Topic: How a title is construed

Cordero v. Hon. Cabatuando

Case No. 81 G.R. No. L-14542 (October 31, 1962) Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No.47

FACTS:

Republic Act No. 1199 is the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines. Section 54 of this
act expressed that indigent tenants should be represented by Public Defendant of
Department of Labor. Congress then amended this in Republic Act No. 2263: An Act
Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act No. 1199. Section 19 of the amendatory act
says that mediation of tenancy disputes falls under authority of Secretary of Justice. Section
20 also provides that indigent tenants shall be represented by trial attorney of the Tenancy
Mediation Commission.

ISSUE:

W/N Sections 19 and 20 of Rep. Act No. 2263 is unconstitutional because of the
constitutional provision that No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more
than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.

HELD:

The constitutional requirement is complied with as long the law has a single general
subject, which is the Agricultural Tenancy Act, and the amendatory provisions no matter
how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject, will be regarded as valid. Constitutional provisions relating to subject matter and
titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede proper
legislation.

LATIN MAXIM:

24a, 37, d
INSULAR LUMBER CO. V. COURT OF TAX APPEALS

Facts:

These two (2) cases are appeals by way of certiorari from the decision dated July 31, 1969
of the Court of Tax Appeals ordering the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to refund to the
Insular Lumber Company the amount of P10,560.20 instead of P19,921.37, representing
25% of the specific tax paid on manufactured oil and motor fuel utilized by said company in
the operation of its forest concession in the year 1963.

Insular Lumber Company (Company for short). a corporation organized and existing under
the laws of New York. U.S.A., and duly authorized to do business in the Philippines is a
licensed forest concessionaire. The Company purchase manufactured oil and motor fuel
which it used in the operation of its forest concession on which specific tax was paid.

The commissioner denied the Company's claim for refund on the ground that the privilege
of partial tax refund granted by Section 5 of Republic Act No. 1435 to those using oil in the
operation of forest and mining concessions is limited to a period of five (5) years from June
14, 1956, the date effectivity of said Act.

Respondent court, however, did not allow the refund of the full amount of P14,598.08
because the Company's right to claim the refund of a portion thereof, particularly those
paid during the period from January 1, 1963 to April 29, 1963 had already prescribed.
Hence, the Company was credited the refund of P10,560.20 only.

Issues:

Did the Court of Tax Appeals err in its previous decisions (denying the tax exemption to
Insular Lumber Company)?

Ruling:

The Commissioner contends that the first proviso in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 1435 is
unconstitutional. In claiming the unconstitutionality of the aforesaid section, the
Commissioner anchored its argument on Article VI, Section 21(l) of the 1935 Constitution
which provides:

No bill which may be enacted into a law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill

The title of R.A. No. 1435 is "An Act to Provide Means for Increasing The Highway
Special Fund." The Commissioner contends that the subject of R.A. No. 1435 was to
increase Highway Special Fund. However, Section 5 of, the Act deals with another subject
which is the partial exemption of miners and loggers.

Partial exemption on which the Company based its claim for refund is clearly not expressed
in the title of the aforesaid Act. More importantly, Section 5 provides for a decrease rather
than an increase of the Highway Special Fund.

The Court finds NO MERIT in the arguments.

Republic Act No. 1435 deals with only one subject and proclaims just one policy - the
necessity for increasing the Highway Special Fund through the imposition of an increased
specific tax on manufactured oils. The proviso in Section 5 of the law is in effect a partial
exemption from the imposed increased tax. Said proviso, which has reference to specific tax
on oil and fuel, is nor, a deviation from the general subject of the law. The primary purpose
of the aforequoted constitutional provision is to prohibit duplicity in legislation the title of
which might completely fail to apprise the legislators or the public of the nature, scope and
consequences of the law or its operation.

Furthermore, in deciding the constitutionality of a statute alleged to be defectively titled,

every presumption favors the validity of the Act. As is true republic in cases presenting
other constitutional issues, the courts avoid declaring an Act unconstitutional whenever
possible. Where there is any doubt as to the insufficiency of either the title, or the Art, the
legislation should be sustained.

As regards the second and third assignment of errors, the commissioner contends that the
five-year limitation period for partial refund of specific tax paid for oil and fuel used in
agriculture and aviation provided in Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1435 is also applicable to
Section 5 of said Act which grants partial refund of specific tax for oil used by miners or
forest concessionaires.

Section 1: ----

Whenever any of the oils mentioned above are, during the five years from June eighteen,
nineteen hundred and fifty-two, used in agriculture and aviation, fifty per centrum of the
specific tax paid thereon shall be refunded by the Commissioner of International Revenue
upon submission of the following: xxxx

Section 5: -----

Provided, however, that whenever any oils mentioned above are used by miners or forest
concessionaires in their operations, twenty-five per centum of the specific tax paid thereon
shall be refunded by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue upon submission of proof of actual
use of oils and under similar conditions enumerated in subparagraph one and two of section
one hereof, amending section one hundred forty-two of the National Internal Revenue Code:
xxxxxx

It is very apparent that the partial refund of specific tax paid for oils used in agriculture and
aviation is limited to five years while there is no time limit for the partial refund of specific
tax paid for oils used by miners and forest concessionaires. We find no basis in applying the
limitation of the operative period provided for oils used in agriculture and aviation to the
provision on the refund to miners and forest concessionaires.

It is very clear from the language of Section 5 that only miners or forest concessionaries are
given the privilege to claim the partial refund. Sawmill operators are excluded, because
they need not be forest concessionaires nor the latter, always are sawmill operators.

Where the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous. so that there is no occasion for
the court's seeking legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial
addition or subtraction.

Topic: Effect of Insufficiency of Title

Philippine Constitution Association v. Gimenez

FACTS:

The House of Representatives enacted into law RA 3836 entitled An Act Amending Subsection
(c), Section 12 of Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred Eighty Six, as amended by RA
3096,which will enable members of congress to retire regardless of age
after having served as such for at least twelve years of which not less than four years have been
rendered as electiveofficer. After enactment of RA 3836, PHILCONSA, a non-stock, non-profit
civic organization duly incorporated under Philippine
laws instituted a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the Auditor
General of the Philippines and disbursing officers of both congress from passing in audit
vouchers, and from countersigning the checks or treasury warrants for the payment to any
former Senator or members of the House of Representatives of retirement and vacation

gratuities pursuant to RA 3836; and likewise restraining the

respondent disbursing officers of both houses, and their successors in office from paying said
vacation and gratuities.
ISSUE:

Is the enactment of RA 3836 constitutional in so far as the said act allows retirement
gratuity and commutation of vacation and
sick leave to Senators and Congressmen and to the elective officials of both houses
of Congress.

HELD:

No, the enactment of RA 3836 is unconstitutional as it violates three provisions of the

constitution, namely Art. IV, Sec. 14, the prohibition of increase in the salaries of members of
congress, as the act provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senator and members of
the House of Representatives without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all is
members approving such increase; Art. III, Sec. 1, Par. 1 as it is patently discriminating and,
Art. VI, Sec. 21, Par. 1, the title of a bill shall not have embrace more than one subject as the
title of the said bill is not in any
way related to thesubject of Commonwealth Act186(establishing the GSIS, providing for both
retirement and insurance benefits of its members).RA 3836 is hereby declared NULL
and VOID

Topic: Body of a Statute

People of the Philippines v. Apolonio Carlos

Case No. 204 G.R. No. L-239 (June 30, 1947) Chapter I, Page 16, Footnote No.63

FACTS:

The Peoples Court found the Appellant, guilty of treason. Appellant attacked the
constitutionality of the Peoples Court Act on the ground that it contained provisions which
deal on matters entirely foreign to the subject matter expressed in its title, such as: (1) a
provision which retains the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance; (2) a provision which
adds to the disqualification of Justices of the Supreme Court and provides a procedure for
their substitution; (3) a provision which changed the existing Rules of Court on the subject
of bail, and (4) a provision which suspends Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE: W/N the Peoples Court Act was unconstitutional.

HELD:

No. The Peoples Court was intended to be a full and complete scheme with its own
machinery for the indictment, trial and judgment of treason cases. The provisions
mentioned were allied and germane to the subject matter and purposes of the Peoples
Court Act. The Congress is not expected to make the title of an enactment a complete index
of its contents. The constitutional rule is satisfied if all parts of a law relate to the subject
expressed in its title.

Topic: Separability Clause

* Greenblatt v. Golden

Topic: Repealing Clause

Williams v. Standard Oil

1 These cases were considered together by the court below and are submitted together
here. In both the validity of a statute of Tennessee is assailed as contravening the federal
Constitution. Appellee in No. 64 is a corporation organized under the laws of Louisiana, and
appellee in No. 65 is a corporation organized under the laws of Delaware. From a time long
prior to the passage of the statute, both have been engaged and are now engaged in the
business of selling gasoline in the state of Tennessee.

2 The statute was adopted in 1927. Its purpose and effect are to fix prices at which
gasoline may be sold within the state. A division of motors and motor fuels is created in the
department of finance and taxation and authorized to collect and record data concerning
the manufacture and sale of gasoline, freight rates, differentials in price to wholesalers and
retailers, the cost and expense of production and sale, etc. The information thus collected is
made available for use by the commissioner of finance and taxation in the regulation of
prices at which gasoline may be sold in the state. Permits for such sale are to be issued
subject to the approval of the commissioner but only at the prices fixed and determined.
Prices of gasoline are to be fixed with a proper differential between the wholesale and
retail price. Rebates, price concessions, and price discrimination between persons or
localities are forbidden. The prices first are to be stated by the applicant for a permit, and, if
not approved by the superintendent of the division, are to be determined by that official,
with a right of review by the commissioner and finally by the courts. Chapter 22, p. 53,
Public Acts Tennessee 1927. By a general statute (Shannon's Tennessee Code, 6437) a
violation of the act is a misdemeanor and is punishable by fine and imprisonment. Pressly
v. State, 114 Tenn. 534, 538, 86 S. W. 378, 69 L. R. A. 291, 108 Am. St. Rep. 921.
3 Appellees brought separate suits in the court below to enjoin the state officers named as
appellants from carrying out their intention to enforce the act and institute criminal
proceedings for violations of it against appellees, respectively, and to have the act declared
unconstitutional and void. Under the facts alleged, the suits were properly brought. Terrace
v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197, 214, 44 S. Ct. 15, 68 L. Ed. 255; Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273
U. S. 418, 427, 428, 47 S. Ct. 426, 71 L. Ed. 718.

4 The principal ground of attack, and the only one we need to consider here, is that the
Legislature is without power to authorize agencies of the state to fix prices at which
gasoline may be sold in the state, because the effect will be to deprive the vendors of such
gasoline of their property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Appellees applied for a temporary injunction against appellants, upon which
there was a hearing, and the court below, consisting of three judges (section 266, Judicial
Code; 28 USCA 380), granted the injunction as prayed. 24 F.(2d) 455 (D. C.) sub nom.
Standard Oil Co. v. Hall.

5 It is settled by recent decisions of this court that a state Legislature is without

constitutional power to fix prices at which commodities may be sold, services rendered, or
property used, unless the business or property involved is 'affected with a public interest.'
Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court, 262 U. S. 522, 43 S. Ct. 630, 67 L. Ed. 1103, 27 A. L. R.
1280; Tyson & Brother v. Banton, supra; Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U. S. 1,
47 S. Ct. 506, 71 L. Ed. 893, 52 A. L. R. 163; Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350, 48 S. Ct. 545, 72
L. Ed. 913. Nothing is gained by reiterating the statement that the phrase is indefinite. By
repeated decisions of this court, beginning with Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77,
that phrase, however it may be characterized, has become the established test by which the
legislative power to fix prices of commodities, use of property, or services, must be
measured. As applied in particular instances, its meaning may be considered both from an
affirmative and a negative point of view. Affirmatively, it means that a business or property,
in order to be affected with a public interest, must be such or be so employed as to justify
the conclusion that it has been devoted to a public use and its use thereby in effect granted
to the public. Tyson & Brother v. Banton, supra, 273 U. S. 434 (47 S. Ct. 426). Negatively, it
does not mean that a business is affected with a public interest merely because it is large or
because the public are warranted in having a feeling of concern in respect of its
maintenance. Id., 273 U. S. 430 (47 S. Ct. 426). The meaning and application of the phrase
are examined at length in the Tyson Case, and we see no reason for restating what is there
said.

6 In support of the act under review it is urged that gasoline is of widespread use; that
enormous quantities of it are sold in the state of Tennessee; and that it has become
necessary and indispensable in carrying on commercial and other activities within the
state. But we are here concerned with the character of the business, not with its size or the
extent to which the commodity is used. Gasoline is one of the ordinary commodities of
trade, differing, so far as the question here is affected, in no essential respect from a great
variety of other articles commonly bought and sold by merchants and private dealers in the
country. The decisions referred to above make it perfectly clear that the business of dealing
in such articles, irrespective of its extent, does not come within the phrase 'affected with a
public interest.' Those decisions control the present case.
7 There is nothing in the point that the act in question may be justified on the ground that
the sale of gasoline in Tennessee is monopolized by appellees, or by either of them,
because, objections to the materiality of the contention aside, an inspection of the pleadings
and of the affidavits submitted to the lower court discloses an utter failure to show the
existence of such monopoly.

8 Nor need we stop to consider the further contention that appellees, being foreign
corporations, may not carry on their business within the state except by complying with
the conditions prescribed by the state. While that is the general rule, a well-settled
limitation upon it is that the state may not impose conditions which require the
relinquishment of rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution. Frost Trucking Co. v. R.
Com., 271 U. S. 583, 593, et seq., 46 S. Ct. 605, 70 L. Ed. 1101, 47 A. L. R. 457, where the
applicable decisions of this court are reviewed.

9 Finally, it is said that even if the price-fixing provisions be held invalid other provisions of
the act should be upheld as separate and distinct. This contention is emphasized by a
reference to section 12 of the act, which declares: 'That if any section or provision of this
act shall be held to be invalid this shall not affect the validity of other sections or provisions
hereof.'

10 In Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44, 71, 42 S. Ct. 453, 459 (66 L. Ed. 822), it is said that such a
legislative declaration serves to assure the courts that separate sections or provisions of a
partly invalid act may be properly sustained 'without hesitation or doubt as to whether
they would have been adopted, even if the Legislature had been advised of the invalidity of
part.' But the general rule is that the unobjectionable part of a statute cannot be held
separable unless it appears that, 'standing alone, legal effect can be given to it and that the
Legislature intended the provision to stand, in case others included in the act and held bad
should fall.' The question is one of interpretation and of legislative intent, and the
legislative declaration 'provides a rule of construction which may sometimes aid in
determining that intent. But it is an aid merely; not an inexorable command.' Dorchy v.
Kansas, 264 U. S. 286, 290, 44 S. Ct. 323, 325 (68 L. Ed. 686).

11 In the absence of such a legislative declaration, the presumption is that the Legislature
intends an act to be effective as an entirety. This is well stated in Riccio v. Hoboken, 69 N. J.
Law, 649, 662, 55 A. 1109, 1113 (63 L. R. A. 485) where the New Jersey Court of Errors and
Appeals, in an opinion delivered by Judge Pitney (afterward a justice of this court), after
setting forth the rule as above, said:
12 'In seeking the legislative intent, the presumption is against any mutilation of a statute,
and the courts will resort to elimination only where an unconstitutional provision is
interjected into a statute otherwise valid, and is so independent and separable that its
removal will leave the constitutional features and purposes of the act substantially
unaffected by the process.

13 Compare Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. McKendree, 203 U. S. 514, 528-530, 27 S.Ct. 153,
51 L. Ed. 298; Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463, 501, 28 S. Ct. 141, 52 L. Ed. 297;
Butts v. Merchants' Transportation Co., 230 U. S. 126, 132, et seq., 33 S. Ct. 964, 57 L. Ed.
1422; and see 1 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (8th Ed.) 362, 363, and note.

14 The effect of the statutory declaration is to create in the place of the presumption just
stated the opposite one of separability; that is to say, we begin, in the light of the
declaration, with the presumption that the Legislature intended the act to be divisible, and
this presumption must be overcome by considerations which make evident the
inseparability of its provisions or the clear probability that the invalid part being
eliminated the Legislature would not have been satisfied with what remains.

15 In the present case, it requires no extended argument to overcome the presumption and
to demonstrate the indivisible character of the act under consideration. The particular
parts of the act sought to be saved are found in sections 1, 2, 3, 4 and 10. Section 1, after a
preamble in respect of the importance of controlling the sale of gasoline and a declaration
that such sale is impressed with a public use, creates the division of motors and motor fuels
as already stated. Section 2 requires the superintendent of the division and other
employees to make investigations, collect and record data concerning the manufacture and
sale of gasoline, the cost of refining, freight rates, differ entials in wholesale and retail
prices, costs and expenses incident to the sale, methods employed in the distribution of
gasoline, and other data and information as may be material in ascertaining and
determining fair and reasonable prices to be paid for gasoline. This information is declared
to be available for use in the regulation of prices and for the inspection and information of
the public. The superintendent is directed to issue permits for the sale of gasoline at prices
fixed and determined as provided in other parts of the statute. Section 3 makes it unlawful
for anyone to engage in the sale of gasoline without first having obtained a permit signed
by the superintendent and approved by the commissioner of finance and taxation, for
which permit application must be made in accordance with and in compliance with all the
requirements of the act. Section 4 requires that the application shall set forth whether the
applicant proposes to do a wholesale or retail business, or both, the number and location of
the different places where he is to operate and other like information. He must also set
forth the price or prices at which he is at the time selling gasoline, the cost price thereof,
including various items which enter into the price, and the price at which he proposes to
sell. Section 10 imposes a special permit tax of $10 per annum for each place of sale at
wholesale, and $1 per annum for each retail service station or curb pump. The tax thus
imposed is constituted a special maintenance fund to aid in defraying the expenses of the
division of motors and motor fuels.

16 The bare recital of these details shows conclusively that they are mere adjuncts of the
price-fixing provisions of the law or mere aids to their effective execution. The function of
the division created by section 1 is to carry these provisions into effect, and if they be
stricken down as invalid the existence of the division becomes without object. The purpose
of collection the data set forth in section 2 is to furnish information to aid in the fixing of
proper prices. The requirements in section 3 that a permit must be obtained before any
person can engage in the business of selling gasoline and those in section 4 that the
application therefor must state the character of the business, the number and location of
the places where business is to be carried on, the price or prices at which the applicant is
then selling gasoline, the cost price thereof, and the price at which he proposes to sell,
obviously constitute data for intelligently putting into effect the price-fixing provisions of
the law or means to that end. The taxes imposed by section 10 are solely for the purpose of
defraying the expenses of the division of motors and motor fuels, and since the functions of
that division practically come to an end with the failure of the price-fixing features of the
law, it is unreasonable to suppose that the Legislature would be willing to authorize the
collection of a fund for a use which no longer exists.

17 Appellants also insist that certain provisions in respect of rebating and discrimination
contained in section 8 of the act are separable. Those provisions are that it shall be
unlawful to grant any rebate, concession, or gratuity to any purchaser for the purpose or
inducing the purchaser to purchase, use, or handle the gasoline of the particular dealer, and
that it shall likewise be unlawful to discriminate for or against any purchaser by selling at
different prices to purchasers in the same locality or in different localities. It seems clear
that these provisions are mere appendants in aid of the main purpose; but, if treated as
separable, they are unconstitutional restrictions upon the right of the private dealer to fix
his own prices and fall within the principle of the decisions already cited. See especially
Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, supra.

18 This interpretation of the various provisions of the act is fortified by a requirement of

the Tennessee Constitution (article 2, 17) that 'no bill shall become a law which embraces
more than one subject, that subject to be expressed in the title.' It is fair to conclude, and
there is nothing to suggest the contrary, that in the passage of the present act the
Legislature intended to observe this requirement and confine the provisions of the act to
the one subject of price-fixing.

19 Accordingly, we must hold that the object of the statute under review was to accomplish
the single general purpose which we have stated, and, that purpose failing for want of
constitutional power to effect it, the remaining portions of the act, serving merely to
facilitate or contribute to the consummation of the purpose, must likewise fall.

20 Decrees affirmed.
21 Mr. Justice HOLMES dissents.

22 Mr. Justice BRANDEIS and Mr. Justice STONE concur in the result.

Topic: Bills originating from the House of Representatives

Mirasol v. CA

Facts:
The Mirasols are sugar land owners and planters.
Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols' sugar production venture FROM 19
73-1975 under a crop loan financing scheme. The Mirasols signed Credit Agreements, a
Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The
Chattel Mortgage empowered PNB to negotiate and sell the latters sugar and to apply
the proceeds to the payment of their obligations to it. President Marcos issued
PD 579 in November, 1974 authorizing Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase
sugar allocated for export and authorized PNB to finance PHILEX's purchases. The decree
directed that whatever profit PHILEX might realize was to be remitted to the government.
Believing that the proceeds were more than enough to pay their obligations, petitioners
asked PNB for an accounting of the proceeds which it ignored. Petitioners continued to
avail of other loans from PNB and to make unfunded withdrawals from their accounts with
said bank. PNB asked petitioners to settle their due and demandable accounts. As a result,
petitioners, conveyed to PNB real properties by way of dacion en pago still leaving an
unpaid amount. PNB proceeded to extra judicially foreclose the
mortgaged properties. PNB still had a deficiency claim.
Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds, insisting that said proceeds,
if properly liquidated, could offset their outstanding obligations. PNB remained adamant in
its stance that under P.D. No. 579, there was nothing to account since under said law, all
earnings from the export sales of sugar pertained to the National Government. On August 9,
1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific performance and damages against
PNB.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional
without notice to the Solicitor General where the parties have agreed to submit such issue
for the resolution of the Trial Court.

(2) Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof are unconstitutional.

(3) Whether or not said PD is subject to judicial review.

Held:
It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority
and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or executi
ve order. The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law,
treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all Regional Trial Courts. The purpose
of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable the Solicitor General to decide
whether or not his intervention in the action assailing the validity of a law or treaty is
necessary. To deny the Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to depriving him
of his day in court. We must stress that, contrary to petitioners' stand, the mandatory
notice requirement is not limited to actions involving declaratory relief and similar
remedies. The rule itself provides that such notice is required in "any action" and not just
actions involving declaratory relief. Where there is no ambiguity in the words used in the
rule, there is no room for construction. In all actions assailing the validity of a statute,
treaty, presidential decree, order, or proclamation, notice to the Solicitor General is
mandatory. Petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579 and its implementing issuances are void
for violating the due process clause and the prohibition against the
taking of private property without just compensation. Petitioners now ask
this Court to exercise its power of judicial review. Jurisprudence has laid down the
following requisites for the exercise of this power: First, there must be before the Court an
actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second,
the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging
the validity of the act must have standing to challenge .Fourth, the question of
constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity, and lastly, the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance

Case No. 292 G.R. No. 115852 (August 25, 1994) Chapter V, Page 243, Footnote No.
266

FACTS:
Petitioner assail the constitutionality of RA 7716 saying that S. No. 1630 did not pass three
reading on separate days as required in the Constitution because the second and the third
readings were done on the same day. The President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent and
the presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of the printing but
also that of reading the bill on three separate days.

ISSUE:
W/N RA 7716, an act that seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and
enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code, has been
constitutionally passed.

HELD:
There is no merit in the contention that presidential certification dispenses only with the
requirement for the printing of the bill and its distribution three days before its passage
but not with the requirement of three readings on separate days. The phrase "except when
the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Sec 26(2)
qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has passed
three readings on separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its final form and distributed
three days before it is finally approved. In other words, the "unless" clause must be read in
relation to the "except" clause, because the two are really coordinate clauses of the same
sentence. To construe the "except" clause as simply dispensing with the second
requirement in the "unless" clause (i.e., printing and distribution three days before final
approval) would not only violate the rules of grammar but it would also negate the very
premise of the "except" clause: the necessity of securing the immediate enactment of a bill
which is certified in order to meet a public calamity or emergency.

National Electification Administration v. COA

Doctrine: The Branches of Government; Executive Department; Powers and Functions of

the President; Control of Executive Departments*
Nature: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
Date: 2002
Ponente: Carpio, J.

Facts:

Government employee salaries were raised via a Joint Resolution of Congress (No. 01),
urging the President to revise the existing compensation. This was made into a 4-year
program. On 28 December 1996, President Ramos issues Executive Order No. 389 (EO 389)
to implement the final year salary increases authorized by the Joint Resolution. EO 389
called for a 2-tranche (or 2-part) salary increase: one on 1 January 1997, and another on 1
November 1997.

In January 1997, petitioner NEA implemented the salary increases. However, they
implement such increase in a single lump sum beginning 1 January 1997 (NEA accelerated
the implementation by paying the second tranche starting 1 January instead of 1
November). Respondent COA issued a Notice of Suspension and Notices of Disallowance.
The Notices of Disallowance were appealed by NEA, but rejected by the Commission en
banc. The decision of the respondent was then challenged in the Supreme Court.

Issues: Did the COA commit a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in disallowing the increased salaries? In other words, is NEA allowed to
accelerate the implementation of the salaries due to availability of funds?

Held:

No, COA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion. Neither is NEA allowed to accelerate
the implementation.

The petition was dismissed for lack of merit. COAs decision was affirmed in toto.
Ratio: On NEAs accelerated implementation and its accordance with the law.

The Court ruled that such acceleration was not in accordance with the law. NEA claimed
that Republic Act No. 8250 (General Appropriations Act of 1997) was their legal basis.
However, such law was not self-executory. Budgetary appropriations under the GAA do
not constitute unbridled authority to government agencies to spend the
appropriated amounts as they wish. Itemization of the Personal Services (the
appropriation used by NEA) is prepared after the enactment of the GAA, and requires the
approval of the President (Sec. 23, Chap. 4, Book IV of the Administrative Code, p. 229).

The execution of the GAA is subject to a program of expenditure to be approved by the

President, which will be the basis for the fund release (Sec. 34, Chap. 5, Book IV of the
Administrative Code, p. 229).

No portion of the appropriations in the GAA shall be used for payment of any salary
increase, unless authorized by law (Sec. 60, Chap. 7, Book VI of the Administrative Code, p.
230). Sec. 33 of the 1997 GAA (p. 230) also provides for salary increases subject to the
approval of the President.

In essence, the mere approval of Congress of the GAA does not make the funds available for
spending instantly. The funds must still be collected during the fiscal year. NEA also argues,
from Sec. 10 of EO 389 (p. 231) that adequately funded government-owned or controlled
corporations (GOCCs) are exempted. The Court rejected this argument, as Sec. 10 only
refers to GOCCs with insufficient funds. There is nothing in the Section that allows those
with sufficient funds to accelerate their schedule. There is no express or implied
authorization in Sec. 10.

NEA also argues that such acceleration was allowed in a Memorandum of the Office of the
President (7 November 1995, p. 232). However, the Court pointed out that the accelerated
implementation is also allowed upon approval of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM). There are also nine terms and conditions, which must be met by the
agency (listed in pp. 233-234, although they are not necessary). NEA did not comply by
seeking approval from the DBM. The Court also pointed out that the petitioner cannot
assail the authority of the President to issue EO 389. The Administrative Code gives the
President such powers (p.234). Joint Resolution No. 01 has also acknowledged such
authority (p. 235). Considering also that it is the fourth and final year, the Court found it
odd that NEA did not question the previous EOs.

NEA also argued that COA did not have the power in determining whether NEA violated the
law. COA exceeded its authority in its inquiry. NEA cited Guevara v. Gimenez. However, the
Supreme Court overturned this decision with Caltex Philippines, Inc. v. Commission on
Audit, stating that Guevara was not controlling anymore, as it was decided in light of the
1935 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution gives the Commission more powers, as provided
in Sec. 2 (D), Art. IX (p. 237). The Constitution and other laws mandate the Commission to
audit all government agencies, including GOCCs.
On the DBMs approval of NEAs proposed budget. NEA also contends that the DBMs
approval of NEAs proposed budget was an approval also of the accelerated
implementation. This was because NEA included such accelerated implementation in its
proposal.

The Court again referred to the nine conditions required of them for the approval to
actually take place. In fact, the approval of the proposed budget was only a part of the first
phase of the entire budget process. (There are four phases: Budget Preparation, Budget
Authorization, Budget Execution, and Budget Accountability). Once the proposed budget
was approved by the DBM, it is submitted to Congress for evaluation and inclusion in the
appropriations law. This authorization does not include the authority to disburse.
*On the Presidents control of all executive departments. The Court finally cited the control of
the President over all executive departments, bureaus, and offices, as provided by our
system of government. Sec. 17, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution provides for this (p. 239).
According to the Court: The presidential power of control over the executive branch of
government extends to all executive employees from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest
clerk. This power is self-executing and does not require statutory implementation. It
cannot be limited nor withdrawn by Congress. All other executive officials must implement
in good faith his directives and orders. The case would not have arisen had NEA complied
in good faith with the directives and orders of the President. NEAs reasons in disregarding
the President were patently flimsy, even ill-conceived.

Philconsa vs Enriquez

Petitioner: Philippine Constitution Association (PhilConsA)

Respondents: Salvador Enriquez (Secretary of Budget and Management)
Ponente: Justice Quiason

Relevant Article:
Article VII, Section 1, 1987 Constitution
The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.

This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto authority of the President
involving the General Appropriations Act of 1994

Facts:
RA 7663 or the General Appropriations Act of 1994 was approved by the President
but vetoed certain provisions of the law and imposed certain provisional conditions.
After the vetoing by the president of some provisions of the GAA of 1994, neither
house of congress took steps to override the veto. Instead, Senators Taada and
Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus.
 In this petition, petitioners contest the constitutionality of: (1) Section 16 on the
Countrywide Development Fund, (2) the veto on four special provisions added to
items in the GAA of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (3) the conditions
imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the
CAFGUs, the DPWH and the National Housing Authority (NHA)

G.R. No. 113105, the Philippine Constitution Association, Exequiel B. Garcia and
Ramon A. Gonzales as taxpayers, prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare as
unconstitutional and void: (a) Article XLI on the Countrywide Development Fund,
the special provision in Article I entitled Realignment of Allocation for Operational
Expenses, and Article XLVIII on the Appropriation for Debt Service or the amount
appropriated under said Article XLVIII in excess of the P37.9 Billion allocated for the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports; and (b) the veto of the President of
the Special Provision of Article XLVIII of the GAA of 1994, while in G.R. No. 11388,
Senators Taada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and
mandamus against the same respondents in G.R. No. 113766. In this petition,
petitioners contest the constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provision
added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions
imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the
CAFGU's, the DPWH, and the National Housing Authority (NHA).

Issues:
1. WON The Countrywide Development Fund is constitutional
2. WON The President has the executive power to impound

Held/Ratio:
1. YES.
PETITIONERS: The power given to the members of Congress to propose and identify the
projects and activities to be funded by the Countrywide Development Fund is an
encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since said power in an appropriation
act in implementation of a law. They argue that the proposal and identification of the
projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and amendment thereof, the only
function given to the Congress by the Constitution
RESPONDENTS: Silent
COURT: The President must perforce examine whether the proposals submitted by the
members of Congress fall within the specific items of expenditures for which the Fund was
set up, and if qualified, he next determines whether they are in line with other projects
planned for the locality. Thereafter, if the proposed projects qualify for funding under the
Funds, it is the President who shall implement them. In short, the proposals and
identifications made by the members of Congress are merely recommendatory.
2. YES.
PETITIONERS: Once Congress has set aside the fund for a specific purpose in an
appropriations act, it becomes mandatory on the part of the President to implement the
project and to spend the money appropriated therefor. The President has no discretion on
the matter, for the Constitution imposes on him the duty to faithfully execute the laws.
RESPONDENT: Silent
COURT: In refusing or deferring the implementation of an appropriation item, the
President in effect exercises a veto power that is not expressly granted by the Constitution.
As a matter of fact, the Constitution does not say anything about impounding. The source of
the Executive authority must be found elsewhere.
Proponents of impoundment have invoked at least three principal sources of the authority
of the President. Foremost is the authority to impound given to him either expressly or
impliedly by Congress. Second is the executive power drawn from the President's role as
Commander-in-Chief. Third is the Faithful Execution Clause which ironically is the same
provision invoked by petitioners herein.

RULING:
VETO on CDF and debt appropriations invalid, since it is germane to the law. VETO on
CAFGU valid.

Topic: Artcle VI, Section 25 (1) 1987 Constitution

Province of Batangas v. Romulo

Bengzon v. Drilon

1992 Gutierrez
Petitioners: Retired Justices Bengzon, Makalintal, Patajo and Leuterio
Respondents: Drilon (Exec. Sec.), Carague (DBM Sec.), Cajucom (Treasurer)

Facts:
June 20, 1953 RA 910 enacted retirement pensions for retired Justices who served
for at least 20 years in service and attained 70 years old
RA 910 was amended by RA 1792, Sec 3-A says that in case salary is increased or
decreased, such increase or decrease will be deemed the retirement pension
Identical retirement benefits given to Consti. Commissions by virtue of RA 1568
amended by RA 3595. Same given to AFP by virtue of PD 758.
(PD 578, RA 1797 and 3595 now hove automatic readjustment features)
1975 Marcos issued PD 644 repealing Sec 3-A of RA 1797 and 3595. (no more
readjustment features)
Marcos issued PD 1909 issued readjusted pensions for AFP alone.
Realizing the unfairness of this, Congress approved a bill for the reenactment of RA
1797 and 3595 under the impression that PD 644 became a law. They passed HB No.
16297 and Senate Bill 790.
President Aquino vetoed GB No. 16297 because it would erode foundation of govt
to adhere to the policy of standardization of compensation stipulated in RA 67587
it should not grant distinct privileges over other civil servants.
There was a prior case:
o Retired Justices asked for readjustment accdg to RA 1797. Held was PD 644
repealing RA 1797 did not become law as there was no valid publication
(Tanada v. Tuvera).
o Granted. Congress included in the General Appropriations Bill of 1992 the
adjusted pension rates
President vetoed provisions of Sec. 1 and Sec. 4 of General Fund Adjustments of Gen.
Appropriations Act because it allegedly nullified the veto of HB 16927.

Issues
WON the veto of President on provisions of Gen. Appropriations Act is unconstitutional
because:
1. subject veto no an item veto. (Yes)
2. Veto violative of doctrine of separation of powers (Yes)
3. Veto deprives retired justices of rights and pension due them (Yes)
4. Veto impairs fiscal autonomy of courts. (Yes)
Ratio
1.
 Veto power not absolute accdg to Sec 27(2) of Art. VI.
When it comes to appropriations, President has item veto power to avoid
inexpedient riders being attached to an indispensable appropriation of revenue
measure
Item particular details. Whole item should be vetoed.
President didnt veto item but methods to issue obligations to officials.
Vetoed portions not items but provisions.
In reality, what were vetoed were RA 1797 and the SC resolution.
No President may veto privisions of a law enacted 35 yrs. before
PD 644 never became valid, RA 1797 was not repealed, HB 16297 veto was
superfluous.
Neither may president use veto to repeal RA 1796 this is arrogating legislative
powers to President

2 and 4.
Art 3, Sec 8 judiciary shall maintain fiscal autonomy.
Fiscal autonomy is full flexibility to allocate resources.
Veto is violative of independence and separation of powers as it is tantamount to
dictating the judiciary how funds should be utilized.

3.
Retirement laws purpose is to entice competent men and women to enter govt
service.
Rationale that justices are unduly favored is a misimpression since enlisted men in
military are so many, justices so few.
Retirement befits should be interpreted liberally in favor of retiree to provide for
sustenance.

Topic: Artcle VI, Section 25 (5) 1987 Constitution

Aurallo v. Aquino

The exercise of the power to augment shall be strictly construed by virtue of its being an
exception to the general rule that the funding of PAPs shall be limited to the amount fixed
by Congress for the purpose. Necessarily, savings, their utilization and their management
will also be strictly construed against expanding the scope of the power to augment. Such a
strict interpretation is essential in order to keep the Executive and other budget
implementors within the limits of their prerogatives during budget execution, and to
prevent them from unduly transgressing Congress power of the purse.
The ascertainment of good faith, or the lack of it, and the determination of whether or not
due diligence and prudence were exercised, are questions of fact. The want of good faith is
thus better determined by tribunals other than this Court, which is not a trier of facts.

FACTS:
In this Motion for Reconsideration, Aquino III, et al. maintain that the issues in these
consolidated cases were mischaracterized and unnecessarily constitutionalized because
the Courts interpretation of savings can be overturned by legislation considering that
savings is defined in the General Appropriations Act (GAA), hence making savings a
statutory issue. They aver that the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased
appropriations constitute savings and may be used for augmentation and that the Court
should apply legally recognized norms and principles, most especially the presumption of
good faith, in resolving their motion.

On their part, Araullo, et al. pray for the partial reconsideration of the decision on
the ground that the Court failed to declare as unconstitutional and illegal all moneys under
the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) used for alleged augmentation of
appropriation items that did not have actual deficiencies. They submit that augmentation of
items beyond the maximum amounts recommended by the President for the programs,
activities and projects (PAPs) contained in the budget submitted to Congress should be
declared unconstitutional.

ISSUES:

1. Are the acts and practices under the DAP, particularly their non-conformity with Section
25(5), Article VI of the Constitution and the principles of separation of power and equal
protection, constitutional?

RULING:

1. No. Regardless of the perceived beneficial purposes of the DAP, and regardless of
whether the DAP is viewed as an effective tool of stimulating the national economy, the acts
and practices under the DAP and the relevant provisions of NBC No. 541 cited in the
Decision should remain illegal and unconstitutional as long as the funds used to finance the
projects mentioned therein are sourced from savings that deviated from the relevant
provisions of the GAA, as well as the limitation on the power to augment under Section
25(5), Article VI of the Constitution. In a society governed by laws, even the best intentions
must come within the parameters defined and set by the Constitution and the law.
Laudable purposes must be carried out through legal methods.

Section 38, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code refers to the authority of
the President to suspend or otherwise stop further expenditure of funds allotted for any
agency, or any other expenditure authorized in the GAA. When the President suspends or
stops expenditure of funds, savings are not automatically generated until it has been
established that such funds or appropriations are free from any obligation or encumbrance,
and that the work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized has been
completed, discontinued or abandoned.

The reversion to the General Fund of unexpended balances of appropriations

savings included pursuant to Section 28 Chapter IV, Book VI of the Administrative Code22
does not apply to the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG), which include the
Judiciary, Civil Service Commission, Commission on Audit, Commission on Elections,
Commission on Human Rights, and the Office of the Ombudsman. The reason for this is that
the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the CFAG.

Section 39 is evidently in conflict with the plain text of Section 25(5), Article VI of
the Constitution because it allows the President to approve the use of any savings in the
regular appropriations authorized in the GAA for programs and projects of any
department, office or agency to cover a deficit in any other item of the regular
appropriations. As such, Section 39 violates the mandate of Section 25(5) because the latter
expressly limits the authority of the President to augment an item in the GAA to only those
in his own Department out of the savings in other items of his own Departments
appropriations. Accordingly, Section 39 cannot serve as a valid authority to justify cross-
border transfers under the DAP. Augmentations under the DAP which are made by the
Executive within its department shall, however, remain valid so long as the requisites
under Section 25(5) are complied with.

Topic: Artcle VI, Section 27 (2) 1987 Constitution

* SEE BENGSON V. DRILON

Topic: Artcle VI, Section 29 (1) 1987 Constitution

Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works

110 Phil. 331 Political Law Appropriation For Private Use Not Allowed

FACTS:
In 1953, Republic Act No. 920 was passed. This law appropriated P85,000.00 for the
construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement Pasig feeder road
terminals. Wenceslao Pascual, then governor of Rizal, assailed the validity of the law. He
claimed that the appropriation was actually going to be used for private use for the
terminals sought to be improved were part of the Antonio Subdivision. The said
Subdivision is owned by Senator Jose Zulueta who was a member of the same Senate that
passed and approved the same RA. Pascual claimed that Zulueta misrepresented in
Congress the fact that he owns those terminals and that his property would be unlawfully
enriched at the expense of the taxpayers if the said RA would be upheld. Pascual
then prayed that the Secretary of Public Works and Communications be restrained from
releasing funds for such purpose. Zulueta, on the other hand, perhaps as an afterthought,
donated the said property to the City of Pasig.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriation is valid.

HELD: No, the appropriation is void for being an appropriation for a private purpose. The
subsequent donation of the property to the government to make the property public does
not cure the constitutional defect. The fact that the law was passed when the said property
was still a private property cannot be ignored. In accordance with the rule that the taxing
power must be exercised for public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be
expanded only for public purposes and not for the advantage of private
individuals. Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be
constructed belonged then to Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private
purpose, and, hence, was null and void.

Belgica v. Executive Secretary

710 SCRA 1 Political Law Constitutional Law Local Government Invalid Delegation
Legislative Department Invalid Delegation of Legislative Power
This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork
Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the
Congress. It underwent several legal designations from Congressional Pork Barrel to the
latest Priority Development Assistance Fund or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is
integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to P40 million for
hard projects (infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million
for soft projects (scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT
development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to P100 million for hard projects, P100
million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to P100 million for hard projects,
P100 million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain
cabinet members may request for the realignment of funds into their department provided
that the request for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-
called presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from
the Malampaya Gas Project this has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential
Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR this has been around since
about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July
2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the
corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles
had been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus
NGOs (non-government organizations) which would make it appear that government
funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact going to ghost projects. An
audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred
with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before
the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.

ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional
because it violates the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of
the purse). The executive, on the other hand, implements the laws this includes the GAA
to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement the law but under the
pork barrel system, whats happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the
legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to
a clear act of implementing the law they enacted a violation of the principle of
separation of powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that
pork barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional
insofar as the legislators only recommend where their pork barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have
to get the concurrence of the legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does
grant the people legislative power but only insofar as the processes of referendum and
initiative are concerned). That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for
it cannot delegate further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local
matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out
a declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose,
tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects
to which his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of
legislative power. The power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two
houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual members. Further,
nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress can delegate the power to the
individual member of Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto
items in the GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being
undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now
identify the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the
president veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after
the approval of the GAA again, Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which
effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless.
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their
Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies
concerning their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of
the house of representatives, whats happening is that a congressman can either bypass or
duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where
the national government (note, a congressman is a national officer) meddles with the
affairs of the local government and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the
Constitution on local autonomy. Its good if thats all that is happening under the pork
barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of
legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is
unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which
provides:

No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law.

Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the
Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund,
as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCORs charter, provided
for the appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain
energy-related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall
be used to further finance energy resource development and for other purposes which the
President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCORs earnings
shall be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in
government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the
Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular
appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.

Topic: Artcle VI, Section 29 (2) 1987 Constitution

* People v. Fernandez

Orden de Predicadores v. Metropolitan Water District this is all I found nothing else sorry :(

Facts: During the construction of the Caniedo water supply for the City of Manila, Sagrada
Orden de Predicadores (Order) donated to Manila certain lands it owned in San Juan del
Monte that were required for bringing water to the city.
In return, the City of Manila decided to furnish, free of charge, water from the Carriedo
waterworks to the Sto. Domingo Convent. The Sto. Domingo Convent enjoyed the free use
of water from 1886 until July 1920. The Metropolitan Water District (MWD), as
administrator and trustee of Manila's water supply system, asked the Order to pay for the
water it consumed from July to September 1920 worth P52.24.

The Order paid the amount under protest and filed the present suit. Lower Court's Ruling:
The CFI absolved the MWD, and directed the Order to pay for the water consumed from
September 1, 1916, up to the third quarter of 1920. Section 3 of the Jone Law prohibits that
any public property or fund be used, without due compensation, for the use, benefit or
maintenance of any church, religious institution or denomination.

Issue: Whether the Sto. Domingo Convent should continue enjoying free water.

Supreme Court's Ruling: The Supreme Court reversed the CFI's ruling. General Francisco
Carriedo will provided funds for the construction of a water supply system for the
inhabitants of Manila. One of the conditions for the grant was for the city of Manila to lay
water conduits to the convents of San Francisco, San Juan de Dios, and Sta. Clara. If any
other convent wishes to enjoy the same benefit, it should contribute to the expenses in
conducting the water.

In the present case, the Sto. Domingo Convent donated its lands in San Juan del Monte in
favor of the city for the construction of the Carriedo waterworks. In turn, the city granted
free use of water in the Sto. Domingo Convent. The free water is compensated by the value
of more than 10,000 square meters of donated land. It was error for the CFI to apply
Section 3 of the Jones Law. J. Street's Concurring and

Dissenting Opinion: The Order cannot be made to pay for the water used since September
l,1916, and prior to the third quarter of 1920 because the water was voluntarily supplied.
However, the Metropolitan Water District can revoke the privilege given to the Order. J.
Johns' dissent, joined by Jjs. Malcolm and Ostrand: There was no contract or agreement
between the Order and the city. Covenants running with land can only be created by a
written instrument under seal in which they are recited in, and made a part of, the
instrument. Neither the gift of land or of water was dependent upon or connected with the
other. Moreover, the current source of waters are from Montalban, and not from the
Carriedo canal. The free use of waters. if at all. should be confined and limited to the waters
of the Carriedo canal.

Aglipay v. Ruiz
13 March 1937 (64 Phil 201) First Division, Laurel (p): 5 concur.

Facts: In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would
order the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila
of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church.
The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent
Church, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto,
Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the
Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioners attorney, the Director of Posts publicly
announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage for printing. The said
stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof remained unsold. The
further sale of the stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.

Issue: Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was in violation of the Constitution.

Held: Religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound

reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a
profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is
recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its
influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of
their Constitution, implored the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a
government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the
nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the
blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy, they thereby
manifested their intense religious nature and placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who
guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human
society is recognized here as elsewhere.

Act 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is
the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would
be advantageous to the Government. Of course, the phrase advantageous to the
Government does not authorize the violation of the Constitution; i.e. to appropriate, use or
apply of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or
church. In the case at bar, the issuance of the postage stamps was not inspired by any
sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or religious denominations. The stamps were
not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church, nor were money derived
from the sale of the stamps given to that church. The purpose of the issuing of the stamps
was to take advantage of an event considered of international importance to give publicity
to the Philippines and its people and attract more tourists to the country. Thus, instead of
showing a Catholic chalice, the stamp contained a map of the Philippines, the location of the
City of Manila, and an inscription that reads Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic
Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937. The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition,
without pronouncement as to costs.