Reprinted with permission of the publisher via the Copyright Clearance Center, Ine. Deep Ecology and the Irrelevance of Morality Eric H. Reitan* Both Acne Naess and Wer wick Fox have argued that deep ecology in terms of Self realization,” is essentially sonmoral. 1 argve thatthe altsinzent of the ecological Self does not render morality inthe richest sense "superfluous," as Fox suggests, To the contrary, the achievement of the ecological Self isa precondiuin for being 3 teuly moral person, both from the perspective ofa robust Kantian moral framework and from the perspective of Aristotelian virtue ethics. The opposition between selt- regard and morality is false one. The two ar the same. The ecological philoropiy ‘of Naess and Fox is an environmental ei inthe grand tradition of moral philosophy. I INTRODUCTION ‘There has been a trend among a number of supporters of the deep ecalogical movement to think of the central deep-ecological notion of “Self-realization,” understood in Arne Naess’s sense as expanding one’s sense of self through a process of identification to include the whole of nature, as an alternative to or replacement for environmental ethics. The notion of Self-realization has been developed both by Arne Naess, in his ecosophy T, and by Warwick Fox in what he calls cranspersonal ecology. What is interesting to note is the tendency of both thinkers (as well as others who embrace their approach to deep ecology) to insist that Self-realization does not constitute a moral standpoint, that to pursue Self-realization is to act in a way that is essentially nonmoral (although nnot immoral). This approach begins with Naess himself, who speaks of the importance (in environmental affairs) of appealing to the inclinations of people rather than to their morals (as if the two were opposed). “ Department of Philosophy, Pacific Lutheran University, Tacome, WA 98447, Reitan's esearch and teaching interests include noaviolence theory, philosophy of punishment, and philosophy of religion The expression deep ecology has come to be vied in atleast two ways in recent years. Fist, ithas been used to refer tothe kindof environmental philosophy (ecosophy) developed by Arne Naess—what Naess calls ecosophy T and Warvick Pox calls ranspersonal ecology. Second, it has come to be used to refer to an ecological movement unified by a set of platform principles (othich, while supported by Naess's philosophy, an also be supported on different grounds). To thislist should be added Naess's use of the term refer to any set of views about the environment arrived at through a process of "deep questioning,” whether or not these views correspond tothe platform principles. Since my focus in this article is on the kind of environmental philosophy veloped by Naess and expanded on by Warvvick Fox and others, I use deep ecology a8 & synonym for ecosophy T and transpersonal ecology. The reader should, howeves, remain conscious ofthe fact that not all those who call themselves deep ecologists share the views of [Naess and Fox,wn Fumonuental ETHICS Vol 1 This apparent opposition is reinforced in the recent writings of Warwick Fox. He advocates a view of deep ecology thatis essentially nonmoral, InApproaching Deep Ecology: A Response fo Richard Sylvan's Critique of Deep Ecology, Fox stresses the opposition between his kind of deep ecology (iranspersonai ecology) ‘and what he cals the “environmental axiological route” by noting that transpersonal ecologists are not looking for an environmental ethic, but rather for an ecological consciousness, implying that the two are not congruous.> More recently, in Towards a Transpersonal Ecology: Developing New Foundations for Environ- ‘menualism, Fox maintains explicitly that when the broadened, ecological Self is realized, “ethies (conceived as being concerned with moral ‘oughts") is rendered superfluous, This articulation of a contrast between deep ecology (at least of the sort that is espoused by Naess and Fox) and environmental ethics needs to be properly qualified. In particular, 1 should note that deep ecologists such as Fox clearly do believe that the development of an ecological consciousness is a good thing— Fox obviously values Self-realization, even though he is resistant 0 speaking in terms of values. Thus, deep ecology is not ethically neutral, if we conceive of ‘ethics broadly as that which has to do with values. Fox’s resistance tocategorizing ‘deep ecology as an ethical standpoint stems, it seems, from what he perceives to bea sharp divergence of deep ecology from prevailing moral philosophies. Fox thinks that deep ecology is distinctly different from environmental ethics as it is traditionally and widely conceived. In particular, he thinks thatthe sense of self which underlies traditional approsches to environmental ethics is radically different from the sense of self which underlies deep ecology. For this reason, Fox is resistant to calling deep ecology an environmental ethic. Fox and Naess's standpoint here, however, does not do justice to the richness of traditional moral thought. Fox's insistence on contrasting deep ecology with environmental ethies arises from a view of morality thats not only unnecessarily narrow, but also in opposition to some of the strongest and most influential ‘moral traditions.* At the core of Fox’s understanding of morality is the view Reaizaon: An Ecologist Approach o Being in the Word” a Toh Seed, Joanna Macy, Pt Fleming, and Arve Naess Thintng Like Meum Towards a Coun! ofA Beings (Philadephis: New Society Publishers, 1988), p. 19-3. Other sures fr tis vews oa Sel. Tealizaton include "Seivelzaton Ia Miaed Communities uf Humans, Beat Seep. eh Wolves” Inquiry 22 (1999) 23 ot Idetiiatin Bra Sour of Deep Ecological Atseden” in Miche Tobias, Deep Bcolony (Stn Deg: Avant Books, 1983). Spiers and Eelogy” Phisopie (1977: 45-9: ad -Now onthe Metodlony of Nomalve Sema Meh hogy and Scene (0 1979 64-79. "arwik Fox Approaching Deep Ecology Response Richard Syan's Critique of Deep ‘eplgy ober Board of Emironnestl Sues, University of Taman, 1980 pp. 10-7 ‘rick ox, Towards a Transpersonal cote: Develpieg New Foundations fo Ene smenuan (oston: Shambhala Pabieaon. 190), 217, preety ‘scrim my sy more bot the crest of enviroment this an tds bot Winer 1996 DEEP ECOLOGY AND THE IRRELEVANCE OF MORALITY mn {hat morality is ¢ set of guidelines directed toward the narrow self which places restrictions and requirements on the narrow self, requirements that demand certain suspension of self-regard. This view of morality is grounded in Kant— in fact, when Arne Naess opposes Self-ealization to morality, he appeals explicitly to Kant’s distinction between moral acts and beautiful acts and holds that what he is recommending is an ecological movement that encourages beautiful acts.” But to conclude from this Kantian distinction that deep ecology is essentially ‘nonmoral is to make too much of that distinction, Deep ecologists rely on an understanding of Kant that I take to be a much too narrow one, albeit s common one. Furthermore, this understanding of morality ignores certain other criti- cally important traditions in ethics; in particular, it overlooks the Aristotelian ‘adition of virtue-based ethics. I argue here that Self-realization in Naess’s sense is not an alternative to more traditional morality, but isin harmony with the main direction of both Kantian and Aristotelian ethics, albeit with a wider scope of concern, While deep ecology recommends that the scope of one’s concer be extended beyond the human community to the whole of nature — and thus is distinct from Kantian and Aristotelian ethics which are concerned only with the human domain—the kind of concern for other beings that is, recommended by deep ecologists fits into both Kantian and Aristotelian ‘categories, and thus does not constitute a sharp break with those traditions, II. NAESS AND FOX ON SELF-REALIZATION Before showing that deep ecology fits into traditional moral categories, I first outline the main thrust of deep ecology, captured in the notion of *Self- realization.” This notion has its origins with Ame Naess, the Norwegian Philosopher who is credited with being the founder of the deep ecology movement. For Naess, an abiding concem for the environment can emerge from a deepened and expanded sense of sel sealization is the process of acquiring that deepened sense of self, which he calls the “ecological Self."* In order to understand the ecological Self it is necessary to note that Naess distinguishes between the narrow ego and the self. For Naess, the self of a Person “is that with which this person identifis.”® While I might identify with litle beyond my narrow ego (defined by my private sensations, feelings, needs, Fox: Indeed, it may be hat urrent tends in environmental ethics fal odo justice vo he richnons fou moral heritage. The aim ofthis paper isto show that deep ecology has ruceceded (pestons unintentionally) in recapturing tha heritage: it may Be that he environmental ethics whch Foe stances himself from is more opposed to morality, properly concelved, than Is deep scolar Naess, "SeIE-Reaication” p28 "Ibi. p20.ONMIENTAL BTUICS vet bs and interests), I might also identify with more than that; thus, my selF need not be cocatensive with the narrow ego, but may extend beyond the narrow ego to my family, my fi wer Himit, to the whole ecosphere. Self-realization is the process of identifying with the whole ecosystem, the ‘whole complex of living things and nonliving things with which they interact. AA person who has so identified him or herself with his or her environment has realized the ecological Self. But what, precisely, is involved in such a process of identification? Although ‘one of the signs of identification with another living being is a powerful sense of empathy, of shared feeling, Naess is careful to point out that such empathy is a consequence of identification, and not the cause of it, Referring to an incident in his own life in which he witnessed the death of a flea through a microscope, Naess observes that ends, my nation, of, at IFT were alienate from the flea, not seeing intuitively anything resembling myself, the death struggle would have left me indifferent, So there must be identification in order for there to be compassion and, among humans, solidarity!” One of the interesting implications of this observation is that identification is seen to be a precondition for compassionate feelings. The act of identifying with another being is not a feeling-induced process, but a feeling-causing process. Another interesting point is that Naess takes this process of identification to Parallel the process of maturation." Infants seem to have little capacity to make identifications beyond their narrow egos, and small children must be taught fo consider the needs of siblings and friends. As one grows, tis hoped that one will expand the scope of one's idemtifications, and the failure to do so is considered childish and-immature. If this account is correct, then it seems that identification is not an inborn instinct. While the potential for such identification, is certainly a part of human nature (and may ironically be one of the things that distinguishes humans from many other animals), the realization of that poten- lial is Far from automatic. In part, that realization depends'upon environmental factors. But the very extent t0 which Naess and other deep ecologists encour- ‘age us to extend our sphere of identification suggests that they take identifica- tion to also depend in part on one’s will Identification then is neither a feeling nor an instinct; instead, it seems to involve an act of will: a choice is made for reasons relating in some way 10 human maturity. My suggestion i that itis @ rational choice, in which rationality, is understood neither in the narrow egoistic sense associated with prudence nor 4s logic and analytic thinking, butrather in its broadest possible sense as involving Noes, "Self Realization” p. 22. Bid, p20; see also Noes, "Notes onthe Methodology of Normative Systems." p71, and Winter 196 DEEP ECOLOGY AND THE IRRELEVANCE OF MORALITY us the whole domain of human thoughtfulness. Identification, I suggest, isa thought- ful act that is made in acknowledgment of a recognized connectedness among living beings and their worl. Naess notes that the “joy and meaning of life is enhanced through incresed self-realization, through the fulfilment of each being's potential."!? The suggestion here is that the ecological Seif is the realization of the potential inherent in human nature; if we regard rationality (broadly conceived) as a significant component of human nature (as it seems we must), there is reason to think that Self-realization is a part of actualizing of our rational nature, One crucial consequence of Self-realization is an expanded self-regard: my concern for myself extends to all those beings with whom I identify. If I identify with a spotted owl, Iwill care about its welfare as if it were my own— because, given my expanded self, its welfare is my own, Pursuing its welfare will not be a sacrifice; it will not require any personal losses, To the contrary sacrificing the spotted owl would be sacrificing a part of myself. Those who have achieved an ecological Self, then, pursue the welfare of the natural environment with the immediacy of those who pursue their own welfare. The distinction between self-regard and other-regard breaks down because the Self extends to the whole ecosystem. All gets become acts of self- regard. IM]. THE APPARENT OPPOSITION OF SELF-REALIZATION AND MORALITY tis this feature of Naess and Fox's version of deep ecology—that it emerges from the expanded sense of self in which all ecologically minded acts are acts of self-regard—that leads philosophers such as Fox to hold that deep ecology is an alternative to environmental ethics rather than an environmental ethic. This way of thinking begins with Naess himself, who makes the opposition explicit. In articulating this opposition, Naess appeals to Kant: The philosopher Immanuel Kant introduced a pair of conasting concepts which deserve extensive use in our effort to live harmoniously ia, for and of nature: the ‘concept of moral act andthe conceptof beautiful act Moral acts ace acts motivated by the intention to follow moral laws, at whatever cost... the supreme indication ‘of our success in performing a pure, moral act is that we do it completely against ‘our inclination, that we hate to doit... If we do something we should because ‘of a moral law, but do i out of inclination and with pleasure—what then? If we do ‘what is right because of postive inclination, then, according to Kant, we perform a beautiful act? 2 aes, "Self Realization” p. 20416 ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS Votre "Naess goes on to insist that “in environmental affairs we should primarily try to influence people towards beautiful acts by finding ways to work on their inctinations rather than their morals.” He thinks that moraizzing uboul the environ- ‘ment makes environmental concernseem a burden and a sacrifice, when itcan be quite the opposite." Fox makes the opposition between deep ecology and more traditional environ mental ethics quite explicit: deep ecology ought aot to be thought of as another approach or position within ronmental uxiology... . Deep ecology should rather be thought of as offering a differen framework of discourse to that offered by the dominant environmental axiological approaeh.!® He maintains that deep ecologists are simply not interested in the “environ- mental axiological route,” which spells out obligations based on the value of the natural order. According to Fox, the path of the deep ecologist is “ako: gether ‘less moralistic, less reasonable, [and] more expressive of their cotal sensibility.""!® Deep ecologists are, in short, concerned with describing a way of being in the world, a way of thinking about things, in which questions of obligation and duty simply don’t arse. Ethics asa set of prescriptions disappears with the advent of the ecological Self. What is unfortunate about this whole way of thinking is the presupposition of a narrow Kantian understanding of ethics—narrow in the sense of being defined by Kant in exclusion of other moral philosophers, but also narrow in the seuse of being grounded in anarrow reading of Kant. In order to understand why Naess and Fox take deep ecology to be opposed to environmental ethics, we need to look at this narrow reading of Kant that lies at the heart of their thinking, According to the traditional, narrow reading of Kunt's ethics, the only acts that are truly moral are acts that are performed without any regard for personal inclinations (taken to include all personal feelings, emotions, desires, and impuises), and are instead performed solely out of respect for the dictates of “pure practical reason” (what Kant calls “duty"). This formulation does not mean that moral acts must be against one’s inclinations, only indifferent to them. According to this reading of Kant, someone who acts in accordance with the requirements of duty, but does so out of some inclination—some feeling or impulse or emotion or desire—rather than out of regard for duty, does not exhibit any more moral worth than the person who, say, kills babies out of inclination. The person who is inclined to act in accordance with duty is ‘beautiful” and “angelic,” and perhaps “saintly”; however, ifthe person acts tb 1s Fox, Approaching Deep Bcology, p70. Winter 1998 DEEP ECOLOGY AND THE IRRELEVANCE OF MORALITY ar ‘because of his or her inclinations, rather than because ofa respect for duty, then the person is not morally praiseworthy, since the person is simply following his ‘or her own natural impulses, What distinguishes the saint from the baby-killer is simply that their inclinations are different; and inclinations are a product of biology and environment, rather than the autonomous choices of an agent, That ‘you have good inelinations rather than bad inclinations has nothing to do with ‘what you have done, and therefore exhibits no special moral worth.!? Once one accepts this line of thinking (and itis one of the most influential lines of thinking in contemporary moral philosophy), one ereates a sharp dichotomy between moral action and action that is done “naturally” or “spontaneously.” Because the majority of self-tegarding acts are done naturally, in accordance ‘with in-built inclinations, such acts lack moral worth (even if they happen to accord with what morality dictates). To be moral, then, one must ignore one's own interests, desires, and feelings. Self-regarding activity, which typically follows such impulses, turns out to lie outside the realm of moral activity, even when the outward manifestations are identical. ‘This understanding of morality comes out quite clearly in Fox's writings. When considering those approaches to environmental ethies that focus on the intrinsic Value of the ecosystem and its inhabitants, Fox notes that such approaches attempt to show thatt is morally wrong to do some things to certain members ‘9F aspects ofthe nonhuman world and morally right to do other things: that one's Personal likes and dislikes—one’s personal prejudices—are neither here nor here with respect tothe validity of these judgments; and that, where conflicts occur between intrinsic value based concerns (Le, moral concerns) and either appe! Live, desire-impulsive concerns or anthropocentric, “responsible mansgemer concerns, i isthe intrinsic value based concerns that should be given overriding priority. Here morality is seen as something that overrides personal inclinations, laying ‘down obligations that one should follow no matter what his or her inclinations happen to be, Ih short, Fox seems to ave in mind here the narrow Kantian under- standing of morality ‘With this strict opposition between moral action and self-regarding action in place, we get the view that Naess's “ecological Self," which identifies with the entire ecosystem, is incapable of being moral in the conventional sense: because one identifies with all beings, activity that promotes the welfare of ‘other beings is self-regarding activity—it is activity motivated by “personal "What call the “narrow reading” of Kans ethics has become so standatd ha Is presented §8 authoritative in most intoductory philosophy texts and maral philosophy texts, See, for example, Lawceace M. Hinman, Ethics: A Plaralistc Approach to Morel Theory (Fort Worth, Harcout Brace Jovanovich, 194), p, 194-95; se also Robert C. Solomon Iroducing Phos. ‘hy: A Teat with Integrated Readings, the, (San Diego Harcoun Brace Jovanovch, 1989), 380,us ewuimonnennran eres vot ts likes,” by “desiring-impulsive concerns”—and therefore cannot be moral activ= ity. Thus we have Naess's chim that his ecosophy appeals to the inclinations ‘of people rather than to their morals. Fox articulates this dichotomy between morality and the ecological conscious- ness of what he calls transpersonal ecology in a more subtle way, but the point is, fundamentally the same, For Fox, morality presupposes. certain narrow self that can choose between self-regarding, desire-fulfilling acts, on the one hand, and mote objective, value-respecting considerations, onthe other. However, the self which is the subject of moral demands disappears when Self-realization is achieved, Thus, we get Fox's claim that once this ecological Sell is realized, ‘morality becomes superfluous: moral injunctions cease to be necessary because, one follows his or her dictates out of pure self-regard. Perhaps, even more. importantly, however, moral injunctions not only lose their necessity, but also ose all meuning for the ecological Self precisely hecause morality (under this, view) presupposes a narrow, atomistic sense of self. According to Fox, they lose their meaning even if the moral system requires the abandonment of such ‘a narrow self: |Wisimportant io note that even if the moral demands ofthe nosmative-judgmental self ere of the [onsual] kind that one ougit to abandon exclusive identification with @ narrow, atomistic oF particle-tike sense of self and develop a wide, expansive, or feld-like sense of self, the self that is being addressed—the self that “ought” to do this—is stil this particular self as distnet from ather particular selves." ‘According to Fox, “tis inherent in the nature of moral demands” that they presuppose or “proceed from the assumption” of a narrow self.2° Once that narrow self disappears, then morality becomes both superfluous and meaning 1ess—assuming, of course, that one understands morality in this narrow Kantian Fox, however, ignores one important implication of aecepting the narow Kaniian undersiandin ical Self, wh accordance with duty, does so purely out of inclination rather than out of 0 siderations of moral obligation, then it follows not that morality is no longer necessary, but rather that the ecological Self precludes the possiblity of gaining moral worth. If we accept a narrow Kantian view of ethics, then following the advice of Fox would result in our inability to do anything that is morally praiseworthy. If we all became ecologically minded in the way that Fox recom- rmends, we abandon the possibility of moral goodness, which seems a serious and significant loss. ‘This conclusion seems wrong, and rightly so: someone who takes to heart ers Winer 16 DEE RCULOGY AND THE IRRELEVANCE OF MORALETY a the advice of Naess and Fox and adopts and lives according to this ecologi consciousness should be praised to high heaven, and not only for the initial choice to adopt such a consciousness; such a person should be exalted, it seems, sa person embodying moral goodness in the deepest possible way IV: RECONCILING SELF-REALIZATION WITH KANT: IDENTIFICATION AND RESPECT ‘The problem lies in part with the narrow reading of Kantian morality, This reading does not seem to adequately describe the moral domain; furthermore, it fails to give due credit to Kant. ‘At the heart of the problem lies the sharp division between self-regard and morality. Ayn Rand was rightly appalled by such division, Rand notes that the first thing a person exposed to such a moral view learns “is that morality is his ‘enemy; he has nothing to gain from it, he can only lose; self-inflicted loss, self- inflicted pain and the gray, debilitating pall of an incomprehensible duty is all that he can expect."! While I find Rand’s narrowly egoistic alternative as appalling as the narrow Kantian view, I do think that on this point she is absolutely right. ‘There is something fundamentally absurd about a view that makes morality into an enemy, ‘This said, I am not prepared to abandon Kant precisely because the narrow reading of Kant does not do justice to the richness of Kant’s whole moral philos- ‘phy. One of the elements of Kant’s philosophy that is overlooked in the narrow reading is the centrality of respect. The person with moral worth is a person who ‘respects the moral law. In at least one ofits formulations, the moral law is expressed by the injunction to respect human beings as ends in themselves, and not merely as means. However, respect is a certain kind of mental attitude or approach which, I believe, gives rise to certain emotions, attitudes, and feelings in the ‘same way that identification, in Naess’s sense, gives rise to compassion. If we take seriously the centrality of respect in Kant's ethics, and make an effort to understand what respect involves, we discover that “inclin: that term, refers only to those natural impulses attached to what Naess calls the “narrow ego” and not to the feelings of compassion or cure that attach to the wider self. Adopting apolicy of respectfulness, I argue, presupposes the abandon ‘ment ofthe narrow self in favor of a wider, more inclusive self. In other words, being moral in any true sense presupposes a wider View of the self rather than the narrow view of self as Fox believes. So what does respect involve for Kant? Inits first cange of use, Kant speaks of respect for the moral law, where the moral law is determined by the dictates of our practical reason. In his first effort to spell out the general form of the moral law, Kant introduces the notion of universalizability: in order for an20 ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS Vol. 18 ten Itsits oso eknose a hough we might be any of he people affected by ‘one conceives of as Kant’s moral point of view. Nevertheless, for my purposes, ‘one is typically thought to lack any personal stake or claim in a Coenen fmmanuel Kant, The Fundamental Principles of the Metphysie of Morals (New York Winer 1998 DEEP ECOLOGY AND THE IRRELEVANCE OF MORALITY aw ‘There are a number of reasons why I think that Kant’s moral point of view ‘one of omnipartiality rather than one of impartiality. What both approaches have in common is that they involve an abandonment of the perspective of the narrow ego. However, what impartiality puts in place of the perspective of the arrow ego is a kind of “non-perspective,” or a perspective of indifference, whereas omnipartiality replaces it with a widened range of equal care. Give the value that Kant attaches to rational agents throughout his work, it seems that equal care forall rational agents is more likely to be his intent than indifference. This point is supported when one recalls that moral worth is found in respecting the moral law—which amounts to respecting the moral point of view and the sovereignty of the person. Why should we respect the moral point of view? Or, what is @ more basic question, what does such respeet involve? Given the opposition that we find between inclination and duty in Kant’s ‘thought, we can assume that respect isnot an inclinaticn. I suggested above that respect involves some kind of mental attitude or approach. But what kind of attitude? My suggestion is that respecting something involves recognizing and affirming the value of that thing, There is, it seems, something active about respect. One does something when one respects a thing, Nevertheless, the act is not just a physical act. Rather, it is a mental act, Its 4 mental choice, or an act of will. In this way, respect i a great deal like the process of identification, which also has an active recognizing and affirming character, Both lead to ov engender spontaneous actions ofa respectful nature. To respect the moral point of view, then, is ( recognize and affirm its value—and the most plausible way (© affirm the value of a point of view is to adopt it. Bet the value of the moral point of view is parasitic on the value of the beings wo are being considered from that point of view. Therefore, it makes more sense to suppose that the ‘moral point of view is one which identifies with all of those beings, rather than ‘one which identifies with none, not even your narrow self. Thus we have the cangruity between respect and identification: to respect the moral point uf view is 10 adopt the moral point of view, which in turn can best be understood 45 the process of identifying with the whole range of beings who are the subjects of moral concern. That we should understand respect forthe moral law this way is supported by the second range of use to which respect is put in Kant’s ethics. In Kant's second ‘attempt to formivlate our moral obligations in general terms, Kant indicates that our duty is to respect rational agents. Kant spells out this duty in terms of treating human beings as ends in themselves, and never as 4 means only.2° To Understand this claim, itis important to recognize that we treat ourselves as ends: we care about our well-being for our own sake, and not for the sake of something else. When we treat another person as a means, we think of that Person as a thing to be used for our own ends. Its useful to think of this point in erms of the narrow ego: o teat person as a means is to consider the persona0 ENVIRONMENTAL ErHics Vol 8 from the perspective of eur narrow ego, and use the person for the purposes of advancing our narrow ego. To treat a person as an end, on the other hand, is to accordto the person the same kind of consideration that we demand for our narrow ‘ego—in other words, to extend our sense of self to include the other person.** or Kant, then, our duty isto identify with all rational agents, to give up our narrow ego in favor of an “omnipartial” world view. The inclinations that we ignore in the process of taking on such a world view, then, are the inclinations of the narrow ego, Morality is opposed tothe self-regard of the narrow self, and it is realized in the adoption of a broader understanding of the self, one which extends to all rational beings. If we understand Kant in this way, we discover that the Self-realization of [Naess and Fox is notin opposition to Kantian morality, but is, tothe contrary, an extension of Kantian morality, from the set of rational beings to the ecosystem as a whole. Moreover, I should note that being moral does not merely involve the single act of abandoning the narrow ego in favor ofthe wider self, and then end. ‘when that move has been made. That move is not what is moral for Kant; rather, that move isa precondition forbeing moral. Being moral involves living according, to such a widened scope of identification, Morality begins with transcending the narrow ego. It does not end there. It should be noted that this interpretation of Kant can be reconciled with the claims that have led thinkers tothe narrow reading of Kantian ethics. When Kant says that our acts can be moral only if they are performed without regard for personal inclination, he is referring to the inclinations of the narrow ego: itis only when we transcend the impulses of the narrow ego that we can achieve the ‘omnipartiality that morality requires. The supreme test of whether or not we are acting omnipartially, and therefore acting morally, is to be found in whether we treat the needs and interest of others as if they are our own even when they run ‘counter to the needs and interests of our narrow ego. If we do, then we have achieved true self-realization—we identity with other beings atleast as much as ‘we identify with our narrow ego—and can thus be said to be behaving morally. Ics also important to note that this reinterpretation of Kant does not undermine the important Kantian insight that one should be praised only for those actions which flow from one’s autonomous decisions. After all, the adoption of the broader self-image is itself an act of will. When one chooses to step beyond ‘one’s narrow ego, one does so, as Ihave suggested above, out of a recognition of the value of doing so; one does so because one acknowledges thatthe egoistic perspective is too narrow. In short, one is acting out of a respect forthe dictates ‘of practical reason. And in adopting the broader self-image, one is thereby showing respect for the value of those beings with whom one now identifies. Fox may be right that an explicit acknowledgement of the value of nature is not part of the thinking of someone who has achieved self-realization; how= Wine 1998 DEEP ECOLOGY AND THE IRRELEVANCE OF MORALISY a the acknowledgement of such value (whether explicit or plc) scems lobe an indispeniblepart ofthe maration process ht leads tthe oe os the thinking of one who Ras achieved Slf-reaization the ecneysaly cor scious personmay sillbeacingin atordance with, Wha te abercarainns of Kant suggests is that Kans enca account of meray nat secont ot Se ication lly morale achieved when one wanscendstichanowene ignoring the inclinations atiahed to hand ops the perpostng of ormniparaity. One acs from dy rather than merely n accordance witht only when one adopt the omnipartal perspectives ote sor ely oe one his achieved Self-realiztion, Such an undertanding of mort Consistent withthe observation of ox and others ta the esgic he selwhichi denies withthe whole of nature, doesnt aetuniericonsrang but acts spontaneously, out of an expanded self-regard, : \V: THE ECOLOGICAL SELF AS AN ARISTOTELIAN VIRTUE ‘mn appeal to Aristotle's moral sought is useful here Aristo, rather han being concerned with outing specific dates, wes concerned wih dessbing wat kind of person was person of god charter. He ann shots concered with giving an account of vie. The focus on virtue hes Ween Isat hoch contemporary thinking about morality, and a renewed concern with von seems tome tobe erially important. For Ansett, mvaiy didnot con essentially doing the righ things, but athe in becoming the hind of person thats god to bea vinous person. A virtuous person acoringta Atl, is someone who docs thigh thing joytlly and spontaneously outeta tems Of character. In oer word, the truly moral peen in Arste’s stow es noaly om oacerainkindoinelnation a love of sitae Someone sho net force himor herself do the ight thing inthe lac of contay helinnions fet virtuous bu mere continent. Th continent person ison the rad ties but has not yet achieved moral per = Furthermore, Arist thinks thst re human happiness sony posible when one is fully witwous—for ony then does one perfectly realize one's stvna nature, Virtue, aecording to Arnos excelet ational tnd Noman er are by nature designed to be ettonal, If iey do not exoree ther revsee perfectly tey fl tactile themselves; nd, furtermore ithe Seats of their eason do not acord with hei nclnation the vo ps of their noere will be forever in conflict, thereby undermining tele happines, Perec happiness, then is found only when one follows the dts of reason out of 8frm nlinaion tod soi other word, when one has Become tus (nt merely coninen24 ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS Vo. 18 For Aristotle, in short, mozality is not opposed to self-regard, but isin harmony with it. Morality is found in states of character—called virtues—in which one carries out the dictates of reason out of inclination. The approach advocated by Naess and Fox fits easily within Aristocelian categories. The ecological Self is one which has acquired a certain kind of virtue. If one approaches environmental preservation out of a sense of obligation, but contrary to one’s inclinations, one would be merely continent. The virtuous person would be the one who spontaneously and lovingly pursued the preser- vation of the environment as if that environment were an extension of herself. Jn short, the truly moral person would be the one who adopts the ecological Self-image advocated by Naess and Fox. But note that virtues are worked at: we do not acquire virtues overnight. We do not become the kind of people who spontaneously care about the environ. iment just like that, Aristotle maintained that virtues develop gradually, through a process of habituation. One acquires the virtues “through like activities.” To become courageous, one must do courageous acts until one internalizes the disposition to perform such acts and begins to do them out of inclination. Thus wwe see that truly virtuous ectivity—moral activity that is done out of inclina- tion—can exhibit moral worth in Kant's sense. It can do so because the development of the state of character which leads to the natural and instinctive performance of moral acts proceeds through personal effort and hard work While it may not be a great achievement to act in accordance with your inclina- tions, it may well be a great achievement to become the kind of person who has the right sorts of inclinations. Thus, we praise you for being the kind of person that you are, rather than for the acts you perform, VI: CONCLUSION In conclusion, then, the attainment of the ecological Self does not render morality in the richest sense “superfluous,” as Fox suggests. To the contcary, the achievement of the ecological Self is a precondition for being a truly moral person, both from the perspective of a robust Kantian moral framewor and from the perspective of Aristotelian virtue ethics. Kantian respect is shown by transcending the narrow ego and identifying with others. Aristotelian virtue is found in the firm disposition o perform moral acts from the sheer love of doing so. The opposition between self-regard in the full sense and morality is a false cone, The two are the same. The ecological philosophy of Naess and Fox is an environmental ethic in the grand tradition of moral philosophy, one which better captures the true character of the moral life than those environmental ethics which are hobbled by the narrow Kantian understanding of morality.