CHAPTER ONE

1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND
Shipping Operation is, without any doubt, a risky activity, and maritime disasters, that
had happened through the years and which will happen in an inevitable way, are due to
the complex environment of shipping operation and as a result have attracted
considerable attention in academia over the past decade. These complex operations give
rise to various types of risks, which could negativelyimpact on the performance of
shipping operations. It is therefore important for shipping companies to know what are
the associated risks? Which ones are more important and how to mitigate the impacts of
these risks in shipping operations?
These various offshore shipping operations include the following;

1) Ship-to-ship transfer operation: This refers to the transfer of ship’s cargo which can
be oil or gas cargo, between two merchant tanker vessels positioned alongside each other.
This operation is very economical as ship does not have to berth at the jetty, especially
for huge oil tankers, which removes the port berthing charges and also cut time for
berthing and mooring. Both all these come at a cost of high environmental pollution and
fire as chances of leakage in operation is always there in the open sea.

2) Crude oil washing operation: This is the washing out of the residue from the tanks of
an oil tanker vessel using the crude oil cargo itself, after the cargo tanks have been
emptied.
3) Tank cleaning operation: This operation involves the removal of all traces of a cargo
from the tanks of a tanker. This operation is an extremely hazardous activity as this tank
contains flammable material which presents specific hazards. If a flammable mixture of
vapour and air exists inside a tank, then the introduction of a source of ignition may cause
a fire and/ or explosion.
4) Gas freeing operation: It is the process of removing the explosives or poisonous
gases from the cargo tanks of a vessel so as not to contaminate the next cargo being
carried and raising the oxygen level to normal (21%).
5) Mooring operation: This is the act of fastening or securing a vessel with a rope or
anchor. The ship’s master and responsible officer must have details of current and future
weather data before commencing the mooring operation.

1
6) Ballasting and de-ballasting operation: The process by which sea water is taken in
the ship when the ship is at the sea to maintain stability is called Ballasting Operation.
The sea water carried by the ship is known as ballast water. The process of taking out
ballast water from the ballast tanks to make them empty is known as de-ballasting.
During discharge, care should be taken to guide against accidental pollution.
These above operations indicates that offshore shipping is associated with a wide range
of risks, where a fault in navigation or in operations can give rise to injuries or loss of
life, to damage of property and sometimes irreparable damage to maritime environment.
Environmental and operational risks that can give rise to costly demands and complaints,
are nowadays, in opinion of Palmgren (2009), a significant matter to owners, and the
evaluation of these and other risks is an essential requirement to maritime safety.

Although risk, inherent to shipping operations, cannot be completely removed (UK P&I
Club, 2001; Peek and Rawson, 2005), it can be reduced to acceptable levels through the
use of risk evaluation principles. However before putting in practice a risk evaluation
plan, there is need to identify, evaluate and prioritize the main existing risks.
On the other hand, several researches (UK P&I Club, 2002, US Department of
Transportation, 2002) identify human error as cause of 60 and 80 per cent of maritime
accidents, giving us an idea of the importance on maritime safety of quality living
conditions on board – related to ship condition and maintenance– and quality of crews –
related to crew competence and qualification. Since human factors –trigger of human
errors– are the main source of risk in shipping operations, it seems interesting to develop
methodologies that allow evaluating quantitatively and qualitatively the real incidence of
several human factors over maritime accidents happening with the aim of taking human
factors into account in properly developing risk evaluation plans.
Within this complex picture of risks in offshore shipping, this study attempts to address
some group of these risk factors. To tackle this issue it is important for the shipping
companies to know what these risks are and how they affect the shipping operations.
Unless there is unlimited resource that could be employed to mitigate such risks, shipping
companies will always have to prioritize their resources to mitigate those risks that are
most imminent and significant. This makes it important to analyze the extent to which
each risk affects the performance of the shipping operation and to identify the relative
consequences of each risk factors.
Over the past few decades, offshore shipping has benefitted from a number of
developments ranging from improved traffic control technology and better ship designs,
2
to a strengthened regulatory regime and enhanced safety procedures. These and other
changes have all helped contribute to a notable drop in offshore shipping accidents, ship
losses, and marine oil spills. Thou efforts continue to further improve marine safety,
public scrutiny of shipping has been heightened in recent years. In efforts to further
enhance safety, stakeholders often turn to measuring risk (an inverse of safety) as a
means of identifying further opportunities for improvement to avoid rare event or even
common accident.

Amidst these developments, this study seeks to evaluate the risk factors in offshore
shipping operations.

1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT

Shipping is and always will be full of risks despite high and ever increasing safety
standards. Although maritime accidents has a relatively low death and injury rate – 180
estimated fatalities in 1995, against 45000 fatalities in road accidents happened the same
year in the European Union -, the consequences of an accident happening as a result of
the risk factors are far reaching. The repercussions of oil pollution or large loss of life in a
tanker vessel, can reverberate for many years and take their toll on businesses, small
economies and even governments (European Transport Safety Council, 2001a).

On the other hand, and such it is indicated by caridis (2009) “despite the significant
advances that have been achieved in recent years in the field of marine technology, the
number of offshore accidents that occur on a world-wide basis has not reduced
significantly”. This is due to, without any doubt, and as it has been shown in several
studies, the high proportion of offshore accidents is related to the risk factors, with human
error generally accepted to be the main factor.

So, even nowadays, when navigation instruments use new and advanced technologies,
human error is generally accepted to be the main cause of such casualties. In relation to
this, it is pointed out (Moreton, 2007) the wrong tendency to think that these new and
improved technologies and rules can counteract the human limits increasing safety at sea,
even when such technologies and rules are frequently developed in an isolated way,
instead of being developed in an integrated way as a component of the navigation system.

In that sense, there is a broad agreement that the key means to lessen or mitigate these
risk factors will be to assess and evaluate the relative risks associated with the events.

3
1.3 OBJECTIVE

The aim of the research is to conduct a comprehensive study on risk evaluation in

offshore shipping operation through the development of a tailored framework that can be
used for identifying risks, measuring the risk likelihood and risk consequence, and the
various risk mitigation strategies and measures in offshore shipping operations.

The specific research objectives include:

1) To identify the key risk factors that poses threat and the potential accidents.
2) To identify the negative consequences of these risks.
3) To determine the level or significance of these risks.
4) To determine the various strategies/measures of minimizing and tackling these
risks.

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS.

Based on the specific objectives of the study, the following research questions were
highlighted;

1) What are these risk factors and the potential accidents?

2) What are the negative effects or the consequences if the risk should occur?
3) What is the significance of these risks?
4) What various strategies/measures can be implemented to minimize and tackle
these risks?

1.5 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

In order to carry out an adequate research work, and to analyze the relationship of the
needed variables, we shall make the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1:
HI: There is a significant relationship between risk factors and human lives onboard.
4
H0: There is no significant relationship between risk factors and human lives onboard.

Hypothesis 2:
HI: There is a significant relationship between risk factors and marine environment.

H0: There is no significant relationship between risk factors and marine environment

1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The contribution of this study would be of interest to the researchers, maritime
practitioners, providing them with a fresh dimension of understanding on the major
causes of maritime disaster and how risk could be minimized, and as well helping the
Nigerian Maritime Sector as a federal agency and pivoting measures and making
decisions of curbing inefficiencies in Nigerian Shipping Sector in general. This study is
also very significant to the future researchers as a framework for further researchers into
the subject matter thereby filling an academic gap in the literature of shipboard risk
factors.
One reason for the sensitivity of this study is the scenario of the loss of lives, loss of
cargoes, machinery and equipment and as well the pollution of the marine environment.
A research work on such a sensitive matter as the relationship between risk factors, safety
of human lives, property and as well marine environment, is therefore at this time a
necessity.

The need to provide a long lasting solution to the threat of human life, property and
marine environment which as a result could yield less accidents, less injuries, less
breakdown and running cost, optimization of ship operations and resources among others
as would be advocated in this research work is therefore a task that must be done and
hence a justification for this research work.

1.7 SCOPE AND LIMITATION OF STUDY

This study covers a greater view on the evaluation of risk factors in offshore shipping
operations but due to the financial constraints, time constraints, limited access to
documents and organizations, lack of reliable data needed for this research work, lack of
prior research studies to this research work, this research could not cover all the factors
affected by the risk. It should be noted that these limitations do not really affect the
content of the research work.

5
Notwithstanding, if these limitations are eliminated, it could have enriched or added
more value to the study.

6
 CHAPTER TWO
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
2.1Definition of risk
The word “risk” originates from the Italian word risicare, which means to dare.
(Bernstein, 2006; Khan and Burnes, 2007; Rao and Goldsby, 2009). However, its
meaning has changed and expanded over time and appears through different people and
different situations (Frosdick, 2007). The study of risk was used to apply mathematics to
gamble when it was proposed by Pascal and Fermat (Frosdick, 2007; Khan and Burnes,
2007; Rao and Goldsby, 2009).

Their work developed probability theory, which becomes the core concept of risk
(Bernstein, 2006). Nowadays, more studies have attempted to understand risk and its
responses from human behaviour and psychology-based approaches (Khan and Burnes,
2007).

There are various definitions of risk. We conduct a comprehensive literature review and
organize different definitions of risk by chronicle into Table 2.1. The definitions can be
categorized into several groups such as “risk is a negative consequence/ outcome”
(Miller, 2001; Sitkin and Pablo, 2002; Hutchins, 2003; Norrman and Hansson, 2004;
Spekman and Davis, 2004), “risk is a measure of the probability of loss” (The Royal
Society, 2002; Yates and Stone, 2002; Chiles and Hutchins, 2003; Norrman and Jansson,
2004; Spekman and Davis, 2004), and “risk is the outcome of uncertainty” (Deloach,
2000; Sitkin and Pablo, 1992; Rao and Goldsby, 2009).

Table 2.1The selected definitions of risk

Authors Definition
Deloach (2000) Risk is the level of exposure to uncertainties that the enterprise must understand
and effectively manage as it executes its strategies to achieve its business
objectives and create value.

Miller (2002) Risk refers to the variance in outcomes or performance that cannot be forecasted
ex-ante.
The Royal Risk is “the chance, in quantitative terms, of a defined hazard occurring. It
Society (2002) therefore combines a probabilistic measure of the occurrence of the primary
event(s) with a measure of the consequences of that/those event(s)”.

7
Sitkin and Risk refers to “the extent to which there is uncertainty about whether potentially
Pablo (2002) significant and/or disappointing outcomes of decisions will be realized”.
Yates and Risk is an inherently subjective construct that deals with the possibility of loss.
Stone (2002)
Hutchins Risk is the probability that an event or action may have negative impact on the
(2003) organization.
Norrman and Risk is “a quality that reflects both the range of possible outcomes and the
Jansson (2004) distribution of respective probabilities for each of the outcomes”.
Spekman and Risk is defined as the probability of variance in an expected outcome.
Davis (2004)
Chiles and Risk refers to the possibility of loss.
Mackin (2006)
Mitchell (2009)Risk is defined as a subjectively determined expectation of loss; the greater the
probability of this loss, the greater is the risk.
Rao and Risk is exposure to a premise, the outcome of which is uncertain.
Goldsby (2009)

According to International Maritime Organization (IMO), Risk is the “combination of the

frequency and the severity of the consequence”. It thereby articulates two components of
the likelihood of occurrence and the probability of severity of the (un)predictable
consequences. In order words, the governing body in shipping implies that there is;

 The probability of occurrence

 The extent of the damage, if caused.
In this study, “risk” is deemed as a negative outcome from uncertainty and it can be
measured from the likelihood and the consequence of uncertainty.

Risk is a parameter used to judge the significance of hazards in relation to safety, and
hazards are the possible events and the conditions that may result in severity.
It is normally evaluated as a function of the severity of the possible consequences (C) for
a hazard, and the probability of occurrence (P) for that particular hazard:

R= f (C, P)

8
Both the possible consequences (C) and the probability of occurrence (P) are the
functions of various parameters. It is normal to use the simplest possible relation between
C and P, i.e. the product of the two, to calculate the risk (R):
R=C.P
Given this simple equation, we can better understand risk as a concept. For example, a
high consequence (C) and a high probability of occurrence (P) for a certain given hazard
mean that the risk is high, which will often be considered as intolerable from a safety
perspective.

On the other hand, a low consequence (C) and a low probability (P) represent a low risk
level. A low level of risk will normally be perceived as tolerable in a safety context, but
may even be negligible if it is really low. The risk level that results from a high
consequence and a low probability, or vice versa, will often be tolerable, but may in
extreme cases be either negligible or intolerable.

The risk needing special attention are those where both consequence and probability are
significant. Given this knowledge, estimated risk of hazards can be used to make
informed decisions in terms of improving safety. Safety can be improved by reducing the
risk, and risks can be reduced by reducing the severity of the consequences, reducing the
probability of occurrence, or a combination of the two.

Risk may be presented in many different and complementary forms. Figure below
illustrates the principle of risk presentation using a specific risk acceptance criterion. This
figure also incorporates an assessment of the hazards in terms of risk, indicating whether
they are intolerable (i.e. unacceptable), tolerable (i.e. acceptable) or negligible using
continuous risk scales.

9
Risk can be broadly understood and explained in three different scenarios, risk versus
probability; risk versus threat; and all outcomes versus negative outcomes. It is believed
that any risk can be managed through the engagement of a proper risk evaluation process.

2.2 Risk Evaluation

In offshore shipping operations, risk is everywhere. The management to mitigate the
impact of risks is an important issue to companies. There are also many studies that
address risk management in various areas, such as banking (Bessis, 2010), finance
(Vaughan, 2007), economics (Tversky and Kahneman, 2002), gold mining (Tufano,
2006), medical/health (Aufseeser-Weiss and Ondeck, 2001; Neale, 2008; NPSA, 2008;
Hollman, 2010), technology (DeLone and McLean, 2002; Elky, 2006), transportation
(Alizadeh and Nomikos, 2009), logistics (e.g. Notteboom, 2006; Husdal and Bråthen,
2010) and supply chain (e.g. Harland et al., 2003; Christopher and Peck, 2004; Zsidisin et
al., 2004; Waters, 2007; Manuj and Mentzer, 2008a, 2008b; Knemeyer et al., 2009;
Yang, 2010, 2011), etc. The definitions of risk evaluation can therefore be found across
the authors and industries. This study presents several definitions of risk evaluation from
selected studies that related to shipping and these are presented in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2The selected definitions of risk evaluation

Fone and Young (2000) Risk evaluation is a general management function that seeks

10
 to assess and address risks in the context of the overall aims
of the shipping organization.
The Royal Society Risk evaluation is the making of decisions regarding risks
(2002, p.3) and their subsequent implementations, and flows from risk
estimation and risk assessment.
Norrman and Jansson Risk evaluation is the process whereby decisions are made
(2004) to accept a known or assessed risk and/or the
implementation of actions to reduce the consequences or
probability of occurrence.
Waters (2007, p.75) Risk evaluation is the process for systematically identifying,
analyzing, prioritizing and responding to risks throughout an
operation.
Syriopoulos (2011) Risk evaluation for shipping is the process by which various
risk exposures are identified, measured and controlled
Yang (2011) Risk evaluation is a decision-making process which is in
view of the outcome of risk assessment

In this study, Risk evaluation is the process of using the results obtained in the risk
analysis to determine the level or significance of estimated risks in order to improve the
safety of the operation through risk reduction. This involves the introduction of safety
measures, also known as risk control options.

The process of risk evaluation has been addressed by many researchers. For
example,Norrman and Jansson (2004) stated that the risk processes broadly include
understanding the risks, and managing the risks to minimize their impact by addressing
probability and impact. These two processes can be further divided into more detailed
stages from risk identification via risk analysis to different ways of risk management.
Sung (2005) reported five steps of risk management as:Identifying and measuring loss
exposure; Identifying and examining alternative techniques for dealing with this
exposure; Selecting the most appropriate risk management alternatives consistent with
the organization’s risk financing philosophy; Implementing the selected alternatives; and
Monitoring and improving the selected alternatives. Several studies use the term “risk
assessment” to represent risk evaluation. For example, Christopher et al. (2002) stated
that “to assess offshore risk exposures, the company must identify not only direct risks to
its operation, but also the potential causes or sources of those risks at every significant
link along the offshore”. Van Duijne et al. (2008) stated three stages of risk assessment

11
including risk identification, risk estimation, and risk evaluation. Blackhurst et al. (2008)
claimed that the most important step in the process of risk assessment is the selection and
definition of the risk categories, which can be weighted, compared and quantified.
Generally speaking, there are three common risk evaluation steps, i.e. risk identification,
risk measurement and analysis, risk mitigation strategies and measures.
This reflects some of the above definitions such as Norrman and Jansson (2004), and
Waters (2007). This study will generally follow the three step risk evaluation perspective.

Identify risk factors

Measure and analyze risk

Monitor / Review
Prioritize risks

Mitigate the risks

Figure 2: The steps involved in evaluating risk

2.2.1 Identification of Risk Factors and the Potential Accidents

Risk identification is the first step in the process of risk evaluation and it produces a list
of risks that impacts on shipping operations (Waters, 2007; Tummala and Schoenherr,
2011), and it is an important stage in the risk evaluation process because decision-makers
can become aware of the unfavorable factors in the projects by risk identification
(Norrman and Jansson, 2004).

12
The threat posed by offshore shipping depends on many risk variables which together
indicate the overall level of threat the operation poses. Tackling the associated underlying
causes of accidents posed by these factors and reducing the frequency of such incidents
further is of paramount importance.

These principal risk factors related to Offshore Shipping Operationsare linked to the
broader risk of major disruptions in world trade and increased economic costs linked to
heightened security. It is important that government address all of these risks with broad-
based security policy responses, since simply responding to threats in isolation to one
another can be both ineffective and costly.

Risk factors can be identified by examining records of previous activities or events. Other
ways in which risk factors could be identified are results from past experiences through
conduction interviews of stakeholders or by analyzing specific real life or generated
scenarios.

These factors include;

1) Cargo Factor.
These include dangerous goods and heavy cargoes. These cargoes are diverse and can
include explosive compounds, fireworks and dangerous chemicals. While thousands of
hazardous goods containers are safely shipped every-day, several significant accidents
have occurred in the past. For example, in November 2002, an explosion involving
improperly stored calcium hypochlorite containers caused death and extensive damage to
the 4389 TEU Hanjin Pennsylvania and its’ cargo near Sri Lanka. These hazardous
goods can be inform of solids, liquids or gases that can harm the crew members onboard,
property or the marine environment.
They can be categorized into 9 classes;

 Explosive materials: These are materials or items which have the ability to
rapidly conflagrate or detonate as a consequence of chemical reaction. Commonly
transported explosives are dynamite, nitroglycerine, propellant and fireworks
 Gases: These class encompasses compressed gases, liquefied gases, dissolved
gases, refrigerated liquefied gases. They are capable of posing serious hazards due
to their flammability, ability to oxidize and/or their toxicity or corrosiveness to

13
 humans. These gases can be in the form of flammable, non-flammable and
poisonous gases.
 Flammable Liquids: These liquids are capable of posing serious hazards due to
their volatility, combustibility, and potential in causing severe conflagration.
Commonly transported flammable liquids are the diethyl ether, gasoline (petrol),
aviation fuel, benzene, kerosene and diesel.
 Flammable Solids: These are materials which, under conditions encountered in
transport, are readily combustible or may contribute to fire through friction
combustible that are easily ignited and readily combustible. Commonly
transported flammable solids are alkali metals, firelighters, nitrocellulose and
magnesium.
 Oxidizing Substance: These are hazardous goods which are may cause or
contribute to combustion, generally by yielding oxygen as a result of a redox
chemical reaction and they include chlorates, nitrites, nitrate, hydrogen peroxide
and permanganate.
 Toxic substances: These are substance which are liable either to cause death or
serious injury or to harm human health if swallowed, inhaled or by skin contact.
The effect of toxic substance depends on the amount of substance that has entered
the body and its toxic properties. Toxic substance enter the body through the air
that we breathe. They are liable to cause death or serious injury. Examples include
potassium cyanide, mercuric chloride, dyes, tear gas, cyanides, pesticides, and
methylene chloride.
 Radioactive Material: These comprises of substances or a combination of
substances that emit ionizing radiation. Examples include uranium, yellow cake,
thorium, radium and plutonium.
 Corrosive Substances: These are substances which by chemical action degrade or
disintegrate other materials upon contact. They cause severe harm when in contact
with the tissue of the body or, in the case of leakage, damage or destroy
surrounding materials. Commonly transported corrosive substances are the Acids,
batteries, chlorides and alkalis
 Miscellaneous Dangerous Goods: These goods present a wide array of potential
hazards to human health and safety. Commonly transported miscellaneous
dangerous goods are fuel cell engines, chemical kits, and internal combustion
engines.
2) Vessel Factor

14
Oil tankers are among the largest ships that sail on water bodies. Some oil tankers
transport raw oil to refineries so that it can be processed into fuel and other products,
while other oil tankers transport the already processed products to be distributed. These
ships are essential to our nation’s economy but when accidents happen, they can cause a
lot of destruction. If an oil tanker vessel runs aground, millions of gallons of oil pour out
into the waterway, killing every animal and plant in its path. It can ruin the environment
in that area in many years to come. In addition to the environment, however, an oil tanker
can be risky to the crew onboard. They are living and working on a ship that is filled to
the brim with a highly flammable liquid. One mistake, one malfunction and one overly
fatigue worker, and boom, the ship can explode.

The threat posed by a given ship depends on some risk variables, which together indicate
the overall level of threat the ship poses. This risk variables includes;

 Technical failures – are short comings within the ship, such as corrosion, steering
failure, engine failure, or hull failure arising from defective materials or
construction or by the shore-based installations such as aids to navigation.
 Ship-related factors – could be the age of a ship, weakness of a ship, hence less
maneuvering capability and stability or draught constraints.
 Static risk factor – includes static characteristics of a ship.
 History-related ship factor – includes historical information about a ship.

3) Human Factor
In Shipping Operation, the human factor include the ship’s crew, pilots, dockworkers and
others. The performance of these people will be dependent on many traits, both inmate
and learned.
Studies on accidents (Baylon& Santos, 2011; Kujala et al. 2009; Martensson, 2006;
Rothblum, 2000) show that the human onboard is the highest risk factor when it comes to
maritime safety since approximately 80-90% of maritime accidents are caused by human
error.
Human error is sometimes described as being one of the following: an incorrect decision,
an improperly performed action, or an improper lack of action. Probably a better way to
explain human error is to provide examples from two real marine casualty.

15
The first example is the collision of the M/V SANTA CRUZ II and the USCGC
CUYAHOGA, which occurred on a clear, calm night on the Chesapeake Bay. Both
vessels saw each other visually and on radar. So what could possibly go wrong? Well, the
CUYAHOGA turned in front of the SANTA CRUZ II. In the collision that ensued, 11
coast Guardsmen lost their lives. What could have caused such a tragedy? Equipment
malfunctions? Severe currents? A buoy off-station? No, the sole cause was human error.

There are two primary errors that were made.The first was on the part of the
CUYAHOGA’s captain: he misinterpreted the configuration of the running lights on the
SANTA CRUZ II, and thus misperceived its size and heading. When he ordered that
fateful turn, he thought he was well clear of the other vessel. The second error was on the
part of the crew: they realized what was happening, but failed to inform or question the
captain. They figured the captain’s perception of the situation was the same as their own,
and that the captain must have had a good reason to order the turn. So they just stood
there and let it happen. Another type of human error that may have contributed to the
casualty was insufficient manning (notice that this is not an error on the part of the
captain or crew; rather, it is an error on the part of a “management” decision-maker who
determined the cutter’s minimum crew size). The vessel was undermanned, and the crew
was overworked. Fatigue and excessive workload may have contributed to the captain’s
perceptual error and the crew’s unresponsiveness.

The second example is the grounding of the TORREY CANYON. Again we have clear,
calm weather--this time it was a daylight transit of the English Channel. While
proceeding through the Scilly Islands, the ship ran aground, spilling 100,000 tons of oil.

At least four different human errors contributed to this accident. The first was economic
pressure, that is, the pressure to keep to schedule (pressure exerted on the master by
management). The TORREY CANYON was loaded with cargo and headed for its deep-
water terminal in Wales. The shipping agent had contacted the captain to warn him of
decreasing tides at Milford Haven, the entrance to the terminal. The captain knew that if
he didn’t make the next high tide, he might have to wait as much as five days before the
water depth would be sufficient for the ship to enter. This pressure to keep to schedule
was exacerbated by a second factor: the captain’s vanity about his ship’s appearance. He
needed to transfer cargo in order to even out the ship’s draft. He could have performed
the transfer while underway, but that would have increased the probability that he might
spill a little oil on the decks and come into port with a “sloppy” ship. So instead, he

16
opted to rush to get past the Scillies and into Milford Haven in order to make the transfer,
thus increasing the pressure to make good time.

The third human error in this chain was another poor decision by the master. He decided,
in order to save time, to go through the Scilly Islands, instead of around them as
originally planned. He made this decision even though he did not have a copy of the
Channel Pilot for that area, and even though he was not very familiar with the area.
The final human error was an equipment design error (made by the equipment
manufacturer). The steering selector switch was in the wrong position: it had been left
on autopilot.

Unfortunately, the design of the steering selector unit did not give any indication of its
setting at the helm. So when the captain ordered a turn into the western channel through
the Scillies, the helmsman dutifully turned the wheel, but nothing happened. By the time
they figured out the problem and got the steering selector back on “manual”, it was too
late to make the turn, and the TORREY CANYON ran aground.
As these two examples show, there are many different kinds of human error. It is
important to recognize that “human error” encompasses much more than what is
commonly called “operator error”.

Below are summaries of these and other human factors areas that need to be improved in
order to prevent casualties in offshore shipping operations;

 Fatigue:
This has been identified as an important cross-modal issue, being just as pertinent and in
need of improvement in the maritime industry as it is in the aviation, rail, and automotive
industries. Fatigue has been cited as the “number one” concern of mariners in two
different studies. It was also the most frequently mentioned problem in a recent Coast
Guard survey. A new study has objectively substantiated these anecdotal fears: in a study
of critical vessel casualties and personnel injuries, it was found that fatigue contributed to
16% of the vessel casualties and 33% of the injuries.

 Inadequate Communication:

Another area for improvement is communications-between shipmates, between masters

and pilots, ship-to-ship, and ship-to-VTS. A National Transportation Safety Board report

17
stated that 70% of major marine collisions and allisions occurred while a State or federal
pilot was directing one or both vessels. Better procedures and training can be designed to
promote better communications and coordination on and between vessels.

 Inadequate General Technical Knowledge:

In one study, this problem was responsible for 35% of casualties. The main contributor to
this category was a lack of knowledge of the proper use of technology, such as radar.
Mariners often do not understand how the automation works or under what set of
operating conditions it was designed to work effectively. The unfortunate result is that
mariners sometimes make errors in using the equipment or depend on a piece of
equipment when they should be getting information from alternate sources.

 Inadequate Knowledge of Own Ship Systems:

A frequent contributing factor to marine casualties is inadequate knowledge of own ship
operations and equipment. Several studies and casualty reports have warned of the
difficulties encountered by crews and pilots who are constantly working on ships of
different sizes, with different equipment, and carrying different cargoes. The lack of
ship-specific knowledge was cited as a problem by 78% of the mariners surveyed. A
combination of better training, standardized equipment design, and an overhaul of the
present method of assigning crew to ships can help solve this problem.

 Poor Design of Automation:

One challenge is to improve the design of shipboard automation. Poor design pervades
almost all shipboard automation, leading to collisions from misinterpretation of radar
displays, oil spills from poorly designed overfill devices, and allisions due to poor design
of bow thrusters. Poor equipment design was cited as a causal factor in one third of
major marine casualties. The “fix” is relatively simple: equipment designers need to
consider how a given piece of equipment will support the mariner’s task and how that
piece of equipment will fit into the entire equipment “suite” used by the mariner.

 Decisions Based On Inadequate Information:

Mariners are charged with making navigation decisions based on all available
information. Too often, we have a tendency to rely on either a favored piece of
equipment or our memory. Many casualties result from the failure to consult available
information (such as that from a radar or an echo-sounder). In other cases, critical

18
information may be lacking or incorrect, leading to navigation errors (for example, bridge
supports often are not marked, or buoys may be off-station).

 Faulty Standards, Policies, or Practices:

This is an oft-cited category and covers a variety of problems. Included in this category is
the lack of available, precise, written, and comprehensible operational procedures aboard
ship (if something goes wrong, and if a well written manual is not immediately available,
a correct and timely response is much less likely). Other problems in this category
include management policies which encourage risk-taking (like pressure to meet
schedules at all costs) and the lack of consistent traffic rules from port to port.

 Poor Maintenance:
Published reports and survey results expressed concern regarding the poor maintenance
of ships. Poor maintenance can result in a dangerous work environment, lack of working
backup systems, and crew fatigue from the need to make emergency repairs. Poor
maintenance is also a leading cause of fires and explosions.

4) Environmental and Natural Factor:

These are natural phenomena such as current, tide and tidal stream, severe wind, reduced
visibility (fog, heavy snow and rain), storm seas, darkness etc. affecting the ship or those
controlling her.

Any accident may have more than one cause. Nevertheless, statistical analyses on the
basis of the main casual trends explicitly reveal that human errors, though declining
marginally, continue to be the major cause for all shipping accidents- being almost 80
percent. In other words, “the acts or omissions of human beings play some part in
virtually every accident, including failures, like structural or equipment ones, which may
be the immediate cause.”(ISF and ICS, 1996).

19
Figure 3: An example chart of risk factors and potential accidents are as follows:
RISK FACTORS ACCIDENTS
Vessel failure  Groundings
 Collision
 Hazardous material discharge

 Noise
 Engine room/machinery space fire
 Explosion on board
Dangerous cargo  Spill
 Personnel exposure
 Improper waste handling
Human error  Fire
 Injury to personnel
 Vessel damage
 Slips, trips, and falls

Bad weather  Loss of crew overboard

 Damage to vessel

2.2.2 Risk Measurement and Analysis

Risk measurement and analysis is the second step in the risk evaluation process. It
provides a quantitative view of the severities of the risks and helps decision-makers know
which risks should priority to be managed.

Risk measurement are based on two factors;

1.0 Risk likelihood

Risk likelihood is defined as the probability of the risk will occur (Garvey and
Lansdowne, 1998). It is often a subjective view of whether the risk will materialize
(Waters, 2007). More specifically, the value of likelihood is located between 0 and1, in
which 0 means never happen and 1 means always happen.
However, an accurate numerical percentage is sometimes difficult to identify. Many
studies use five abstractive categories to describe the probability of events (Hallikas et al.

20
2004; NPSA, 2008): very unlikely (or very low; impossible; rare), improbable (or low;
unlikely), moderate (or medium; occasional; possible), probable (or high; frequent;
likely), and very probable (or very high; almost certain).
In this study, we will follow this format and use 0, 1, 2, 3 and 4 to represent “rare”,
“unlikely”, “possible”, “likely”, and “almost certain”.

Likelihood Rating Definition

Rare 0 The occurrence is not anticipated May only
occur in exceptional circumstances
Unlikely 1 Trivial likelihood, however could occur at
some time.
Possible 2 Possibility less than 50 -50, might occur at
some time.
Likely 3 Possibility more than 50 -50, will probably
occur in most circumstances.
Almost certain 4 Almost certain it would occur, can be expected
to occur in most circumstances
Figure 4: Frequency scale

2. Risk consequence
Risk consequence is regarded as an outcome (losses or gains) of a risk event (Waters,
2007; NPSA, 2008). The level of risk consequence can be described in different ways.
Some scholars use “negligible, minor, moderate, serious, and critical” (NPSA, 2008);
some use “no safety effect, minor, major, hazardous, and catastrophic” (Cox, 2008); “no
impact, minor impact, medium impact, serious impact, and catastrophic impact” (Hallikas
et al., 2004), “low moderate, and high” (Elky, 2006) and “negligible, marginal, critical,
and catastrophic” (Tummala and Schoenherr, 2011) have also been used. This study uses
“insignificant, minor, moderate, major, and catastrophic” to describe the level of risk
consequence. Each of three risk consequences mentioned above is measured at five levels
from 0 to 4.

21
Consequence Rating Definition
categories

Insignificant 0 Injury not requiring first aid, no cosmetic vessel

damage, no environmental impact.

Minor 1 Injury requiring first aid, cosmetic vessel

damage, no environmental impact, additional
work, minor operational disruption.

Moderate 2 Injury requiring more than first aid, vessel

damage, some environmental damage, longer
operational disruption.

Major 3 Severe injury, major vessel damage, major

environmental impact, major operational
disruption.

Catastrophic 4 Loss of life, loss of vessel, extreme

environmental impact.

Figure 5: Consequence scale.

Risk analysis is the process of calculating the risk for the identified risk factors. When
analyzing a risk, one decides on the relationship between the likelihood of a risk
occurring and the consequences of the risk identified. The level of risk is then defined
and evaluation of it is then explored.The levels of the risks will identify which risk factor
present the greatest risks for the operation being examined.

The risk priority score, located where the two ratings intersect, will fall into one of the
following four general groups: Very High (VH), High (H), Moderate (M), or Low (L).

22
 Consequences

0 1 2 3 4

0 M H H VH VH

1 M M H VH VH

Frequency 2 L M H H H

3 L L M M H

4 L L M M M

Figure 6: Risk priority matrix

A risk priority of “VH” indicates an event or an accident that is very likely to occur and
with very high consequences. A risk priority of “L” indicates and inconsequential event
that is unlikely to occur. Risk priorities of “H” and “M” lie somewhere in between. The
items with the same highest risk priority scores should be addressed first.

Risk analysis can also be defined as the process in which risks are examined in various
degrees of detail- qualifying and quantifying –to determine the extent of risks, how risk
components are related to each other, and which ones are the most important to deal with.

There are various methods for risk measurement and analysis. One common method is to
compare the risk factors through their likelihood and consequences (Tummala and
Schoenherr, 2011) and put them into a risk matrix/map (Yang, 2010, 2011), which can
provide a straightforward ranking according to the risk severity. However, the risk
consequence varies (NPSA, 2008): some consequences are more tangible and easy to
evaluate, whereas the others may be intangible and difficult to evaluate (Waters, 2007).
Damage to maritime safety and security caused by, e.g., bad weather conditions and
dangerous working environment in offshore shipping operations is indeed a serious risk
consequence (Tzannatos, 2003; IMO, 2009). Notably, some of the damages are
measurable by monetary terms and some, such as pain and suffering of the crew and their

23
families, may not be measured directly by monetary terms. The following introduce the
twomajor risk consequences, including marine pollutionand loss of human lives and
property.

1) Marine Pollution
The environmental impact of shipping includes greenhouse gas emissions, acoustic, and
oil pollution. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) estimates that carbon
dioxide emissions from shipping were equal to 2.2% of the global human-made
emissions in 2012 and expects them to rise by as much as 2 to 3 times by 2050 if no
action is taken.

 Ballast water discharges by ships can have a negative impact on the marine
environment. These discharge typically contains a variety of biological materials,
including viruses, bacteria etc. These materials often include non-native, nuisance,
exotic species that can cause extensive ecological and economic damage to aquatic
ecosystems along with serious human health problems.
 Grey water is wastewater from the sinks, showers, galleys, laundry and cleaning
activities aboard a ship. It can contain a variety of pollutant substances, including
fecal coliforms, detergents, oil and grease, metals, organic compounds, petroleum
hydrocarbons, nutrients, foodwaste, medical and dental waste. Grey water has
potential to cause adverse environmental effect because of concentrations of
nutrients and other oxygen-demanding materials, in particular.
 Bilge water: On a ship, oil often leaks from engine and machinery spaces or from
engine maintenance activities and mixes with water in the bilge, the lowest part of
the hull of the ship, but there is a filter to clean bilge water before being
discharged. Oil, gasoline, and by-products from the biological breakdown of
petroleum products can harm fish and wildlife and pose threats to human health if
ingested. Oil in even minute concentrations can kill fish or have various sub-lethal
chronic effects.
 The noise produced by ships can travel long distances, and marine species who
may rely on sound for their orientation, communication, and feeding, can be
harmed by this sound pollution. According to Discovery Channel’s article on
Sonic Sea Journeys Deep into the Ocean, over the last century, extremely loud
noise from commercial ships, oil and gas exploration, and other sources has
transformed the ocean’s delicate acoustic habitat, challenging the ability of whales
and other marine life to prosper and ultimately to survive.

24
  Most commonly associated with ship pollution are oil spills. While less frequent
than the pollution that occurs from daily operations, oil spills have devastating
effects. While being toxic to marine life, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons
(PAHs), the components of crude oil, are very difficult to clean up, and last for
years in the sediment and marine environment. One of the more widely known
spills was the Exxon Valdez incident in Alaska. The ship ran aground and dumped
a massive amount of oil into the ocean in March, 1989. Despite efforts of scientists
and volunteers, over 4,000 seabirds, about 1,000 sea otters, and immense numbers
of fish were killed.

Marine pollution incidents are caused mostly by shipping activities; either by ship
operations such as loading or discharging of oil, bunkering, oil transfer etc.(operational
pollution) or ship accidents, mostly by tankers, such as collision, grounding, hull failures,
fire and explosion (accidental pollution).
The environmental damage resulting from a shipping activity, or a series of operations,
does not hurt only the people directly involved. Neighboring economies may also be
badly affected as a result of a pollution incident occurred in other state’s territorial water.
A seaside vacation, swimming, water sports, fishing and fish farming could be ruined by
oil pollution. Seafood could be more difficult to find; even harm to fish and wildlife
could be immeasurable.

2)Loss of Human Lives and Property

Safety has been an increasing concern in the maritime domain over the past few decades.
A number of international conventions and legislation, such as SOLAS (International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea) and IMDG code (the International Maritime
Dangerous Goods code), have been adopted by the International Maritime Organization
(IMO) in order to reduce the risks and the impact of damage in relation to human lives
onboard. However, maritime safety incidents still occur from time to time and in most
cases, huge damage could be incurred.

Fire aboard ship at sea which may lead to serious fatality or property losses or large-scale
environmental damages is one of a seafarer’s worst fears. It is also another potential
threat that all seafarers are faced with. It sometimes results in total loss of the ship and /
or her cargo. In spite of high safety standards, it is an immediate danger for life, cargo
and the environment. The nature of oil and refined products carried onboard tankers
means that such ships are vulnerable to fires and / or explosions, and the danger of fire
onboard such ships is much greater. For that reason, fire safety provisions specified by
25
international regulations are much more stringent for tankers than for ordinary dry cargo
ships. The SOLAS Convention therefore contains a special section devoted to fire safety
measures for tankers (SOLAS, Chapter II–2).
Ship-to-ship transfer operations pose a threat for tankers and their crew as there is a
danger of explosive gas building up inside cargo tanks, and in the late 1960s such
happenings led to a number of ships exploding. To avoid this, IMO requires tankers to be
fitted with an inert gas system which pumps gas taken from the ship’s boiler flue gas
system into the cargo tanks during cargo handling operations, thus preventing explosive
gases from accumulating.

The most disastrous ship fire / explosion took place in December 30,1917 in Port of
Halifax, Canada. The French freighter "Mont Blanc" loaded with high explosives
destined for Europe was rammed by the Belgian freighter "Imo" while entering the
harbour to meet other ships for a joint Atlantic crossing, including the cruiser HMS "High
Flyer". Approximately 15 minutes after the collision the cargo exploded destroying about
50% of the City of Halifax; estimated 3,000 people died and more than 7,500 were
injured. Similarly, in December 20th 1987, the ferry "Dona Paz" (designed to carry 1,400
passengers and a crew of 50) crowded with approximately 3,000 passengers collided
head-on with the tanker "Victor" loaded with 8,300 barrels of oil; in the subsequent
explosion and fire at least 3,000 people died; only 24 passengers survived in Tablas
Strait, off Mindoro Island, Philippines.

2.2.3 Risk Mitigation Strategies and Measures

This is the last step in the risk evaluation processes. Managers need to make the right
strategies corresponding to the risks to mitigate their impacts. In this step, you will
identify ways to mitigate the risk factors and potential accidents that have the highest risk
priority scores. Then develop countermeasures that can be used to prevent or reduce the
consequences associated with the risk factors or potential accidents. Some
countermeasures may mitigate more than one risk factor or potential accident. In some
studies, this step is also called risk management, which is defined as “the process
whereby decisions are made to accept a known or assessed risk and/or the
implementation of actions to reduce the consequences or probability of occurrence”
(Norrman and Jansson, 2004, p.438).
There is a large array of approaches for dealing with risks. Although the choices may be
endless, there are generally a few principal evaluation strategies, namely
avoidance/elimination, reduction, transfer and acceptance (USCG 2001) (Knight 2009).
26
The goals of risk evaluation can be achieved by employing various strategies, which, in
turn, use different ways and means that vary widely for different situations and systems.
The term “risk management measure” is the most generic term representing the wide
range of methods, techniques, approaches, or tools for managing risks at a more
operational or tactic level. A few of the many different current terms in use are risks
control measures, preventive, reduction, and mitigation measures, safety measures,
countermeasures, alternatives, actions and options. Each term may have a specific
meaning in a specific context. Risk evaluation does not only involve risk control
measures as described in the IMO’s FSA methodology (see IMO 2002). It encompasses a
wide range of strategies and measures. For example, risk transfer and acceptance or
retention, which may not necessarily involve any risk control measure at all, are also
important risk evaluation strategies.

As mentioned earlier, risk evaluation involves determination of the level or significance

of estimated risks, which may fall into one of the risk regions as shown in Figure 1. For
each risk region, generic risk management strategies and measures are designed to deal
with risks, such as these (IMO, 2004; HSC, 1991; HSE, 1999; ISO, 1998) (see Figure 7):

High Risk Level

Intolerable Risk Not Acceptable: Risk is not acceptable and
Unacceptable/ cannot be justified except in extraordinary
Intolerable Risk circumstances
Region

Acceptable/Tolerable, if made ALARP

Undesirable Risk
Risk reduction measures must be taken to
drive residue risks towards broadly
Acceptable/ acceptable region
Tolerable Risk
(ALARP) Region If residue risks remain in this region and if
the society desires the benefits of the activity
the risk is tolerable only if the risk reduction
is impracticable or requires actions that are
Tolerable Risk grossly disproportionate in time, efforts and
resources to the reduction of risk achieved

Negligible Risk Broadly Acceptable: Risk is broadly

acceptable
Broadly Acceptable
Risk Region

Low Risk Level

27
Figure 7: Risk regions/levels and principles of risk tolerability/ acceptability and risk
evaluation strategies and measures (adapted from IMO 2004; HSE 1999; ISO 1998).

- Intolerable/Unacceptable Region: Risks in this region are considered

unacceptable or intolerable and cannot be justified, except in extraordinary
circumstances. Immediate measures should be taken to eliminate or reduce risks at
the acceptable/tolerable level irrespective of costs.
- The “As Low As is Reasonably Practicable” (ALARP) or Tolerability Region:
Risks in this region may be considered undesirable, in particular those that lie in
the upper boundary (see Figure 7), but acceptable if they meet ALARP.
Undesirable risks may only be acceptable /tolerable if the risk reduction strategies
and measures are impracticable or if the costs are disproportionate to
improvements gained.
- Broadly Accepted Region: Risks in this region are considered negligible and
broadly accepted. There may be no need for detailed work to demonstrate
ALARP. However, it is necessary to insure that risks remain at this level.

With respect to shipping operation risks, the results of risk evaluation may lead to the
following decision-making scenarios:

- Risks are found to be negligible and broadly acceptable (i.e. risks that lie in the
Broadly Acceptable Risk Region), and no further information may be needed; or
- Risks are found to be of some concern or undesirable risks (i.e. risks that lie in the
ALARP Risk Region), and further information is needed; or
- Risks are found to be of great concern or intolerable risks (i.e. risks that lie in the
Unacceptable/Intolerable Risk Region), and further information and immediate
preventive, reduction or mitigation measures are needed.
In the latter two cases (i.e. scenarios b and c), detailed risk analysis is needed.

Risk evaluation strategies and measures are identified, developed and employed in
different ways. However, they depend very much on the issues concerning the system.
For example, if the risk level is high due to a high frequency, then measures could be
enacted to prevent hazardous events from occurring in the first place. Shipping operation
hazards, causes and contributing factors leading to release events are first identified by
tracing them back through the error chain, and then appropriate measures are
implemented to prevent release events. Further, factors contributing most to risks and that
can be readily managed can also be identified. When the risk level is high due to the

28
severity or magnitude of consequences, then measures could be designed and employed
to minimize or mitigate their severity.

Figure 8: Avoidance/elimination, prevention, reduction and mitigation strategies

2.2.3.1 Risk Evaluation Strategies

1) Risk avoidance/elimination
The strategy of risk avoidance or elimination involves avoiding the risk by deciding not
to proceed with the activity or choosing another way to achieve the same outcome. It
means to hinder or keep from happening (CED 2002), especially by taking precautionary
measures. Preventive risk control occurs when risk control measures reduce the
probability of the undesirable events (IMO 2002).

2) Risk transfer
Risk transfer is the process of shifting all or part of the responsibility of the risk to
another party who is best able to control it. It can take many forms, but the most common
of these is the risk transfer by insurance. In recent years, more risks have become
29
commercially insured. In some industries or operations, insurance is one of the most
developed areas of risk management. Risk transfer is mainly based on cost-benefit
considerations. The costs of insured risks consist of insurance premiums, fees,
commissions, and other administrative costs. In the shipping industry, the risks are
insured by the risk carriers such as insurance companies. Approximately 90% of the
world's merchant fleet (by tonnage) is bound into a mutual, non-profit-making structure,
which is made up of the Protection and Indemnity (P&I) Clubs into which ship-owners
pool their third-party liabilities (Bennett 2001). Such liabilities include those arising from
the ship, cargo and other property losses and damages, personnel injuries, and pollution
liabilities (UK P&I Club 1998). The P&I Clubs contrast with commercial “hull and
machinery” underwriters, such as the Lloyd's of London syndicates. Ship-owners
generally purchase insurance from profitmaking companies (Bennett 2001).

3) Risk retention
It is the process of retaining the risk after accepting that the risk cannot be avoided,
controlled or transferred. It is also known as risk acceptance, for example, decision to
accept risk because the cost of eliminating it is completely too high. There are various
reasons why certain risks are to be retained. In some situations, risks, however
undesirable they could be, cannot be avoided, reduced or transferred, as this can be
economically or practically impossible. The decision makers may have no other
alternative than to retain these risks.
Risk retention does not necessarily mean doing nothing. “Doing nothing” means taking
some kind of risk (HSE 2001). Although risks may be at the “negligible” level, where no
actions for changes or improvements may be needed, the decision makers still need to
commit considerable time, resources and efforts to maintain these risks at the current
level.

4) Risk reduction
The strategy of risk reduction involves reduction, but not a complete elimination, of the
frequency of occurrence of undesirable events and/or the severity of their consequences.
At present, and in the near future, complete elimination of most risks in offshore shipping
operation may not be possible, as this may be very costly, practically difficult or not
feasible.

Risk reduction can be achieved by reducing the frequency of occurrences of hazards

and/or the severity of their consequences should they occur. For example, in order to

30
reduce risks onboard ships, measures can be taken to contain flammable or toxic spills
and prevent fires/explosions. The risks can also be reduced by timely responses in
evacuation of the crews that are likely to be exposed to dangerous goods hazards. The
approach of reducing the frequency of occurrence, such as causes, contributing factors,
hazard release events and exposure, constitutes prevention, also known as loss or accident
prevention. Whereas minimization of the severity of consequences, once the release or
involvement of dangerous goods has happened and the risk receptors are exposed to
dangerous goods hazards, is generally known as mitigation.

The list of possible measures to deal with offshore shipping risks is endless. To promote
greater marine safety in terms of shipping operation, the government will work to
maintain and improve the knowledge and skills of people involved in marine affairs, and
establish a system for improved operational safety.

Offshore shipping operations are highly regulated and numbers of responsible authorities
are assigned to enforce compliance with regulations. The following are the major
international conventions, adopted by the International Maritime Organization (and the
International Labour Organization) concerning safety and pollution prevention.

a) MARPOL (International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships,

1973/1978): This contains requirements to prevent pollution that may be caused both
accidentally and in the course of routine operations. MARPOL concerns the prevention
of pollution from oil, bulk chemicals, dangerous goods, sewage, garbage and atmospheric
pollution, and includes provisions such as those which require certain oil tankers to have
double hulls. It addresses more comprehensively with both operational and technical
requirements as it provides for the design and construction of oil tankers including
segregated ballast tanks, crude oil washing systems, gas inertingsystems, retrofitting
schemes, steering equipment, and navigational aids. All ships flagged under countries
that are signatories to MARPOL are subject to its requirements, regardless of where they
sail and member oceans are responsible for vessels registered under their respective
nationalities.

b) SOLAS (International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974): This lays
down a comprehensive range of minimum standards for the safe construction of ships and
the basic safety equipment (e.g. fire protection, navigation, lifesaving and radio) to be
carried on board. SOLAS also requires regular ship surveys and the issue by flag states of
certificates of compliance.

31
c) The International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972 (COLREGs):
This is published by the IMO and set out, among other things, the “rules of the road” or
navigation rules to be followed by ships and other vessels at sea to prevent collision
between two or more vessels. The COLREGs are derived from a multilateral treaty called
the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea.

d) STCW (International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and

Watch-keeping for Seafarers, 1978/1995/2010): This establishes uniform standards of
competence for seafarers. Furthermore, since improvement of seamen’s quality is
important to prevent human errors, all seamen’s training organizations that teach science
on vessel navigation or provide sea training will implement training for new seamen and
re-education for other seamen, and also work to enrich their education programs.

e) ILO 147 (The ILO Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1976):
Thisrequires national administrations to have effective legislation on labour issues such
as hours of work, medical fitness and seafarers' working conditions. This was superseded
by the ILO Maritime Labour Convention, 2006) which entered into force on 30 August
2013.
f) IMDG Code (International Maritime Dangerous Goods): This code is intended to
protect crew members and to prevent marine pollution in the safe transportation of
hazardous materials by vessel. It is intended for use not only by the mariner but also by
all those involved in industries and services connected with shipping. Contains advice on
terminology, packaging, labeling, markings, stowage, segregation, handling and
emergency response
There is no single solution to guarantee a high degree of safety and health, environmental
and property protection. As one single measure may be not sufficient, several measures
are often combined to achieve the risk mitigation strategy.

32
 CHAPTER THREE
3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Research methodology is concerned with the procedures and steps involved in the
collection and analysis of data to achieve the objective of the research. Data is considered
as the life-wire of an empirical study. Hence, in this chapter, the researcher outlined the
research designed used, characteristics of the population, sampling design and
procedures, the data collection instrument and the method of analyzing the collected data.

3.2 RESTATEMENT OF RESEARCH QUESTION

As earlier stated in chapter one, the following research questions are aimed at achieving
the objectives of the research:

1) What are these risk factors and the potential accidents?

2) What are the negative effects or the consequences if the risk should occur?
3) What is the significance of these risks?
4) What various strategies/measures can be implemented to minimize and tackle
these risks?

3.3 RESTATEMENT OF RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS

Hypothesis 1:

H0: There is no significant relationship between risk factors and human lives onboard.
Hypothesis 2:

H0: There is no significant relationship between risk factors and marine environment

3.4 RESEARCH DESIGN

Research design can be described as the plan and structure of investigating research
conceived so as to obtain answers to the research questions. It is a frame work that guides
the researcher in the process of collecting, analyzing and interpretation of observation.

Research design also helps the researcher to develop a mental image of the structure for
gathering data and the analysis that may follow. Three different types of research design
as identified by (Nworuh, 2004) are Survey, Experiment and Expostfato and for this

33
research, the researcher adopted survey research design with the aid of a questionnaire to
identify the risk factors offshore shipping operation and the various countermeasures.

3.5 CHARACTERISTICS OF POPULATION

The results of this research were generalized due to the nature and size of the population.
It was selected from shipping companies and oil companies in Rivers and Lagos state.

3.6 SAMPLING DESIGN AND PROCEDURES

Sampling is selecting a small group of elements drawn through definite technique from a
particular population so that by studying the sample we may fairly generalize our results
back to the population from which they were chosen. The samples for this research
consist of 60 questionnaires distributed to different levels of shipping companies and oil
companies.

The questionnaires were developed to identify the major risk factors during offshore
shipping operations and the various ways of tackling them. Since the collected
information is expected to be confidential, no one was identified by name and/ or other
type of identification system.

The sample size of this study consist of fifty-two (52) correspondent, which were derived
from the population size of sixty (60) people, using the statistical formula;

n = N

1 + N (e) 2

Where, N= 60

Where n = sample size,

N = population

E = Error estimate (5%)

1 = constant

34
 n = N = 60

1 + N (e) 2 1 + 60 (0.05)2

=36 / 1.15

=52.17, Approximate figure = 52

3.7 DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENT

Data was collected for this research through two major sources which are the primary and
secondary sources of data collection. The method of data collection was streamlined to
meet the required information needed for this research.

3.7.1 PRIMARY SOURCE OF DATA

This involved obtaining information by means of circulating questionnaires to the target

audience and also to those considered knowledgeable in the subject being investigated.

The questionnaires were designed in two parts- Part ‘A’ relates to the respondent’s
personal data and experience while Part ‘B’ was directed to the topic of the study. The
questions were thus framed in objectives form so as to allow for a ‘Yes or ‘No’ answer.
This is done to enhance objectivity on the part of the respondents.

3.7.2 SECONDARY SOURCE OF DATA

Secondary source of data include those compiled by other researchers on similar topic.
Secondary data were collected from books by different authors, journals and periodicals,
internet, seminar papers and lecture notes on maritime industry. These data helped in the
background information of this research and in the literature review on pertinent views
and experiences of other contributors with regards to the kind of problem under
consideration.

35
3.8 METHOD OF ANALYSIS

The method of data analysis adopted by the researcher is chi-square (x2) statistical tested.
This is because of the ordinal nature of the data generated from the primary source of
data collection.

3.7.1 CHI-SQUARE (X2)

The chi-square (x2) is a non-parametric statistical test tool. This is because it does not
concern definite parameters and their required assumptions. Due to the nature of the
research hypothesis in this research, the chi-square test tool was used to test the null
hypothesis Ho1 and Ho2.

3.7.2 CHI-SQUARE TEST FOR INDEPENDENCE

X2 = (oi – ei )

ei

Where oi = Observed frequency

ei = Expected frequency

Observed frequency (oi) is the number of individual from the sample data who is
classified into a particular category. Each individual is counted once.

Expected frequency (ei) is the frequency value that is predicted from the null hypothesis
and the sample size.

36
 REFERENCES

Tank Ship Fire and Study Cases. (2000). Tank ship fire at Bay City, Michigan.

Available: Internet: http://www.3m.com/market/industrial/fpsystems/casehist.html

Palmgren, N.G. (2001) Foreword of managing risk in shipping. In: The Nautical Institute
(Ed.). Managing risk in shipping, London.

IMO (2011) ‘Accidents don’t have to happen’, Current Awareness Bulletin, 23(9), p.10.

Vose, D. (2008) Risk Analysis: A Quantitative Guide. England: John Wiley and Sons

Ganesan, S. (2010) ‘Preparing for oil major vetting inspections’. 4th Maritime

Risk Evaluation. Hilton Metropole, London, 27-29 April.

Environment, Health and Safety - CALTEX. (2000, December)

Available: Internet: http://www.caltex.com.au/

Mediola S., &Achutegui J.J. (2000). Fire ranks second in maritime casualties.

Available: Internet: www.fire.org.uk/marine/papers/marinecasu.html

Cahill, R.A. (2003). Collisions and their causes, Fairplay Publications, London, ISBN 0-
905045-46-7, 36.

SAILING DEPTH 1 (2001): Collision regulations explained (Part1), 18 June 2001, http//:
Sailing Depth1.html

Branch, A. E. Elements of shipping. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. (2007).

Lin, K. and Chang, C. C. (2006) Shipping Operation and Management (in Chinese).
Taipei: Shipping Digest.

Hollnagel, E., 2008. Risk + barriers = safety? Safety Science 46, 221–229.

37
Alizadeh, A. H. and Nomikos, N. K. (2009) Shipping Derivatives and Risk Evaluation.
Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Cox, L.A. (2008) ‘What’s wrong with risk matrices?’ Risk Analysis, 28(2), pp.

497-512.

Dickson, G. (1999) Corporate Risk Management. London: Witherby, for the

Institute of Risk Management.

Frosdick, M. (1997) ‘The techniques of risk evaluation are insufficient in themselves’,

Disaster Prevention and Management, 6(3), pp. 165-177.

Garvey, P.R. and Lansdowne, Z.F. (1998) ‘Risk matrix: an approach for identifying,
assessing, and ranking maritime risks’, Air Force Journal of Logistics, 22(1), pp.18

The Institute of Risk Management (2002) A Risk Evaluation Standard.

Available:http://www.theirm.org/publications/documents/Risk_Evaluation_Standard_030
820.pdf (Accessed: 12 March 2012)

Sung, M. J. (2005) The Modern Risk Management. 5th ed. Taipei: Wu-Nam Book Inc.

38