Crim Rev Atty Diwa Part 1 1-10

CRIM REV ATTY DIWA CASES PART 1 1-10
Jeross Romano Aguilar

G.R. No. 208170, August 20, 2014 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PETRUS YAU A.K.A.
“JOHN” AND “RICKY” AND SUSANA YAU Y SUMOGBA A.K.A. “SUSAN”, Accused-Appellants.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 208170, August 20, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PETRUS YAU A.K.A. “JOHN” AND “RICKY” AND
SUSANA YAU Y SUMOGBA A.K.A. “SUSAN”, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the September 7, 2012 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
03446, which affirmed the December 14, 2007 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 214,
Mandaluyong City (RTC), in Criminal Case No. MC-04-7923.
The RTC found accused-appellant Petrus Yau (Petrus) guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the
crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention, as defined and penalized in Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, (R.A. No. 7659), and convicted accused-
appellant Susana Yau y Sumogba (Susana) as an accomplice to the commission of the same crime.
The Facts
Petrus and Susana were charged with the crime of Kidnapping For Ransom in the Information,3 dated
February 13, 2004, the accusatory portion of which reads: chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
That on or about January 20, 2004, at around 2:00 P.M. in the vicinity of Shoemart Mega Mall, Mandaluyong
City, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with the use of
a sleeping substance, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and take away
ALASTAIR JOSEPH ONGLINGSWAM in the following manner, to wit: while said ALASTAIR JOSEPH
ONGLINGSWAM was on board a white Toyota taxi cab with plate number PVD-115 being driven by the
above-named accused Petrus Yau a.k.a. “John” and “Ricky” and the taxi cab was travelling along Epifanio
Delos Santos (EDSA) Avenue, he suddenly fell unconscious and upon regaining consciousness he was
already handcuffed and in chains inside a house located at B23, L2, Ponsettia St., Camilla Sorrento Homes,
Panapaan IV, Bacoor, Cavite, where he was kept for twenty two (22) days, which house is owned by
accused Susana Yau y Sumogba and while therein he was maltreated; that ransom in the amount of SIX
HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS (US$600,000.00) and TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php20,000.00) for each
day of detention was demanded in exchange for his safe release until he was finally rescued on February 11,
2004, by PACER operatives of the Philippine National Police.
CONTRARY TO LAW. chanroble slaw
Version of the Prosecution
In the Appellee’s Brief,4 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presented the following narration of the
kidnapping: cha nRoblesvi rt ual Lawlib rary
On January 20, 2004, at around 1:30 in the afternoon, private complainant Alastair Onglingswam, who is a
practicing lawyer and businessman from the United States, went out of Makati Shangrila Hotel, where he
was billeted, and hailed a white Toyota taxi cab with plate number PVD-115 to take him from the said hotel
to Virra Mall Shopping Center in San Juan, Metro Manila. While the said taxicab was plying along EDSA, and
within the vicinity of SM Megamall, private complainant received a phone call from his associate Kelly Wei in
Hong Kong. He noted that while he was on the phone conversing with his associate, appellant Petrus Yau,
whom he noted to have short black hair, a moustache and gold framed eyeglasses, would from time to time
turn to him and talk as if he was also being spoken to. Thereafter, he felt groggy and decided to hang-up his
phone. He no longer knew what transpired except that when he woke up lying down, his head was already
covered with a plastic bag and he was handcuffed and chained.
When private complainant complained that the handcuffs were too tight, a man who was wearing a red
mask and introduced himself as “John” approached him and removed the plastic bag from his head and
loosened his handcuff. John informed him that he was being kidnapped for ransom and that he will be
allowed to make phone calls to his family and friends. Hours later, John returned with telephony equipment,
tape recorder, phone and a special antennae cap for the cellphone. With these equipment, private
complainant was allowed to call his girlfriend and father and asked them for the PIN of his ATM cards and for
money, however, with instructions not to inform them that he was kidnapped. A day after, he was told by
his captor to call his girlfriend and father to tell them that he was still alive as well as to reveal to them that
he was kidnapped for ransom and his kidnappers were demanding Six Hundred Thousand Dollars
(US$600,000.00) as ransom and Twenty Thousand Pesos (Php20,000.00) a day as room and board fee.
The private complainant’s family, girlfriend (Iris Chau) and friends received a text message purportedly from
the former informing them that he was kidnapped and ransom for his liberty was demanded.
On January 21, 2004, the family of the victim informed the United States Embassy in Manila about the
situation and a meeting with the representatives of the Philippine National Police was arranged.
Subsequently, Chau received an email from the purported kidnapper demanding US$2,000.00. Chau then
wired US$1,000.00, upon instructions, to Ong Kwai Ping thru Metro Bank and Trust Company. Likewise,
private complainant’s brother Aaron Onglingswam made eight (8) deposits to Ong Kwai Ping’s account in
Metro Bank, amounting to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php200,000.00), to ensure his brother’s safety
and eventual release.
During private complainant’s twenty-two (22) days of captivity, while he was allowed to communicate with
his family almost daily to prove that he was still alive and was served with meals almost five times a day
either by John or the other accused Susan Yau, he was also maltreated i.e. beaten with sticks, made to lay-
down biting a piece of wood which was made as target for a rifle.
On February 10, 2004, the PACER received information that a taxi with plate number PVD 115 plying along
Bacoor was victimizing passengers. Upon instructions of P/Supt. Isagani Nerez, members of the Police Anti-
Crime and Emergency Response Task Force (PACER) were ordered to proceed to Bacoor, Cavite to look for
Toyota Corolla White Taxicab with Plate No. PVD 115.
On February 11, 2004, at around 4:00 o’clock in the morning, the PACER group proceeded to Bacoor and
positioned themselves along Aguinaldo Highway under the overpass fronting SM Bacoor. Not having caught
sight of the taxi, after three hours, the group moved to a different location along the Aguinaldo Highway
where they were able to chance upon the said vehicle. Thus, they followed it, then flagged it down and
approached the driver. The driver was asked to scroll down his window and was told that the vehicle was
being used to victimize foreign nationals. Appellant did not offer to make any comment. Hence, this
prompted the officers to ask for his name and since he answered that he was Petrus Yau, a British national,
they asked him for his driver’s license and car registration but appellant was not able to produce any. Since
he could not produce any driver’s license and car registration, they were supposed to bring him to the police
station for investigation, however, when shown a picture of private complainant and asked if he knew him,
he answered that the man is being kept in his house. He was immediately informed that he was being
placed under arrest for kidnapping private complainant Alastair Onglingswam after being informed of his
constitutional rights. Thereafter, appellant’s cellphones, a QTEK Palmtop and Sony Erickson were
confiscated. Upon instructions of P/Supt. Nerez, [appellant] was brought to the parking lot of SM City Bacoor
for a possible rescue operations of the victim.
Appellant led the team to his house and after opening the gate of his residence, he was led back to the
police car. The rest of the members of PACER proceeded inside the house and found a man sitting on the
floor chained and handcuffed. The man later identified himself as Alastair Onglingswam.
During the trial of the case, private complainant positively identified Petrus Yau as his captor and the taxi
driver. Test conducted by the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation reveals that the DNA found in
the mask used by private complainant’s captor matched that of appellant Petrus Yau.5
Version of the Defense
Petrus and Susana denied the accusation, and stated the following in their Brief6 to substantiate their claim
of innocence: chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
Accused Petrus Yau denied having committed the crime. He averred that the supposed kidnap victim
coordinated with the police to set up the subject case against him and his family. He is a British national. He
had been in the Philippines for many times since he was 14 years old. He came to the country in July 2001
for a vacation and had not left since then. On September 2001, he got married to Susana Yau. Prior thereto,
he was in Singapore running some businesses.
On January 20, 2004, at around 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon (the date and time the victim was kidnapped),
Petrus Yau was at home sleeping.
On February 11, 2004 (the date the victim was allegedly rescued) at around 8:30 – 9:00 o’clock in the
morning, he went to his wife Susana in her shop and got money to be deposited to the Asia Trust Bank. He
parked his car outside the bank. After he alighted from his car, three (3) men bigger than him held his
hands: one (1) of them held his neck. They pushed him inside their van. They tied his hands with packing
tape, covered his eyes with the same tape, and his head with a plastic bag. They kicked and beat him until
he became unconscious.
When he regained consciousness, he was inside an air-conditioned room. His hands were handcuffed and he
felt very cold because his body was wet. His head was still being covered. He shouted asking where he was.
People came in and he heard them talking in Tagalog. They kicked him for about twenty (20) seconds.
Later, he was made to sit, as he was lying on the floor. He said that he could not see anything, thus,
someone removed the cover of his head. They accused him of being a kidnapper, to which he replied that he
was not. He pleaded to them to allow him to make a call to the British Embassy, his friends and his wife, but
to no avail.
When he was taken into custody, he had his wedding ring, watch and a waist bag containing his British
passport, alien certificate, driver’s license, Asia Trust bankbook in the name of Susana Yau, ATM Cards (in
his name) of Metrobank, PCI Equitable Bank and Banco de Oro, VISA Card, and some cash given to him by
his wife . He lost those personal properties.
After four (4) to five (5) hours, he was transferred to another room without a window. The following day, he
was brought to and detained at the PACER Custodial Center.
Petrus Yau can speak English but he is better in the Chinese language, both Mandarin and Cantonese. He
bought the taxi he was driving in August 2003 for Eighty Five Thousand Pesos (Php85,000.00) for personal
use and/or for resale. It had a defective engine (usually overheats), without an aircon and cannot travel for
long journey. He does not drive a taxi to earn a living. He had police friends who told him that he cannot
drive a taxi as an occupation since his driver’s license is non-professional.
Sometime on June 2003, he and his wife Susana had a heated argument over his womanizing. Hence, she
decided to live separately from him (though she was pregnant at that time) and moved to another house
(Block 5, Lot 4, Tulip Street, Andrea Village, Bacoor, Cavite). Sometimes, she would visit him.
Petrus claimed that his house does not have a basement, contrary to the victim’s testimony that he was
placed in the basement. He was not in his house when the police officers allegedly rescued the kidnapped
victim. He left his house in good condition in the morning before his arrest. The white Toyota Corolla taxi he
was driving had markings of faded grey, not black, as claimed by Alastair.
During the inquest proceedings, Petrus Yau was not assisted by a counsel and was not informed of his
constitutional rights.
Susana Sumogba Yau denied the accusation that she was in the company of the kidnapper every time the
latter served Alastair’s food (lunch and dinner). She is legally married to Petrus Yau. They have two (2)
children named Charlie and Vivian. On February 11, 2004, she lived at Block 5, Lot 4, Tulips Street, Andrea
Village, Bacoor, Cavite, while Petrus Yau lived at Block 23, Lot 2, Ponsettia Street, Sorrento Town Homes,
Bacoor, Cavite, with his girlfriend. Susana and Petrus were separated since June 2003.
On February 11, 2004, she called him to pick up the amount of Php7,000.00 (earnings of her sari-sari store)
and to deposit it in her account at Asia Trust Bank. She would request Petrus to do such errand for her as
she does not trust her househelp. Petrus came to her at around 7:00 o’clock in the morning. At around
11:00 o’clock a.m. of the same day, four (4) to five (5) policemen arrived at her residence and told her to
come with them to the hospital where Petrus was brought because he met a vehicular accident along
Aguinaldo Highway.
Susana, together with her children and helpers, went with them, and rode in their van. They, however, were
not brought to the hospital but to an office. Thereat, Susana saw her husband (almost dead) inside a small
room with a one-way mirror. She was not able to talk to him. She, together with her children and helpers,
were detained for three (3) days inside a small room. After three (3) days, her children and helpers were
released and they went home. At that time, she was not provided with the assistance of a counsel.
Susana stated that her husband’s name is Petrus Yau. He is not known either as John or Ong Kwai Ping. He
is engaged in the business of buying cars for resale. They owned three (3) houses and lots, all registered in
her name. At the time she was taken into custody by the police, she had with her Five Thousand Pesos cash,
Allied Bank passbook and ATM Cards (Allied Bank and Asia Trust Bank), VISA card, passport, wedding ring,
necklace and cellphone, which were taken away by persons whom she does not know.7
The Ruling of the RTC
In its judgment, dated December 14, 2007, the RTC convicted Petrus Yau, as principal, of the crime of
kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention, and Susana Yau, as an accomplice to the commission
thereof. The RTC found the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible and sufficient, with their
versions of the incident dovetailing with each other even on minor details. It observed that Petrus failed to
rebut his positive identification by the victim, Alastair and his brother Aaron John Onglingswam (Aaron
John), with whom he talked for several times over the phone. It stated that the circumstantial evidence
proffered by the prosecution had adequately reinforced its theory that Petrus was the perpetrator of the
heinous act.
With respect to Susana, the RTC wrote that she was positively identified by Alastair as the Filipino woman
who fed him or accompanied Petrus in bringing him food during his 22 days of captivity and, for said reason,
should be held liable as an accomplice.
The RTC rejected the twin defenses of alibi and frame-up submitted by Petrus and Susana because the same
were unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The dispositive portion of the said decision
states:chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibrary
WHEREFORE, this court renders judgment finding the accused Petrus Yau GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT as principal of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention and pursuant to
Republic Act No. 9346, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the prison term of RECLUSION PERPETUA. The court
also finds the accused Susana Yau GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as accomplice to the commission
of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention and applying to her the benefit of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law wherein her minimum penalty shall be taken from the penalty next lower in
degree of the imposable penalty of RECLUSION TEMPORAL which is prision mayor, she is hereby therefore
sentenced to suffer the prison term of EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION MAYOR MINIMUM AS
MINIMUM to TWELVE (12) YEARS and TEN (10) MONTHS of RECLUSION TEMPORAL MINIMUM AS MAXIMUM.
Accused are credited in full of the preventive imprisonment they have already served in confinement.
Further, both accused are sentenced to pay, jointly and severally, the victim ALASTAIR JOSEPH
ONGLINGSWAM actual damages of Two Hundred Seventy Three Thousand and One Hundred Thirty Two
Pesos (P273, 132.00) plus interest from the filing of the information until full payment, moral damages of
One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), and exemplary damages of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000.00).
SO ORDERED.8
Unfazed, Petrus and Susana appealed the RTC judgment of conviction before the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
The CA affirmed the conviction of Petrus and Susana. 9 The appellate court likewise lent credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, who were able to establish with certitude the commission of the
crime and the identities of the culprits thereof.
Hence, this appeal.
ASSIGNED ERRORS:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS
ILLEGALLY ARRESTED AND AS SUCH, THE PIECES OF OBJECT EVIDENCE ALLEGEDLY SEIZED ARE
INADMISSIBLE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS THE ALLEGED KIDNAPPER.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.10
Susana insisted that the trial court erred: 1] in not giving credence to her claim that she was living
separately with her husband, Petrus Yau; 2] in not considering that she was not mentioned in the sworn
statement executed by Alastair, dated February 12, 2004, even when said victim was asked if there was
another person assisting Petrus in the perpetration of the crime; 3] in not considering the Resolution of the
Department of Justice, dated February 13, 2004, finding probable cause against her because she is the
registered owner of the house where Alastair was held captive and not because she served food on the
victim; and 4] in convicting her as an accomplice.11 cralaw red
On September 11, 2013, the Court issued a resolution12 notifying the parties that they could file their
respective supplemental briefs if they so desire. The People of the Philippines, represented by the OSG,
opted not to file any supplemental brief, maintaining its positions and arguments in its brief earlier filed in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03446.13 Petrus filed his Supplemental Brief14 on December 27, 2013 in amplification of
his arguments raised in his brief filed before the CA.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
Encapsulated, the issues herein focus on: (a) the credibility of the prosecution witnesses; (b) the sufficiency
of the prosecution evidence to prove the commission of kidnapping for ransom and the identity of the
culprits thereof; and (c) the degree of responsibility of each accused-appellant for the crime of kidnapping
for ransom.
Worth reiterating on the issue of the credibility of the witnesses is the ruling of the Court in People v.
Maxion15 that:chanRoblesvirtual Lawlib rary
The issue raised by accused-appellant involves the credibility of witness, which is best addressed by the trial
court, it being in a better position to decide such question, having heard the witness and observed his
demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. These are the most significant factors in
evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting
testimonies. Through its observations during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be expected to
determine, with reasonable discretion, whose testimony to accept and which witness to believe. Verily,
findings of the trial court on such matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances
of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition
of the case.16
It has been an established rule in appellate review that the trial court’s factual findings, such as its
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, the probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions
drawn from the factual findings, are accorded great respect and have even conclusive effect. Such factual
findings and conclusions assume even greater weight when they are affirmed by the CA.17 cralawred
In the case at bench, the RTC gave more weight and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses compared to those of the accused-appellants. After a judicious review of the evidence on record,
the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the factual findings of the RTC and the CA, and their
respective assessment and calibration of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
In every criminal case, the task of the prosecution is always two-fold, that is, (1) to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged; and (2) to establish with the same quantum of proof
the identity of the person or persons responsible therefor, because, even if the commission of the crime is a
given, there can be no conviction without the identity of the malefactor being likewise clearly
ascertained.18 Here, the prosecution was able to satisfactorily discharge this burden.
Victim Alastair positively identified Petrus as the driver of the white Toyota Corolla taxicab with Plate No.
PVD 115 which he boarded before he lost consciousness on the afternoon of January 20, 2004. He claimed
that while he was conversing with his business associate Kelly Wei over his phone inside the taxicab, Petrus
would turn his face towards him, from time to time, and would talk as if he was being spoken to. Alastair
claimed that he had a good look and an ample opportunity to remember the facial features of the driver as
to be able to recognize and identify him in court. It is the most natural reaction for victims of crimes to
strive to remember the faces of their accosters and the manner in which the craven acts are committed.19 cralawred
Alastair also recognized the voice behind the red mask used by his kidnapper as belonging to Petrus. It was
established that from the first to the twentieth day of Alastair’s captivity, his kidnapper would meet him five
times a day and would talk to him for an hour, thus, enabling him to remember the culprit’s voice which had
a unique tone and noticeable Chinese accent. Alastair declared with certainty that it was the voice of Petrus.
Witness Aaron John insisted that the person who introduced himself as Ong Kwai Ping and with whom he
had talked over the phone for three weeks, demanding necessity money and ransom for the release of his
brother Alastair, was Petrus because of the distinct tone of his voice with Chinese accent. There was no
showing that Alastair and Aaron John had any ill motive to falsely testify against Petrus. As a rule, absent
any evidence showing any reason or motive for prosecution witnesses to perjure, the logical conclusion is
that no such improper motive exists, and their testimonies are, thus, worthy of full faith and credit.20 cralawre d
Further, the prosecution presented credible and sufficient pieces of circumstantial evidence that led to the
inescapable and reasonable conclusion that Petrus committed the crime charged. The settled rule is that a
judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the following requisites
concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.21 The corollary rule is that the circumstances proven must constitute an unbroken chain which leads
to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person.22cra lawred
The combination of the following established facts and circumstances affirm the findings of guilt by the RTC
and the CA: chanRoblesvi rtual Lawl ibra ry
1] The victim was rescued by the police inside the house owned by Petrus and Susana, located at Block 23,
Lot 2, Ponsettia St., Camella Sorrento Homes, Bacoor, Cavite; chan roblesv irtuallaw lib rary
2] The Toyota Corolla white taxicab bearing Plate No. PVD 115, which the victim recalled boarding in going
to Virra Mall Greenhills Shopping Center on the afternoon of January 20, 2004 and where he lost
consciousness, was found in the possession of the accused-appellant Petrus on February 11, 2004; chanroble svi rtual lawlib rary
3] The driver’s license of Petrus and an ATM card in the name of Ong Kwai Ping were recovered inside the
Toyota Corolla taxicab of Petrus Yau; chanroblesvi rt uallawl ibra ry
4] In the house where the victim was rescued, the following evidence were found: one (1) chain with
padlock; handcuffs; short broken chain; checkered pajama; black blazer; one (1) Onesimus black coat; two
(2) video camera cartridges, one showing the victim in lying down position and family footages, and the
other one labeled “sex scandal”; eight (8) pieces of cellphones; notebook; two (2) Talk n Tex SIM cards;
Globe SIM card; two (2) Transfer Certificates of Title for two pieces of land in Bacoor, Cavite, under the
name of Susana Sumogba; original copy of the Official Receipts and Certificate of Registration of a Suzuki
1993 motorcycle bearing Plate No. 2M9748; business license and mayor’s permit issued to Susana Yau;
marriage contract of Petrus Yau and Susana Yau; birth certificate of Susana Sumogba; birth certificates of
their children; ACR of Petrus Yau; Meralco bills; Asia Trust deposit slips; five ATM deposit slips; and PLDT
bills;
chan rob lesvi rtual lawlib rary
5] Two (2) cellphones, a QTEK Palmtop and a Sony Erickson were found in the possession of Petrus.
Incidentally, it was reported that the owner of the QTEK Palmtop cellphone was a certain Jasper Beltran,
also a kidnapped victim whose whereabouts had not been known yet; and ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry
6] The DNA examination on the red mask worn by the kidnapper that was recovered inside the house and
on the buccal swab taken from Petrus showed that both DNA profiles matched.23
The Court agrees with the findings of the RTC and the CA that the foregoing pieces of circumstantial
evidence, when analyzed and taken together, definitely lead to no other conclusion than that Petrus was the
author of the kidnapping for ransom. When viewed as a whole, the prosecution evidence effectively
established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The elements of Kidnapping For Ransom under Article 267 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, are as
follows: (a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the
victim of his liberty; and (c) motive of the accused, which is extorting ransom for the release of the
victim.24 cra lawred
All of the foregoing elements were duly established by the testimonial and documentary evidences for the
prosecution in the case at bench. First, Petrus is a private individual. Second, Petrus kidnapped Alastair by
using sleeping substance which rendered the latter unconscious while inside a taxicab driven by the said
accused-appellant. Third, Petrus took and detained Alastair inside the house owned by him and Susana Yau
in Bacoor, Cavite, where said victim was handcuffed and chained, and hence, deprived of his liberty. Fourth,
Alastair was taken against his will. And fifth, Petrus made demands for the delivery of a ransom in the
amount of US$600,000.00 for the release of the victim.
Anent the criminal liability of each accused-appellant, there is no doubt that Petrus is liable as principal of
the crime of kidnapping for ransom. Susana, on the other hand, is liable only as an accomplice to the crime
as correctly found by the lower courts. It must be emphasized that there was no evidence indubitably
proving that Susana participated in the decision to commit the criminal act. The only evidence the
prosecution had against her was the testimony of Alastair to the effect that he remembered her as the
woman who gave food to him or who accompanied his kidnapper whenever he would bring food to him
every breakfast, lunch and dinner.
Jurisprudence25 is instructive of the elements required, in accordance with Article 18 of the RPC, in order
that a person may be considered an accomplice, namely, (1) that there be a community of design; that is,
knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose;
(2) that he cooperates in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying
material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (3) that there be a relation
between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice.
In the case at bench, Susana knew of the criminal design of her husband, Petrus, but she kept quiet and
never reported the incident to the police authorities. Instead, she stayed with Petrus inside the house and
gave food to the victim or accompanied her husband when he brought food to the victim. Susana not only
countenanced Petrus’ illegal act, but also supplied him with material and moral aid. It has been held that
being present and giving moral support when a crime is being committed make a person responsible as an
accomplice in the crime committed.26 As keenly observed by the RTC, the act of giving food by Susana to
the victim was not essential and indispensable for the perpetration of the crime of kidnapping for ransom
but merely an expression of sympathy or feeling of support to her husband.27Moreover, this Court is guided
by the ruling in People v. De Vera,28 where it was stressed that in case of doubt, the participation of the
offender will be considered as that of an accomplice rather than that of a principal.
Alastair’s positive identification of Susana is not in any bit prejudiced by his failure to mention her name in
his sworn statement, dated February 12, 2004. It is well-settled that affidavits, being ex parte, are almost
always incomplete and often inaccurate, but do not really detract from the credibility of
witnesses.29 Oftentimes, the allegations contained in affidavits involved mere passive mention of details
anchored entirely on the investigator’s questions. The discrepancies between a sworn statement and a
testimony in court do not outrightly justify the acquittal of an accused, as testimonial evidence carries more
weight than an affidavit.30 Testimonies given during the trial are more exact and elaborate. Besides, sworn
statements are often executed when an affiant’s mental faculties are not in such a state as to afford the
affiant a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident which transpired.31 cra lawred
Given the overwhelming picture of their complicity in the crime, this Court cannot accept the defenses of
alibi and frame-up interposed by the accused-appellants. Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to
contrive and difficult to prove. Alibi must be proven by the accused with clear and convincing evidence;
otherwise it cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters. 32 The defense of frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor, for it
can easily be concocted but is difficult to prove. In order to prosper, the defense of frame-up must be
proven by the accused with clear and convincing evidence.33 Apart from their bare allegations, no competent
and independent evidence was adduced by the accused-appellants to substantiate their twin defenses of
alibi and frame-up and, thus, remain self-serving and do not merit any evidentiary value. More importantly,
nowhere in the records does it show of any dubious reasons or improper motive that could have impelled
the prosecution witnesses, particularly victim Alastair Onglingswam, to falsely testify and fabricate
documentary or object evidence just to implicate accused-appellants in such a heinous crime as kidnapping
for ransom. Their only motive was to see to it that the kidnapper be brought to justice and sentenced with
the appropriate penalty.
As a last-ditch effort to exculpate themselves from any criminal culpability, the accused-appellants
questioned the legality of their warrantless arrests. This too must fail.
Any objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused must be opportunely raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is
deemed waived.34 The accused-appellants never objected to or questioned the legality of their warrantless
arrests or the acquisition of jurisdiction by the RTC over their persons before they entered their respective
pleas to the kidnapping for ransom charge. Considering this lapse and coupled with their full and active
participation in the trial of the case, accused-appellants were deemed to have waived any objection to their
warrantless arrests. The accused-appellants voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC thereby
curing whatever defects that might have attended their arrest. It bears stressing that the legality of the
arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over their persons.35Their warrantless arrests cannot, by
themselves, be the bases of their acquittal.
Even assuming arguendo that the accused-appellants made a timely objection to their warrantless arrests,
jurisprudence is replete with rulings that support the view that their conviction was proper despite being
illegally arrested without a warrant. In People v. Manlulu,36 the Court ruled that the illegality of the
warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record
point to their culpability. Indeed, the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient cause for setting aside a
valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.37 cra lawred
With respect to the penalty, the Court finds that the RTC was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility of parole against Petrus as principal in the charge of kidnapping for ransom in
view of R.A. No. 9346, prohibiting the death penalty. Also, the Court finds that the penalty of eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and ten (10) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, meted out against Susana, an accomplice, to be proper.
The Court also sustains the RTC in awarding actual damages in the amount of P273,132.00 plus interest
committed from the filing of the information until fully paid. As regards the moral damages against the
accused-appellants, the Court finds the award of P1,000,000.00 to be exorbitant. Hence, the same is being
reduced to P200,000.00, as the reasonable compensation for the ignominy and sufferings that Alastair and
his family endured because of the accused-appellants’ inhumane acts of detaining him in handcuffs and
chains, and mentally torturing him and his family to raise the ransom money. The fact that they suffered the
trauma from mental, physical and psychological ordeal which constitutes the basis for moral damages under
Article 2219 of the Civil Code is too obvious to still require its recital at the trial through the superfluity of a
testimonial charade. The Court also finds the award of exemplary damages to be in order in view of the
presence of the qualifying circumstance of demand for ransom, and to serve as an example and deterrence
for the public good. The Court, however, reduces the amount from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00 in line with
prevailing jurisprudence.38 cra lawred
The RTC, however, erred in ruling that Susana was solidarily liable with Petrus for the payment of damages.
This is an erroneous apportionment of the damages awarded because it does not take into account the
difference in the nature and degree of participation between the principal, Petrus, and the accomplice,
Susana. The ruling of this Court in People v. Montesclaros39 is instructive on the apportionment of civil
liabilities among all the accused-appellants. The entire amount of the civil liabilities should be apportioned
among all those who cooperated in the commission of the crime according to the degrees of their liability,
respective responsibilities and actual participation. Accordingly, Petrus should shoulder a greater share in
the total amount of damages than Susana who was adjudged only as an accomplice.
In fine, the accused-appellants are ordered to pay the victim, Alastair Onglingswam actual damages in the
amount of P273,132.00; moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00; and exemplary damages in the
amount of P100,000.00, or a total amount of P573,132.00. Taking into consideration the degree of their
participation, the principal, Petrus, should be liable for two-thirds (2/3) of the total amount of the damages
(P573,132.00 x 2/3) or P382,088.00; and the accomplice, Susana, should be ordered to pay the remaining
one-third (1/3) or P191,044.00. Specifically, Petrus shall be liable for actual damages in the amount of
P182,088.00; moral damages in the amount of P133,333.33; and exemplary damages in the amount of
P66,666.67; and Susana for the amount of P91,044.00 as actual damages; P66,666.67 as moral damages;
and P33,333.33 as exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the September 7, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03446
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-appellants Petrus Yau and Susana Yau y Sumogba are
ordered to pay the victim Alastair Joseph Onglingswam moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00 and
exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00. The award of actual damages in the amount of
P273,132.00 is maintained. The civil liabilities of the accused-appellants shall be apportioned as follows: cha nRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary
1] Petrus Yau is directed to pay actual damages in the amount of P182,088.00; moral damages in the
amount of P133,333.33; and exemplary damages in the amount of P66,666.67; and ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
2] Susana Yau y Sumogba is directed to pay actual damages in the amount of P91,044.00, moral damages
in the amount of ?66,666.67 and exemplary damages in the amount of P33,333.33.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio,* Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 80762 March 19, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FAUSTA GONZALES, AUGUSTO GONZALES, CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR., CUSTODIO
GONZALES, JR., NERIO GONZALES and ROGELIO LANIDA, accused, CUSTODIO
GONZALES, SR., accused-appellant.
SARMIENTO, J.:
In a decision 1 dated October 31, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch XXXVIII (38), in
Criminal Case No. 13661, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Fausta Gonzales, Augusto
Gonzales, Custodia Gonzales, Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales and Rogelio Lanida," found
all the accused, except Rogelio Lanida who eluded arrest and up to now has remain at large and not
yet arrained, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as defined under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code. They were sentenced "to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim in the amount of P40,000.00, plus moral damages in the
sum of P14,000.00 and to pay the costs." 2 The victim was Lloyd Peñacerrada, 44, landowner, and a
resident of Barangay Aspera, Sara, Iloilo.
Through their counsel, all the accused, except of course Rogelio Lanida, filed a notice of appeal
from the trial court's decision. During the pendency of their appeal and before judgment thereon
could be rendered by the Court of Appeals, however, all the accused-appellants, except Custodio
Gonzales, Sr., withdrew their appeal and chose instead to pursue their respective applications for
parole before the then Ministry, now Department, of Justice, Parole Division. 3
On October 27, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 4 on the appeal of Custodio
Gonzales, Sr. It modified the appealed decision in that the lone appellant was sentenced to reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Lloyd Peñacerrada in the amount of P30,000.00. In all other
respect, the decision of the trial court was affirmed. Further, on the basis of our ruling in People
vs. Ramos, 5 the appellate court certified this case to us for review.6
The antecedent facts are as follows:
At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of February 21, 1981, Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of
Barangay Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo, was awakened from his sleep by the spouses Augusto and Fausta
Gonzales. Augusto informed Paja that his wife had just killed their landlord, Lloyd Peñacerrada, and
thus would like to surrender to the authorities. Seeing Augusto still holding the knife allegedly used in
the killing and Fausta with her dress smeared with blood, Paja immediately ordered a nephew of his
to take the spouses to the police authorities at the Municipal Hall in Poblacion, Ajuy. As instructed,
Paja's nephew brought the Gonzales spouses, who "backrode" on his motorcycle, to the municipal
building. 7 Upon reaching the Ajuy Police sub-station, the couple informed the police on duty of the
incident. That same night, Patrolman Salvador Centeno of the Ajuy Police Force and the Gonzales
spouses went back to Barangay Tipacla. Reaching Barangay Tipacla the group went to Paja's
residence where Fausta was made to stay, while Paja, Patrolman Centeno, and Augusto proceeded
to the latter's residence at Sitio Nabitasan where the killing incident allegedly occurred. 8 There they
saw the lifeless body of Lloyd Peñacerrada, clad only in an underwear, sprawled face down inside
the bedroom. 9 The group stayed for about an hour during which time Patrolman Centeno inspected
the scene and started to make a rough sketch thereof and the immediate surroundings. 10 The next
day, February 22, 1981, at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning, Patrolman Centeno, accompanied by
a photographer, went back to the scene of the killing to conduct further investigations. Fausta
Gonzales, on the other hand, was brought back that same day by Barangay Captain Paja to the
police substation in Ajuy. When Patrolman Centeno and his companion arrived at Sitio Nabitasan,
two members of the 321st P.C. Company stationed in Sara, Iloilo, who had likewise been informed
of the incident, were already there conducting their own investigation. Patrolman Centeno continued
with his sketch; photographs of the scene were likewise taken. The body of the victim was then
brought to the Municipal Hall of Ajuy for autopsy.
The autopsy of Lloyd Peñacerrada's cadaver was performed at about 11:20 a.m. on February 22,
1981; after completed, a report was made with the following findings:
PHYSICAL FINDINGS
1. Deceased is about 5 ft. and 4 inches in height, body moderately built and on
cadaveric rigidity.
EXTERNAL FINDINGS
1. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 9 cm. in length, located at the lower 3rd anterior
aspect of the arm, right, directed upward to the right axillary pit.
2. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the proximal 3rd, forearm right, posterior
aspect with an entrance of 5 cm. in width and 9 cm. in length with an exit at the
middle 3rd, posterior aspect of the forearm, right, with 1 cm. wound exit.
3. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the middle 3rd, posterior aspect of the
forearm right, 1 cm. in width.
4. Incised wound, 4 cm. long, depth visualizing the right lateral border of the sternum,
6th and 7th ribs, right located 1.5 inches below the right nipple.
5. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 10.5 cm. in depth, directed inward to the thoracic
cavity right, located at the left midclavicular line at the level of the 5th rib left.
6. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 9.5 cm. in depth directed toward the right thoracic
cavity, located at the mid left scapular line at the level of the 8th intercostal space.
7. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, located at the base of the left armpit directed
toward the left thoracic cavity.
8. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 11 cm. in length, directed toward the left deltoid
muscle, located at the upper 3rd axilla left.
9. Puncture wound, 3 cm in width, 11.5 cm in length, located at the anterior aspect,

proximal 3rd arm left, directed downward.
10. Stab wound, thru and thru, 2.5 cm. in width, and 5 cm. in length, medial aspect,
palm right.
11. Stabwound, 4 cm.in width, iliac area, right, directed inward with portion of large
intestine and mysentery coming out.
12. Stab wound, 4 cm. in width, located at the posterior portion of the shoulder, right,
directed downward to the aspex of the light thoracic cavity.
13. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 10 cm. in length, located at the medial portion of
the medial border of the right scapula.
14. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 4.5 cm. in length, located at the posterior aspect of
the right elbow.
15. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 2 cm. in length, located at the posterior portion,
middle 3rd, forearm, right.
16. Lacerated wound at the anterior tantanelle with fissural fracture of the skull.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Stab wound No. 5, injuring the left ventricle of the heart.
2. Stab wound No. 6, severely injuring the right lower lobe of the
lungs.
3. Stab wound No. 7, injuring the right middle lobe of the lungs.
4. Stab wound No. 11, injuring the descending colon of the large
intestine, thru and thru.
5. Stab wound No. 12, severely injuring the apex of the right lungs
(sic).
CAUSE OF DEATH:
MASSIVE HEMMORRHAGE DUE TO MULTIPLE

LACERATED, STABBED (sic), INCISED AND
PUNCTURED WOUNDS.
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The autopsy report thus showed that Dr. Rojas "found sixteen (16) wounds, five (5) of which are fatal
because they penetrated the internal organs, heart, lungs and intestines of the deceased." 12
On February 23, two days after the incident, Augusto Gonzales appeared before the police sub-
station in the poblacion of Ajuy and voluntarily surrendered to Police Corporal Ben Sazon for
detention and protective custody for "having been involved" in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada. He
requested that he be taken to the P.C. headquarters in Sara, Iloilo where his wife, Fausta, was
already detained having been indorsed thereat by the Ajuy police force. 13
Based on the foregoing and on the investigations conducted by the Ajuy police force and the 321st
P.C. Company, an information for murder dated August 26, 1981, was filed by the Provincial Fiscal
of Iloilo against the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. The information read as follows:
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses FAUSTA GONZALES and AUGUSTO

GONZALES of the crime of MURDER committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of February, 1981, in the Municipality of Ajuy, Province
of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named
accused with four other companions whose identities are still unknown and are still at
large, armed with sharp-pointed and deadly weapons, conspiring, confederating and
helping each other, with treachery and evident premeditation, with deliberate intent
and decided purpose to kill, and taking advantage of their superior strength and
number, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab,
hack, hit and wound Lloyd D. Peñacerrada, with the weapons with which said
accused were provided at the time, thereby inflicting upon said Lloyd D. Peñacerrada
multiple wounds on different parts of his body as shown by autopsy report attached
to the record of this case which multifarious wounds caused the immediate death of
said Lloyd D. Peñacerrada.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Iloilo City, August 26, 1981. 14
When arraigned on September 16, 1981, Augusto and Fausta both entered a plea of not guilty.
Before trial, however, Jose Huntoria 15 who claimed to have witnessed the killing of Lloyd
Peñacerrada, presented himself to Nanie Peñacerrada, the victim's widow, on October 6, 1981, and
volunteered to testify for the prosecution. A reinvestigation of the case was therefore conducted by
the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo on the basis of which an Amended Information, 16 dated March 3, 1982,
naming as additional accused Custodio Gonzales, Sr. (the herein appellant), Custodio Gonzales, Jr.,
Nerio Gonzales, and Rogelio Lanida, was filed. Again, all the accused except as earlier explained,
Lanida, pleaded not guilty to the crime.
At the trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Jesus Rojas, the Rural Health physician of Ajuy who
conducted the autopsy on the body of the victim; Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of Barangay
Tipacla; Patrolman Salvador Centeno and Corporal Ben Sazon of the Ajuy Police Force; Sgt. (ret)
Nicolas Belicanao and Sgt. Reynaldo Palomo of the 321st P.C. Company based in Sara, Iloilo; Jose
Huntoria; and Nanie Peñacerrada, the widow.
Dr. Jesus Rojas testified that he performed the autopsy on the body of the deceased Lloyd
Penacerrada at around 11:20 a.m. on February 22, 1981 after it was taken to the municipal hall of
Ajuy. 17 His findings revealed that the victim suffered from 16 wounds comprising of four (4)
punctured wounds, seven (7) stab wounds, four (4) incised wounds, and one (1) lacerated wound. In
his testimony, Dr. Rojas, while admitting the possibility that only one weapon might have caused all
the wounds (except the lacerated wound) inflicted on the victim, nevertheless opined that due to the
number and different characteristics of the wounds, the probability that at least two instruments were
used is high. 18 The police authorities and the P.C. operatives for their part testified on the aspect of
the investigation they respectively conducted in relation to the incident. Nanie Peñacerrada testified
mainly on the expenses she incurred by reason of the death of her husband while Barangay Captain
Bartolome Paja related the events surrounding the surrender of the spouses Augusto and Fausta
Gonzales to him, the location of the houses of the accused, as well as on other matters.
By and large, the prosecution's case rested on Huntoria's alleged eyewitness account of the
incident. According to Huntoria, who gave his age as 30 when he testified on July 27, 1982, 19 at 5:00
o'clock in the afternoon on February 21, 1981, he left his work at Barangay Central, in Ajuy, Iloilo
where he was employed as a tractor driver by one Mr. Piccio, and walked home; 20 he took a short-
cut route. 21 While passing at the vicinity of the Gonzales spouses' house at around 8:00 o'clock in
the evening, he heard cries for help. 22 Curiosity prompted him to approach the place where the
shouts were emanating. When he was some 15 to 20 meters away, he hid himself behind a clump of
banana
trees. 23 From where he stood, he allegedly saw all the accused ganging upon and takings turns in
stabbing and hacking the victim Lloyd Peñacerrada, near a "linasan" or threshing platform. He said
he clearly recognized all the accused as the place was then awash in moonlight. 24 Huntoria further
recounted that after the accused were through in stabbing and hacking the victim, they then lifted his
body and carried it into the house of the Gonzales spouses which was situated some 20 to 25
meters away from the "linasan". 25 Huntoria then proceeded on his way home. Upon reaching his
house, he related what he saw to his mother and to his wife 26 before he went to sleep. 27Huntoria
explained that he did not immediately report to the police authorities what he witnessed for fear of
his life. 28 In October 1981 however, eight months after the extraordinary incident he allegedly
witnessed, bothered by his conscience plus the fact that his father was formerly a tenant of the
victim which, to his mind, made him likewise a tenant of the latter, he thought of helping the victim's
widow, Nanie Peñacerrada. Hence, out of his volition, he travelled from his place at Sitio Nabitasan,
in Barangay Tipacla Municipality of Ajuy, to Sara, Iloilo where Mrs. Peñacerrada lived, and related to
her what he saw on February 21, 1981. 29
Except Fausta who admitted killing Lloyd Peñacerrada in defense of her honor as the deceased
attempted to rape her, all the accused denied participation in the crime. The herein accused-
appellant, Custodio Gonzales, Sr., claimed that he was asleep 30 in his house which was located
some one kilometer away from the scene of the crime 31 when the incident happened. He asserted
that he only came to know of it after his grandchildren by Augusto and Fausta Gonzales went to his
house that night of February 21, 1981 to inform him. 32
The trial court disregarded the version of the defense; it believed the testimony of Huntoria.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Custodia Gonzales, Sr., the lone appellant, contended that the
trial court erred in convicting him on the basis of the testimony of Jose Huntoria, the lone alleged
eyewitness, and in not appreciating his defense of alibi.
The Court of Appeals found no merit in both assigned errors. In upholding Huntoria's testimony, the
appellate court held that:
. . . Huntoria positively identified all the accused, including the herein accused-
appellant, as the assailants of Peñacerrada. (TSN, p. 43, July 27, 1982) The claim
that Huntoria would have difficulty recognizing the assailant at a distance of 15 to 20
meters is without merit, considering that Huntoria knew all the accused. (Id., pp. 37-
39) If Huntoria could not say who was hacking and who was stabbing the deceased,
it was only because the assailant were moving around the victim.
As for the delay in reporting the incident to the authorities, we think that Huntoria's
explanation is satisfactory. He said he feared for his life. (Id., pp. 50-51, 65) As stated
in People vs. Realon, 99 SCRA 442, 450 (1980): "The natural reticence of most
people to get involved in a criminal case is of judicial notice. As held in People
v. Delfin, '. . . the initial reluctance of witnesses in this country to volunteer
information about a criminal case and their unwillingness to be involved in or dragged
into criminal investigations is common, and has been judicially declared not to affect
credibility.'"
It is noteworthy that the accused-appellant self admitted that he had known Huntoria
for about 10 years and that he and Huntoria were in good terms and had no
misunderstanding whatsoever. (TSN, p. 33, July 18, 1984) He said that he could not
think of any reason why Huntoria should implicate him. (Id., p. 34) Thus, Huntoria's
credibility. is beyond question. 33
The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the appellant's defense of alibi. 34 The appellate court,
however, found the sentence imposed by the trial court on the accused-appellant erroneous. Said
the appellate court:
Finally, we find that the trial court erroneously sentenced the accused-appellant to 12
years and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal. The penalty for
murder under Article 248 is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. As
there was no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the imposible penalty should
be reclusion perpetua. Consequently, the appeal should have been brought to the
Supreme Court. With regard to the indemnity for death, the award of P40,000.00
should be reduced to P30,000.00, in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme
Court. (E.g., People v. De la Fuente, 126 SCRA 518 (1983); People v. Atanacio, 128
SCRA 31 (1984); People v. Rado, 128 SCRA 43 (1984); People v. Bautista, G.R. No.
68731, Feb. 27, 1987).35
The case, as mentioned earlier, is now before us upon certification by the Court of Appeals, the
penalty imposed being reclusion perpetua.
After a careful review of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, we find the same insufficient to
convict the appellant of the crime charged.
To begin with, the investigation conducted by the police authorities leave much to be desired.
Patrolman Centeno of the Ajuy police force in his sworn statements 36 even gave the date of the
commission of the crime as "March 21, 1981." Moreover, the sketch 37 he made of the scene is of
little help. While indicated thereon are the alleged various blood stains and their locations relative to
the scene of the crime, there was however no indication as to their quantity. This is rather
unfortunate for the prosecution because, considering that there are two versions proferred on where
the killing was carried out, the extent of blood stains found would have provided a more definite clue
as to which version is more credible. If, as the version of the defense puts it, the killing transpired
inside the bedroom of the Gonzales spouses, there would have been more blood stains inside the
couple's bedroom or even on the ground directly under it. And this circumstance would provide an
additional mooring to the claim of attempted rape asseverated by Fausta. On the other hand, if the
prosecution's version that the killing was committed in the field near the linasan is the truth, then
blood stains in that place would have been more than in any other place.
The same sloppiness characterizes the investigation conducted by the other authorities. Police
Corporal Ben Sazon who claimed that accused Augusto Gonzales surrendered to him on February
23, 1981 failed to state clearly the reason for the "surrender." It would even appear that Augusto
"surrendered" just so he could be safe from possible revenge by the victim's kins. Corporal Sazon
likewise admitted that Augusto never mentioned to him the participation of other persons in the
killing of the victim. Finally, without any evidence on that point, P.C. investigators of the 321st P.C.
Company who likewise conducted an investigation of the killing mentioned in their criminal
complaint 38 four other unnamed persons, aside from the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales, to
have conspired in killing Lloyd Peñacerrada.
Now on the medical evidence. Dr. Rojas opined that it is possible that the sixteen wounds described
in the autopsy report were caused by two or more bladed instruments. Nonetheless, he admitted the
possibility that one bladed instrument might have caused all. Thus, insofar as Dr. Rojas' testimony
and the autopsy report are concerned, Fausta Gonzales' admission that she alone was responsible
for the killing appears not at all too impossible. And then there is the positive testimony of Dr. Rojas
that there were only five wounds that could be fatal out of the sixteen described in the autopsy
report. We shall discuss more the significance of these wounds later.
It is thus clear from the foregoing that if the conviction of the appellant by the lower courts is to be
sustained, it can only be on the basis of the testimony of Huntoria, the self-proclaimed eyewitness.
Hence, a meticulous scrutiny of Huntoria's testimony is compelling.
To recollect, Huntoria testified that he clearly saw all the accused, including the appellant, take turns
in hacking and stabbing Lloyd Peñacerrada, at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening, on February 21,
1981, in the field near a "linasan" while he (Huntoria) stood concealed behind a clump of banana
trees some 15 to 20 meters away from where the crime was being committed. According to him, he
recognized the six accused as the malefactors because the scene was then illuminated by the
moon. He further stated that the stabbing and hacking took about an hour. But on cross-
examination, Huntoria admitted that he could not determine who among the six accused did the
stabbing and/or hacking and what particular weapon was used by each of them.
ATTY. GATON (defense counsel on cross-examination):
Q And you said that the moon was bright, is it correct?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And you would like us to understand that you saw the hacking and
the stabbing, at that distance by the herein accused as identified by
you?
A Yes, sir, because the moon was brightly shining.
Q If you saw the stabbing and the hacking, will you please tell this
Honorable Court who was hacking the victim?
A Because they were surrounding Peñacerrada and were in constant

movement, I could not determine who did the hacking.
ATTY. GATON:
The interpretation is not clear.
COURT:
They were doing it rapidly.
A The moving around or the hacking or the "labu" or "bunu" is rapid. I

only saw the rapid movement of their arms, Your Honor, and I cannot
determine who was hacking and who was stabbing. But I saw the
hacking and the stabbing blow.
ATTY. GATON:
Q You cannot positively identify before this Court who really hacked
Lloyd Peñacerrada?
A Yes sir, I cannot positively tell who did the hacking.
Q And likewise you cannot positively tell this Honorable Court who
did the stabbing?
A Yes sir, and because of the rapid movements.
Q I noticed in your direct testimony that you could not even identify
the weapons used because according to you it was just flashing?
A Yes, sir.39
(Emphasis supplied)
From his very testimony, Huntoria failed to impute a definite and specific act committed, or
contributed, by the appellant in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada.
It also bears stressing that there is nothing in the findings of the trial court and of the Court of
Appeals which would categorize the criminal liability of the appellant as a principal by direct
participation under Article 17, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, there is nothing in
the evidence for the prosecution that inculpates him by inducement, under paragraph 2 of the same
Article 17, or by indispensable cooperation under paragraph 3 thereof. What then was the direct part
in the killing did the appellant perform to support the ultimate punishment imposed by the Court of
Appeals on him?
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides how criminal liability is incurred.
Art. 4. Criminal liability — Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or

property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on
account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, one of the means by which criminal liability is incurred is through the commission of a felony.
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, provides how felonies are committed.
Art. 3. Definition — Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos).
Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault
(culpa).
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault
when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack
of skill.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the elements of felonies in general are: (1) there must be an act or omission; (2) the act or
omission must be punishable under the Revised Penal Code; and (3) the act is performed or the
omission incurred by means of deceit or fault.
Here, while the prosecution accuses, and the two lower courts both found, that the appellant has
committed a felony in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, forsooth there is paucity of proof as to what
act was performed by the appellant. It has been said that "act," as used in Article 3 of the Revised
Penal Code, must be understood as "any bodily movement tending to produce some effect in the
external world." 40 In this instance, there must therefore be shown an "act" committed by the
appellant which would have inflicted any harm to the body of the victim that produced his death.
Yet, even Huntoria, as earlier emphasized, admitted quite candidly that he did not see who "stabbed"
or who "hacked" the victim. Thus this principal witness did not say, because he could not whether
the appellant "hacked or "stabbed" victim. In fact, Huntoria does not know what specific act was
performed by the appellant. This lack of specificity then makes the case fall short of the test laid
down by Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code previously discussed. Furthermore, the fact that the
victim sustained only five fatal wounds out of the total of sixteen inflicted, as adverted to above, while
there are six accused charged as principals, it follows to reason that one of the six accused could
not have caused or dealt a fatal wound. And this one could as well be the appellant, granted ex
gratia argumenti that he took part in the hacking and stabbing alleged by Huntoria. And why not
him? Is he not after all the oldest (already sexagenarian at that time) and practically the father of the
five accused? And pursuing this argument to the limits of its logic, it is possible, nay even probable,
that only four, or three, or two of the accused could have inflicted all the five fatal wounds to the
exclusion of two, three, or four of them. And stretching the logic further, it is possible, nay probable,
that all the fatal wounds, including even all the non-fatal wounds, could have been dealt by Fausta in
rage against the assault on her womanhood and honor. But more importantly, there being not an iota
of evidence that the appellant caused any of the said five fatal wounds, coupled with the
prosecution's failure to prove the presence of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt, the appellant's
conviction can not be sustained.
Additionally, Huntoria's credibility as a witness is likewise tarnished by the fact that he only came out
to testify in October 1981, or eight long months since he allegedly saw the killing on February 21,
1981. While ordinarily the failure of a witness to report at once to the police authorities the crime he
had witnessed should not be taken against him and should not affect his credibility,41 here, the
unreasonable delay in Huntoria's coming out engenders doubt on his veracity. 42 If the silence of
coming out an alleged eyewitness for several weeks renders his credibility doubtful, 43 the more it
should be for one who was mute for eight months. Further, Huntoria's long delay in reveiling what he
allegedly witnessed, has not been satisfactorily explained. His lame excuse that he feared his life
would be endangered is too pat to be believed. There is no showing that he was threatened by the
accused or by anybody. And if it were true that he feared a possible retaliation from the
accused, 44 why did he finally volunteer to testify considering that except for the spouses Augusto
and Fausta Gonzales who were already under police custody, the rest of the accused were then still
free and around; they were not yet named in the original information, 45 thus the supposed danger on
Huntoria's life would still be clear and present when he testified.
Moreover, Huntoria is not exactly a disinterested witness as portrayed by the prosecution. He

admitted that he was a tenant of the deceased. In fact, he stated that one of the principal reasons
why he testified was because the victim was also his landlord.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, Mr. Huntoria, why did it take you so long from the time you
saw the stabbing and hacking of Lloyd Peñacerrada when you told
Mrs. Peñacerrada about what happened to her husband?
A At first I was then afraid to tell anybody else but because I was
haunted by my conscience and secondly the victim was also my
landlord I revealed what I saw to the wife of the victim.46
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis ours.)
At this juncture, it may be relevant to remind that under our socioeconomic set-up, a tenant owes the
very source of his livelihood, if not existence itself, from his landlord who provides him with the land
to till. In this milieu, tenants like Huntoria are naturally beholden to their landlords and seek ways and
means to ingratiate themselves with the latter. In this instance, volunteering his services as a
purported eyewitness and providing that material testimony which would lead to the conviction of the
entire family of Augusto Gonzales whose wife, Fausta, has confessed to the killing of Lloyd
Peñacerrada, would, in a perverted sense, be a way by which Huntoria sought to ingratiate himself
with the surviving family of his deceased landlord. This is especially so because the need to get into
the good graces of his landlord's family assumed a greater urgency considering that he ceased to be
employed as early as May 1981. 47 Volunteering his services would alleviate the financial distress he
was in. And Huntoria proved quite sagacious in his choice of action for shortly after he volunteered
and presented himself to the victim's widow, he was taken under the protective wings of the victim's
uncle, one Dr. Biclar, who gave him employment and provided lodging for his family. 48 Given all the
foregoing circumstances, we can not help but dismiss Huntoria as an unreliable witness, to say the
least.
At any rate, there is another reason why we find the alleged participation of the appellant in the
killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada doubtful — it is contrary to our customs and traditions. Under the
Filipino family tradition and culture, aging parents are sheltered and insulated by their adult children
from any possible physical and emotional harm. It is therefore improbable for the other accused who
are much younger and at the prime of their manhood, to summon the aid or allow the participation of
their 65-year old 49 father, the appellant, in the killing of their lone adversary, granting that the victim
was indeed an adversary. And considering that the appellant's residence was about one kilometer
from the scene of the crime, 50 we seriously doubt that the appellant went there just for the purpose of
aiding his three robust male sons (Custodia Jr., Nerio, and Augusta), not to mention the brother and
sister, Rogelio and Fausta, in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, even if the latter were a perceived
enemy.
Finally, while indeed alibi is a weak defense, 51 under appropriate circumstances, like in the instant
case in which the participation of the appellant is not beyond cavil it may be considered as
exculpatory. Courts should not at once look with disfavor at the defense of alibi for if taken in the
light of the other evidence on record, it may be sufficient to acquit the accused. 52
In fine, the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
appellant is hereby ACQUITTED. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 97471 February 17, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ISABELO PUNO y GUEVARRA, alias "Beloy," and ENRIQUE AMURAO y PUNO, alias
"Enry," accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Edward C. Castañeda for accused-appellants.
REGALADO, J.:
The primal issue for resolution in this case is whether accused-appellants committed the felony of
kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information;
or a violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974),
as contended by the Solicitor General and found by the trial court; or the offense of simple robbery
punished by Paragraph 5, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as claimed by the defense.
In an information dated and filed on May 31, 1989 in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
103, as Criminal Case No. Q-57404 thereof, appellants were charged with kidnapping for ransom
allegedly committed in the following manner:
That on or about the 13th day of January, 1988 in Quezon City, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then private
individuals, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other,
did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and carry away one
MARIA DEL SOCORRO SARMIENTO y MUTUC * for the purpose of extorting ransom, to the
damage and prejudice of the said offended party in such amount as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the
Civil Code.1
On a plea of not guilty when arraigned,2 appellants went to trial which ultimately resulted in a
judgment promulgated on September 26, 1990 finding them guilty of robbery with extortion
committed on a highway, punishable under Presidential Decree No. 532, with this disposition in
the fallo thereof:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused ISABELO PUNO

and ENRIQUE AMURAO GUILTY as principals of robbery with extortion committed
on a highway and, in accordance with P.D. 532, they are both sentenced to a jail
term of reclusion perpetua.
The two accused are likewise ordered to pay jointly and severally the offended
private victim Ma. Socorro M. Sarmiento the sum of P7,000.00 as actual damages
and P3,000.00 as temperate damages.3
Before us now in this appeal, appellants contend that the court a quo erred (1) in convicting them
under Presidential Decree No. 532 since they were not expressly charged with a crime therein; (2) in
applying Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court since the charge under said presidential
decree is not the offense proved and cannot rightly be used as the offense proved which is
necessarily included in the offense charged.4
For the material antecedents of this case, we quote with approval the following counter-statement of
facts in the People's brief5 which adopted the established findings of the court a quo, documenting
the same with page references to the transcripts of the proceedings, and which we note are without
any substantial divergence in the version proffered by the defense.
This is a prosecution for kidnapping for ransom allegedly done on January 13, 1988
by the two accused (tsn, Jan. 8, 1990, p. 7).
Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento owns a bakeshop in Araneta Avenue, Quezon

City called Nika Cakes and Pastries. She has a driver of her own just as her husband
does (Ibid., pp. 4-6).
At around 5:00 in the afternoon of January 13, 1988, the accused Isabelo Puno, who
is the personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao
purportedly on account of local election there) arrived at the bakeshop. He told Mrs.
Socorro that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency
(something bad befell a child), so Isabelo will temporary (sic) take his place (Id., pp.
8-9).
Mrs. Socorro's time to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig came and so she got into the
Mercedes Benz of her husband with Isabelo on (sic) the wheel. After the car turned
right in (sic) a corner of Araneta Avenue, it stopped. A young man, accused Enrique
Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver (Id., pp. 9-10).
Once inside, Enrique clambered on top of the back side of the front seat and went
onto where Ma. Socorro was seated at the rear. He poke (sic) a gun at her (Id., p.
10).
Isabelo, who earlier told her that Enrique is his nephew announced, "ma'm, you
know, I want to get money from you." She said she has money inside her bag and
they may get it just so they will let her go. The bag contained P7,000.00 and was
taken (Id., pp. 11-14).
Further on, the two told her they wanted P100,000.00 more. Ma. Socorro agreed to
give them that but would they drop her at her gas station in Kamagong St., Makati
where the money is? The car went about the Sta. Mesa area. Meanwhile, Ma.
Socorro clutched her Rosary and prayed. Enrique's gun was menacingly storing (sic)
at her soft bread (sic) brown, perfumed neck. He said he is an NPA and threatened
her (Id., p.15).
The car sped off north towards the North superhighway. There Isabelo, Beloy as he
is called, asked Ma. Socorro to issue a check for P100,000.00. Ma. Socorro
complied. She drafted 3 checks in denominations of two for P30 thousand and one
for P40 thousand. Enrique ordered her to swallow a pill but she refused (Id., pp. 17-
23).
Beloy turned the car around towards Metro Manila. Later, he changed his mind and
turned the car again towards Pampanga. Ma. Socorro, according to her, jumped out
of the car then, crossed to the other side of the superhighway and, after some
vehicles ignored her, she was finally able to flag down a fish vendors van. Her dress
had blood because, according to Ma. Socorro, she fell down on the ground and was
injured when she jumped out of the car. Her dress was torn too (Id., pp. 23-26).
On reaching Balintawak, Ma. Socorro reported the matter to CAPCOM (Id., p. 27).
Both accused were, day after, arrested. Enrique was arrested trying to encash Ma.
Socorro's P40,000.00 check at PCI Bank, Makati. (tsn, Oct. 18, 1989, pp. 10-13)6
As observed by the court below, the defense does not dispute said narrative of complainant, except
that, according to appellant Puno, he stopped the car at North Diversion and freely allowed
complainant to step out of the car. He even slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw that
his employer had gotten a ride, and he claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while
running across the highway.7
Appellants further testified that they brought the Mercedez Benz car to Dolores, San Fernando,
Pampanga and parked it near a barangay or police outpost. They thereafter ate at a restaurant and
divided their loot.8 Much later, when he took the stand at the trial of this case, appellant Puno tried to
mitigate his liability by explaining that he was in dire need of money for the medication of his ulcers.9
On these relatively simple facts, and as noted at the start of this opinion, three theories have been
advanced as to what crime was committed by appellants. The trial court cohered with the
submission of the defense that the crime could not be kidnapping for ransom as charged in the
information. We likewise agree.
Prefatorily, it is worth recalling an accepted tenet in criminal law that in the determination of the
crime for which the accused should be held liable in those instances where his acts partake of the
nature of variant offenses, and the same holds true with regard to the modifying or qualifying
circumstances thereof, his motive and specific intent in perpetrating the acts complained of are
invaluable aids in arriving at a correct appreciation and accurate conclusion thereon.
Thus, to illustrate, the motive of the accused has been held to be relevant or essential to determine
the specific nature of the crime as, for instance, whether a murder was committed in the furtherance
of rebellion in which case the latter absorbs the former, or whether the accused had his own
personal motives for committing the murder independent of his membership in the rebellious
movement in which case rebellion and murder would constitute separate offenses. 10 Also, where
injuries were inflicted on a person in authority who was not then in the actual performance of his
official duties, the motive of the offender assumes importance because if the attack was by reason of
the previous performance of official duties by the person in authority, the crime would be direct
assault; otherwise, it would only be physical injuries. 11
In the case at bar, there is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to
or at the time they committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of
money from her under the compulsion of threats or intimidation. This much is admitted by both
appellants, without any other esoteric qualification or dubious justification. Appellant Puno, as
already stated, candidly laid the blame for his predicament on his need for funds for, in his own
testimony, "(w)hile we were along the way Mam (sic) Corina was telling me "Beloy, I know your
family very well and I know that your (sic) not (a) bad person, why are you doing this?" I told her
"Mam, (sic), because I need money and I had an ulcer and that I have been getting an (sic)
advances from our office but they refused to give me any bale (sic). . . ." 12
With respect to the specific intent of appellants vis-a-vis the charge that they had kidnapped the
victim, we can rely on the proverbial rule of ancient respectability that for this crime to exist, there
must be indubitable proof that
the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty, 13 and not where
such restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the commission of another offense
primarily intended by the offenders. Hence, as early as United States vs. Ancheta, 14 and consistently
reiterated thereafter, 15 it has been held that the detention and/or forcible taking away of the victims
by the accused, even for an appreciable period of time but for the primary and ultimate purpose of
killing them, holds the offenders liable for taking their lives or such other offenses they committed in
relation thereto, but the incidental deprivation of the victims' liberty does not constitute kidnapping or
serious illegal detention.
That appellants in this case had no intention whatsoever to kidnap or deprive the complainant of her
personal liberty is clearly demonstrated in the veritably confessional testimony of appellant Puno:
Q At what point did Mrs. Sarmiento handed (sic) the bag containing
the P7,000.00 to your nephew?
A Santo Domingo Exit.
Q And how about the checks, where were you already when the
checks was (sic) being handed to you?
A Also at the Sto. Domingo exit when she signed the checks.
Q If your intention was just to robbed (sic) her, why is it that you still
did not allow her to stay at Sto. Domingo, after all you already
received the money and the checks?
A Because we had an agreement with her that when she signed the
checks we will take her to her house at Villa (sic) Verde.
Q And why did you not bring her back to her house at Valle Verde
when she is (sic) already given you the checks?
A Because while we were on the way back I (sic) came to my mind

that if we reach Balintawak or some other place along the way we
might be apprehended by the police. So when we reached Santa Rita
exit I told her "Mam (sic) we will already stop and allow you to get out
of the car." 16
Neither can we consider the amounts given to appellants as equivalent to or in the nature of ransom,
considering the immediacy of their obtention thereof from the complainant personally. Ransom, in
municipal criminal law, is the money, price or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a
captured person or persons, a payment that releases from captivity. 17 It can hardly be assumed that
when complainant readily gave the cash and checks demanded from her at gun point, what she
gave under the circumstances of this case can be equated with or was in the concept of ransom in
the law of kidnapping. These were merely amounts involuntarily surrendered by the victim upon the
occasion of a robbery or of which she was summarily divested by appellants. Accordingly, while we
hold that the crime committed is robbery as defined in Article 293 of the Code, we, however, reject
the theory of the trial court that the same constitutes the highway robbery contemplated in and
punished by Presidential Decree No. 532.
The lower court, in support of its theory, offers this ratiocination:
The court agrees that the crime is robbery. But it is also clear from the allegation in
the information that the victim was carried away and extorted for more money. The
accused admitted that the robbery was carried on from Araneta Avenue up to the
North Superhighway. They likewise admitted that along the way they intimidated Ma.
Socorro to produce more money that she had with her at the time for which reason
Ma. Socorro, not having more cash, drew out three checks. . . .
In view of the foregoing the court is of the opinion that the crimes committed is that
punishable under P.D. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974)
under which where robbery on the highway is accompanied by extortion the penalty
is reclusion perpetua.18
The Solicitor General concurs, with the observation that pursuant to the repealing clause in Section
5 of said decree, "P.D. No- 532 is a modification of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code,
particularly Article 267 which
are inconsistent with it." 19 Such opinion and complementary submission consequently necessitate an
evaluation of the correct interplay between and the legal effects of Presidential Decree No. 532 on
the pertinent Provisions of the Revised Penal Code, on which matter we are not aware that any
definitive pronouncement has as yet been made.
Contrary to the postulation of the Solicitor General, Presidential Decree No. 532 is not a modification
of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code on kidnapping and serious illegal detention, but of Articles
306 and 307 on brigandage. This is evident from the fact that the relevant portion thereof which
treats of "highway robbery" invariably uses this term in the alternative and synonymously with
brigandage, that is, as "highway robbery/brigandage." This is but in line with our previous ruling, and
which still holds sway in criminal law, that highway robbers (ladrones) and brigands are
synonymous. 20
Harking back to the origin of our law on brigandage (bandolerismo) in order to put our discussion
thereon in the proper context and perspective, we find that a band of brigands, also known as
highwaymen or freebooters, is more than a gang of ordinary robbers. Jurisprudence on the matter
reveals that during the early part of the American occupation of our country, roving bands were
organized for robbery and pillage and since the then existing law against robbery was inadequate to
cope with such moving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law was passed. 21
The following salient distinctions between brigandage and robbery are succinctly explained in a
treatise on the subject and are of continuing validity:
The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation of bands of
robbers. The heart of the offense consists in the formation of a band by more than
three armed persons for the purpose indicated in art. 306. Such formation is
sufficient to constitute a violation of art. 306. It would not be necessary to show, in a
prosecution under it, that a member or members of the band actually committed
robbery or kidnapping or any other purpose attainable by violent means. The crime is
proven when the organization and purpose of the band are shown to be such as are
contemplated by art 306. On the other hand, if robbery is committed by a band,
whose members were not primarily organized for the purpose of committing robbery
or kidnapping, etc., the crime would not be brigandage, but only robbery. Simply
because robbery was committed by a band of more than three armed persons, it
would not follow that it was committed by a band of brigands. In the Spanish text of
art. 306, it is required that the band "sala a los campos para dedicarse a
robar." 22 (Emphasis supplied).
In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If the purpose is only
a particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least four armed
participants. 23 The martial law legislator, in creating and promulgating Presidential Decree No. 532
for the objectives announced therein, could not have been unaware of that distinction and is
presumed to have adopted the same, there being no indication to the contrary. This conclusion is
buttressed by the rule on contemporaneous construction, since it is one drawn from the time when
and the circumstances under which the decree to be construed originated. Contemporaneous
exposition or construction is the best and strongest in the law. 24
Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or brigandage only acts of
robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine
highways as defined therein, and not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined or
particular victim, is evident from the preambular clauses thereof, to wit:
WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements are
still committing acts of depredation upon the persons and properties of innocent and
defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another, thereby disturbing the
peace, order and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and social
progress of the people:
WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute . . . highway robbery/brigandage

which are among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes
of all countries;
WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from

perpetrating such acts of depredaions by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders,
with the end in view of eliminating all obstacles to the economic, social, educational
and community progress of the people. (Emphasis supplied).
Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a particular person chosen by
the accused as their specific victim could be considered as committed on the "innocent and
defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another," and which single act of depredation
would be capable of "stunting the economic and social progress of the people" as to be considered
"among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries," and
would accordingly constitute an obstacle "to the economic, social, educational and community
progress of the people, " such that said isolated act would constitute the highway robbery or
brigandage contemplated and punished in said decree. This would be an exaggeration bordering on
the ridiculous.
True, Presidential Decree No. 532 did introduce amendments to Articles 306 and 307 of the Revised
Penal Code by increasing the penalties, albeit limiting its applicability to the offenses stated therein
when committed on the highways and without prejudice to the liability for such acts if committed.
Furthermore, the decree does not require that there be at least four armed persons forming a band
of robbers; and the presumption in the Code that said accused are brigands if they use unlicensed
firearms no longer obtains under the decree. But, and this we broadly underline, the essence of
brigandage under the Code as a crime of depredation wherein the unlawful acts are directed not
only against specific, intended or preconceived victims, but against any and all prospective victims
anywhere on the highway and whosoever they may potentially be, is the same as the concept of
brigandage which is maintained in Presidential Decree No. 532, in the same manner as it was under
its aforementioned precursor in the Code and, for that matter, under the old Brigandage Law. 25
Erroneous advertence is nevertheless made by the court below to the fact that the crime of robbery
committed by appellants should be covered by the said amendatory decree just because it was
committed on a highway. Aside from what has already been stressed regarding the absence of the
requisite elements which thereby necessarily puts the offense charged outside the purview and
intendment of that presidential issuance, it would be absurd to adopt a literal interpretation that any
unlawful taking of property committed on our highways would be covered thereby. It is an
elementary rule of statutory construction that the spirit or intent of the law should not be
subordinated to the letter thereof. Trite as it may appear, we have perforce to stress the elementary
caveat that he who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but skin deep into its
meaning, 26 and the fundamental rule that criminal justice inclines in favor of the milder form of
liability in case of doubt.
If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed on a highway would be the determinant for
the application of Presidential Decree No. 532, it would not be farfetched to expect mischievous, if
not absurd, effects on the corpus of our substantive criminal law. While we eschew resort to
a reductio ad absurdum line of reasoning, we apprehend that the aforestated theory adopted by the
trial court falls far short of the desideratum in the interpretation of laws, that is, to avoid absurdities
and conflicts. For, if a motor vehicle, either stationary or moving on a highway, is forcibly taken at
gun point by the accused who happened to take a fancy thereto, would the location of the vehicle at
the time of the unlawful taking necessarily put the offense within the ambit of Presidential Decree
No. 532, thus rendering nugatory the categorical provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act of
1972? 27 And, if the scenario is one where the subject matter of the unlawful asportation is large
cattle which are incidentally being herded along and traversing the same highway and are
impulsively set upon by the accused, should we apply Presidential Decree No. 532 and completely
disregard the explicit prescriptions in the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974? 28
We do not entertain any doubt, therefore, that the coincidental fact that the robbery in the present
case was committed inside a car which, in the natural course of things, was casually operating on a
highway, is not within the situation envisaged by Section 2(e) of the decree in its definition of terms.
Besides, that particular provision precisely defines "highway robbery/brigandage" and, as we have
amply demonstrated, the single act of robbery conceived and committed by appellants in this case
does not constitute highway robbery or brigandage.
Accordingly, we hold that the offense committed by appellants is simple robbery defined in Article
293 and punished under Paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code with prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. Appellants have
indisputably acted in conspiracy as shown by their concerted acts evidentiary of a unity of thought
and community of purpose. In the determination of their respective liabilities, the aggravating
circumstances of craft 29 shall be appreciated against both appellants and that of abuse of confidence
shall be further applied against appellant Puno, with no mitigating circumstance in favor of either of
them. At any rate, the intimidation having been made with the use of a firearm, the penalty shall be
imposed in the maximum period as decreed by Article 295 of the Code.
We further hold that there is no procedural obstacle to the conviction of appellants of the crime of
simple robbery upon an information charging them with kidnapping for ransom, since the former
offense which has been proved is necessarily included in the latter offense with which they are
charged. 30 For the former offense, it is sufficient that the elements of unlawful taking, with intent to
gain, of personal property through intimidation of the owner or possessor thereof shall be, as it has
been, proved in the case at bar. Intent to gain (animus lucrandi) is presumed to be alleged in an
information where it is charged that there was unlawful taking (apoderamiento) and appropriation by
the offender of the things subject of the robbery. 31
These foregoing elements are necessarily included in the information filed against appellants which,
as formulated, allege that they wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnapped and extorted ransom
from the complainant. Such allegations, if not expressly but at the very least by necessary
implication, clearly convey that the taking of complainant's money and checks (inaccurately termed
as ransom) was unlawful, with intent to gain, and through intimidation. It cannot be logically argued
that such a charge of kidnapping for ransom does not include but could negate the presence of any
of the elements of robbery through intimidation of persons. 32
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE and another one is
rendered CONVICTING accused-appellants Isabelo Puno y Guevarra and Enrique Amurao y Puno
of robbery as Punished in Paragraph 5 of Article 294, in relation to Article 295, of the Revised Penal
Code and IMPOSING on each of them an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and
jointly and severally pay the offended party, Maria del Socorro M. Sarmiento, the amounts of
P7,000.00 as actual damages and P20,000.00 as moral damages, with costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Nocon and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 504 September 16, 1902
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellant,

vs.
TOMASA DE LOS REYES, defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellant.

Manuel Torres, for private prosecutor.
Alfredo Chicote, for appellee.
LADD, J.:
This is an appeal from the Court of First Instance of Manila, taken by the complaining witness, Julian
Gonzalez, from a judgment of acquittal, upon a complaint for bigamy under article 471 of the Penal
Code.
The defendant was married to the complaining witness in Manila, May 27, 1897. After living together
in Manila for a time they separated, the defendant remaining in the house where they had been
previously living until some time subsequent to July 12, 1900. On that day she was married in Manila
by a Protestant clergyman to Ramon Martinez. Her defense is that she honestly believed her first
husband was dead when she married Martinez.
It appears that the mother and some other relatives of Gonzalez lived, after the separation, in the
same house with the defendant. Gonzalez testifies that the separation took place in March, 1900,
and that he also lived for some months in the lower story of the same house, the defendant living in
the upper story. He further testifies that after he left this house and went to live elsewhere he visited
his relatives there nearly every day down to a few days before the trial, which took place in
September, 1901. He says that he often saw his wife at these times, supplying her with means for
her support through his relatives, but that he never spoke with her. A short time after her second
marriage the defendant moved away from the house and has since lived elsewhere.
The defendant testifies that she and Gonzalez had been living together a year and two months when
the separation took place. That would fix the date of the separation in July, 1898. She testifies that
some time during the year following the separation she was told by the mother of Gonzalez that she
had been informed that her son was dead, that thereupon prayers were said for his soul for nine
nights, and that she put on mourning and wore it a year. She says that she contracted the second
marriage with the consent of the mother of Gonzalez, and believing that the information which she
had received from her as to the death of Gonzalez was true. The mother of Gonzalez died before the
trial.
There was some further evidence from other witnesses on both sides, but it was of such a character
as to throw but little light upon the facts of the case. On the whole, we have reached the conclusion,
though not without some hesitation, that the story told by the defendant is in the main more likely to
be true than false, and that she probably did contract the second marriage under a bona fide belief
that the first marriage had been dissolved by the death of Gonzalez.
We have recently held, in the United States vs. Marcosa Peñalosa and Enrique Rodriguez, decided
January 27, 1902, that there can be no conviction under article 475 of the Penal Code, where by
reason of a mistake of fact the intention to commit the crime does not exist, and we think the same
principle must apply to this case. The defendant was therefore properly acquitted of the crime
charged in the complaint.
We are, however, of the opinion that the defendant is chargeable with criminal negligence in
contracting the second marriage, and should have been convicted under article 568 of the Penal
Code. (See G.O., No. 58, sec. 29.) It does not appear that she made any attempt to ascertain for
herself whether the information received by her mother-in-law as to the death of Gonzalez was to be
relied upon. She never even saw or communicated directly in any way with the persons who gave
her mother-in-law this information. Moreover, viewing the testimony in the light most favorable to her,
she waited less than two years after hearing the death of her husband before contracting the second
marriage. The diligence with which the law requires the individual at all times to govern his conduct
varies with the nature of the situation in which he is to perform. In a matter so important to the good
order of society as that in question, where the consequences of a mistake are necessarily so
serious, nothing less than the highest degree of diligence will satisfy the standard prescribed by the
law. We can not say that the defendant has acted with that diligence in the present case.
Applying the provisions of article 568 of the Penal Code, the act of contracting a second or
subsequent marriage, the prior marriage not having been lawfully dissolved, being one which, if
done with malice, would constitute a grave crime, the offense committed by the defendant is
punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum degree to prision correccional in its minimum degree.
There being no aggravating circumstance, and as we think the extenuating circumstance of article
11 of the Penal Code may properly be considered in this case, this penalty should be applied in its
minimum degree.
We therefore sentence the defendant to four months and one day of arresto mayor and costs. The
judgment of the court below will be modified in accordance with this opinion. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Cooper, Smith, Willard, and Mapa, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.
Gibb & Gale, for appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the testimony of the
accused himself, because from the very nature of these facts and from the circumstances
surrounding the incident upon which these proceedings rest, no other evidence as to these facts was
available either to the prosecution or to the defense. We think, however, that, giving the accused the
benefit of the doubt as to the weight of the evidence touching those details of the incident as to
which there can be said to be any doubt, the following statement of the material facts disclose by the
record may be taken to be substantially correct:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley,
Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy
or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached house situates some 40 meters from the
nearest building, and in August, 19087, was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No one
slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the
building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the building, by
which communication was had with the other part of the house. This porch was covered by a heavy
growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of the room was not furnished with a
permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch
on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of
fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In the room there was but one small window, which,
like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door and window, there were no other openings
of any kind in the room.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for the night,
was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and
called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door
that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the
heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and the defendant,
fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the
room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair
which had been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that
the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a
burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair was merely thrown back into
the room by the sudden opening of the door against which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife
which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards
turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the steps
in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately recognized him in
the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers who slept in the next
house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just
described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and as
defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his
personal protection.
The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on friendly and
amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had an understanding that when either returned at night,
he should knock at the door and acquiant his companion with his identity. Pascual had left the house
early in the evening and gone for a walk with his friends, Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibañez,
servants employed at officers' quarters No. 28, the nearest house to the mess hall. The three
returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped at their room at No.
28, Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few moments after the party separated, Celestino and
Mariano heard cries for assistance and upon returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back
steps fatally wounded in the stomach, whereupon one of them ran back to No. 28 and called
Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who immediately went to the aid of the wounded man.
The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it
under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of their sleeping
room, despite defendant's warnings.
No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals suggests itself, unless
it be that the boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and sought to
frightened him by forcing his way into the room, refusing to give his name or say who he was, in
order to make Ah Chong believe that he was being attacked by a robber.
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital,
where he died from the effects of the wound on the following day.
The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court
of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one
day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law.
At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual Gualberto,
but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his
lawful right of self-defense.
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —
The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:
xxx xxx xxx
4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following attendant
circumstances:
(1) Illegal aggression.
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to
complete exception from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder
who forced open the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the
defendant believed him to be. No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the right of the
defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door
notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill the
intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a
small room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite his warnings
defendant would have been wholly justified in using any available weapon to defend himself from
such an assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts
and deliver the first blow.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither the
defendant nor his property nor any of the property under his charge was in real danger at the time
when he struck the fatal blow. That there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or
"ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling and resisting, and that there was no real "necessity"
for the use of the knife to defend his person or his property or the property under his charge.
The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally
responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt
from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the
crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when
he committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one answer, and we hold that under
such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or
mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to
negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged
(e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of
intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction
under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of
article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor incurs criminal liability
for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from that which he intended to
commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases
cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates vs. People, 32
N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)
The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only question worthy of
consideration is whether malice or criminal intent is an essential element or ingredient of the crimes
of homicide and assassination as defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has been said that
since the definitions there given of these as well as most other crimes and offense therein defined,
do not specifically and expressly declare that the acts constituting the crime or offense must be
committed with malice or with criminal intent in order that the actor may be held criminally liable, the
commission of the acts set out in the various definitions subjects the actor to the penalties described
therein, unless it appears that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the express
provisions of article 8 of the code, which treats of exemption. But while it is true that contrary to the
general rule of legislative enactment in the United States, the definitions of crimes and offenses as
set out in the Penal Code rarely contain provisions expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent
is an essential ingredient of the crime, nevertheless, the general provisions of article 1 of the code
clearly indicate that malice, or criminal intent in some form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and
offense therein defined, in the absence of express provisions modifying the general rule, such as are
those touching liability resulting from acts negligently or imprudently committed, and acts done by
one voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act committed is different from that
which he intended to commit. And it is to be observed that even these exceptions are more apparent
than real, for "There is little distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a wrongful thing and
indifference whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits supplies
the place of the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again,
"There is so little difference between a disposition to do a great harm and a disposition to do harm
that one of them may very well be looked upon as the measure of the other. Since, therefore, the
guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do harm, which the criminal shows by committing it, and
since this disposition is greater or less in proportion to the harm which is done by the crime, the
consequence is that the guilt of the crime follows the same proportion; it is greater or less according
as the crime in its own nature does greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been
otherwise stated, the thing done, having proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to be viewed the same
whether the corruption was of one particular form or another.
Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the
contrary shall appear.
An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even
though the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to commit.
The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary" as used in
this article, say that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and roundly asserts that
without intention (intention to do wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime; and that the
word "voluntary" implies and includes the words "con malicia," which were expressly set out in the
definition of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted from the code of 1870, because, as
Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was redundant, being implied and included in the word
"voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)
Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said to exempt
from criminal responsibility when the act which was actually intended to be done was in itself a lawful
one, and in the absence of negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes in his
discussion of the provisions of this article of the code that in general without intention there can be
no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have shown above, the exceptions insisted upon by
Viada are more apparent than real.
Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:
In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where there is no
intention there is no crime . . . in order to affirm, without fear of mistake, that under our code
there can be no crime if there is no act, an act which must fall within the sphere of ethics if
there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio 169.)
And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for example in its
sentence of May 31, 1882, in which it made use of the following language:
It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice which is
supposed from the operation of the will and an intent to cause the injury which may be the
object of the crime.
And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that, whatever may be
the civil effects of the inscription of his three sons, made by the appellant in the civil registry and in
the parochial church, there can be no crime because of the lack of the necessary element or criminal
intention, which characterizes every action or ommission punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal
negligence."
And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the following language:
. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or their absence
in the commission of an act defined and punished by law as criminal, is not a necessary
question of fact submitted to the exclusive judgment and decision of the trial court.
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential element of the
various crimes and misdemeanors therein defined becomes clear also from an examination of the
provisions of article 568, which are as follows:
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice, would
constitute a grave crime, shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
degree, to prision correccional in its minimum degrees if it shall constitute a less grave crime.
He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple imprudence or
negligence shall incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum degrees.
In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their discretion,
without being subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the crime is
equal to or less than those contained in the first paragraph thereof, in which case the courts
shall apply the next one thereto in the degree which they may consider proper.
The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words "criminal intent,"
and the direct inference from its provisions is that the commission of the acts contemplated therein,
in the absence of malice (criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal
liability on the actor.
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approximate in meaning
the word "willful" as used in English and American statute to designate a form of criminal intent. It
has been said that while the word "willful" sometimes means little more than intentionally or
designedly, yet it is more frequently understood to extent a little further and approximate the idea of
the milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent without justifiable excuse. In one case
it was said to mean, as employed in a statute in contemplation, "wantonly" or "causelessly;" in
another, "without reasonable grounds to believe the thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that
ordinarily in a statute it means "not merely `voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other words,
corruptly." In English and the American statutes defining crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously,"
and "malice aforethought" are words indicating intent, more purely technical than "willful" or willfully,"
but "the difference between them is not great;" the word "malice" not often being understood to
require general malevolence toward a particular individual, and signifying rather the intent from our
legal justification. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and cases cited.)
But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the definition of a
crime that it be committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously" "with malice aforethought," or in one of
the various modes generally construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that reasoning from
general principles it will always be found that with the rare exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to
constitute a crime evil intent must combine with an act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position with
numerous citations from the decided cases, thus forcely present this doctrine:
In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule as to the
intent. In controversies between private parties the quo animo with which a thing was done is
sometimes important, not always; but crime proceeds only from a criminal mind. So that —
There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment is
the sentence of wickedness, without which it can not be. And neither in philosophical
speculation nor in religious or mortal sentiment would any people in any age allow that a
man should be deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It is therefore a principle of our legal
system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of an offense is the wrongful intent,
without which it can not exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by —
Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct on this
subject. It consequently has supplied to us such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi mens
sit rea, "the act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus me incito
factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me against my will is not my act;" and others of
the like sort. In this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence differs from civil. So also —
Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to the intention, we
inculpate or exculpate others or ourselves without any respect to the happiness or misery
actually produced. Let the result of an action be what it may, we hold a man guilty simply on
the ground of intention; or, on the dame ground, we hold him innocent." The calm judgment
of mankind keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In times of excitement, when vengeance
takes the place of justice, every guard around the innocent is cast down. But with the return
of reason comes the public voice that where the mind is pure, he who differs in act from his
neighbors does not offend. And —
In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to man, no one
deems another to deserve punishment for what he did from an upright mind, destitute of
every form of evil. And whenever a person is made to suffer a punishment which the
community deems not his due, so far from its placing an evil mark upon him, it elevates him
to the seat of the martyr. Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads the want of bad intent in
justification of what has the appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence that the plea, if
its truth is credited, will be accepted as good. Now these facts are only the voice of nature
uttering one of her immutable truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior to all other
doctrines, because first in nature from which the law itself proceeds, that no man is to be
punished as a criminal unless his intent is wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs.
286 to 290.)
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this doctrine of
abstract justice result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non
excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"), without which justice could not be administered in
our tribunals; and compelled also by the same doctrine of necessity, the courts have recognized the
power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make
their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. Without discussing these
exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to say that the courts have always held that unless
the intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the
intent of the doer is clear and beyond question the statute will not be so construed (cases cited in
Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and 77); and the rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has
been said not to be a real departure from the law's fundamental principle that crime exists only
where the mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose need not be to break the law, and if suffices if it
is simply to do the thing which the law in fact forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and
cases cited.)
But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity therefore, requiring
mistake in fact to be dealt with otherwise that in strict accord with the principles of abstract justice.
On the contrary, the maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is,
in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as
shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the
actor from criminal liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid
down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear
to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387; P. vs. Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb.,
342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625; Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41;
P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to say, the question as to
whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be
determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the mistake was made,
and the effect which the surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his
mind, in forming the intent, criminal or other wise, upon which he acted.
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the
existence of facts which will justify a killing — or, in terms more nicely in accord with the
principles on which the rule is founded, if without fault or carelessness he does believe them
— he is legally guiltless of the homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an
innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with reference to the right
of self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason and
sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently
adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as
they appear to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and
defends himself correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts to be the law will not
punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and he was really no occassion for the
extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 305, and large array of cases there
cited.)
The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of this rule is the
case where a man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds up" his
friends in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol demands his money or his life, but is killed by
his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled at his head is
loaded, and that his life and property are in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one
will doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer believed them to be he would be innocent of the
commission of any crime and wholly exempt from criminal liability, although if he knew the real state
of the facts when he took the life of his friend he would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of
homicide or assassination. Under such circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of the facts
overcomes the presumption of malice or criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a
necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law" in cases of homicide or assassination) overcomes
at the same time the presumption established in article 1 of the code, that the "act punished by law"
was committed "voluntarily."
Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:
If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a felonious
design against him, and under that supposition killed him, although it should afterwards
appear that there was no such design, it will not be murder, but it will be either manslaughter
or excusable homicide, according to the degree of caution used and the probable grounds of
such belief. (Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's
report of the case, p.7.)
In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:
A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with an
outstretched arms and a pistol in his hand, and using violent menaces against his life as he
advances. Having approached near enough in the same attitude, A, who has a club in his
hand, strikes B over the head before or at the instant the pistol is discharged; and of the
wound B dies. It turns out the pistol was loaded with powder only, and that the real design of
B was only to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say that A is more criminal that he would
have been if there had been a bullet in the pistol? Those who hold such doctrine must
require that a man so attacked must, before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how
the pistol is loaded — a doctrine which would entirely take away the essential right of self-
defense. And when it is considered that the jury who try the cause, and not the party killing,
are to judge of the reasonable grounds of his apprehension, no danger can be supposed to
flow from this principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)
To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by Viada, a few of
which are here set out in full because the facts are somewhat analogous to those in the case at bar.
QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at night, in
company only of his wife, without other light than reflected from the fire, and that the man
with his back to the door was attending to the fire, there suddenly entered a person whom he
did not see or know, who struck him one or two blows, producing a contusion on the
shoulder, because of which he turned, seized the person and took from his the stick with
which he had undoubtedly been struck, and gave the unknown person a blow, knocking him
to the floor, and afterwards striking him another blow on the head, leaving the unknown lying
on the floor, and left the house. It turned out the unknown person was his father-in-law, to
whom he rendered assistance as soon as he learned his identity, and who died in about six
days in consequence of cerebral congestion resulting from the blow. The accused, who
confessed the facts, had always sustained pleasant relations with his father-in-law, whom he
visited during his sickness, demonstrating great grief over the occurrence. Shall he be
considered free from criminal responsibility, as having acted in self-defense, with all the
circumstances related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal Code? The criminal branch of
the Audiencia of Valladolid found that he was an illegal aggressor, without sufficient
provocation, and that there did not exists rational necessity for the employment of the force
used, and in accordance with articles 419 and 87 of the Penal Code condemned him to
twenty months of imprisonment, with accessory penalty and costs. Upon appeal by the
accused, he was acquitted by the supreme court, under the following sentence:
"Considering, from the facts found by the sentence to have been proven, that the accused
was surprised from behind, at night, in his house beside his wife who was nursing her child,
was attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to distinguish with which they might
have executed their criminal intent, because of the there was no other than fire light in the
room, and considering that in such a situation and when the acts executed demonstrated
that they might endanger his existence, and possibly that of his wife and child, more
especially because his assailant was unknown, he should have defended himself, and in
doing so with the same stick with which he was attacked, he did not exceed the limits of self-
defense, nor did he use means which were not rationally necessary, particularly because the
instrument with which he killed was the one which he took from his assailant, and was
capable of producing death, and in the darkness of the house and the consteration which
naturally resulted from such strong aggression, it was not given him to known or distinguish
whether there was one or more assailants, nor the arms which they might bear, not that
which they might accomplish, and considering that the lower court did not find from the
accepted facts that there existed rational necessity for the means employed, and that it did
not apply paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme
court of Spain, February 28, 1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .
QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated in a retired
part of the city, upon arriving at a point where there was no light, heard the voice of a man, at
a distance of some 8 paces, saying: "Face down, hand over you money!" because of which,
and almost at the same money, he fired two shots from his pistol, distinguishing immediately
the voice of one of his friends (who had before simulated a different voice) saying, "Oh! they
have killed me," and hastening to his assistance, finding the body lying upon the ground, he
cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I am ruined," realizing that he had been the
victim of a joke, and not receiving a reply, and observing that his friend was a corpse, he
retired from the place. Shall he be declared exempt in toto from responsibility as the author
of this homicide, as having acted in just self-defense under the circumstances defined in
paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not
so find, but only found in favor of the accused two of the requisites of said article, but not that
of the reasonableness of the means employed to repel the attack, and, therefore,
condemned the accused to eight years and one day of prison mayor, etc. The supreme court
acquitted the accused on his appeal from this sentence, holding that the accused was acting
under a justifiable and excusable mistake of fact as to the identity of the person calling to
him, and that under the circumstances, the darkness and remoteness, etc., the means
employed were rational and the shooting justifiable. (Sentence supreme court, March 17,
1885.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)
QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night, by a
large stone thrown against his window — at this, he puts his head out of the window and
inquires what is wanted, and is answered "the delivery of all of his money, otherwise his
house would be burned" — because of which, and observing in an alley adjacent to the mill
four individuals, one of whom addressed him with blasphemy, he fired his pistol at one the
men, who, on the next morning was found dead on the same spot. Shall this man be
declared exempt from criminal responsibility as having acted in just self-defense with all of
the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of
the Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that there existed in favor of the accused a majority of the
requisites to exempt him from criminal responsibility, but not that of reasonable necessity for
the means, employed, and condemned the accused to twelve months of prision
correctional for the homicide committed. Upon appeal, the supreme court acquitted the
condemned, finding that the accused, in firing at the malefactors, who attack his mill at night
in a remote spot by threatening robbery and incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense of
his person, property, and family. (Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)
A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant
Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who
forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril,
both of his life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the
circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in
good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising
his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have
been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have
been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the
facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe
threatened his person and his property and the property under his charge.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and the
defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the
costs of both instance de oficio. So ordered.
Johnson Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.

Arellano, C.J., and Mapa, J., dissent.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 130487. June 19, 2000]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO

ESTRADA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is an automatic review of the death penalty imposed on accused-appellant

by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Dagupan City in Criminal Case No. 94-
00860-D. We nullify the proceedings in the court a quoand remand the case
[1]
for proper disposition.

In an Information dated December 29, 1994, accused-appellant Roberto Estrada y
Lopez was charged with the crime of murder for the killing of one Rogelio P. Mararac, a
security guard. The Information reads:
That on or about the 27th day of December 1994 in the City of Dagupan,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, ROBERTO ESTRADA Y LOPEZ, being then armed with a
butchers knife, with intent to kill one ROGELIO P. MARARAC with treachery
and committed in a holy place of worship, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the
latter by stabbing him, hitting him on vital parts of his body with the said
weapon, thereby causing his death shortly thereafter due to Cardiorespiratory
Arrest, Massive Intrathoracic Hemorrhage, Stab Wound as per Autopsy
Report and Certificate of Death both issued by Dr. Tomas G. Cornel, Assistant
City Health Officer, this City, to the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of
said deceased ROGELIO P. MARARAC in the amount of not less than FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), Philippine currency, and other
consequential damages.
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

Dagupan City, Philippines, December 29, 1994. [2]
At the arraignment on January 6, 1995, accused-appellants counsel, the Public

Attorneys Office, filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and to Commit
Accused to Psychiatric Ward at Baguio General Hospital. It was alleged that
accused-appellant could not properly and intelligently enter a plea because he
was suffering from a mental defect; that before the commission of the crime, he
was confined at the psychiatric ward of the Baguio General Hospital in Baguio
City. He prayed for the suspension of his arraignment and the issuance of an
order confining him at the said hospital. [3]
The motion was opposed by the City Prosecutor. The trial court, motu proprio,
propounded several questions on accused-appellant. Finding that the
questions were understood and answered by him intelligently, the court denied
the motion that same day. [4]
The arraignment proceeded and a plea of not guilty was entered by the court
on accused-appellants behalf. [5]
The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely: (1) Dr. Tomas Cornel, the
Assistant Health Officer of Dagupan City who issued the death certificate and conducted
the autopsy on the victim; (2) Crisanto Santillan, an eyewitness to the incident; (3) SPO1
Conrado Francisco, one of the policemen who apprehended accused-appellant; and (4)
Rosalinda Sobremonte, the victims sister. The prosecution established the following
facts:
In the morning of December 27, 1994, at the St. Johns Cathedral, Dagupan
City, the sacrament of confirmation was being performed by the Roman
Catholic Bishop of Dagupan City on the children of Dagupan. The cathedral
was filled with more than a thousand people. At 11:00 A.M., nearing the close
of the rites, the Bishop went down the altar to give his final blessing to the
children in the front rows. While the Bishop was giving his blessing, a man from
the crowd went up and walked towards the center of the altar.He stopped
beside the Bishops chair, turned around and, in full view of the Catholic faithful,
sat on the Bishops chair. The man was accused-appellant. Crisanto Santillan,
who was assisting the Bishop at the rites, saw accused-appellant. Santillan
approached accused-appellant and requested him to vacate the Bishops
chair. Gripping the chairs armrest, accused-appellant replied in Pangasinese:
No matter what will happen, I will not move out! Hearing this, Santillan moved
away. [6]
Some of the churchgoers summoned Rogelio Mararac, the security guard at

the cathedral. Mararac went near accused-appellant and told him to vacate the
Bishops chair. Accused-appellant stared intensely at the guard. Mararac
grabbed his nightstick and used it to tap accused-appellants hand on the
armrest. Appellant did not budge. Again, Mararac tapped the latters hand. Still
no reaction. Mararac was about to strike again when suddenly accused-
appellant drew a knife from his back, lunged at Mararac and stabbed him, hitting
him below his left throat. Mararac fell. Accused-appellant went over the victim
and tried to stab him again but Mararac parried his thrust. Accused-appellant
looked up and around him. He got up, went to the microphone and shouted:
Anggapuy nayan dia! (No one can beat me here!). He returned to the Bishops
chair and sat on it again. Mararac, wounded and bleeding, slowly dragged
himself down the altar. [7]
Meanwhile, SPO1 Conrado Francisco, who was directing traffic outside,

received a report of a commotion inside the cathedral. Rushing to the cathedral,
SPO1 Francisco saw a man, accused-appellant, with red stains on his shirt and
a knife in one hand sitting on a chair at the center of the altar. He ran to
accused-appellant and advised him to drop the knife. Accused-appellant
obeyed. He dropped the knife and raised his hands. Thereupon, Chief
Inspector Wendy Rosario, Deputy Police Chief, Dagupan City, who was
attending the confirmation rites at the Cathedral, went near accused-appellant
to pick up the knife. Suddenly, accused-appellant embraced Chief Inspector
Rosario and the two wrestled with each other. Chief Inspector Rosario was able
to subdue accused-appellant. The police came and when they frisked
appellant, they found a leather scabbard tucked around his waist. He was [8]
brought to the police station and placed in jail.

In the meantime, Mararac, the security guard, was brought to the hospital
where he expired a few minutes upon arrival. He died of cardio-respiratory
arrest, massive, intra-thoracic hemorrhage, stab wound. He was found to
[9]
have sustained two (2) stab wounds: one just below the left throat and the
other on the left arm.The autopsy reported the following findings:
EXTERNAL FINDINGS
1. Stab wound, along the parasternal line, level of the 2nd intercostal space, left, 1 x 1
penetrating. The edge of one side of the wound is sharp and pointed.
2. Stab wound, antero-lateral aspect, distal 3rd, arm, left, x x . The edge of one side of
the wound is sharp and pointed.
INTERNAL FINDINGS
Massive intrathoracic, left, hemorrhage with perforation of the upper and lower
lobe of the left lung. The left pulmonary blood vessel was severely cut. [10]
After the prosecution rested its case, accused-appellant, with leave of court,
filed a Demurrer to Evidence. He claimed that the prosecution failed to prove
the crime of murder because there was no evidence of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery; that there was unlawful aggression by the victim
when he tapped accused-appellants hand with his nightstick; and that accused-
appellant did not have sufficient ability to calculate his defensive acts because
he was of unsound mind. [11]
The Demurrer to Evidence was opposed by the public prosecutor. He alleged

that the accused pretended to be weak, tame and of unsound mind; that after
he made the first stab, he furiously continued stabbing and slashing the victim
to finish him off undeterred by the fact that he was in a holy place where a
religious ceremony was being conducted; and the plea of unsound mind had
already been ruled upon by the trial court in its order of January 6, 1995. [12]
On February 21, 1995, a letter was sent by Inspector Wilfredo F. Valdez, Jail
Warden of Dagupan City to the trial court. Inspector Valdez requested the court
to allow accused-appellant, who was confined at the city jail, to be treated at
the Baguio General Hospital to determine whether he should remain in jail or
be transferred to some other institution. The other prisoners were allegedly not
comfortable with appellant because he had been exhibiting unusual
behavior. He tried to climb up the jail roof so he could escape and see his
family.[13]
As ordered by the trial court, the public prosecutor filed a Comment to the jail
wardens letter. He reiterated that the mental condition of accused-appellant to
stand trial had already been determined; unless a competent government

agency certifies otherwise, the trial should proceed; and the city jail warden was
not the proper person to determine whether accused-appellant was mentally ill
or not.[14]
In an order dated August 21, 1995, the trial court denied the Demurrer to
Evidence. Accused-appellant moved for reconsideration.
[15]
While the motion for reconsideration was pending, on February 26, 1996,
counsel for accused-appellant filed a Motion to Confine Accused for Physical,
Mental and Psychiatric Examination. Appellants counsel informed the court that
accused-appellant had been exhibiting abnormal behavior for the past weeks;
he would shout at the top of his voice and cause panic among the jail inmates
and personnel; that appellant had not been eating and sleeping; that his co-
inmates had been complaining of not getting enough sleep for fear of being
attacked by him while asleep; that once, while they were sleeping, appellant
took out all his personal effects and waste matter and burned them inside the
cell which again caused panic among the inmates. Appellants counsel prayed
that his client be confined at the National Center for Mental Health in Manila or
at the Baguio General Hospital. Attached to the motion were two (2)
[16]
letters. One, dated February 19, 1996, was from Inspector Pedrito Llopis, Jail
Warden, Dagupan City, addressed to the trial court judge informing him of
appellants irrational behavior and seeking the issuance of a court order for the
immediate psychiatric and mental examination of accused-appellant. The [17]
second letter, dated February 21, 1996, was addressed to Inspector Llopis from
the Bukang Liwayway Association, an association of inmates in the Dagupan
City Jail. The letter, signed by the president, secretary and adviser of said
association, informed the jail warden of appellants unusual behavior and
requested that immediate action be taken against him to avoid future violent
incidents in the jail.[18]
On September 18, 1996, the trial court denied reconsideration of the order
denying the Demurrer to Evidence. The court ordered accused-appellant to
present his evidence on October 15, 1996. [19]
Accused-appellant did not take the witness stand. Instead, his counsel
presented the testimony of Dr. Maria Soledad Gawidan, a resident physician[20]
in the Department of Psychiatry at the Baguio General Hospital, and accused-

appellants medical and clinical records at the said hospital. Dr. Gawidan [21]
testified that appellant had been confined at the BGH from February 18, 1993
to February 22, 1993 and that he suffered from Schizophrenic Psychosis,
Paranoid Typeschizophrenia, paranoid, chronic, paranoid type; and after four [22]
(4) days of confinement, he was discharged in improved physical and mental

condition. The medical and clinical records consisted of the following: (1) letter
[23]
of Dr. Alfredo Sy, Municipal Health Officer, Calasiao, Pangasinan to Dr. Jesus
del Prado, Director, BGH referring accused-appellant for admission and
treatment after a relapse of his violent behavior; (2) the clinical cover sheet of
[24]
appellant at the BGH; (3) the consent slip of appellants wife voluntarily
[25]
entrusting appellant to the BGH; (4) the Patients Record; (5) the Consent for
[26] [27]
Discharge signed by appellants wife; (6) the Summary and Discharges of

[28]
appellant; (7) appellants clinical case history; (8) the admitting notes; (9)
[29] [30] [31]
Physicians Order Form; (10) the Treatment Form/ medication sheet; and
[32] [33]
(11) Nurses Notes. [34]

The trial court rendered a decision on June 23, 1997. It upheld the prosecution
evidence and found accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged and thereby sentenced
him to death, viz:
WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Roberto Estrada y Lopez guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and in view of the presence
of the aggravating circumstance of cruelty which is not offset by any mitigating
circumstance, the accused is sentenced to suffer the Death Penalty and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P50,000.00.
The accused is ordered to pay the sum of P18,870.00 representing actual

expenses and P100,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED. [35]
In this appeal, accused-appellant assigns the following errors:

I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT

GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED, DESPITE CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE ON RECORD, SUPPORTING HIS PLEA OF
INSANITY.
II
THE LOWER COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE STABBING

TO DEATH OF ROGELIO MARARAC WAS ATTENDED WITH TREACHERY
AND AGGRAVATED BY CRUELTY, GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS PLEA OF INSANITY CANNOT BE CONSIDERED
AN EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE. [36]
The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is criminally liable for a
felony committed by him. Under the classical theory on which our penal code
[37]
is mainly based, the basis of criminal liability is human free will. Man is [38]
essentially a moral creature with an absolutely free will to choose between good
and evil. When he commits a felonious or criminal act (delito doloso), the act
[39]
is presumed to have been done voluntarily, i.e., with freedom, intelligence and
[40]
intent. Man, therefore, should be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful

[41]
acts so long as free will appears unimpaired. [42]
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that every person
is of sound mind and that all acts are voluntary. The moral and legal
[43] [44]
presumption under our law is that freedom and intelligence constitute the
normal condition of a person. This presumption, however, may be overthrown
[45]
by other factors; and one of these is insanity which exempts the actor from
criminal liability. [46]
The Revised Penal Code in Article 12 (1) provides:
ART. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability.The following are
exempt from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the
law defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in
one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted,

which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the
permission of the same court.
An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted during a
lucid interval. If the court therefore finds the accused insane when the alleged
crime was committed, he shall be acquitted but the court shall order his
confinement in a hospital or asylum for treatment until he may be released
without danger. An acquittal of the accused does not result in his outright
release, but rather in a verdict which is followed by commitment of the accused
to a mental institution. [47]
In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will
not exclude imputability. The accused must be so insane as to be incapable
[48]
of entertaining a criminal intent. He must be deprived of reason and act without

[49]
the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to

discern or a total deprivation of freedom of the will. [50]
Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes insanity as

an exempting circumstance must prove it by clear and positive evidence. And [51]
the evidence on this point must refer to the time preceding the act under
prosecution or to the very moment of its execution. [52]
To ascertain a persons mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible

to receive evidence of the condition of his mind within a reasonable period both
before and after that time. Direct testimony is not required. Neither are
[53] [54]
specific acts of derangement essential to establish insanity as a

defense. Circumstantial evidence, if clear and convincing, suffices; for the
[55]
unfathomable mind can only be known by overt acts. A persons thoughts,

motives, and emotions may be evaluated only by outward acts to determine
whether these conform to the practice of people of sound mind. [56]
In the case at bar, there is no direct proof that accused-appellant was afflicted
with insanity at the time he killed Mararac. The absence of direct proof,
nevertheless, does not entirely discount the probability that appellant was not
of sound mind at that time. From the affidavit of Crisanto Santillan attached to [57]
the Information, there are certain circumstances that should have placed the
trial court on notice that appellant may not have been in full possession of his
mental faculties when he attacked Mararac. It was highly unusual for a sane
person to go up to the altar and sit on the Bishops chair while the Bishop was
administering the Holy Sacrament of Confirmation to children in a jampacked
cathedral. It goes against normal and ordinary behavior for appellant, without
sufficient provocation from the security guard, to stab the latter at the altar,
during sacramental rites and in front of all the Catholic faithful to witness.
Appellant did not flee, or at least attempt to flee after the stabbing. He
nonchalantly approached the microphone and, over the public address system,
uttered words to the faithful which no rational person would have made. He then
returned to the Bishops chair and sat there as if nothing happened.
Accused-appellants history of mental illness was brought to the courts attention on
the day of the arraignment. Counsel for accused-appellant moved for suspension of the
arraignment on the ground that his client could not properly and intelligently enter a plea
due to his mental condition. The Motion for Suspension is authorized under Section 12,
Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides:
Sec. 12. Suspension of arraignment.The arraignment shall be suspended, if at

the time thereof:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition

which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against
him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his
mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose.
(b) x x x.
The arraignment of an accused shall be suspended if at the time thereof he

appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition of such nature as to
render him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead
intelligently thereto. Under these circumstances, the court must suspend the
proceedings and order the mental examination of the accused, and if
confinement be necessary for examination, order such confinement and
examination. If the accused is not in full possession of his mental faculties at
the time he is informed at the arraignment of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, the process is itself a felo de se, for he can neither
comprehend the full import of the charge nor can he give an intelligent plea
thereto.[58]
The question of suspending the arraignment lies within the discretion of the trial
court.[59]And the test to determine whether the proceedings will be suspended depends on
the question of whether the accused, even with the assistance of counsel, would have a
fair trial. This rule was laid down as early as 1917, thus:
In passing on the question of the propriety of suspending the proceedings
against an accused person on the ground of present insanity, the judges should
bear in mind that not every aberration of the mind or exhibition of mental
deficiency is sufficient to justify such suspension. The test is to be found in
the question whether the accused would have a fair trial, with the
assistance which the law secures or gives; and it is obvious that under a
system of procedure like ours where every accused person has legal counsel,
it is not necessary to be so particular as it used to be in England where the
accused had no advocate but himself. In the American jurisdiction, the issue
[60]
of the accuseds present insanity or insanity at the time of the court proceedings
is separate and distinct from his criminal responsibility at the time of commission
of the act. The defense of insanity in a criminal trial concerns the defendants
mental condition at the time of the crimes commission. Present insanity is
commonly referred to as competency to stand trial and relates to the
[61]
appropriateness of conducting the criminal proceeding in light of the defendants

present inability to participate meaningfully and effectively. In competency
[62]
cases, the accused may have been sane or insane during the commission of
the offense which relates to a determination of his guilt. However, if he is found
incompetent to stand trial, the trial is simply postponed until such time as he
may be found competent. Incompetency to stand trial is not a defense; it merely
postpones the trial. [63]
In determining a defendants competency to stand trial, the test is whether he

has the capacity to comprehend his position, understand the nature and object
of the proceedings against him, to conduct his defense in a rational manner,
and to cooperate, communicate with, and assist his counsel to the end that any
available defense may be interposed. This test is prescribed by state law but
[64]
it exists generally as a statutory recognition of the rule at common law. Thus: [65]
[I]t is not enough for the x x x judge to find that the defendant [is] oriented to
time and place, and [has] some recollection of events, but that the test must be
whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understandingand whether he has a rational as
well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. [66]
There are two distinct matters to be determined under this test: (1) whether the
defendant is sufficiently coherent to provide his counsel with information
necessary or relevant to constructing a defense; and (2) whether he is able to
comprehend the significance of the trial and his relation to it. The first requisite
[67]
is the relation between the defendant and his counsel such that the defendant
must be able to confer coherently with his counsel. The second is the relation
of the defendant vis-a-vis the court proceedings, i.e., that he must have a
rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings. [68]
The rule barring trial or sentence of an insane person is for the protection of the
accused, rather than of the public. It has been held that it is inhuman to require
[69]
an accused disabled by act of God to make a just defense for his life or
liberty. To put a legally incompetent person on trial or to convict and sentence
[70]
him is a violation of the constitutional rights to a fair trial and due process of
[71]
law; and this has several reasons underlying it. For one, the accuracy of the
[72] [73]
proceedings may not be assured, as an incompetent defendant who cannot

comprehend the proceedings may not appreciate what information is relevant
to the proof of his innocence. Moreover, he is not in a position to exercise many
of the rights afforded a defendant in a criminal case, e.g., the right to effectively
consult with counsel, the right to testify in his own behalf, and the right to
confront opposing witnesses, which rights are safeguards for the accuracy of
the trial result. Second, the fairness of the proceedings may be questioned, as
there are certain basic decisions in the course of a criminal proceeding which a
defendant is expected to make for himself, and one of these is his plea. Third,
the dignity of the proceedings may be disrupted, for an incompetent defendant
is likely to conduct himself in the courtroom in a manner which may destroy the
decorum of the court. Even if the defendant remains passive, his lack of
comprehension fundamentally impairs the functioning of the trial process. A
criminal proceeding is essentially an adversarial proceeding. If the defendant is
not a conscious and intelligent participant, the adjudication loses its character
as a reasoned interaction between an individual and his community and
becomes an invective against an insensible object. Fourth, it is important that
the defendant knows why he is being punished, a comprehension which is
greatly dependent upon his understanding of what occurs at trial. An
incompetent defendant may not realize the moral reprehensibility of his
conduct. The societal goal of institutionalized retribution may be frustrated when
the force of the state is brought to bear against one who cannot comprehend
its significance. [74]
The determination of whether a sanity investigation or hearing should be

ordered rests generally in the discretion of the trial court. Mere allegation of
[75]
insanity is insufficient. There must be evidence or circumstances that raise a

reasonable doubt or a bona fide doubt as to defendants competence to
[76] [77]
stand trial. Among the factors a judge may consider is evidence of the
defendants irrational behavior, history of mental illness or behavioral
abnormalities, previous confinement for mental disturbance, demeanor of the
defendant, and psychiatric or even lay testimony bearing on the issue of

competency in a particular case. [78]
In the case at bar, when accused-appellant moved for suspension of the arraignment
on the ground of accuseds mental condition, the trial court denied the motion after finding
that the questions propounded on appellant were intelligently answered by him. The court
declared::
xxx
It should be noted that when this case was called, the Presiding Judge asked
questions on the accused, and he (accused) answered intelligently. As a
matter of fact, when asked where he was born, he answered, in Tayug.
The accused could answer intelligently. He could understand the questions

asked of him.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment

and to Commit Accused to Psychiatric Ward at Baguio General Hospital, is
hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED. [79]
The fact that accused-appellant was able to answer the questions asked by the
trial court is not conclusive evidence that he was competent enough to stand
trial and assist in his defense. Section 12, Rule 116 speaks of an unsound
mental condition that effectively renders [the accused] unable to fully
understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. It is not
clear whether accused-appellant was of such sound mind as to fully understand
the charge against him. It is also not certain whether his plea was made
intelligently. The plea of not guilty was not made by accused-appellant but by
the trial court because of his refusal to plead. [80]
The trial court took it solely upon itself to determine the sanity of accused-appellant.
The trial judge is not a psychiatrist or psychologist or some other expert equipped with
the specialized knowledge of determining the state of a persons mental health. To
determine the accused-appellants competency to stand trial, the court, in the instant case,
should have at least ordered the examination of accused-appellant, especially in the light
of the latters history of mental illness.
If the medical history was not enough to create a reasonable doubt in the judges
mind of accused-appellants competency to stand trial, subsequent events
should have done so. One month after the prosecution rested its case, the Jail
Warden of Dagupan City wrote the trial judge informing him of accused-
appellants unusual behavior and requesting that he be examined at the hospital
to determine whether he should remain in jail or be placed in some other
institution. The trial judge ignored this letter. One year later, accused-appellants
counsel filed a Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric
Examination. Attached to this motion was a second letter by the new Jail
Warden of Dagupan City accompanied by a letter-complaint of the members of
the Bukang Liwayway Association of the city jail. Despite the two (2) attached
letters, the judge ignored the Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental
[81]
and Psychiatric Examination. The records are barren of any order disposing of
the said motion. The trial court instead ordered accused-appellant to present
his evidence. [82]
Dr. Gawidan testified that the illness of accused-appellant, i.e., schizophrenia,

paranoid type, is a lifetime illness and that this requires maintenance medication
to avoid relapses. After accused-appellant was discharged on February 22,
[83]
1993, he never returned to the hospital, not even for a check-up. [84]
Accused-appellant did not take the witness stand. His counsel manifested that
accused-appellant was waiving the right to testify in his own behalf because he
was suffering from mental illness. This manifestation was made in open court
[85]
more than two (2) years after the crime, and still, the claim of mental illness was
ignored by the trial court. And despite all the overwhelming indications of
accused-appellants state of mind, the judge persisted in his personal
assessment and never even considered subjecting accused-appellant to a
medical examination. To top it all, the judge found appellant guilty and
sentenced him to death!
Section 12, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure speaks of a
mental examination. The human mind is an entity, and understanding it is not
[86]
purely an intellectual process but depends to a large degree upon emotional

and psychological appreciation. Thus, an intelligent determination of an
[87]
accuseds capacity for rational understanding ought to rest on a deeper and

more comprehensive diagnosis of his mental condition than laymen can make
through observation of his overt behavior. Once a medical or psychiatric
diagnosis is made, then can the legal question of incompetency be determined
by the trial court. By this time, the accuseds abilities may be measured against
the specific demands a trial will make upon him. [88]
If the mental examination on accused-appellant had been promptly and properly

made, it may have served a dual purpose by determining both his competency
[89]
to stand trial and his sanity at the time of the offense. In some Philippine cases,
the medical and clinical findings of insanity made immediately after the
commission of the crime served as one of the bases for the acquittal of the
accused. The crime in the instant case was committed way back in December
[90]
1994, almost six (6) years ago. At this late hour, a medical finding alone may
make it impossible for us to evaluate appellants mental condition at the time of
the crimes commission for him to avail of the exempting circumstance of
insanity. Nonetheless, under the present circumstances, accused-appellants
[91]
competence to stand trial must be properly ascertained to enable him to

participate in his trial meaningfully.
By depriving appellant of a mental examination, the trial court effectively
deprived appellant of a fair trial. The trial courts negligence was a violation of
the basic requirements of due process; and for this reason, the proceedings
before the said court must be nullified. In People v. Serafica, we ordered that
[92]
the joint decision of the trial court be vacated and the cases remanded to the
court a quo for proper proceeding. The accused, who was charged with two (2)
counts of murder and one (1) count of frustrated murder, entered a plea of guilty
to all three charges and was sentenced to death. We found that the accuseds
plea was not an unconditional admission of guilt because he was not in full
possession of his mental faculties when he killed the victim; and thereby
ordered that he be subjected to the necessary medical examination to
determine his degree of insanity at the time of commission of the crime. [93]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Dagupan
City in Criminal Case No. 94-00860-D convicting accused-appellant Roberto Estrada and
sentencing him to death is vacated and the case is remanded to the court a quo for the
conduct of a proper mental examination on accused-appellant, a determination of his

competency to stand trial, and for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., on official leave.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 125672. September 27, 1996]
JESUSA CRUZ, petitioner, vs. CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION FOR

WOMEN IN MANDALUYONG, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
After having served five and a half years of her life sentence, may petitioner
-- who was convicted of selling 5.5 grams of prohibited drugs, namely, dried
marijuana leaves -- be now entitled to the beneficent penalty provisions of R.A.
7659 and be now released from imprisonment?
The Facts
Petitioner Jesusa Cruz, a.k.a. Jesusa Mediavilla, is at present confined at

the Correctional Institution for Women in Mandaluyong City serving the penalty
of life imprisonment imposed upon her as a consequence of her conviction
on March 31, 1992 for violation of Section 4, Article II of R.A. 6425 otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Her appeal from the judgment of
conviction rendered by the Regional TrialCourt of Iloilo City, Branch 33, was
dismissed by this Court on March 1, 1993 in G.R. No. 106389, People vs.
Jesusa Cruz. Hence, her life sentence has become final and executory.
On August 6, 1996, the present petition for habeas corpus was filed by Atty.
Mylene T. Marcia-Creencia (of the law firm of Fortun and Narvasa) who was
appointed by this Court on September 13, 1995 as counsel de oficio to assist
the accused in the preparation of the said pleading. Petitioner alleges that, as
of the date of filing of her herein petition, she has already served five and a half
years of her life sentence (February 2, 1991 to August 5, 1996). She argues
that the penalty of life imprisonment imposed by the trial court is excessive
considering that the marijuana allegedly taken from her was only 5.5 grams or
less than 750 grams. The Solicitor General, in his Comment filed with this Court
on August 30, 1996, interposed no objection to a favorable application of
Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious.

R.A. 7659, which took effect on December 13, 1993, partly modified the
penalties prescribed by R.A. 6425; that is, inter alia, where the quantity of
prohibited drugs involved is less than 750 grams, the penalty is reduced to a
range of prision correccional to reclusion perpetua. (Ordoez vs. Vinarao, G.R.
No. 121424, March 28, 1996). In People vs. Simon (234 SCRA 555, July 29,
1994) and People vs. De Lara (236 SCRA 291, September 5, 1994), this Court
ruled that where the marijuana is less than 250 grams, the penalty to be
imposed shall be prision correccional. Moreover, applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the penalty imposable is further reduced to any period
within arresto mayor, as minimum term, to the medium period of prision
correccional as the maximum term, there being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstances (Garcia, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 110983,
March 8, 1996).
All told, the petitioner should now be deemed to have served the maximum
period imposable for the crime for which she was convicted, i.e., selling 5.5
grams of dried marijuana leaves. Although her penalty of life imprisonment had
already become final, the beneficial effects of the amendment provided under
R.A. 7659 should be extended to petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The petitioner is
hereby ORDERED RELEASEDIMMEDIATELY, unless she is being detained
on some other legal charge. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), took no part. Related to Counsel of a party.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 115008-09. July 24, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANIEL QUIJADA

Y CIRCULADO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Accused-appellant Daniel Quijada appeals from the decision of 30

September 1993 of Branch 1
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol convicting him of the two offenses
separately charged in two informations, viz., murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code and illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form
under P.D. No. 1866, and imposing upon him the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for the first crime and an indeterminate penalty ranging
from seventeen years, four months, and one day, as minimum, to twenty years
and one day, as maximum, for the second crime.[1]
The appeal was originally assigned to the Third Division of the Court but
was later referred to the Court en banc in view of the problematical issue of
whether to sustain the trial court's judgment in conformity with the doctrine laid
down in People vs. Tac-
an, People vs. Tiozon, People vs. Caling, People vs. Jumamoy,[5] People
[2] [3] [4]
vs. Deunida,[6] People vs. Tiongco,[7] People vs. Fernandez,[8] and People vs.
Somooc,[9] or to modify the judgment and convict the appellant only of illegal
possession of firearm in its aggravated form pursuant
[10]
to People vs. Barros, which this Court (Second Division) decided on 27 June
1995.
The informations read as follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 8178
That on or about the 30th day of December, 1992, in the municipality of Dauis,
province of Bohol, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the abovenamed accused, with intent to kill and without any justifiable motive, with
treachery and abuse of superior strength, the accused being then armed with a .38 cal.
revolver, while the victim was unarmed, suddenly attacked the victim without giving
the latter the opportunity to defend himself, and with evident premeditation, the
accused having harbored a grudge against the victim a week prior to the incident of
murder, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot Diosdado Iroy y Nesnea with the use of the said firearm, hitting the latter on his
head and causing serious injuries which resulted to his death; to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the deceased.
Acts committed contrary to the provision of Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with
aggravating circumstance of nighttime being purposely sought for or taken advantage of by the
accused to facilitate the commission of the crime.[11]
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 8179
That on or about the 30th day of December, 1992, in the municipality of Dauis,
province of Bohol, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the abovenamed accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
keep, carry and have in his possession, custody and control a firearm (hand gun) with
ammunition, without first obtaining the necessary permit or license to possess the said
firearm from competent authorities which firearm was carried by the said accused
outside of his residence and was used by him in committing the crime of Murder with
Diosdado Iroy y Nesnea as the victim; to the damage and prejudice of the Republic of
the Philippines.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of P.D. No. 1866.[12]

Having arisen from the same incident, the cases were consolidated, and
joint hearings were had. The witnesses presented by the prosecution were
SPO4 Felipe Nigparanon (Acting Chief of Police of Dauis, Bohol), SPO
Gondalino Inte, Dr. Greg Julius Sodusta, Rosita Iroy, and Teodula
Matalinis. The defense presented as witnesses Alfred Aranzado, Edwin Nistal,

Julius Bonao, Saturnino Maglupay, and the appellant himself.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the Office of the Solicitor
General in the Brief for the Appellee as follows:
On 25 December 1992, a benefit dance was held at the Basketball Court of
Barangay Tinago, Dauis, Bohol. On this occasion, a fist fight occurred between
Diosdado Iroy and appellant Daniel Quijada as the latter was constantly
annoying and pestering the former's sister. Rosita Iroy (TSN, Crim. Cases 8178
& 8179, June 8, 1993, pp. 32-35; August 5, 1993, pp. 14-15).
In the evening of 30 December 1992, another benefit dance/disco was held
in the same place. This benefit dance was attended bv Rosita Iroy, Ariel Dano,
Teodora Badayos, Ado Aranzado, Largo Iroy and Diosdado Iroy.
While Rosita Iroy and others were enjoying themselves inside the dancing
area, Diosdado Iroy, Eugene Nesnea and Largo Iroy, who were then sitting at
the plaza (the area where they positioned themselves was duly lighted and was
approximately four meters from the dancing hall), decided to just watch the
activities in the dance hall directly from the plaza.
After dancing, Rosita Iroy decided to leave and went outside the gate of the
dance area. Subsequently, or around 11:30 of the same night, while facing the
direction of Diosdado Iroy, Rosita lroy saw appellant surreptitiously approach
her brother Diosdado Iroy from behind. Suddenly, appellant fired his revolver at
Diosdado Iroy, hitting the latter at the back portion of the head. This caused
Rosita Iroy to spontaneously shout that appellant shot her brother; while
appellant, after shooting Diosdado Iroy, ran towards the cornfield.
Diosdado Iroy was immediately rushed by Elmer Nigparanon and Largo Iroy
to the hospital but the injury sustained was fatal. In the meantime, Rosita Iroy
went home and relayed to her parents the unfortunate incident (TSN, Crim Case
Nos. 8178 & 8179, June 8, 1993, pp. 9-22, inclusive of the preceding
paragraphs).
At around midnight, the incident was reported to then Acting Chief of Police
Felipe Nigparanon by Mrs. Alejandra Iroy and her daughter Teodula
Matalinis. The police officer made entries in the police blotter regarding the
shooting and correspondingly, ordered his men to pick up the appellant. But
they were unable to locate appellant on that occasion (TSN, Crim. Case Nos.
8178 & 8179, June 9, 1993, pp. 2-6).
In the afternoon of 31 December 1992, appellant, together with his father
Teogenes Quijada went to the police station at Dauis, Bohol. There and then,
appellant was pinpointed by Elenito Nistal and Rosita Iroy as the person who
shot Diosdado Iroy. These facts were entered in the police blotter as Entry No.
1151 (TSN, Crim. Case Nos. 8178 & 8179, ibid. p. 14, June 14, 1993, pp. 4-
6).[13]
The slug was embedded at the midbrain.[14] Diosdado Iroy died of
Cardiorespiratory arrest, secondary to tonsillar herniation, secondary to
massive intracranial hemorrhage, secondary to gunshot wound, 1 cm. left
occipital area, transacting cerebellum up to midbrain.[15]
The firearm used by the appellant in shooting Diosdado Iroy was not
licensed. Per certifications issued on 26 April 1993, the appellant was not a duly
licensed firearm holder as verified from a consolidated list of licensed firearm
holders in the province[16] and was not authorized to carry a firearm outside his
residence.[17]
The appellant interposed the defense of alibi, which the trial court rejected
because he was positively identified by prosecution witness Rosita Iroy. It
summarized his testimony in this wise:
Daniel Quijada y Circulado, the accused in the instant cases, declared that
in the afternoon of December 30, 1992 he was in their house At 6:00 o'clock in
the afternoon he went to Tagbilaran City together with Julius Bonao in a tricycle
No. 250 to solicit passengers. They transported passengers until 10:30 o'clock
in the evening. They then proceeded to the Tagbilaran wharf waiting for the
passenger boat Trans Asia Taiwan. Before the arrival of Trans Asia Taiwan
they had a talk with Saturnino Maglopay. They were able to pick up two
passengers for Graham Avenue near La Roca Hotel. They then returned to the
Tagbilaran wharf for the arrival of MV Cebu City that docked at 12:10 past
midnight. They had a talk with Saturnino Maglopay who was waiting for his
aunties scheduled to arrive aboard MV Cebu City. They were not able to pick
up passengers which, as a consequence, they went home. They had on their
way home passengers for the Agora Public Market. They arrived at the house
of Julian Bonao at Bil-isan, Panglao, Bohol at 3:00 o'clock in the morning of
December 31, 1992 where he passed the night. He went home to Mariveles,
Dauis, Bohol at 9:00 o'clock in the morning.[18]
The trial court gave full faith and credit to the version of the prosecution and
found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged and
sentenced him accordingly. It appreciated the presence of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery considering that the appellant shot the victim at the
back of the head while the latter was watching the dance. The dispositive
portion of the decision dated 30 September 1993 reads as follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, in Criminal Case No. 8178, the court finds the
accused Daniel Quijada guilty of the crime of murder punished under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer an
imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua, with the accessories of the law and to pay
the cost.
In Criminal Case No. 8179, the Court finds the accused Daniel Quijada
guilty of the crime of Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition
punished under Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 1866 as amended, and hereby sentences
him to suffer an indeterminate sentence from Seventeen (17) years Four (4)
months and One (1) day, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years and One (1) day,
as maximum, with the accessories of the law and to pay the cost.
The slug or bullet which was extracted from the brain at the back portion of
the head of the victim Diosdado Iroy is hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the
government.
It appearing that the accused Daniel Quijada has undergone preventive
imprisonment he is entitled to the full time he has undergone preventive
imprisonment to be deducted from the term of sentence if he has executed a
waiver otherwise he will only be entitled to 4/5 of the time he has undergone
preventive imprisonment to be deducted from his term of sentence if he has not
executed a waiver.[19]
On 29 October 1993, after discovering that it had inadvertently omitted in
the decision an award of civil indemnity and other damages in Criminal Case
No. 8178, the trial court issued an order directing the appellant to pay the
parents of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of
their son and P10,000.00 for funeral expenses.[20] The order was to form an
integral part of the decision.
The decision was promulgated on 29 October 1993.[21]
The appellant forthwith interposed the present appeal, and in his Brief, he
contends that the trial court erred
I
. . . IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND GIVING CREDENCE TO

THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES ROSITA IROY AND
FELIPE NIGPARANON.
II
. . . IN NOT CONSIDERING THE TESTIMONIES OF DEFENSE WITNESSES

EDWIN NISTAL AND ALFRED ARANZADO, AND IN DISREGARDING THE
PICTORIAL EXHIBITS OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT PARTICULARLY
THE RELATIVE POSITIONS OF DIOSDADO IROY, ROSITA IROY, EDWIN
NISTAL, AND ALFRED ARANZADO.
III
. . . IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT PROSECUTION WITNESSES ROSITA IROY AND

SP04 FELIPE NIGPARANON HAD MOTIVES IN FALSELY TESTIFYING AGAINST
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.[22]
The appellant then submits that the issue in this case boils down to the
identity of the killer of Diosdado Iroy. To support his stand that the killer was not
identified, he attacks the credibility of prosecution witnesses Rosita Iroy and
SP04 Felipe Nigparanon. He claims that the former had a motive "to put him in
a bad light" and calls our attention to her direct testimony that her brother
Diosdado, the victim, boxed him on the night of 25 December 1992 because he
allegedly "bothered her." He further asserts that Rosita could not have seen the
person who shot Diosdado considering their respective positions, particularly
Rosita who, according to defense witnesses Nistal and Aranzado, was still
inside the dancing area and ran towards the crime scene only after Diosdado
was shot. And, the appellant considers it as suppression of evidence when the
prosecution did not present as witnesses Diosdado's companions who were
allegedly seated with Diosdado when he was shot.
As to SPO4 Nigparanon, the appellant intimates improper motives in that
the said witness is a neighbor of the Iroys, and when he testified, a case for
arbitrary detention had already been filed against him by the appellant. The
appellant further claims of alleged omissions and unexplained entries in the
police blotter.
Finally, the appellant wants us to favorably consider his defense of alibi

which, according to him, gained strength because of the lack of evidence on the
identity of the killer. Furthermore, he stresses that his conduct in voluntarily
going to the police station after having been informed that he, among many
others, was summoned by the police is hardly the actuation of the perpetrator
of the killing of Diosdado Iroy -- specially so if Rosita Iroy's claim is to be
believed that moments after the shooting she shouted that Daniel Quijada shot
Diosdado Iroy.
In its Appellee's Brief, the People refutes every argument raised by the
appellant and recommends that we affirm in toto the challenged decision.
After a careful scrutiny of the records and evaluation of the evidence
adduced by the parties, we find this appeal to be absolutely without merit.
The imputation of ill-motive on the part of Rosita Iroy and the basis therefor
hardly persuade. The appellant was the one who was boxed by and lost to
Diosdado Iroy in their fight on the night of 25 December 1992. It is then logical
and consistent with human experience that it would be the appellant who would
have forthwith entertained a grudge, if not hatred, against Diosdado. No
convincing evidence was shown that Rosita had any reason to falsely implicate
the appellant in the death of her brother Diosdado.
The claim that Rosita could not have seen who shot her brother Diosdado
because, as testified to by defense witnesses Nistal and Aranzado, she was
inside the dancing hall and rushed to her brother only after the latter was shot
is equally baseless. The following testimony of Rosita shows beyond cavil that
she saw the assailant:
Q You said that you were initially dancing inside the dancing place and you went out, about
what time did you get out?
A 11:00 o'clock.
Q And you were standing about two (2) meters from Diosdado Iroy until 11:30 when the
incident happened?
A Yes, I was standing.
Q And where did you face, you were facing Diosdado Iroy or the dancing area?
A I was intending to go near my brother. I was approaching and getting near going to
my brother Diosdado Iroy and while in the process I saw Daniel Quijada shot my
brother Diosdado Iroy.[23]
xxx xxx xxx
Q And in your estimate, how far was your brother Diosdado Iroy while he was sitting at the
plaza to the dancing place?
A More or less four (4) meters distance.
COURT:
From the dancing hall?
A Yes, your honor.
Q And in your observation, was the place where Diosdado Iroy was sitting lighted or
illuminated?
A Yes, sir.
Q What kind of light illuminated the place?
A I do not know what kind of light but it was lighted.

Q Was it an electric light?
A It is electric light coming from a bulb.
Q Where is that electric bulb that illuminated the place located?
A It was placed at the gate of the dancing place and the light from the house.
Q You said gate of the dancing place, you mean the dancing place was enclosed at that time
and there was a gate, an opening?
A Yes, sir.
Q What material was used to enclose the dancing place?
A Bamboo.
Q And how far was the bulb which was placed near the entrance of the dancing place to the
place where Diosdado Iroy was sitting?
A Five (5) meters.
Q You mentioned also that there was a light coming from the house, now whose house was
that?
A The house of spouses Fe and Berto, I do not know the family name.
Q Was the light coming from the house of spouses Fe and Berto an electric light?
A Yes sir.
Q And in your estimate, how far was the source of light of the house of Fe and Berto to the
place where Diosdado Iroy was sitting?
A About six (6) meters distance.[24]
xxx xxx xxx
Q What was the color of the electric bulb in the gate of the dancing place?
A The white bulb.[25]
The trial court disbelieved the testimony of Nistal and Aranzado. It explicitly
declared:
The factual findings of the Court in the instant case is anchored principally in ". . .
observing the attitude and deportment of witnesses while listening to them
speak (People vs. Magaluna, 205, SCRA 266).
thereby indicating that on the basis of the witnesses' deportment and manner
of testifying, the declarations of Nistal and Aranzado failed to convince the trial
court that they were telling the truth. Settled is the rule that the factual findings
of the trial court, especially on the credibility of witnesses, are accorded great
weight and respect. For, the trial court has the advantage of observing the
witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as
the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie
or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready
reply;[26] or the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the
sincere or the flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the
sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an
oath, the carriage and mien.[27] The appellant has miserably failed to convince
us that we must depart from this rule.
Neither are we persuaded by the claimed suppression of evidence

occasioned by the non-presentation as prosecution witnesses any of the
companions of Diosdado who were seated with him when he was shot.In the
first place, the said companions could not have seen from their back the person
who suddenly shot Diosdado. In the second place, the testimony of the
companions would, at the most, only corroborate that of Rosita Iroy. Besides,
there is no suggestion at all that the said companions were not available to the
appellant. It is settled that the presumption in Section 3 (e), Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced
does not apply when the testimony of the witness is merely corroborative or
where the witness is available to the accused.[28]
The alleged improper motive on the part of SP04 Nigparanon simply
because he is a neighbor of the Iroy; remains purely speculative, as no
evidence was offered to establish that such a relationship affected SP04
Nigparanon's objectivity. As a police officer, he enjoyed in his favor the
presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duty.[29] As to the
alleged omissions and unexplained entries in the police blotter, the same were
sufficiently clarified by SP04 Nigparanon.
The defense of alibi interposed by the appellant deserves scant
consideration. He was positively identified by a credible witness. It is a
fundamental judicial dictum that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the accused.[30] Besides, for that defense to prosper it
is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime
was committed; he must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for
him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. [31]As
testified to by defense witness Julian Bonao, the Tagbilaran wharf, where the
appellant said he was, is only about eight to nine kilometers away from the
crime scene and it would take only about thirty minutes to traverse the distance
with the use of a tricycle.[32] It was, therefore, not physically impossible for the
appellant to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
Finally, the appellant asserts that if he were the killer of Diosdado Iroy, he
would not have voluntarily proceeded to the police station. This argument is
plain sophistry. The law does not find unusual the voluntary surrender of
offenders; it even considers such act as a mitigating
circumstance. Moreover, non-flight is not conclusive proof of innocence.[34]
[33]
The evidence for the prosecution further established with moral certainty
that the appellant had no license to possess or carry a firearm. The firearm then
that he used in shooting Diosdado Iroy was unlicensed. He, therefore,
committed the crime of aggravated illegal possession of firearm under the
second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, which reads:
SEC.
1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms, A
mmunition or InstrumentsUsed or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms
or Ammunition -- The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose or possess any firearm, part of firearm,
ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm,

the penalty of death shall be imposed.
In light of the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Tac-an,[35] and reiterated
in People vs. Tiozon,[36]People vs. Caling,[37] People vs. Jumamoy,[38] People
vs. Deunida,[39] People vs. Tiongco,[40] People vs. Fernandez,[41] and People v
s. Somooc,[42] that one who kills another with the use of an unlicensed firearm
commits two separate offenses of (1) either homicide or murder under the
Revised Penal Code, and (2) aggravated illegal possession of firearm under the
second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, we sustain the decision of the
trial court finding the appellant guilty of two separate offenses of murder in
Criminal Case No. 8178 and of aggravated illegal possession of firearm in
Criminal Case No. 8179.
Although Tac-an and Tiozon relate more to the issue of whether there is a
violation of the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy if an accused
is prosecuted for homicide or murder and for aggravated illegal possession of
firearm, they at the same time laid down the rule that these are separate
offenses, with the first punished under the Revised Penal Code and the second
under a special law; hence, the constitutional bar against double jeopardy will
not apply. We observed in Tac-an:
It is elementary that the constitutional right against double jeopardy protects one
against a second or later prosecution for the same offense, and that when the
subsequent information charges another and different offense, although arising from
the same act or set of acts, there is no prohibited double jeopardy. In the case at bar, it
appears to us quite clear that the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 4007 is that of
unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm penalized under a special statute, while
the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 4012 was that of murder punished under the
Revised Penal Code. It would appear self-evident that these two (2) offenses in
themselves are quite different one from the other, such that in principle, the
subsequent filing of Criminal Case No. 4012 is not to be regarded as having placed
appellant in a prohibited second jeopardy.
And we stressed that the use of the unlicensed firearm cannot serve to increase
the penalty for homicide or murder; however, the killing of a person with the use
of an unlicensed firearm, by express provision of P.D. No. 1866, shall increase
the penalty for illegal possession of firearm.
In Tiozon, we stated:
It may be loosely said that homicide or murder qualifies the offense penalized in said
Section 1 because it is a circumstance which increases the penalty. It does not,
however, follow that the homicide or murder is absorbed in the offense; otherwise, an
anomalous absurdity results whereby a more serious crime defined and penalized in
the Revised Penal Code is absorbed by a statutory offense, which is just
a malum prohibitum. The rationale for the qualification, as implied from the exordium
of the decree, is to effectively deter violations of the laws on firearms and to stop the
"upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public order and safety due to the proliferation of
illegally possessed and manufactured firearms, x x x." In fine then, the killing of a
person with the use of an unlicensed firearm may give rise to separate prosecutions for
(a) violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and (b) violation of either Article 248
(Murder) or Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. The accused cannot
plead one as a bar to the other; or, stated otherwise, the rule against double jeopardy
cannot be invoked because the first is punished by a special law while the second,
homicide or murder, is punished by the Revised Penal Code.
In People vs. Doriguez, [24 SCRA 163, 171], We held:
It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only
for the same offense or identical offenses. A simple act may offend against two (or
more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires
proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or
conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution under
the other. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same code)
defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is not obstacle to a prosecution of
the other, although both offenses arise from the same fact, if each crime involves
some important act which is not an essential element of the other.
In People vs. Bacolod [89 Phil. 621], from the act of firing a shot from a sub-machine
gun which caused public panic among the people present and physical injuries to one,
informations of physical injuries through reckless imprudence and for serious public
disturbance were filed. Accused pleaded guilty and was convicted in the first and he
sought to dismiss the second on the ground of double jeopardy. We ruled:
The protection against double jeopardy is only for the same offense. A simple act may
be an offense against two different provisions of law and if one provision requires
proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under
one does not bar prosecution under the other.
Since the informations were for separate offense[s] -- the first against a person and the
second against public peace and order -- one cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other
under the rule on double jeopardy.
In Caling, we explicitly opined that a person charged with aggravated illegal

possession of firearm under the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No.
1866 can also be separately charged with and convicted of homicide or murder
under the Revised Penal Code and punished accordingly. Thus:
It seems that the Court a quo did indeed err in believing that there is such a thing as
"the special complex crime of Illegal Possession of Unlicensed Firearm Used in
Homicide as provided for and defined under the 2nd paragraph of Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866
as amended," and declaring Caling guilty thereof. The legal provision invoked, "Sec.
1 of P.D. 1866, as amended," reads as follows:
"SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of

Firearms [or] Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the
Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. - The penalty of reclusiontemporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall
unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearm, part of
firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in
the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty
of death shall be imposed."
What is penalized in the first paragraph, insofar as material to the present case is the
sole, simple act of a person who shall, among others, "unlawfully possess any firearm
x x x (or) ammunition x x x." Obviously, possession of any firearm is unlawful if the
necessary permit and/or license therefor is not first obtained. To that act is attached
the penalty of reclusion temporal, maximum, to reclusion perpetua. Now, if "with the
use of (such) an unlicensed firearm, a "homicide or murder is committed," the crime is
aggravated and is more heavily punished, with the capital punishment.
The gravamen of the offense in its simplest form is, basically, the fact of possession of
a firearm without license. Thecrime may be denominated simple illegal possession, to
distinguish it from its aggravated form. It is Aggravated if theunlicensed firearm is us
ed in the commission of a homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code. But the
homicideor murder is not absorbed in the crime of possession of an unlicensed firearm
; neither is the latter absorbed in theformer. There are two distinct crimes that are here
spoken of. One is unlawful possession of a firearm, which may beeither simple or agg
ravated, defined and punished respectively by the first and second paragraphs of Secti
on 1 of PD1866. The other is homicide or murder, committed with the use of an unlice
nsed firearm. The mere possession of afirearm without legal authority consummates th
e crime under P.D. 1866, and the liability for illegal possession is madeheavier by the
firearm's use in a killing. The killing, whether homicide or murder, is obviously distin
ct from the act ofpossession, and is separately punished and defined under the Revised
Penal Code. (emphasis supplied)
In Jumamoy, we reiterated Caling and amplified the rationale on why an

accused who kills another with an unlicensed firearm can be prosecuted and
punished for the two separate offenses of violation of the second paragraph of
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and for homicide or murder under the Revised Penal
Code.Thus:
Coming to the charge of illegal possession of firearms, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866
penalizes, inter alia, the unlawful possession of firearms or ammunition
with reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. However, under
the second paragraph thereof, the penalty is increased to death if homicide or murder
is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm. It may thus be loosely said that homicide or murder qualifies the offense beca
use both arecircumstances which increase the penalty. It does not, however, follow tha
t the homicide or murder is absorbed in theoffense. If these were to be so, an anomalo
us absurdity would result whereby a more serious crime defined andpenalized under t
he Revised Penal Code will be absorbed by a statutory offense, one which is merely m
alumprohibitum. Hence, the killing of a person with the use of an unlicensed firearm
may give rise to separate prosecutionsfor (a) the violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 18
66 and (b) the violation of either Article 248 (Murder) or Article 249(Homicide) of th
e Revised Penal Code. The accused cannot plead one to bar the other; stated
otherwise, the rule against double jeopardy cannot be invoked as the first is punished
by a special law while the second - Murder or Homicide - is punished by the Revised
Penal Code. [citing People vs. Tiozon, 198 SCRA 368, 379 (1991); People vs.
Doriguez, 24 SCRA 163 (1968)]. Considering, however, that the imposition of the
death penalty is prohibited by the Constitution, the proper imposable penalty would be
the penalty next lower in degree, or reclusion perpetua. (emphasis supplied)
In Deunida, in discussing the propriety of the Government's action in

withdrawing an information for murder and pursuing only the information for
"Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm," this Court categorically declared:
At the outset, it must be stressed that, contrary to the prosecution's legal position in
withdrawing the information for murder, the offense defined in the second paragraph
of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 does not absorb the crime of homicide or murder under
the Revised Penal Code and, therefore, does not bar the simultaneous or subsequent
prosecution of the latter crime. The 1982 decision in Lazaro vs. People, involving the
violation of P.D. No. 9, which the investigating prosecutor invokes to justify the
withdrawal, is no longer controlling in view of our decisions in People vs. Tac-
an, People vs. Tiozon, and People vs. Caling.
In Somooc, we once more ruled:
The offense charged by the Information is clear enough from the terms of that
document, although both the Information and the decision of the trial court used the
term "Illegal Possession of Firearm with Homicide," a phrase which has sometimes
been supposed to connote a "complex crime as used in the Revised Penal Code. Such
nomenclature is, however, as we have ruled in People vs. Caling, a misnomer since
there is no complex crime of illegal possession of firearm with homicide. The
gravamen of the offense penalized in P.D. No. 1866 is the fact of possession of a
firearm without a license or authority for such possession. This offense is aggravated
and the imposable penalty upgraded if the unlicensed firearm is shown to have been
used in the commission of homicide or murder, offenses penalized under the Revised
Penal Code. The killing of a human being, whether characterized as homicide or
murder, is patently distinct from the act of possession of an unlicensed firearm and is
separately punished under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
The foregoing doctrine suffered a setback when in our decision of 27 June

1995 in People vs. Barros,[43] we set aside that portion of the appealed decision
convicting the appellant of the offense of murder and affirmed that portion
convicting him of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form. We therein
made the following statement:
[A]ppellant may not in the premises be convicted of two separate offenses [of illegal
possession of firearm in its aggravated form and of murder], but only that of illegal
possession of firearm in its aggravated form, in light of the legal principles and
propositions set forth in the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, to
which the Members of the Division, the ponente included, subscribe.
The pertinent portions of the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Florenz D.

Regalado referred to therein read as follows:
This premise accordingly brings up the second query as to whether or not the crime
should properly be the aggravated illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm through
the use of which a homicide or murder is committed. It is submitted that an accused so
situated should be liable only for the graver offense of aggravated illegal possession
of the firearm punished by death under the second paragraph of Section 1, Presidential
Decree No. 1866, and it is on this point that the writer dissents from the holding which
would impose a separate penalty for the homicide in addition to that for the illegal
possession of the firearm used to commit the former.
If the possession of the unlicensed firearm is the only offense imputable to the
accused, the Court has correctly held that to be the simple possession punished
with reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua in the first
paragraph of Section 1. Where, complementarily, the unlicensed firearm is used to
commit homicide or murder, then either of these felonies will convert the erstwhile
simple illegal possession into the graver offense of aggravated illegal possession. In
other words, the homicide or murder constitutes the essential element for integrating
into existence the capital offense of the aggravated form of illegal possession of a
firearm. Legally, therefore, it would be illogical and unjustifiable to use the very same
offenses of homicide or murder as integral elements of and to create the said capital
offense, and then treat the former all over again as independent offenses to be
separately punished further, with penalties immediately following the death penalty to
boot.
The situation contemplated in the second query is, from the punitive standpoint,
virtually of the nature of the so-called, special complex crimes," which should more
appropriately be called composite crimes, punished in Article 294, Article 297 and
Article 335. They are neither of the same legal basis as nor subject to the rules on
complex crimes in Article 48, since they do not consist of a single act giving rise to
two or more grave or less grave felonies nor do they involve an offense being a
necessary means to commit another. However, just like the regular complex crimes
and the present case of aggravated illegal possession of firearms, only a single penalty
is imposed for each of such composite crimes although composed of two or more
offenses.
On the other hand, even if two felonies would otherwise have been covered by the
conceptual definition of a complex crime under Article 48, but the Code imposes a
single definite penalty therefor, it cannot also be punished as a complex crime, much
less as separate offense, but with only the single penalty prescribed by law. Thus,
even where a single act results in two less grave felonies of serious physical injuries
and serious slander by deed, the offense will not be punished as
a delito compuesto under Article 48 but as less serious physical injuries with
ignominy under the second paragraph of Article 265. The serious slander by deed is
integrated into and produces a graver offense, and the former is no longer separately
punished.
What is, therefore, sought to be stressed by such alternative illustration, as well as the
discussion on complex and composite crimes, is that when an offense becomes a
component of another, the resultant crime being correspondingly punished as thus
aggravated by the integration of the other, the former is not to be further separately
punished as the majority would want to do with the homicide involved in the case at
bar.
With the foregoing answers to the second question, the third inquiry is more of a
question of classification for purposes of the other provisions of the Code. The theory
in Tac-an that the principal offense is the aggravated form of illegal possession of
firearm and the killing shall merely be included in the particulars or, better still, as an
element of the principal offense, may be conceded. After all, the plurality of crimes
here is actually source from the very provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1866
which sought to "consolidate, codify and integrate" the various laws and presidential
decrees to harmonize their provision" which must be updated and revised in order to
more effectively deter violators of said laws.
This would be akin to the legislative intendment underlying the provisions of the
Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, wherein the principal crime to be charged is still
carnapping, although the penalty therefore is increased when the owner, driver or
occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed. The same situation, with escalating
punitive provisions when attended by a killing, are found in the Anti-Piracy and Anti-
Highway Robbery Law of 1974 and the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974, wherein
the principal crimes still are piracy, highway robbery and cattle rustling. Also, in the
matter of destructive arson, the principal offense when, inter alia, death results as a
consequence of the commission of any of the acts punished under said article of the
Code.
In the present case, the academic value of specifying whether it is a case of illegal
possession of firearm resulting in homicide or murder, or, conversely, homicide or
murder through the illegal possession and use of an unlicensed firearm, would lie in
the possible application of the provision on recidivism. Essentially, it would be in the
theoretical realm since, taken either way, the penalty for aggravated illegal possession
of a firearm is the single indivisible penalty of death, in which case the provision on
recidivism would not apply. If, however, the illegal possession is not established but
either homicide or murder is proved, then the matter of recidivism may have some
significance in the sense that, for purposes thereof, the accused was convicted of a
crime against persons and he becomes a recidivist upon conviction of another crime
under the same title of the Code.
Lastly, on the matter of the offense or offenses to be considered and the penalty to be
imposed when the unlawful killing and the illegal possession are charged in separate
informations, from what has been said the appropriate course of action would be to
consolidate the cases and render a joint decision thereon, imposing a single penalty for
aggravated illegal possession of firearm if such possession and the unlawful taking of
life shall have been proved, or for only the proven offense which may be either simple
illegal possession, homicide or murder per se. The same procedural rule and
substantive disposition should be adopted if one information for each offense was
drawn up and these informations were individually assigned to different courts or
branches of the same court.
Indeed, the practice of charging the offense of illegal possession separately from the
homicide or murder could be susceptible of abuse since it entails undue concentration
of prosecutorial powers and discretion. Prefatorily, the fact that the killing was
committed with a firearm will necessarily be known to the police or prosecutorial
agencies, the only probable problem being the determination and obtention of
evidence to show that the firearm is unlicensed.
Now, if a separate information for homicide or murder is filed without alleging therein
that the same was committed by means of an unlicensed firearm, the case would not
fall under Presidential Decree No. 1866. Even if the use of a firearm is alleged therein,
but without alleging the lack of a license therefor as where that fact has not yet been
verified, the mere use of a firearm by itself, even if proved in that case, would not
affect the accused either since it is not an aggravating or qualifying circumstance.
Conversely, if the information is only for illegal possession, with the prosecution
intending to file thereafter the charge for homicide or murder but the same is
inexplicably delayed or is not consolidated with the information for illegal possession,
then any conviction that may result from the former would only be for simple illegal
possession. If, on the other hand, the separate and subsequent prosecution for
homicide or murder prospers, the objective of Presidential Decree No. 1866 cannot be
achieved since the penalty imposable in that second prosecution will only be for the
unlawful killing and further subject to such modifying circumstances as may be
proved.
In any event, the foregoing contingencies would run counter to the proposition that the
real offense committed by the accused, and for which sole offense he should be
punished, is the aggravated form of illegal possession of a firearm.Further, it is the
writer's position that the possible problems projected herein may be minimized or
obviated if both offenses involved are charged in only one information or that the trial
thereof, if separately charged, be invariably consolidated for joint
decision. Conjointly, this is the course necessarily indicated since only a single
composite crime is actually involved and it is palpable error to deal therewith and
dispose thereof by segregated parts in piecemeal fashion.
If we follow Barros, the conviction of the appellant for murder in Criminal

Case No. 8178 must have to be set aside. He should only suffer the penalty for
the aggravated illegal possession of firearm in Criminal Case No. 8179.
The Court en banc finds in this appeal an opportunity to reexamine the
existing conflicting doctrines applicable to prosecutions for murder or homicide
and for aggravated illegal possession of firearm ininstances where an
unlicensed firearm is used in the killing of a person. After a lengthy deliberation
thereon, the Court en banc arrived at the conclusion that the rule laid down
in Tac-an, reiterated
in Tiozon, Caling, Jumamoy, Deunida, Tiongco, Fernandez, and Somooc is
the better rule, for it applies the laws concerned according to their letter and
spirit, thereby steering this Court away from a dangerous course which could
have irretrievably led it to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation
of powers through Judicial legislation. That rule upholds and enhances the
lawmaker's intent or purpose in aggravating the crime of illegal possession of
firearm when an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of murder or
homicide.Contrary to the view of our esteemed brother, Mr. Justice Florenz D.
Regalado, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in the case under
consideration, Tac-an did not enunciate an unfortunate doctrine or a
"speciously camouflaged theory" which "constitutes an affront on doctrinal
concepts of penal law and assails even the ordinary notions of common sense."
If Tac-an did in fact enunciate such an "unfortunate doctrine," which this
Court has reiterated in a convincing number of cases and for a convincing
number of years, so must the same verdict be made in our decision
in People vs. De Gracia,[44] which was promulgated on 6 July 1994. In the latter
case, we held that unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm in furtherance
of rebellion may give rise to separate prosecutions for a violation of Section 1

of P.D. No. 1866 and also for a violation of Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised
Penal Code on rebellion. A distinction between that situation and the case
where an unlicensed firearm is used in homicide or murder would have no basis
at all. In De Gracia, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Florenz D.
Regalado, made the following authoritative pronouncements:
III. As earlier stated, it was stipulated and admitted by both parties that from
November 30, 1989 up to and until December 9, 1989, there was a
rebellion. Ergo, our next inquiry is whether or not appellant's possession of the
firearms, explosives and ammunition seized and recovered from him was for the
purpose and in furtherance of rebellion.
The trial court found accused guilty of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of
rebellion pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code which
states that "any person merely participating or executing the command of others in a
rebellion shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period." The court
below held that appellant De Gracia, who had been servicing the personal needs of
Col. Matillano (whose active armed opposition against the Government, particularly
at the Camelot Hotel, was well known), is guilty of the act of guarding the explosives
and "molotov bombs for and in behalf of the latter. We accept this finding of the
lower court.
The above provision of the law was, however, erroneously and improperly used by the
court below as a basis in determining the degree of liability of appellant and the
penalty to be imposed on
him. It must be made clear thatappellant is charged with the qualified offense of illega
l possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion underPresidential Decree No. 1866
which, in law, is distinct from the crime of rebellion punished under Article 134 and
135of the Revised Penal Code. There are two separate statutes penalizing different off
enses with discrete penalties. TheRevised Penal Code treats rebellion as a crime apart
from murder, homicide, arson, or other offenses, such as illegalpossession of firearms,
that might conceivably be committed in the course of a rebellion. Presidential Decree
No. 1866defines and punishes, as a specific offense, the crime of illegal possession of
firearms committed in the course or aspart of a rebellion.
As a matter of fact, in one case involving the constitutionality of Section 1 of Presiden

tial Decree No. 1866, the Courthas explained that said provision of the law will not be
invalidated by the mere fact that the same act is penalized undertwo different statutes
with different penalties, even if considered highly advantageous to the prosecution an
d onerousto the accused. It follows that, subject to the presence of requisite elements i
n each case, unlawful possession of anunlicensed firearm in furtherance of rebellion m
ay give rise to separate prosecutions for a violation of Section 1 ofPresidential Decree
No. 1866, and also a violation of Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code on r
ebellion.Double jeopardy in this case cannot be invoked because the first is an offense
punished by a special law while thesecond is a felony punished by the Revised Penal
Code with variant elements.
We cannot justify what we did in De Gracia with a claim that the virtue of
fidelity to a controlling doctrine, i.e., of Tac-an, had compelled us to do
so. Indeed, if Tac-an enunciated an "unfortunate doctrine" which is "an affront
on doctrinal concepts of penal law and assails even the ordinary notions of
common sense," then De Gracia should have blazed the trail of a new
enlightenment and forthwith set aside the "unfortunate doctrine" without any
delay to camouflage a judicial faux pas or a doctrinal quirk. De Gracia provided
an excellent vehicle for an honorable departure from Tac-an because no attack
on the latter was necessary as the former merely involved other crimes to which
the doctrine in Tac-an might only be applied by analogy.De Gracia did not even
intimate the need to reexamine Tac-an; on the contrary, it adapted the latter to
another category of illegal possession of firearm qualified by rebellion precisely
because the same legal principle and legislative purpose were involved, and
not because De Gracia wanted to perpetuate an "unfortunate doctrine" or to
embellish "the expanding framework of our criminal law from barnacled ideas
which have not grown apace with conceptual changes over time," as the
concurring and dissenting opinion charges.
The majority now reiterates the doctrine in Tac-an and the subsequent
cases not because it has become hostage to the "inertia of time [which] has
always been the obstacle to the virtues of change," as the concurring and
dissenting opinion finds it to be, but rather because it honestly believes
that Tac-an laid down the correct doctrine. If P.D. No. 1866 as applied in Tac-
an is an "affront on doctrinal concepts of penal laws and assails even the
ordinary notions of common sense," the blame must not be laid at the doorsteps
of this Court, but on the lawmaker's. All that the Court did in Tac-an was to apply
the law, for there was nothing in that case that warranted an interpretation or
the application of the niceties of legal hermeneutics.It did not forget that its duty
is merely to apply the law in such a way that shall not usurp legislative powers
by judicial legislation and that in the course of such application or construction
it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation
modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a
construction which is repugnant to its terms.[45]
Murder and homicide are defined and penalized by the Revised Penal
Code[46] as crimes against persons. They are mala in se because malice
or dolo is a necessary ingredient therefor.[47] On the other hand, the offense of
illegal possession of firearm is defined and punished by a special penal
law,[48] P.D. No. 1866. It is a malum prohibitum[49] which the lawmaker, then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, in the exercise of his martial law powers, so
condemned not only because of its nature but also because of the larger policy
consideration of containing or reducing, if not eliminating, the upsurge of crimes
vitally affecting public order and safety due to the proliferation of illegally
possessed and manufactured firearms, ammunition, and
explosives. If intent to commit the crime were required, enforcement of the
decree and its policy or purpose would be difficult to achieve. Hence, there is
conceded wisdom in punishing illegal possession of firearm without taking into
account the criminal intent of the possessor. All that is needed
isintent to perpetrate the act prohibited by law, coupled, of course,
by animus possidendi. However, it must be clearly understood that
this animus possidendi is without regard to any other criminal or felonious intent
which an accused may have harbored in possessing the firearm.[50]
A long discourse then on the concepts

of malum in se and malum prohibilum and their distinctions is an exercise in
futility.
We disagree for lack of basis the following statements of Mr. Justice
Regalado in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, to wit:
The second paragraph of the aforestated Section 1 expressly and unequivocally

provides for such illegal possession and resultant killing as a single integrated offense
which is punished as such. The majority not only created two offenses by dividing a
single offense into two but, worse, it resorted to the unprecedented and invalid act of
treating the original offense as a single integrated crime and then creating another
offense by using a component crime which is also an element of the former.
It would already have been a clear case of judicial legislation if the illegal possession
with murder punished with a single penalty have been divided into two separate
offenses of illegal possession and murder with distinct penalties. It is consequently a
compounded infringement of legislative powers for this Court to now, as it has done,
treat that single offense as specifically described by the law and
impose reclusion perpetua therefor (since the death penalty for that offense is still
proscribed), but then proceed further by plucking out therefrom the crime of murder in
order to be able to impose the death sentence. For indeed, on this score, it is beyond
cavil that in the aggravated form of illegal possession, the consequential murder (or
homicide) is an integrated element or integral component since without the
accompanying death, the crime would merely be simple illegal possession of a firearm
under the first paragraph of Section 1.
The second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 does not warrant and
support a conclusion that it intended to treat "illegal possession
and resultant killing" (emphasis supplied) "as a single and integrated offense"
of illegal possession with homicide or murder. It does not use the
clause as a result or on theoccasion of to evince an intention to create a single
integrated crime. By its unequivocal and explicit language, which we quote to
be clearly understood:
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty
of death shall be imposed. (emphasis supplied)
the crime of either homicide or murder is committed NOT AS A RESULT

OR ON THE OCCASION of the violation of Section 1, but WITH THE USE of
an unlicensed firearm, whose possession is penalized therein. There is a world
of difference, which is too obvious, between (a) the commission of homicide or
murder as a result or on the occasion of the violation of Section 1, and (b) the
commission of homicide or murder with the use of an unlicensed firearm. In the
first, homicide or murder is not the original purpose or primary objective of the
offender, but a secondary event or circumstance either resulting from or
perpetrated on the occasion of the commission of that originally or primarily
intended. In the second, the killing, which requires a mens rea, is the primary
purpose, and to carry that out effectively the offender uses an unlicensed
firearm.
As to the question then of Mr. Justice Regalado of whether this Court should
also apply the rule enunciated here to P.D. No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-
Highway Robbery Law of 1974), P.D. No. 533 (Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of
1974), and P.D. No. 534 (Defining Illegal Fishing and Prescribing Stiffer
Penalties Therefor), the answer is resoundingly in the negative. In those cases,
the lawmaker clearly intended a single integrated offense or a special complex
offense because the death therein occurs as a result or on theoccasion of the
commission of the offenses therein penalized or was not the primary purpose
of the offender, unlike in the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No.
1866. Thus, (a) Section 3 of P.D. No. 532 provides:
SEC. 3. Penalties. -- Any person who commits piracy or highway robbery/brigandage

as herein defined, shall, upon conviction by competent court be punished by:
a. Piracy. - The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods
shall be imposed. If physical injuries or other crimes are committed as a result or on
the occasion thereof, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If
rape, murder or homicide is committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, or
when the offenders abandoned the victims without means of saving themselves, or
when the seizure is accomplished by firing upon or boarding a vessel, the mandatory
penalty of death shall be imposed.
b. Highway Robbery/Brigandage.-- The penalty of reclusion temporal in its minimum

period shall be imposed. If physical injuries or other crimes are committed during or
on the occasion of the commission of robbery or brigandage, the penalty
of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods shall be
imposed. If kidnapping for ransom or extortion, or murder or homicide, or
rape is committed as a result or on the occasion thereof, the penalty of death shall be
imposed. (emphasis supplied)
(b) Section 8 of P.D. No. 533 reads in part as follows:
SEC. 8. Penal provisions. -- Any person convicted of cattle rustling as herein defined
shall, irrespective of the value of the large cattle involved, be punished
by prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period if
the offense is committed without violence against or intimidation of persons or force
upon things. If the offense is committed with violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things, the penalty of reclusiontemporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If a person is seriously injured
or killed as aresult or on the occasion of the commission of cattle rustling, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death shall beimposed. (emphasis supplied)
and (c) Section 3 of P.D. No. 534 reads as follows:
SECTION. 3. Penalties.-- Violations of this Decree and the rules and regulations
mentioned in paragraph (f) of Section 1 hereof shall be punished as follows:
a. by imprisonment from 10 to 12 years, if explosives are

used: Provided, that if the explosion results (1) in physical injury to person, the
penalty shall be imprisonment from 12 to 20 years, or
(2) in the loss of human life, then thepenalty shall be imprisonment from 20 years to li
fe, or death;
b. by imprisonment from 8 to 10 years, if obnoxious or poisonous substances are

used: Provided, that if the use of suchsubstances results (1) in physical injury to any
person, the penalty shall be imprisonment from 10 to 12 years, or
(2) inthe loss of human life, then the penalty shall be imprisonment from 20 years to li
fe, or death; x x x (emphasis supplied)
The unequivocal intent of the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No.

1866 is to respect and preserve homicide or murder as a distinct offense
penalized under the Revised Penal Code and to increase the penalty for illegal
possession of firearm where such a firearm is used in killing a person. Its clear
language yields no intention of the lawmaker to repeal or
modify, pro tanto, Articles 248 and 249 of the Revised Penal Code, in such a
way that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of homicide or
murder, either of these crimes, as the case may be, would only serve to
aggravate the offense of illegal possession of firearm and would not anymore
be separately punished. Indeed, the words of the subject provision are palpably
clear to exclude any suggestion that either of the crimes of homicide and
murder, as crimes mala in se under the Revised Penal Code, is obliterated as
such and reduced as a mere aggravating circumstance in illegal possession of
firearm whenever the unlicensed firearm is used in killing a person.The only
purpose of the provision is to increase the penalty prescribed in the first
paragraph of Section 1 -- reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua -- to death, seemingly because of the accused's manifest arrogant
defiance and contempt of the law in using an unlicensed weapon to kill another,
but never, at the same time, to absolve the accused from any criminal liability
for the death of the victim.
Neither is the second paragraph of Section 1 meant to punish homicide or
murder with death if either crime is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, i.e., to consider such use merely as a qualifyingcircumstance and not
as an offense. That could not have been the intention of the lawmaker because
the term "penalty" in the subject provision is obviously meant to be the penalty
for illegal possession of firearm and not the penalty for homicide or murder. We
explicitly stated in Tac-an:
There is no law which renders the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating

circumstance in homicide or murder.Under an information charging homicide or
murder, the fact that the death weapon was an unlicensed firearm cannot be used to
increase the penalty for the second offense of homicide or murder to death .... The
essential point is that the unlicensed character or condition of the instrument used in
destroying human life or committing some other crime, is not included in the
inventory of aggravating circumstances set out in Article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code.
A law may, of course, be enacted making the use of an unlicensed firearm as a

qualifying circumstance.This would not be without precedent. By analogy, we
can cite Section 17 of B.P. Blg. 179, which amended the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425). The said section provides that when an offender
commits a crime under a state of addiction, such a state shall be considered as

a qualifying aggravating circumstance in the definition of the crime and the
application of the penalty under the Revised Penal Code.
In short, there is nothing in P.D. No. 1866 that manifests, even vaguely, a
legislative intent to decriminalize homicide or murder if either crime is committed
with the use of an unlicensed firearm, or to convert the offense of illegal
possession of firearm as a qualifying circumstance if the firearm so illegally
possessed is used in the commission of homicide or murder. To charge the
lawmaker with that intent is to impute an absurdity that would defeat the clear
intent to preserve the law on homicide and murder and impose a higher penalty
for illegal possession of firearm if such firearm is used in the commission of
homicide or murder.
Evidently, the majority did not, as charged in the concurring and dissenting
opinion, create two offenses by dividing a single offense into two. Neither did it
resort to the "unprecedented and invalid act of treating the original offense as a
single integrated crime and then creating another offense by using a component
crime which is also an element of the former." The majority has always
maintained that
the killing of aperson with the use of an illegally possessed firearm gives rise
to two separate offenses of (a) homicide or murder under the Revised Penal
Code, and (b) illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form.
What then would be a clear case of judicial legislation is an interpretation of
the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 that would make it define
and punish a single integrated offense and give to the words WITH THE USE
OF a similar meaning as the words AS A RESULT OR ON THE OCCASION
OF, a meaning which is neither born out by the letter of the law nor supported
by its intent. Worth noting is the rule in statutory construction that if a statute is
clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation,[51] leaving the court no room for any
extended ratiocination or rationalization of the law.[52]
Peregrinations into the field of penology such as on the concept of a single
integrated crime or composite crimes, or into the philosophical domain of
integration of the essential elements of one crime to that of another would then
be unnecessary in light of the clear language and indubitable purpose and intent
of the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866. The realm of penology,
the determination of what should be criminalized, the definition of crimes, and
the prescription of penalties are the exclusive prerogatives of the legislature. As
its wisdom may dictate, the legislature may even create from a single act or
transaction various offenses for different purposes subject only to the limitations
set forth by the Constitution. This Court cannot dictate upon the legislature to
respect the orthodox view concerning a single integrated crime or composite
crimes.
The only apparent obstacle to the imposition of cumulative penalties for
various acts is the rule on double jeopardy. This brings us to the proposition in
the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Regalado that the majority view offends
the constitutional bar against double jeopardy under the "same-evidence" test
enunciated in People vs. Diaz.[53] He then concludes:
In the cases now before us, it is difficult to assume that the evidence for the murder in
the first charge of aggravated illegal possession of firearm with murder would be
different from the evidence to be adduced in the subsequent charge for murder
alone. In the second charge, the illegal possession is not in issue, except peripherally
and inconsequentially since it is not an element or modifying circumstance in the
second charge, hence the evidence therefor is immaterial.But, in both prosecutions,
the evidence on murder is essential, in the first charge because without it the crime is
only simple illegal possession, and, in the second charge, because murder is the very
subject of the prosecution. Assuming that all the other requirements under Section 7,
Rule 117 are present, can it be doubted that double jeopardy is necessarily present and
can be validly raised to bar the second prosecution for murder?
In fact, we can extrapolate the constitutional and reglementary objection to the cases
of the other composite crimes for which a single penalty is imposed, such as the
complex, compound and so-called special complex crimes. Verily, I cannot conceive
of how a person convicted of estafa through falsification under Article 48 can be
validly prosecuted anew for the same offense or either estafa or falsification; or how
the accused convicted of robbery with homicide under Article 294 can be legally
charged again with either of the same component crimes of robbery or homicide; or
how the convict who was found guilty of rape with homicide under Article 335 can be
duly haled before the court again to face charges of either the same rape or
homicide. Why, then, do we now sanction a second prosecution for murder in the
cases at bar since the very same offense was an indispensable component for the other
composite offense of illegal possession of firearm with murder? Why would the
objection of non bis in idim as a bar to a second jeopardy lie in the preceding
examples and not apply to the cases now before us?
We are unable to agree to the proposition. For one, the issue of double
jeopardy is not raised in this case. For another, the so-called "same-evidence"
test is not a conclusive, much less exclusive, test in double jeopardy cases of
the first category under the Double Jeopardy Clause which is covered by
Section 21, Article III of the Constitution and which reads as follows:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act
is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Note that the first category speaks of the same offense. The second refers to
the same act. This was explicitly distinguished in Yap vs. Lutero,[54] from
where People vs. Relova[55] quotes the following:
Thirdly, our Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds of double jeopardy. The first
sentence of clause 20, Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, ordains that "no
person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." (italics in
the original) The second sentence of said clause provides that "if an act is punishable
by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act." Thus, the first sentence prohibits double
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense whereas, the second contemplates double
jeopardy of punishment for the same act. Under the first sentence, one may be twice
put in jeopardy of punishment of the same act, provided that he is charged with
different offenses, or the offense charged in one case is not included in, or does not
include, the crime charged in the other case. The second sentence applies, even if the
offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of
an ordinance and the other a violation of a statute. If the two charges are based on one
and the same act, conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall
bar a prosecution under the other. Incidentally, such conviction or acquittal is not
indispensable to sustain the plea of double jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. So long as jeopardy has been attached under one of the informations charging
said offense, the defense may be availed of in the other case involving the same
offense, even if there has been neither conviction nor acquittal in either case.
Elsewise stated, where the offenses charged are penalized either by different
sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry
relates to the identity of offenses charged. The constitutional protection against
double jeopardy is available only where an identity is shown to exist between
the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged.[56] The question of identity or
lack of identity of offenses is addressed by examining the essential elements of
each of the two offenses charged, as such elements are set out in the respective
legislative definitions of the offenses involved.[57]
It may be noted that to determine the same offense under the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States of America which reads:
[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb . . . .
the rule applicable is the following: "where the same act or transaction
constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied
to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each
provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not."[58]
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution of the United States of
America was brought to the Philippines through the Philippine Bill of 1 July
1902, whose Section 5 provided, inter alia:
[N]o person for the same offense shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment . . . .
This provision was carried over in identical words in Section 3 of the Jones Law
of 29 August 1916.[59]Then under the 1935 Constitution, the Jones Law
provision was recast with the addition of a provision referring
to the same act. Thus, paragraph 20, Section 1, Article III thereof provided as
follows:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act
is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
This was adopted verbatim in Section 22, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution and
in Section 21, Article III of the present Constitution.
This additional-element test in Lutero and Relova and
in Blockburger, Gore, and Missouri would safely bring the second paragraph of
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 out of the proscribed double jeopardy principle.For,
undeniably, the elements of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form

are different from the elements of homicide or murder, let alone the fact that
these crimes are defined and penalized under different laws and the former
is malum prohibitum, while both the latter are mala in se. Hence, the fear that
the majority's construction of the subject provision would violate the
constitutional bar against double jeopardy is unfounded.
The penalty which the trial court imposed in Criminal Case No. 8179 for
illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form must, however, be
modified. The penalty prescribed by P.D. No. 1866 is death. Since Section
19(1), Article III of the Constitution prohibits the imposition of the death penalty,
the penalty next lower in degree, reclusion perpetual must be imposed.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED, and the challenged
decision of 30 September 1993 of Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Bohol
finding accused-appellant DANIEL QUIJADA y CIRCULADO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. 8178 and of illegal
possession of firearm in its aggravated form in Criminal Case No. 8179 is
AFFIRMED. The penalty imposed in the first case, as amended by the Order of
29 October 1993, is sustained; however, the penalty imposed in the second
case is changed to Reclusion Perpetua from the indeterminate penalty ranging
from Seventeen (17) years, Four (4) months, and One (1) day, as minimum, to
Twenty (20) years and One (1) day, as maximum.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo, Melo, Francisco, Panganiban, and Torres, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Romero, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, JJ., joined J.
Regalado in his concurring and dissenting opinion.
Regalado, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Hermosisima, J., see concurring opinion.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 39519 November 21, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellee

vs.
DANIEL PINTO, JR. and NARCISO BUENAFLOR, JR., defendants-appellants.
The Solicitor General for petitioner-appellee.
K.V. Faylona & Associates for defendants-appellants.
FERNAN, C.J.:
As an aftermath of the mission of the Legazpi City Police Department to serve on Christmas day in
1970 a search warrant on Francisco Bello who was allegedly training a private army, patrolmen
Daniel Pinto, Jr. and Narciso Buenaflor, Jr. were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the then
Circuit Criminal Court in said city, of killing not only Bello but also 9-year-old Richard Tiongson and
Rosalio Andes and seriously wounding Maria Theresa Tiongson. The dispositive portion of the
decision of June 13, 1974. 1 reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Narciso Buenaflor, Jr. and Daniel Pinto, Jr.
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of crime of:
(a) MURDER in CCC-X-288-Albay, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer

imprisonment for the rest of their lives (Reclusion Perpetua); to indemnify the heir of
Rosalie Andes in the amount of Twenty-five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos, jointly
and severally; and to pay the costs;
(b) MURDER in CCC-X-289-Albay, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer

imprisonment for the rest of their lives (Reclusion Perpetua); to indemnify the heirs of
Francisco Bello in the amount of Twenty-five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos, jointly
and severally; and to pay the costs;
(c) MURDER in CCC-X-298-Legazpi City, and hereby sentences each of them to

suffer imprisonment for the rest of their lives (Reclusion Perpetua); to indemnify the
heirs of Richard Tiongson in the amount of Twenty-five Thousand (P25,000.00)
Pesos, jointly and severally; and to pay the costs;
(d) FRUSTRATED MURDER in CCC-X-299 Legazpi City, and hereby sentences

each of them to imprisonment of from Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision
Mayor as Minimum, to Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day of Reclusion Temporal as
Maximum; to indemnify the victim, Maria Theresa Tiongson, in the amount of Eight
Thousand (P8,000.00) Pesos, jointly and severally; and to pay the costs.
In addition to the foregoing the accused are sentenced to suffer perpetual disqualification
from public office.
According to the prosecution, on December 25, 1970, the Legazpi City Police secured from the City
Court of Legazpi a warrant for the search of the house and premises of Francisco Bello in Mariawa,
Legazpi City on the ground that the police had probable cause to believe that Bello illegally
possessed a garand rifle, a thompson submachinegun and two automatic pistols. 2 The police had
earlier undertaken a surveillance of Bello on the basis of information it had received that he was
conducting an "obstacle course" or training men for combat since October, 1970. 3
called his officers to a "confidential conference" at the residence

Upon receipt of the search warrant, the Chief of Police, Dr. Solomon Adornado, 4
of Mayor Gregorio Imperial. Present at the said conference were the mayor, his secretary, and the
officers of the patrol division, secret service and the administration of the city police. The Chief of
Police was assisted by Major Alfredo Molo, head of the intelligence division of the city police, in
briefing the group on how to serve the search warrant and to arrest Bello as the latter had been
identified as the one who shot Salustiano Botin the night before. At the time of the briefing, no
warrant of arrest had yet been issued against Bello. 5
Team 3 was placed under

The policemen were divided into three teams and around five members of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) who were also present were assigned to the different teams. 6
the charge of Sgt. Salvador de la Paz with a policeman named Luna and appellants Buenaflor and
Pinto as members. Wilfredo Romero was the PC member assigned to the team. 7 Except for Romero
and Pinto who were each armed with a carbine, the policemen of Team 3 each carried a .38 caliber
pistol. 8
Loaded in four vehicles, the three teams proceeded from the residence of the Mayor to barrio Homapon arriving there at around seven o'clock in the evening. The four vehicles met at the junction of Homapon and the road to Mariawa.
They had decided to ride on the way to Mariawa when one of the jeeps bogged down because of the muddy road. Hence, the three teams had to walk in single file on the right side of the road with the teams had to walk in single file on
the right side of the road with the teams maintaining a distance o around ten meters between them. 9
Suddenly, Romero noticed the members of his team running. He ran with them and then he heard someone shout, "Pondo!" (stop). The shout was followed by a shot and then a burst of gunfire. The team had by then deployed to the
he found that Buenaflor was 5

right side of the road. When Romero checked the men by shouting the agreed password of "bayawas" for which the person challenged answered "santol", 10
meters in front of him "at the bank of the road", Pinto was two meters to the right of Buenaflor, Sgt.
de la Paz was two meters to his (Romero's) right, Luna who was holding a walkie-talkie was to his
left and another policeman was in front of Luna. 11 When Romero heard the gunburst, he saw
"flashes of fire" "just in front" of him or from the place where Buenaflor was. 12
The area where the team deployed was lower in elevation than the road but Romero heard the rumbling of a jeep going towards the direction of Homapon when he heard the burst of gunfire and saw the flashes of fire from the direction
of Buenaflor. 13
On the jeep which passed by the deployed policemen were Fr. Felix Cappellan, Mrs. Zenaida Stilianopolous Tiongson, her six children and the driver. They had just come from a lechonada party in the hacienda in Mariawa of Mrs.
Purificacion Napal Anduiza, the mother of Francisco Bello. Fr. Capellan had celebrated mass to commemorate the death anniversary of Mrs. Anduiza's father. When Fr. Capellan decided to go back to his parish, the Anduiza's offered
Seated on the front seat of the "McArthur type" jeep which had only a canvass top
their jeep for his transportation. 14
but no cover on the sides and back, 15 were the driver, Mrs. Tiongson with a child on her lap and Fr.
Capellan. 16 Richard Tiongson was seated on the steel seat behind the driver while his sister Maria
Theresa was beside him. 17 The three other children were also seated at the back.
After crossing the creek on their way to Homapon and as the driver "changed to high gear with a
dual", 18 Mrs. Tiongson saw blinking lights some 300 yards ahead. 19 Fearing that there might be
"people with bad intentions" or hold-uppers, Fr. Capellan told the driver to go faster. 20 Then Fr.
Capellan heard one shot and after a few seconds and around 50 meters ahead, there was rapid
firing with some of the bullets hitting the jeep. 21 According to Mrs. Tiongson, the widow of Col. Angel
Tiongson of the PC, the rapid firing sounded "automatic". 22 The firing came from the left rear side of
the jeep. 23
Through the light of the jeep,

Before they were fired upon, Maria Theresa saw a man lying flat on his stomach while holding a gun on the left side of the road just ahead of the jeep. 24
Maria Theresa noticed that the man was wearing a jacket and a hat and he was on the shoulder of
the road. 25 After passing the man, the rapid firing ensued. Richard said "ugh" and fell on the floor of
the jeep. Maria Theresa was about to hold Richard when she felt herself hit at the buttocks. Then
they all screamed. 26
The jeep continued its fast uphill climb until it reached a level area and almost fell into a ditch were it not for a clump of banana plants. The jeep came to a full stop. Fr. Capellan saw three men with flashlights but he could not distinguish
Mrs. Tiongson saw a PC jeep and some cars and, believing that
their faces as it was dark and their flashlights were focused on the ground. 27
one of the cars was that of the Mayor, she called Tia Citang, the mother of the mayor, at the same
time identifying herself. 28 She must have managed to take Richard from the jeep and was cuddling
him on the ground near the left rear end of the jeep when she requested Fr. Capellan to administer
extreme unction on Richard. As Fr. Capellan had no holy oil, he gave the boy absolution. 29
Even after Mrs. Tiongson had identified herself as the widow of Col. Tiongson to the men around, nobody listened to her appeal for help. When she approached Chief of Police Adornado, she hit him and asked him why they shot her
and her companions. The Chief of Police replied that the shooting was no longer his fault because Mrs. Tiongson and her companions did not stop when told to do so. She requested the Chief of Police for a car in which to take Richard
to the hospital or for a driver and even for a walkie-talkie so she could talk to Mayor Imperial but the Chief of Police did not heed her pleas. 30
(TSN, February 9, 1972, pp. 17-22).
A few minutes later, a jeep driven by Fernando Anduiza arrived. Mrs. Tiongson and her children
boarded the jeep. At the intersection of the road to Legazpi City proper and the road to Mariawa, the
area was brightly lighted and armed men ordered them to put their hands up. They were told to
alight from the jeep to be searched but Mrs. Tiongson begged the lieutenant manning the area to let
them pass so they could bring her two children to the hospital. 31
Her pelvis
Richard and Maria Theresa were brought to the Sacred Heart Clinic in Legazpi City. Thirteen-year-old Maria Theresa was treated for a gunshot wound at the "right upper quadrant of the right buttocks." 32
and abdomen were x-rayed. One of the x-ray plates 33 revealed an oval spot indicating a foreign body
in Maria Theresa's pelvis. The attending physician decided not to extract the foreign body as Maria
Theresa was not a "very good surgical risk". 34 The hospital charged P282.90 for Theresa's
hospitalization. 35 She was later brought by an army plane to the PC Station Hospital in Camp
Crame, Quezon City for further treatment and hospitalization 36 but the foreign body was never
removed from her pelvic area.
Richard sustained a gunshot wound at the back about the level of the 5th lumbar vertebrae. The
bullet travelled obliquely to the left kidney, the lesser sac, the liver and the right auricle. 37 Richard
was operated at the hospital but he died at 8:45 the following morning due to massive hemorrhage
caused by the gunshot wound. 38 When he was autopsied, a lead slug was found embedded in his
heart. 39 His mother paid P862.35 40 for his hospitalization and was charged P200 by the church.
Mayor Imperial paid P500 to Funeraria Oro for Richard's burial. 41
Meanwhile, according to Chief of Police Adornado, after the shooting incident involving the Tiongsons, the police pursued their mission to serve the search warrant on Bello. When they reached Bello's residence in Mariawa, they were
met by a "volley of fire." Suddenly, the house was lighted and a certain Escober met him. Although Bello and his parents, Mr. and Mrs. Anduiza, were not around, the police searched the area and found a Japanese Springfield rifle,
Thereafter, the Chief of Police declared

ammunition of a garand rifle, ammunition of a carbine, live ammunition for a .38 caliber pistol and 380 bullets for an automatic pistol. 42
the search terminated and the entire searching party left for headquarters. 43 The following day, he
issued Special Order No. 24 which states:
December 26, 1970
To All Concerned:
The following men mentioned below are hereby assigned at Homapon until their mission is
accomplished, effective as of today, December 26, 1970:
1 Sgt. Salvador de la Paz, In-charge
2. Pfc. Carlos Barbin, member
3. Pat. Eduardo Arcinue, member
4. Pat. Juan Luna, member
5. Pat. Daniel Pinto, member
6. Pat. Celedonio Abordo, member
7. Pat. Narciso Buenaflor, member
Report progress of mission any time of day through the radio system. For strict compliance.
(Sgd.)
SOLOMON B. ADORNADO
Chief of Police
Copy furnished: The Honorable City Mayor, The Patrol Command, LCPD, the OIC and file . 44
It was not necessary to specify the mission in the

The mission was to keep peace and order in the specified place and to determine the whereabouts of Bello. 45
order itself because the Chief of Police "had a close understanding with the squad that went to
Homapon". 46For a "convenient tactical deployment," Sgt. De la Paz further divided Team 3 into three
groups with patrolmen Buenaflor and Pinto composing Group II. 47
At noontime of December 26, 1970, Francisco Bello, more popularly known as Paquito, arrived at the residence of Inocencia Malbas in sitio Ando, Talahib, Daraga, Albay. He was with Inocencia's brother, Francisco Andes, Francisco's
Bello requested Inocencia and her husband that he and

son Ananias, and Leoncio Mostoles. Rosalio, another son of Francisco, also arrived with the group. 48
his group be allowed to spend the night in Inocencia's house. 49

Inocencia woke up at around 5:00 o'clock in the morning of December 27, 1970. At the sala, on her way from her room to the kitchen, she saw Bello sleeping alone. From the kitchen, Inocencia went to the balcony through the sala. On
her way back to the kitchen, she noticed that Bello, who was wearing a red shirt and an underwear, had awakened. Bello opened the window, spat out and went to the balcony. He reentered the sala and saying that it was cold, Bello put
on his clothes and pants. He also wore his jacket. He went back to the balcony and asked for water. Inocencia's husband gave Bello a glass of water. After gurgling, Bello placed the glass on the window sill and ask Inocencia's husband
for a cup of coffee. 50
Inocencia's husband was about to offer Bello a cup of coffee when she heard a successive burst of gunfire. Bello, who was the balcony facing the copra kiln ("agonan") with his back towards the pili tree, gradually fell to the floor with his
hands above his head. Then there was another burst of gunfire. From the kitchen, Inocencia rushed to the door from where she saw a man holding a long firearm, whom she later identified as Pinto, near the pili tree which was around
eight meters from where Bello was, and another man, also holding a gun, crouching near the stairs. 51
was about to rush to Bello when her husband pulled her. Just then a man,
Inocencia, with her two-year-old child in her arms, 52
whom Inocencia identified as Buenaflor, came up the house, pointed a gun at Inocencia and her
husband and told them to lay flat on the floor. The man asked them where the gun was. Inocencia
told him that there was no gun in the house but then, when she looked around, she saw a long
firearm with its muzzle pointed upward leaning against the wall near the door around two meters
from where Bello laid flat on his back. Bello himself had a gun but it was in its holster tucked on his
waist. 53 It was Buenaflor who took both the long firearm and the gun in Bello's holster. 54
Inocencia went near the pili tree where Rosalio's body was,
When Francisco Andes went up the house, he told Inocencia that Rosalio was dead. 55
knelt down and asked the man with a long firearm why he killed Rosalio. The man answered that
Rosalio fought back. However, Inocencia did not notice any weapon near Rosalio's body. 56
Bello died because of

Bello's hands and feet were tied together and a bamboo pole was inserted between them so that two men, one of them being Francisco Andes, could carry the cadaver. 57
"shock secondary to massive hemorrhage due to multiple gunshot wounds". 58 A former pilot and 28
years old at the time of his death, Bello sustained a gunshot wound at the left temple, an inch above
the highest point of the pinna of the left ear. The bullet which entered his head through the
squamous temporal bone travelled towards the occipital region down to the floor of the left middle
cranial fosa until it reached the base of the tongue.
Bello had three gunshot wounds on his chest. One bullet entered the superior part of the right
scapular area about the level of the third thoracic vertebrae. The bullet travelled to the right inna in a
slightly upward direction making its exit at the lateral part of the right supraclavicular fossa above the
clavicle. The second gunshot wound was at the left side interscapular area. The bullet travelled
upwards and to the right fracturing the 7th rib, entered the lower lobe of the left lung, punctured the
pulmonary conus, went through the junction of the right auricular appendage and the right auricle,
the anteromedial side of the pericardium, grazed the medial surface of the middle lobe of the right
lung and exited at the right side of the chest. The third gunshot wound was below the right nipple.
The bullet went to the chest cavity, the lower lobe of the right lung, the dome of the diaphragm, the
right lobe of the liver, the 8th thoracic vertebrae and exited at the left of the midline at the inferior
interscapular area. 59
While Bellos corpse was being autopsied, a slug fell from his jacket. A bullet jacket and lead fragments were found at the base of his skull and a slug was extracted from the floor of his mouth. 60
Rosalio Andes, 23 years old, also died of shock due to multiple gunshot wounds. A bullet entered his right temporal area, macerated the brain, fractured both parietal bones and exited at the left parietal bone. Another bullet entered the
left scapular area below the level of the 6th rib, travelled to the dome of the left diaphragm, the left lobe of the liver, the pancreas, the small intestines, and the perineum below the ramus of the right pubis. The slug was found at the
gluteoperineal junction about 2 inches below the tip of the coccys and 2 1/2 inches above the gluteal line. A third bullet entered the left knee and exited at the medial side of the leg. 61
The
The slugs and parts of bullets which were extracted from the bodies of the victims were turned over to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on December 29, 1970 by Fiscal Aquilino Bonto for safekeeping purposes. 62
empty shells and slugs which both the PC and the Legazpi City police found in Talahib were also
turned over to the NBI 63 in the same manner that the four empty carbine shells 64 found by the PC
near the coconut tree a meter from the shoulder of the road to Mariawa were also turned over to the
NBI. 65 Also submitted to the NBI for ballistic examination were twelve Smith & Wesson caliber .38
revolvers, two Smith & Wesson "paltik" caliber .22, four Tell caliber revolvers, one Bosque automatic
pistol caliber .380, four carbine Inland rifles caliber .30, three US Springfield rifles caliber.30, one
Thompson submachine gun caliber .45 and one Colt automatic pistol caliber.45. 66
Pinto, who admitted carrying a caliber .30 carbine during

Defendants Pinto and Buenaflor both denied having fired at the jeep bearing the Tiongson family. 67
the incident, 68 testified that the shooting occurred because the Tiongsons' jeep "was going towards"
them. 69
After the search had been conducted in Bello's premises,

According to Pinto, when they reached Mariawa, it was he who fired one shot in the air. 70
Team 3 was instrued by a "superior officer" "to remain and maintain peace and order in (the) vicinity
including Mariawa". 71 While he and Buenaflor were patrolling the area, at around midnight, they
"chanced upon a house" wherein Bello and his group were staying. They captured four of Bello's
bodyguards and tied them to a pili tree with the torn shirt of one of the captives. 72
At daybreak, Pinto saw Bello smoking at the porch. Buenaflor, who was behind him, called Bello. Then a single shot coming from the house rang out. It was answered by a burst of fire which Pinto "presumed" came from Buenaflor. By
reflex action, Pinto transferred from the pili tree to a nearby coconut tree. But before he reached the coconut tree, he saw a man with a bolo in his hand running towards him. As the man was menacingly near him, Pinto shot him. 73
After a lull in the firing, he went up the house to look for Bello's other companions. He saw the body of Bello on the porch and "near" it was a garand which he took. He also got Bello's short firearm "from a holster." He turned over both
the garand and the short firearm to Buenaflor. One of the captured persons kicked Bello's body saying that if not for Bello, his son would not have been killed. Thereafter, the two dead persons were carried by the captured bodyguards
to Mariawa. 74
In Mariawa, Pinto contacted (through the radio) police outpost No. 5 in Banquerohan and two jeeps arrived. When they reached the junction in Homapon, Major Molo, who was with Fiscal Benito Se, told Pinto to go back with him to
Talahib. Although Pinto warned Major Molo that it would be dangerous to go back because one of Bello's men had escaped, they nevertheless proceeded to Talahib. With three other policemen, they arrived there between eight and
nine in the morning where they were instructed to "look for evidence specifically . . . for a thompson." He found in the porch two shells and the others found a hat and a flashlight. Thereafter, they returned to Mariawa and later, to Legazpi
City proper. 75
On cross-examination, Pinto stated that he did not know that they found Bello in an area which was beyond the jurisdiction of Legazpi City. He admitted that while they were instructed patrol the area, they were also told to effect the
According to Pinto, of the fifteen bullets in the magazine of his carbine,

arrest of Bello even if no complaint had been lodged against him. 76
only two remained. He fired "most" of the thirteen shots during the "Bello incident". 77
Pinto shot the man later identified as Rosalio Andes when he was at a distance of around three meters. Rosalio was "face to face" with him when Pinto shot him. As Rosalio did not fall from the first shot, Pinto continued shooting
When he went up the porch he saw the garand "lying on the floor" but the gun tucked on Bello's
him. 78
waist was still in its holster. 79

On the Tiongson incident, Pinto asserted that he did not fire his
When he saw the headlight of the Tiongsons' jeep, he also saw a flashlight being waved. A little
carbine. 80
later, he heard a shout ordering the jeep to stop. Then he heard one shot and immediately after, the
volley of fire as the jeep was going towards his direction. As it passed by him, he heard the jeep's
passengers shriek. 81
For his part, Buenaflor declared that during the mission to serve the search warrant on Bello, he carried the ".38 caliber revolver Tel." (sic) which had been issued to him by the Legazpi City Police Department. He did not fire his gun at
In the afternoon of December 26, however, Major Molo

the Tiongsons and, "as a matter of fact," he surrendered his firearm for ballistic examination. 82
issued him a Thompson submachinegun. 83

While patrolling Homapon, he and Pinto "chanced upon" some persons who told them that they could guide them to where Bello was. At the place which they later found to be Talahib, they went near a pili tree from where they saw a
house "below." Then he saw a man who turned out to be Mostoles. Buenaflor apprehended Mostoles because the latter was Bello's bodyguard and he had a .22 caliber firearm with him. He came by another man with a bolo, named
"Banteque" and apprehended him also. Then, from behind the pili tree, Pinto appeared with yet another man. They waited for a while until another man, who turned out to be Francisco Andes, came within four meters of him. Buenaflor
pointed his submachinegun at him so Andes approached him. Buenaflor confiscated Andes' .22 caliber firearm. 84
From the group, Buenaflor learned that Bello provided them with firearms and that Bello himself had a pistol tucked in his holster as well as a garand. He and Pinto then tied the men to the pili tree. Later, he saw a person in the balcony
of the house below and Buenaflor shouted twice: "Paquito, mag-surrender ka!" Then Buenaflor heard a "a shot coming from the direction of the balcony followed by successive shots." He sought cover behind the pili tree and, while in a
crouching position, fired his submachinegun towards the balcony. Pinto was then behind him. As Pinto shifted his position while firing his carbine, Buenaflor went down to the "elevated portion going down to the nipa shack" until he was
near the coconut tree. There he found a person lying with his face down. He later found out that the person was the son of Francisco Andes. 85
After the firing had stopped, Pinto told him that Bello was dead. Pinto then went up the house. Buenaflor went back to the pili tree, untied the four persons they had captured, and told them to do something so they could carry the bodies
of Bello and (Rosalio) Andes. 86
While admitting that the person who led them

Like Pinto, on cross-examination, Buenaflor also asserted that he did not fire his gun at the jeep carrying the Tiongsons. 87
to Bello had told them that the latter was in Talahib, Buenaflor did not know that Talahib was a barrio
of Daraga, Albay and not of Legazpi City. 88 He reiterated that he shouted at Bello urging him to
surrender 89 but he was not able to fire a warning shot or identify himself as a member of the police
force "because after the secondshot there was already a burst of gunfire". 90
After they had found out

Buenaflor affirmed that the first shot emanating from the balcony of the house in Talalib which was around fifteen meters from the pili tree, came from a "high caliber firearm". 91
that Bello was dead, Pinto went up the house. Later, Pinto gave him Bello's 380 automatic pistol and
garand. 92 Although he looked at those firearms, he did not determine whether they had been
fired. 93 He noticed, however, that the magazine of the garand was "intact". 94 Aside from Bello's
firearms, Buenaflor and Pinto confiscated two .22 caliber revolvers and two bolos found on Bello's
bodyguards. 95
He
Buenaflor stated that his Thompson submachinegun had two clips with each clip containing 30 bullets. When he gave back the firearm to Major Molo, only four bullets were left of the one clip he had used. 96
remembered having squeezed twice the trigger of his Thompson submachinegun or automatic rifle
in Talahib. 97 His service revolver was still with him then. 98
As a result of this series of events, four separate informations were filed against Pinto and Buenaflor. The information charging Pinto and Buenaflor for
the murder of Andes which was filed on July 26, 1971 reads:
That on or about the 27th day of December, 1970, in sitio Ando, Barrio Talahib, Daraga, Albay and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court the accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, without any justifiable cause or motive, with
intent to kill, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery and evident premeditation, accused Pat. Narciso
Buenaflor, Jr. and Pat. Daniel Pinto, Jr., and by means of a Cal. 45 Thompson Sub-Machine Gun, SN-213436 and a US Carbin Inland, Cal.
30, SN-5099407, owned respectively by said accused, shoot one Rosalio Andes, inflicting upon him gunshot wounds as described in the
attached Autopsy Report marked as Annex "A" and being made an integral part of this Information, thereby causing upon said Rosalio
Andes serious and mortal wounds which led to his instantaneous death.
Contrary to law.
The information charging Pinto and Buenaflor with having murdered Bello contains basically the same allegations as the above and it was filed on the
same date. On August 24, 1971 two other informations were filed against Pinto and Buenaflor: one for the murder of Richard Tiongson and another for
the frustrated murder of Maria Theresa Tiongson. On arraignment, Pinto and Buenaflor both pleaded not guilty to all the charges.
After trial, the trial court rendered the aforementioned judgment of conviction. For the killing of Bello and Andes, the trial court appreciated evident
premeditation as a qualifying circilmstance and treachery, nighttime and use of public position as aggravating circumstances. For the incident involving
the Tiongson children, it considered the crimes as qualified by treachery and aggravated by the use of public position.
Pinto and Buenaflor instituted the instant appeal praying for exoneration mainly on the basis of their claim that the killings were perpetrated in the
course of the performance of their official duties as peace officers in obedience to the lawful order of their superiors.
In order that the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code may be successfully invoked, the defense has to prove that these two requisites are present: (a) the offender acted in the
performance of a duty and (b) the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance or lawful exercise of such duty. In the absence of the second requisite, the justification becomes an incomplete one
thereby converting it into a mitigating circumstance under Articles 13 and 69 of the same Code. 99
Admittedly, the appellants and the rest of the police force involved, originally set out to perform a legal duty: the service of a search warrant on Bello. In
the process, however, appellants abused their authority resulting in unauthorized and unlawful moves and consequences. Armed with only a search
warrant and the oral order to apprehend Bello, they went beyond the ambit of their mission and deprived Bello and two other persons of their lives.
While the defense presented proofs that Bello had a string of record in the police blotter for misdeeds ranging from taking the harvest of their hacienda without the permission of his parents to assaulting his stepfather, and that he was
there was no proof that he had been convicted of any offense or that he was
"dangerous while under the influence of liquor", 100
a dangerous fugitive from justice which would warrant a "shoot to-kill" order from police authorities.
Proof of bad moral character of the victim only establishes a probability that he committed a crime
but it certainly cannot be the reason for annihilating him nor may it prevail over facts proven showing
that the same victim had been cold-bloodedly killed. 101 As such, the suspicion that Bello was
maintaining a private army was not a sufficient justification for his being rubbed out without due
process of law.
The police theory that Bello authored the shooting of one Salustiano Botin on Christmas eve is
neither a justification for his arrest without a warrant. It should be observed that while the police had
obtained a search warrant for illegal possession of firearms against Bello even on Christmas day
which was supposed to be a holiday, no such effort was made in securing warrant of arrest for
Bello's alleged frustrated killing of Botin. The improbability of the defense evidence through the
testimony of Botin himself that Bello had shot him in the evening of December 24, 1970 is bolstered
by the same testimony showing that while he was shot by Bello in the presence of the police force
who were converging at the junction of Homapon and Mariawa, the same law enforcers were unable
to arrest Bello. Besides the fact that no other eyewitness corroborated Botin's testimony even in the
face of his own admission that Bello had no reason to shoot him, no complaint was ever lodged
against Bello for the alleged shooting. 102
Unable to find
On the other hand, the prosecution, through eyewitness Rogelio Escober, tried to establish that during said shooting incident the police were looking for Bello at the store of a certain Serrano. 103
Bello, the police, specifically Pinto, mauled Escober while asking him to testify against Bello for
allegedly shooting Botin. 104 The police had focused their vehicles' headlights near the bodega of ex-
Mayor Los Baños in their effort to flush out Bello who, unknown to the police, had earlier left the
vicinity. It was when the police fired at the said bodega that Botin must have been accidentally
shot. 105 This story was uncorroborated but if true, would show the police's dangerous propensity for
using otherwise official operations in an unlawful manner.
A propensity for rash judgment was likewise amply shown at the incident involving the Tiongson
children. Since the jeep coming towards them was owned by the Anduizas, the appellants acted
obviously in the belief that Bello was its passenger and posthaste they fired upon it even without any
inquiry as to the identity of its passengers. 106Granting that the police indeed fired a warning shot,
sound discretion and restraint dictated that, there being no responding shots from its passengers
after the alleged warning shot and considering the condition of the road which was not only muddy
but uphill, instead of directing aimless gunburst at the jeep, the most that they could have done was
to render the jeep immobile by shooting its tires. That way, they could have verified the identity of the
passengers. As it were, they riddled the jeep with bullets injuring in the process innocent passengers
who were completely unaware of what they were up against.
Appellants' stark denial of firing their guns upon the Tiongson family falls flat in the face of various
circumstantial evidence which point to their culpability. There is the unflinching testimony of Sgt.
Romero that he saw "flashes of fire" from the direction of Buenaflor as the jeep bearing the
Tiongsons passed by. Said testimony was corroborated by that of Rafael Jacob, the PC member of
team 2, that while no one in his team fired his gun, the "sporadic firing" came from team 3 after the
first of fire which occurred while the jeep was "abreast of team 2". 107 Even defense witness Mariano
Rico, a policeman who led team 1, was "sure" that he heard gunshots at the moment when "the jeep
had just passed team 2". 108
Then there are the four empty .30 caliber carbine shells which were found near the coconut tree where, according to Romero, Pinto was deployed. While he himself carried a carbine, Romero did not fire it and his testimony was never
contradicted. The four empty shells were compared with the test shells which were fired from the US carbine, caliber .30 Inland Division, SN-5099407, which, according to the aforequoted information charging appellant with having killed
Andes, was used by Pinto, they were found to have "significant similar individual characteristics". 109
and Buenaflor was proven to be

While it is true that the ballistic report reveals that the lead bullet taken from the body of Richard was fired from a Smith & Wesson type firearm 110
carrying a .38 caliber Tell revolver, the findings of expert witnesses or, in this case, the ballistic
report pointing to another kind of caliber .38 weapon as the source of Richard's wound only serves
as a guide for the courts after considering all the facts of the case. 111 The undisputed fact is that
Buenaflor was specifically pointed by Romero as the one who fired his firearm as the Anduiza jeep
bearing the Tiongsons passed by. Inasmuch as no evidence that Romero would prevaricate to pin
responsibility on Buenaflor was ever presented, there is, therefore, no reason to discredit his
testimony. 112
According to
In addition to all these, Buenaflor's motive for wanting to do away with Bello has been established. Such motive provided a circumstantial evidence leading to the inference that indeed he fired his gun. 113
the unrebutted testimony of Rogelio Escober, an overseer of the Napal hacienda and constant
companion of Bello, on November 1, 1970, Buenaflor and another policeman named Santos Urbana,
Jr. borrowed Bello's jeep on the pretext that they needed it to transfer Moscoso, the suspect in the
Perez killing, to the Albay Police Headquarters. When it was returned, the jeep had bloodstains.
Bello and Escober later learned from a PC officer that the jeep had been used in dumping in
Guinobatan the body of Moscoso. Confronted by the PC officer, Bello admitted that the jeep was
borrowed by Buenaflor and Urbina and agreed to execute a sworn statement on the matter.
Consequently, the PC authorities notified Mayor Imperial of the solution of the Moscoso killing.
Three days later, Escober and Bello met Urbina who warned Bello, "Kit, if you want to give your
statement, just say that I borrowed your jeep for thirty minutes. This is a brotherly advice because
something might happen to you." Bello retorted that he would do what was right and that was to tell
the truth. Urbina said that it was up to Bello but he repeated that he was giving Bello a brotherly
warning that something might happen to him 114 (TSN, August 23, 1973, pp. 4-20). These facts were
of course denied by Buenaflor. However, as between the positive declaration of a prosecution
witness and the negative denial of the accused, the former deserves more credence. 115
and to desist
All these pieces of circumstantial evidence point to no other inference than that Pinto and Buenaflor fired their guns in defiance of their superior officer's order only "to find the whereabouts" of Bello 116
from using their weapons "without clearance from the Chief of Police". 117 Since there is more than
one circumstance and the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, the combination
of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 118
The fact that the victims were different from the ones the appellants intended to injure cannot save them from conviction. Aberratio ictus or mistake in the identity of the victim carries the same gravity as when the accused zeroes in on
his intended victim. The main reason behind this conclusion is the fact that the accused had acted with such a disregard for the life of the victim(s) — without checking carefully the latter's identity as to place himself on the same legal
Neither may the fact that the accused made a mistake in killing one
plane as one who kills another willfully, unlawfully and feloniously. 119
man instead of another be considered a mitigating circumstance. 120

It is not even necessary to pinpoint who between Pinto and Buenaflor actually caused the death of Richard or the wounding of Maria Theresa in the presence of proof beyond reasonable doubt that they acted in conspiracy with each
Prior agreement between the appellants to lull their intended victim is not essential to prove
other. 121
conspiracy as the same may be inferred from their own acts showing joint purpose and design. 122 In
this case, such unity of purpose and design is shown by the fact that only the two of them fired their
guns when the Anduiza jeep with the Tiongsons passed by. This they did in defiance of the order of
their superior not to shoot unless ordered to do so. Conspiracy having been proved, the guilt or
culpability is imposable on both appellants in equal degrees. 123
The same conspiracy was evident in the killing of Bello and Andes. The appellants' concerted action was shown by the manner by which they killed the
two. In this incident, however, they invoke self-defense as a justifying circumstance. Evidence at hand, however, do not favor their claim.
Under Article 11 (1) of the Rules of Court, an accused must prove the presence of all the following elements of said exempting circumstance: (a) unlawful aggression, (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel
The presence of unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua

it, and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. 124
non. There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless

the victim has committed an unlawful aggression on the person defending himself. 125
In this case, Buenaflor insists that he fired at Bello because, after calling out to him to surrender, his shout was answered by a gunshot. Pinto
corroborates his story but the principal prosecution eyewitness in this incident, Inocencia Malbas, swears that she heard no such shout to surrender
nor a gunshot from Bello's direction before Bello was fired upon by the appellants. Physical evidence as well as the testimonies of Buenaflor himself
and Pinto show that Inocencia, and not the appellants, was telling the truth.
Rafael Señora, the NBI agent who went to Talahib and the road to Mariawa to investigate as well as to take pictures, found no bullet marks at the crime scene which would pertain to a .22 caliber "paltik" firearm which Bello's men
As no other "paltik" firearms were recovered from the crime scene other than the two which
allegedly used. 126
Buenaflor confiscated from Mostoles and Francisco Andes, the possibility of said firearms or one of
its kind having been used by Bello's men against the appellant particularly the one who escaped is
nil.
Buenaflor claimed that the shot after his call to Bello belonged to a high-powered gun 127 obviously
referring to the firearms recovered from Bello himself. According to Buenaflor however, when he
found the rifle, its magazine was "intact" and he did not manipulate the rifle to know how many of its
bullets had been used. 128 Moreover, if Bello indeed fired a gun, it must be the firearm in his holster
and not the garand which was found a couple of meters from where Bello had fallen. That Bello did
not fire any of his two firearms is buttressed by Pinto's own testimony that Bello was smoking with
his back towards them when he was shot at and that at that moment, he did not see Bello holding a
gun. 129 We cannot help, therefore, but conclude that the defense claim that Buenaflor's call to Bello
was answered by a gunshot is but a figment of their imagination designed for their own exoneration.
Appellants' claim of unlawful aggression on the part of Bello or his men would have been clarified
had any of Bello's men whom they had captured been presented in court. These men, Leoncio
Mostoles, Francisco Andes, Domingo Bantique and Ananias Andes had executed statements before
the Legazpi City police to the effect that they heard Buenaflor's call for Bello to surrender and that
Bello fired his gun at the appellants. However, all four of them later executed statements before the
NBI retracting said earlier statements in view of the fact that the police had threatened them to make
the statements favorable to the appellants. 130
As regards the unlawful aggression of Rosalio Andes against Pinto, we find that if we are to believe Pinto, we have to stamp full credibility on his statement alone. Even Buenaflor admitted that he did not see Rosalio Andes attack
Inocencia swore that she did not see any weapon near the fallen Rosalio. Indeed, if the
Pinto. 131
aggression did occur, Pinto would not have lost time in presenting in court the bolo which Andes
threatened to use on him. But granting that Rosalio had a bolo, Pinto was not justified in inflicting the
wounds sustained by Rosalio because a mere threatening attitude of the victim will not constitute
unlawful aggression. 132Moreover, Pinto's testimony that Rosalio menacingly approached him with a
bolo after Buenaflor had released a sunburst directed at the house where Bello was, is contrary to
human behavior if not totally ridiculous. On the contrary, by his own admission, Pinto continued firing
until he saw Rosalio fell.
An accused who admits inflicting fatal injury on his victim and invokes self-defense must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not only on the weakness of that of the prosecution for, even if
weak, the prosecution evidence gains more credibility. 133 Unfortunately, in this case, inspire of the
fact that the prosecution had only one eyewitness to the killing of Bello and Andes, the appellants
had not presented sufficiently strong evidence to shore up their claim of self-defense.
We agree with the trial court that treachery attended the commission of all four crimes in this case.
The killing of Richard Tiongson, Francisco Bello and Rosalio Andes as well as the wounding of
Maria Theresa Tiongson were all so sudden that all of them were left defenseless. This is shown not
only by the testimonial evidence on the commission of the crimes but also by the nature and location
of the wounds of all the victims. 134 The presence of treachery qualifies the killings to murder and the
wounding of Maria Theresa to frustrated murder. Nighttime, however, may not be appreciated as
there is no proof that it was specifically sought in the commission of the crime and therefore we
deem it absorbed by treachery.
Evident premeditation has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt in this case but we find that
the appellants indeed took advantage of their public position in perpetrating the crime. Under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, murder is punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to death. There being no mitigating circumstance to temper the penalty and there being only the
aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of their public office under Article 14 (1) of the said
Code, the proper penalty is death. 135 However, in view the constitutional abolition of the death
penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed on the appellants for each of the three
murders they committed.
For the wounding of Maria Theresa, the penalty imposable, applying Article 50 of the Revised Penal
Code, is prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium. There being no reason to further
lower the penalty by one degree pursuant to the provision of Article 250, and there being one
aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstance, the penalty should be within the range
of prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, 136 the proper penalty for the frustrated murder of Maria Theresa is six (6) years of prision
correccional maximum as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum as
maximum. The indemnity of eight thousand pesos imposed by the lower court should be respected
considering that while there is evidence as to the actual amount she spent while confined at the
Sacred Heart Hospital in Legazpi City, there is no proof as to the expenses she incurred after she
was transferred to the Camp Crame Hospital in Quezon City.
As in all cases wherein peace officers are accused, this case creates a feeling of frustration in
everyone. The crimes committed here ought to have no place in this democratic and civilized
society. True it is that a police officer is sometimes left in a quandary when faced with a situation
where a decisive but legal action is needed. But, as this Court said in Calderon vs. People and Court
of Appeals (96 Phil. 216, 225 [1954]), "(t)he judgment and discretion of public officers, in the
performance of their duties, must be exercised neither capriciously nor oppressively, but within
reasonable limits. In the absence of a clear and legal provision to the contrary, they must act in
conformity with the dictates of a sound discretion, and with the spirit and purpose of the law." Police
officers must always bear in mind that although they are dealing with criminal elements against
whom society must be protected, these criminals are also human beings with human rights. In the
words of then Justice Moran in the Oanis case (Supra):
It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm" without regard to
his right to life which he has by such notoriety already forfeited. We may approve of this
standard of official conduct where the criminal offers resistance or does something which
places his captors in danger of imminent attack. Otherwise, we cannot see how, as in the
present case, the mere fact of notoriety can make the life of a criminal a mere trifle in the
hands of officers of the law. Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for redoubled official alertness
an vigilance; it never can justify precipitate action at the cost of human life. Where, as here,
the precipitate action of the appellants has cost an innocent life and there exist no
circumstances whatsoever warrant action of such character in the mind of a reasonably
prudent man, condemnation—not condonation— should be the rule; otherwise we would
offer a premium to crime in the shelter of official actuation.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby affirmed subject to the modifications that
appellants shall solidarily be liable for the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000) for each of the three
murders they committed and, for the frustrated murder of Maria Theresa Tiongson, each of them
shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years of prision correccional maximum as
minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum as maximum.
Inasmuch as appellant Daniel Pinto, Jr. had been a police officer for only five months 137 when the
crimes were committed, let a copy of this decision be furnished the Office of the President for
whatever action may be proper to temper his penalty. 138
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., I concur but agree with Justice Bidin.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-47722 July 27, 1943
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants.
Antonio Z. Oanis in his own behalf.

Maximo L. Valenzuela for appellant Galanta.
Acting Solicitor-General Ibañez and Assistant Attorney Torres for appellee.
MORAN, J.:
Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio Tecson, the accused Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto
Galanta, chief of police of Cabanatuan and corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, respectively,
were, after due trial, found guilty by the lower court of homicide through reckless imprudence and
were sentenced each to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and six months to two years and
two months of prison correccional and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased in
the amount of P1,000. Defendants appealed separately from this judgment.
In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial
Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor:
"Information received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get
him dead or alive." Captain Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant and asked that he be
given four men. Defendant corporal Alberto Galanta, and privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio
Serna and D. Fernandez, upon order of their sergeant, reported at the office of the Provincial
Inspector where they were shown a copy of the above-quoted telegram and a newspaper clipping
containing a picture of Balagtas. They were instructed to arrest Balagtas and, if overpowered, to
follow the instruction contained in the telegram. The same instruction was given to the chief of police
Oanis who was likewise called by the Provincial Inspector. When the chief of police was asked
whether he knew one Irene, a bailarina, he answered that he knew one of loose morals of the same
name. Upon request of the Provincial Inspector, the chief of police tried to locate some of his men to
guide the constabulary soldiers in ascertaining Balagtas' whereabouts, and failing to see anyone of
them he volunteered to go with the party. The Provincial Inspector divided the party into two groups
with defendants Oanis and Galanta, and private Fernandez taking the route to Rizal street leading to
the house where Irene was supposedly living. When this group arrived at Irene's house, Oanis
approached one Brigida Mallare, who was then stripping banana stalks, and asked her where Irene's
room was. Brigida indicated the place and upon further inquiry also said that Irene was sleeping with
her paramour. Brigida trembling, immediately returned to her own room which was very near that
occupied by Irene and her paramour. Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene,
and an seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door where they were, simultaneously or
successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots, Irene
saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where the shots came, she saw the
defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned out later that the
person shot and killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent
citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour. The Provincial Inspector, informed of the killing,
repaired to the scene and when he asked as to who killed the deceased. Galanta, referring to
himself and to Oanis, answered: "We two, sir." The corpse was thereafter brought to the provincial
hospital and upon autopsy by Dr. Ricardo de Castro, multiple gunshot wounds inflicted by a .32 and
a .45 caliber revolvers were found on Tecson's body which caused his death.
These are the facts as found by the trial court and fully supported by the evidence, particularly by the
testimony of Irene Requinea. Appellants gave, however, a different version of the tragedy. According
to Appellant Galanta, when he and chief of police Oanis arrived at the house, the latter asked Brigida
where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place, and upon further inquiry as to the whereabouts
of Anselmo Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping in the same room. Oanis went to the room
thus indicated and upon opening the curtain covering the door, he said: "If you are Balagtas, stand
up." Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, and Irene woke up and as the former was about to sit up in
bed. Oanis fired at him. Wounded, Tecson leaned towards the door, and Oanis receded and
shouted: "That is Balagtas." Galanta then fired at Tecson.
On the other hand, Oanis testified that after he had opened the curtain covering the door and after
having said, "if you are Balagtas stand up." Galanta at once fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas,
while the latter was still lying on bed, and continued firing until he had exhausted his bullets: that it
was only thereafter that he, Oanis, entered the door and upon seeing the supposed Balagtas, who
was then apparently watching and picking up something from the floor, he fired at him.
The trial court refused to believe the appellants. Their testimonies are certainly incredible not only
because they are vitiated by a natural urge to exculpate themselves of the crime, but also because
they are materially contradictory. Oasis averred that be fired at Tecson when the latter was
apparently watching somebody in an attitudes of picking up something from the floor; on the other
hand, Galanta testified that Oasis shot Tecson while the latter was about to sit up in bed immediately
after he was awakened by a noise. Galanta testified that he fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas,
when the latter was rushing at him. But Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter
was still lying on bed. It is apparent from these contradictions that when each of the appellants tries
to exculpate himself of the crime charged, he is at once belied by the other; but their mutual
incriminating averments dovetail with and corroborate substantially, the testimony of Irene Requinea.
It should be recalled that, according to Requinea, Tecson was still sleeping in bed when he was shot
to death by appellants. And this, to a certain extent, is confirmed by both appellants themselves in
their mutual recriminations. According, to Galanta, Oanis shot Tecson when the latter was still in bed
about to sit up just after he was awakened by a noise. And Oanis assured that when Galanta shot
Tecson, the latter was still lying in bed. Thus corroborated, and considering that the trial court had
the opportunity to observe her demeanor on the stand, we believe and so hold that no error was
committed in accepting her testimony and in rejecting the exculpatory pretensions of the two
appellants. Furthermore, a careful examination of Irene's testimony will show not only that her
version of the tragedy is not concocted but that it contains all indicia of veracity. In her cross-
examination, even misleading questions had been put which were unsuccessful, the witness having
stuck to the truth in every detail of the occurrence. Under these circumstances, we do not feel
ourselves justified in disturbing the findings of fact made by the trial court.
The true fact, therefore, of the case is that, while Tecson was sleeping in his room with his back
towards the door, Oanis and Galanta, on sight, fired at him simultaneously or successively, believing
him to be Anselmo Balagtas but without having made previously any reasonable inquiry as to his
identity. And the question is whether or not they may, upon such fact, be held responsible for the
death thus caused to Tecson. It is contended that, as appellants acted in innocent mistake of fact in
the honest performance of their official duties, both of them believing that Tecson was Balagtas, they
incur no criminal liability. Sustaining this theory in part, the lower court held and so declared them
guilty of the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence. We are of the opinion, however, that,
under the circumstances of the case, the crime committed by appellants is murder through specially
mitigated by circumstances to be mentioned below.
In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of honest mistake of fact, appellants rely on the
case of U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488. The maxim is ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only
when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. In the Ah Chong case, defendant
therein after having gone to bed was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out
twice, "who is there," but received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from
his bed and called out again., "If you enter the room I will kill you." But at that precise moment, he
was struck by a chair which had been placed against the door and believing that he was then being
attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be
his room-mate. A common illustration of innocent mistake of fact is the case of a man who was
marked as a footpad at night and in a lonely road held up a friend in a spirit of mischief, and with
leveled, pistol demanded his money or life. He was killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that
the attack was real, that the pistol leveled at his head was loaded and that his life and property were
in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. In these instances, there is an innocent mistake of
fact committed without any fault or carelessness because the accused, having no time or opportunity
to make a further inquiry, and being pressed by circumstances to act immediately, had no alternative
but to take the facts as they then appeared to him, and such facts justified his act of killing. In the
instant case, appellants, unlike the accused in the instances cited, found no circumstances
whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The person in the room being then asleep,
appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves,
and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the
victim was unarmed, according to Irene Requinea. This, indeed, is the only legitimate course of
action for appellants to follow even if the victim was really Balagtas, as they were instructed not to
kill Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if resistance or aggression is
offered by him.
Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is reasonably
necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape,
recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm (People vs. Delima, 46 Phil, 738),
yet he is never justified in using unnecessary force or in treating him with wanton violence, or in
resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be effected otherwise (6 C.J.S., par. 13, p.
612). The doctrine is restated in the new Rules of Court thus: "No unnecessary or unreasonable
force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater
restraint than is necessary for his detention." (Rule 109, sec. 2, par. 2). And a peace officer cannot
claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest
(5 C.J., p. 753; U.S. vs. Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109). It may be true that Anselmo Balagtas was a
notorious criminal, a life-termer, a fugitive from justice and a menace to the peace of the community,
but these facts alone constitute no justification for killing him when in effecting his arrest, he offers no
resistance or in fact no resistance can be offered, as when he is asleep. This, in effect, is the
principle laid down, although upon different facts, in U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234, 242).
It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm" without regard to his
right to life which he has by such notoriety already forfeited. We may approve of this standard of
official conduct where the criminal offers resistance or does something which places his captors in
danger of imminent attack. Otherwise we cannot see how, as in the present case, the mere fact of
notoriety can make the life of a criminal a mere trifle in the hands of the officers of the law. Notoriety
rightly supplies a basis for redoubled official alertness and vigilance; it never can justify precipitate
action at the cost of human life. Where, as here, the precipitate action of the appellants has cost an
innocent life and there exist no circumstances whatsoever to warrant action of such character in the
mind of a reasonably prudent man, condemnation — not condonation — should be the rule;
otherwise we should offer a premium to crime in the shelter of official actuation.
The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and
not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being
simply the incident of another act performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939). In the
words of Viada, "para que se celifique un hecho de imprudencia es preciso que no haya mediado en
el malicia ni intencion alguna de dañar; existiendo esa intencion, debera calificarse el hecho del
delito que ha producido, por mas que no haya sido la intencion del agente el causar un mal de tanta
gravedad como el que se produjo." (Tomo 7, Viada Codigo Penal Comentado, 5.a ed. pag. 7). And,
as once held by this Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with
the idea of reckless imprudence (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232; People vs. Bindor, 56 Phil., 16),
and where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot
be considered as reckless imprudence (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605) to support a plea of
mitigated liability.
As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with the qualifying
circumstance of alevosia. There is, however, a mitigating circumstance of weight consisting in the
incomplete justifying circumstance defined in article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code. According
to such legal provision, a person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or
in the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are two requisites in order that the circumstance may
be taken as a justifying one: (a) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the
due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. In the instance case, only
the first requisite is present — appellants have acted in the performance of a duty. The second
requisite is wanting for the crime by them committed is not the necessary consequence of a due
performance of their duty. Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get him dead or alive if resistance
is offered by him and they are overpowered. But through impatience or over-anxiety or in their desire
to take no chances, they have exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty by killing the person whom
they believed to be Balagtas without any resistance from him and without making any previous
inquiry as to his identity. According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by one
or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.
For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder
with the mitigating circumstance above mentioned, and accordingly sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of from five (5) years of prision correctional to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, with
the accessories of the law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased Serapio Tecson jointly and severally
an indemnity of P2,000, with costs.
Yulo, C.J., Bocobo, Generoso and Lopez Vito, A., concur.

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CRIM REV ATTY DIWA CASES PART 1 1-10

Jeross Romano Aguilar

G.R. No. 208170, August 20, 2014

CONTRARY TO LAW. chanroble slaw

Version of the Prosecution

Version of the Defense

The Ruling of the RTC

The Ruling of the CA

Hence, this appeal.

The Court’s Ruling

The appeal is bereft of merit.

Carpio,* Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 80762 March 19, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

The antecedent facts are as follows:

9. Puncture wound, 3 cm in width, 11.5 cm in length, located at the anterior aspect,

1. Stab wound No. 5, injuring the left ventricle of the heart.

MASSIVE HEMMORRHAGE DUE TO MULTIPLE

The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses FAUSTA GONZALES and AUGUSTO

Iloilo City, August 26, 1981. 14

ATTY. GATON (defense counsel on cross-examination):

Q And you said that the moon was bright, is it correct?

A Yes, sir, because the moon was brightly shining.

A Because they were surrounding Peñacerrada and were in constant

The interpretation is not clear.

They were doing it rapidly.

A The moving around or the hacking or the "labu" or "bunu" is rapid. I

A Yes sir, I cannot positively tell who did the hacking.

A Yes sir, and because of the rapid movements.

Art. 4. Criminal liability — Criminal liability shall be incurred:

2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or

Moreover, Huntoria is not exactly a disinterested witness as portrayed by the prosecution. He

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 97471 February 17, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Edward C. Castañeda for accused-appellants.

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused ISABELO PUNO

Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento owns a bakeshop in Araneta Avenue, Quezon

A Santo Domingo Exit.

A Because while we were on the way back I (sic) came to my mind

The lower court, in support of its theory, offers this ratiocination:

WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute . . . highway robbery/brigandage

WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Nocon and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 504 September 16, 1902

THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellant,

Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellant.

Arellano, C.J., Cooper, Smith, Willard, and Mapa, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

Gibb & Gale, for appellant.

Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —

xxx xxx xxx

(1) Illegal aggression.

(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.

Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows: