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JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, petitioner,

vs .
HON. MARIA ROWENA
MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE, respondents.
[G.R. No. 172716. November 17, 2010.]
J. Carpio

Digest Author: Jude Fanila

Topic: 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure – Duplicity of the offense; Exception

Case Summary: Petitioner, Jason Ivler was involved in an accident with the respondent, Evangeline
Ponce. Had two criminal cases filed against him for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide/reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries.

Pled guilty to reckless imprudence slight physical injuries. Raised the defense of double jeopardy when
prosecution tried to pursue the homicide charge. Tried to appeal to MeTC claiming double jeopardy but
failed. Filed Certiorari before, RTC dismissed Ivler’s special civil action for certiorari, ruling that his
failure to appear before metropolitan trial proceedings in the criminal case led to him waiving his
standing for the certiorari.

SC – ruled that quasi-offenses (RPC 365 – reckless imprudence) penalizes the imprudence itself not the
act. Thus, any conviction or acquittal resulting from a single instance of reckless imprudence serves as a
bar against double jeopardy.

Petitioners: Jason Ivler


Respondents: Judge Rowena Modesto-San Pedro (MTC Judge), Evangeline Ponce -

Doctrines Involved: Reckless Imprudence – because RPC 365 describes a single quasi-offense and not
simply a means to commit an offense, it falls within the scope of the double jeopardy clause. Any
acquittal or conviction bars subsequent prosecution regardless of the various resulting acts so long as a
single instance of reckless imprudence

FACTS:
1. Aug. 4 2004 – Vehicular accident, involving petitioner, Ivler and Evangeline (respondent) and
Nestor Ponce. Evangeline suffered injuries, Nestor died. In relation to the accident two criminal
cases were filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig (MeTC)
a. Crim Case No. 82367 – Reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries (for
injury to Evangeline)
b. Crim Case No. 82366 – Reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to
property (for death of nestor)
2. Sep. 7 2004 – Petitioner, Ivler pleaded guilty for Crim Case 82367 (Injuries) but filed a motion to
quash the information for Crim Case 82366 (death) on the grounds of double jeopardy – because
second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
a. MeTC – dismissed the motion to quash, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.
3. RTC – Petitioner, via certiorari appealed the dismissal of the motion to quash (SCA 2803).
During this time, petitioner also sought the suspension of the proceedings in Crim Case 82366,
including the arraignment.
a. MeTC – proceeded with arraignment without acting on petitioners motion to suspend the
proceedings.
i. Ivler refueed to show up to the MeTC proceedings, MeTC cancelled his bail and
issued a warrant of arrest.
1. Only after these proceedings did the MeTC denied Ivler’s motion to
suspend proceedings and arraignment. Ivler appealed this, but motion for
reconsideration remains unresolved.
ii. On the basis of the arrest warrant, Ponce sought the dismissal of SCA 2803
before the RTC arguing that this amounted to loss of standing to maintain
the suit.
4. Feb 2 2006 – RTC dismissed SCA 2803 – on the basis of Ivler’s forfeiture of standing arising
from the warrant of arrest and his non-appearance at the arraignment. Essentially, affirmed
MeTC.
5. Leading to current petition.

ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT:


 Petitioner’s Argument related to Doctrine: Right to double jeopardy – argues that multiple
consequences of a single crime are material only to the penalty. Here, one act of reckless
imprudence to which he pled guilty to. | Also argues that he did not abscond 1 as his petition in
SCA 2803 constrained him to forego participation in the proceedings for the criminal case.
 Respondent’s Argument related to Doctrine: Jurisprudence provides that light offenses (slight
phys injury) cannot be complexed under Art. 48 of the RPC with grave or less grave felonies
(homicide). Thus, the need to separate the two criminal cases for reckless imprudence. |
Petitioner’s absconding led to his forfeiting his standing to maintain his petition in SCA 2803.

ISSUES + HELD:
1. W/N the petitioner forfeited standing to seek relief in SCA when the meTC ordered his arrest
after non-appearance? - NO
o Rule 125 Sec. 1 and Rule 124 Sec. 8 i - controlling rules in dismissal of appeals on the
basis of escape from custody or violation of terms of bail. Basically, CA or SC can
dismiss appeals if appellant escapes from prison, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country
upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio during the pendency of the appeal.
 However, the appeal contemplated here is a suit to review judgment of
convictions.
o This is not applicable to the present case, as the RTC dismissed a special civil action for
certiorari to review a pre-arraignment ancillary question i.e. w/n due process can be
invoked to bar proceedings in criminal case.
 RTC’s reliance on People v. Esparas improper as different facts. In Esparas, the
SC granted review to an appeal despite the accused jumping bail and their
subsequent conviction in absentia. Thus, Esparas deal with mandatory review for
death sentences under RA 769 as an exception to Rule 124.
o RTCs ratio of non-appearance = loss of standing also goes against principle behind RoC
Rule 114 Sec. 21ii

1
From what I can tell, absconding in proceedings is valid grounds for dismissal
 Rule 114 – deals with treatment of defendants who absents themselves from post-
arraignment hearings. – There, absence of defendant only renders bondsman
potentially liable for the bond if they fail to produce the accused within a 30-day
period. – Standing of the accused is retained UNTIL failure to surrender and
subsequent trial in absentia and final disposition of the case.
 Ergo, mere non-appearance does not convert the accused’s status to that
of a fugitive without standing.
o RTCs argument that petitioner provided no explanation for absence – refuted by records.
Petitioner sought to suspend MeTC proceedings because of the certiorari. Following
MeTCs refusal to defer arraignment, petitioner sought reconsideration a motion which the
MeTC has still yet to resolve.
2. W/N petitioner’s constitutional right to double jeopardy bars further proceedings in the criminal
case? – YES
a. Art. III – Sec. 21 of Constitution - Right against Double Jeopardy – prevents a post-
conviction prosecution for the same offense if there was a prior verdict rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction.
b. Reckless Imprudence – Under Art. 365 of the RPC what is penalized is the mental
attitude or condition behind the act i.e. the negligence/imprudence. This deals with a
unique quasi-offense, unlike regular penal provisions which penalizes an intentional
criminal act.
i. SC discusses brief history – initially, doctrine was reckless imprudence was
merely a means to commit crimes. However, later abandoned in Quizon v.
Justice of the peace of Pampanga where the court ruled that quasi-crimes under
RPC 365 are a distinct species of crimes, not mere methods of committing
crimes.
c. Reckless Imprudence – because RPC 365 describes a single quasi-offense and not simply
a means to commit an offense, it falls within the scope of the double jeopardy clause.
Any acquittal or conviction bars subsequent prosecution regardless of the various
resulting acts so long as a single instance of reckless imprudence.
i. Court has adhered to this principle in multiple cases, People v. Diaz, People v.
Belga etc. Case of People v. Silva applies exactly to the current case, same
reckless imprudence leading to slight phys injury and homicide. There, an
acquittal in one of the cases was found to bar prosecution in the other.
1. Only one case that strayed from this line of jurisprudence El Pueblo de
Filipinas v. Estipona , but even that was set aside explicitly in Buerano v.
CA.
d. Application of RPC 48 to RPC 365 – they are incompatible rules.
i. 48 applies in two instances: (1) When a single act constitutes two or more grave
or less grave felonies; (2) When an offense is a necessary means for committing
another.
1. There are instances however, where a single criminal negligence can
result in multiple non-crime (bc under quasi-offense) damage to persons
or property with penalties ranging from light, less grave or grave
offenses.
a. Question of rule to apply, if RPC 48 should be applied to
complex the single quasi offense OR should there be a single
charge, collectively alleging all the consequences of the single
quasi-crime?
i. If the former, because RPC 48 is applied, offenses with a
penalty of light penalties are charged separately, as what
happened in the above case. However, this leads to the
double jeopardy issues discussed.
ii. If the latter, single charge but penalizes each
consequence separately according to scheme provided in
365.
2. SC notes that historically, two different lines of jurisprudence affirming
both answers. However, opts to adopt the latter (single charge) option as
it adheres to the distinct concept of quasi-crimes outlined in
jurisprudence.
a. SC chooses this route because conceptually impossible for quasi-
offenses to always fit into both modes of RPC 48, also adheres to
the principle of double jeopardy.
i. While favorable sentencing under RPC 48 becomes
unavailable, this is counteracted by certainty of non-
prosecution in cases of multiple quasi-crimes.

RULING:

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2


February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157.

We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler
y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the
ground of double jeopardy.

Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives.

SO ORDERED.
DISSENT:

NOTES:
i
Rule 124 Sec. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute. – The Court of Appeals may,
upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio and with notice to the appellant in either case, dismiss the appeal if
the appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except where the appellant is
represented by a counsel de officio.
Rule 125 - Section 1. Uniform Procedure. – Unless otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the
procedure in the Supreme Court in original and in appealed cases shall be the same as in the Court of Appeals.
ii
Rule 114 - Section 21. Forfeiture of bail.—When the presence of the accused is required by the court or these
Rules, his bondsmen shall be notified to produce him before the court on a given date and time. If the accused
fails to appear in person as required, his bail shall be declared forfeited and the bondsmen given thirty (30) days
within which to produce their principal and to show cause why no judgment should be rendered against them for
the amount of their bail. Within the said period, the bondsmen must: (a) produce the body of their principal or
give the reason for his non-production; and (b) explain why the accused did not appear before the court when
first required to do so. Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen, jointly
and severally, for the amount of the bail. The court shall not reduce or otherwise mitigate the liability of the
bondsmen, unless the accused has been surrendered or is acquitted. (21a)

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