OPLE VS TORRES

[G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998]

293 SCRA 141

FACTS: Petitioner Senator Blas F. Ople assailed the constitutionality of the

Administrative Order No. 308 entitled “Adoption of Computerized Identification
Reference System” on the following grounds:
1.) The administrative order issued by the executive is deemed to be a law and not a
mere administrative order thus it is a usurpation of legislative power of the congress to
make laws, and
2.) It impermissibly intrudes the citizen’s constitutional right of privacy.

ISSUE: Does the Administrative Order No. 308 violates the constitutional right to
privacy?

HELD: Yes, the Administrative Order violates the constitutional right to privacy because
its scope is too broad and vague that will put people’s right to privacy in clear and
present danger if implemented. The A.O. 308 also lacks of proper safeguards for
protecting the information that will be gathered from people through biometrics and
other means. Thus, A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual’s liberty of abode and
travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable
unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right
against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for “fishing expeditions” by government
authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.

MARQUEZ VS. DESIERTO

G.R. No. 135882, June 27, 2001

FACTS: Petitioner Marquez received an Order from the Ombudsman Aniano A.

Desierto to produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in camera
relative to various accounts maintained at Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas
Branch, where she is the branch manager. The accounts to be inspected were involved
in a case pending with the Ombudsman entitled, Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau
(FFIB) v. Amado Lagdameo, et al.

The basis of the Ombudsman ordering an in camera inspection of the accounts is a trail
managers checks purchased by one George Trivinio, a respondent in OMB-097-0411,
pending with the office of the Ombudsman by virtue of its power to investigate and to
require the production and inspection of records and documents granted to it by RA
No.6770.

ISSUE: Whether or not an in camera inspection of the questioned account is allowed

as an exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits (R.A. No.1405)

HELD:
We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending
case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly
identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the
court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account holder must be
notified to be present during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the
account identified in the pending case. In the case at bar, there is yet no pending
litigation before any court of competent authority. What’s existing is an investigation by
the Office of the Ombudsman.
Zone of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Invasion of privacy is an
offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits
Act, and the Intellectual Property Code.
GRISWOLD VS. CONNECTICUT
381 U.S. 479

Facts. Appellant Griswold, Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of

Connecticut and Appellant Buxton, a licensed physician who served as Medical Director
for the League at its Center in New Haven, were arrested and charged with giving
information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons on means of preventing
conception. Appellants were found guilty as accessories and fined $100 each.
Appellants appealed on the theory that the accessory statute as applied violated the
14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. Appellants claimed standing based
on their professional relationship with the married people they advised.

Issue. Does the Constitution provide for a privacy right for married couples?

Held. The First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from
governmental intrusion, which although not expressly included in the Amendment, is
necessary to make the express guarantees meaningful. The association of marriage is
a privacy right older than the Bill of Rights, and the State’s effort to control marital
activities in this case is unnecessarily broad and therefore impinges on protected
Constitutional freedoms.

ROE VS. WADE

Facts. Texas statutes made it a crime to procure or attempt an abortion except when
medically advised for the purpose of saving the life of the mother. Appellant Jane Roe
sought a declaratory judgment that the statutes were unconstitutional on their face and
an injunction to prevent defendant Dallas County District Attorney from enforcing the
statutes. Appellant alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant, and that she was
unable to receive a legal abortion by a licensed physician because her life was not
threatened by the continuation of her pregnancy and that she was unable to afford to
travel to another jurisdiction to obtain a legal abortion. Appellant sued on behalf of
herself and all other women similarly situated, claiming that the statutes were
unconstitutionally vague and abridged her right of personal privacy, protected by the
First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

Issue. Do the Texas statutes improperly invade a right possessed by the appellant to
terminate her pregnancy embodied in the concept of personal liberty contained in the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, in the personal marital, familial, and
sexual privacy protected by the Bill of Rights or its penumbras, or among the rights
reserved to the people by the Ninth Amendment?
Held. The right to personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but the right is not
unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulation.
The abortion laws in effect in the majority of the States are of relatively recent vintage,
deriving from statutory changes generally enacted in the latter half of the 19th century.
At common law abortion performed before quickening (the first recognizable movement
of the fetus in utero) was not an indictable offense, and it is doubtful that abortion was
ever a firmly established common law crime even when it destroyed a quick fetus.

Three reasons have been advanced for the historical enactment of criminal abortion
laws. The first is that the laws are the product of a Victorian social concern to
discourage illicit sexual conduct, but this argument has been taken seriously by neither
courts nor commentators. The second reason is that the abortion procedure is
hazardous, therefore the State’s concern is to protect pregnant women. However,
modern medical techniques have altered the situation, with abortions being relatively
safe particularly in the first trimester. The third reason is the State’s interest is in
protecting the prenatal life. However, this is somewhat negated by the fact that the
pregnant woman cannot be prosecuted for the act of abortion.

For the stage prior to the approximate end of the first trimester, the abortion decision
must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician, and
may not be criminalized by statute.

For the stage subsequent to the approximate end of the first trimester, the State may
regulate abortion in ways reasonably related to maternal health based upon the State’s
interest in promoting the health of the mother.

For the stage subsequent to viability, the State may regulate and even proscribe
abortion, except where necessary for the preservation of the mother’s life, based upon
the State’s interest in the potential of the potential life of the unborn child.

WHITE LIGHT CORP., VS CITY OF MANILA

FACTS: On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled “An
Ordinance” prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension
houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila. White Light Corp is an operator
of mini hotels and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said
Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of
WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual
guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a
valid exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the
establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels,
motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments,
including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor of the City.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 7774 is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon
individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for
protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades private
rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there
for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to “wash up” or to
freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or
less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights
may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate
demands of public interest or public welfare.

PEOPLE V. ESTRADA
GR# 164368-69, APRIL 2, 2009,
J. BRION

FACTS: On April 4, 2001, an Information for plunder was filed with the Sandiganbayan
against respondent Estrada, among other accused. A separate Information for illegal
use of alias, was likewise filed against him. In the information, it was alleged that on or
about 04 February 2000, in the City of Manila, then President Estrada without having
been duly authorized, judicially or administratively, taking advantage of his position and
committing the offense in relation to office, i.e., in order to conceal the ill-gotten wealth
he acquired during his tenure and his true identity as the President of the Republic of
the Philippines, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally represent himself
as ‘JOSE VELARDE’ in several transactions and use and employ the said alias “Jose
Velarde” which IS neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing
documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.

Estrada was subsequently arrested on the basis of a warrant of arrest that the
Sandiganbayan issued. A Special Division in the Sandiganbayan was made to try, hear,
and decide the charges of plunder and related against respondent Estrada. At the trial,
the People presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove the allegations of
the Informations for plunder, illegal use of alias, and perjury.

After the People rested in all three cases, the defense moved to be allowed to file a
demurrer to evidence in these cases. In its Joint
Resolution, the Sandiganbayan only granted the defense leave to file demurrers in
illegal use of alias and perjury. The Sandiganbayan ruled that the people failed to
present evidence that proved Estrada’s commission of the offense.

ISSUE: Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in dismissing
Crim. Case No. 26565 and in applying R.A. No. 1405 as an exception to the illegal use
of alias punishable under Commonwealth Act No. 142

HELD: No. The Sandiganbayan position that the rule in the law of libel – that mere
communication to a third person is publicity – does not apply to violations of CA No.
142. In order to be held liable for a violation of CA No. 142, the user of the alias must
have held himself out as a person who shall publicly be known under that other name.
In other words, the intent to publicly use the alias must be manifest. The presence of
Lacquian and Chua when Estrada signed as Jose Velarde and opened Trust Account
No. C-163 does not necessarily indicate his intention to be publicly known henceforth as
Jose Velarde. Thus, Estrada could not be said to have intended his signing as Jose
Velarde to be for public consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua were
also inside the room at that time. The same holds true for Estrada’s alleged
representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez, assuming the evidence for these
representations to be admissible. All of Estrada’s representations to these people were
made in privacy and in secrecy, with no iota of intention of publicity.

Bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405 (the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) are statutorily
protected or recognized zones of privacy. Given the private nature of Estrada’s act of
signing the documents as “Jose Velarde” related to the opening of the trust account, the
People cannot claim that there was already a public use of alias when Ocampo and
Curato witnessed the signing. Petition was denied.