VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA and FRANCISCO SALVA,
respondents.

G.R. No. 122039 May 31, 2000

J. Mendoza

Digest Author: Jude Fanila

Topic: Quasi-Delict & Delict– Applicability of doctrine of proximate cause

Case Summary: Petitioner is driver and operator of a jeepney which was involved in an accident
involving the truck of respondent Salva, the collision of which led to the injury of his passenger,
respondent Sunga. Sunga sued petitioner for damages due to the accident.

RTC absolved Calalas of responsibility on the basis that there was a Civil Case filed by Calalas against
Salva wherein RTC ruled that Salva’s driver was the proximate cause of the accident in an action based
on Quasi-Delict. CA reversed RTC, finding Calalas liable as a common carrier (breach of contract of
carriage)

SC affirms CA, ruling that an action for QD and action for breach of contract of carriage are entirely
different things. Even if Salva’s driver was proximate cause for collision (which made him liable via QD
to Calalas) Calalas is still liable to Sunga for his breach in contract of carriage.

Petitioners: Vicente Calalas – owner and operator of jeepney

Respondents: CA| Eliza Sunga – Student at Siliman University, passenger of jeep| Francisco Salva –
owner of truck that bumped into jeepney owned by Calalas

Doctrines Involved: The doctrine of proximate cause applies only in actions for quasi-delict NOT in
actions for breach of contract. This is because the doctrine is used to impute liability of persons where the
two parties have no pre-existing relation i.e. quasi-delicts. Because QDs are based on negligence, if you
can disprove that negligent action was proximate cause of the damage, then no liability under QD.

FACTS:
1. August 23 1989 – respondent, Eliza Sunga at around 10 am took a passenger jeep owned and
operated by petitioner, Vicente Calalas.
a. Jeepney was full, Sunga was given an “extension seat” i.e. a wooden stool which was
placed at the rear end of the jeepney, near the door.
2. On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off,
Sunga, because she was seated at the end of the jeepney gave way to the passenger.
a. As she was giving way, a truck driven by one Igelcerio Verena (owned by respondent,
Salva) bumped into the left-rear portion of the jeepney.
b. Collision led to injury on the part of Sunga, who fractured her left leg – “distal third of
the left tibia-fibula, with severe necrosis of the underlying skin”
i. Injury required – closed reduction of the fracture, long leg circular casting, and
case wedging
 3. As a result of the injury, Sunga was confined from August 23 to September 7, 1989 – also had to
have a cast on for (3) months and had to use crutches.
4. October 9, 1989 – Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas before the RTC of
Dumaguete on the grounds of:
a. Violation of contract of carriage, for failure to exercise due diligence required as a
common carrier.
b. Calalas in response, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva the owner of the
truck that bumped into the jeep.
5. CASE TRAIL:
6. RTC Dumaguete – absolved Calalas of liability, ruled against Salva holding that it was the driver
of the truck that was liable.
a. It also took cognizance of a separate civil case (Case No. 3490) for quasi-delict which
Calalas filed against Salva and Verana(truck driver) which was ruled in favor of Salva,
finding Salva and Verana jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney.
7. CA – reversed RTC decision – on the basis that Sunga’s cause of action was based on a breach of
contract of carriage due to lack of diligence required for common carriers under the Civil Code,
not for a quasi-delict.
a. Dismissed complaint against Salva, found Calalas liable for damages to Sunga –
awarding the following: P100k in actual, compensatory, and moral damages + P10k in
attorney’s fees + P1k in litigation expenses.
8. Leading to current appeal before the SC.

ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT:

 Petitioner’s Argument related to Doctrine: That the ruling on civil case Calalas filed against
Verana and Salva was controlling – RTC there found that negligence of Verana was the
proximate cause of the accident – Petitioner argues that accident was a fortuitous event – that
finding him liable would be equivalent to ruling that common carriers are the insurer of the safety
of its passengers. – that Sunga sitting on extension seat was an implied assumption of risk.
 Respondent’s Argument related to Doctrine: None given in case.

ISSUES + HELD:
1. W/N ruling in Civil Case 3940 should apply to the present case? – NO
o Respondent, Sunga was never a party to that case, she is not bound by the principle of res
judicata.
o Similarly, 3940 and present case involves different issues. In 3940, case was for a quasi-
delict in which Salva and Verana were held liable for damage to Calalas’ jeepney. Here,
case involves Calalas’ liability for his contract of carriage.
 A quasi-delict is based on the negligence of the tortfeasor
 A breach of contract or culpa contractual is based on the negligence in the
performance of a contractual obligation.
o In a quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the
basis of the action.
 In a breach of contract, all that is needed to prosecute the action is (1) Proof of
existence of contract and; (2) Failure of obligor to comply with contract.
o Therefore, no basis in ruling that Civil Case 3940 is binding on Sunga. Immaterial
that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of the truck driver as the
doctrine of proximate cause applies only in actions for quasi-delict NOT in actions
for breach of contract.
  The doctrine of proximate cause is used to impute the liability of a person
when there is no relation between him and another party. In these cases, the
obligation is created by the law itself.
 In culpa contractual the contract itself establishes the relationship between
the parties who create the obligation themselves.
o
2. W/N Calalas is liable for breach of contract of carriage? – NO
a. In the case of a common carrier like in the present case, NCC 1756 provides that in case
of death or injury to their passengers they are presumed to be at fault or to have acted
negligently unless they show that they have observed extraordinary diligence as defined
in NCC 1733 and 1735.
b. As applied to the case, SC finds that Calalas did not prove that he observed extraordinary
diligence, in fact he was even negligent.
i. (1) CA found that jeep was not properly parked (rear end was exposed about two
meters from the highway in a diagonal angle) this counts as violation of the land
transportation and traffic code (see notes)
ii. (2) Undisputed that jeepney took in more passengers than allowed which also
violated the LTTC which played into Sunga having to sit in an extension seat,
which placed her in greater peril in comparison to regular passengers.
3. Sub issues
a. W/N Sunga sitting on extension seat was an implied assumption of risk? – NO
i. SC points out that this is like arguing that people who drown/injured in boarding
overloaded ferries should not be compensated because boarding is an implied
assumption of risk
b. W/N jeepney being bumped was a fortuitous event? – NO
i. Fortuitous Event – an event which could not be foreseen OR though foreseen,
inevitable. Requires the following elements to concur:
1. (a) the cause of the breach is independent of the debtor's will; (b) the
event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it
impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and
(d) the debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the creditor
ii. Here, Calalas should have foreseen that parking his jeepney diagonally with its
rear end facing the highway was kinda dangerous
c. W/N award of moral damages excessive? – YES
i. General rule under, moral damages not awarded in breach of contract unless
there is a showing that breach was (1) accompanied by bad faith OR; (2) breach
resulted in the death of a passenger. 1
ii. Here, no one died, no showing of bad faith.
1. Sunga’s argument that driver of jeepney failed to help her to the hospital
insufficient to sustain a charge of bad faith (it was truck driver who
helped her); SC notes that if anything, it only shows that Verana, the
truck driver recognized that he was the one at fault for the accident.

RULING:

1
See NCC 2219, 1764 in relation to 2206(3)
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31, 1995, and its resolution,
dated September 11, 1995, are AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral
damages is DELETED.

SO ORDERED.

DISSENT:

NOTES:

Article 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public
policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the
safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.

Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles 1734,
1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the
passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.

Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for
all the circumstances.

Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.

RA 4136 – Land Transpo and Traffic Code - Sec. 54. Obstruction of Traffic. — No person shall
drive his motor vehicle in such a manner as to obstruct or impede the passage of any vehicle, nor,
while discharging or taking on passengers or loading or unloading freight, obstruct the free
passage of other vehicles on the highway.
Sec. 32(a) Exceeding registered capacity. — No person operating any motor vehicle shall allow
more passengers or more freight or cargo in his vehicle than its registered capacity.