ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ, AURORA MEJIA VILLASOR, ROY P. VILLASOR, petitioners, vs.

THE
CITY JUDGE, CESAR L. PARAS, TRINIDAD T. LAZATIN and TERRA DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.

Doctrine: The place where the criminal offense was committed not only determines the venue of
the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction.
Nature: Original action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition.
Date: October 29, 1966
Ponente: Dizon, J.

Facts:
 February 1964 – petitioners Roy Villasor, as administrator of intestate estate of spouses Manuel
Mejia and Gloria Lazatin, together with co-petitioners Angelina Lopez and Aurora Villasor
entered into a contract with Trinidad Lazatin for the development and subdivision of the 3
parcels of land belonging to estate. Lazatin transferred his (her) rights under the contract to
Terra Dev’t.
 Months later, petitioners filed an action to rescind the contract for gross and willful violation of
its terms. Lazatin and Terra, in turn, filed with the Fiscal’s Office of the City of Angeles a
complaint against petitioners for an alleged violation of Article 172 (falsification by private
individuals and use of falsified documents), in relation to Article 171 ( modes of committing
falsification) of the RPC. City fiscal filed an information charging petitioners with the crime of
falsification of private document upon allegation that they made it appear in the contract that
Aurora was the guardian of minor George Mejia and that Angelina was the guardian of minor
Alexander Mejia, when in truth and in fact, they knew that they weren’t the guardians of said
minors on the date of execution of document.
 Parties charged moved for the dismissal of the case (through motion to quash) on the ground
that City Court of Angeles had NO jurisdiction over the offense because the private document
was signed by them outside the territorial limits of the city. City judge denied the motion to
quash.

Issue: Whether or not the City Court of Angeles City has jurisdiction to try and decide the case.
Held: No, it does not have jurisdiction.

Ratio:
It is settled law in criminal actions that the place where the criminal offense was committed
not only determines the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. (US vs.
Pagdayuman). In the present case, Angelina signed the document in Makati while Aurora signed it
in Quezon City, both within the province of Rizal.
US vs. Barretto: the offense is consummated at the time when and at the place where the
document is falsified to the prejudice of or with the intent to prejudice a third person xxx. It is evident
therefore that the place where the crime is committed is the place where the document is falsified.
The City Court of Angeles has no jurisdiction over the offense charge.
- Arman Mislang
MARIO FL. CRESPO, petitioner, vs. HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT
CRIMINAL COURT OF LUCENA CITY, 9th Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by the SOLICITOR GENERAL, RICARDO BAUTISTA, ET AL., respondents.

Doctrine: The rule in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court.
Nature: Petition to review the decision of the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City.
Date: June 30, 1987
Ponente: Gancayco, J.

Facts:

 April 18, 1977 – Assistant Fiscal Proceso de Gala with the approval of Provincial Fiscal filed an
information for estate against Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City. When the
case was set for arraignment, Crespo filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that
there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of
the Office of the Provincial Fiscal.
 August 1, 1977 – Judge Leodegario Mogul denied the motion. Motion for recon was also denied
in the order of August 5 but the arraignment was deferred to August 18 to afford petitioner
time to elevate matter to appellate court.
 August 17, 1977 – Court of Appeals restrained Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment
until further orders of the Court.
 May 15, 1978 – CA granted the writ of injunction perpetually restraining judge from enforcing
his threat to compel the arraignment of accused until DOC has resolved the petition for review.
 March 22, 1978 – Usec of Justice Hon. Catalino Macaraig Jr., resolving the petition for review,
reversed the resolution of Provincial Fiscal and directed to move for immediate dismissal of the
information filed against the accused. A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed
by Provincial Fiscan witht the trial court but was denied by Judge on Nov. 24, 1978.
 Accused filed for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for issuance of writ of
prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the CA. January 23, 1979 - CA issued
restraining order. October 25, 1979 - CA dismissed petition and lifted restraining order. CA
denied motion for reconsideration.

Issue: Whether the trial court action on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial
Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may
refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trail on merits.
Held: Yes.

Ratio:
It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a
criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. The reason for placing the criminal
prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded
prosecution by private persons. It cannot be controlled by the complainant.
It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation that the fiscal determines the
existence of a prima facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot
interfere with the fiscal’s discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. It is not prudent or
even permissible for a court to compel the fiscal to prosecute a proceeding originally initiated by
him on an information, if he finds that the evidence relied upon by him is insufficient for conviction.

The action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same is
subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor or the Secretary
of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of fiscal. The filing of
a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires
jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case.

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in
Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests
in the sound discretion of the Court. The fiscal cannot impose his opinion on the trial court.

- Arman Mislang