Société québécoise de science politique

The United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 1982-1997: A Study of "Targeted"

Resolutions
Author(s): Ron Wheeler
Source: Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol. 32,
No. 1 (Mar., 1999), pp. 75-101
Published by: Canadian Political Science Association and the Société québécoise de science
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The United Nations Commission on HumanRights,
1982-1997: A Study of "Targeted"Resolutions*

RON WHEETFR University of Saskatchewan

When the United Nations was founded in 1945, it was mandated not
only to prevent "the scourge of war," but also to promote justice,
social progress and human rights. In separate provisions of the Charter,
the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) was authorized "to make
recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and obser-
vance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all," and to "set
up commissions ... for the promotion of human rights." ' Accordingly,
ECOSOC established the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1946
and, the following year, created the Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to undertake studies and
make recommendations to the Commission regarding international
discriminatory practices.
Until the late 1960s, the Commission passed broad resolutions
which developed or affirmed international human rights standards, but
did not address specific violations of those standards. A Commission
statement in 1946 declared that it had "no power to take any action in
regards to any complaints regarding human rights,"2 a position that
was endorsed by ECOSOC in 1947 and reaffirmed by the Commission
in 1959.3 By these measures, it could not even name states that violated
human rights. However, under pressure from an increasing Third
World membership which sought to utilize the forum to condemn racial

* This article is part of a long-term study of the United Nations Commission on

HumanRights. The researchwas supported,in part,by the President'sSocial Sci-
ences andResearchCouncilResearchFundat the Universityof Saskatchewan.
I Articles 62(2) and 68 of the UN Charter.
2 UN Doc. E/CN.4/14.Rev.2 (1946).
3 A. H. Robertsonand J. G. Merrills,Human Rights in the World(4th ed.; Man-
chester:ManchesterUniversityPress, 1996), 78.

Ron Wheeler, Departmentof Political Studies, University of Saskatchewan,Saska-

toon, SaskatchewanS7N 5A5. E-mail: wheeler@sask.usask.ca
Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique
XXXII:1 (March/mars 1999) 75-101
? 1999 CanadianPolitical Science Association (1'Associationcanadiennede science politique)
and/et la Societe quebecoise de science politique
76 RONWHEELER

practices in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, on June 6, 1967,

ECOSOC passed Resolution 1235 (XLII) which authorizedthe Com-
mission "to examine informationrelevant to gross violations of fun-
damentalrights and fundamentalfreedoms" and to conduct an annual
publicdebateon the "questionof the violationof humanrightsandfun-
damentalfreedoms,includingpolicies of racialdiscriminationandsegre-
gation and of apartheid, in all countries."4 Shortly afterward,this
expandedCommissionmandatewas utilizedby Arab statesto seek con-
demnationof Israel for its occupationof Arabterritoriesduringthe Six
Day War,which endedwithindays of the passageof Resolution1235.
In 1970, ECOSOC passed Resolution 1503 (XLVIII) [1970],
which authorizedthe Sub-Commissionto appointa "working group"
to investigatespecific allegationsof humanrights violations. Although
Resolution 1503 requiredthat strict confidentialitybe maintaineduntil
any investigations had been completed, the Commission itself could
publicize the violations if, following the investigation, it decided to
take action under the 1235 procedure.For nearly a decade, however,
the Commission focused its public efforts almost exclusively on South
Africa, Rhodesia and Israel. Most memberspreferredto addressother
human rights violations under the confidential proceduresof Resolu-
tion 1503, which they believed precludedpublic discussion underRes-
olution 1235. Equally important,however, was the prevailing strict
interpretationof Article 2(7) of the UN Charter,which declares that
"nothing contained in the present Chartershall authorizethe United
Nations to intervenein matterswhich are essentially within the domes-
tic jurisdictionof any state."5While some states viewed Article 2(7) as
an essential safeguardagainstUN infringementson their nationalsov-
ereignty, it also became, as Tom J. Farer suggests, a protectionunder
which "every rogue regime would seek shelter."6
The period from 1979 to 1982 was a transitionalone for the Com-
mission. Its membersbegan to questionthe view thathumanrightsvio-
lations in specific states could not be discussed publicly until confiden-
tial procedureshad been completed. Moreover,North/Southdivisions
within the Commission were occasionally transcendedas some West-
ern states, particularlyCanada,joined with ThirdWorldstates, such as

4 See Robin M. Maher and David Weissbrodt,"The 41st Session of the UN Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,"
HumanRights Quarterly12 (1990), 301-02.
5 Philip Alston, "The Commission on Human Rights," in Philip Alston, ed., The
United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1992), 141. For a good descriptionof this period see 139-44.
6 Tom J. Farer, "The United Nations and Human Rights: More than a Whimper,
Less than a Roar," in RichardPierreClaude and Bums H. Weston, eds., Human
Rights in the WorldCommunity:Issues and Action (2nd ed.; Philadelphia:Uni-
versity of PennsylvaniaPress, 1992), 228.
Abstract. This article examines resolutions passed by the United Nations Commis-
sion on HumanRights from 1982 to 1997, which targetedspecific states, governments
and other political actors for violations of humanrights. The types of actors that were
named, their regional distributionand the actions taken by the Commission are each
analyzed. Among the findings presented are that the Commission's effectiveness has
been limited by its inability to address most systematic government violations of
humanrights, by a lack of universalityin its applicationof internationalstandardsand
by a recenttrendtowardconsensus decision making.
Resume. Cet article examine les resolutionsqui ont ete adoptees par la Commission
des droits de l'homme des Nations Unies de 1982 a 1997, et qui ont cible certains
Etats, des gouvernementset quelquesjoueurs politiques pour des violations de droits
de l'homme. Les joueurs politiques, leur distributionregionale et les actions prises par
la Commission sont analys6s. Cet articled6montreque l'efficacit6 de la Commission a
ete limitee par son incapacite de prendre en consideration la plupart des violations
systematiques des gouvernements contre les droits de l'homme, le manque d'alter-
native globale dans l'application des standardsinternationauxet la recente augmenta-
tion des d6cisions atteintesparconsensus.

Costa Rica, to focus attention on some flagrant violation of human

rights thathad been previouslyignored.As a result, the door was grad-
ually opened to public debate and resolutions on human rights viola-
tions in a numberof differentstates, includingAfghanistan,Argentina,
Kampuchea(hereinafterCambodia),El Salvador, Bolivia and Guate-
mala.7The changed mood in the Commission could be seen in its pas-
sage of resolutionsin 1982 and 1983 which criticized Poland's martial
law measures, despite Poland's contentionthat the resolutions were in
violation of Article 2(7) of the UN Charter.8
Since 1982, the Commission has passed nearly 400 resolutions
which assign specific responsibility for human rights violations to
states, governments,or otherpolitical actors.While it continues to pass
resolutionswhich affirmor elaborateinternationalhumanrights stand-
ards (and passage of such resolutionshas increasedconsiderablysince
1982), its most importantresolutions are those which target specific
political actors for human rights violations. As Philip Alston notes,
"while there are strong grounds for insisting that the Commission's
performancebe judged on the basis of a much broaderrange of consid-
erations,the reality is that its effectiveness in respondingto violations
remains the benchmarkwhich the great majorityof governments and
otherobserverscontinueto use."9

7 Howard Tolley, Jr., "Decision-Making at the United Nations Commission on

Human Rights, 1979-82," Human Rights Quarterly 5 (1983), 29, 40, 51. Also
see Alston, "The Commission on Human Rights," 145; and Jack Donnelly,
InternationalHumanRights (Boulder:Westview, 1993), 61-62.
8 Commission on HumanRights (hereafterCHR) Res. 1982/26, UN Doc. E/CN.4/
1982/30, 143; CHR Res. 1983/30, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1983/60, 160. For Poland's
criticismsof the 1982 resolution,see UN Doc. E/CN.4/1983/SR.40/Add.1.
9 Alston, "The Commissionon HumanRights," 138.
78 RONWHEELER

Resolutions of the UN Commission on Human Rights

During the 16-yearperiod from 1982 to 1997, the Commissionconsid-
ered 1,216 draftresolutions.10Of these, 1,196 passed, 3 failed and on 17
the Commissionvoted eitherto "takeno action" or to suspenddebate.1'
The majority(68%) of the resolutionspassed by the Commissionwere
"global"ones,which did not addressspecific violationsof humanrights.
Global resolutions are directed at the entire internationalcommunity
throughbroadstatementswhich affirmhumanrightsstandards,establish
or elaborate proceduresfor the Commission or Sub-Commission,or
addressspecial events (such as the WorldPublic InformationCampaign
for HumanRights). Most are consideredunder the "thematic" agenda
topics that were developed in 1980 to deal broadly with types (rather
thaninstances) of humanrights violations such as rape, torture,wrong-
ful imprisonment,racial discrimination,genocide and slavery.12
This article is concerned with resolutions we shall term "tar-
geted." Like global ones, targetedresolutionsmay containbroadstate-
ments and affirm global standards,but they also address violations of
human rights by specific political actors, generally states or groups
within states, but sometimes groupsof states.13Passage of these resolu-
tions is almost always contentious because of strong opposition from
the alleged violators. Because members of the Commission are often
reluctantto damagerelationswith anotherstate (particularlywithin the
same region) by voting for a draft resolution which names it for spe-
cific humanrights violations, targetedresolutionsoften pass only after
the occurrenceof atrocitiesfrom which most membersof the Commis-
sion find it politically expedient to distance themselves. In an analysis
of the passage of Commission resolutions from 1979 to 1991, Philip
Alston observed that "as a general rule it seems that blood needed to
be spilled, and in large quantities."14
From 1982 to 1997, the Commissiontook action on 391 draftres-
olutions which targetedspecific actorsfor humanrights violations, and
it passed all but three of them. Given their high rate of passage and the

10 This total does not include draftresolutionswhich were subsequentlywithdrawn

by their sponsor(s).
11 Motions to "take no action" on a draftresolution are introducedunderrule 65,
paragraph2, of the Rules of Procedure of the Functional Commissionsof the
Economic and Social Council which provides that such a motion has priority
over a motion on the draftresolutionitself. Rule 49 suspends debate on a resolu-
tion and also precludesa vote (UN Doc. E/5975/Rev.l [1983]).
12 Robertsonand Merrills,HumanRights in the World,89-95.
13 Forexample, 10 resolutionswere passedbetween 1983 and 1991 which condemned
"Westernstates" as a groupfor providingassistanceto SouthAfrica.PhilipAlston
has also used the term "targeted,"but only with referenceto "country-specific"
resolutions(Alston, "The Commissionon HumanRights," 161).
14 Ibid., 163.
The UnitedNations Commissionon HumanRights, 1982-1997 79

Commission's lack of power to enforce them, how important are

targetedresolutions?While it is certainlytrue,as JackDonnelly has sug-
gested, that "votes and resolutions are quite cheap at the United
Nations,"15thereare nonethelesstwo reasonswhy it is worthwhileto in-
vestigate that Commission's passage of targeted resolutions.First, be-
cause targetedresolutionsaddress"gross violations,"they are an impor-
tantmeasureof the limits of the internationalcommunity'stoleranceof
infringementson humanrights. Second, they are an importantindicator
of universalityin the applicationof humanrights standards.While one
can make a case for the universalityof certainrights on philosophical
and other grounds,standardscan only be said to approach"universal-
ity" to the extent thatthey are uniformlyand consistentlyappliedto all
states. Because the Commission has become the focal point of UN
judgments on human rights conditions throughout the world, it is
importantto assess the mannerin which it rendersthosejudgments.
This article examines the targetedresolutionspassed by the Com-
mission from 1982 to 1997. Of the 1,196 resolutions passed by the
Commission during this period, 388 were designated as targetedones
and were analyzed in searchof answers to three specific questions con-
cerning the Commission's application of human rights standards:
(1) Have therebeen changes in the types of actorstargetedby the Com-
mission? (2) Have therebeen changes in the regional distributionof the
actorstargetedby the Commission?(3) Have there been changes in the
actions takenby the Commission?

Types of Actors Designated in Targeted Resolutions

Targetedresolutions addressmany differenttypes of humanrights vio-
lations. However, the Commission's concerns have thus far focused on
three categories of violators: Governmentsthat systematically violate
the human rights of citizens or other residents of the states, or that
make little effort to protect their rights (Gv); combatants (including
governments)who violate the human rights of innocent parties while
engaged in a violent political struggle within a state (Cb); and states
that deny the right of self-determinationto the people of a contested
territory(St).
In this study, the type of "targeting"was determinedby the lan-
guage of each resolutionratherthanaccordingto the agendaitem under
which it was consideredby the Commission.16In addition, resolutions

15 JackDonnelly, "HumanRights at the United Nations 1955-85: The Question of

Bias," InternationalStudies Quarterly32 (1988), 278.
16 Resolutions naming specific violators of human rights may be introducedunder
several different agenda categories-for example, under the 1235 agenda item,
as separateagendaitems, or even under "Advisory Services".
80 RON WHEELER

were classified as addressingcombatantsin a violent domestic conflict

ratherthan systematic governmentviolations, if they attributedhuman
rights violations within a state to parties other than the government,or
to both the governmentand other parties.Third, most targetedresolu-
tions on South Africa denouncedits apartheidpolicies, but those which
focused primarilyon its actions against neighbouringstates (including
Namibia) were classified as addressing a "denial of the right of self-
determination"to anotherstate. Finally, with one exception,17resolu-
tions on the variousregions of the formerYugoslaviawere classified as
targeting combatants in an internal political struggle because the
"statehood" of some former Yugoslav republics was contested and
disregardedby partiesin the conflict throughoutmost of the period we
examined.

FIGURE 1
TYPES OF ACTORSADDRESSED BY THE COMMISSIONON HUMAN
RIGHTSIN TARGETEDRESOLUTIONS,1982-1997

70 -

= 60 - ,' ,
0

- 50
50 _---'
_

LC40 .-Gv
---- Cb

?30 - st

I 20 :

.10 /\ -"
! . V/
0 ' ------.-----....---..--.---------.---. -
-------.- --.---
OJ C LO CO0 1 -0- 00 ) O CJ CO) t' O CO
0 -
Co0 00 c 0 Co 0 0o o o 0 0) 0) 0) 0) 0 0

Year
Note: Gv-goverments that systematically violate human rights; Cb-combatants
in internal conflicts who violate the rights of innocent parties; St-states that
deny the right to self-determination to the people of an occupied or contested
territory.

17 A 1994 resolution specifically condemned "the discriminatory measures and

practices, as well as the violations of human rights, committed by the authorities
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) against ethnic
Albanians in Kosovo," This was clearly intended to address the issue of "self-
determination" (CHR Res. 1994/76, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/132, 219).
The UnitedNations Commissionon HumanRights, 1982-1997 81

As Figure 1 shows, the percentageof Commission resolutions on

differenttypes of humanrightsviolatorschanged considerablyover the
years covered by this study. Although there was no significanttrendin
the passage of resolutionson systematicgovernmentviolations, resolu-
tions on combatantsin internalconflicts increasedfrom only 5 per cent
of the targetedresolutionspassed in 1982 to 26 per cent of those passed
in 1997. Resolutions on the denial of self-determinationdroppedfrom
58 per cent in 1982 to 30 per cent by 1997. Different factors affected
each category, however, and it is necessary to examine them sepa-
rately.

Resolutions on SystematicGovernmentViolationsof HumanRights

As Table 1 shows, therewas a gradualincrease in the annualnumberof
Commission resolutions targeting systematic government violations
from 1982 to 1997. There was little percentage change in this type of
resolution,however, suggesting there had been no elevation of the pri-
ority given to this category of human rights violation.18These resolu-
tions were often hotly contested, and almost 40 per cent of them re-
quired a vote. Members of the Commission (particularlywithin the
same region) were regularly lobbied to oppose their introductionor,
failing in this, to vote againstthem. To avoid these pressures,members
of the Commission often preferredto have allegations of humanrights
abuses investigated and discussed only under the confidential 1503
process.19The only targeteddraftresolutionsof any kind to be defeated
in Commission votes from 1982 to 1997 were three on alleged system-
atic governmentviolations of humanrights (in the United States, China
and Nigeria in 1995).20The targetingof governmentshas been highly
selective and repetitive, and only 22 were named for gross human
rights violations throughoutthe entire period examined (see Appen-
dix). Resolutions were focused on a small numberof regional outcasts
(such as South Africa, Israel and EquatorialGuinea) and other politi-
cally unpopularregimes (such as in Guatemala,Iran and Iraq). Others
were ignored or considered only under the confidential 1503 proce-
dures. For example, for nine years, Paraguay'sgovernmentwas able to
hide underthe 1503 procedure,despite brutalattackson its Indianpop-

18 The decreasedpercentage of resolutions on systematic governmentviolations in

1986 and 1987 occurredbecause fewer resolutions were passed on apartheidin
South Africa and more were passed in the other two categories.
19 Even within the Sub-Commission, lobbying becomes so intense that members
have sometimes favouredsecret ballots to protectthemselves from political pres-
sures from states named in Sub-Commission draft resolutions. See Maher and
Weissbrodt,"The 41st Session," 303.
20 E/CN.4/1195/L.26, E/CN.4/1995/L.86 and E/CN.4/1995/L.100, respectively(UN
Doc. E/CN.4/1995/176,386, 391,415).
82 RON WHEELER

ulation.21Even Cambodia's Pol Pot governmentwas not targetedby

Commissionresolutions.

TABLE 1
TYPES OF ACTORSADDRESSED IN TARGETED
RESOLUTIONS,1982-1997 (by numberof resolutions)

Year Gv Cb St
1982 7 1 11
1983 7 1 10
1984 7 1 14
1985 8 1 13
1986 6 1 15
1987 6 3 17
1988 9 1 14
1989 8 4 12
1990 11 3 14
1991 10 3 11
1992 10 3 10
1993 13 9 9
1994 13 11 8
1995 11 10 6
1996 10 7 6
1997 10 6 7
Total 146 65 177
Note: Gv-governments that systematicallyviolate humanrights;Cb-com-
batants in internal conflicts who violate the rights of innocent parties;
St-states that deny the right to self-determinationto the people of an
occupied or contestedterritory.

Resolutionson Combatantsin Domestic Conflicts

Targetedresolutionsaddressinghumanrights violations by combatants
in domestic conflicts increased significantly over the period 1982 to
1997, reaching a high of 37 per cent of the targetedresolutionspassed
in 1995. This was a result of the massive humanrights violations in the
civil wars and ethnic conflicts which emerged in Eastern Europe and
Africa in the 1990s. Because the UN became involved more in internal

21 Even in 1990, the Commission merely recommendedthat Paraguayapply for the

Commission's advisory services. See CHR Res. 1990/161, UN Doc. E/CN.4/
1990/94, 129.
The UnitedNations Commissionon HumanRights, 1982-1997 83

than internationalconflicts following the end of the Cold War,22it is

not surprisingthatmany of the Commission's concerns mirroredthose
of the UN Security Council. Indeed, while some internal conflicts
which were addressed by the Security Council were not subjects of
Commission resolutions (for example, Liberia), the Commission
passed resolutions on every internal conflict in which the Security
Council invoked ChapterVII of the UN Charterin an effort to ensure
the deliveryof humanitarianassistanceand to protecthumanrights.
In EasternEurope,the struggle for power and territorywhich fol-
lowed the collapse of the formerYugoslaviain 1991 led to a conspicu-
ous disregardfor even the most fundamentalhuman rights, especially
in Bosnia-Herzegovinaand Kosovo, but also in Croatia.Between 1993
and 1997, the Commission passed 10 resolutions condemning several
political groups in the formerYugoslaviafor murder,rape, forced dis-
appearances and other atrocities. The Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian
Croatswere routinelycondemnedfor "ethnic cleansing."23
In Africa, human rights atrocities following the collapse of civil
governmentin Somalia in 1991 led to widespreadhuman rights viola-
tions amid unsuccessful UN efforts to restore order and to provide
humanitarianaid. Attacks on civilians and the deliberateobstructionof
the distributionof food and other urgently needed supplies led the
Commission to pass resolutions on Somalia from 1993 to 1997. In
Rwanda, genocidal attacks on Tutsis by Hutu authorities during the
civil war became widespreadand systematic in 1994, following an air-
plane explosion in which the presidentsof Rwanda and Burundiwere
both killed. The military victory of Tutsi rebels in July 1994 forced
millions of Hutus to leave their homes and to survive in horrendous
conditions, while fleeing vigilantes and government troops seeking
revenge for previouspersecution.Commissionresolutionspassed from
1995 to 1997 condemnedthe genocide of the formerRwandanauthori-
ties and expressed grave concern at the continuationof human rights
violations under the new government.24In addition,humanrights vio-
lations in Burundi and Zaire, which were already of concern to the
Commission, were aggravatedby the flow of refugees from Rwanda
and were the subjectof resolutionspassed duringthe same years.

22 Much has been written about the UN becoming immersed in internalconflicts,

including ethnic conflict and the disintegrationof states. A particularlythought-
ful work is Kalevi J. Holsti's The State, Warand the State of War,Studies in
InternationalRelations51 (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1996).
23 See, for example, CHR Res. 1994/72, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/132, 203.
24 For example, the resolutionpassed in 1997 expressed "graveconcern at the dete-
riorationin the humanrights situationin Rwandasince the beginning of January
1997," including "arbitraryarrests" and "the killing of unarmedcivilians by
some elements of the securityforces" (UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/150, 223).
84 RON WHEELER

The ethnic conflicts in Africa were unlike either the recurrent mil-
itary coups or the "wars of national liberation" that were characteristic
of the Third World in earlier decades, conflicts in which Third World
states had accepted few pretexts for UN or other external interference.
Even though the Organization of African Unity (OAU) continued to
oppose direct intervention in regional conflicts in principle,25 no OAU
members voted against any of the resolutions passed by the Commis-
sion from 1993 to 1997 to address human rights violations in these
internal conflicts. Thus, the end of the Cold War provided the Commis-
sion with a rare and important opportunity to overcome the limitations
of regional solidarity and the usual affirmations of Article 2(7) of the
UN Charter.

Resolutions of Denial of Self-Determination

As Table 1 shows, from 1982 to 1997 there was a significant decline in
targeted resolutions on the issue of states denying "the right of self-
determination"to the people of occupied or contested territories. The
reason for this is clear. All but six of these resolutions26 dealt with
seven situations: the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (7 resolutions
from 1982 to 1988), Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia (9 resolutions
from 1982 to 1990), South Africa's violation of Namibia's right to
independence and actions against "front-line" African states (10 reso-
lution from 1982 to 1990), aid given to South Africa by other states (24
resolutions from 1982 to 1993), US actions in Central America and the
Caribbean (4 resolutions in 1984, 1989 and 1990), the occupation of
Arab territories by Israel (92 resolutions from 1982 to 1997) and Mo-
rocco's actions in Western Sahara (16 resolution from 1982 to 1997).
By the end of the period, only the last two of these remained as interna-
tional issues. Interventions by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and by
the United States in Central America (except for the overthrow of
Noriega in Panama in 1990) ended along with the Cold War, and Viet-
nam's withdrawal from Cambodia was completed in 1990. However,
the greatest decrease in the number of self-determination resolutions
resulted from changes in South Africa, particularly the victory of the
African National Congress in the multiparty elections in South Africa,
in April and May of 1994. In 1994, the Commission ceased condemn-
ing Western states for aiding South Africa, and in 1995 it removed all
topics on South Africa itself from its agenda.

25 Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe and Roger A. Coate, The United Nations
and Changing World Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 36-39.
26 There were two resolutions on Iraq's invasion of Kuwait (1991 and 1992), three
on the situation in East Timor (1983, 1993 and 1997), and one on Yugoslavia's
actions against Kosovo (1994). On the classification on the Kosovo resolution
see n. 17.
The United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 1982-1997 85

From 1994 to 1997, the only self-determination resolutions

passed by the Commission concerned Israel's occupation of Arab terri-
tories, Western Sahara, East Timor and the former Yugoslavia (the
1994 resolution on Kosovo mentioned earlier). Given that almost half
(47%) of the targeted resolutions passed prior to 1994 dealt with self-
determination issues, this was a significant shift in Commission focus.
As with the internal conflict resolutions, this was not a result of chang-
ing Commission priorities, however, but of global political changes
which made resolutions unnecessary.
Systematic government violations are still not adequately ad-
dressed, at least through resolutions which hold violators to public ac-
count.27 This suggests that temporary human rights violations precipi-
tated by internal political turmoil are more easily and readily addressed
by the Commission than long-standing violations in stable, if nonethe-
less oppressive, political systems. However, while increased attention
to internal conflicts cannot compensate for the Commission's narrow
focus in targeting systematic government violations, it is, nonetheless,
an important step in achieving greater universality in the application of
human rights standards.

The Regional Distribution of Targeted Resolutions

To assess the Commission's concentration on particular regions of the
world, targeted resolutions were classified using a modified version of
the regional differentiation employed by the United Nations Population
Fund in 1990 (see Table 2).28 Two rules were followed in classifying

27 More states alleged to be guilty of systematic government violations of human

rights have been considered under the 1503 procedure than under the public
1235 one (Alston, The UnitedNations and Human Rights, 148). It has been sug-
gested that states "may even deliberatelyseek inclusion in the 1503 procedureto
avoid public scrutiny"(Maherand Weissbrodt,"The 41st Session," 302).
28 This differentiationis consistent with the geopolitical realities enveloping Com-
mission resolutions during the 1980s, prior to the establishmentof new states in
Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus, in Table 2, the
categories "WesternEurope" and "Eastern Europe" include those states that
were considered to be within those regions during the Cold War, thereby avoid-
ing the issue of where to divide "West" from "East" in the Europe of the 1990s.
For a full listing of states includedin each region, see United Nations Population
Fund, The State of WorldPopulation 1990 (New York:United Nations, 1990).
The category on the "Soviet Union," however, was alteredto "USSR and Suc-
cessors" in our classificationto include resolutionstargetingsuccessor republics
following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. A special category for
"WesternStates" was also created from the large number of resolutions that
were passed between 1983 and 1991 to target Westernstates (or, euphemisti-
cally, "certain states") as a group for aiding South Africa. This category in-
cluded only these resolutions, and not those that targetedparticular Western
states (which were included in otherregionalcategories).
86 RONWHEELER

targetedresolutions by region. First, resolutions were included in the

classification if the intendedtargets were clear in speeches made dur-
ing Commission meetings, even if their sponsors chose not name them
in the resolutions (usually in an effort to facilitatetheirpassage).29Sec-
ond, resolutions were classified according to the regional location of
the targeted state, ratherthan with reference to where the violations
occurred. For example, the 1990 resolution which criticized the US
invasion of Panama in December 1989 was classified under "North
America" ratherthan "LatinAmerica."30
States in Asia, Africa and Latin America were named in the over-
whelming majority of the targeted resolutions passed by the Com-
mission between 1982 and 1997. Of the 388 resolutions, 294 (76%)
targetedpolitical actorsin these threeregions. The largenumberof res-
olutions on human rights violations in predominantlyThird World
regions can be explained in partby the large numberof states thateach
contains. However, there are four other important reasons for this
heavy concentrationof Commissionresolutions.
First, human rights violations are characteristicof most violent
conflicts, and there have been well over 100 military conflicts in the
ThirdWorldsince the end of the Second WorldWar.31
Second, while human rights violations occur in every region,
many of the most egregious violations have occurred in Third World
states. Human rights violations in, for example, Iraq, Nigeria and
Sudan have attracted considerable internationalpublicity and have
been raised in many differentUN organs, includingthe SecurityCoun-
cil.
Third, most draft resolutions which target governmentsfor sys-
tematic human rights violations are introducedby Westernstates and
place a heavy emphasis on civil and political rights which are lacking
in many Third World states.32The frequent controversies within the

29 Such resolutionsincludedthose on the US interventionsin Grenadaand Panama,

the Soviet interventionin Afghanistanand the Vietnameseoccupationof Cambo-
dia.
30 See CHR Res. 1990/10, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1990/94, 27.
31 Steven R. David collected data on more than 100 civil and internationalwars in
the Third World between 1945 and 1990 (Steven R. David, "Why the Third
World Still Matters," International Security 17 [1992/93], 131). Dozens more
have eruptedsince 1990 in the aftermathof the Cold Warand bipolarity.
32 Representativesof many Third World states claim there is a Westernbias in the
Commission which ignores their differenthistories, cultures,economic priorities
and political systems, and which leads to their being targetedunfairlyin Com-
mission resolutions. For example, during the 1997 session of the Commission,
China's representative,Wu Jianmin, stated that "since 1992, the Commission
has studied 72 draft resolutions-all of them against developing nations" and
that "the Commission must change thatbias" ("China Accuses West of Seeking
Showdown," Inter Press Service, March 11, 1997).
TABLE2
REGIONALDIFFERENTIATIONOF ACTORSNAMED IN TARGETEDRESOLUTIONS,1982-1997
(numberof resolutionspassed per year for each region)
Totalno.
resolu- East South OtherW. South Other Latin North Western "W
Year tions Asia Asia Israel Asia Africa Africa America America Europe S
1982 19 1 2 4 0 4 3 4 0 0
1983 18 2 2 2 0 4 3 4 0 1
1984 22 1 3 7 0 4 3 4 1 0
1985 22 1 3 7 0 4 4 4 0 0
1986 22 1 3 10 0 7 2 3 1 0
1987 26 1 4 8 1 8 2 4 0 0
1988 24 1 3 6 0 8 2 4 0 0
1989 24 1 3 6 0 7 2 4 1 0
1990 28 1 3 7 0 7 2 6 2 0
1991 24 0 3 7 2 5 2 4 0 0
1992 23 1 3 6 2 3 2 4 0 0
1993 31 3 2 6 1 3 6 4 0 0
1994 32 2 2 6 1 2 8 4 0 0
1995 27 2 2 5 1 2 8 4 0 0
1996 23 2 2 5 1 0 9 3 0 0
1997 23 3 2 5 1 0 8 3 0 0
Total 388 23 42 97 10 68 66 63 5 1
Percentage 6 11 25 3 18 17 16 1 0
Note: Some resolutionsdesignatedmore thanone target.
88 RONWHEELER

Commission as to whether human rights are universal or dependent

upon specific social, political and economic contexts, and concerning
the relativemeritsof deontologicaland consequentialistarguments,are
complex and will not be discussed here. It is clear, however, thatmany
resolutions focus on human rights violations in Third World states
because theirpolitical practicesoften do not conformto Westernstand-
ards.33
Fourth, the Commission's emphasis on Third World regions has
been skewed by the large numberof resolutions which have targeted
Israel and (apartheid)South Africa. As Table 2 reveals, while resolu-
tions on Asian and African states representedthe majorityof targeted
resolutions, the percentageon Africa drops from 35 per cent to 17 per
cent if resolutions on South Africa are excluded, and for Asia it drops
from 44 per cent to 20 per cent if resolutions on Israel are excluded.
Thus, even though ThirdWorldstates in Asia, Africa and Latin Amer-
ica have been targetedheavily, the regional imbalanceis substantially
less thanit may appear.
The most significant change in the Commission's regional focus
from 1982 to 1997 was in targetedresolutions on Africa, and resulted
from the elimination of resolutions targeting South Africa and an in-
crease in those targetingotherAfricanstates after 1992. Of the 66 reso-
lutions dealing with African states other than South Africa from 1982
to 1995, 39 (nearly 60%) were passed in the five-year period from
1993 to 1997. Apart from the usual ones on EquatorialGuinea and
WesternSahara,these resolutionsincluded one on Angola (1994), two
on Nigeria (1996-1997), threeon Rwanda(1995-1997), four on Burun-
di (1994-1997). Interestingly,no African states, except others being
targeted, voted against these resolutions, although the language of a
resolutionwas sometimes softened to obtaintheirsupport.34
Unlike most other regions, Latin American states were heavily
targeted by Commission resolutions. Human rights violations in the
following Latin American states were addressed in 63 resolutions
passed from 1982 to 1997: Bolivia (4 resolutions from 1982 to 1985),
Chile (9 resolutions from 1982 to 1990), Cuba (8 resolutions from
1990 to 1997), El Salvador(14 resolutionsfrom 1982 to 1995), Guate-
mala (16 resolutions from 1982 to 1997), Haiti (11 resolutions from

33 On these issues, see Mario Gomez, "Social Economic Rights and HumanRights
Commissions," Human Rights Quarterly 17 (1995), 155-69; and ZehraF. Arat,
Democracy and Human Rights in Developing Countries (Boulder: Lynne
Rienner, 1991).
34 Partlyfor this reason, a spokesmanfor Amnesty Internationalsaid thatin dealing
with Africa's Great Lakes region, the Commission was "almost irrelevant"in
the face of "some of the worst human rights abuses since the Second World
War" (quoted in "US Criticises Chinese Tactics at UN Rights Forum,"Reuters
WorldService, April 18, 1997).
The United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 1982-1997 89

1987 to 1997) and Paraguay (1 resolution in 1990). Resolutions on sys-

tematic government violations of human rights were the most common,
representing 73 per cent of the total. The remaining 27 per cent dealt
with El Salvador and Haiti (after Jean-Bertrand Aristide's reinstate-
ment in 1994), and faulted both the government and one or more com-
batants in internal conflicts. That most of the resolutions on the region
were co-sponsored (if not drafted) by Latin American states suggests
that the substantial number of resolutions was as indicative of the will-
ingness of the Latin American bloc to permit, and sometimes initiate,
the targeting of states, as of excessive brutality or prevalence of viola-
tions within in the region.35 However, Latin American states in the
Commission have complained that their region is targeted excessively,
and have sometimes pre-empted more strongly worded draft resolu-
tions by Western states with milder ones of their own.36 Moreover, as
was common in most regions, major actors (such as Mexico and Bra-
zil) were not named for human rights violations, regardless of their
severity.
Compared to Latin America, resolutions on human rights viola-
tions in other parts of the Third World were focused on very few states.
West Asia was one of the least-targeted regions, if the resolutions on
the Israeli occupation of Arab territories are excluded. Only 10 resolu-
tions were passed on other states in the region, and all but one (passed
in 1987 on the Cyprus conflict)37 addressed human rights violations in
Iraq. Both the low number of resolutions, and their focus on one state
are striking, given the size of the region, and considering that non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) have regularly presented informa-
tion to the Commission on large-scale human rights violations in Saudi
Arabia, Syria, Yemen and other West Asian states.38 Resolutions ad-
dressing human rights violations in South Asia and East Asia were also
directed at very few states. Of the targeted resolutions which named
states in South Asia, all but one (on Sri Lanka in 1987) targeted either
Afghanistan (25 resolutions) or Iran (16 resolutions). In East Asia,
more than half of the 23 resolutions that were passed by the Commis-
sion dealt with Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia prior to its with-

35 CompareAlston, The UnitedNations and HumanRights, 163.

36 This was the case concerning El Salvadorand Guatemalain 1990 (Reed Brody,
Penny Parkerand David Weissbrodt, "MajorDevelopments in 1990 at the UN
Commissionon HumanRights," HumanRights Quarterly 12 [1990], 570-71).
37 UN Res. 1987/50, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1987/60, 113.
38 See, for example, Amnesty International'sReport on Human Rights around the
World for 1996 and 1997. These are available at http://www.amnesty.org/
ailib/index.html.Also see "Non-GovernmentalOrganizationClaim Numerous
Violations of Human Rights aroundthe World," M2 Presswire, April 15, 1997;
and "UN Rights Commission Criticized as a Toothless Tiger," Agence France
Presse, March3, 1997.
90 RONWHEELER

drawal in 1990 (9 resolutions) or with the domestic conflict that fol-

lowed (5 resolutions, 2 of which condemnedthe KhmerRouge).39The
only other resolutions on East Asian states were on Myanmar(6 reso-
lutions) and Indonesia (3 resolutions which directly or indirectlyheld
Indonesiaresponsiblefor humanrightsviolations in East Timor).40
Despite widespread or highly publicized human rights violations
in other East Asian states, none has been targetedin Commissionreso-
lutions. China, for example, was regularly accused of human rights
violations following the Tiananmenincident in 1989, but majorefforts
by the United States, members of the EuropeanUnion and otherWest-
ern states to obtain passage of resolutions on China were always less
successful than China's lobbying campaign with other Third World
states.41The Commission voted to "take no action" under Rule 65 on
six draft resolutions on human rights conditions in China which were
introducedbetween 1990 and 1997. Only once, in 1995, did China's
effort to invoke Rule 65 fail, but the draftresolutionitself was defeated
in a close vote (20 in favour,21 opposed, and 12 abstaining).42In 1997,
Canada and five members of the EuropeanUnion (France, Germany,
Greece, Italy and Spain) droppedtheir usual co-sponsorshipof a draft
resolution on human rights conditions in China, and, during the 54th
Session of the Commission in 1998, neitherthe EuropeanUnion or the
United States were preparedto introducea draftresolution on human
rights in China.43Should the United States choose to introduceresolu-
tions targetingChina in the future,it is unlikely thatit would be able to
obtainthe votes necessary for theirpassage.
It is true, as ThirdWorldstates complain,that developed states in
Europe and North America are infrequentlytargeted in Commission
resolutions.For example, no resolutionswere passed on WesternEuro-
pean states, except for one passed in 1983 which held Portugalpartly
responsible for human rights violations in East Timor,44and several,
passed from 1983 to 1991, which condemned "certainstates" or "cer-
tain Westernstates" (undoubtedlyincluding Britain) for aiding South
Africa. Some West Europeanstates have been accused of systematic
39 For Commission condemnations of the Khmer Rouge, see CHR Res. 1995/55,
UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/176, 169, and CHR Res. 1996/54, UN Doc. E/CN.4/
1996/177.
40 CHR Res. 1983/8, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1983/60, 129, and CHR Res. 1993/97, UN
Doc. E/CN.4/1993/122, 277.
41 On Chinese lobbying in the Commission on Human Rights, see Ann Kent,
"China and the InternationalHuman Rights Regime: A Case Study of Multilat-
eral Monitoring, 1989-1994," HumanRights Quarterly(1995), 1-47.
42 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/176, 389.
43 "EU AbandonsUS over Human Rights in China," Agence France Presse, Feb-
ruary23, 1998; "U.S. Alters Rights Policy towardChina," Los Angeles Times,
March 14, 1998, Al.
44 CHR Res. 1983/8, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1983/60, 129.
The UnitedNations Commissionon HumanRights, 1982-1997 91

humanrights violations in NGO presentationsto the Commission, but

no resolutionshave resulted.For example, alleged humanrights viola-
tions in NorthernIrelandby the British governmenthave been investi-
gated but no resolutions have resulted. In addition,neitherTurkeynor
Greece have been targeted,even though massive human rights viola-
tions in these states have been well publicized and have been raised
regularlyby Amnesty International.45
In North America, Canadawas not mentioned in any resolution,
but the United States was targetedfive times, usually implicitly (thatis,
it was mentioned by name in only one of the resolutions) during the
period 1982 to 1997. A first resolution, passed in 1986 on the "Situa-
tion in OccupiedPalestine," expressed "grave concern" at agreements
on strategic cooperationbetween Israel and the United States "which
would encourage and supportIsraeli policies of aggression, expansion
and continued occupation of Palestinianand other Arab territories."46
The other four resolutionsimplicitly addressedUS militaryactions. In
1984, the US was targetedfor overthrowingthe government of Gre-
nada, and in 1990 it was criticizedfor its invasion of Panamathe previ-
ous year.47It was also indirectlyfaulted in 1989 and 1990 for support-
ing mercenarieswho were fighting against the Sandinistagovernment
in Nicaragua.48The US was accused of racism and other systematic
humanrights violations in two additionaldraftresolutions which were
introduced in 1987 and 1995, but the Commission took no action
(underRule 65) on the first, and defeated the second by an overwhelm-
ing margin.49
Several resolutions were passed on states in Eastern Europe, al-
though mostly after the revolutions of 1989 swept across the region.
Apartfrom the 1982 and 1983 resolutionsthattargetedPoland's imple-

45 "Amnesty Blasts U.N. Human Rights Body as Too Soft," Reuters, April 26,
1996; "Groups Lobby UN on Human Rights in NI," The Irish Times, July 5,
1995; AmnestyReport on NorthernIreland (Amnesty InternationalReportEUR
45/06/98), April 1998; and Amnesty International,Greece: Tortureand Ill-Treat-
ment (London:Amnesty InternationalPublications, 1992).
46 CHR Res. 1986/22, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1986/65, 69.
47 For the resolutionon Grenadasee CHR Res. 1984/25, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1984/77,
59. For the resolutionon Panama,see n. 30.
48 Resolutions with the title "Use of Mercenariesas a Means of Impedingthe Exer-
cise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination" were passed from 1987 to
1990. The 1989 and 1990 resolutions listed Nicaraguaas a victim of mercenary
violence, thus indirectly faulting US supportof the so-called Contrasin Central
America. See CHR Res. 1989/21, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1989/94, 69, and CHR Res.
1990/7, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1990/94, 27.
49 Draft Resolution E/CN.4/1987/L.31 accused the US government of systematic
human rights violations (UN Doc. E/CN.4/1987/60, 215). Draft Resolution
E/CN.4/1995/L.26 addressed"racism and racial discrimination"in the US (UN
Doc. E/CN.4/1995/176, 380).
92 RON WHEELER

mentationof martiallaw measures (mentioned earlier),50and one that

targetedAlbania for governmentviolations in 1988, no EasternEuro-
pean states were named in resolutions prior to 1989. The collapse of
Communismin the region, however, freed the Commission from Cold
War ideological and other geopolitical considerations which had
blocked efforts in the past. Albaniawas namedin six additionalresolu-
tions from 1989 to 1994, Romaniawas named in five resolutionsfrom
1989 to 1993, and partsof the formerYugoslaviawere named (usually
collectively) in 10 resolutions passed from 1993 to 1997 to condemn
the slaughterof civilians, rape, "ethnic cleansing" and other human
rightsatrocities.
Seventeen resolutions targeted the "USSR and successors."
However,apartfrom the resolutionson Polandin 1982 and 1983 which
implicitly faulted the Soviet Union for Poland's martiallaw measures,
all but two addressedthe Soviet interventionin Afghanistan.Those two
resolutionswere passed in 1993 and 1994 to addresshumanrights vio-
lations in Georgia, but merely authorizedhuman rights assistance.51
Armed clashes in several other former Soviet republics produced no
resolutionsby the Commission, although a 1995 draftresolution criti-
cizing Russian behaviour in Chechnya probably would have passed,
but was withdrawnin lieu of a statementof concern read by the Com-
mission chair.52
What conclusions can be reached concerningthe regional empha-
ses of the Commission's targetedresolutions?First, while resolutions
on humanrights violations in ThirdWorldregions increasedsomewhat
during the last few years examined, the focus was mainly on Africa
(and PapuaNew Guinea),53and was not only permittedby ThirdWorld
regionalblocs, but was often supported,albeit sometimes throughcom-
promise wording. For example, from 1993 to 1997, no African mem-
bers of the Commission (except Libya and the Sudan itself) opposed
the five resolutions expressing serious concern at human rights viola-
tions by the governmentof Sudan, and the 1996 and 1997 resolutions
were passed by consensus. Twelve resolutions addressinggovernment
violations in Togo, Zaire and Papua New Guinea (the island of Bou-
gainville) also passed by consensus.

50 See n. 8.
51 CHR Res. 1993/85, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1993/122, 252, and CHR Res. 1994/59,
UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/132, 172.
52 "North-SouthConfrontationover Rights WorriesWest," Agence France Presse,
March 11, 1995.
53 PapuaNew Guinea was targetedfrom 1993 to 1995 for humanrights conditions
on the island of Bougainville (UN Res. 1993/76, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1993/122,
226; UN Res. 1994/81, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/132, 230; and UN Res. 1995/65,
UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/176, 191).
The United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 1982-1997 93

Second, while it is certainly true that far more Commission reso-

lutions have been passed on Third World states than on developed ones
(which have been mainly Eastern European states since 1989), very
few states have been targeted in most regions of the Third World either.
While human rights violations in Turkey, Greece and Russia have been
ignored, so have those in Brazil, Saudi Arabia and Syria. Although the
concentration of resolutions on only a few states is less in Latin Amer-
ica, and has declined somewhat in Africa, in most regions of the Third
World only those states that are the least popular or the least effective at
lobbying need to fear the passage of resolutions targeting them for
human rights violations.

Actions Taken in Targeted Resolutions

The Commission takes specific actions through the wording of targeted
resolutions which indicates its assessment of the severity of the human
rights violations being addressed.54 Specifically, the Commission can:
condemn or censure the target (Cd), criticize the target or express con-
cern regarding human rights violations, but stop short of condemnation
or censure (Cr), encourage, make suggestions, or provide advisory and
other assistance to the target to improve human rights conditions (EA)
or close consideration of a human rights situation that had previously
concerned the Commission (Cl).
As Figure 2 demonstrates, the most striking trend in Commission
actions was the decline after 1986 in the annual percentage of resolu-
tions that condemned political actors, and the corresponding increase
in those which less harshly criticized their actions. The most dramatic
decline in condemnatory resolutions concerned the issue of self-deter-
mination (see Table 3). While the overwhelming majority of the self-
determination resolutions that were passed prior to 1994 condemned
targeted states, by the end of the period most only expressed concern,
or offered encouragement or assistance. Condemnatory resolutions on
self-determination issues declined from a high of 13 passed in 1987 to

54 In this study,Commissionresolutionswereclassifiedin accordancewith the strong-

est judgment(thatis, the harshestlanguage)they contained.For example,if a reso-
lution expressed serious "concern" regardinghuman rights violations, but also
"condemned"the governmentfor not takingaction to remedythe situation,it was
classifiedas condemnatory.Oneexceptionwas made,however.Becausea 1995 res-
olution on Haiti condemnedthe previousgovernmentof Raoul Cedrasbut offered
encouragementand assistanceto the currentgovernmentof Jean-Bertrand Aristide,
it was classifiedas providing"encouragementor assistance"(E/CN.4/1995/70,UN
Doc. E/CN.4/1995/176, 202). Because even those resolutionswhich offer "encour-
agementor assistance"often express "concern"in some manner,resolutionswere
classified as expressing "criticismor concern" only if they contained language
which indicatedthatthe Commissionconsideredthe humanrightsviolationsto be
quiteserious(forexample,"graveconcern," "seriousconcern").
 o 5 - ,'

94 RONWHEELER

only 2 by 1997. As mentioned earlier, this was mainly a result of the

end of the Cold Warand the resolutionof the SouthAfricanproblem.

FIGURE2
ACTIONSTAKENBY THE COMMISIONON HUMAN RIGHTS
IN TARGETEDRESOLUTIONS,1982-1997

80
/ _
= 70 --
o
: 60 -

a y-/\a->,,>- Cr
,50

o 40 s/ /----C \

4 20
-, .
0) i o

L. 10
--.-'--. \ ,.'. ' '
=...'-. , I--- , ,, , I ', -I I I s
CJ CO L ) CO 00 O - CM CO) ) CC) N
00 O O OcO C0O C00 O 0 0)0 0)0

Year
Note: Cd-condemn or censure;Cr-criticize or express serious concern; EA-en-
courage or assist; Cl-close considerationof a situation.

Very few states were condemned for systematic governmentvio-

lations of humanrights. While there was a slight increase in the num-
ber of governments which were criticized, apart from South Africa,
only Iraq (1992-1997), Haiti (1992-1994) and Zaire (1994-1995) were
condemned for systematic governmentviolations from 1982 to 1997.
In 1996 and 1997, only Iraqwas condemned.This may be explainedin
partby the growing tendencyof membersto introducedraftresolutions
which renderless severejudgmentson targetedgovernmentsthanthey
are known to favour as a strategyto attractvotes. This was true of the
draftresolutionson the Sudan and China thatwere introducedin 1996
and 1997. The strategywas successful in the first case and unsuccess-
ful in the second.55As well, therehas been a tendencywithin the Com-

55 The resolutions on Sudan expressed only "concern" (CHR Res. 1996/73, UN

Doc. E/CN.4/1996/177, 237; CHR Res 1997/59, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/150,
32). Consistent with draft resolutions introducedin previous years, both draft
resolutionson Chinaalso expressed "concern" ratherthan "condemnation,"but
the language of each was deliberatelysoftened in an effort to ease their passage.
However, China was successful in convincing a majorityof membersto "takeno
action" (under rule 65) on each draft (E/CN.4/1996/L.90, UN Doc. E/CN.4/
1996/177, 352; E/CN.4/1997/L.91, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/150, 355).
TABLE3
COMMISSIONACTIONSIN TARGETEDRESOLUTIONSON TYPES OF HUMAN
RIGHTSVIOLATIONS,1982-1997 (by numberof resolutions)
Gv Cb St

Year Cd Cr EA Cl Cd Cr EA C1 Cd Cr EA C1
1982 0 5 2 0 0 1 0 0 6 5 0 0
1983 0 4 2 1 0 1 0 0 5 5 0 0
1984 0 5 2 0 0 1 0 0 11 3 0 0
1985 0 4 4 0 0 1 0 0 10 3 0 0
1986 1 5 0 0 0 1 0 0 11 3 1 0
1987 0 3 2 1 0 3 0 0 13 3 1 0
1988 2 5 2 0 0 1 0 0 10 4 0 0
1989 1 6 1 0 0 4 0 0 10 2 0 0
1990 2 6 3 0 1 2 0 0 9 4 1 0
1991 1 5 4 0 0 3 0 0 7 3 1 0
1992 2 6 2 0 0 2 1 0 7 2 1 0
1993 2 8 3 0 2 5 2 0 5 3 1 0
1994 3 7 3 0 4 6 1 0 5 2 1 0
1995 2 5 2 2 2 5 3 0 1 4 1 0
1996 1 8 0 11 2 5 0 0 1 5 0 0
1997 1 8 1 0 2 4 0 0 2 5 0 0
Total 18 90 33 5 13 45 7 0 113 56 8 0
Note: Gv-governments that systematically violate human rights; Cb-combatants in intern
the rights of innocentparties;St-states that deny the right to self-determinationto the p
contested territory;Cd-condemn or censure; Cr-criticize or express serious conc
assist; Cl-close considerationof a situation.
96 RONWHEELER

mission to endeavourto pass targetedresolutionsby consensus. Of the

252 targeted resolutions passed from 1982 to 1992, only 71 (28%)
were passed by consensus. However, of the 136 targetedresolutions
passed from 1993 to 1997, 85 (63%) were passed withouta vote.
At both the 1996 and 1997 sessions, a number of Third World
states sponsored draft decisions which advocated decision making by
consensus ratherthan by voting. Some states undoubtedlyhave an ul-
terior motive in seeking greater consensual decision making in the
Commission-to avoid being targeted for human rights violations.
Others undoubtedly dislike being placed in the politically sensitive
position of having to vote on resolutionsthattargetother states (partic-
ularly those within the same region). While both drafts were subse-
quentlywithdrawnin exchange for statementsby the chair thatconsen-
sus should be sought wheneverpossible,5 theirintroductionappearsto
have had a significanteffect not only on voting, but on the languageof
draftresolutions.
During the 1996 and 1997 sessions, major efforts were under-
taken by some members of the Commission to achieve compromises
on the substanceand wording of resolutionsin an attemptto avoid vot-
ing on resolutions. The successful effort by South Africa to avert a
showdown in the Commission over the EuropeanUnion's draftresolu-
tion on Nigeria in 1996 is a case in point. While Western states
favoured a strong resolution naming a special rapporteurfor Nigeria,
the Africanbloc was not preparedto supportit. At the same time, Afri-
can states hardly wished to condone behaviour as deplorable as the
November 1995 hanging of nine prominentpolitical activists by the
Nigerian government. Consequently, political bargaining produced
advance agreementon the wording of a resolutionwhich, while taking
a lesser action than the Americans and Europeansfavoured,could be
supportedby the African bloc. Thus the resolutionwas passed by con-
sensus.57For anotherexample, Rwandaitself was allowed to draftthe
resolutionagainst its own government(which, not surprisingly,substi-
tuted a weaker investigative mandate for the special UN rapporteur).
This resolutionwas also passed withouta vote.58
Despite the overall reductionin condemnatoryresolutions during
this period, the numberof those which targetedcombatantsin internal
conflicts increased. This is particularlysignificantbecause from 1982

56 UN Docs. E/CN.4/1996/177, 296; and E/CN.4/1997/150, 291.

57 "South Africa Takes a Step Back from Putting Nigeria in the Hot Seat," The
Christian Science Monitor, April 22, 1996; and "U.N. Rights Body Censures
Nigeria," Reuters,April 23, 1996.
58 CHR Res. 1997/66, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1977/150, 221; and "HumanRights Takes
a Dive at the UN," Agence France Presse, April 18, 1997.
The United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 1982-1997 97

to 1992, with only one exception,59 Commission resolutions had never

condemned parties in internal conflicts. From 1992 to 1997, however,
12 condemnatory resolutions were passed. While most of them ad-
dressed human rights violations in the former Yugoslavia (six of them
condemning combatants for atrocities in Bosnia and Herzegovina), res-
olutions were also passed on violations in Burundi and Cambodia.
Equally significant was the Commission's willingness to condemn
combatants other than governments, including the Serbs and Croats in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia.60
"Critical" resolutions on internal conflicts also increased be-
tween 1982 and 1997 and, when combined with the increased number
of condemnatory resolutions, reveal a significant decline in the Com-
mission's tolerance of severe violations of human rights in internal
conflicts. Indeed, since the end of the Cold War, there has been a global
expectation that the UN will intercede in some manner to reduce blood-
shed and human rights atrocities in regional conflicts. While the Secu-
rity Council has been the main focus of these expectations,61 the Com-
mission on Human Rights has not been unaffected. The virtual elimina-
tion of colonial and ideological dimensions in regional conflicts has
made UN members in both bodies less reticent to appear partisan by
taking or authorizing action.
Despite the increase in the targeting, and even condemning, of
parties in violent internal conflicts, the more limited expression of
"concern" or "criticism" has become the norm in other targeted Com-
mission resolutions. Although a number of factors were reflected in the
trend toward milder resolutions after 1992, Third World pressures for
consensual decision making appear to have played a major role. Even
when consensus could not be achieved, many resolutions were worded
so that they could pass with few or no negative votes. Needless to say,
it is much easier to reach agreement if harsh judgments are avoided. In
recent years, condemnations have been mainly limited to resolutions
on which there is nearly unanimous agreement within the Commission,
such as those on Iraq, the Israeli occupation of Arab lands and the
internal conflicts in Eastern Europe and Africa.

59 CHR Res. 1990/77 condemneda single murderin El Salvador,which was presum-

ably an operationof right-wing"deathsquads"(UN Doc. E/CN.4/1990/94, 159).
60 On the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats,see, for example, CHR Res. 1994/72,
UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/132, 203. For resolutions on the KhmerRouge, see CHR
Res. 1995/55, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/176, 169, and CHR Res. 1996/54,
UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/177, 182.
61 Ron Wheeler, "Introduction: The United Nations in Transition," in Ron
Wheeler and Howard McConnell, eds., Swords and Plowshares: The United
Nations in Transition(Toronto:CanadianScholars Press, 1997), 1-16. Also see
RichardFalk's chapterentitled "Explainingthe UN's UnhappyFiftieth Anniver-
sary:TowardReclaimingthe Next Half-Century,"in ibid., 19-32.
98 RONWHEELER

Conclusion
The Commissionon HumanRights is the principalUN voice on human
rights violations by and within member states. Between 1982 and
1997, its ability and willingness to addressspecific violations of human
rights throughresolutionswhich named specific states and otheractors
increased significantly. By publicizing the worst "violations of human
rights and fundamentalfreedoms," the Commission has focused world
attentionon many perpetratorsof cruel and inhumane actions against
individuals and groups all over the world. As Jeri Laber, executive
director of Helsinki Watch, has said, "by singling out nations and
showing the difference between their words and deeds, we are holding
them up to public scrutinyand exertinga kind of moralpressure."62
Over the years covered by this study, the Commission named 35
states in targeted resolutions (37 if Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina
are counted separately from Yugoslavia), which is a substantialim-
provementover earlieryears in which only Israel and the racistregimes
in southern Africa were singled out. Moreover, the Commission has
become willing to address human rights violations in some internal
conflicts, and even to condemn parties other than governments.These
are importantachievements, giving the Commission a much broader
focus. However, althougha wide varietyof allegationsof humanrights
violations by governments are investigated and discussed each year
under the confidential 1503 procedures, only 22 governments have
been targetedin resolutions for systematic violations of humanrights.
Moreover,in most regions, only a few offenders have been designated
in resolutions for any type of human rights violations, generally those
states with insufficientpolitical clout to mobilize regionaloppositionto
theirpassage-such as Afghanistan,Cambodia,Guatemala,Haiti,Iraq
and Iran. Other states, such as Brazil, China, Greece, Mexico, Saudi
Arabia, Syria and Turkey,for example, have been able to avoid being
targeted,despite highly publicizedhumanrights violations. In his study
of "bias" in the Commission on Human Rights from 1955 to 1985,
JackDonnelly observedthat "certaincountriesare singled out, for par-
tisan purposes, to the exclusion of other, no less reprehensiblere-
gimes."63This is no less truetoday.
Regionally, states in Asia, Africa and Latin America were the
subjects of the overwhelming majority of the Commission's targeted
resolutions throughoutthe period examined here. This was true even
when the many resolutions on Israel and South Africa were excluded
from the regional statistics. The biggest regional change concerned
62 "UN Raises Stronger Arm against Nations Violating Human Rights with
Broadened Definition of Human Rights, More Staff, and Faster Response to
Complaints,"The ChristianScience Monitor, May 23, 1990.
63 Donnelly, "HumanRights at the United Nations," 288.
The UnitedNations Commissionon HumanRights, 1982-1997 99

Africa-the decline, and then elimination, of resolutions on South

Africa (including those which condemned its Westernsupporters),and
the increase in those which addressedhumanrights violations in other
African states. However, this was more a response to the atrocities
which occurred in the ethnic conflicts in the region than to a shift in
regional priorities within the Commission, and it was not only per-
mitted by the African bloc, but was generally supported(although, in
some cases, milderresolutionswere the result).
It is true, as some ThirdWorldstates complain,thatWesternstates
are seldom targetedin Commission resolutions and none has been tar-
geted for domestic humanrights violations of any kind. That the Com-
mission has been unable to pass even a single resolution addressing
human rights conditions in a Western state reduces its credibility as a
representativeof human rights for the entire internationalcommunity
and gives rise to criticisms, such as China's, that developed states
"have made every effort to attackdeveloping countries with so-called
human rights abuses while turninga blind eye to their own inglorious
human rights record. In fact, they have turnedthe Commission into a
'court' where they put developing countries on trial."64To overcome
allegations of bias will require,as GerhadBaum, chair of the German
delegation in 1995 stated, thatWesternstates "be more critical of our-
selves, explain that we are not judges and admit that we have our own
problems such as racism."65This may be more importantthan resolv-
ing the closely related but separateissue of whether civil and political
rights are more importantthansocial, culturaland economic ones.
It is important to reiterate, however, that relatively few states
within most regions of the Third World (particularlyAsia) have been
targetedfor human rights violations either-and even fewer for sys-
tematic government violations of human rights. There is an almost
monotonous pattern in Commission resolutions of targeting Third
World pariahs and ignoring human rights violations in more popular
states. Many Third World states which commit serious human rights
violations are sheltered by the voting strengthof other states in their
region, and this is at least as important as Commission myopia or
regional bias in explaining why many states with questionablehuman
rightsrecordshave not been targetedby resolutions.
Of equal importanceto the lack of universality in the Commis-
sion's targetedresolutions is the trend towardexpressing concern, but
not condemnation,in the resolutionsthat are passed. Increasingly,con-

64 "China Accuses Developed Nations of 'Confrontation' at UN Human Rights

Forum,"Xinhua News Agency, March 16, 1997, in British BroadcastingCorpo-
ration,Summaryof WorldBroadcasts, March 18, 1997, FE/D2870/G.
65 "North-SouthConfrontationover Rights WorriesWest," Agence France Presse,
March 11, 1995.
100 RON WHEELER

demnationsare limited only to resolutionsfacing little or no opposition

within the Commission. While there are a numberof reasons for this,
Commission members appear to have become more sensitive to the
ease with which resolutions are passed than to the severity of the
humanrights violations that are addressed.While strongdenunciations
establish clear limits on internationaltolerance of human rights viola-
tions, milder resolutions make it easier for members to reach agree-
ment on the targetingof states. The latterconsiderationseems to have
outweighed the former in recent years, and Amnesty International's
allegations that human rights violations are often "ignored or traded
for the sake of a fudged consensus" in the Commission and that there
is a "growing trend of sacrificing strong language in exchange for a
dialogue with the accused country" are well-founded.66
In 1996, the Commission chair observed that "at the currentses-
sion therehas been an increasedeffort towardsmore openness and dia-
logue among delegations, resulting in the adoption of resolutions and
decisions by consensus."67In 1997, even China, which regularlycriti-
cizes the Commission for "divisive votes" and harsh judgments on
ThirdWorld states, was satisfied with the results of the Commission's
session.68Regionalsolidaritypreventsmany seriousviolationsof human
rights from being addressedin Commissionresolutionsand is a major
barrierto the achievementof universality;if consensualdecision making
became the norm, it seems likely that even fewer violators would be
namedin stronglywordedresolutions.Thatduringthe 1997 session, the
Commissioncould only condemnthe governmentof Iraqfor systematic
humanrights violationsmay forewarnof a periodin which few govern-
mentsaredesignatedas serioushumanrightsoffenders.
It is certainly true, as Commission Chair GilbertoVergne Saboia
statedin 1996, that "the fact thatwe don't adopta resolutionon certain
issues doesn't mean the Commission hasn't given [it] attention,"69but
targetedresolutionsare nonetheless the Commission's most visible and
important tool for affirming international human rights standards.
Because it has no power to enforce those resolutions, how seriously
they are taken by the internationalcommunitydepends, in large meas-
ure, on the fairness and frankness of the Commission's judgments.

66 Reuters, "AmnestyBlasts U.N. HumanRights Body as Too Soft."

67 See the statementof Commission ChairGilbertoV. Saboia of Brazil on April 24,
1996 (UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/177, 296).
68 Following the 1997 session, China's Alternate RepresentativeLiu Xinsheng
stated that "confrontationand cooperationcannot coexist, so the removal of the
confrontationbetween countries should be the No. 1 task in reforms. In this
regard,the 53rd session of the commission took a welcoming step" ("China Pro-
poses Reforms in UN Human Rights Body," Xinhua News Agency, July 22,
1997).
69 Reuters, "AmnestyBlasts U.N. HumanRights Body as Too Soft."
The UnitedNations Commissionon HumanRights, 1982-1997 101

Without doubt, the Commission has made considerable progress in

addressing "gross violations of human rights and fundamentalfree-
doms" since 1982, naming many of the most serious offenders in tar-
geted resolutions. However, its effectiveness as a representative of
human rights for the entire internationalcommunity is limited by its
inabilityto addresssystematichumanrights violations by most govern-
ments, and by the lack of universalityin its applicationof international
standards.Moreover,the trendtowardmilderresolutionshas weakened
the Commission's judgments and, arguably, diminished their public
impact. If future decision making by consensus is required for the
Commission to target actors for humanrights violations, its effective-
ness may be reducedeven further.

Appendix: States Designated in Targeted Resolutions, 1982-1997

SystematicGovernmentViolationsof HumanRights
Afghanistan(1984-1988)
Albania(88-94)
Bolivia (1982-1985)
Cambodia(1997)
Chile (1982-1990)
Cuba(1990-1997)
EquatorialGuinea(1982-1997)
Guatemala(1982-1997)
Haiti (1987-1997)
Iran(1982-1997)
Iraq(1991-1997)
Mauritania(1985)
Myanmar(1992-1997)
Nigeria (1996-1997)
Paraguay(1990)
Poland (1982-1983)
Romania(1989-1993)
SouthAfrica (1986-1995)
Sudan(1993-1996)
Togo (1994-1996)
Uganda (1982-1985)
Zaire (1993-1997)

HumanRights Violationsby Combatantsin ViolentInternal Conflicts

Afghanistan(1989-1997) PapuaNew Guinea(1993-1995)
Angola (1994) Rwanda(1995-1997)
Burundi(1994-1997) Somalia (1993-1997)
Cambodia(1993-1996) Sri Lanka(1987)
El Salvador(1982-1995) Sudan(1997)
Georgia (1993-1994) Togo (1993)
Haiti (1989, 1995-1996) The formerYugoslavia(1993-1997)

State Violationsof the Right of Self Determination

USSR (1982-1988)
Vietnam(1982-1990)
Indonesia(1983, 1993, 1997)
Iraq(1991-1992)
Israel(1982-1997)
Morocco (1982-1997)
Portugal(1983)
South Africa (1982-1990)
US (1984, 1989, 1990)
Yugoslavia(SerbiaandMontenegro)
(1994)