The definitions of Analysis and Synthesis interpolated in Eucl. XIII.

are as follows (I adopt

the reading of B and V, the only intelligible one, for the second).
“Analysis is an assumption of that which is sought as if it werw admitted <and the
passage> through its consequences to something admitted (to be) true.
“Synthesis is an assumption of that which is admitted <and the passage> through its
consequences to the finnishing or attainment of what is sought.”
The languange is by no means clear and has, at the best, to be filled out.
Pappus has a fuller account1:
“The so-called ἀναλυόμενος ('Treasury of Analysis') is, to put it shortly, a special body of
doctrine provided for the use of those who, after finishing the ordinary Elements, are desirous of
acquiring the power of solving problems which may be set them involving (the construction of)
lines, and it is useful for this alone. It is the work of three men, Euclid the author of the Elements,
Apollonius of Perga, and Aristaeus the elder, and proceeds by way of analysis and synthesis.
“Analysis then takes that which is sought as if it were admitted and passes from it through
its sucessive consequences to something which is admitted as the result of synthesis: for in analysis
we assume that which is sought as if it were (already) done (γεγονός), and we inquire what it is from
which this results, and again what is the antecedent cause of the latter, and so on, until by so
retracing our steps we come upon something already known or belonging to the class of first
principles, and such a method we call analysis as being solution backwards (ἀνάπαλιν λύσιν).
“But in synthesis, reversing the process, we take as already done that which was last
arrived at in the analysis and, by arranging in their natural order as consequences what were before
antecedents, and successively connecting them one with another, we arrive finally at the
construction of what was sought; and this we call synthesis.
“Now analysis is of two kinds, the one directed to searching for the truth and called
theoretical, the other directed to finding what we are told to find and called problematical. (I) In the
theoretical kind we assume what is sought as if it were existent and true, after which we pass
through its sucessive consequences, as if they too were true and established by virtue of our
hypothesis, to something admitted: then (a), if that something admitted is true, that which is sought
will also be true and the proof will correspond in the reverse order to the analysis, but ( b), if we
come upon something admittedly false, that which is sought will also be false. (2) In the
problematical kind we assume that which is propounded as if it werw known, after which we pass
through its sucessive consequences, taking them as true, up to something admitted: if then (a) what
is admitted is possible and obtainable, that is, what mathematicians call given, what was originally
proposed will also be possible, and the proof will again correspond in reverse order to the analysis,

1 Pappus, VII. pp. 634 – 6.

but if (b) we come upon something admittedly impossible, the problem will also be impossible.”
The ancient Analysis has been made the subject of careful studies by several writers during
the last half-century, the most complete being those of Hankel, Duhamel and Zeuthen; others by
Ofterdinger and Cantor should also be mentioned2.

2 Hankel, Zur Geschichter der Mathematik in Alterlhum und Mittelalter, 1987, pp. 137 – 150; Duhamel, Des
méthodes dans les sciences de raisonnement, Part I, 3 ed., Paris, 1885, pp. 39 – 68; Zeuthen, Geschichte der
Mathematik in Altertum und Mittealter, 1896, pp. 91 – 104; Ofterdinger, Beiträge zur Geschichte der grieschischen
Mathematik, Ulm, 1860; Cantor, Geschichte der Mathematik, I3, pp. 220 – 2.