LAUREL v MISA
residents of Barrio Banaban. They gathered the
PETITIONER: Anastacio Laurel
RESPONDENT: Eriberto Misa
FACTS:
A petition for habeas corpus was filed by
Anastacio Laurel. He argued that a Filipino citizen
who adhered to the enemy giving the them aid and
comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be
prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and
penalized by the Article 114 of the Revised Penal
Code on the grounds that the sovereignty of the
Philippines was suspended hence the allegiance of
Filipino Citizens to the PH is also suspended and that
there was a change of sovereignty upon the
proclamation of the PH Republic.
ISSUE: W/N a Filipino Citizen who aided the enemy
during the Japanese occupation charged for treason
HELD: YES. The court held that, a citizen or a
subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an
absolute and permanent allegiance which consists of
the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his
government and sovereign.
The court also held that art 114 of the RPC
was applicable to treason committed against the
national security of the legitimate government
because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were
still bound by their allegiance to the PH during
enemy occupation.
Also, the court stated that military occupation
of an enemy territory does not transfer the
sovereignty to the occupant. The “sovereignty” that
is suspended should be construed to mean the
suspension of the exercise of the rights of
sovereignty.
HENCE: Petition DENIED
PEOPLE vs MANAYAO
PETITIONER: People
RESPONDENT: Pedro Manayao
FACTS:
Pedro Manayao, Filomeno Flores and
Raymundo Flores accused were charged with treason
complexed with multiple murder in the People’s
Court. Only Manayao was apprehended and charged.
On the 27th day of January 1945, Japanese
soldiers and a number of Filipinos affiliated with the
Makapili conceived the diabolical idea of killing the
residents and slaughtered them, except the children,
using rifles and bayonets. Witnesses have established
the foregoing facts and Manayao himself admitted
that he participated in the massacre in 2 sworn
statements.
However, he contends that he was a member
of the Armed Forces of Japan, was subject to military
law, and not subject to the jurisdiction of the People's
Court; and that he lost his Philippine citizenship and
was therefore not amenable to the Philippine law of
treason.
He argues that he may lose his citizenship
based on CA 63 by: subscribing to an oath of
allegiance to support the constitution of a foreign
counrty, accepting commission in the military, or by
being declared a deserted of the PH Army.
ISSUE: W/N Manayao can be charged with treason?
HELD: YES. The court held that no evidence was
provided to show that Manayao has subscribed to an
oath of allegiance to Japan although Manayao swore
to held Japan in the war, it does not constitute as
swearing to support its constitution and laws.
There was also no evidence to show that
Manayo was accepted in a commission in the
military of Japan. Much less is there any evidence
that Manayao had ever been declared as a deserted in
the PH Army – nor was he ever a member thereof.
The court also held that under Art 2 sec 2 of
the former Constitution, that states that
“The defense of the State is a prime duty
of government, and in the fulfillment of
this duty all citizens may be required by
law to render personal, military or civil
service."
This provision during such a period of stress,
the citizen cannot be considered free to cast off his
loyalty and obligations toward the Fatherland.
It was intended (but did not declare) that the
duties of the citizen solemnly proclaimed in the
above-quoted constitutional precept could be
effectively cast off by him even when his country is
at war, by the simple expedient of subscribing to an
oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws
of a foreign country, and an enemy country at that, or
by accepting a commission in the military, naval or
air service of such country, or by deserting from the
Philippine Army, Navy, or Air Corps.
HENCE: GUILTY
PEOPLE v PEREZ
FACTS:
 Susano Perez aka “Kid,” provided women to
the invading Japanese officers during WW2.
He was convicted of 5 counts of treason by
the People’s Court and was sentenced to
death.
 On appeal to the SC: the deeds committed by
Perez did not constitute as treason
 not guilty of count 4 has not been substantiated while
ISSUE: W/N the furnishing of women to the
Japanese invaders constitute treason
HELD: NO. The Law of treason does not prohibit all
kinds of social, business and political interaction
between invaders and inhabitants (occupation is
bound to create all sorts of relationships between
invader and invade.
Gen Rule: To be treasonous, the extent of aid
and comfort given to the enemies must be to
RENDER ASSISTANCE TO THEM as enemies and
be DIRECTLY IN FURTHERANCE to their hostile
objectives. Sexual/social relations w/ the Japanese
did not directly/materially improve Japanese war
efforts or weaken PH/US efforts. INTENT OF
DISLOYALTY is a vital ingredient.
HENCE: Perez is GUILTY OF RAPE
PEOPLE V. EDUARDO PRIETO (JAN. 29,
1948)
FACTS:
The appellant was prosecuted in the People's Court
for treason on 7 counts. After pleading not guilty he
entered a plea of guilty to counts 1, 2, 3 and 7, and
maintained the original plea as to counts 4, 5 and 6.
The special prosecutor introduced evidence only on
count 4, stating with reference to counts 5 and 6 that
he did not have sufficient evidence to sustain them.
The defendant was found guilty on count 4 as well as
counts 1, 2, 3 and 7 and was sentenced to death and
to pay a fine of P20,000.
The lower court believes that the accused is "guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of treason
complexed by murder and physical injuries," with
"the aggravating circumstances mentioned above."
Apparently, the court has regarded the murders and
physical injuries charged in the information, not only
as crimes distinct from treason but also as modifying
circumstances. The Solicitor General agrees with the
decision except as to the technical designation of the
crime. In his opinion, the offense committed by the
appellant is a "complex crime of treason with
homicide.
ISSUES:
W/N guilty appellant is guilty of 7 counts of treason.
HELD:
No. Only on counts 1, 2, 3, and 7. The defendant was
counts 5 and 6 were abandoned. The accused pleaded
not guilty to counts 4, 5 and 6, but entered a plea of
guilty to counts 1, 2, 3 and 7. Two witnesses gave
evidence on count 4 but their statements do not
coincide on any single detail. These witnesses
evidently referred to two different occasions. This
evidence does not satisfy the two-witness principle.
The two witnesses failed to corroborate each other
not only on the whole overt act but on any part of
it.There being an aggravating circumstance and a
mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed is
reclusion perpetua. The judgment of the lower court
will be modified in this respect accordingly. In all
other particulars, the same will be affirmed.
PEOPLE V. APOLINAR ADRIANO (JUNE 30,
1947)
FACTS:
The accused bore arm and joined and assisted the
Japanese Military Forces and the Makapili Army in
armed conflicts and engagements against the United
States armed forces and the Guerrillas of the
Philippine Commonwealth, contrary to law. The
prosecution did not introduce any evidence to
substantiate any of the facts alleged except that of
defendant's having joined the Makapili organization.
ISSUES:
W/N appellant should be discharged.
HELD:
Yes. The mere fact of having joined a Makapili
organization is evidence of both adherence to the
enemy and giving him aid and comfort. Adherence,
unlike overt acts, need not be proved by the oaths of
two witnesses. At the same time, being a Makapili is
in itself constitutive of an overt act. It is not
necessary, except for the purpose of increasing the
punishment, that the defendant actually went to
battle or committed nefarious acts against his country
or countrymen. But membership as a Makapili, as an
overt act, must be established by the deposition of
two witnesses. This provision is so exacting and so
uncompromising in regard to the amount of evidence
that where two or more witnesses give oaths to an
overt act and only one of them is believed by the
court or jury, the defendant is entitled to discharge.
PEOPLE V. LOL-LO AND SARAW (FEB. 27,
1922)
FACTS:
Two boats left Matuta for Peta. The second boat was
surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four
Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but
once on the Dutch boat, took for themselves all of the
cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally
violated two of the women by methods too horrible
to described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat,
with the exception of the two young women, were
again placed on it and holes were made in it, with the
idea that it would submerge, although as a matter of
fact, these people, after eleven days of hardship and
privation, were succored. Taking the two women
with them, and repeatedly violating them, the Moros
finally arrived at Maruro. Two of the Moro
marauders were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the
women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were
able to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home Sulu.
There they were arrested and were charged with the
crime of piracy. A demurrer was interposed by
counsel de officio for the Moros, based on the
grounds that the offense charged was not within the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any
court of the Philippine Islands, and that the facts did
not constitute a public offense, under the laws in
force in the Philippine Islands. After the demurrer
was overruled by the trial judge, a trial was had, and
a judgment was rendered finding the two defendants
guilty and sentencing each of them to life
imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to return together
with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in
another case, to the offended parties, the thirty-nine
sacks of coprax which had been robbed, or to
indemnify them in the amount of 942 rupees, and to
pay a one-half part of the costs.
ISSUES:
W/N the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with
the crime of piracy are still in force.
HELD:
Yes. The crime falls under the first paragraph
of article 153 of the Penal Code in relation to article
154. There are present at least two of the
circumstances named in the last cited article as
authorizing either cadena perpetua or death. The
crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense
against chastity and (2) the abandonment of persons
without apparent means of saving themselves. It is,
therefore, only necessary for us to determine as to
whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death
should be imposed. In this connection, the trial court,
finding present the one aggravating circumstance of
nocturnity, and compensating the same by the one
mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction
provided by article 11, as amended, of the Penal
Code, sentenced the accused to life imprisonment. At
least three aggravating circumstances, that the wrong
done in the commission of the crime was deliberately
augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary
for its commission, that advantage was taken of
superior strength, and that means were employed
which added ignominy to the natural effects of the
act, must also be taken into consideration in fixing
the penalty. Considering, therefore, the number and
importance of the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances here present, which cannot be offset
by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of
instruction, and the horrible nature of the crime
committed, it becomes our duty to impose capital
punishment.
PEOPLE V. RODRIGUEZ
Facts:
Appellants Jaime Rodriguez, Rico Lopez, Davio
Reyes and Peter Ponce were charged of the crime of
piracy in an information filed before the then CFI of
Sulu and TawiTawi. The appellants (crew members
of M/V Noria 767) armed with bladed weapons and
high caliber firearms, within the territorial waters of
Tawi-Tawi, stole equipment and other personal
properties belonging to the crew and passengers of
the said vessel. The appellants used personal
violence against the passengers and the crews that
resulted to physical injuries and death of some of the
passengers. The appellants were sentenced to the
extreme penalty of death despite pleading guilty on
the crime of piracy. The case was brought to the
Court for automatic review.

Issue/s: W/N the appellants were guilty of the crime
of piracy?
Held:
Yes. Appellants pleaded guilty on the crime of
piracy. Under PD No. 532, Any attack upon or
seizure of any vessel, or the taking away of the whole
or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the
personal belongings of its complement or
passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons
or force upon things, committed by any person,
including a passenger or member of the complement
of said vessel, in Philippine waters, shall be
considered as piracy.
PEOPLE V SIYOH
Facts: Appellants, Julaide Siyoh and Omarkyam
Kiram, together with Namli Indanan and Andaw
Jamahali were accused of qualified piracy with triple
murder and frustrated murder. On July 14, 1979, the
appellants, fired their guns into the air and stopped
the pump boat wherein Rodolfo de Castro, Danilo
Hiolen, Anastacio de Guzman and Antonio de
Guzman were riding, traveling at that time from the
island of Baluk-Baluk towards Pilas. The appellants
boarded the said pump boat and stole cash,
wristwatches, stereo sets, merchandise and other
personal belongings amounting to the total amount
of P18,342.00. The said accused, on the occasion of
the crime herein above-described, taking advantage
that the said victims were at their mercy, ordered
them to jump into the water and fired their guns at
them which caused the death of Rodolfo de Castro,
Danilo Hiolen, Anastacio de Guzman and wounded
Antonio de Guzman. The CFI found the accused
have performed all the acts of execution which would
have produced the crime of Qualified Piracy with
triple murder and frustrated murder as defined in PD
No. 532 and were sentenced to supreme penalty of
death. However, considering sec 106 of the Code of
Mindanao and Sulu, the illiteracy or ignorance or
extreme poverty of the accused, a commutation to
life imprisonment was recommended. The case was
brought to the Supreme court for automatic review.
Issue: W/N the accused-appellants were guilty of the
crime of qualified piracy?
Held: Yes. the number of persons killed on the
occasion of piracy is not material. P.D. No. 532
considers qualified piracy, i.e. rape, murder or
homicide is committed as a result or on the occasion
of piracy, as a special complex crime punishable by
death regardless of the number of victims.
PEOPLE VS TULIN
FACTS: M/T Tabangao, a cargo vessel owned by
the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation,
loaded with barrels of kerosene, regular gasoline, and
diesel oil was sailing off the coast of Mindoro when
it was suddenly boarded by 7 fully armed pirates led
by Emilio Changco. The pirates, including the
accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante Jr.
detained the crew and took complete control over the
vessel. The crew was forced to sail to Singapore, all
the while sending misleading radio messages to
PNOC that the ship was undergoing repairs.
The ship arrived in the vicinity of Singapore
and cruised around the area presumably to await
another vessel which, however, failed to arrive. The
pirates were thus forced to return to the Philippines
on March 14, 1991, arriving at Calatagan, Batangas
on March 20, 1991 where it remained at sea. On
March 28, 1991, the "M/T Tabangao" again sailed to
and anchored about 10 to 18 nautical miles from
Singapore's shoreline where another vessel called
"Navi Pride" anchored beside it. Emilio Changco
ordered the crew of "M/T Tabangao" to transfer the
vessel's cargo to the hold of "Navi Pride".
ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippines has
jurisdiction over the crime committed outside the
Philippine waters or territory?
HELD: Yes. Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code,
before its amendment, provided that piracy must be
committed on the high seas by any person not a
member of its complement nor a passenger thereof.
Upon its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659, the
coverage of the pertinent provision was widened to
include offenses committed "in Philippine waters."
On the other hand, under Presidential Decree No. 532
(issued in 1974), the coverage of the law on piracy
embraces any person including "a passenger or
member of the complement of said vessel in
Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or not, a
member of the complement or not, any person is
covered by the law.
 Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded (People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922]).
nor amended the provisions on piracy under
Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no
contradiction between the two laws. There is
likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to
construe or interpret the law. All the presidential
decree did was to widen the coverage of the law, in
keeping with the intent to protect the citizenry as well
as neighboring states from crimes against the law of
nations. As expressed in one of the "whereas" clauses
of Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the
highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the
penal statutes of all countries." For this reason,
piracy under the Article 122, as amended, and piracy
under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist
harmoniously as separate laws.

As regards the contention that the trial

court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person
of accused-appellant Hiong since the crime was
committed outside Philippine waters, suffice it to
state that unquestionably, the attack on and
seizure of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T
Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were
committed in Philippine waters, although the
captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to
Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded,
transferred, and sold. And such transfer was done
under accused-appellant Hiong's direct
supervision. Although Presidential Decree No.
532 requires that the attack and seizure of the
vessel and its cargo be committed in Philippine
waters, the disposition by the pirates of the vessel
and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of
piracy, hence, the same need not be committed in
Philippine waters.

Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of

Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As such, it
is an exception to the rule on territoriality in
criminal law. The same principle applies even if
Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not with
a violation of qualified piracy under the penal
code but under a special law, Presidential Decree
No. 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine
waters. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 532 should
be applied with more force here since its purpose
is precisely to discourage and prevent piracy in
Philippine waters (People v. Catantan, 278 SCRA
761 [1997]). It is likewise, well-settled that
regardless of the law penalizing the same, piracy
is a reprehensible crime against the whole world
BENITO ASTORGA v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
Petitioner: Benito Astorga
Respondent: People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 154130
Ponente: Ynares-Santiago
Date: October 1, 2003
Facts
On Sept. 2, 1997, Regional Special Operations
Group (RSOG) of DENR Tacloban sent a team to
Daram, Western Samar to conduct an intelligence
gathering and forest protection operations in line
with the government’s efforts against illegal logging.
The team was composed of Moises dela Cruz,
Wenifredo Maniscan, Renato Miltante, Crisanto
Pelias, and Elpidio E. Simon. They were escorted by
Andres B. Cinco, Jr and Rufo Capoquian
(policemen).
The team stopped at Brgy. Bagacay, Daram at 2 PM
and saw two boats being constructed in which they
learned that those belonged to a certain Michael
Figueroa. En route to Brgy. Manungca, Sta. Rita they
saw two more boats being constructed in the vicinity
of Brgy. Lucob-Lucob, Daram around 4:30-5PM
prompting them to investigate. Maniscan and
Militante proceeded to the site of the boat
construction wherein they met Mayor Astorga.
Afterwards, Militante returned to the boat to fetch
Simon at the request of Astorga.
Simon, accompanied by dela Cruz and the
policemen, tried to explain the purpose of their
mission but he was slapped hard twice on the
shoulder by Astorga followed by threats. Astorga
them ordered reinforcements who were armed men
in fatigue uniforms. Simon took out his handheld
ICOM radio to inform DENR in Catbalogan of their
location, however, Astorga snatched the device.
After receiving hostility from Astorga, Simon
requested to be given permission to go home.
Astorga declined the request and told them they were
to be brought to Daram.
They were brought to a house where they were
served dinner. After dinner, Militante, Maniscan, and
Capoquian were allowed to leave the house but not
the barangay. The rest waited until 2 AM to be
allowed to leave.
The complainant then filed a criminal complaint for
arbitrary detention against Astorga and his men. The
Sandiganbayan ruled in favor of the complainants.
Issue W/N Astorga is guilty of committing arbitrary
detention of the complainants?
RULING
YES. Following the elements of arbitrary detention
under Art. 124, the first element is that the offender
must be a public officer; the second is that he detains
a person; and the third is that the detention is without
legal grounds.
Given that Astorga is the mayor of Daram, the first
element is satisfied.
Astorga also admitted the his acts were motivated by
his instinct of self-preservation and the feeling that
he was being singled out. Thus, the detention was
bereft of legal grounds satisfying the third element.
According to prevailing jurisprudence on illegal
detention and kidnapping, there is no need to involve
physical restraint upon the victim to be deprived of
his liberty. If the acts and actuations of the accused
would instill fear to the victim sufficient to paralyze
or limit his actions and movements, the victim is
detained against his will. This can be seen in the
refusal to be allowed to go home which was followed
by the arrival of armed men in fatigue uniforms who
surrounded the team. The second element is thus
satisfied.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986, dated
July 5, 2001 finding petitioner BENITO ASTORGA
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Arbitrary Detention and sentencing him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8)
months of prision correccional, as maximum, is
AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
MELENCIO SAYO and JOAQUIN MOSTERO
v. THE CHIEF OF POLICE and THE OFFICER
IN CHARGE OF MUNICIPAL JAIL, BOTH OF
CITY OF MANILA
Petitioner: Melencio Sayo and Joanquin Mostero
Respondent: Chief of Police and the Officer-in-
Charge of Municipal Jail
G.R. No. L-2128
Ponente: Feria
Date: May 12, 1948
Facts
On Apr. 2, 1948, Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman of
Manila City, arrested Sayo and Mostero upon
complaint of one Bernardino Malinao of committing
the crime of robbery. Dumlao presented a complaint
against them to the Fiscal’s Office of Manila. On
Apr. 7, 1948, when the petition for habeas corpus
was filed to the Court, Sayo and Mostero were still
detained without any information against them filed
or released by the City Fiscal.
Issue W/N Sayo and Mostero were arbitrarily
detained?
RULING
YES. What constitutes as a violation of Art. 125 is
the failure to deliver a person arrested to the proper
judicial authority within a specific period. The City
Fiscal does not constitute as a proper judicial
authority. The Court explained that taking into
consideration the history of the provision, judicial
authority means the courts of justices or judges of
courts vested with judicial power to temporary detain
or confine persons charged with committing public
offense. Furthermore, the Court explained that it is
under the constitution (Art. 3) that judicial authority
is vested to a judge after examination of complainant
and his witnesses. Lastly, the Rules of Court
emphasizes the role of judges in the arrest and
detainment of suspects.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
In view of all the foregoing, without making any
pronouncement as to the responsibility of the officers
who intervened in the detention of the petitioners, for
the policeman Dumlao may have acted in good faith,
in the absence of a clear cut ruling on the matter, in
believing that he had complied with the mandate of
article 125 by delivering the petitioners within six
hours to the office of the City Fiscal, and the latter
might have ignored the fact that the petitioners were
being actually detained when the said policeman
filed a complaint against them with the City Fiscal,
we hold that the petitioners are being illegally
restrained of their liberty, and their release is hereby
ordered unless they are now detained by virtue of a
process issued by a competent court of justice.
ARTHUR MEDINA Y YUMUL v. MARCELO F.
OROZCO, JR., Acting City Warden of Caloocan
City
Petitioner: Arthur Medina y Yumul
Respondent: Marcelo F. Orozco, Jr.
G.R. No. L-26723
Ponente: Sanchez
Date: December 22, 1966
Facts
Arthur Medina was arrested on Nov. 7, 1965 at 12
NN as the alleged murderer of on Marcelo Sangalang
which occurred on Oct. 31, 1965. He was
incarcerated in Caloocan City Jail. 9 AM on the day
of his arrest, the murder case against him and two
others involved was referred to a fiscal who
conducted preliminary investigation in his presence.
On Nov. 10, 1965 at 3:40 PM, an information for
murder was filed against him, Antonio Olivar y
Flores, and Alexander Enriquez y Raginio in the CFI
Rizal Caloocan branch (Criminal Case No. C-1197).
By order of the court, they were committed to jail.
Issue W/N Medina was arbitrarily detained under
Art. 125?
RULING
NO. Although the law mandates his delivery to
proper judicial authorities within 18 hours or be
released thereafter and the facts showed otherwise,
he cannot be declared arbitrarily detained. The events
following his arrest, such Nov. 7 was a Sunday, Nov.
8 declared as an official holiday, and Nov. 9 which
was an election day (official holiday), were
difficulties faced by the fiscal to promptly file his
information and thus be committed to jail.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
For the reasons given, the petition herein to set
petitioner Arthur Medina y Yumul at liberty is
hereby denied. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.

JASPER AGBAY v. THE HONORABLE
DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE
MILITARY, SPO4 NEMESIO NATIVIDAD, JR.
and SPO2 ELEAZAR M. SOLOMON
Facts:
Jasper Agbay (Petitioner), together with one
Sherwin Jugalbot, was arrested and detained at the
Liloan Police Station, Metro Cebu for an alleged
violation of R.A. 7610. The following day, a
Complaint for violation of R.A. 7610 was filed
against petitioner and Jugalbot before the 7th
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Metro
Cebu. Subsequently, counsel for petitioner wrote the
Chief of Police of Liloan demanding the immediate
release of petitioner considering that the latter had
failed to deliver the petitioner to the proper judicial
authority within thirty-six (36) hours from his
detention. September 7, 1997, this was not acted
upon. When petitioner was able to post bond and was
released, he filed a complaint for delay in the
delivery of detained persons against herein private
respondents. By virtue of Memorandum Circular No.
14 of the Office of the Ombudsman the case for
delay in delivery filed by petitioner against herein
private respondents was transferred to the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military for its proper
disposition. Thus, it was this office which acted on
the complaint, and issued the Resolution
recommending its dismissal against herein private
respondents. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of
this Resolution but it was denied. Hence, this petition
for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not there was delay in the delivery of
detained persons to the proper judicial authorities.
Held:
No. The filing of the complaint with the Municipal
Trial Court constitutes delivery to a proper judicial
authority as contemplated by Art. 125 of the Revised
Penal Code. Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code
punishes public officials or employees who shall
detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail
to deliver such person to the proper judicial
authorities within the periods prescribed by law. The
continued detention of the accused becomes illegal
upon the expiration of the periods provided for by
Art. 125 without such detainee having been delivered
to the corresponding judicial authorities. The words
judicial authority as contemplated by Art. 125 mean
the courts of justices or judges of said courts vested
with judicial power to order the temporary detention
or confinement of a person charged with having
committed a public offense, that is, the Supreme
Court and other such inferior courts as may be
established by law.In contrast with a city fiscal, it is
undisputed that a municipal court judge, even in the
performance of his function to conduct preliminary
investigations, retains the power to issue an order of
release or commitment . Furthermore, upon the filing
of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court, the
intent behind Art. 125 is satisfied considering that by
such act, the detained person is informed of the crime
imputed against him and, upon his application with
the court, he may be released on bail. Thus, the very
purpose underlying Article 125 has been duly served
with the filing of the complaint with the MCTC.
PETITION DISMISSED
SORIA v. HON. DESIERTO (Head of the Office
of the Ombudsman)
Facts:
Petitioners Rodolfo Soria and Edimar Bista
were arrested on May 13, 2001 (a Sunday and the day
before May 14 elections) without a warrant by
respondents (officers of the Office of the
Ombudsman) for alleged illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition. One police identified
Bista to have a standing warrant of arrest for
violation of BP Blg. 6. From the time of Soria’s
detention up to the time of his release, 22 hours had
already elapsed and Bista was detained for 26 days.
The crimes for which Soria was arrested without
warrant are punishable by correctional penalties or
their equivalent, thus, criminal complaints or
information should be filed with the proper judicial
authorities within 18 hours of his arrest. The crimes
for which Bista was arrested are punishable by
afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent,
thus, he could only be detained for 36 hours without
criminal complaints or information having been filed
with the proper judicial authorities.
Petitioners filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman for Military Affairs a complaint-
affidavit for violation of Art. 125 of the Revised
Penal Code against herein private respondents. The
office dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
Petitioners then filed their motion for reconsideration
which was denied for lack of merit in the second
assailed Resolution.

Issue:
Whether or not Respondents are liable for violation
of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code (Delay in
the delivery of detained persons)

Held:
No, they are not. Article 125 should be construed as
excluding Sundays, holidays and election days in the
computation of the periods prescribed within which
public officers should deliver arrested persons to the
proper judicial authorities. In the instant case, while
it appears that the complaints against Soria for Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Violation of COMELEC
Resolution No. 3328 were filed with the Regional
Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan,
Ilocos Sur, only on May 15, 200[1] at 4:30 p.m., he
had already been released the day before or on May
14, 2001 at about 6:30 p.m. by the respondents, as
directed by Prov. Prosecutor Jessica [Viloria].
Hence, there could be no arbitrary detention or
violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code to
speak of.
PETITION DISMISSED