each representative district, to be elected in the general
elections of 1971.
c. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI be amended so as to
authorize Senators and members of the House of Rep to become
delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without
forfeiting their respective seats.
3. Subsequently, Congress passed RA No. 4913, providing that the amendments to
the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be
Poli Law Review | Dean Candelaria Compilation 6.04 Article XVI-XVIII
submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections which shall be held
on November 14, 1967.
4. On October 31, 1967, the PHILCONSA filed with this Court the petition in G. R. No.
L-28224, for review by certiorari of the resolution of the Commission on Elections
dismissing the petition therein.
5. Ramon A. Gonzales, the petitioner in L-28196, is admittedly a Filipino citizen, a
taxpayer, and a voter. He claims to have instituted case L-28196 as a class unit, for
and in behalf of all citizens, taxpayers, and voters similarly situated.
6. The Solicitor General maintains that this Court has no jurisdiction over the subject-
matter upon the ground that the same is "merely political" as held in Mabanag vs.
Lopez Vito.
7. The consti prov involved is Section 1 of Article XV, as amended, reads:
a. The Congress in joint session assembled by a vote of three-fourths of all
the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting
separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a
convention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of
this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an
election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification.
Issue 1: are the matters at hand only political questions? NO
1. Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto
is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. It is part of
the inherent powers of the people to make, and, hence, to amend their own
Fundamental Law. Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely
because the same explicitly grants such power.
2. Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as component
elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as such, the members of
Congress derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when
performing the same function, for their authority does not emanate from the
Constitution they are the very source of all powers of government, including the
Constitution itself.
3. Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the
Constitution, the members of Congress derive their authority from the
Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not have the final say on
whether or not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits.
Issue 2: Are the congressmen that passed the Resolution and RA 4913 only de facto
congressmen for failing to make an apportionment within 3 years thereafter? FAILURE TO
REAPPORTION DOESNT MAKE THEM DE FACTO. Retarded argument
1. 1935 consti has a similar provision to 1987 consit which states: The first objection
is based upon Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution, which provides:
a. The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 120
Members xxx The Congress shall by law make an apportionment within
three years after the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise.
Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of
Representatives shall have the same number of Members as that fixed
by law for the National Assembly xxx
2. It is urged that the last enumeration or census took place in 1960. We are unable
to agree with the theory that, in view of the failure of Congress to make a valid
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Page 29 of 36
apportionment within the period stated in the Constitution, Congress became an
"unconstitutional Congress" and that, in consequence thereof, the Members of its
House of Representatives are de facto officers.
3. The major premise of this process of reasoning is that the constitutional provision
on "apportionment within three years after the return of every enumeration, and
not otherwise," is mandatory. The fact that Congress is under legal obligation to
make said apportionment does not justify, however, the conclusion that failure to
comply with such obligation rendered Congress illegal or unconstitutional, or that
its Members have become de facto officers.
4. The effect of this omission has been envisioned in the Constitution, pursuant to
which:
a. . . . Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of
Representatives shall have the same number of Members as that fixed
by law for the National Assembly. . . .
5. Even if we assumed, however, that the present Members of Congress are merely
de facto officers, it would not follow that the contested resolutions and Republic
Act No. 4913 are null and void. In fact, the main reasons for the existence of the de
facto doctrine is that public interest demands that acts of persons holding, under
color of title, an office created by a valid statute be, likewise, deemed valid insofar
as the public is concerned. As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot
be assailed collaterally. (through quo warranto)
Issue 2: W/n Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution and call a
convention for that purpose at the same time. YES
1. Atty. Juan T. David, as amicus curiae, theorizes that congress may not do both at
the same time due to the disjunctive "or." Such basis is, however, a weak one, in
the absence of other circumstances and none has brought to our attention
supporting the conclusion drawn by the amicus curiae. In fact, the term "or" has,
oftentimes, been held to mean "and," or vice-versa, when the spirit or context of
the law warrants it.
2. It is, also, noteworthy that R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 propose amendments to the
constitutional provision on Congress, to be submitted to the people for ratification
on November 14, 1967, whereas R. B. H. No. 2 calls for a convention in 1971, to
consider proposals for amendment to the Constitution, in general. In other words,
the subject-matter of R. B. H. No. 2 is different from that of R B. H. Nos. 1 and 3.
Moreover, the amendments proposed under R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3, will be
submitted for ratification several years before those that may be proposed by the
constitutional convention called in R. B. H. No. 2. Again, although the three (3)
resolutions were passed on the same date, they were taken up and put to a vote
separately, or one after the other. In other words, they were not passed at the
same time.
3. (doesnt say who so I presume counsel of petitioners) Counsel ask: Since Congress
has decided to call a constitutional convention to propose amendments, why not
let the whole thing be submitted to said convention? Whether or not this should
be done is a political question, not subject to review by the courts of justice.
Issue 4: May Constitutional Amendments Be Submitted for Ratification in a General Election?
YES
1. Article XV of the Constitution provides: when approved by a majority of the
votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for
their ratification.
Poli Law Review | Dean Candelaria Compilation 6.04 Article XVI-XVIII
2. There is in this provision nothing to indicate that the "election" therein referred to
is a "special," not a general, election. The circumstance that three previous
amendments to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification
in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the
circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed
amendments for ratification in general elections.
3. Petitioners maintain that the term "election," as used in Section 1 of Art. XV of the
Constitution, should be construed as meaning a special election. Some members of
the Court even feel that said term ("election") refers to a "plebiscite," without any
"election," general or special, of public officers. They opine that constitutional
amendments are, in general, if not always, of such important, if not transcendental
and vital nature as to demand that the attention of the people be focused
exclusively on the subject-matter
4. The ideal conditions are, however, one thing. The question whether the
Constitution forbids the submission of proposals for amendment to the people
except under such conditions, is another thing. (in other words, political question)
The majority view although the votes in favor thereof are insufficient to declare
Republic Act No. 4913 unconstitutional as ably set forth in the opinion penned
by Mr. Justice Sanchez, is, however, otherwise.
5. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 4913 provides guidelines to appraise the voters, such
as publication in 3 consecutive issues of official gazette, posted in conspicuous
place in every city, 5 copies per polling place, copies in native languages per polling
place, COMELEC to make available copies for free distribution, and contested
resolutions to be printed in full on the back of the ballots.
6. We are not prepared to say that the foregoing measures are palpably inadequate
to comply with the constitutional requirement that proposals for amendment be
"submitted to the people for their ratification," and that said measures are
manifestly insufficient, from a constitutional viewpoint, to inform the people of
the amendment sought to be We are impressed by the factors considered by our
distinguished and esteemed brethren, who opine otherwise, but, we feel that such
factors affect the wisdom of Republic Act No. 4913 and that of R. B. H. Nos. 1 and
3, not the authority of Congress to approve the same.
Six (6) Members of this Court believe, however, said Act and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 violate the
spirit of the Constitution. Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring
Republic Act 4913 and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in
these two (2) cases must be, as they are hereby, dismiss and the writs therein prayed for
denied, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
2. Tolentino v Comelec (RM)
G.R. No. L-34150 | October 16, 1971
Petitioner: ARTURO M. TOLENTINO
Respondents: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, THE AUDITOR, and THE DISBURSING
OFFICER OF THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
Intervenors: RAUL S. MANGLAPUS, JESUS G. BARRERA, PABLO S. TRILLANA III, VICTOR DE LA SERNA, MARCELO B.
FERNAN, JOSE Y. FERIA, LEONARDO SIGUION REYNA, VICTOR F. ORTEGA, and JUAN V. BORRA
Summary: The Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being by virtue of 2 resolutions
of the Congress of the Philippines approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly
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Page 30 of 36
convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments to the
Constitution. the Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 amending Section 1 of
Article V of the Constitution to lower the voting age to 18 which will be part of the
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to coincide with
the local elections. This was even before the rest of the draft of the Constitution (then under
revision) had been approved. Arturo Tolentino then filed a motion to prohibit such
plebiscite. The Court held that it has jurisdiction over the case. Moreover, it held that there
is a limitation or condition in Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution which is violated by
the act of the Convention of calling for a plebiscite on the sole amendment contained in
Organic Resolution No. 1, and that is the condition and limitation that all the amendments to
be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to the people in a single election
or plebiscite.It being indisputable that the amendment now proposed to be submitted to a
plebiscite is only the first amendment the Convention propose the SC held that the plebiscite
being called for the purpose of submitting the same for ratification of the people on
November 8, 1971 is not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, hence all
acts of the Convention and the respondent Comelec in that direction are null and void.
FACTS
The Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being by virtue of 2 resolutions
of the Congress of the Philippines approved in its capacity as a constituent
assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose
amendments to the Constitution namely, Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions
of Congress held on March 16, 1967 and June 17, 1969 respectively.
The delegates to the said Convention were all elected under and by virtue of said
resolutions and the implementing legislation thereof, Republic Act 6132.
Resolution No. 4 merely modified the number of delegates to represent the
different cities and provinces fixed originally in Resolution No 2.
After the election of the delegates, the Convention held its inaugural session. Its
preliminary labors of election of officers, organization of committees and other
preparatory works over, as its first formal proposal to amend the Constitution, its
session which began at about 3:30 in the morning of September 28, 1971, the
Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 amending Section 1 of Article V of
the Constitution to lower the voting age to 18 which will be part of the
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to
coincide with the local elections.
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by (male) citizens of
the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are
(twenty-one) EIGHTEEN years or over and are able to read
and write, and who shall have resided in the Philippines
for one year and in the municipality wherein they propose
to vote for at least six months preceding the election.
September 28, 1971, President Diosdado Macapagal, called upon respondent
Comelec "to help the Convention implement the resolution."
COMELEC "RESOLVED to inform the Constitutional Convention that it will hold the
plebiscite on condition that:
(a) The Constitutional Convention will undertake the printing of separate
official ballots, election returns and tally sheets its expense;
Poli Law Review | Dean Candelaria Compilation 6.04 Article XVI-XVIII
(b) The Constitutional Convention will adopt its own security measures for the
printing and shipment of said ballots and election forms; and
(c) Said official ballots and election forms will be delivered to the Commission
in time so that they could be distributed at the same time that the
Commission will distribute its official and sample ballots to be used in the
elections on Nov. 8, 1971.
The President of the Convention also issued an order forming an Ad Hoc
Committee to implement the Resolution.
o This Committee issued implementing guidelines which were approved by
the President who then transmitted them to the Commission on
Elections.
o The Committee on Plebiscite and Ratification filed a report on the
progress of the implementation of the plebiscite in the afternoon of
October 7,1971, enclosing copies of the order, resolution and letters of
transmittal above referred to
In its plenary session, the Convention approved a resolution authored by Delegate
Antonio Olmedo of Davao Oriental, calling for a recess of the Convention from
November 1, 1971 to November 9, 1971 to permit the delegates to campaign for
the ratification of Organic Resolution No. 1.
Thereafter, the Convention passed Resolution No. 24 submitted by Delegate Jose
Ozamiz confirming the authority of the President of the Convention to implement
Organic Resolution No. 1, including the creation of the Ad Hoc Committee ratifying
all acts performed in connection with said implementation.
Hence, this petition for prohibition to principally restrain the COMELEC "from
undertaking to hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which the proposed
constitutional amendment "reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of Article V of the
Constitution of the Philippines to eighteen years "shall be, submitted" for
ratification by the people pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1 of the
Constitutional Convention of 1971, and the subsequent implementing resolutions,
by declaring said resolutions to be without the force and effect of law in so far as
they direct the holding of such plebiscite and by also declaring the acts of the
respondent Commission (COMELEC) performed and to be done by it in obedience
to the aforesaid Convention resolutions to be null and void, for being violative of
the Constitution of the Philippines.
Respondents contention. The power to provide for, fix the date and lay down the
details of the plebiscite for the ratification of any amendment is within the
authority of the Convention as a necessary consequence and part of its power to
propose amendments and that this power includes that of submitting such
amendments either individually or jointly at such time and manner as the
Convention may direct in discretion.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction?
2. Whether or not it is within the powers of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 to
order, on its own fiat, the holding of a plebiscite for the ratification of the
proposed amendment reducing to eighteen years the age for the exercise of
suffrage under Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution proposed in the
Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 in the manner and form provided for in said
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Page 31 of 36
resolution and the subsequent implementing acts and resolution of the
Convention?
1. JURISDICTION
The power of judicial review
o The judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon
to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments
and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
o The courts may review the validity of an act of the constitutional convention
proposing a particular amendment to the Constitution..
The Power to review acts of the constitutional convention
o A constitutional convention is supreme within the domain of its legitimate
authority.
o The current constitutional convention came into being only because it was called
by a resolution of a joint session of Congress acting as a constituent assembly by
1
authority of Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution.
o Once convened, this convention became endowed with extraordinary powers
generally beyond the control of any department.
o Such powers can be coextensive only with the purpose for which the convention
was called and as it is self-evident that the amendments it may propose CANNOT
have any effect as part of the Constitution until the same are duly ratified by the
people.
o The acts of the convention, its officers and members are not immune from attack
on constitutional grounds.
o The present Constitution is in full force and effect in its entirety and in everyone of
its parts.
o In internal operation and the performance of its task to propose amendments to
the Constitution it is not subject to any degree of restraint or control by any other
authority than itself.
o BUT neither the Convention nor any of its officers or members can rightfully
deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, deny
anyone in this country the equal protection of the laws or the freedom of speech
and of the press in disregard of the Bill of Rights of the existing Constitution.
The SC has jurisdiction over the case at bar
o Cited the case of Gonzales v. COMELEC. The court upheld the jurisdiction of the SC
because both the Convention and the Court are subject to the Constitution and the
rule of law, and upon principle, reason and authority, per Justice Laurel, it is
within the power, as it is the solemn duty of the Court, under the existing
1
SECTION 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of
the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this
Constitution or call a convention for the purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are
submitted to the people for their ratification.
Poli Law Review | Dean Candelaria Compilation 6.04 Article XVI-XVIII
Constitution to resolve the issues in which petitioner, respondents and intervenors
have joined in this case.
Limits to the power of a constitutional convention
o As to matters not related to its internal operation and the performance of its
assigned mission to propose amendments to the Constitution, the Convention and
its officers and members are all subject to all the provisions of the existing
Constitution.
o Now we hold that even as to its latter task of proposing amendments to the
Constitution, it is subject to the provisions of Section 1 of Article XV.
2. Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution contemplates a single election
o The Court held that there is a limitation or condition in Section 1 of Article XV of
the Constitution which is violated by the act of the Convention of calling for a
plebiscite on the sole amendment contained in Organic Resolution No. 1, and that
is the condition and limitation that all the amendments to be proposed by the
same Convention must be submitted to the people in a single election or
plebiscite.
o It being indisputable that the amendment now proposed to be submitted to a
plebiscite is only the first amendment the Convention propose the SC held that the
plebiscite being called for the purpose of submitting the same for ratification of
the people on November 8, 1971 is not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the
Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent Comelec in that
direction are null and void.
o The SC arrived at this decision for the following reasons:
1. The language of the constitutional provision is clear.
o lt says distinctly that either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a
convention called for the purpose "may propose amendments to this
Constitution," thus placing no limit as to the number of amendments that
Congress or the Convention may propose.
o The same provision also as definitely provides that "such amendments shall
be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes
cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for
their ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many "elections"
or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or amendments proposed
by the same constituent assembly of Congress or convention, and the
provision unequivocably says "an election" which means only one.
3. The wisdom and appropriateness of this provision.
o Amending the Constitution is as serious and important an undertaking as
constitution making itself.
o Any amendment of the Constitution is as important as the whole of it if only
because the Constitution has to be an integrated and harmonious instrument.
It must be in tune with all the parts.
4. A constitution is the work of the people thru its drafters assembled by them for
the purpose.
o Once the original constitution is approved, the part that the people play in its
amendment becomes harder, for when a whole constitution is submitted to
them, more or less they can assumed its harmony as an integrated whole, and
they can either accept or reject it in its entirety.
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o So also, when an amendment is submitted to them that is to form part of the
existing constitution, they can also study with deliberation the proposed
amendment in relation to the whole existing constitution and or any of its
parts and thereby arrive at an intelligent judgment as to its acceptability.
Application to the case at bar:
o It is evident that no fixed frame of reference is provided the voter, as to what
finally will be concomitant qualifications that will be required by the final
draft of the constitution to be formulated by the Convention of a voter to be
able to enjoy the right of suffrage.
o There are other considerations which make it impossible to vote intelligently
on the proposed amendment. If a voter would favor the reduction of the
voting age to eighteen under conditions he feels are needed under the
circumstances, and he does not see those conditions in the ballot nor is there
any possible indication whether they will ever be, because Congress has
reserved those for future action.
o The situation actually before Us is even worse. No one knows what changes in
the fundamental principles of the constitution the Convention will be minded
to approve. A voter in the proposed plebiscite cannot intelligently determine
the effect of the reduction of the voting age upon the different institutions
which the Convention may establish and of which presently he is not given
any idea.
Valid Plebiscite
o In order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment to the Constitution
may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample
basis for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se as well as
its relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a
harmonious whole.
o In the context of the present state of things, where the Convention has hardly
started considering the merits of hundreds, if not thousands, of proposals to
amend the existing Constitution, to present to the people any single proposal or a
few of them cannot comply with this requirement.
o The present Constitution does not contemplate in Section 1 of Article XV a
plebiscite or "election" wherein the people are in the dark as to frame of reference
they can base their judgment on. There is no proper submission.
o Under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, a proposal to amendment the
Constitution should be submitted to the people not separately from but together
with all the other amendments to be proposed by this present Convention.
The Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 and all subsequent acts of the
Convention implementing the same violate the condition in Section 1, Article XV
that there should only be one "election" or plebiscite for the ratification of all the
amendments the Convention may propose.
We are not denying any right of the people to vote on the proposed amendment;
We are only holding that under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the same
should be submitted to them not separately from but together with all the other
amendments to be proposed by this present Convention.
Poli Law Review | Dean Candelaria Compilation 6.04 Article XVI-XVIII
Article XVIII
Sec. 25
1. Bayan v Zamora (JE; APG edits)
October 10, 2000; Buena, J.
RRV: This involves the VFA agreement entered into between Philippines and the United
States. President Ramos approved the VFA and was duly signed by US Ambassador Thomas
Hubbard. President Estrada ratified the VFA. President referred it to the Senate and Senate,
in turn, referred the VFA to its Committee on Foreign Relations. Proposed Senate Resolution
No. 443 was approved by the Senate, by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of its members. Senate
Resolution No. 443 was then re-numbered as Senate Resolution No. 18. VFA officially
entered into force after an Exchange of Notes between respondent Secretary Siazon and
United States Ambassador Hubbard. Which provision shall govern the VFA, Section 21,
Article VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution? - The VFA is governed by both
sections of the Constitution.
See table sa ratio part to distinguish art. 7 sec 21 and art 18 section 25.
SC held that both sections must be taken as complementary to each other, and not in
isolation. Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities, should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in
a limited sense, however, the provisions of section 21, Article VII will find applicability with
regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes required to
obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate, as will be further discussed hereunder. As to the
matter of voting, Section 21, Article VII particularly requires that a treaty or international
agreement, to be valid and effective, must be concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
members of the Senate. On the other hand, Section 25, Article XVIII simply provides that the
treaty be duly concurred in by the Senate. Thus, the concurrence of the Senate
contemplated under Section 25, Article XVIII means that at least two-thirds of all the
members of the Senate favourably vote to concur with the treaty-the VFA in the instant
case. Section 25, Article XVIII VFA, must be related and viewed in light of the clear mandate
embodied in Section 21, Article VII, which in more specific terms, requires that the
concurrence of a treaty, or international agreement, be made by a two -thirds vote of all the
members of the Senate. The fundamental law is clear that two-thirds of the 24 Senators, or
at least 16 favorable votes, suffice so as to render compliance with the strict constitutional
mandate of giving concurrence to the subject treaty. It is inconsequential whether the
United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international
law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA
possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to
be taken equally as a treaty.
Facts:
Philippines and the United States of America forged a Military Bases Agreement
which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory
by United States military personnel. To further strengthen their defense and
security relationship, the Philippines and the United States entered into a Mutual
Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to
Bautista Caguioa Chavez Cupin David Dulay Enguio Feble Galon Gammad Gan Gerona Giltendez Gonzales Lambino Lukban Macabulos Magbanua Nitura Oducado Pabilane Quintos Ramos Remollo Rivera Santos Tan Taylo Uy
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respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public
vessels, and aircraft.
In line with the closing of the US Bases in 1991, the USA and the Philippines,
through Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell and DFA Usec Rodolfo
Severino Jr., exchanged notes on the complementing strategic interests of the
United States and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region. With this meeting, the
concept of the Visiting Forces Agreement was born.
President Ramos approved the VFA and was duly signed by US Ambassador
Thomas Hubbard.
Pres. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA.
President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora,
officially transmitted to the Senate the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the
President and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution.
The Senate, in turn, referred the VFA to its Committee on Foreign Relations,
chaired by Senator Ople, and its Committee on National Defense and Security,
chaired by Senator Biazon, for their joint consideration and
recommendation. Thereafter, joint public hearings were held by the two
Committees.
The Committees submitted Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443 recommending
the concurrence of the Senate to the VFA and the creation of a Legislative
Oversight Committee to oversee its implementation. Debates then ensued.
Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443 was approved by the Senate, by a two-thirds
(2/3) vote of its members. Senate Resolution No. 443 was then re-numbered as
Senate Resolution No. 18.
VFA officially entered into force after an Exchange of Notes between respondent
Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Hubbard.
o VFA, which consists of a Preamble and nine (9) Articles, provides for the
mechanism for regulating the circumstances and conditions under which
US Armed Forces and defense personnel may be present in the
Philippines.
Petitioners argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is applicable considering that the
VFA has for its subject the presence of foreign military troops in the Philippines.
Respondents, on the contrary, maintain that Section 21, Article VII should apply
inasmuch as the VFA is not a basing arrangement but an agreement which involves
merely the temporary visits of United States personnel engaged in joint military
exercises.
Issues: Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII or of Section 25,
Article XVIII of the Constitution? - The VFA is governed by both sections of the Constitution.
Was there a grave abuse of discretion when the two presidents signed the treaty?
Ratio:
Section 25 of Article XVIII Section 21, Article VII
After the expiration in 1991 of the Treaties can only be valid when
Agreement between [the concurred by 2/3 of the Senate
Philippines and the USA] Deals with treatise or international
concerning Military Bases, foreign agreements in general, in which
military bases, troops, or facilities case, the concurrence of at least
Poli Law Review | Dean Candelaria Compilation 6.04 Article XVI-XVIII Page 34 of 36

shall not be allowed except under two-thirds (2/3) of all the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and
a treaty duly concurred in by the Members of the Senate is required personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such
Senate, and when the Congress so to make the subject treaty, or visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the United States and
requires, ratified by a majority of international agreement, valid and the Philippine government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of
votesin a national referendum binding on the part of the vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and
Allows the presence of foreign Philippines. supplies.
military bases, troops or facilities It lays down the general rule on Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign
as long as a treaty, with a treatise or international military bases, troops, or facilities, should apply in the instant case. To a certain
concurrence of the Senate agreements and applies to any extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of section 21, Article VII
(following the 2/3 rule of Section form of treaty with a wide variety will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of
21, Article VII) has been signed. of subject matter, such as, but not determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the
A special provision that applies to limited to, extradition or tax Senate, as will be further discussed hereunder.
treaties which involve the treatise or those economic in The Constitution makes no distinction between transient and permanent with
presence of foreign military bases, nature. regard to the structure for the establishment of a military base
troops or facilities in the All treaties or international Court does not subscribe to the argument that Section 25, Article XVIII is not
Philippines. agreements entered into by the controlling since no foreign military bases, but merely foreign troops and facilities,
The concurrence of the Senate is Philippines, regardless of subject are involved in the VFA. The Constitution reveals that the proscription covers
only one of the requisites to matter, coverage, or particular foreign military bases, troops, or facilities.
render compliance with the designation or appellation, o The clause does not refer to foreign military bases, troops, or facilities
constitutional requirements and to requires the concurrence of the collectively but treats them as separate and independent subjects. The
consider the agreement binding on Senate to be valid and effective. provision contemplates three different situations - a military treaty the
the Philippines. Opens with the clause No treaty x subject of which could be either (a) foreign bases, (b) foreign troops, or
foreign military bases, troops, or x x, (c) foreign facilities - any of the three standing alone places it under the
facilities may be allowed in the coverage of Section 25, Article XVIII.
Philippines only by virtue of a
treaty duly concurred in by the Whether or not the requirements of Section 25 were complied with when the Senate gave
Senate, ratified by a majority of its concurrence to the VFA.
the votes cast in a national Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in
referendum held for that purpose the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must
if so required by Congress, and be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and,
recognized as such by the other when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the
contracting state. people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other
It contains the phrase shall not be contracting state.
allowed. There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the
VFA.
Both sections must be taken as complementary to each other, and not in o The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in
isolation. Both constitutional provisions, far from contradicting each other, accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, whether under the
actually share some common ground. These constitutional provisions both general requirement in Section 21, Article VII, or the specific mandate
embody phrases in the negative and thus, are deemed prohibitory in mandate and mentioned in Section 25, Article XVIII, the provision in the latter article
character. The concurrence of the Senate is indispensable to render the treaty or requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national
international agreement valid and effective. referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.
The fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Section 21, Note: As to the matter of voting, Section 21, Article VII particularly requires that a
Article VII, and that the Senate extended its concurrence under the same treaty or international agreement, to be valid and effective, must be concurred in
provision, is immaterial. For in either case, whether under Section 21, Article VII by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate. On the other hand,
or Section 25, Article XVIII, the fundamental law is crystalline that the Section 25, Article XVIII simply provides that the treaty be duly concurred in by
concurrence of the Senate is mandatory to comply with the strict constitutional the Senate.
requirements. Section 25, Article XVIII VFA, must be related and viewed in light of the clear
mandate embodied in Section 21, Article VII, which in more specific terms,

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Poli Law Review | Dean Candelaria Compilation 6.04 Article XVI-XVIII
requires that the concurrence of a treaty, or international agreement, be made by
a two -thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. Indeed, Section 25, Article
XVIII must not be treated in isolation to section 21, Article, VII.
Thus, the concurrence of the Senate contemplated under Section 25, Article XVIII
means that at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate favorably vote to
concur with the treaty-the VFA in the instant case.
Two-thirds (2/3) of this figure, or not less than sixteen (16) members, must decide
in favour of the proposal to comply with the requisite number of votes mentioned
in Section 21 of Article VII. The fact that there were actually twenty-three (23)
[
incumbent Senators at the time the voting was made, will not alter in any
significant way the circumstance that more than two-thirds of the members of the
Senate concurred with the proposed VFA, even if the two-thirds vote requirement
is based on this figure of actual members (23). In this regard, the fundamental law
is clear that two-thirds of the 24 Senators, or at least 16 favorable votes, suffice so
as to render compliance with the strict constitutional mandate of giving
concurrence to the subject treaty.
Requirement that the VFA should be recognized as a treaty by the United States of
America.
Petitioners content that the phrase recognized as a treaty, embodied in section
25, Article XVIII, means that the VFA should have the advice and consent of the
United States Senate pursuant to its own constitutional process, and that it should
not be considered merely an executive agreement by the United States.
Respondents argue that the letter of United States Ambassador Hubbard stating
that the VFA is binding on the United States Government is conclusive, on the
point that the VFA is recognized as a treaty by the United States of
America. According to respondents, the VFA, to be binding, must only be accepted
as a treaty by the United States.
This Court is of the firm view that the phrase recognized as a treaty means that
the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty.
To require the other contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to
submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its
Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.
It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an
executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement
is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of
an agreement under international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as
a treaty.
In international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive
agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned, as long as the
negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers. International law
continues to make no distinction between treaties and executive agreements: they
are equally binding obligations upon nations.
In our jurisdiction, we have recognized the binding effect of executive agreements
even without the concurrence of the Senate or Congress.
o Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading - the right of the
Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of
subsequent congressional approval has been confirmed by long
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usage. From the earliest days of our history we have entered into
executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and
consular relations, most-favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark
and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the
settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been seriously
questioned by our courts.
o The records reveal that the United States Government, through
Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the United States
government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA.
o The ratification, by the President, of the VFA and the concurrence of the
Senate should be taken as a clear an unequivocal expression of our
nations consent to be bound by said treaty, with the concomitant duty
to uphold the obligations and responsibilities embodied thereunder.
In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as
commonly believed, in the legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to
giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.
With the ratification of the VFA, which is equivalent to final acceptance, and with
the exchange of notes between the Philippines and the United States of America, it
now becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part, under the principles of
international law, to be bound by the terms of the agreement. Hence, we cannot
readily plead the Constitution as a convenient excuse for non-compliance with our
obligations, duties and responsibilities under international law.
There was no grave abuse of discretion in the enactment of the said treaty.
A President can enter into agreements with other Heads of State, as given by the
Constitution. However, the enactment of his agreements or treaties must first
undergo a concurrence by 2/3 of the Senate, which the President dutifully
followed.
The petitions are dismissed.
DISSENTING OPINION by Justice Puno:
1. Respondents claim that Section 25 of Article XVIII pertains only to PERMANENT presence of foreign
military troops, and not TEMPORARY presence. According to Blacks Law Dictionary, permanence does not
entail absolute perpetuity, but a period of time much, much longer in duration than temporariness. There
is no provision in the VFA which states exactly when the VFA will cease to exist: This agreement shall
remain in force until the expiration of 180 days from the date on which either party gives the other party
notice in writing that it desires to terminate the agreement. Mr. Siazon, in the hearing held concerning
VFA, remarked that the VFA is permanently temporary.
2. Treaties are agreements, and the VFA is such treaty. However, the fact that on the Americans side the VFA
is an executive agreement poses a problem. Treaties, to be properly enacted, must undergo the treaty-
making process properly. The Philippine government executed such process properly, with the President
heeding the concurrence of the Senate. However, the treaty did not undergo the proper treaty-making
process in the United States, becoming just an executive agreement.
2. Republic v Sandiganbayan (LM)
Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines (PCGG)
Respondent: Sandiganbayan and Peter Sabido
Date: April 7, 1993 | Bidin, J.
Summary: PCGG sequestered PIMECO and filed cases against certain people, including
Sabido. Sabido learned that PCGG planned to transfer the management of PIMECO to MPCP,
a subsidiary of GSIS so he filed a Manifestation with the Sandiganbayan where his case is
Poli Law Review | Dean Candelaria Compilation 6.04 Article XVI-XVIII
pending for a TRO. Sandiganabyan issued a Preliminary Injunction on the transfer. SC held
that the projected transfer of management of PIMECO to MPCP is unwarranted and was
effected by PCGG beyong the scope of the powers vested upon it by law. Such turnover
made by the PCGG is equivalent to the performance of an act of ownership which PCGG
cannot exercise. PCGG is merely a conservator or caretaker which can exercise only powers
of administration over property sequestered, frozen or provisionally taken over.
Facts:
1. In 1986, PCGG issued an order sequestering Philippine Integrated Meat
Corporation (PIMECO) and filed pursuant to EO 14, a Complaint against former
President Marcos, Imelda, Sabido, Benedicto, Yulo, Dehesa, Tengco, Sison,
Zalamea, and Ferry for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and
damages, involving PIMECO, together with their assets, shares of stock, effects,
evidence and records.
2. Sabido filed his Answer to the above complaint denying that he was a close
business associate of Marcos and that he has not, directly or indirectly, singly or
collectively with his co-defendants, participated in the plunder of the National
Treasury and the other acts stated in the complaint. He thereafter filed a
Manifestation stating that he learned from newspaper reports that PCGG intend to
turnover the management, control and possession of PIMECO to the GSIS through
its subsidiary Meat Packing Corporation of the Philippines (MPCP) and alleged that
since PIMECO is a sequestered asset, the approval of the Court of the turnover is
indispensable since it is in custodia legis.
3. Subsequently, officials and board members of PIMECO labor union filed with the
Court a formal communication wherein they appealed to the Court to issue
certification or anything that could attest to the fact that the status quo is
maintained, to enable PIMECO to continue doing business.
4. Sandiganbayan issued a TRO enjoining PCGG to cease and desist from enforcing
the contemplated turnover of the management, control and possession of PIMECO
to MPCP until further orders.
5. As a comment to the Manifestation of Sabido, PCGG asserted that the transfer of
operation, management and control of PIMECO involves an exercise of PCGGs
pure administrative judgment, as conferred on it by law, in respect of its mandated
duty to preserve, conserve, or otherwise prevent dissipation of the value of
PIMECO, which it has provisionally taken over.
6. Sandiganbayan issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the PCGG from
procedding with the projected turnover or to interfere with its present
management and also enjoined the PCGG from dismissing or replacing the
management team presently operating except for valid or serious grounds not
attributable to the opposition to the turnover.
Issue: W/N PCGG committed GADALEJ?
Held: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Ratio:
1. While the PCGG is ordinarily allowed a free hand in the exercise of its
administrative or executive function, Sandiganbayan is empowered to determine
in an appropriate case, if in the exercise of such functions, the PCGG has gravely
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abused its discretion or has overstepped the boundaries of the power conferred
upon it by law.
2. We find that the projected transfer of management of PIMECO to MPCP is
unwarranted and was effected or done by PCGG beyond the scope of the powers
vested upon it by law. Such turnover made by the PCGG is equivalent to the
performance of an act of ownership, which PCGG cannot exercise. We have
invariably ruled that the PCGG is merely a conservator or caretaker which can
exercise only powers of administration over property sequestered, frozen or
provisionally taken over.
3. Something more than mere physical custody is connoted, the PCGG may in this
case exercise some measure of control in the operation, running, or management
of the business itself. But even in this special situation, the intrusion into
management should be restricted to the minimum degree necessary to accomplish
the legislative will, which is to prevent the disposal or dissipation of the business
enterprise. There should be no hasty, indiscriminate, unreasoned replacement or
substitution of management officials or change of policies, particularly in respect
of viable establishments.
4. PCGG should be reminded of its mandated task that insofar as sequestered assets
are concerned, the fact remains that it is merely a conservator and not the owner
who exercises power of dominion over the sequestered property. Its power to
sequester ill-gotten wealth is akin to the provisional remedy of preliminary
attachment which is always subject to the control of the Sandiganbayan.
5. In issuing the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by private respondent, the
Sandiganbayan found that there is no proof showing that the members of the
management team at PIMECO have mismanaged the business or exercised any act
prejudicial to all the parties concerned. On the contrary, it found that from an
inoperative business concern prior to the takeover by the PCGG, PIMECO was
revived and emerged to become one of the top 1,000 corporations in the country
for the years 1987 and 1988 and was the recipient of an award for being the best-
managed PCGG sequestered firm in 1988.