Professional Documents
Culture Documents
by
Adolfo A. Lopez
in
(Vancouver)
June 2017
This report presents a literature review of the drivers, the concepts and challenges regarding some
of the recent initiatives to assure a better level of governance associated to tailings management
within mining companies. Specifically, this report reviews the governance aspects, at a corporate
level and at the mine site level, that would be deemed necessary to assure that good governance
forms an integral part of how a mining company approaches the high-risk elements of tailings
tailings governance by the members of the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM).
The checklist was later used to assess the level of compliance of the El Mauro tailings storage
facility (Minera Los Pelambres, a subsidiary of Antofagasta plc), using publicly available
information. The results of the assessment found that disclosure, the apparent lack of a visible
corporate head of tailings and the apparent lack of an approach to change management were the
main issues in verifying that the company follows good governance practices. The assessment
observed elements of a sound and through risk assessment program and a high level of awareness
and actions toward tailings management. Nonetheless, tailings were not found to be specifically
The main challenges in moving forward in implementing and assuring good governance of tailings
facilities are: disclosure at the company level and at the regulatory agency level; the approach to
change management and the evolution of the risk profile throughout the life of the facility; the lack
ii
Preface
This report is the final deliverable for the course MINE597 Engineering Report for MEng students.
The faculty advisor and reviewer for the report is Dr. Dirk van Zyl.
The review and assessment presented in this report is based primarily on the work submitted by
Golder Associates Africa (Pty) Ltd. on December 2016 for the International Council on Mining
and Metals (ICMM), titled Review of Tailings Management Guidelines and Recommendations for
Improvement. I completed the assessment of a specific mine site and corporate systems based on
iii
Table of Contents
2.4 Challenges for improving the governance aspects of tailings management systems ... 26
3.2 Findings......................................................................................................................... 34
References .....................................................................................................................................42
iv
List of Tables
Table 2.1 Checklist for good practice of governance aspects for tailings management ............... 24
v
List of Abbreviations
British Columbia
I thank Dr. Dirk van Zyl for his guidance and expert opinions.
I thank my loving wife and children, who inspire my life and have supported me through my
graduate studies.
vii
Dedication
viii
Chapter 1: Introduction
The purpose of the work was to complete a literature review of the governance aspects of tailings
management systems and assess the challenges faced by mine operators and regulators,
considering some of the recent initiatives, commitments and regulatory changes developed in the
last three years. The assessment examines the systems and complexities at a specific mine site and
management system. The mine site selected for the assessment is the Los Pelambres mine, located
Publicly available information has been used in completing the literature review and site-specific
assessment, including that from mining industry organizations, corporate reporting and mining
regulations.
A discussion of the recent catastrophic failures of tailings storage facilities as drivers for
agencies and the mining industry have responded in the last three years following the
Mount Polley and Samarco tailings release incidents. Change and initiatives reviewed
include updated guidelines developed by the Mining Association of Canada (MAC), and
A review of the use of the concepts of stewardship and governance to tailings management.
The use of these concepts for water management is also discussed in connection with the
operation of tailings storage facilities. The concept of robustness is also discussed as a tool
1
A review of best practices in tailings governance aspects, based primarily on Golder
Associates (Golder) review of tailings management practices developed for ICMM titled
the subsequent Position Statement issued by the International Council on Mining and
An assessment of the tailings governance aspects of the tailings management system at the
selected mine site and at the corresponding corporate systems. The assessment includes a
list of gaps and a discussion of the findings and challenges. The assessment is based on a
for improving the governance aspects of tailings management, from a regulatory and
industry perspective.
2
Chapter 2: Governance and tailings management systems
Governments and industry swing into action following environmental catastrophes in an attempt
to understand the root causes of such tragedies and ascertain how to increase control and reduce
risk. A simple review of the regulatory changes and industry initiatives, aiming at reducing the
risk of high-volume industries like mining, shows these follow an unequivocal pattern of
catastrophe and learning. In 2001, ICOLD reported a rate of 2 significant TSF failures per year;
although the rate may appear to have dropped over the last 15 years, two significant failures shook
the industry enough to drive commitments aimed at providing a higher level of assurance that the
risk profile is maintained sufficiently low. Guidelines and regulations have been reviewed and
compared once again, and the current set of international best practices has been benchmarked by
some mining jurisdictions; conversely, industry commitments have been adopted to raise the
The catastrophic failures of the tailings storage facilities at Imperial Metals Mount Polley mine
(British Columbia, Canada) and BHP Billiton & Vales joint venture Samarco mine (Minas Gerais,
Brazil) have been globally recognized as two of the worst of its kind caused by the mining industry.
The consequences of the sudden structural failure of the retaining structures caused immediate and
severe impact to the environment and to the surrounding inhabitants from the uncontrolled
discharge of impounded tailings material and water. The severity, extent and long-term damage
varies among these two catastrophic events and is a consequence of a complex function of the
3
impounded material and water quality, the climate, the geography, and the land use and inhabitants
The concepts of geotechnical engineering judgement that Ralph Peck described in his 1980 Laurits
Bjerrumm lecture (Peck, 1980) are still applicable today in approaches that attempt to address
uncertainty and variability, such as reliability and robustness; in his lecture, Peck stated that
designers and regulatory bodies tend to place increasing reliance on analytical procedures of
design. Remarkably, some of the key aspects of recent regulatory changes and industry-led
initiatives pursue an increased standard of care in applying better judgement through the life cycle
of tailings storage facilities through increased or explicit requirements for independent review
The recent TSF failures briefly described below have seriously hindered the already fragile public
perception of the mining and metals industrys ability to commit to the protection of the
Industry organizations and regulators have subsequently placed significant efforts into discussions
on what type and extent of changes and controls would have the most impact on preventing
4
2.1.1 The Mount Polley effect
Located in the Province of British Columbia, Canada, the Mount Polley Mine1, became known
worldwide following the catastrophic breach of its tailings storage facility on August 4, 2014. The
incident represented a major environmental incident caused by the release of tailings material and
supernatant water to the surrounding land. The flood material caused extensive damage and
erosion and entered two lakes located close to the mine. Fortunately, there were no reported third-
party damages to infrastructure nor fatalities. In the words of the president of the Society for
Mining, Metallurgy, and Exploration (SME), John Marsden (2014) , the Mount Polley spill posed,
once again, a credibility issue on the mining industry, noting the event as frustrating, great
harm, a huge setback, and anticipating escalating regulatory controls in the short term that are
likely not to improve the risk profile and overall safety under the current state-of-practice.
Investigation and Review Panel (the expert panel) appointed by the British Columbia Ministry of
Mines to assess the causes of the dam breach and provide recommendations for improved practice.
The cause of the failure of physical stability was investigated by the designated expert panel and
1
The Mount Polley Mine, owned by Mount Polley Mining Corporation (MPMC), is a copper-gold
mine located in south-central British Columbia, approximately 8 km from the town of Likely, 60
km northeast of Williams Lake and 50 km east of the Gibraltar mine. MPMC has been in operation
since 1997; production stopped on account of the TSF failure and was restarted about one year
after the incident. MPMC is a subsidiary of Imperials Metals Corporation (III-TSX), a Vancouver-
5
by several consultants retained by MPMC and the Ministry of Mines. The scope of those
investigations was limited to physical causes that led to the failure mechanism; other root causes,
such as the risk management approach, systems and resources, as well as legal responsibilities,
were not within the scope of the expert panel. The cause of the failure mechanism was reported to
be the increased stress level on an unidentified clay layer in the foundation of the dam. The
complexity of the geological environment had not been sufficiently taken into consideration in the
design of the foundation of the perimeter embankment, where the breach occurred.
On a purely geotechnical perspective of the immediate cause, if the foundation materials and their
stress-strain behavior had been fully assessed and taken into consideration in the initial design
and/or the subsequent changes throughout the operation, the failure mechanism could have been
mitigated or eliminated altogether. A contributor to the failure mechanism was the increased stress
level within the foundation materials caused by a raise of the embankment with a steeper
Water management was also a relevant contributing factor in the extent of the consequences of the
breach of the embankment dam. As may be observed through publicly available footage of the
disaster, the extensive impact to the landscape immediately downstream of the dam breach and
along the flow path of the Hazeltine Creek (a small tributary creek to Quesnel Lake) showed
evidence of significant amounts of natural sediments that had been eroded by action of a very fluid
slurry. The fluid material that made its way into Quesnel Lake, conceivably the most publicized
impact and matter of public concern, was therefore a mix of tailings, process water, contacted run-
off from the mine site, and eroded natural sediments. The extent of erosion downstream of the dam
breach, as well as the volume of tailings material released from the dam breach, could have been
significantly reduced if the size of the reclaim water pond (also termed supernatant or decant pond)
6
had been maintained at the lowest level possible. It is important to note that the water management
practice at the mine was to divert the contact and run-off water streams into the tailings
impoundment; consequently, the TSF was also a critical component for site water management. A
permit for the discharge of water from within the impoundment had been requested by the mining
company but had been rejected. At the time of the dam breach, the volume of water stored within
the impoundment was significant. As noted by the BC Chief Inspector of Mines in the investigation
report on the Mount Polley breach (Mount polley mine tailings storage facility breach.2014), there
was no qualified individual responsible for the water balance at the mine, and there was no
evidence of an adequate assessment of the risks of operating with a surplus of (or significantly
higher than what would be accepted as good practice) supernatant water within the tailings
Another significant contributing factor to the incremental loss of redundancy and robustness was
the successive changes in the design that had been introduced throughout the years of operation,
mainly aiming to optimize construction materials and reduce costs. Although the embankment dam
had been constructed following an approved design, it may be reasonably alleged that the sum of
changes and optimizations had significantly decreased the level of redundancy and robustness of
the original design. Although SME president John Marsden stated that the risk profile of tailings
the challenges of maintaining a risk profile of a tailings facility throughout the successive changes
that normally occur during the design, construction and operation phases of a facility.
The Mount Polley expert panel delivered seven (7) recommendations within its report, covering
areas from design standards to guidelines, management systems and assurance. The Chief
qualified person to manage dam safety; (2) site-wide water management by a qualified person; (3)
operations, maintenance and surveillance manual; (4) emergency response plan; and (5) risk
management (Mount polley mine tailings storage facility breach.2014). The other
recommendations of the Chief Inspector of Mines target the mining industry (including
independent technical review boards), professional organizations, and the role and organization of
Following the release of the expert panel report, the BC Chief Inspector of Mines ordered mines
to assess the risk of their tailings storage facilities in terms of foundation material, drainage
capability, and water management. The Ministry of Energy and Mines of BC initiated a series of
- A revised BC Mines Act, enacted in March 2016 (about 1 year and 7 months after the TSF
failure), incorporating:
- Changes to the Health, Safety and Reclamation Code for Mines in British Columbia (the
o new standards and design criteria including slope requirements, minimum static
o the definition of roles and responsibilities for the engineer of record; and
8
o requirements for a TSF management system and audits
The BC Ministry of Mines now requires mines to submit an annual report that includes an overview
of its Independent Tailings Review Board activities, which will be made electronically available
to the public.
The BC Minister of Mines also called on the cooperation of the industry to address additional
recommendations by the Mount Polley expert panel, specifically regarding the development of
guidelines for conducting subsurface geotechnical investigations, taking into consideration the
local settings known to exist in the Province. The expert panel noted that the development of such
guidelines as one of the best applicable practices that may be implemented. In response to the
panels recommendation, APEGBC, the licensing and regulatory body in British Columbia for
professional engineers and geoscientists, published the professional practice guidelines for site
characterization for dam foundations in BC, in September 2016. The guidelines complemented the
The Mining Association of Canada (MAC), in response to the Mount Polley incident, set up an
independent task force to assess the potential for improvement of the tailings components of the
Towards Sustainable Mining (TSM) program, which consists of the tailings management protocol
and accompanying guidance documents. MACs TSM initiative was endorsed in the expert panels
report, acknowledging that such a set of commitments, management system, procedures and
resources represents good practice and adherence should be a minimum requirement at any tailings
storage facility. MACs tailings documentation includes a Tailings Management Protocol with
three associated guides: the Tailings Guide; the OMS guide; and the Audit & Assessment guide.
MACs protocol and accompanying guides provide a management focus that goes beyond a set of
9
standards for design and operation and furtherly requires evidence of assurance and accountability
by means of performance indicators. The history of these documents dates to 1996, when MAC
first established a Tailings Working Group (TWG) in response to several major international dam
failures that raised the awareness in the industry. The TWG published one of the first guidance
documents of its kind in 1998, titled A Guide to the Management of Tailings Facilities. MACs
Towards Sustainable Mining (TSM) program, established in 2004 and mandatory for MAC
members, updated the Tailings Protocol and produced or updated the accompanying guidance
documents. MACs task forces final report included 29 recommendations to strengthen the
protocol and guides, and aim at raising the performance bar of the local industry to the current
level of recognized best practices of many mines. The recommendations have been progressively
incorporated into the tailings protocol during 2016, and the modifications to the guides will
continue through 2017. A summary of some of the key recommendations included in the report
- increase the level of assessment of the performance indicators included in the Tailings
Protocol;
- incorporate a risk-based and critical controls approach in the Tailings Guide that is verified
- include the assessment of best available technology and best available practices (BAT and
In the United States, response to the alarm posed by the Mount Polley incident was spearheaded
by the local industry through the Montana Mining Association and sponsored by Montana State
senators, enacting a bill that revised the mining laws (An act revising metal mine reclamation laws,
10
2015), including most importantly the requirement of an independent review panel to review the
o new standards;
o new fees;
o increased enforcement
The Fundo tailings storage facility, one of three tailings facilities at the Samarco mine2 in the
Minas Gerais state in Brazil, collapsed on 5 November, releasing more than 30 million cubic
meters of tailings material, causing 19 fatalities, 14 of which were workers at the mine site, and
extensive impact to the ecosystem and communities along the flow path of 650 km into the Atlantic
Ocean (Phillips, 2016) (Samarco, 2017). Hundreds of peoples homes were destroyed by the flow
of sediments and water. The collapse of the TSF, also known as the Mariana disaster, was
(Denuncia samarco.2016). The magnitude of the damage has been compared to the Deepwater
Horizon oil rig explosion and spill that occurred in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 that killed 11 people
and dumped 500,000 cubic meters of crude into the ocean (Phillips, 2016).
An Expert Review Panel (the Panel) was constituted by a law firm, retained by Samarco and parent
companies, to determine the immediate cause of failure. As reported by the Panel in the report of
2
The Samarco mine is an iron ore operation owned by Samarco Minerao S.A., a 50/50 joint venture between BHP
Billiton Brasil Ltda. and Vale S.A. The mine is located in the State of Minas Gerais, Brazil, about 2 km from the town
of Bento Rodrigues.
11
its review (Report on the immediate causes of the failure of the fundo dam.2016), the tailings dam
collapsed due to the liquefaction of a weak zone of material within the foundation of the upstream
slope of the tailings dam. A minor earthquake, known to have occurred prior to the collapse, may
have accelerated the failure mechanism, according to the Panel. The key immediate factors leading
to the collapse was the existence of a weak layer or zone within the foundation of the upstream
shoulder of the dam, and the degree of saturation within this weak zone. Successive modifications
to the original design of the dam section had been implemented throughout the life of the facility
to mitigate the impact of unexpected changes, including the issues with the underdrain or basal
drain system observed following initial construction and the failure of other water conveying
structures near the left abutment. The modifications to the design provided the grounds for an
unusually high phreatic surface within the upstream shoulder, as well as the likeliness of building
the dam raises over weak, liquefaction-susceptible slime materials. Water management at the TSF
was a significant contributing factor in providing the grounds for the failure mechanism, as the
water pond surpassed the safe distance to the upstream face of the dam for some time, allowing
weak slimes to settle within the zone that would later become the foundation of the dam raise.
The approach to the modifications of the design and the regulatory approval process have been
questioned, claiming negligence, as well as lack of regulation and enforcement from government
an industry. Samarco was initially fined $265 million by the Brazilian government but the fine was
later increased to $5 billion, and the mine joint-venture owners Vale and BHPs assets in Brazil
have been blocked (Phillips, 2016). Samarcos initial response to the disaster was largely criticized
for being slow and lacking transparency regarding the health risks posed by the released tailings,
as well as for the condition of the other tailings facilities operated by the mine (Gormezano, Protti,
prosecution. Samarco was fined 250 million Reais by the Brazilian federal environmental
protection agency, Ibama, and 112 million Reais by the Minas Gerais state environment agency,
Semad. In March, Samarco, Vale and BHP Billiton signed an agreement with the federal
government for socioeconomic and environmental recovery work, estimated to cost a total of about
20bn Reais over 15 years; only after more than 6 months after the dam failure, Samarco, Vale and
BHP Billiton created a foundation, named Renova Foundation, to conduct those programs.
However, the agreement is now threatened after a high court judge suspended the settlement.
Separately, in May 2016, federal prosecutors in Minas Gerais made legal actions for 155 billion
Reais in damages (more than 45 billion US dollars), claiming the company was negligent in its
responsibilities for failures in planning, control and risk management (Denuncia samarco.2016).
Brazils federal police also conducted an investigation, concluding that the Company knew that
the tailings dam was at risk, and recommended pressing charges against Company executives
(Phillips, 2016).
A local coalition of local communities impacted by dam projects in Brazil, called Movimento dos
Atingidos por Barragens (MAB), made four key demands to Samarco and parent companies BHP
Billiton and Vale following the collapse of the tailings dam, including: eliminating the S4 dam;
restructuring of the Renova foundation; recognition of a larger number of affected families; and
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2.1.3 ICMM response
The International Committee on Mining and Metals (ICMM) released a Position Statement in
December 2016 in response to the two tailings dam breach disasters occurred in the last two years,
addressing the concerns for better assurance in tailings management (ICMM, 2016).
The ICMM was created in 2001, transforming and expanding the mandate of the International
Council on Metals and the Environment (ICME), as an industry-led initiative to catalyze change
and organize efforts of the member companies in achieving the principles for sustainable
development that were established as an agenda for change from the outcomes of the Mining,
Minerals, and Sustainable Development (MMSD) project (ICMM, 2017a). The ICMM is currently
composed of 23 member companies, representing about one-third of the global metals production.
The ten principles that constitute ICMMs sustainable development framework aim at improving
the social and environmental performance of the mining and metals industry. The MMSD project,
completed between 2000 and 2002, was a wide- ranging research and consultation project,
managed by the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) and the
International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), with a total of over sixty
representatives and specialists involved in planning, budgeting, reviewing and making decisions.
The project was planned through the Global Mining Initiative (GMI) led by a handful of leading
mining companies and the WBCSD to understand and address the growing community unrest,
criticism from civil society, broader public opposition and increased scrutiny. The project involved
four regional partnerships, twenty national-level projects, twenty-three workshops, and 175
working papers, with contributions from more than 5,000 participants (Globalization and self-
regulation: The crucial role that corporate codes of conduct play in global business2011).
14
For many, the ICMM is recognized as a valid contributor to improving global standards within the
mining and metals industry. For others, the ICMM is not more than a self-serving institution
conducting public relations to improve the image of its members, and maintain the status quo of
position statements have been developed to accompany and strengthen those principles. The
December 2016 Position Statement provides a specific focus on tailings governance aspects of
tailings management (ICMM, 2016) , drawing from the conclusions of the review of standards and
best practices at the corporate level, commissioned to Golder Associates Africa (Pty) Ltd.
(Golder). Members are expected to implement the commitments by November 2018 (ICMM,
2016). The Golder review, and subsequent position statement, limit the objectives to prevention of
sudden structural failure from surface impoundments; however, the elements for better governance
may well be applicable to any other type or configuration of tailings management and storage
system.
In parallel, ICMM released a separate position statement in January 2017 regarding water
stewardship. The January 2017 position statement on water management requires member
companies to apply strong and transparent water governance(ICMM, 2017b). Water management
and tailings management are closely related elements at any mine site; thus, benefits should be
expected from making consistent changes of water and tailings management systems.
Golders review (Golder, 2016) looked at some of the most notable or recognized national
tailings management. The objective of the review was to produce a benchmark set of good practice,
based on Golders recognized experience in tailings consulting and engineering, and compare that
15
against the standards, guidelines, and corporate systems. The review looked at standards, critical
Golders review found that only a minority of member companies did not fully follow good
practice, as defined in the Golder report. The report also identified the following space for
Communication protocol between the engineer of record (EOR) and the operator or owner
Risk assessment system, with assurance that mitigation measures are taken into
Golders conclusions highlight the benefit of implementing the improvements within a tailings
governance framework embedded within the management framework to provide better means for
assurance and decision-making. The report also highlights the relevance of assigning qualified
apparent lack of or shortcoming of a process or system for change management, and with it the
management of risk throughout the life of a TSF. The recommendation, in Golders report, is to
explicitly incorporate the requirement for a change management system, endorsed and driven by
an executive commitment, to assure that the implications of potential material changes throughout
the life of the facility, whether internal or external, are fully adopted, communicate and embedded
into the operations manuals, into budgets and into training at all levels. In addition, the review
16
recommends prescriptions for formal communication between the engineer of record and the
operator or owner of a mine, to transfer and confirm shard understanding of the intents and the
The member companies of the ICMM, taking into consideration the review and recommendations
Planning and Resourcing, meaning the right people and the budget necessary for effective
implementation, with the associated capital and operating costs explicitly forming part of
Risk Management, requiring not only the identification but also the definition of a risk
control regime and the performance of the risk controls. This requires a process for
identifying the appropriate risk controls and defining their performance criteria, a process
Change Management, to explicitly include the assessment, control (by means of risk
process. The purpose, as stated in the position statement, is to avoid introducing uncertain,
change. The documents and records are committed to be maintained suitably current and
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accessible, as stated. The acceptable level of risk or the evolution of the risk profile is not
to impending failure, where action thresholds and response actions are established. An
communicating the outcomes and action plans of such reviews to executive management.
The commitment, however, does not specify the frequency of the external reviews.
The commitments made by the ICMM members represent a set of good practices in terms of
maintaining the safety of TSFs. The commitments are broad and do not specific elements such as
frequency, performance or assessment criteria for compliance. The commitments also do not
One reasonable critique to the review process and subsequent specific commitments released by
the ICMM, is the lack of engagement of a broad range of communities of interest in understanding
the root causes and changes required to significantly reduce the likelihood of occurrence of
disasters from TSF failures. A broad review (both internal to the industry and external to it) of the
root causes, or specifically the causes rooted in management, such as policies, procedures,
resources, were not addressed by the recent effort by the ICMM. Unlike the original approach of
multi-stakeholder engagement and agenda for change that became the foundation for the work of
the ICMM and has been used in other publications by the ICMM, understandably the basis behind
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this position statement appears to be a self-assessment by the industry. Nonetheless, a key
acknowledgement and commitment regarding assurance systems, risk and change management,
Stewardship
The concept of stewardship for tailings management has been used for at least 15 years. The
concept of tailings stewardship was the title of one of the MMSD reports published in 2002
(Martin, Davies, Rice, Higgs, & Lighthall) and was defined by the authors as the act of taking
care of the tailings facility in all aspects, from concept to closure, and including the mill process
where the tailings materials originate. Good stewardship elements that were discussed to be critical
to ensure the safety throughout the life cycle of a TSF include checks and balances and procedures
for quality assurance, as well as definitions of responsibilities and competency (Martin et al.,
2002). The concept of stewardship dates back several centuries and has evolved in modern times
to the use in myriad ways, from a biblical perspective to many elements regarding environmental
conservation such as water use. Water stewardship within the mining industry has become a
development.
Governance. The concept of governance is broad and dependent on the context, referring broadly
authoritative direction and control. The concept of governance may be taken broadly as the
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collection of efforts and processes to set the rules and make decisions in line with a shared purpose
Governance has been used assess the level of effectiveness of governments; the performance or
the effectiveness of governments of assuring a countrys needs are fulfilled is associated with a
level of governance, either representing good governance or a poor governance. The significance
and implications, as well as the expected elements of good governance may be regarded as being
more explicit for governments. Expected elements of good governance, in a national government
context, will therefore aim at providing efficient public services, stable politics, strengthening civil
society and assuring access to sustainable welfare and economic growth. Poor governance, on the
other hand, has been associated with corruption, abuse, arbitrary decisions, and other elements
In a broader sense, the work presented in this report expands on the concept of governance as the
set of rules and processes for decision-making and implementation of an organization or key
elements of an organization, in this case the management of tailings material. The concept of
governance may also be used to assess the efficacy of any group of people in reaching their intent
by the articulation of interests, power, legitimacy, formal and informal rules, control and
accountability.
The practices and systems that lead to a good level of governance need to occur at all levels in an
organization, or in other words, become recognized as the legitimate way. The responsibility of
delivering on the practices should not rely exclusively on the role of a regulating agency or
executive management, but should call on the benefits of participatory partnerships, each sharing
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Industries, governments, NGOs and social movements have attempted to create systems or ways
that encourage good behavior including certified rules, labelling and monitoring systems so that
consumers, shareholders and regulators are provided with a certain level of assurance. One such
example of a transnational collaborative initiative that has strengthened the governance aspects of
mining operations is the International Cyanide Management Code For the Manufacture, Transport,
and Use of Cyanide In the Production of Gold, also known as the Cyanide Code, which has been
recognized by the industry and by regulators to represent a set of best practices in a commitment
to improving the management of cyanide used in gold and silver mining and to assist in the
protection of human health and the reduction of environmental impacts (The cyanide code.2017).
The Cyanide Code was finalized in 2002, as a two-year effort by a multi-stakeholder steering
committee formed at workshop hosted by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
and the International Council on Metals and the Environment (ICME), in response to the Baia
Mare incident in 20003. The Cyanide Code has been fully implemented since 2005, with 45
signatory mining companies and operations (among producers, transporters and mines) in more
than 50 countries as of the first quarter of 2017 (The cyanide code.2017); it is recognized globally
for the transparency and validation of the risk based management approach and compliance
process. The systems and practices that form the Cyanide Code have been successful in reducing
3
The Baia Mare incident (Aurul gold mine, northwestern Romania), known as one of the worst environmental
damages in Europe, was a tailings dam failure and subsequent release of cyanide and metals-containing sediments and
water. The tailings material flowed into the Some River, consequently affecting the Tisza and Danube rivers, outside
of the Romanian border. The incident caused severe damage to the ecosystem within the course of the affected rivers
and prompted the neighboring Hungarian government to ban the use of cyanide in gold processing. The Baia Mare
incident was a driver for a global-scale discussion regarding the safe management of cyanide, led by the UNEP and
ICME in 2000.
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resistance (Cyanide management2008) and has been adopted or otherwise accepted as the standard
to which operations and projects are generally expected to adhere to for financing and approval.
Such a code of practice is an excellent example of a process of global partnerships between a wide
range of stakeholders at a global scale to develop the systems, rules and means for a shared purpose
(albeit with presumably diverse interests), thus representing a substantial improvement in setting
the standard of care in the management of a high-risk materials or elements such as cyanide.
Adherence to the Cyanide Code, therefore, is illustrated here as an example of the commitment to
elements of good governance, such as: the acknowledgement of the multi-stakeholder nature of
to risk-based processes to ensure the adequate definition of policies, rules, systems, people, and
improvement, was presented by Golder (2016) and ICMM (2016) as a key element to improve the
efficacy of the overall goal of a sustainable mining business. The review completed recently by
Golder (2016) reiterates some of the reflections stated almost 15 years earlier in Tailings
Stewardship report for the MMSD project (Martin et al., 2002): a review of the standards and best
practices reveals a reasonably adequate level of the state of knowledge and the available
technology to provide for the safe management and storage of tailings materials. Despite the
catastrophic failures provide evidence of the implementation issues across the industry. The
checkered scorecard of environmental protection of mining operations does not appear to make
consistent improvements, greatly caused by the varied approach to risk management in terms of
22
the people and resources committed, and the processes for developing policies and making
decisions.
The reviews of some of the leading guidelines, regulations and practices, commissioned recently
by the ICMM (2016) and reported in (Martin et al., 2002), although spaced about 15 years apart,
agree on the acknowledgement that the shortcomings lie in the efficacy of the implementation of
the state of knowledge and on the verification process of the controls that are put in place to assess
the operating conditions. These elements constitute the set of good practices and assurance
systems. Good practice, in this regard, is regarded as the set of policies, standards, limits,
thresholds, and procedures or methods that agree with the current state of knowledge and global
consensus of the practices that enable a common ground for sustainable development.
International best practice is also a term used to represent a global consensus or convergence on
the ground rules among the industry, governments and international finance institutions, by means
of policies, norms, procedures and protections (Williams, 2008); in this report, the concept of good
Golders review of standards, guidelines and practices, commissioned by the ICMM (Golder,
2016), compiled a set of elements representing good practice in tailings management, with input
from ICMM members. Table 2.1 defines a checklist of criteria for good governance in tailings
management, both at a corporate level and at the site level, based on Golders review and adjusted
23
Table 2.1 Checklist for good practice of governance aspects for tailings management
Source/comments
1.1 The corporate tailings management framework (or equivalent) is Golder, 2016
explicitly endorsed by the Board of Directors
1.2 The corporate tailings management framework (or equivalent) is Expanded from
mandatory for its subsidiaries and joint venture operations, Golder, 2016
whether the company acts as operator or not
1.3 The corporate tailings management framework is explicitly Beyond Golder, 2016
committed to by executive mine management.
1.4 The corporate tailings management framework explicitly refers to Expanded from
the principle of appointing suitably qualified individuals and Golder, 2016
sufficient resources to lead the management and assurance
processes. The framework identifies a corporate head of tailings
(or similar), although not replacing accountability of the CEO or
COO
1.5 The tailings management framework explicitly calls on a risk Golder, 2016
management system
1.6 The tailings management framework explicitly calls on a formal Golder, 2016
change management system (either associated with the risk
management system, the assurance program or other)
1.7 The tailings management framework defines accountabilities (of Golder, 2016
which the CEO or COO ultimately accountable), responsibilities,
roles and authorities.
1.8 The tailings management framework specifies regular executive Golder, 2016
oversight (CEO/COO and/or Board of Directors)
2.1 The assurance program specifies the milestones, frequency and Adapted from Golder,
scope of the inspections, audits and reviews for each project phase 2016
24
Source/comments
2.2 The assurance program specifies the competence requirements for Golder, 2016
the person responsible for the program
2.3 The assurance program requires independent review, specifying Golder, 2016
the milestones and frequency
2.4 The assurance program requires that the outcomes of the Adapted from Golder,
assurance program, including but not limited to the independent 2016
review, are submitted to the accountable party (CEO/COO and
Board of Directors), as part of their oversight role of the tailings
management system. There must be evidence that the outcomes
are elevated and acknowledged by the corporate executive and the
Board.
2.5 The assurance program includes change management within the Adapted from Golder,
elements that are audited and reviewed. A formal change 2016
management process is required to be maintained through the life
of the facility.
3.1 The organizational structure at the mine site clearly identifies the
responsible position for tailings management
3.3 The OMS manual, or other organizational document, clearly Adapted from Golder,
states the roles and division of responsibilities, specifies the 2016
protocols for communication of events, and specifies the decision-
making authorities
3.4 The OMS manual provides a comprehensive and updated source Adapted from Golder,
of information regarding the design and operating constraints, 2016
assumptions, applicability of constructions methods, and
allowable operating ranges. Also, the OMS manual provides
detailed information on the applicable critical controls, thresholds
and actions required upon specific observations or events.
25
Source/comments
3.5 The OMS manual defines the minimum training required for Adapted from Golder,
personnel involved in tailings management. 2016
Each of the elements detailed in the above list should be defined in the corresponding system,
procedures and protocols, in such a way that eliminates ambiguity and allows for consistent
In addition to explicit requirements set forth in a corporate management system for tailings, or a
system in which the tailings components are required to adhere to, a transparent and effective
assurance program is a key aspect to achieve good governance. An effective assurance program
will ensure that good governance practices will be carried out; it will also provide proof that all
the recurring elements of assurance are carried out on a regular basis. The assurance program
should, furthermore, represent the means to adapt and improve the policies, systems, procedures
and controls. The level of legitimacy of such an assurance system may be further strengthened by
conduct (such as the Cyanide Code) and multi-industry benchmarking. The latter requires
extensive partnerships and cooperation among professional associations, owners, and possibly
national governments.
2.4 Challenges for improving the governance aspects of tailings management systems
Implementing change that steepens the cost for tailings management is a difficult challenge with
myriad barriers; like many of the changes and improvements to reduce the risk of failure that the
largest industries have undergone, catastrophes have been the triggering event driving action from
26
governments to industry. Tailings management is perhaps the highest risk component of many
mines due to the extent of the consequences of uncontrolled release of tailings and water. On the
other hand, the cost of implementing physical changes to an operating TSF could, in some cases,
be prohibitive, leading to no changes implemented at all. The paragraphs below elaborate on some
implementing effective management of tailings is to appoint that has the technical capacity and
the resources to lead the development of a tailings management framework, and steer the
implementation of the processes, controls and reviews. Unfortunately, this leadership role is too
often unrecognized as a critical component of the organization and has a secondary priority. The
lack of corporate steering in tailings management may be observed in large and small mining
companies and throughout the developed and developing world; it is a clear indication of a
Resources need to be made available, not only for appointing the right person to a position of
leadership of tailings management, but as importantly for developing and implementing the
systems, processes and regular audits and reviews, as well as the subsequently elevating the
outcomes of reviews and changes to executive management and the accountable CEO/COO and
Board of Directors for informed decision making. Consequently, assigning a corporate leadership
for tailings management cannot be regarded as guarantee by itself for successfully assessing nd
controlling the risks of catastrophic failure. Formally allocating resources for monitoring, for EOR
involvement and for independent technical expert review is a key step to assessing and acting on
capacity to manage change and its consequences will affect people, teams, projects, corporations
and ultimately the industry. Change may be driven by internal or external events, such as
regulatory changes, political pressure, conflict with communities of interest, commodity cycles,
increasing reserves, unprecedented natural events; many of these can effectively be assessed and
quantified, and subsequently mitigated. The challenge is maintaining focus on the critical goals of
tailings management: managing the risk profile to assure human safety, environmental protection
and continuity of business. Performance metrics of critical risk controls and design criteria must
be meaningful to this goal and must be carefully assessed and reviewed as potential changes are
analyzed and material changes are implemented. The risk profile may be regarded through several
perspectives, such as the level of robustness or the level of resilience, the latter representing a
broader capacity of being able to recover from damage. Methodologies to assess and manage the
risks, such as those involving risk assessment by means of bowties and critical risk controls,
represent tools for good practice that have shown to be successful in developing and
communicating a better understanding of what the critical failure modes and controls are in each
phase of a project. Bowties first appeared in the oil and gas industry in the 1990s and are currently
widely being used in the mining industry to characterize the dynamics of complex and high
consequence events and to define the risk controls that may be implemented and monitored to
prevent or mitigate catastrophic events (Mills, Andrew, & Reynolds, 2016). A risk management
approach that incorporates a sophisticated quantitative approach would be well suited to assess the
implications of change in the risk profile of a TSF. The outcomes of such a methodology may
further be used for quantifying the cost/benefit of improving the safety of a TSF or to better inform
decision making for operational cost optimization. Consequently, elevating the outcomes of the
28
change management process within a risk management program to the executive and board level
is critical in assuring the accountable parties are informed and involved in establishing the goals
Consistency throughout mine sites in other jurisdictions. What seems basic to achieving standard
corporations and governments, including: arbitrary decision-making and political; weak or lacking
regulation and enforcement, executive incentive. Strong company commitment and executive
practices and communicating transparency and responsibility in managing high risk operations.
Disclosure, the key to legitimacy, is perhaps the most challenging of all. The ICMM position
statement on tailings governance solely states internal communication and review to the
accountable executive and the board. Public disclosure to a meaningful extent is not discussed in
the list of commitments. However, public disclosure is not unheard of in the mining industry; such
Partnership and collaboration, among industry, national governments and NGOs. Mining is a
unique industry of macro-impacts and transnational supply/demand chain, yet bound to very local
settings of site-specific features and regulations. Mines are subject to the rules of local jurisdictions
and the business and work culture, and consequently, transnational corporations find themselves
challenged in the means and standards in which they conduct business and execute mine
development. On the other hand, local jurisdictions are likewise challenged in defining the
approach to policy-making and setting the rules of the game, as well as setting the resources for
monitoring and enforcement. At times, the impact of mining operations can become a transnational
concern and governments are faced with the challenge of setting common standards. Nevertheless,
29
developing agreements among mining jurisdictions and implementing international rules or codes
of conduct, as well as a legal mechanism for compliance has proved problematic (Morgan, Peinado
Gomes, & Perez-Aleman, 2016), or otherwise slow and driven by political priorities. Codes of
conduct, or certification systems, such as the Forestry Stewardship Council (FSC) or the Cyanide
Code are good examples of transnational cooperation initiatives that have proven to be reasonably
successful. However, significant challenges persist in moving forward in a large list of elements,
including tailings management. One of these challenges is the level and means of enforcement,
due to significant variations in local practices and organization of regulatory agencies, challenging
the set of broad standards that comprise global partnerships. Another important challenge is the
interaction and subsequent legitimacy of national states or mining jurisdictions with transnational
and local NGOs, particularly if national state priorities are driven by the need for rapid
development and are drawn to obstruct or object the involvement of transnational NGOs. Morgan
et at. (2016) further discuss this challenge as faced by the developing nations of the Global South
that strive to fuel development and reduce poverty. The developing nations, but not limited only
to those, are also faced with the issues of corruption or other subtler forms of political influence,
further preventing moving forward with changes and updates to laws and regulation. The
complement the role of national states, created as a collaboration between multiple stakeholders
advantage/disadvantage.
30
Chapter 3: Assessment of tailings governance aspects at MLP
The mine site selected for the assessment is the Los Pelambres mine, located in central-northern
Chile, owned and operated by Antofagasta Minerals SA, a subsidiary of Antofagasta plc, the
largest privately-owned Chilean copper mining group and the eighth largest copper producer
worldwide. Antofagasta plc is listed on the FTSE 100 index, with a market capitalization of $9.7
Antofagasta Minerals has been a member of ICMM since 2014 and is the first private company
based in Chile to become a member of the organization. As such, Antofagasta Minerals committed
to implementing the commitments under the tailings governance framework, released in December
Los Pelambres is a sulphide copper mine with gold and copper credits, located in central-northern
Chile, 240 km northeast of Santiago. Los Pelambres has a remaining life of 21 years (as of end of
2016). The concentrator has a throughput capacity of 175,000 tpd and the tailings are currently
delivered to the El Mauro tailings dam, located 50 km from the mine, which started operating in
2008. The TSF is a cyclone tailings sand type dam with downstream raise construction method; it
has an authorized storage capacity of 1,700 million tonnes of tailings. The ultimate height of the
tailings dam is currently authorized at 237 m and is currently at 163 m as of end of 2017 (Mayne
Nicholls, R., 2016). The TSF is located 12 km upstream of the town of Caimanes.
3.1 Methodology
An assessment of a list of governance aspects of the tailings management system was completed
for the El Mauro TSF based primarily on the best practices in tailings management described by
Golder (2016) and the ICMM member commitments of December 2016 (ICMM, 2016), further
31
expanded and/or modified by the author of this report and presented in Table 2.1. The company
information review included publicly available information on the company website and the open-
access information available through the regulatory agencies of Chile. Comments regarding the
information made available by the company and the regulatory agencies, as well the compliance
32
Document/Presentation Title Source
33
3.2 Findings
This section presents a review of the governance checklist items of Table 2.1 against the documents
listed in Table 3.1. Findings and comments are included within the review checklist and further
Findings/comments
34
Findings/comments
within the terms of reference of the said
committee.
1.8 The tailings management framework No reference found to tailings system oversight
specifies regular executive oversight by executive management at corporate level
(CEO/COO and/or Board of Directors)
2.5 The assurance program includes change No evidence found related to change
management within the elements that management
are audited and reviewed. A formal
change management process is required
to be maintained through the life of the
facility.
3.1 The organizational structure at the mine Yes. The manager for the concentrator (and
site clearly identifies the responsible other processing facilities) is also the manager
position for tailings management for the tailings system. There is a tailings and
water superintendent. The manager of plants
and tailings reports to the operations manager.
3.3 Discussion
The main issue in conducting the assessment was the lack of disclosure of specific documentation
related to the tailings management system. The corporate documentation related to risk
management and assurance processes, although apparently well documented and implemented,
has no reference to tailings, whether in the terms of reference or in review records to demonstrate
that the risks associated with tailings management have been adequately assessed and the controls
are reviewed.
Information publicly available through regulatory agencies in Chile is limited and broad-based for
informational purposes of the overall operation and operational data. There is no evidence of
Although the transparency law of Chile, that came into effect in April 2009, contains a principle
of access to information that provides citizens the right to make information requests to public
organisms with a guaranteed turnaround time, the information that is made available is limited. A
request for disclosure of operational information of the El Mauro TSF including the OMS Manual,
was made by the author of this report to the Geology and Mines Service (SERNAGEOMIN)
through the web-based information request system; however, no information relevant to this report
was received. It can be consequently considered that a significantly higher level of disclosure could
regulators do not generally reference the OMS manual of a TSF for regular monitoring and
reviews, but rather develop a checklist of items established based on the approval document for
Although not explicit within the documents reviewed, the risk profile of the tailings management
components at the Los Pelambres mine may be deemed to have been extensively reviewed. The
El Mauro TSF, located only 12 km upstream from the town of Caimanes, has received significant
media coverage and involvement from local and national NGOs in the last ten years due to claims
made by the local community concerning water quantity, quality and the risk of physical
instability. Only in 2016, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the company, but most importantly,
a benefits agreement was signed with the local community, paving the way for better
understanding and increased security for business continuity and mine expansion. The agreement
with the community was made possible, in part, by assuring involvement in the development of a
Contingency Plan for a potential dam breach event, which complements the current Emergency
Preparedness Plan. The latter forms part or is otherwise referenced in the OMS Manual for the
TSF. None of the mentioned documents have been found to be available to the public upon request
(other than the community members involved in the development of the Plan).
Clear evidence and description of the corporate audit and risk assessment practices and assurance
process was found within the documentation of the London-based Antofagasta plc headquarters.
Regular reviews, risk assessment and monitoring procedures and risk control reviews form part of
the corporate approach to control the business risks. Although there is no evidence of the findings
and risk priorities, a substantial emphasis on tailings management at the Los Pelambres mine
38
suggests that tailings risks are a priority risk and concern for the company executives and the board
of directors.
There was evidence found that tailings management and innovation plays a key role at a corporate
level for the continuity and expansion of the operating mines and the project developments. Risk
prioritization and risk control performance was seen to have an active aspect of governance at the
board level. Consideration and current implementation of innovation and reduction of risks
associated with tailings management was found to be relevant in the business decisions at a
corporate level, as evidenced by the high-throughput thickened tailings deposition method at the
Centinela mine.
39
Chapter 4: Conclusion
The review of governance aspects for tailings management systems that was presented in this
report is based on a literature review of the relevant aspects to develop and implement good
governance, drawing from ICMMs position statement on tailings governance and from a wide
range of sources. The corporate and mine site assessment of a checklist of items related to
limitations of the findings are therefore inherent to the level of disclosure of the company and
regulatory agencies.
The most significant challenge and obstacle in assessing the governance aspects within the selected
company was the lack of information publicly available, or in other words, the disclosure of
information of the corporate management systems, the mine site operations manuals and the
outcomes of the review processes. A very limited amount of information is made available to
would allow a clear confirmation that a set of governance aspects are comprised within the
There are aspects that are inferred to exist and good practices are evidenced by a recently improved
relation with local communities, made possible by disclosing information with these communities
in a collaborative process to address the concerns regarding public safety and water availability.
By this evidence, good practices and a good level of governance may therefore be reasonably
key risk priority in securing continuity and paving the way for the planned mine expansions at
40
Change management, or the change and evolution of the risk profile associated with potential or
material changes to the tailings system throughout the life of the facility, was not found to be
A rather significant evidence of the lack of awareness of the relevance of good tailing management
is that there is no outward-facing tailings head at the corporate level. Many of the largest mining
companies worldwide have an established and authoritative tailings group that provides the means
for implementation of an assurance program. Antofagasta plc does not show evidence of such a
group, at least one that is publicly visible to shareholders and the public.
Transnational partnerships to develop a standard approach, systems, protocols and practices, was
reviewed in this report as a means to facilitate the achievement of good governance aspects of
corporations and national states with regards to tailings management. Many valuable insights can
be learned from an international standard such as the Cyanide Code, which considers far more
specific terms than general commitments. Nevertheless, the case of tailings presents more complex
challenges because of the intrinsic site-specific nature of tailings and the interaction with local
settings (physical, social and political), as well as because of the reluctance of facing extremely
41
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