Crim Rev Atty Diwa Part 1 31-40

CRIM REV ATTY DIWA PART 1 41-50
Jeross Romano Aguilar
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 137050. July 11, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GEORGE CORTES y

ORTEGA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is before the Court on automatic review of the decision [1] of the Regional
Trial Court, Surigao del Sur, Branch 29, Bislig, finding accused George Cortes y Ortega
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentencing him to the supreme penalty
of death.
On August 12, 1998, provincial prosecutor Alfredo J. Pondoc of Surigao del Sur
filed with the Regional Trial Court, Surigao del Sur, Branch 29, Bislig, an Information
for murder against accused George Cortes y Ortega, which reads as follows:
That on or about 11:00 oclock in the evening, more or less, of June 24, 1998, at P.
Lindo Street, Saint Paul District, Nangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with
treachery and evident premeditation, armed with a knife and with intent to kill did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assault and stabbed one
Edlyn S. Gamboa, a 16 year old girl, thereby inflicting the latter multiple stab wounds
on her body which caused her instantaneous death as certified by the doctor, to the
damage and prejudice of the victims heirs.
Contrary to law: In violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.[2]
On June 24, 1998, at about eleven oclock in the evening, Junilla Macaldo was sitting
on a bench outside her house located at P. Lindo St., Saint Paul District, Mangagoy,
Bislig, Surigao del Sur. While thus seated, Edlyn Gamboa came to her asking for the
whereabouts of Yen-yen Ibua. Junilla noticed that Edlyn was followed by accused
George Cortes.Junilla then instructed Edlyn to go upstairs of the house. When Edlyn
complied, accused followed her and successively stabbed her several times. Junilla tried
to help Edlyn, but accused overpowered her. In a moment, Edlyn was able to run away
despite being wounded; however, she collapsed five (5) meters away from where she
was stabbed. Junilla shouted for help. At this juncture, accused scampered away. Edlyn
was able to stand up but again collapsed after walking about five (5) steps. She was
brought to the Babano Medical Clinic, where she expired.
Accused admitted that he stabbed Edlyn. He mistook Edlyn for her male companion
against whom he had an altercation earlier. He committed the mistake because at the
time of the incident, accused was very drunk and the place was very dark. He only
learned that he had stabbed the wrong person the following morning through the radio
vigilantes program.
On August 28, 1998 the trial court arraigned the accused. [3] He entered a plea of
guilty.[4] In virtue of his plea of guilty, the trial court proceeded to satisfy itself of the
voluntariness of the plea by propounding questions to the accused to find out if he
understood his plea and the legal consequence thereof. Accused, assisted by counsel,
reiterated his plea of guilty and the extra judicial confession he executed before the
police.
Nonetheless, the prosecution proceeded to present evidence to prove the presence
of aggravating circumstances.The accused on the other hand presented evidence
proving the mitigating circumstances that attended the commission of the crime.
The prosecution alleged that the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation, cruelty, nighttime, abuse of superior strength, disrespect to sex, and
intoxication were present in the commission of the crime. The accused, on the other
hand, raised the attendance of the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, plea
of guilty, mistaken identity and the alternative mitigating circumstance of intoxication.
On September 2, 1998, the trial court after considering the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances attendant found the existence of the aggravating
circumstances and appreciated only the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty that
was offset by one of the aggravating circumstances. The trial court then proceeded to
rule on the appropriate penalty to be imposed on the accused. The trial court rendered
a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by the Republic Act 7659, otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Death, to indemnify the family of the
victim in the amount of P60,000.00, and to pay damages in the amount of
P200,000.00 and cost .[5]
Hence, this review.[6]

Accused raises the following errors imputed to the trial court:
1. In finding that the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, cruelty, nighttime,
abuse of superior strength, sex and intoxication attended the commission of the crime charged;
and
2. In imposing the death penalty upon accused instead of reclusion perpetua.
According to the accused, the prosecution failed to prove the aggravating

circumstances of evident premeditation and other circumstances attending the
commission of the crime.
We agree with the accused that the prosecution did not prove the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation. The prosecution failed to establish the following
elements of this aggravating circumstance: (a) the time when the accused determined
to commit the crime, (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to that
determination, and (c) a lapse of time between the determination and the execution
sufficient to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of the act.[7]
As to the aggravating circumstance of cruelty, although the accused stabbed the
victim several times, the same could not be considered as cruelty because there was no
showing that it was intended to prolong the suffering of the victim. For cruelty to be
appreciated against the accused, it must be shown that the accused, for his pleasure and
satisfaction, caused the victim to suffer slowly and painfully as he inflicted on him
unnecessary physical and moral pain. The crime is aggravated because by deliberately
increasing the suffering of the victim the offender denotes sadism and consequently a
marked degree of malice and perversity. The mere fact of inflicting various successive
wounds upon a person in order to cause his death, no appreciable time intervening
between the infliction of one (1) wound and that of another to show that he had wanted
to prolong the suffering of his victim, is not sufficient for taking this aggravating
circumstance into consideration.[8]
As to the aggravating circumstance of nighttime, the same could not be considered
for the simple reason that it was not specifically sought in the commission of the
crime. Night-time becomes an aggravating circumstance only when (1) it is specially
sought by the offender; (2) the offender takes advantage of it; or (3) it facilitates the
commission of the crime by insuring the offender's immunity from identification or
capture.[9] In the case at bar, no evidence suggests that accused purposely sought the
cover of darkness to perpetrate the crime, or to conceal his identity.
The trial court erred in further appreciating the aggravating circumstance of abuse
of superior strength. Abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery, so that it can
not be appreciated separately as another aggravating circumstance.[10] Here, treachery
qualified the offense to murder.
As to the aggravating circumstance of disregard of sex, the same could not be
considered as it was not shown that accused deliberately intended to offend or insult the
sex of the victim, or showed manifest disrespect for her womanhood.[11] In fact, the
accused mistook the victim for a man.
Ordinarily, intoxication may be considered either aggravating or mitigating,
depending upon the circumstances attending the commission of the crime. Intoxication
has the effect of decreasing the penalty, if it is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to
commit the contemplated crime; on the other hand, when it is habitual or intentional, it
is considered an aggravating circumstance. A person pleading in toxication to mitigate
penalty must present proof of having taken a quantity of alcoholic beverage prior to the
commission of the crime, sufficient to produce the effect of obfuscating reason. At the
same time, that person must show proof of not being a habitual drinker and not taking
the alcoholic drink with the intention to reinforce his resolve to commit the crime. [12]
Accused argues that in the absence of any of the aggravating circumstances alleged
in the information and considering that there was one mitigating circumstance
attendant, that of plea of guilty, the penalty imposable is not death but reclusion
perpetua.
The Solicitor General agrees with the accused that the only aggravating
circumstance present was treachery which qualified the killing to murder and that there
were two mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and intoxication, not habitual. The
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua, not death, in accordance with Article 63 in relation
to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6759.
We also award P50,000.00 as moral damages in keeping with current
jurisprudence. Moral damages is proper considering the mental anguish suffered by the
heirs of the victim on account of her untimely and gruesome death.[13]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Surigao del Sur, Branch
29, Bislig, in Criminal Case No. 2026 convicting accused George Cortes y Ortega of
murder is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the penalty imposed. In lieu of
the death penalty, the accused George Cortes y Ortega is hereby sentenced to reclusion
perpetua, with all the accessory penalties of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the victim
in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as death indemnity, and fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Buena,
Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., andSandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., abroad on official leave.
Quisumbing, J., on official leave.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J., on leave.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 130508. April 5, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARMANDO

REGALA y ABRIOL, accused-appellant.
DECISION
GONZAGA_REYES, J.:
Armando Regala appeals from the judgment in Criminal Case No. 7929
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate, Branch 46,
5th Judicial Region, convicting him of the crime of Robbery with Rape.
The information against accused-appellant on November 27, 1995, filed by

2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jesus C. Castillo, reads as follows: Sppedsc
"That on or about September 11, 1995, in the evening thereof, at

Barangay Bangon, Municipality of Aroroy, Province of Masbate,
Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Court, the said accused
confederating together and helping one another, with intent to
gain, violence and intimidation upon persons, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the kitchen of the house
of Consuelo Arevalo and when inside, hogtied said Consuelo
Arevalo and granddaughter Nerissa Regala (sic), take, steal, rob
and carry away cash amount of P3,000.00 and two (2) gold rings
worth P6,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of owner Consuelo
Arevalo in the total amount of P9,000.00, Philippine Currency; and
in pursuance of the commission of the crime of robbery against
the will and consent of the granddaughter Nerissa Regala (sic)
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously accused Armando Regala y
Abriol has for two times sexually abused and/or intercoursed with
her, while hogtied on the bed and in the kitchen.
CONTRARY TO LAW. [1]
Accused-appellant was apprehended by the police four days after the

incident. He was identified at a police line-up by Nerissa and her
grandmother. Calrsc
The prosecution presented three witnesses: Dra. Conchita Ulanday, Municipal

Health Officer of Aroroy, Masbate, who personally examined the rape victim;
Nerissa Tagala, the rape victim, 17 years old, a third year high school student;
and her grandmother, Consuelo Arevalo, who was her companion when the
robbery with rape transpired at Consuelos house.
The prosecutions version is stated in Appellees Brief as follows: Sccalr
"On September 11, 1995, at about 9:00 oclock in the evening at

Barangay Bangon, Aroroy, Masbate, then 16-year old victim
Nerissa Tagala and her grandmother (Consuelo Arevalo) were
sleeping, when appellant Armando Regala and his two other
companions entered the formers house. (pp. 6-7, TSN, August 26,
1996).
Appellant and his companions entered the house through the

kitchen by removing the pieces of wood under the stove.
Appellant went to the room of Nerissa and her grandmother and
poked an 8-inch gun on them, one after the other. (p. 8, TSN,
August 26, 1996)
Nerissa and her grandmother were hogtied by appellant and his

companions. Thereafter, Nerissa was raped by appellant
Armando Regala in bed while her grandmother was on the floor.
After the rape, appellant and his two companions counted the
money which they took from the "aparador." (pp. 9-10, TSN,
August 26, 1996)
Appellant and his companions then ran away with P3,000 in cash,
2 pieces of ring valued atP6,000 and two wrist watches
worth P5,000. (pp. 11-13, TSN, August 26, 1996)
The following day, September 12, 1995, Nerissa went to the Rural
Health Clinic of Aroroy, Masbate for medical examination. In the
Medical Report presented by Municipal Health Officer Dr.
Conchita S. Ulanday, it was shown that Nerissa sustained
laceration of the hymen at 4:00 oclock and 7:00 oclock positions
(fresh wounds), indicating a possible sexual assault upon the
victim. (p. 16, TSN, August 26, 1996) [2]
The defense presented accused-appellant who testified that on September

11, 1995, he was staying in the house of Antonio Ramilo at barangay
Syndicate, Aroroy, Masbate. Ramilo was the manager in the gold panning
business where accused-appellant was employed. Antonio Ramilo testified
and corroborated his defense and stated that accused-appellant was in his
house, which is about 5 kilometers away from Barangay Bangon. Calrspped
The trial court held that the defense of alibi cannot overcome the positive
identification of the accused. The dispositive portion of the judgment reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds

accused Armando Regala y Abriol guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Robbery with Rape, as penalized under Par. 2 of
Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to
suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the victim
Consuelo Arevalo the sum of P9,000.00, the cash and value of
the looted articles; to indemnify the victim Nerissa Tagala the sum
of P50,000.00 as moral damages, and the further sum
of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. No subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs." [3]
Armando has appealed to this Court pleading that: Scedp
(1) THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT

SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXIST TO ESTABLISH CLEARLY THE
IDENTITY OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS PERPETRATOR
OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
(2) THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING

ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED. [4]
which alleged errors were discussed jointly.
In essence, accused-appellant questions the sufficiency of the prosecutions

evidence in identifying him as one of the perpetrators of the crime charged.
He claims that the complaining witness could not have positively identified him
as there was no electricity nor any light in the place of the incident which took
place at 9:00 oclock in the evening. Consuelo Arevalo was able to identify
accused-appellant only after he was pinpointed by Nerissa, and made
contradictory statements in court when she stated that accused-appellant
removed his mask after she was hogtied, and later stated that accused-
appellant removed his mask before she was hogtied. The medico-legal officer,
Dr. Ulanday, herself testified that the complaining witness either voluntarily
submitted to a sexual act or was forced into one. Edpsc
The appellee insists that appellants lame defense of alibi cannot stand against
the positive identification made by the victim, and avers that the victim, a 16
year old barrio lass at the time the rape was committed, was motivated by a
sincere desire to seek and obtain justice. The Solicitor General also
recommends an additional award of compensatory damages of P50,000.00 in
favor of Nerissa Tagala. Edp
We affirm the judgment of conviction.
There was sufficient evidence to establish the identity of accused-appellant as

the perpetrator of the crime.Misedp
Nerissa positively recounted the incident on the witness stand. She was
sleeping with her grandmother in the latters house when the accused-
appellant Regala, together with the unidentified companions entered the
house. Regala pointed a gun, about 8 inches long, at her grandmother, and
then at her, and hogtied both of them. Regala took off her panty and her
shorts, and removed his own "porontong" pants, and made sexual intercourse
("itot") with her while she was hogtied in bed. Her grandmother was at the
floor. She saw the aparador of her grandmother being opened. She could not
shout because the gun was pointed at her, and she was afraid. Two
companions of the accused-appellant entered the room as she was being
raped. Two rings valued at about P6,000.00 and 2 wrist watches (one "Seiko"
and the other "Citizen") and money was taken by the accused-appellant and
his companions. After raping her in bed, Nerissa saw accused-appellant
counting the money taken from the aparador. Thereafter, she was brought to
the kitchen, still hogtied, and raped again. On cross-examination, Nerissa
[5]
stated that although there was no electricity, and the light in the house was
already off, she was able to see the face of Regala because at the time
Regala was counting the money, one of his companions was holding the
flashlight "beamed to the money" and there was "some reflection" on the face
of Regala She remembered the face of Regala because of an earring on his
[6]
left ear which he was wearing when presented at the police line-up.
[7] [8]
Consuelo Arevalo testified and corroborated the testimony of her

granddaughter. Armando Regala entered the house with two companions,
hogtied her and Nerissa, and were asking for money. After having sexual
intercourse with Nerissa, Regala took P3,000.00 in paper bills and coins from
her aparador, and got a stainless Seiko wristwatch and two gold rings valued
at P6,000.00. She was able to recognize Regala because of his earring on his
left ear, and because he was pinpointed by Nerissa at the police station. She
was not able to shout at the time because her mouth was gagged with a piece
of cloth by Regala. On cross-examination, Consuelo Arevalo declared that
[9]
she was able to see Regala because he used her flashlight, and he took off
the mask he was wearing; she recognized Regala because of his earring and
his flat top hair cut.
[10]
The Court gives its approbation to the finding of the trial court that the
evidence was sufficient to clearly establish the identity of Armando Regala as
the person who, with two companions, committed the crime of robbery
accompanied by rape on the night of September 11, 1995. Nerissa Tagala
positively identified Armando Regala because at the time he was counting the
money on her bed, the other companion of the accused beamed the flashlight
towards the money and there was a reflection on the face of Regala. Although
the three intruders were wearing masks when they entered the house, they
removed their masks later. [11]
Our cases have held that wicklamps, flashlights, even moonlight and starlight
may, in proper situations, be sufficient illumination, making the attack on the
credibility of witnesses solely on this ground unmeritorious.
[12]
We are not persuaded by the contention of accused-appellant that the

contradictory replies of Consuelo Arevalo when asked whether Regala
removed his mask "before" or "after" she and Nerissa were hogtied
[13] [14]
exposed the fact that she was not able to identify the accused-appellant. The
contradiction referred to a minor detail and cannot detract from the fact that
both Nerissa and Consuelo positively identified Regala as there was a

flashlight used to focus at the money while it was being counted and there
was a reflection on the face of Regala. Both Nerissa and Consuelo
remembered the earring on his left ear, which he was still wearing at the time
of the police line-up inside the police station. Misoedp
Dr. Conchita Ulandays testimony does not support the contention of accused-
appellant that Nerissa voluntarily submitted to the sexual advances of Regala.
The admission of Dr. Ulanday that her findings point to the fact that Nerissa
"either voluntarily or was forced into sexual act" does not prove that Nerissa
voluntarily submitted to the sexual act. Dr. Ulanday testified that there was
suggested evidence of penetration as shown by the two lacerations at 4
oclock and at 7 oclock which were fresh wounds. That the act was involuntary
was clearly established by the fact that Nerissa was hogtied when she was
sexually attacked. As correctly pointed out by appellee, Nerissa was a 16-year
old barrio lass, not exposed to the ways of the world and was not shown to
have any ill-motive to falsely implicate accused-appellant, who was a stranger.
And as repeatedly pronounced by this Court, it simply would be unnatural for
a young and innocent girl to concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts and thereafter subject herself to a public trial
or ridicule if she was not, in fact, a victim of rape and deeply motivated by a
sincere desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished. [15]
The crime of robbery with rape was committed in 1995 when RA 7659 was
already in force. Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code as amended now
provides, under paragraph 1 thereof: Edpmis
"1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when for any

reason of or on occasion of the robbery, the crime
of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery
shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or
arson."
The victim in the case at bar was raped twice on the occasion of the robbery.
There are cases holding that the additional rapes committed on the same
[16]
occasion of robbery will not increase the penalty. In People vs.

Martinez, accused Martinez and two (2) other unidentified persons, who
[17]
remained at large, were charged with the special complex crime of robbery
with rape where all three raped the victim. The Court imposed the penalty of
death after considering two (2) aggravating circumstances,
namely, nocturnidad and use of a deadly weapon. However, the Court did not
consider the two (2) other rapes as aggravating holding that "(T)he special
complex crime of robbery with rape has, therefore, been committed by the
felonious acts of appellant and his cohorts, with all acts or rape on that
occasion being integrated in one composite crime."Jjsc
There are likewise cases which held that the multiplicity of rapes committed
[18]
could be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. In People vs.

Candelario where three (3) of the four (4) armed men who robbed the victim
[19]
"alternately raped her twice for each of them", this Court, citing People vs.
Obtinalia, ruled that "(T)he characterization of the offense as robbery with
[20]
rape, however, is not changed simply because there were several rapes
committed. The multiplicity of rapes should instead be taken into account in
raising the penalty to death." Scjj
It should be noted that there is no law providing that the additional rape/s or
homicide/s should be considered as aggravating circumstance. The
enumeration of aggravating circumstances under Article 14 of the Revised
Penal Code is exclusive as opposed to the enumeration in Article 13 of the
same code regarding mitigating circumstances where there is a specific
paragraph (paragraph 10) providing for analogous circumstances. Sjcj
It is true that the additional rapes (or killings in the case of multiple homicide
on the occasion of the robbery) would result in an "anomalous situation"
where from the standpoint of the gravity of the offense, robbery with one rape
would be on the same level as robbery with multiple rapes. However, the
[21]
remedy lies with the legislature. A penal law is liberally construed in favor of
the offender and no person should be brought within its terms if he is not
[22]
clearly made so by the statute. [23]
In view of the foregoing, the additional rape committed by herein accused-

appellant should not be considered as aggravating. The penalty of reclusion
perpetua imposed by the trial court is proper. Supreme
As regards the civil indemnity, we find well-taken the recommendation of the

Solicitor General that compensatory damages should be awarded in the
amount of P50,000.00. Nerissa Tagala is entitled to an award of civil
indemnity ex delicto of P50,000.00, which is given in favor of the offended
party in rape. Also a conviction for rape carries with it the award of moral
[24]
damages to the victim since it is recognized that the victims injury is

concomitant with and necessarily results from the ordinary crime of rape to
warrant per se an award of P50,000.00 as moral damages. [25]
WHEREFORE, the judgment convicting Armando Regala y Abriol guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape, is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Nerissa Tagala is entitled to an
additional award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. Court
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,

Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, and De
Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28232 February 6, 1971

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, ET AL., defendants. JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, BASILIO PINEDA, JR.,
alias "BOY," EDGARDO AQUINO Y PAYUMO and ROGELIO CAÑAL Y SEVILLA, defendants-
appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo and Solicitor Augusto M. Amores for plaintiff-
appellee.
Baizas, Alberto and Associates, Andreciano F. Caballero and Lota, Paraiso, Garcia and Dueñas for
defendant-appellant Jaime G. Jose.
Mabanag, Eliger and Associates for defendant-appellant Basilio Pineda, Jr.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo and Feliciano for defendant-appellant Edgardo P. Aquino.
Antonio Coronel Law Office and Roberto J. Ignacio for defendant-appellant Rogelio S. Canial.
PER CURIAM:
The amended complaint filed in this case in the court below, reads as follows:
The undersigned complainant accuses JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, BASILIO PINEDA,

JR. Alias "BOY," EDUARDO AQUINO Y PAYUMO alias "EDDIE" and ROGELIO
CAÑAL Y SEVILLA alias "ROGER," as principals, WONG LAY PUENG, SILVERIO
GUANZON Y ROMERO and JESSIE GUION Y ENVOLTARIO as accomplices, of
the crime of Forcible Abduction with rape, committed as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of June, 1967, in Quezon City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named principal accused, conspiring
together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, did, then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design, forcibly abduct the undersigned
complainant against her will, and did, then and there take her, pursuant to their
common criminal design, to the Swanky Hotel in Pasay City, where each of the four
(4) accused, by means of force and intimidation, and with the use of a deadly
weapon, have carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant against her will, to
her damage and prejudice in such amount as may be awarded to her under the
provisions of the civil code.
That WONG LAY PUENG, SILVERIO GUANZON y ROMERO, and JESSIE GUION
y ENVOLTARIO without taking a direct part in the execution of the offense either by
forcing, inducing the principal accused to execute, or cooperating in its execution by
an indispensable act, did, then and there cooperate in the execution of the offense by
previous or simultaneous acts, that is, by cooperating, aiding, abetting and permitting
the principal accused in sequestering the undersigned complainant in one of the
rooms of the Swanky Hotel then under the control of the accused Wong Lay Pueng,
Silverio Guanzon y Romero and Jessie Guion y Envoltario, thus supplying material
and moral aid in the consummation of the offense.
That the aforestated offense has been attended by the following aggravating
circumstances:
1. Use of a motor vehicle.
2. Night time sought purposely to facilitate the commission of the crime and to make
its discovery difficult;
3. Abuse of superior strength;
4. That means were employed or circumstances brought about which added

ignominy to the natural effects of the act; and
5. That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be deliberately augmented by
causing other wrong not necessary for the commission.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, Basilio Pineda, Jr. pleaded guilty to the charge imputed in the above-quoted
amended complaint; however, in an order dated July 11, 1967, the court reserved judgment "until
such time as the prosecution shall have concluded presenting all of its evidence to prove the
aggravating circumstances listed in the complaint." Upon the other hand, the rest of the defendants
went to trial on their respective pleas of not guilty. After the merits, the court below rendered its
decision on October 2, 1967, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Jaime Jose, Rogelio Cañal, Eduardo
Aquino and Basilio Pineda, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of forcible
abduction with rape as described under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and hereby sentences each of them to the death penalty to be executed at
a date to be set and in the manner provided for by law; and each to indemnify the
complainant in the amount of ten thousand pesos. On the ground that the
prosecution has failed to establish a prima facie case against the accomplices Wong
Lay Pueng, Silverio Guanzon y Romero, and Jessie Guion y Envoltario, the Motion to
Dismiss filed for and in their behalf is hereby granted, and the case dismissed
against the aforementioned accused.
Insofar as the car used in the abduction of the victim which Jaime Jose identified by
pointing to it from the window of the courtroom and pictures of which were submitted
and marked as Exhibits "M" and "M-1," and which Jaime Jose in his testimony
admitted belonged to him, pursuant to Art. 45 of the Revised Penal Code, which
requires the confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the crime,
the Court hereby orders its confiscation.
This case is now before us by virtue of the appeal interposed by Basilio Pineda, Jr., Edgardo Aquino,
and Jaime Jose, and for automatic review as regards Rogelio Cañal. However, for practical
purposes all of them shall hereafter be referred to as appellants.
The complainant, Magdalena "Maggie" de la Riva, was, at the time of the incident, 25 years old and
single; she graduated from high school in 1958 at Maryknoll College and finished the secretarial
course in 1960 at St. Theresa's College. Movie actress by profession, she was receiving P8,000.00
per picture. It was part of her work to perform in radio broadcasts and television shows, where she
was paid P800.00 per month in permanent shows, P300.00 per month in live promotional shows,
and from P100.00 to P200.00 per appearance as guest in other shows.
So it was that at about 4:30 o'clock in the morning of June 26, 1967, Miss De la Riva, homeward
bound from the ABS Studio on Roxas Blvd., Pasay City, was driving her bantam car accompanied
by her maid Helen Calderon, who was also at the front seat. Her house was at No. 48, 12th Street,
New Manila, Quezon City. She was already near her destination when a Pontiac two-door
convertible car with four men aboard (later identified as the four appellants) came abreast of her car
and tried to bump it. She stepped on her brakes to avoid a collision, and then pressed on the gas
and swerved her car to the left, at which moment she was already in front of her house gate; but
because the driver of the other car (Basilio Pineda, Jr.) also accelerated his speed, the two cars
almost collided for the second time. This prompted Miss De la Riva, who was justifiably annoyed, to
ask: "Ano ba?" Forthwith, Pineda stopped the car which he was driving, jumped out of it and rushed
towards her.
The girl became so frightened at this turn of events that she tooted the horn of her car continuously.
Undaunted, Pineda opened the door of Miss De la Riva's car and grabbed the lady's left arm. The
girl held on tenaciously to her car's steering wheel and, together with her maid, started to scream.
Her strength, however, proved no match to that of Pineda, who succeeded in pulling her out of her
car. Seeing her mistress' predicament, the maid jumped out of the car and took hold of Miss De la
Riva's right arm in an effort to free her from Pineda's grip. The latter, however, was able to drag Miss
De la Riva toward the Pontiac convertible car, whose motor was all the while running.
When Miss De la Riva, who was being pulled by Pineda, was very near the Pontiac car, the three
men inside started to assist their friend: one of them held her by the neck, while the two others held
her arms and legs. All three were now pulling Miss De la Riva inside the car. Before she was
completely in, appellant Pineda jumped unto the driver's seat and sped away in the direction of
Broadway Street. The maid was left behind.
The complainant was made to sit between Jaime Jose and Edgardo Aquino at the back seat; Basilio
Pineda, Jr. was at the wheel, while Rogelio Cañal was seated beside him. Miss De la Riva entreated
the appellants to release her; but all she got in response were jeers, abusive and impolite language
that the appellants and threats that the appellants would finish her with their Thompson and throw
acid at her face if she did not keep quiet. In the meantime, the two men seated on each side of Miss
De la Riva started to get busy with her body: Jose put one arm around the complainant and forced
his lips upon hers, while Aquino placed his arms on her thighs and lifted her skirt. The girl tried to
resist them. She continuously implored her captors to release her, telling them that she was the only
breadwinner in the family and that her mother was alone at home and needed her company because
her father was already dead. Upon learning of the demise of Miss De la Riva's father, Aquino
remarked that the situation was much better than he thought since no one could take revenge
against them. By now Miss De la Riva was beginning to realize the futility of her pleas. She made
the sign of the cross and started to pray. The appellants became angry and cursed her. Every now
and then Aquino would stand up and talk in whispers with Pineda, after which the two would
exchange knowing glances with Cañal and Jose.
The car reached a dead-end street. Pineda turned the car around and headed towards Victoria
Street. Then the car proceeded to Araneta Avenue, Sta. Mesa Street, Shaw Boulevard, thence to
Epifanio de los Santos Avenue. When the car reached Makati, Aquino took a handkerchief from his
pocket and, with the help of Jose, blindfolded Miss De la Riva. The latter was told not to shout or
else she would be stabbed or shot with a Thompson. Not long after, the car came to a stop at the
Swanky Hotel in Pasay City The blindfolded lady was led out of the car to one of the rooms on the
second floor of the hotel.
Inside the room Miss De la Riva was made to sit on a bed. Her blindfold was removed. She saw
Pineda and Aquino standing in front of her, and Jose and Cañal sitting beside her, all of them smiling
meaningfully. Pineda told the complainant: "Magburlesque ka para sa amin." The other three
expressed their approval and ordered Miss De la Riva to disrobe. The complainant ignored the
command. One of the appellants suggested putting off the light so that the complainant would not be
ashamed. The idea, however, was rejected by the others, who said that it would be more
pleasurable for them if the light was on. Miss De la Riva was told to remove her stocking in order,
according to them, to make the proceedings more exciting. Reluctantly, she did as directed, but so
slowly did she proceed with the assigned task that the appellants cursed her and threatened her
again with the Thompson and the acid. They started pushing Miss De la Riva around. One of them
pulled down the zipper of her dress; another unhooked her brassiere. She held on tightly to her
dress to prevent it from being pulled down, but her efforts were in vain: her dress, together with her
brassiere, fell on the floor.
The complainant was now completely naked before the four men, who were kneeling in front of her
and feasting their eyes on her private parts. This ordeal lasted for about ten minutes, during which
the complainant, in all her nakedness, was asked twice or thrice to turn around. Then Pineda picked
up her clothes and left the room with his other companions. The complainant tried to look for a
blanket with which to cover herself, but she could not find one.
Very soon, Jose reentered the room and began undressing himself. Miss De la Riva, who was sitting
on the bed trying to cover her bareness with her hands, implored him to ask his friends to release
her. Instead of answering her, he pushed her backward and pinned her down on the bed. Miss De la
Riva and Jose struggled against each other; and because the complainant was putting up stiff
resistance, Jose cursed her and hit her several times on the stomach and other parts of the body.
The complainant crossed her legs tightly, but her attacker was able to force them open. Jose
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the complainant. He then left the room.
The other three took their turns. Aquino entered the room next. A struggle ensued between him and
Miss De la Riva during which he hit, her on different parts of the body. Like Jose, Aquino succeeded
in abusing the complainant. The girl was now in a state of shock. Aquino called the others into the
room. They poured water on her face and slapped her to revive her. Afterwards, three of the
accused left the room, leaving Pineda and the complainant After some struggle during which Pineda
hit her, the former succeeded in forcing his carnal desire on the latter. When the complainant went
into a state of shock for the second time, the three other men went into the room again poured water
on the complainant's face and slapped her several times. The complainant heard them say that they
had to revive her so she would know what was happening. Jose, Aquino and Pineda then left the
room. It was now appellant Canal's turn. There was a struggle between him and Miss De la Riva.
Like the other three appellants before him, he hit the complainant on different parts of the body and
succeeded in forcing his carnal lust on her.
Mention must be made of the fact that while each of mention must be made the four appellants was
struggling with the complainant, the other three were outside the room, just behind the door,
threatening the complainant with acid and telling her to give in because she could not, after all,
escape what with their presence.
After the appellants had been through with the sexual carnage, they gave Miss De la Riva her
clothes, told her to get dressed and put on her stockings, and to wash her face and comb her hair, to
give the impression that nothing had happened to her. They told her to tell her mother that she was
mistaken by a group of men for a hostess, and that when the group found out that she was a movie
actress, she was released without being harmed. She was warned not to inform the police; for if she
did and they were apprehended, they would simply post bail and later hunt her up and disfigure her
face with acid. The appellants then blindfolded Miss De la Riva again and led her down from the
hotel room. Because she was stumbling, she had to be carried into the car. Inside the car, a
appellant Jose held her head down on his lap, and kept it in that position during the trip, to prevent
her from being seen by others.
Meanwhile, the four appellants were discussing the question of where to drop Miss De la Riva. They
finally decided on a spot in front of the Free Press Building not far from Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue near Channel 5 to make it appear, according to them, that the complainant had just come
from the studio. Pineda asked Jose to alight and call a taxicab, but to choose one which did not
come from a well-known company. Jose did as requested, letting several taxicabs pass by before
flagging a UBL taxicab. After they warned again Miss De la Riva not to inform anyone of what had
happened to her, appellant Canal accompanied her to the taxicab. The time was a little past 6:00
o'clock. When Miss De la Riva was already inside the cab and alone with the driver, Miguel F.
Campos, she broke down and cried. She kept asking the driver if a car was following them; and each
time the driver answered her in the negative.
It was 6:30 o'clock — or some two hours after the abduction — when Miss De la Riva reached
home. Her mother, her brother-in-law Ben Suba, as well as several PC officers, policemen and
reporters, were at the house. Upon seeing her mother, the complainant ran toward her and said,
"Mommy, Mommy, I have been raped. All four of them raped me." The mother brought her daughter
upstairs. Upon her mother's instruction, the complainant immediately took a bath and a douche. The
older woman also instructed her daughter to douche himself two or three times daily with a strong
solution to prevent infection and pregnancy. The family doctor, who was afterwards summoned,
treated the complainant for external physical injuries. The doctor was not, however, told about the
sexual assaults. Neither was Pat. Pablo Pascual, the police officer who had been sent by the desk
officer, Sgt. Dimla, to the De la Riva residence when the latter received from a mobile patrol a report
of the snatching. When Miss De la Riva arrived home from her harrowing experience, Pat. Pascual
attempted to question her, but Ben Suba requested him to postpone the interrogation until she could
be ready for it. At that time, mother and daughter were still undecided on what to do.
On the afternoon of June 28, 1967, the complainant family gathered to discuss what steps, if any,
should be taken. After some agonizing moments, a decision was reached: the authorities had to be
informed. Thus, early on the morning of June 29, 1967, or on the fourth day after the incident, Miss
De la Riva, accompanied by her lawyer, Atty. Regina O. Benitez, and by some members of the
family, went to the Quezon City Police Department Headquarters, filed a complaint and executed a
statement (Exh. "B") wherein she narrated the incident and gave descriptions of the four men who
abused her. In the afternoon of the same day, the complainant submitted herself ito a medico-
internal examination by Dr. Ernesto Brion, NBI Chief Medico-Legal Officer.
During the physical examination of the complainant by Dr. Brion on June 29, 1967, Pat. Pascual was
also at the NBI office. There he received a telephone call from the police headquarters to the effect
that one of the suspects had been apprehended. That evening, the complainant and Pat. Pascual
proceeded to the headquarters where Miss De la Riva identified appellant Jaime Jose from among a
group of persons inside the Office of the Chief of Police of Quezon City as one of the four men he
abducted and raped her. She executed another statement (Exh. "B-1") wherein she made a formal
identification of Jose and related the role played by him.
At about 9:00 o'clock of the same evening, appellant Jose executed a statement (Exh. "I") before
Pat. Marcos G. Viñas. In his statement, which was duly sworn. Jose admitted that he knew about,
and was involved in, the June 26 incident. He named the other line appellants as his companions.
Jose stated, among other things, that upon the initiative of Pineda, he and the other three waited for
Miss De la Riva to come out of the ABS Studio; that his group gave chase to the complainant's car;
that it was Pineda who blindfolded her and that only Pineda and Aquino criminally assaulted the
complainant.
After Exh, "I" was executed by Jose, an informant furnished Pat. Vinas with a picture of appellant
Edgardo Aquino. The picture was shown to Miss De la Riva, who declared in her sworn statement
(Exh. "B-3") that the man in the picture was one of her abductors and rapists. The same picture was
shown to Jose, who, in another sworn statement (Exh. "I-l"), identified the man in the picture as
appellant Aquino.
After the apprehension of Jose, the other three soon fell into the hands of the authorities: Pineda and
Cañal on July 1, 1967, in Lipa City, and Aquino on July 5, 1967, in the province of Batangas. On the
evening of July 1, 1967. Miss De la Riva pointed to Pineda and Cañal as among the four persons
who abducted and raped her. She picked them out from among several person in the Office of the
Chief of Police of Quezon City. Later in the same evening, Miss De la Riva executed a sworn
statement (Exh. B-2)wherein she made the same identification of the two appellants from among a
group of persons in the Office of the Chief of the Detective Bureau, adding that appellant Cañal had
tattoo marks on his right hip. After the identification, one of the policemen took appellant Cañal
downstairs and undressed him, and he saw, imprinted on the said appellant's right hip, the words
"Bahala na Gang."
Appellant Cañal and Pineda executed and swore to separate statements on the day of their arrest.
In his statement (Exh. "G"), appellant Cañal confirmed the information previously given by Jose that
the four of them waited for Miss De la Riva to come down from the ABS Studio, and that they had
planned to abduct and rape her. Appellant Cañal admitted that all four of them participated in the
commission of the crime, but he would make it appear that insofar as he was concerned the
complainant yielded her body to him on condition that he would release her. Pineda executed a
statement (Exh. "J") stating that he and his other three companions wept to the ABS Studio, and
that, on learning that Miss De la Riva was there, they made plans to wait for her and to follow her.
He admitted that his group followed her car and snatched her and took her to the Swanky Hotel. He
would make it appear, however, that the complainant voluntarily acceded to having sexual
intercourse with him.
In his medical report (Exh. "K"), Dr. Brion noted the presence of multiple contusions and bruises on
different parts of the complainant's body, as well as of genital injuries. On the witness stand the
doctor was shown several photographs of the complainant taken in his presence and under his
supervision. With the aid of the photographs and the medical reports, the doctor explained to the
court that he found contusions or bruises on the complainant's chest, shoulders, arms and fore-
arms, right arm index finger, thighs, right knee and legs. He also declared that when he was
examining her, Miss De la Riva complained of slight tenderness around the neck, on the abdominal
wall and at the sites of the extragenital physical injuries, and that on pressing the said injuries, he
elicited a sigh of pain or tenderness on the part of the subject. The injuries, according to Dr. Brion,
could have been caused blows administered by a closed fist or by the palm of the hand, and could
have been inflicted on the subject while she was being raped. It was the doctor's opinion that they
could have been sustained on or about June 26, 1967. In connection with the genital examination,
the doctor declared that he found injuries on the subject's genitalia which could have been produced
by sexual intercourse committed on June 26, 1967. He said that he failed to find spermatozoa. He
explained, however, that spermatozoa are not usually found in the vagina after the lapse of three
days from the last intercourse, not to mention the possibility that the subject might have douched
herself.
The three appellants who pleaded not guilty (Jose, Aquino and Cañal) took the witness stand. We
quote hereunder the portions of the decision under review relative to the theory of the defense:
Their story is that they and their co-accused Pineda had gone to the Ulog Cocktail
Lounge somewhere in Mabini street in Manila, and there killed time from 9:30 in the
evening of June 25 until closing time, which was about 3:30 in the early morning of
the next day. At the cocktail lounge they had listened to the music while enjoying
some drinks. Between them they had consumed a whole bottle of whisky, so much
so that at least Aquino became drunk, according to his own testimony. They had
been joined at their table by a certain Frankie whom they met only that night. Come
time to go home, their new acquaintance asked to be dropped at his home in Cubao.
The five men piled into the red-bodied, black topped two-door convertible Plymouth
(Pontiac) car of Jaime Jose, and with Pineda at the wheel repaired to Cubao After
dislodging their new friend, Pineda steered the car to España Extension to bring
Aquino to his home in Mayon Street. But somewhere in España Extension before the
Rotonda a small car whizzed to them almost hitting them. They saw that the driver
was a woman. Pineda gave chase and coming abreast of the small car he shouted,
"Putang ina mo, kamuntik na kaming mamatay." The woman continued on her way.
Now Pineda saying "let us teach her a lesson," sped after her and when she swerved
ostensibly to enter a gate, Pineda stopped his car behind being hurriedly got down,
striding to the small car, opened the door and started dragging the girl out. Both Jose
and Aquino confirm the presence of another woman inside the girl's car, who helped
the girl struggle to get free from Pineda's grip; and that the struggle lasted about ten
minutes before Pineda finally succeeded in pushing the girl into the red convertible.
All the three accused insist they did nothing to aid Pineda: but they also admit that
they did nothing to stop him.
Now the defense contends that Pineda cruised around and around the area just to
scare the girl who was in truth so scared that she begged them to let her be and
return her to her home. She turned to Jose in appeal, but this one told her he could
net do anything as the "boss" was Pineda. Aquino heard her plead with Jose "do you
not have a sister yourself?" but did not bear the other plea 'do you not have a
mother?' Then Pineda stopped at the corner of the street where he had forcibly
snatched the girl presumably to return her, but then suddenly changing his mind he
said, 'why don't you do a strip tease for us. I'll pay you P1,000.00 and the girl
taunted, 'are you kidding?': that after a little while she consented to do the
performance as long as it would not last too long and provided the spectators were
limited to the four of them.
Pineda sped the car until they got to Swanky Hotel where he and Maggie alighted
first, but not before Maggie had borrowed a handkerchief from one of them to cover
her face as she went up the Hotel. The three followed, and when they saw the pair
enter a room, they quickly caught up. All the three accused testify that as soon as
they got into the room, Maggie de la Riva asked the boys to close the windows
before she. undressed in front of them. They themselves also removed their clothing.
Two of them removed their pants retaining their briefs, while Boy Pineda and Cañal
stripped to the skin "because it was hot." The three accused declared that they saw
Boy Pineda hand P100.00 to Maggie and they heard him promise her that he would
pay the balance of P900.00 later. Whereupon, the show which lasted about 10
minutes began with the naked girl walking back and forth the room about 4 to 5
times. This accomplished, all of them dressed up once more and the three accused
(Jaime Jose, Eduardo Aquino and Rogelio Cañal) left the room to wait in the car for
Boy Pineda and Maggie de la Riva who were apparently still discussing the mode of
payment of the balance. Three minutes later Maggie de la Riva and Boy Pineda
joined them. Now, the question of how and where to drop Maggie came up and it is
testified to by the accused that it was Maggie's idea that they should drop her near
the ABS Studio so that it would appear as if she had just come from her work.
Jaime Jose was picked by the police on the morning of June 29 along Buendia
Avenue. Aquino testifies how, on June 29 Pineda went to him with a problem. He did
not have the P900.00 with which to pay Maggie the balance of her "show" and he
was afraid that if he did not pay, Maggie would have her goons after him. He wanted
Aquino to go with him to Lipa City where he had relatives and where he could help
raise the money. Aquino readily obliged, and to make the company complete they
invited Cañal to join them. They used another car of Jaime Jose, different from the
one they had used the day before. At Lipa, Aquino detached himself from his
compassions and proceeded alone to the barrio allegedly to visit his relatives. In the
meantime his two companions had remained in the City and had, according to Canal,
gone to live in a house very close to the municipal hall building. They later moved to
another house where the PC and Quezon City police posse found and arrested
them. Aquino was the last to be apprehended, when having read in the newspapers
that he was wanted, he surrendered on July 5 to Mrs. Aurelia Leviste, wife of the
governor of Batangas.
The striptease-act-for-a-fee story on which the defense theory is anchored, defies one's credulity
and reason, and had utterly to counteract the evidence for the prosecution, particularly the
complainant's testimony and Dr. Brion's medical report and testimony. We quote with approval the
able dissertion of the trial judge on this point:
As main defense in the charge of rape, the three accused advance the proposition
that nothing happened in Swanky Hotel except a strip-tease exhibition which the
complaint agreed to do for them for fee of P1,000.00, P100.00 down and the balance
to be paid "later." The flaw in this connection lies in its utter inverisimilitude. The
Court cannot believe that any woman exists, even one habitual engaged in this kind
of entertainment (which Maggie de la Riva has not been proven to be) who would
consent (and as easily and promptly as defense claims) to do a performance, not
even for all money in the worlds after the rough handling she experienced from these
wolves in men's clothing who now hungered for a show. There is no fury to match a
woman stirred to indignation. A woman's pride is far stronger than her yen for money,
and her revenge much more keen. The Court cannot believe that after the rudeness
and meanness of these men to her, Maggie would in so short an interval of time
forget her indignation and so readily consent to satisfy their immoral curiosity about
her. The woman in her would urge her to turn the men's hankering as a weapon of
revenge by denying them their pleasure.
Besides, the manner of payment offered for the performance is again something
beyond even the wildest expectations. Assuming that the woman whom the accused
had abducted was in this kind of trade assuming that the price offered was to her
satisfaction, whom woman would be willing to perform first and be paid later? It is
simply preposterous to believe that Maggie de la Riva should have consent to do a
striptease act for a measly down-payment of P100.00 and the balance to be paid
God knows when. Since when are exposition of the flesh paid on the installment
basis? By the very precautious nature of their pitiful calling, women who sell their
attractions are usually very shrewed and it is to be expected that they could
demand full payment before curtain call. How was Maggie to collect later when she
did not even know who these man were, where they lived, whether they could be
trusted with a promise to pay later (!) whether she could ever find them again? If
there is anything that had struck the Court about the complaint, it is her courage, her
intelligence and her alertness. Only a stupid woman, and a most stupid one that,
could have been persuaded to do what the defense want this Court to believe
Maggie de la Riva consented to do.
Finally, it is odd that not one of these men should have mentioned this circumstances
during their interview with anyone, either the press, their police interrogator, the
person who negotiated their surrender (as in the case of Aquino) or even their
counsel. One cannot escape the very strong suspicion that this story is a last ditch,
desperate attempt to save the day for the accused. It truly underscores the
hopelessness of their stand and projects all the more clearly their guilt.
Then there is the incident of the men's stripping themselves. Why was there need for
this? The Court realizes that in its desperate need of an explanation for Maggie's
positive identification of Cañal as the man with the tattoo mark on his right buttock,
the defense concocted the sickeningly incident story that the four men removed their
underclothing in the presence of a woman simply "because it was hot." What kind of
men were these who were so devoid of any sense of decency that they thought
nothing of adding insult to injury by not only inducing a woman a strip before them,
but for forcing her to perform before a naked audience? And then they have gall to
argue that "nothing" happened. For males of cold and phlegmatic blood and
disposition it could be credible, but not for men of torrid regions like ours where quick
passions and hot tempers are the rule rather than the exception!
All of these consideration set aside, notwithstanding, it is quite obvious that the version of the
defense has not been able to explain away a very vital piece of evidence of prosecution which, if
unexplained, cannot but reduce any defense unavailing. The result of the physical (external and
internal) examination conducted on the person of Maggie de la Riva in the afternoon of June 29, the
pertinent findings of which quoted earlier in this decision, establish beyond doubt that at the time that
Maggie de la Riva was examined she bore on her body traces of physical and sexual assault.
The only attempt to an explanation made by the defense is either one of the
following: (1) the insinuation that when Maggie de la Riva and Boy Pineda were left
behind in the hotel room the bruises and the sexual attack could have taken place
then. But then, the defense itself says that these two persons rejoined the three
after three or four minutes! It is physically impossible, in such a short time, for Boy
Pineda to have attacked the girl and inflicted on her all of these injuries; (2) it was
suggested by the defense that Maggie de la Riva could have inflicted all of those
injuries upon herself just to make out a case against the accused. The examining
physician rules out this preposterous proposition, verily it does not take much stretch
of the imagination to see how utterly impossible this would be, and for what purpose?
Was P900.00 which she had failed to collect worth that much self-torture? And what
about all the shame, embarrassment and publicity she would (as she eventually did)
expose herself to? If she really had not been raped would she have gone thru all of
these tribulation?
A woman does not easily trump up rape charges for she has much more to lose in
the notoriety the case will reap her, her honor and that of her family, than in the
redress she demands (Canastre 82-480; Medina, C.A. 1943 O.G. 151; Medina y
Puno, CA O.G. 338; CA 55 O.G. 7666; Galamito, L-6302, August 25, 1954); (3) it
could also be argued that the contusions and bruises could have been inflicted on
Maggie during her struggle with Pineda when the latter pulled and pushed her into
the red convertible car. The telltale injuries, however, discount this possibility, for the
location in which many of the bruises and traumas were located (particularly on the
inner portion of her thighs) could not have been cause by any struggle save by those
of a woman trying to resists the brutal and bestial attack on her honor.
In their Memorandum the accused contend that Maggie's sole and uncorroborated
testimony should not be rated any credence at all as against the concerted
declaration of the the accused. In the first place, it is not correct to say that Maggie's
declaration was uncorroborated — she has for corroboration nothing less than the
written extra-judicial statements of Jose and Canal. But even assuming that Maggie
stood alone in her statements, the cases cited by the accused in their Memorandum
notwithstanding which the Court does not consider in point anyway, jurisprudence
has confirmed the ruling that numbers is the least vital element in gauging the weight
of evidence. What is more important is which of the declarations is the more credible,
the more logical, the more reasonable, the more prone to be biased or polluted.
(Ricarte 44 OG 2234; Damian CA-GR No. 25523, April 24, 1959). Besides, it should
be borne in maid that in the most detestable crime of rape in which a man is at his
worst the testimony of the offended party most often is the only one available to
prove directly its commission and that corroboration by other eyewitnesses would in
certain cases place a serious doubt as to the probability of its commission, so trial
courts of justice are most often placed in a position of having to accept such
uncorroborated testimony if the same is in regards conclusive, logical and probable
(Landicho, VIII ACR 530).
We shall now consider the points raised by the appellants in their briefs.
1. Appellants Jose, Aquino and Cañal deny having had anything to do with the abduction of Miss De
la Riva. They point to Pineda (who entered a plea of guilty) as the sole author thereof, but they
generously contend that even as to him the act was purged at any taint of criminality by the
complainant's subsequent consent to perform a striptease show for a fee, a circumstance which, it is
claimed, negated the existence of the element of lewd design. This line of defense has evidently leg
no to stand on. The evidence is clear and overwhelming that all the appellants participated in the
forcible abduction. Miss De la Riva declared on the witness stand, as well as in her sworn
statements, that they helped one another in dragging her into the car against her will; that she did
not know them personally; that while inside the car, Jose and Aquino, between whom she was
seated, toyed with her body, the former forcing his lips on hers, and the latter touching her thighs
and raising her skirt; that meaningful and knowing glances were in the meanwhile being exchanged
among the four; and that all of them later took turns in ravishing her at the Swanky Hotel. This
testimony, whose evidentiary weight has not in the least been overthrown by the defense, more than
suffices to establish the crimes charged in the amended complaint. In the light thereof, appellants'
protestation that they were not motivated by lewd designs must be rejected as absolutely without
factual basis.
2. The commission of rape by each of the appellants has, as held by the court below, likewise been
clearly established. Jose, Aquino and Canal contend that the absence of semen in the complainant's
vagina disproves the fact of rape. The contention is untenable. Dr. Brion of the NBI, who testified as
an expert, declared that semen is not usually found in the vagina after three days from the last
intercourse, especially if the subject has douched herself within that period. In the present case, the
examination was conducted on the fourth day after the incident, and the complainant had douched
herself to avoid infection and pregnancy. Furthermore, the absence of spermatozoa does not
disprove the consummation of rape, the important consideration being, not the emission of semen,
but penetration (People vs Hernandez, 49 Phil., 980). Aquino's suggestion that the abrasions on the
cervix were caused by the tough tip of a noozle deliberately used by the complainant to strengthen
her alleged fabricated tale of rape, is absurd, if not cruel. It is difficult to imagine that any sane
woman, who is single and earning as much Miss Dela Riva did, would inflict injuries on her genital
organ by puncturing the same with a sharply-pointed instrument in order to strike back at four
strangers who allegedly would not pay her the sum of P900.00 due her for a striptease act. Besides,
Dr. Brion testified that the insertion of such an instrument in the genital organ would not result in the
kind of injuries he found in the mucosa of the cervix.
3. Other evidence and considerations exist which indubitably establish the commission of successive
rapes by the four appellants. Upon Miss De la Riva's arrival at her house in the morning of June 26,
1967, she immediately told her mother, " Mommy Mommy, I have been raped. All four of them raped
me." This utterance, which is part of the res gestae, commands strong probative value, considering
that it was made by the complainant to her mother who, in cases of this nature was the most logical
person in whom a daughter would confide the truth. Aquino and Canal would make capital of the fact
that Miss De la Riva stated to the reporters on the morning of June 26, that she was not abused. Her
statement to the press is understandable. At that time the complainant, who had not yet consulted
her family on a matter which concerned her reputation as well as that of her family, and her career,
was not then in a position to reveal publicly what had happened to her. This is one reason why the
complainant did not immediately inform the authorities of the tragedy that befell her. Another reason
is that she was threatened with disfiguration. And there were, of course, the traumas found by Dr.
Brion on different parts of the complainant's body. Could they, too, have been self-inflicted? Or, as
suggested, could they possibly have been inflicted by appellant Pineda alone, when the story given
by the other three is that Pineda and the complainant were left in the hotel room for only three or four
minutes, and that they came out to join them in what they would picture to be a cordial atmosphere,
the complainant even allegedly suggesting that she be dropped on a spot where people would
reasonably presume her to have come from a studio? Equally important is the complainant's public
disclosure of her tragedy, which led to the examination of her private parts and lay her open to risks
of future public ridicule and diminution of popularity and earnings as a movie actress.
4. Jose and Canal seek the exclusion of their extrajudicial statements from the mass of evidence on
the grounds that they were secured from them by force and intimidation, and that the incriminating
details therein were supplied by the police investigators. We are not convinced that the statements
were involuntarily given, or that the details recited therein were concocted by the authorities. The
statements were given in the presence of several people and subscribed and sworn to before the
City Fiscal of Quezon City, to whom neither of the aforesaid appellants intimated the use of
inordinate methods by the police. They are replete with details which could hardly be known to the
police; and although it is suggested that the authorities could have secured such details from their
various informers, no evidence at all was presented to establish the truth of such allegation. While in
their statements Jose and Canal admitted having waited — together with the two other appellants —
for Miss De la Riva at the ABS Studio, each of them attempted in the same statements to exculpate
himself: appellant Jose stated that only Pineda and Aquino criminally abused the complainant; while
appellant Canal would make it appear that the complainant willingly allowed him to have sexual
intercourse with her. Had the statements been prepared by the authorities, they would hardly have
contained matters which were apparently designed to exculpate the affiants. It is significant, too, that
the said two appellants did not see it fit to inform any of their friends or relatives of the alleged use of
force and intimidation by the police. Dr. Mariano Nario of the Quezon City Police Department, who
examined appellant Canal after the latter made his statement, found no trace of injury on any part of
the said appellant's body in spite of the claims that he was boxed on the stomach and that one of his
arms was burned with a cigarette lighter. In the circumstances, and considering, further, that the
police officers who took down their statements categorically denied on the witness stand that the two
appellants were tortured, or that any detail in the statements was supplied by them or by anyone
other than the affiants themselves, We see no reason to depart from the trial court's well-considered
conclusion that the statements were voluntarily given. However, even disregarding the in-custody
statements of Jose and Canal, We find that the mass of evidence for the prosecution on record will
suffice to secure the conviction of the two.
The admissibility of his extrajudicial statements is likewise being questioned by Jose on the other
ground that he was not assisted by counsel during the custodial interrogations. He cites the
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in Messiah vs. U.S. (377 U.S. 201), Escobedo
vs. Illinois (378 U.S. 478) and Miranda vs. Arizona (384 U.S. 436).
The provision of the Constitution of the Philippines in point is Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 1, par.
17 of which provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall ... enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel ..." While the said provision is identical to that in the Constitution of the United
States, in this jurisdiction the term criminal prosecutions was interpreted by this Court, in U.S. vs.
Beecham, 23 Phil., 258 (1912), in connection with a similar provision in the Philippine Bill of Rights
(Section 5 of Act of Congress of July 1, 1902) to mean proceedings before the trial court from
arraignment to rendition of the judgment. Implementing the said constitutional provision, We have
provided in Section 1, Rule 115 of the Rules of Court that "In all criminal prosecutions the defendant
shall be entitled ... (b) to be present and defend in person and by attorney at every stage of the
proceedings, that is, from the arraignment to the promulgation of the judgment." The only instances
where an accused is entitled to counsel before arraignment, if he so requests, are during the second
stage of the preliminary investigation (Rule 112, Section 11) and after the arrest (Rule 113, Section
18). The rule in the United States need not be unquestioningly adhered to in this jurisdiction, not only
because it has no binding effect here, but also because in interpreting a provision of the Constitution
the meaning attached thereto at the time of the adoption thereof should be considered. And even
there the said rule is not yet quite settled, as can be deduced from the absence of unanimity in the
voting by the members of the United States Supreme Court in all the three above-cited cases.
5. Appellant Pineda claims that insofar as he is concerned there was a mistrial resulting in gross
miscarriage of justice. He contends that because the charge against him and his co-appellants is a
capital offense and the amended complaint cited aggravating circumstances, which, if proved, would
raise the penalty to death, it was the duty of the court to insist on his presence during all stages of
the trial. The contention is untenable. While a plea of guilty is mitigating, at the same time it
constitutes an admission of all the material facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating
circumstances, and it matters not that the offense is capital, for the admission (plea of guilty) covers
both the crime and its attendant circumstances qualifying and/or aggravating the crime (People vs.
Boyles, et al., L-15308, May 29, 1964, citing People vs. Ama, L-14783, April 29, 1961, and People
vs. Parete, L-15515, April 29, 1961). Because of the aforesaid legal effect of Pineda's plea of guilty,
it was not incumbent upon the trial court to receive his evidence, much less to require his presence
in court. It would be different had appellant Pineda requested the court to allow him to prove
mitigating circumstances, for then it would be the better part of discretion on the part of the trial court
to grant his request. (Cf. People vs. Arconado, L-16175, February 28, 1962.) The case of U.S. vs.
Agcaoili (31 Phil., 91), cited by Pineda, is not in point, for there this Court ordered a new trial
because it found for a fact that the accused, who had pleaded guilty, "did not intend to admit that he
committed the offense with the aggravating circumstances" mentioned in the information. We are not
in a position to make a similar finding here. The transcript of the proceedings during the arraignment
shows that Pineda's counsel, Atty. Lota prefaced his client's plea of guilty with the statement that .
I have advised him (Pineda) about the technicalities in plain simple language of the
contents of aggravating circumstances and apprised him of the penalty he would get,
and we have given said accused time to think. After a while I consulted him — for
three times — and his decision was still the same.
Three days after the arraignment, the same counsel stated in court that he had always been averse
to Pineda's idea of pleading guilty, because "I know the circumstances called for the imposition of
the maximum penalty considering the aggravating circumstances," but that he acceded to his client's
wish only after the fiscal had stated that he would recommend to the court the imposition of life
imprisonment on his client. To be sure, any such recommendation does not bind the Court. The
situation here, therefore, is far different from that obtaining in U.S. vs. Agcaoili, supra.
6. Two of the appellants — Jose and Cañal — bewail the enormous publicity that attended the case
from the start of investigation to the trial. In spite of the said publicity, however, it appears that the
court a quo was able to give the appellants a fair hearing. For one thing, three of the seven (7)
original accused were acquitted. For another thing, Jose himself admits in his brief that the Trial
Judge "had not been influenced by adverse and unfair comments of the press, unmindful of the
rights of the accused to a presumption of innocence and to fair trial."
We are convinced that the herein four appellants have conspired together to commit the crimes
imputed to them in the amended information quoted at the beginning of this decision. There is no
doubt at all that the forcible abduction of the complainant from in front of her house in Quezon City,
was a necessary if not indispensable means which enabled them to commit the various and the
successive acts of rape upon her person. It bears noting, however, that even while the first act of
rape was being performed, the crime of forcible abduction had already been consummated, so that
each of the three succeeding (crimes of the same nature can not legally be considered as still
connected with the abduction — in other words, they should be detached from, and considered
independently of, that of forcible abduction and, therefore, the former can no longer be complexed
with the latter.
What kind of rape was committed? Undoubtedly, it is that which is punishable by the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death, under paragraph 3, Article 335, as amended by Republic Act No.
4111 which took effect on June 20, 1964, and which provides as follows:
ART. 335. When and how rape committed.—Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the
circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two
or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the
penalty shall be death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or

on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be likewise death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty
shall be death.
As regards, therefore, the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, the first of the crimes
committed, the latter is definitely the more serious; hence, pursuant the provision of Art. 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, the penalty prescribed shall be imposed in its maximum period. Consequently,
the appellants should suffer the extreme penalty of death. In this regard, there is hardly any
necessity to consider the attendance of aggravating circumstances, for the same would not alter the
nature of the penalty to be imposed.
Nevertheless, to put matters in their proper perspective and for the purpose of determining the
proper penalty to be imposed in each of the other three crimes of simple rape, it behooves Us to
make a definite finding in this connection to the effect that the commission of said crimes was
attended with the following aggravating circumstances: (a) nighttime, appellants having purposely
sought such circumstance to facilitate the commission of these crimes; (b) abuse of superior
strength, the crime having been committed by the four appellants in conspiracy with one another (Cf.
People vs. De Guzman, et al., 51 Phil., 105, 113); (c) ignominy, since the appellants in ordering the
complainant to exhibit to them her complete nakedness for about ten minutes, before raping her,
brought about a circumstance which tended to make the effects of the crime more humiliating; and
(d) use of a motor vehicle. With respect to appellants Jose, Aquino and Ca_¤_al, none of these
aggravating circumstances has been offset by any mitigating circumstance. Appellant Pineda
should, however, be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty, a factor
which does not in the least affect the nature of the proper penalties to be imposed, for the reason
that there would still be three aggravating circumstances remaining. As a result, appellants should
likewise be made to suffer the extreme penalty of death in each of these three simple crimes of rape.
(Art. 63, par. 2, Revised Penal Code.)
In refusing to impose as many death penalties as there are offenses committed, the trial court
applied by analogy Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that "the maximum
duration of all the penalties therein imposed upon the appellant shall not be more than threefold the
length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon the appellant, which
should not exceed forty years." The said court is of the opinion that since a man has only one life to
pay for a wrong, the ends of justice would be served, and society and the victim would be vindicated
just as well, if only one death penalty were imposed on each of the appellants.
We cannot agree with the trial court. Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code can only be taken into
account in connection with the service of the sentence imposed, not in the imposition of the penalty
(People vs. Escares, 55 Off. Gaz., 623). In holding that only one death penalty should be imposed
because man has only one life, the trial court ignored the principle enunciated in the very case it
cited, namely, U.S. vs. Balaba, 37 Phil., 260, where this Court, in affirming the judgment of the trial
court, found the accused guilty of two murders and one homicide and imposed upon him two death
sentences for the murders and a prison term for the homicide. In not applying the said principle, the
court a quo said that the case of Balaba is different from the present case, for while in the former
case the accused was found to have committed three distinct offenses, here only one offense is
charged, even if complex. As We have explained earlier herein, four crimes were committed,
charged and proved. There is, therefore, no substantial difference between the two cases insofar as
the basic philosophy involved is concerned, for the fact remains that in the case of Balaba this Court
did not hesitate to affirm the two death sentences imposed on the accused by the trial court.
In People vs. Peralta, et al., L-19060, October 29, 1968, in which this Court imposed on each of the
six accused three death penalties for three distinct and separate crimes of murder, We said that
"since it is the settled rule that once conspiracy is established, the act of one conspirator is
attributable to all, then each conspirator must be held liable for each of the felonious acts committed
as a result of the conspiracy, regardless of the nature and severity of the appropriate penalties
prescribed by law." In the said case (which was promulgated after the decision of the court a
quo had been handed down) We had occasion to discuss at length the legality and practicality of
imposing multiple death penalties, thus:
The imposition of multiple death penalties is decried by some as a useless formality,

an exercise in futility. It is contended, undeniably enough, that a death convict, like all
mortals, has only one life to forfeit. And because of this physiological and biological
attribute of man, it is reasoned that the imposition of multiple death penalties is
impractical and futile because after the service of one capital penalty, the execution
of the rest of the death penalties will naturally be rendered impossible. The foregoing
opposition to the multiple imposition of death penalties suffers from four basic flaws:
(1) it fails to consider the legality of imposing multiple capital penalties; (2) it fails to
distinguish between imposition of penalty and service of sentence; (3) it ignores the
fact that multiple death sentences could be served simultaneously; and (4) it
overlooks the practical merits of imposing multiple death penalties.
The imposition of a penalty and the service of a sentence are two distinct, though
related, concepts. The imposition of the proper penalty or penalties is determined by
the nature, gravity and number of offenses charged and proved, whereas service of
sentence is determined by the severity and character of the penalty or penalties
imposed. In the imposition of the proper penalty or penalties, the court does not
concern itself with the possibility or practicality of the service of the sentence, since
actual service is a contingency subject to varied factors like the successful escape of
the convict, grant of executive clemency or natural death of the prisoner. All that go
into the imposition of the proper penalty or penalties, to reiterate, are the nature,
gravity and number of the offenses charged and proved and the corresponding
penalties prescribed by law.
Multiple death penalties are not impossible to serve because they will have to be
executed simultaneously. A cursory reading of article 70 will show that there are only
two moves of serving two or more (multiple) penalties: simultaneously
or successively. The first rule is that two or more penalties shall be served
simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit. In the case of multiple
capital penalties, the nature of said penal sanctions does not only permit but actually
necessitates simultaneous service.
The imposition of multiple death penalties, far from being a useless formality, has
practical importance. The sentencing of an accused to several capital penalties is an
indelible badge of his extreme criminal perversity, which may not be accurately
projected by the imposition of only one death sentence irrespective of the number of
capital felonies for which he is liable. Showing thus the reprehensible character of the
convict in its real dimensions, the possibility of a grant of executive clemency is
justifiably reduced in no small measure. Hence, the imposition of multiple death
penalties could effectively serve as deterrent to an improvident grant of pardon or
commutation. Faced with the utter delinquency of such a convict, the proper
penitentiary authorities would exercise judicious restraint in recommending clemency
or leniency in his behalf.
Granting, however, that the Chief Executive, in the exercise of his constitutional
power to pardon (one of the presidential prerogatives which is almost absolute)
deems it proper to commute the multiple death penalties to multiple life
imprisonments, then the practical effect is that the convict has to serve the maximum
forty (40) years of multiple life sentences. If only one death penalty is imposed, and
then is commuted to life imprisonment, the convict will have to serve a maximum of
only thirty years corresponding to a single life sentence.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that in view of the existence of conspiracy among them and of our
finding as regards the nature and number of the crimes committed, as well as of the presence of
aggravating circumstances, four death penalties should be imposed in the premises.
————
Before Us is a petition for intervention filed by Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation asking for
reversal of that portion of the judgment of the court below ordering the confiscation of the car used
by the appellants in abducting the complainant. The aforesaid car is a 1965 two-door Pontiac sedan
with Motor No. WT-222410, Serial No. 2376752110777, Plate No. H-33284, File No. 11584171,
alleged by the intervenor to be in the custody of Major Ernesto San Diego of the Quezon City Police
Department. The car is registered in the name of Mrs. Dolores Gomez.
On April 4, 1967, Mrs. Dolores Gomez, mother of an appellant Jaime G. Jose, bought the car from
the Malayan Motors Corporation and simultaneously executed a chattel mortgage thereon to secure
payment of the purchase price of P13,200, which was stipulated to be payable in 24 monthly
installments of P550 beginning May 4, 1967 up to April 4, 1969. The mortgage was duly registered
with the Land Transportation Commission and inscribed in the Chattel Mortgage Registry. The
mortgage lien was annotated on the motor registration certificate. On April 17, 1967, for value
received and with notice to Mrs. Gomez, the Malayan Motors Corporation assigned its credit against
Mrs. Gomez, as well as the chattel mortgage, to the intervenor. The assignment was duly registered
with the Land Transportation Commission and annotated on the registration certificate.
Mrs. Gomez failed to pay any of the installments due, in view of which the intervenor filed on July 5,
1967, an action for replevin against her (Civil Case No. 69993, Court of First Instance of Manila) as a
preliminary step to foreclosure of the chattel mortgage. On July 7, 1967, the court issued an order for
the seizure of the car. The sheriff, however, could not enforce the writ of replevin because the car
was not in Mrs. Gomez' possession, the same having been used by her son, appellant Jaime G.
Jose, together with the other appellants in this case, in the abduction of Miss De la Riva, as a result
of which the car was seized by the Quezon City police and placed in the custody of Major San
Diego, who refused to surrender it to the sheriff on the ground that it would be used as evidence in
the trial of the criminal case.
During the pendency of that criminal case in the court below, or on July 26, 1967, the intervenor filed
with the said court a petition for intervention. The said petition was not, however, acted upon. On
October 2, 1967, the trial court rendered its judgment in the present case ordering the car's
confiscation as an instrument of the crime. Although not notified of the said decision, the intervenor
filed, on October 17, 1967, a motion for reconsideration of the order of confiscation; but the same
was denied on October 31, 1967, on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the case
in view of the automatic elevation thereof to this Court. The intervenor then filed a petition for relief
from judgement, but the same was also denied.
On February 5, 1968, judgement was rendered in the replevin case ordering Mrs. Gomez to deliver
the car to the intervenor so that the chattel mortgage thereon could be foreclosed, or, in the
alternative, to pay the intervenor the sum of P13,200 with interest thereon at 12% per annum from
July 5, 1968, the premium bond, attorney's fees, and the costs of suit. The judgment became final
and executory. Attempts to execute the judgment against the properties of Mrs. Gomez were
unavailing; the writ of execution was returned by the sheriff unsatisfied. On July 26, 1968, the
present petition for intervention was filed with this Court, which allowed the intervenor to file a brief.
In his brief the Solicitor General contends, among others, that the court a quo having found that
appellant Jose is the owner of the car, the order of confiscation is correct.
Considering that the car in question is registered in the name of Mrs. Dolores Gomez, who, in the
absence of strong evidence to the contrary, must be considered as the lawful owner thereof; that the
only basis of the court a quo in concluding that the said car belongs to appellant Jose were the
latter's statements during the trial of the criminal case to that effect; that the said statement were not,
however, intended to be, nor could constitute, a claim of ownership over the car adverse to his
mother, but were made simply in answer to questions propounded in court for the sole purpose of
establishing the identity of the defendant who furnished the car used by the appellants in the
commission of the crime; that the chattel mortgage on the car and its assignment in the favor of the
intervenor were made several months before the date of commission of the crimes charged, which
circumstance forecloses the possibility of collusion to prevent the State from confiscating the car;
that the final judgement in the replevin case can only be executed by delivering the possession of
the car to the intervenor for foreclosure of the chattel mortgage; and the Article 45 of the Revised
Penal Code bars the confiscation and forfeiture of an instrument or tool used in the commission of
the crime if such "be the property of a third person not liable for the offense," it is the sense of this
Court that the order of the court below for confiscation of the car in question should be set aside and
that the said car should be ordered delivered to the intervenor for foreclosure as decreed in the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in the replevin case, Civil Case No. 69993.
————
Before the actual promulgation of this decision, this Court received a formal manifestation on the
part of the Solicitor General to the effect that Rogelio Cañal, one of the herein appellants, died in
prison on December 28, 1970. As a result of this development, this case is hereby dismissed as to
him alone, and only insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, with one-fourth (1/4) of the costs
declared de oficio.
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby modified as follows: appellants Jaime G. Jose,
Basilio Pineda, Jr., and Edgardo P. Aquino are pronounced guilty of the complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape, and each and every one of them is likewise convicted of three (3) other crimes
of rape. As a consequence thereof, each of them is hereby sentenced to four (4) death penalties; all
of them shall, jointly and severally, indemnify the complainant of the sum of P10,000.00 in each of
the four crimes, or a total of 40,000.00; and each shall pay one-fourth (1/4) of the costs.
Insofar as the car used in the commission of the crime is concerned, the order of the court a quo for
its confiscation is hereby set aside; and whoever is in custody thereof is hereby ordered to deliver its
possession to intervenor Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation in accordance with the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 69993 thereof.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Villamor and
Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Barredo and Teehankee, JJ., took no part.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20183 June 30, 1966
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee,

vs.
EDUARDO BERDIDA Y INGUITO, ET AL., defendants.
EDUARDO BERDIDA Y INGUITO, LORETO SABERON Y CASAS, VICENTE ABERAS Y
CORDERO and JESUS FELICIA Y BALIDBID, defendants and appellants.
Senen S. Ceniza, Emilio G. Opinion and Agustin R. Romeras for defendants and appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General A. A. Alafriz, Acting Assistant Solicitor General I. C. Borromeo and
Solicitor S. C. Jacob for plaintiff and appellee.
PER CURIAM:
This is an automatic review of death sentence pursuant to the Rules of Court.1
On 10 May 1960, an information for frustrated murder2 of Antonio Maravilla and another information
for murder3 of Federico Cañalete, were filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila. Said
informations were directed against the same eight accused: Eduardo Berdida y Inguito, Jesus Felicia
y Balidbid, Vicente Aberas y Cordero, Cristoto Mitilla y Paral, Demetrio Garin y Payos, Protacio
Libres y Corona, Loreto Saberon y Casas and Mario Mustrado y Sumaya.
After the defendants pleaded not guilty at their arraignment on 16 May 1960, the two cases were
tried jointly. Acting on a motion to dismiss filed by defendants Cristoto Mitilla and Mario Mustrado,
after the prosecution rested its case, the court dismissed the charges against Mario Mustrado, with
costs de oficio. After the trial, the Court of First Instance rendered on 27 July 1962 the decision now
under review. Its dispositive portion states:
In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the defendants Eduardo Berdida,
Loreto Saberon, Vicente Aberas and Jesus Felicia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder. This Court has in previous cases endeavored to avoid the imposition of the
capital punishment. In the case at bar, however, where the offenders, pretending to be police
officers, kidnapped the victims and mercilessly beat one of them to death, the Court finds no
other alternative, in pursuance to the mandate of the law, but to impose, as it hereby
imposes upon the said defendants, the death penalty, to indemnify jointly and severally the
heirs of Federico Cañalete in the sum of P4,000.00 and to pay the costs. May God have
mercy on their souls.
In Criminal Case No. 52338, above-said defendants are also hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted murder and considering the aggravating
circumstances present, they are sentenced each to suffer a maximum penalty of TEN (10)
YEARS of prision mayor and a minimum of SIX (6) YEARS ofprision correccional, and to pay
the costs, without prejudice on the part of the complainant to institute a separate civil action
for the recovery of damages.
The defendants Garin, Mitilla and Libres are hereby acquitted, in both cases, with costs de
oficio, and their immediate release is hereby ordered.
So ordered.
The records show the prosecution's evidence, as follows:
At about 10 o'clock in the evening of 7 May 1960, Antonio Maravilla, Federico Cañalete, Virgilio
Haban and Pedrito Rapadas left the store of one Mang Terio at Mabuhay Street, North Harbor,
Tondo, Manila, and proceeded walking towards their homes. They were met on their way by
Eduardo Berdida, Antonio Louie, one Tiquio and one aliasIfugao, who identified themselves as
detectives, told them not to move, and pointed sharp and long bolos to them.4Antonio Maravilla and
Federico Cañalete raised their hands, but Pedrito Rapadas and Virgilio Haban were able to run
away. Antonio Louie then dealt a fist blow on Antonio Maravilla. After that, the group took Antonio
Maravilla and Federico Cañalete along the rail tracks, telling them that they had done something
wrong.
At the end of the rail tracks, said group tied the hands of Antonio Maravilla and Federico Cañalete.
After doing this, they dragged the two and took them to a place in Pier 8 at the North Harbor near
Vicente Aberas' house. In said place, there were others who joined the group, among them, Jesus
Felicia, Loreto Saberon and Vicente Aberas. At this point Eduardo Berdida told Antonio Maravilla
and Federico Cañalete to dig their graves, but they refused. Arturo Macabebe, who also joined the
group, took two sticks of cigarettes and told Antonio Maravilla and Federico Cañalete to smoke.
Antonio Maravilla again refused. Following said refusal, the victims were hit with a piece of wood.
Eduardo Berdida and Jesus Felicia then held Antonio Maravilla and Federico Cañalete, respectively,
by the hands and from behind. As they were thus held, Vicente Aberas delivered fist blows on them,
first on Antonio Maravilla, then on Federico Cañalete.5 Furthermore, Loreto Saberon also held
Federico Cañalete while others gave fist blows to the latter.6 At about 1 o'clock in the morning of 8
May 1960, Antonio Maravilla lost consciousness, shortly after hearing Loreto Saberon say that the
group would cut off the ears of Antonio Maravilla and Federico Cañalete for appetizer or "pulutan".7
Antonio Maravilla's sister, Elizabeth, had meanwhile been informed by Virgilio Haban, one of those
who were able to run away, that her brother and Federico Cañalete were taken by armed men. She
therefore went out with some companions in search of her brother. She asked the help of Patrolman
Carlos Pili, who was then at the corner of Kaguitingan and Lakandula Streets in front of Pier 6.
Patrolmen Amado Santos and Fabricante also joined them. As the other policemen took to separate
directions, Patrolman Pili and Elizabeth Maravilla went along Mabuhay Street. They came upon a
group of men, between Piers 6 and 8, who were hesitant to answer their inquiries. So they
proceeded further, entering a small alley. As they went on, Elizabeth found the shoes of her brother.
So they continued until they met Vicente Aberas, stripped to the waist, with bloodstains on his
hands.8 Patrolman Pili detained him. Since somebody threatened them should they proceed any
further, Patrolman Pili and Elizabeth Maravilla went to Precinct 3, taking along Vicente Aberas.
Assistance from the Mobile Patrol was then requested. Accompanied by her neighbors and more
policemen, Elizabeth, together with Patrolman Pili, returned and went further to the interior of
Mabuhay Street. Finally, they came upon Federico Cañalete and Antonio Maravilla, sprawled on the
ground, the former face down, the latter flat on his back. Federico Cañalete was found dead. Antonio
Maravilla was alive, though his face was swollen, rendering him barely recognizable. Antonio
Maravilla was taken to the North General Hospital.
Patrolman Pili, meanwhile, went still further to the interior and saw, about 12 meters away from
where they found the victims, a group drinking liquor. At the approach of Patrolman Pili, about four
men ran away, leaving behind four men, namely, Loreto Saberon, Mario Mustrado, Cristoto Mitilla
and Protacio Libres, the last mentioned being then drunk and asleep on a bamboo bed.9 A Mobile
Patrol car thereafter arrived and apprehended them, except Libres. Patrolman Pili next went towards
a house near Tagumpay Street in which direction the others had fled. In said house, which was that
of Crisanta Melgar, the patrolman found some persons who pretended to be sleeping, namely,
Demetrio Garin, Jesus Felicia and Eduardo Berdida. Patrolman Pili brought them outside and they
were taken by the Mobile Patrol to the Detective Bureau.
Furthermore, the body of Federico Cañalete was examined at the scene where it was found by
officers of the Mobile Patrol. Detective Bureau agents likewise went to said place. Finding
bloodstains near an a alley to Tagumpay Street, they went to a house thereat and found Protacio
Libres sleeping on a bamboo bed. Said detectives took Libres to the headquarters.
At the police station, all the apprehended suspects were made to mingle with other persons. Antonio
Maravilla, who was fetched to point out therefrom the persons who attacked him and Federico
Cañalete identified Eduardo Berdida, Vicente Aberas, Loreto Saberon and Jesus Felicia.
An autopsy was made on 8 May 1960 on the body of Federico Cañalete by Dr. Luis Larion, Medical
Examiner of the Manila Police Department. The post mortem findings in his report are as follows:
(Exh. M):
CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM:
Hemorrhage extensive, subarachnoid brain.
CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEM:
Laceration, blood vessels, brain and spleen.
RESPIRATORY SYSTEM:
Contusion, posterior lung, bilateral.
Congestion, lungs, bilateral.
GASTROINTESTINAL SYSTEM:
About 150 cc. partially digested rice meal with slight alcoholic odor.
Hemoperitoneum about 100 cc. blood, abdominal cavity.
SPLEEN: Maceration spleen.
PANCREAS: Contusion, hemorrhagic, pancreas.
BONES AND JOINTS:
Fracture-separation, left parieto-occipital and right fronto-temporal skull.
MISCELLANEOUS:
Wound, stab, non-penetrating, 1.3 x 0.5 cm. x 1.5 cm. deep, right lumbar region.
Wound, lacerated, 3 x 0.5 cm. occipital region.
Wound, lacerated, 2.5 cm. x 1.5 cm. x 1 cm. deep, non-penetrating, left abdomen.
Hematoma, frontal, right; left, parieto-occipital, and occipital, scalp, head.
Contusion, multiple, left forehead; left lower eyelids; left face; nose; lower lip; left
lateral neck; posterior neck; left shoulder; left and right posterior chest.
Contused abrasion, anterior left lower chest and right abdomen.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
Shock and hemorrhage due to traumatic fracture of the skull with maceration of
spleen, contusion of the lungs and extensive subarachnoid hemorrhages in the brain.
Antonio Maravilla, as shown in the medico-legal certificate of Dr. Cumalinga Espinosa of the North
General Hospital (Exh. R), sustained these injuries:
Contusion with abrasion, and periorbital hematoma, eye right.
Contusion upper and lower lip.
Contusion 2" mental region.
Contusion with slight hematoma, malar right, and mandible bilateral.
Abrasion, 3", lateral neck left.
Abrasion, 2" #2 level of the 10th rib right, along the MCL.
For the defense of herein appellants, the following evidence was presented to establish alibi:
Sometime between 7 and 8 o'clock in the evening of 7 May 1960 Crisanta Melgar was filling drums
with water in her house at 1205 Tagumpay Street, Tondo, Manila. Shortly thereafter, Eduardo
Berdida, Loreto Saberon and Jesus Felicia arrived. Since her husband was on night duty and her
brother- in-law was ill, Crisanta Melgar asked the three to remain and help her fill up the drums with
water, intending to sell the same the next morning. Said defendants consented and for some time
helped Crisanta fill the drums with water. At about 9 o'clock in the evening, however, said
defendants went to sleep in the ground floor of Crisanta's new house, still under construction,
adjacent to the house aforementioned. At about midnight a policeman and someone in civilian
clothes knocked at the door and inquired from Crisanta if there were three persons sleeping in her
house. She said yes, and opened the door. The policeman then told Crisanta that a dead man was
found near their place. The one in civilian attire went to the back of the house. Crisanta told the
policeman she knew nothing of any incident and that the three men had been in her house for some
time. She then awoke the defendants Berdida, Saberon and Felicia. The policeman told them to
stand up and the man in civilian was asked if they were the ones involved. Said man looked at the
defendants and replied in the negative. The policeman and the civilian then left and the defendants
went back to sleep. After a while, Crisanta, who was restless and could not sleep, went down, awoke
the defendants, and told them that it was better for them to leave. So, the said defendants left, but a
policeman stopped them at Tagumpay Street and took them to the police headquarters.
As to the defendant Vicente Aberas, his defense of alibi is as follows:
In the evening of 7 May 1960, he was on board the fishing boat "Don Paulino." At about 10:30
o'clock in the evening, after unloading their catch of fish, he left for home, bringing with him
a tulingan fish. Juan, a co-worker of his, invited him to drink beer in a store near Pier 8. For some
time they stayed there, then he left for home. On the way he met five men beating up somebody.
Approaching them, he asked them to have pity on the man and not to beat him. Someone in the
group, armed with a club, warned him not to interfere, so, becoming afraid, he left. In reaching home,
he took off his shirt, cut the fish he brought with him in half, lengthwise, and took one of the halves to
the house of Emiliano Retone, another co-worker of his, who did not report for work that day. Retone
invited him to drink gin. After drinking, he headed for home, but on his way he met two policemen
and a woman. After being asked where he came from, which he answered, and whether he had
seen a fight, to which he said yes, he was taken to Precinct 3.
Appellants would, first of all, assail Antonio Maravilla's testimony identifying them as the assailants,
for the reason that he lost consciousness, and, therefore, could not be relied upon to make said
identification. Appellants would further insist on their defense of alibi. Antonio Maravilla, it is true, lost
consciousness' at about 1 o'clock in the morning of 8 May 1960. It is however equally true that
before his sense faded out he saw herein appellants perform their atrocities on himself as well as on
Federico Cañalete. It cannot therefore be doubted that he made no mistake in pointing out to herein
appellants as definitely among their assailants. This he did, not only at the police station but also in
open court during the trial. It is furthermore not disputed by defendants-appellants that Antonio
Maravilla has no reason or motive to falsely accuse them of murder and attempted murder. The
positive identification he made must therefore be given credence.
It follows that the defense of alibi cannot be sustained. The rule is settled, to the point of being trite,
that the defense of alibi is worthless in the face of positive identification by prosecution witnesses,
pointing to the accused as participants in the crime. 10
The trial court, moreover, found the above-related defenses of alibi not credible. For, according to
said court, if defendants Berdida, Felicia and Saberon really went to help Crisanta Melgar, their
provincemate, fill drums with water at her house, it is rather unusual that they went to sleep at about
9 o'clock in the evening. Furthermore, the policeman who inquired about persons sleeping in
Crisanta Melgar's house strangely knew their number, that is, three persons. And, finally, it is
unbelievable that said policeman did not take them to the headquarters for identification by Antonio
Maravilla himself. 1äwphï1.ñët
And, with respect to the defendant-appellant Vicente Aberas, the trial court found it too surprising to
believe that he went to such lengths of amiability, as to go, shirtless at that, to his friend Retone, at
an unholy hour, to share with him one-half of his tulingan fish. No previous agreement, or urgent
need for such an act obtained. It could have waited for the next morning, especially since, having
allegedly come from work, defendant Aberas must have been tired.
As this Court stated in People vs. Constante, L-14639, December 28, 1964, the defense of alibi is an
issue of fact that hinges on credibility; that the credibility of an alibi depends so much on the
credibility of the witnesses who seek to establish it; and that, in this inspect, the relative weight which
the trial judge assigns to the testimony of said witnesses must, unless patently and clearly
inconsistent with the evidence on record, be accepted. For, as is well recognized, his proximate
contact with those who take to the witness chair places him, compared to appellate Justices, in the
more competent position to discriminate be between the true and the false.
And in the present appeal, we find no warrant to depart from the lower court's finding on defendants-
appellants' defense of alibi.
It is also contended by appellants that the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, abuse of superior
strength, and evident premeditation should not be appreciated in fixing the penalty. Appellants would
argue that nighttime was not purposely sought to facilitate the offense or to afford impunity. At any
rate, they would further argue, nighttime as well as abuse of superior strength are deemed absorbed
in treachery. As to evident premeditation, they aver that the premeditation, if any, is not evident, for
lack of sufficient lapse of time between the execution of the offense and a previous showing of intent
to commit it, so as to show that the offenders clung to their determination to commit the crime.
The presence of one generic aggravating circumstance, apart from the qualifying circumstance of
treachery, suffices to fix the penalty for murder at the extreme punishment of death. For there is no
mitigating circumstance in the present case. From the facts and evidence of record in this case, it is
clear that appellants took advantage of nighttime in committing the felonies charged. For it appears
that to carry out a sentence they had pronounced upon Antonio Maravilla and Federico Cañalete for
the death of one Pabling, they had evidently chosen to execute their victims under cover of
darkness, at the dead of night, when the neighborhood was asleep. Inasmuch as the treachery
consisted in the fact that the victims' hands were tied at the time they were beaten, the circumstance
of nighttime is not absorbed in treachery, but can be perceived distinctly therefrom, since the
treachery rests upon an independent factual basis. A special case therefore is present to which the
rule that nighttime is absorbed in treachery does no apply. 11
In addition, the presence of evident premeditation is likewise borne out by the record. For the victims
were told at the start, when they were taken captives, that they had done something wrong, that they
were the ones who stabbed and killed one Pabling, and that for this reason they were to go with the
group (T.s.n., 10 October 1960, pp. 20, 22; Exh. D). Not only that; the victims were then taken to a
spot where they were ordered to dig their graves. The assailants were previously armed with deadly
weapons, and their assault was a concerted and group action. From the time of apprehension of the
victims, About 10 o'clock in the evening, to the time Antonio Maravilla lost consciousness, about 1
o'clock early the following morning, is sufficient time for the offenders to meditate and reflect on the
consequences of their act.
In People vs. Lopez, 69 Phil. 298, this Court found the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation present, in view of the repeated statements of the defendants that the hour of
reckoning of the victim would arrive, the existing enmity between them, the fact that they were
previously armed with deadly weapons, and the fact that the aggression was simultaneous and
continuous until the deceased was left unconscious on the ground. And in People vs. Lazada, 70
Phil. 525, four hours was held sufficient lapse of time for purposes of the presence of evident
premeditation. Furthermore, sufficient lapse of time in this regard is not simply a matter of the
precise number of hours, but of the reasonable opportunity, under the situation and circumstances,
to ponder and reflect upon the consequences. In the present case, we find the facts and
circumstances obtaining sufficient to support the trial court's finding of the attendance of evident
premeditation.
Following previous instances, the indemnity to the heirs of the deceased in this case should be
increased to P6,000. 12
Anent the attempted murder case, no appeal therefrom was taken. The record shows that
defendants perfected no appeal from the judgment below. The present automatic review is limited
only to the murder case in which the death penalty was imposed. It was only because of the joint trial
that the record of the attempted murder case was likewise elevated herein. Since no appeal was
taken in the attempted murder case, the judgment with respect thereto has become final. It therefore
cannot now be reviewed herein, as some of the appellants would ask. And defendants-appellants,
who are detained, should accordingly be deemed to have started serving their respective sentence
in said attempted murder case from the time the decision of the trial court became final as to said
case.
Wherefore, the death penalty imposed on defendants-appellants is hereby affirmed, and the
indemnity to the heirs of Federico Cañalete is hereby increased from P4,000 to P6,000, with costs.
So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and
Sanchez, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 132895. March 10, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ELIZABETH CASTILLO

and EVANGELINE PADAYHAG, appellants.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us on automatic review is the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of

Paraaque, Branch 260, National Capital Judicial Region, in Criminal Case No. 95-86,
finding appellants Elizabeth Castillo (Castillo) and Evangeline Padayhag (Padayhag)
guilty of Qualified Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention[2] and sentencing them to
death.
The Information[3] charging Castillo, Padayhag and Imelda Wenceslao with the crime
of kidnapping, reads:
That on or about March 1, 1995, in Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, said accused ELIZABETH CASTILLO and
EVANGELINE PADAYHAG, conspiring together, confederating, and mutually
helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap,
carry away, and seriously detain HORACIO CEBRERO IV @ Rocky, a five years old
child (sic), which kidnapping or serious detention lasted for more than three (3) days
thereby depriving him of his liberty, and which was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the parents of the victim, to the damage and prejudice of the
victim himself and his parents.
The said accused IMELDA CASTILLO WENCESLAO, without having participated

in the said crime as a principal, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously participated (sic) in the execution of the crime by previous and
simultaneous acts by allowing and furnishing the use of her residence where victim
Horacio Cebrero IV was kept knowing him to have been taken by principal accused
Elizabeth Castillo and Evangeline Padayhag without the consent of his parents.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment on 10 May 1995, both Castillo and Padayhag initially pleaded
guilty. However, on 18 May 1995, Castillo and Padayhag withdrew their plea of guilt. They
entered a plea of not guilty on 3 August 1995. Imelda Wenceslao remains at large.
The prosecution submitted documentary evidence and presented eight witnesses,
namely: (1) Horacio Cebrero IV (Rocky), the victim; (2) Rosanna Baria, the victims yaya;
(3) Luis Cebrero, the victims father; (4) Sandra Cebrero, the victims mother; (5) Staff Sgt.
Alejandro Delena of the Philippine National Police (PNP); (6) Wivino Demol, a member
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Intelligence Security Group, army
surveillance and search team; (7) Capt. Raniel Ramiro, also of the AFP Intelligence
Security Group; (8) and Staff Sgt. Manual Iglesias of the PNP.
The defense presented only two witnesses: Castillo and Padayhag themselves.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarized the prosecutions version of
the incident in the appellees brief, as follows:
On March 1, 1995, Rosanna Baria was employed as one of the household helpers of
Mr. and Mrs. Luis De Guzman Cebrero at their residence in Classic Homes, B. F.
Paraaque, Metro Manila (p. 26, tsn, August 3, 1995). In the morning of said date,
Femie, another housemaid of the Cebreros and Barias relative, bathed and dressed up
Rocky, the couples six year old son and afterwards advised Baria that someone, who
was also a Cebrero househelper, will fetch Rocky (p. 28, supra). At about 8:00 a.m., a
tricycle arrived. On board was a woman, whom Baria pointed to in court and who
gave her name as Evangeline Padayhag (p. 26, supra). Baria assisted Rocky to board
the tricycle. The tricycle brought Rocky and the woman, whom Rocky pointed to in
court and who gave her name as Evangeline Padayhag (p. 9, tsn, August 3, 1995), to a
nearby Mcdonalds. Thereat, they were joined by another woman (p. 13, supra) whom
Rocky pointed to in court and who gave her name as Elizabeth Castillo (p. 9, supra).
The three proceeded to a house far from the Mcdonalds (p. 13, supra) where Rocky
slept four times (p. 14, supra).
At about 5:30 p.m. of March 1, 1995, Luis Cebrero arrived home from work. When
his son DJ arrived, he informed his father that Rocky did not attend school. Luis
Cebrero asked Baria (pp. 4-5, tsn, August 22, 1995) who told him that Rocky was
fetched at home by a woman to attend a birthday party (p. 5, supra). Informed thereof,
Mr. Cebrero then called up his friends and went to the police station to report that his
son was missing (p. 9, supra).
At about 7:30 p.m. that night, Luis Cebrero received a telephone call from a woman
saying, Ibigay mo sa akin ang ATM card mo o ang bata (p. 10, supra). Luis replied,
Kailangan ko ang bata. The woman asked how much money was in his ATM and Luis
replied P40,000.00. Luis then requested to talk to his son but the woman said, Hindi
puwede, malayo dito ang anak mo at tatawag na lang uli ako (p. 10, supra).
Luis Cebrero decided to connect a tape recorder to his phone. On March 2, 1995, at
about 7:20 p.m., his phone rang. The caller was a woman telling him, Bigyan mo ako
nang isang million, to which he replied, Hindi ko kayang ibigay ang isang million.
The caller told Luis that she will call back later on (pp. 11-12, supra).
The Cebreros informed the authorities that two of their maids were hired from an
agency, the General Services, Inc. at Paraaque. Major Ordoyo of the Intelligence
Security Group, Philippine Army (PA) sent Sergeants Rempillo and Iglesias to the
agency to verify this. The two were furnished by General Services, Inc. with the
personal data of the maids named Elizabeth Castillo and Jasmine Nuez (pp. 13-14, tsn,
March 12, 1996).
When the caller did not contact Luis Cebrero the following day, March 3, 1995, he
instructed his wife to raise some money. From the bank, Mrs. Cebrero
withdrew P800,000.00 in P1,000.00 denomination. The bank provided Mrs. Cebrero a
list containing the serial numbers of the money withdrawn (pp. 15-16, supra).
On March 4, 1995, at about 9:30 p.m., Luis Cebrero received a telephone call. The
caller was a woman who asked, Ano nasa iyo na ba ang pera? Luis answered, Hindi
ko kayang ibigay sa iyo ang halagang iyon, kalahati lang ang kaya kong ibigay. The
caller said, Sige, puede na yan (p. 17, supra) and instructed Luis Cebrero to be in
Paco, Obando, Bulacan, alone, at about 2:00 a.m.; that at Paco, Obando, Bulacan, is a
Farmacia Dilag and beside it is a street which Luis must follow until he reaches the
church called Sabadista where he should drop the money (p. 18, supra). Luis Cebrero
received another call on that same night instructing him to stop in front of the
Farmacia Dilag and walk on the street beside it going to a chapel and to drop the
money on the chapels terrace (p. 19, supra).
Informed of the place for the pay-off, on March 4, 1995, Major Ronnie Eleazar,
Commanding Officer of the Intelligence Security Group (ISG), Philippine Army,
briefed his men on Rockys kidnapping and assigned them their respective tasks in the
stakeout they will undertake around the pay-off area (pp. 6-7 tsn, January 30, 1996).
At about 11:00 p.m. of March 4, 1995, Sgt. Alejandro Delena and his ISG team,
proceeded to Obando, Bulacan for the stakeout. After positioning themselves near the
stakeout site, a car arrived and stopped in front of the chapel. The man alighted and
placed a bag in front of the chapel and immediately left (p. 10, supra). After about
forty (40) minutes, two women appeared, proceeded to where the bag was dropped.
On seeing the bag, the women laughed and left. After about two (2) minutes, the two
women returned, picked up the bag and immediately left (pp. 11-12, supra). The ISG
team searched the area around the drop-off place but the two women were nowhere to
be found (p. 17, supra). In court, Sgt. Delena pointed to and identified Castillo and
Padayhag as the two women he saw in front of the chapel in Obando, Bulacan and
who, later on, picked up the bag dropped by Luis Cebrero (p. 12, supra).
Puzzled by the sudden disappearance of the two women, Sgt. Delena and his team
remained at the stake-out area. The team befriended the residents of the place, one of
whom was a certain Joselito Torres who claimed to be the former boyfriend of
Elizabeth Castillo whom he recognized from the picture shown to him by Sgt. Delena.
Torres informed the ISG team that Castillo had already left for Mindanao. Sgt. Delena
immediately communicated the information, including the address of Gigi Padayhag
in Navotas, to his commanding officer (p. 19, supra).
At about 9:00 p.m. of March 5, 1995, Luis Cebrero was at home when a tricycle
stopped in front of his house. Somebody knocked at the door and when Luis Cebrero
opened it, he saw his son, Rocky (pp. 23-24, tsn, August 22, 1995).
On March 12, 1995, an ISG team headed by Sgt. Manuel Iglesias was dispatched to
Navotas to locate Gigi Padayhag at the address furnished by Sgt. Delena. The team
found Padayhag who upon being apprised of the kidnapping of Rocky Cebrero,
voluntarily went with the ISG team to Camp Crame to clear her name (p. 14, tsn, May
22, 1996).
Upon the instruction of the ISG, Sgts. Delena and Demo were ordered to proceed to
Dipolog City to look for Castillo (pp. 20-21, tsn, January 30, 1996). Sgt. Delena
arrived in Dipolog City on March 13, 1996. He was briefed and shown the area where
Castillo could be found (p. 23, supra).
When Sgt. Demol arrived in Dipolog City, he and Sgt. Delena coordinated with the
PNP stationed at Barangay Tulong, Rizal, Zamboanga del Norte (p. 41, tsn, March 12,
1996). Thereat, Sgt. Demol requested for the assistance of persons from Barangay
Mitimos, where Castillo was believed to be hiding. The PNP assigned them two
barangay officials of Mitimos who, when shown the picture of Castillo, said that the
woman in the picture is in Barangay Mitimos (p. 46, supra).
Upon the request of the police, the two barangay officials conducted a daily
surveillance on Castillo. On March 18, 1995, Sgt. Demol reported to the ISG
headquarters that Castillo was in Barangay Mitimos. In turn, Sgt. Demol was advised
that ISG will be sending him, through JRS Express, copies of the list of serial
numbers of the bills used as pay-off and a DOJ subpoena (p. 54, supra). Upon receipt
of said documents, Sgt. Demol applied for a search warrant (p. 58, supra) which was
granted by the Dipolog City Regional Trial Court on March 21, 1995 (p. 57, supra).
The search warrant was shown to Elizabeth Castillo and her father who signed the
same (pp. 60-61, supra). The search yielded a black bag placed in a carton inside the
house (pp. 61-62) containing money in P1,000.00 bills in the total amount
of P277,000.00 (p. 68, supra). The serial numbers of the recovered money bills
appeared in the list furnished to Sgt. Demol by ISG (pp. 88-89, supra). Thereafter, the
money was deposited with the Regional Trial Court at Dipolog City (p. 89, supra).
Prosecuted for kidnapping and serious illegal detention, Evangeline Padayhag and
Elizabeth Castillo initially pleaded guilty upon arraignment and were each meted the
penalty of life imprisonment (p. 4, tsn, August 3, 1995). The trial court, however, on
motion based on improvident plea, ordered the withdrawal of the plea of guilty and
directed the re-arraignment of Castillo and Padayhag.
After trial, Castillo and Padayhag were convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention as charged.[4]
Appellants maintain their innocence and present their own version of the events in
their brief, as follows:
1. Accused ELIZABETH CASTILLO was a househelper at the Cebrero household

from December 1993 to January 1995. She did the cleaning of the house, laundry of
dirty clothes, and also took care of Rocky, son of Luis and Sandra Cebrero;
2. Accused Evangeline Padayhag, also a househelper, is a friend of Elizabeth Castillo.

The two met sometime in 1994 at Paco, Ubando, Bulacan, when Padayhag worked in
the household of Julito Lawagon, the latter being the neighbor of Helen Lim,
Elizabeth Castillos sister;
3. Upon assumption from work, Castillo was promised by Mrs. Sandra Cebrero a
monthly salary of one thousand two hundred pesos (P1,200.00);
4. Castillo, however, was never given compensation during her entire employment in
the Cebrero household;
5. Castillo was also not treated nicely by the Cebrero spouses. When something gets
lost in the house, she was always the one being blamed, although the children were
the ones getting the things. Besides, they say bad words against her. Thus, she has no
other choice but to leave her work;
6. Castillo had been consistently demanding from the Cebrero spouses her unpaid
wages for one year; but her demands remained unheeded;
7. Having reached only elementary education, Castillo believed that the only effective
way for her to claim back her unpaid wages is to use Rocky, son of the Cebrero
Spouses;
8. On 1 March 1995 Castillo called Padayhag, telling the latter that her boyfriend is
sick. At that time, Padayhag was already working at Jelaya St., B.F. Homes, Paraaque
under the employ of Lulu Sablan. Castillo fetched Padayhag. The two, however, did
not go to see Padayhags boyfriend but instead they went to a playground;
9. Castillo then instructed Padayhag to fetch Rocky from his house at Cesar Virata St.,
B.F. Homes, Paraaque, Manila. When Padayhag asked why she wanted to see Rocky,
Castillo answered that she missed the boy. Padayhag obliged to the request, knowing
that the latter would not do any harm to the boy;
10. It was only the first time that Padayhag saw Rocky;
11. She brought the child to a market at B.F. Paraaque, where Castillo was waiting.
The three went on a stroll. Thereafter, they went to the house of Imelda Wenceslao,
Castillos sister, at Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. Castillo noticed that Rocky had a
fever, so she requested Vangie to buy a medicine;
12. Padayhag was not told by Castillo as to when the latter would return the boy.
Padayhag did not sense anything wrong with what had happened as she believed that
Castillo only took Rocky for a stroll;
13. Imelda Wenceslao asked why they brought a child along with them. Castillo
answered that she just wanted to see the boy. Wenceslao then asked if they asked
permission from the parents, and Castillo answered no;
14. At night, Castillo talked to Mr. Luis Cebrero over the phone to inform him that
Rocky was with her. Mr. Cebrero told her not to harm the boy. No threat or demand
for ransom was ever made by the accused to the Cebrero spouses. She never asked
Mr. Cebrero how much money he had in the bank;
15. The following day, 2 March 1995, Castillo called Mr. Cebrero again to tell him
that she could not yet return Rocky because he still had a slight fever. She also told
Mr. Cebrero: Hindi nyo ako sinusuwelduhan. He asked her: Magkano ba ang
kailangan mo? She did not answer. Then Mr. Cebrero said: May pera ako rito,
kalahating milyon. At that moment, Castillo hanged-up the phone;
16. Castillo denied in her Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 25 August 1999, attached as
Annex A and made an integral part hereof, that she demanded one million
(P1,000,000.00) from the Cebrero spouses;
17. On the evening of 4 March 1995, when Castillo called Mr. Cebrero, he asked them
where they were. The accused told him that they were in Paco, Ubando, Bulacan, near
a Protestant Church. Mr. Cebrero then said: Pupunta ako riyan bandang 2:00 ng
madaling araw (March 5, 1999) na may bitbit na pera at ilalapag ko ito sa may
simbahan;
18. On 5 March 1995, at around 4:30 a.m. Castillo and Padayhag went out to buy
pandesal. They noticed that at a post near a Church, a dog was trying to pull a black
plastic bag. They picked it up and brought it home. When they opened it, they found
five bundles of money, in P1,000.00 denomination;
19. At about 9:00 p.m. of the same day, Mr. Cebrero heard a tricycle stop in front of
their house. Someone knocked at the door, and when he opened the door, he saw
Rocky;
20. On 11 March 1995, Capt. Raniel Ramiro, Intelligence Security Group of the
Philippine Army, together with his men, after coordinating with Caloocan Police,
arrested Evangeline Padayhag at her residence at Dagat-Dagatan, Caloocan City. The

military men did not have a warrant of arrest at this particular operation;
21. The military were civilian-dressed. They pretended to be Padayhags cousins who
came from abroad, and they invited her to a birthday party. However, they brought her
to Fort Bonifacio for interrogation. It was only then that Padayhag learned that her
companions were military men;
22. At Fort Bonifacio, the police coerced Padayhag to confess to the crime,
threatening her: Pag hindi ka pa umamin, kami na mismo and bibitay sa iyo.
Padayhag, however, did not confess to the commission of the crime. She was then
brought to Camp Crame at Quezon City on that same date;
23. The following day, 12 March 1995, during the custodial investigation, a certain
Major Meneses was exerting pressure on Padayhag to reveal where the P500,000.00
is. She told Major Meneses: Wala akong pera na ganoon kalaki. He said to her: Pag
hindi ka umamin, papatayin na kita talaga! Her answer was: Patayin nyo man ako,
hindi ako aamin dahil wala akong ganoong kalaking pera. Major Meneses then
slapped Padayhag and hit her with a stool on her leg;
24. Major Meneses also threatened Padayhag that if she would not confess to the
crime, he would submerge her on a drum. They forcibly brought her to a toilet room.
She saw there two big drums. Major Meneses then told her: Iyong mga hindi umamin,
nilulublob namin dito sa drum. Padayhag shouted. Thereafter, someone knocked at the
door and said: Pakawalan nyo na iyan dahil marami nang tao. They brought her out of
the room and handcuffed her;
25. SPO1 Larry Pablo was likewise threatening Padayhag: Pag hindi ka pa umamin,
ihuhulog na kita sa bintanang ito! (They were on the third floor of a building) Alam
mo ba kung ilan na ang naihulog namin diyan? Panlabindalawa ka na sa ihuhulog
namin diyan!;
26. During the custodial investigation, Padayhag was not assisted by a counsel, nor
has she waived her right to counsel. She was coerced by the police into signing an
extrajudicial confession without even explaining to her the contents thereof;
27. Atty. Eranio Sedillo only arrived one hour (1 hr.) after Padayhag had already
signed the questioned extrajudicial confession;
28. Elizabeth Castillo was arrested at Mitimos, Rizal, Zamboanga del Norte on or
about 21 March 1995. Police officers came to her house, and when they informed her
that they were looking for the money, she voluntarily gave it to them;
29. The approximate amount of money taken by Castillo was only twenty thousand
(P20,000.00) She returned the rest of the money to the police who arrested, her;
30. Castillo vehemently denied in her Sinumpaang Salaysay (par. No. 14) that she
returned only P227,000.00;
31. Castillo and her escorts were fetched in Manila by a van. Inside the van, they
blindfolded her. They removed her blindfold when they reached Camp Crame;
32. Major Meneses and SPO1 Larry Pablo investigated her. She was slapped by
Pablo, forcing her to admit where the money is;
33. During the investigation, Pablo poked a gun on her, then forced her to write what
he would say to her. He instructed her to write: Na kapag hindi ko isasauli ang lahat
ng pera ay pwede nyo na akong patayin. Castillo followed the instructions because of
fear.
[5]
In an 11-page Decision, of which nine pages were devoted to the recital of facts, the
trial court found the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses more credible and gave no
weight to Castillo and Padayhags defenses. The trial court convicted appellants on 17
December 1997 and imposed on them the death penalty, thus:
Originally, both accused pleaded guilty to the offense and were meted the penalty of
life imprisonment. However, shortly thereafter, they moved to withdraw their plea
claiming it was precipitate, which the court allowed and proceeded with a full-blown
trial.
Accused Elizabeth Castillo demanded money from Rockys parents for the release of
the latter. She told his father to bring the money to Obando Bulacan. The Court can
only imagine the pain, worry, fear and anxiety of the boys parents while their
youngest son was under detention.
Ransom is money, price or consideration demanded for the redemption of a captured

person or persons, a payment that releases from captivity (Corpus Juris Secundum
458). The testimony of Elizabeth Castillo that she did not know about the money
cannot be given weight. Two hundred Seventy Seven Thousand (P277,000.00) Pesos
was found among her things, the bills bearing the same serial number as the money
paid to her.
The court has taken a hard look in determining the liability of Evangeline Padayhag as
it seems that her only participation in the crime was picking up the boy from his
house. Although she did not get part of the ransom the fact is that she fully and
directly cooperated and did her part to carry out the resolution of her co-accused.
Under these facts there was conspiracy to extort ransom. People versus Kamad
Akiran, 18 SCRA 239.
The Court is convinced that the prosecution has established the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, ELIZABETH CASTILLO and EVANGELINE PADAYHAG are

sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death. Further, they are hereby ordered to
pay jointly and severally the sum of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos as
moral damages and Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos as exemplary
damages plus costs of litigation.
SO ORDERED. [6]
Appellants seek the reversal of their conviction by raising the following assignments
of error:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MISAPPRECIATING (SIC) THE FACTS OF THE

CASE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS

CONSPIRACY TO EXTORT RANSOM IN THIS CASE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE UNCOUNSELLED

CONFESSION OF EVANGELINE PADAYHAG.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY

IN THE CASE AT BAR. [7]
We affirm the trial courts judgment convicting Castillo. However, we acquit her co-
accused Padayhag.
To sustain a conviction for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention under Article 267
of the Revised Penal Code,[8] the prosecution must establish the following: (1) the offender
is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives
the victim of his liberty; (3) the act of kidnapping or detention is illegal; and (4) in the
commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the
kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating
public authority; (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted on the victim or threats to kill are
made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or a public officer.[9]
Appellant Castillos Liability
Castillo asserts that the victims parents did not pay her wages when she worked as
a maid of the victims family.[10] She claims that it was this injustice, her educational level
and her ignorance of the law, which impelled her to take Rocky. She faults the trial court
for refusing to consider this. Castillo is mistaken. Whether or not her employer failed to
pay her salary is irrelevant. No amount of perceived injustice can serve as justification for
any person to retaliate through the commission of another crime. The trial court was
therefore correct in disregarding Castillos claim that Rockys parents committed injustice
on her.
Castillos claim of injustice cannot justify in any way her demand for ransom. Ransom
is money, price or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured person
or persons, a payment that releases from captivity.[11] Thus, even if she had a right to
demand payment of her unpaid wages, the money she actually demanded and eventually
received, is still ransom.
Castillos reliance on her low educational level is similarly unavailing. The penalty for
kidnapping for ransom is the singular and indivisible penalty of death. This bars the
application of any alternative, mitigating or aggravating circumstance.[12]
Mr. Cebrero admitted that he was unable to identify his son Rockys abductors. De
Lena and Iglesias, the police officers who did the stake-out during the pay-off, testified
that the two women suddenly disappeared after retrieving the plastic bag containing the
ransom. The police officers inability to explain how two simple maids managed to give 5
carloads of police officers the slip severely discredits their account of what happened that
day.
Rockys testimony, however, leaves no room for doubt. Only six years of age when
he testified, Rocky was candid and direct in his recollection, narrating events as a young
boy saw them happen, thus:
COURT
Alright. Rocky, when Vangie went to fetch you from your house.
A Yes.
COURT
You took a tricycle.
A Yes.
COURT
Where did you go?
A I do not know.
PROS. FONACIER
Your Honor, please, may we request that the rule on evidence be not strict on this boy.
The witness is of tender age.
ATTY. SOLUREN
There is no strict implementation as to what the Honorable Prosecutor stated. There is
no strict implementation of the rules of court. In fact, we are very lenient but the
fact is, the child said he does not know. But the question is he was giving the
answer to this witness.
COURT
Ask another question.
Q Rocky, nang sumakay kayo ni Vangie sa tricycle, nakita mo ba si Beth Castillo?
A Nakita namin si Beth sa McDonalds. Malapit sa amin.
Q Rocky, nakita ninyo si Beth. Ngayon, tatlo na kayo, ikaw, si Beth at si Vangie?
A Yes.
Q Rocky, noong magkasama na kayong tatlo, saan kayo nagpunta?
A Nasundo namin si Beth.
Q Noong nasundo na ninyo si Beth, saan kayo nagpunta?
A Sa bahay nila.
Q Kaninong bahay?
A Hindi ko alam.
Q Malayo ba sa McDonald o malapit. Sinabi mo kanina, nagpunta kayo sa bahay nila?
A Yes.
Q Iyong bahay na pinuntahan ninyo, malayo sa McDonald?
A Malayo.
Q Anong sinakyan ninyo?
A Hindi ko alam.
Q Noong dumating kayo doon sa bahay na hindi ninyo, bahay, natulog ka ba doon?
A Yes.
Q Ilang beses ka natulog doon?

A 4 sleeps.
Q Pinakakain ka ba sa bahay na pinuntahan ninyo?
A Yes.
Q Ano ang pinakakain sa iyo?
A Champorado and fish.
Q Sino ang nagpapakain sa iyo?
A Vangie.
Q Sino si Vangie. Puede mo bang ituro sa amin?
PROS. FONACIER
The witness is pointing to accused Evangeline Padayhag as the Vangie he was
referring to.
Q Doon sa 4 sleeps mo sa bahay na iyon, saan ka pa nila dinala?
A Pinauwi na ako.
Q Sinong kasama mo noong pinauwi ka?
A Wala, pero mula sa McDonald, naiwan na ako sa tricycle hanggang sa bahay.[13]
Unshaken by rigorous cross-examination, Rockys testimony would have been more
than enough to convict Castillo. The testimony of a single witness, if credible and positive,
is sufficient to convict.[14] But there is more. The evidence on record amply supports the
factual findings of the trial court. Both the evidence of the prosecution and the defense
establish the commission of the crime.
Castillo admitted she instructed Padayhag to fetch Rocky on 1 March 1995:
Q And as a result of sitting at the palaruan, Miss witness, what happened next?
A Pinasundo ko si Rocky kay Vangie, mam.
Q And why did you ask Vangie to fetch Rocky, Miss witness?
A Kasi po naalala ko pagnamamalengke ako at kasama ko si Rocky, lagi po kaming
pumupunta sa palaruan, mam
Q And then what happened next, Miss witness?
A Sinundo po ni Vangie si Rocky, mam.
Q Whom did Vangie fetch, Miss witness?
A Si Rocky po, mam.
Q And after Rocky fetched by Vangie, what happened next?
A Ipinasyal po namin si Rocky, mam.[15] (Emphasis supplied)
She also testified that she had no permission from Rockys parents to take the child
with her:
T Saan kayo nananghalian?
S Doon po sa bahay ng kapatid ko.
T Noong dumating kayo doon, ano naman ang sinabi ng kapatid mo sayo?
S Ang sabi niya, bakit daw may kasama kaming bata.
T Ano naman ang naging sagot mo kay Imelda?
S Sabi ko pinasyal lang po namin.
T Hindi tinanong ni Imelda kung bakit pinasyal nyo ang bata, kung may paalam yong
bata doon sa kanyang magulang?
S Tinanong po.
T Ano naman ang sinabi mo sa kanya?
S Sinabi ko gusto ko lang makita si Rocky.
T Pero, ano ang sinabi mo noong tinanong kung may paalam ang bata sa kanyang
magulang, anong naging sagot mo sa katanungan niya?
S Ang sabi niya baka daw pagalitan kami.
T Ano naman ang naging sagot mo?
Your Honor, may we asked (sic) the witness to be more responsive with her answer.
COURT
What was the question, please?
Stenographer:
(Reading back the question)
T Noong tinanong ni Imelda kung may paalam ang bata sa mga magulang, ano
ang sagot mo?
S Ang sabi ko po hindi, walang paalam.
T Ano ang naging reaction ng iyong kapatid na si Imelda?
S Bakit daw hindi nagpaalam.[16] (Emphasis supplied)
Castillo testified that, during the period of Rockys detention she called Rockys father,
Mr. Cebrero, to wit:
Q What happened next Miss witness?
A Tinawagan ko po ang mga Cebrero.
Q Who of the Cebreros did you call up?
A Si Luis Cebrero po, mam.
Q What happened next after that?
A Pagtawag ko po kay Mr. Luis Cebrero tinanong po niya sa akin kung nasaan si
Rocky, mam.
Q And what is your reply?
A Sinabi ko po na nandidito sa amin, mam.
Q After that what happened next?
A Nagalit po si Luis Cebrero sa akin, mam.
Q And what did you do when Luis Cebrero got angry?
A Tinanong po niya ako kung magkano ang kailangan ko, mam.
Q And what else did he say, Miss witness?
A Sinabi po niya sa akin na huwag ko raw pong sasaktan si Rocky, mam.
Q And then what else?
A Pinipilit po niya ako na kung magkano daw ang kailangan namin na pera,
pagkatapos hindi ko na po sinagot ang tanong niya, mam.
Q And then what happened next?
A Binaba ko na po iyong telepono, mam.[17] (Emphasis supplied)
The number and time of these calls coincided with the calls Mr. Cebrero received
from Castillo telling him that she had Rocky and instructing him to pay the ransom for
Rockys release.
Additionally, Castillo by her own admission placed herself at the time and place where
the pay-off occurred:
T Sa pangatlong araw naman, nandoon ka pa rin ba at saka si Rocky?
S Opo.
T Sa bahay ni Imelda?
S Nagpaalam po ako sa kapatid ko na maghahanap muna ako ng trabaho.
T Si Vangie, saan naman siya noon?
S Nandoon pa rin sa Dagat-dagatan po.
T Si Rocky naman?
S Andoon po sa bahay ng kapatid ko.
T Mga anong oras yon na nagpaalam ka na maghanap ng trabaho?
S Umaga po ako nagpaalam.
T Kung ganoon umalis ka ng umagang yan?
S Opo.
T Saan ka naman pumunta?
S Naghanap po ako ng trabaho.
T Saan ka naghanap ng trabaho?
S Sa may bandang Bulacan po.
T Sa may Paco Obando, doon ka ba pumunta?
S Hindi po.
T Saang parte ka ng Bulacan pumunta?
S Malapit po sa may Hindi ko na po matandaan yong pinuntahan namin.
T Malapit sa may?
S Papunta na po ng Obando, pero hindi nakarating doon.
T Saan ka pumunta doon para maghanap ka ng trabaho?
ATTY. SOLUREN
Already answered, Your Honor, that the place papunta ng Obando pero hindi pa
nakakarating sa Obando.
STATE PROSECUTOR FONACIER
That is why I am asking.
COURT
What place is that? Witness may answer.
T Anong detalyadong lugar?
S Sa may Julo po.
T Ano yong Julo?
S Malapit po iyan sa Obando
COURT
Saang bayan ng Bulacan yon?
S Yon lang po ang alam ko.[18] (Emphasis supplied)

Beyond a feeble excuse that she was in Obando in order to look for employment,
Castillo provides no other plausible reason why her presence at that place, at such an
opportune time should not be taken against her as additional evidence of her guilt. To
attribute this to coincidence, as Castillo would probably have us do, taxes ones credulity.
The same can be said of her inability to explain how the ransom money was found in
her possession when she was caught by policemen in Dipolog. Castillo plainly contradicts
herself on this point. In Castillos brief, she admitted going to the pay-off site on the day
Mr. Cebrero was told to leave the ransom for Rockys release. Castillo admitted she found
at the site a black plastic bag filled with money and brought it home. [19]However in her
testimony before the trial court, she maintained that the first time she saw the same plastic
bag was when it mysteriously appeared in her luggage when she went to Dipolog:
Q And thereafter, Miss witness, what happened next?
A Hinanap ko iyong mga kagamitan ko po, mam.
Q And for what purpose you looked at your things, Miss witness?
A Para ayusin po iyong mga kagamitan ko para makapagpahinga na po ako, mam.
Q What happened next, Miss witness?
A May nakuha ako na isang plastic bag sa loob ng aking bag, mam.
Q And what is this plastic bag about, Miss witness?
A May laman po na pera, mam.
Q And how much money was there in that plastic bag, Miss witness?
A Hindi ko po alam.
Q And what did you observe about the money in the plastic bag?
A Nagulat po ako, mam.
Q And why were you surprised?
A Hindi ko po kasi lubos na maisip na ang bag na aking dala dala ay may laman
na isang malaking halaga na pera, mam.
Q And what did you do after learning that there was money inside your bag, Miss
witness?
A Pinabayaan ko na lang po at inaantay na may kumuha na lang po niyon sa akin
mam.[20] (Emphasis supplied)
Castillo insists that she took Rocky simply because she missed him, and wanted to
spend time with him. At the same time, in her brief Castillo claims that what spurred her
to take Rocky was her desire to get her unpaid wages from the Cebreros. [21]
Castillo also points out that Rocky came along freely with them, was not harmed, and
was even cared for during his detention. This argument is pointless. The essence of
kidnapping is deprivation of liberty. For kidnapping to exist, it is not necessary that the
offender kept the victim in an enclosure or treated him harshly. [22] Where the victim in a
kidnapping case is a minor, it becomes even more irrelevant whether the offender forcibly
restrained the victim. Leaving a child in a place from which he did not know the way home,
even if he had the freedom to roam around the place of detention, would still amount to
deprivation of liberty. For under such a situation, the childs freedom remains at the mercy
and control of the abductor.
Next, Castillo explains that she called Mr. Cebrero not to ask for ransom but to tell
him that Rocky was with her and unharmed. Castillo admitted that Mr. Cebrero pleaded
with her not to harm Rocky. Castillo failed to explain, however, why she did not inform Mr.
Cebrero of their exact whereabouts so that Mr. Cebrero could fetch Rocky. Her failure to
inform Mr. Cebrero clearly shows she kept Rocky in detention considering she called Mr.
Cebrero several times while she had physical control over Rocky.
Castillos explanation that she decided to return Rocky only when he was no longer
sick is also implausible. In the first place, she failed to explain why she did not return the
child the moment she found out he was sick. That would have been the more prudent
course of action at that time. However, one day after the pay-off on 4 March 1995, Rocky
suddenly appeared by himself at the Cebreros home on 5 March 1995. Any reasonable
person would conclude that the pay-off and the return of the child were related events.
Castillo would have us attribute this to coincidence.
Castillo would also have us believe that what prompted her sudden departure for
Dipolog, where she was eventually captured, was her inability to find employment in
Manila. And yet Castillo does not explain why she tried to bring Padayhag along with her
to Dipolog.
Finally, Castillo points out that the prosecution coached Rockys testimony. True,
Rocky admitted he did not know the contents of the document he signed in front of the
fiscal.[23] Rocky also stated that he was told to testify that Padayhag forced him to go with
her, and finally, that he must accuse both appellants as his abductors. [24] These
admissions, damaging as they may sound, are of little use to appellants. The reason is
simple. The facts to which Rockys testimony pertains to are the very same facts Castillo
herself admitted on the witness stand. Even if we were to discredit Rockys testimony
entirely, the facts of his kidnapping stand proven by no less than Castillos own admission
on the witness stand and in her brief.
With the evidence Castillos own testimony established, the prosecutions witnesses
did little more than corroborate what Castillo herself had admitted. Since Castillo admitted
in open court that she instructed Padayhag to fetch Rocky even without the parents
permission, we find her explanations futile. Her allegations of torture and of signing a
sworn statement without counsel are useless. After claiming to have been tortured into
making her sworn statement, logic would have it that Castillo should have debunked the
contents of that statement through her testimony. Instead, she freely and voluntarily
recounted events as she narrated them in her sworn statement. Moreover, there is no
allegation that the trial court decided her guilt based on her sworn statement. The trial
court based its decision on the testimonies of all the witnesses, including Castillos.
In sum, the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt Castillos guilt.
Appellant Padayhags Liability
The same cannot be said of Padayhag. Our review of the evidence on record shows
that the prosecution failed to prove Padayhags guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
We reiterate the doctrine that an appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for
review on any question including those not raised by the parties.[25] This becomes even
more imperative in cases where the penalty imposed is death.
Padayhags sole involvement in this entire episode is her act of fetching Rocky and
bringing him to where Castillo was waiting for them. Padayhag then went strolling with
the two, went to the house of Castillos sister together with Castillo and Rocky, and then
later left the house. From this fact alone, the prosecution would have us rule that
Padayhag acted in conspiracy with Castillo. The prosecution contends that without
Padayhags help, Castillo could not have abducted Rocky.
We are not persuaded.
There must be positive and conclusive evidence that Padayhag acted in concert with
Castillo to commit the same criminal act. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by
conspiracy, there must be a sufficient and unbroken chain of events that directly and
definitely links the accused to the commission of the crime without any space for baseless
suppositions or frenzied theories to filter through.[26] Indeed, conspiracy must be proven
as clearly as the commission of the crime itself.[27]
Conspiracy is established by the presence of two factors: (1) singularity of intent; and
(2) unity in execution of an unlawful objective. The two must concur. Performance of an
act that contributes to the goal of another is not enough. The act must be motivated by
the same unlawful intent. Neither joint nor simultaneous action is per se sufficient indicium
of conspiracy, unless proved to have been motivated by a common design. [28]
Padayhags act of fetching Rocky is not conclusive proof of her complicity with
Castillos plan, a plan Padayhag did not even know. Both appellants testified that
Padayhag met Castillo only because Castillo told Padayhag that Padayhags boyfriend
was sick. It was precisely on the pretext that they were to visit Padayhags boyfriend that
the two met. When they met, Padayhag realized that Castillo had deceived her:
Q Why? (sic) Elizabeth Castillo fetched you on February 28, 1995 and why did you
decide to leave your employment?
A Kasi sabi po niya sa akin ang boyfriend ko raw ay maysakit, sir.
Q And could you tell us who is that boyfriend of yours?
A Si Jessie Mercader po, sir.
Q And what is the address of Jessie Mercader, at that time, February 28, 1995?
A Sa Caloocan City po, sir.
Q And you said he was sick. What was his sickness?
ATTY. SOLUREN
Your Honor, that is misleading.
COURT
Reform your question.
Q Madam witness, you said that you were informed that your boyfriend was sick. Did
you go and see your boyfriend?
A Sumama po ako kay Elizabeth Castillo pero hindi na po kami natuloy pumunta doon,
sir.
Q For what reason you did not go?
A Hindi po sinabi sa akin ni Elizabeth Castillo, sir.
Q So, you did not come to find out what was the sickness of your boyfriend?
A Hindi na po sir.
Q Are we made to understand, madam witness, when you left your employer on 28
February 1995 for the reason that your boyfriend was sick, you did not actually go
and see your boyfriend?
A Opo, sir.[29]
After the two spent the day together, Castillo beseeched Padayhag to fetch Rocky
citing as reason her love for the child and a desire to spend time with the boy. Padayhag
is a young lass from the province who only finished Grade Two. Padayhag was thus easily
misled by the more worldly Castillo. Padayhags testimony reveals her naivet:
COURT
Q Ano ang sinabi sa iyo bakit mo susunduin ang bata?
A Namimiss na raw po niya iyong bata at nais niyang makita, Your Honor.
COURT
Tapos ikaw ang pinasundo niya doon sa bata?

A Opo, Your Honor.
COURT
Tapos noon dalhin sa Caloocan, ano pa, sinabi pa rin niya namimiss niya ang bata
ganoon uli ang sinabi niya sa iyo?
A Wala na po siyang sinabi sa akin, Your Honor.
COURT
Hindi ka ba nakahalata na may mali doon sa pangyayaring iyon?
A Ang pagkakaalam ko po ay ipapasyal lamang niya ang bata, Your Honor.
Q Sa Caloocan?
A Opo, Your Honor.
COURT
Tapos umalis ka na pagkatapos ninyong kumain doon ng kapatid niya?
A Opo, Your Honor.
COURT
Ipinasyal ba niya ang bata?
A Hindi ko na po alam kasi umalis nga po pagkatapos namin kumain, Your Honor.
COURT
Kailan niya sinabi sa iyo na ibabalik ang bata?
A Wala po siyang sinabi kung kailan, Your Honor.
COURT
Ganoon ba ang alam mo sa pamamasyal?
A Siya naman po ang nagyaya, Your Honor.[30]
Her ignorance and susceptibility to confusion becomes more evident in the following
exchange:
COURT
Kailan ka ba umalis kay Mr. Julito Luwagon?
A Hindi ko pa matandaan, Your Honor.
COURT
Pero sabi mo kanina ay pitong buwan ka doon?
A Opo pitong buwan ako roon pero hindi ko po matandaan kung anong buwan, Your
Honor.
ATTY. SOLUREN
She only finished Grade II, Your Honor.
COURT
Yes I know it but she would know that she works for seven (7) months. Alam mo ba na
December 1994 ka nagsimula mangamuhan kay Julito Luwagon?
A Opo, Your Honor.
COURT
Enero, Pebrero, Marso, Abril, Mayo, Hunyo at Hulyo tama ba iyon?
A Opo, Your Honor.
COURT
Papaano nangyari noong Enero 1995 ikaw ay nagtratrabaho na kay Lulu Sablan?
A Itinuro po sa akin ni Elizabeth Castillo na mag-apply ng trabaho sa may BF Homes,
Your Honor.
COURT
Kailan kayo nagkita nitong si Elizabeth Castillo?
A Noong January lang po, Your Honor.
COURT
Saan kayo nagkita?
A Pinaalis niya po ako doon sa pinagtratrabahuan ko sa may Dagat Dagatan, Your
Honor.
COURT
Alam mo ba kung ilang buwan mayroon ang isang taon?
A Hindi ko po alam, Your Honor.
COURT
Pero alam mo ang mga buwan, Enero, Pebrero.. alam mo iyon?
A Opo, Your Honor.
COURT
Sige nga sabihin mo nga sa akin kung anu-ano ang mga buwan?
A Enero, Pebrero, Marso, Abril, Mayo, Hunyo, Hulyo, Agosto, Setyembre, Oktubre,
Nobyembre at Disyembre po, Your Honor.[31]
Padayhags confusion in the way she answered the questions propounded to her only
highlights the fact that she was not aware of Castillos plans and was vulnerable to the
latters manipulation. Her straightforward and wide-eyed admission of facts that
incriminate her demonstrate a level of honesty that can only be found in those who do not
know the art of deceit. Far from a cold and calculating mind, Padayhag strikes us as one
whose innocence often leaves her at the mercy of her more worldly peers. It is clear that
she acted with the full belief that Castillo was doing nothing wrong. Whatever moved her
to do what Castillo asked of her is up for speculation. What matters is that her motivation
in fetching Rocky was not to kidnap the boy. To impose criminal liability, the law requires
that there be intentional participation in the criminal act,[32] not the unwitting cooperation of
a deceived individual.
In its brief the prosecution itself cites that any inquiry as to the liability of an individual
as a conspirator should focus on all acts before, during and after the commission of the
crime.[33] We have done precisely that, and it is precisely why we rule for her innocence.
After her stroll with Castillo and Rocky, she left when Castillo brought the boy to her sisters
house in Caloocan.[34] She never visited nor contacted Castillo afterwards. She remained
at her house and refused to go with Castillo when the latter suddenly tried to coax her to
go to Dipolog. None of the money used as ransom was found in her possession. Her
involvement in the pay-off was never established. The testimony of two prosecution
witnesses, Sgt. De Lena and Sgt. Iglesias, claiming that Padayhag was with Castillo when
the latter picked up the ransom in Obando, is contradicted by Castillos admission in open
court that she brought along a certain Mila and not Padayhag. [35] In addition, the
testimonies of these two police officers suffer from their failure to explain how they
suddenly lost track of the two women who took the ransom in front of their very eyes.
All these circumstances illustrate the absence of any hint of conspiracy. We also find
that the prosecution failed to prove Padayhags guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In People
v. Gonzales[36] we held:
In the absence of conspiracy, if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of
two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the
test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.
Every person accused has the right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proven beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of innocence stands as a
fundamental principle of both constitutional and criminal law.[37] Thus, the prosecution has
the burden of proving every single fact establishing guilt. [38]Every vestige of doubt having
a rational basis must be removed.[39] The defense of the accused, even if weak, is no
reason to convict.[40] Within this framework, the prosecution must prove its case beyond
any hint of uncertainty. The defense need not even speak at all. The presumption of
innocence is more than sufficient.
The failure to prove Padayhags involvement as a conspirator reveals how tenuous
the evidence is linking her to the crime. Padayhags culpability hinges on how her act of
fetching Rocky and bringing him to Castillo formed part of a concerted effort to kidnap the
child. The act of fetching the boy, by itself, does not constitute a criminal offense. By itself,
it is not even sufficient to make her an accomplice. For a person to be considered an
accomplice there must be a community of design, that is, knowing the criminal design of
the principal, the co-accused concurs with the latter. Mere commission of an act which
aids the perpetrator is not enough. As we explained in People v. Cual:[41]
The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly rendered, which
cannot exist without the previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be
executed. It is therefore required in order to be liable as an accomplice, that the
accused must unite with the criminal design of the principal by direct participation.
There was therefore a need for clear and convincing proof that this single act was
committed to kidnap the child. The prosecution failed to prove this. Padayhag explained
that Castillo coaxed her into fetching Rocky through another deception and by playing on
her feelings of sympathy and friendship. Castillo corroborated this on the witness stand.
The prosecution failed to prove otherwise.
The facts as established show that the only thing Castillo told Padayhag was to fetch
Rocky because Castillo missed her former ward. Upon reaching the house of the
Cebreros, the boys nanny handed over to Padayhag the child. There is no allegation or
evidence that Padayhag knew the criminal plan of Castillo. Neither is there any hint that
Castillo told Padayhag to abduct the boy, or to misrepresent herself or use means that
would have led Padayhag to suspect that Castillo had some criminal design. Nor was
there any proof that Padayhag knew that Castillo had no permission from the boys
parents. The appearance of the boy itself, newly bathed and dressed for a stroll, would
have led Padayhag to believe whatever story Castillo contrived to ask her in fetching the
boy.
A criminal conviction must stand on the strength of the evidence presented by the
prosecution, and not on the weakness of the defense of the accused. The prosecution
should have done more to establish Padayhags guilt. Instead, the prosecution left a lot of
room for other possible scenarios besides her guilt. This is a fatal error. The presumption
of innocence imposes a rule of evidence, a degree of proof that demands no less than
total compliance. As we explained in United States v. Reyes:[42]
The presumption of innocence can be overborne only by proof of guilt beyond

reasonable doubt, which means proof, to the satisfaction of the court and keeping in
mind the presumption of innocence, as precludes every reasonable
hypothesis except that which it is given to support. It is not sufficient for the proof
to establish a probability, even though strong, that the fact charged is more likely
true than the contrary. It must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and
moral certainty- a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of
those who are to act upon it. (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, we find Padayhags explanation sufficiently supported by

circumstances aside from Castillos testimony. Padayhags acts before, during and after
the crime all point to the conclusion that she was no more than an unwitting tool of Castillo.
Castillo misled her into a meeting. Castillo again misled her into fetching Rocky. Castillo
never met or contacted her after the day of Rockys abduction. Castillo also testified that
she did not bring Padayhag along with her when she went to Obando on the day that
coincided with the pay-off. The only circumstance linking Padayhag to that event is the
shaky account of two police officers who admitted that their quarry inexplicably
disappeared before their very eyes. Even the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duty, by itself, cannot prevail over the constitutional presumption of
innocence.[43] Nothing links Padayhag to the demand for ransom. She never received any
part of the ransom, precisely because she did not even know it existed.
Penalty and Damages
Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,[44] the penalty of death is imposed upon
proof that the kidnapping was committed to extort ransom from the victim or any other
person. We find that the prosecution has established Castillos guilt for this crime beyond
reasonable doubt. However, Castillos pecuniary liability must be modified to conform with
jurisprudence. The award of exemplary damages must be deleted in the absence of any
aggravating circumstance. Mr. Cebrero testified that their family suffered serious anxiety
at the possibility of not seeing Rocky again.[45] The pain and anguish they experienced
justifies the award of moral damages. However, we reduce the trial courts award of moral
damages to P100,000 in line with current jurisprudence.[46]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 260,
National Capital Judicial Region, in Criminal Case No. 95-86 convicting appellant
Elizabeth Castillo is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Elizabeth Castillo is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH and to pay the victim P100,000 as moral
damages. The award for exemplary damages is deleted for lack of legal basis. The trial
courts Decision convicting appellant Evangeline Padayhag is REVERSED. We ACQUIT
Evangeline Padayhag and order her immediate RELEASE from confinement unless held
for another lawful cause. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to report to
the Court, within five days from notice, compliance with this Decision.
In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25
of Republic Act No. 7659, upon finality of this decision, let certified true copies of the
records of this case be forwarded to the President of the Philippines for the possible
exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., on leave.
Panganiban, J., on official leave.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132324. September 28, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NORLITO TAN @

NORLY and JOSE TAN, accused-appellants.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When an accused invokes self-defense, the burden of proof to show that the killing was
justified shifts to him.Even if the prosecution evidence may be weak, it could not be disbelieved
after his open admission owing authorship of the killing. However, to implicate a co-accused as a
co-principal, conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. In the absence of conspiracy,
the responsibility of the two accused is individual, not collective.
The Case
Before us is an appeal of the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, in
Criminal Case No. P-2297, which convicted Norlito Tan of murder, and Jose Tan of being an
accomplice in such crime.
On January 3, 1994, an Information[2] was filed against the appellants, the accusatory portion
of which reads as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of September, 1993, in Barangay Gatbo, Municipality of
Ocampo, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one
another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stone
and stab with a deadly weapon one Magdaleno Rudy Olos alias Modesto Olos,
thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds on the different parts of his body
which caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the offended party
in such amount as may be proven in court.[3]
On December 14, 1995, Jose Tan was arrested in Ocampo, Camarines Sur. Upon his
arraignment on January 3, 1996, he entered a plea of not guilty.[4] Subsequently, Norlito Tan was
arrested on April 1, 1996. When arraigned on May 23, 1996, he likewise pleaded not guilty.[5] Trial
on the merits ensued. On July 2, 1997, the trial court rendered its assailed Decision, the decretal
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the

accused NORLY alias NORLITO TAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
of MURDER and is hereby imposed the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA
ranging from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years while the other
accused JOSE TAN is also adjudged guilty as an accomplice to the offense of
MURDER and is hereby imposed an indeterminate penalty of PRISION MAYOR
in its medium period ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day as minimum to ten
years (10) as maximum, together with its accessory penalties. As civil liability, both
accused are hereby ordered to pay the heirs of MODESTO OLOS, represented by his
widow, Ofelia Nueca Olos, the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00)
Philippine currency with costs against them.
The accused Norly Tan and Jose Tan are credited with the full period of their
preventive imprisonment if they agreed in writing to abide with all the terms and
conditions of their provisional detention, otherwise, to only 4/5 thereof. [6]
The appellants lodged their appeal with the Court of Appeals which, in view of the penalty
imposed, forwarded it to this Court.[7]
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In the Peoples Brief,[8] the Office of the Solicitor General presents the facts as viewed by the
prosecution in this wise:
On September 6, 1993, at about 6:00 p.m., Ramon Nueca was weeding his ricefield
located at Gatbo, Ocampo, Camarines Sur. At that time, there was still sunlight. (pp.
7-8, TSN, July 3, 1996).
At a distance of about twenty (20) meters, Ramon Nueca saw Magalino Olos, (who
was also his brother-in-law), walking along the road going to Gatbo. At that time,
appellant Jose Tan who was then sixteen (16) years old, was also walking infront of
Olos. Appellant Norlito Tan, (brother of appellant Jose Tan), who was holding an
eight-inch knife known as gatab, suddenly emerged from the grassy portion at the
right side of the road where the grasses [were] higher than a person. Appellant Norlito
Tan stabbed Olos three (3) times. Olos was hit twice at the upper portion of his back
and once at his abdomen. Thereafter, appellant Jose Tan threw a stone at Olos, hitting
him at his neck (pp. 9-16, 35-37, TSN, July 3, 1996).
Ramon Nueca decided to go to the place of the incident to pacify

appellants. However, when appellants saw Ramon Nueca coming, they fled. Ramon
Nueca and his brother, Simplicio, brought Olos to the Municipal Hall of
Ocampo.From there, Olos was brought by an ambulance to the Bicol Regional
Hospital in Naga City where he later died. (pp. 18-20, TSN, July 3, 1996).
Olos was examined and treated at the Bicol Regional Hospital by a certain Dr. Jullie
Sy. However, at the time of the trial of this case, he was no longer connected with
[the]Bicol Regional Hospital, hence, was not available to testify in this case. His
findings as reflected in the medical certificate (Exhibit B) which he issued were
interpreted by Dr. Thomas Gonzales, the incumbent Municipal Health Officer of Pili,
Camarines Sur (p. 3, Annex A, Appellants Brief).
Dr. Gonzales testified that the first finding in the medical certificate (Exhibit B)
consists of a 1.4 centimeter-wound found at the left portion of the back side of the
victim which would have been inflicted by a sharp-bladed instrument (pp. 11-12,
TSN, August 14, 1996); the second finding consists of a 1.6 centimeter wound located
on the level of the 4th introspect asterior left side of the body of the victim below the
level of the nipple or left front side of his body below the nipple (p. 13, ibid.); the
third finding consists of a fatal injury located at the umbilical area left side of the liver
of the victim with the intestine coming out. (pp. 13-15 ibid).
xxx xxx xxx[9]
Version of the Defense

In their Brief,[10] Appellants Norlito Tan and Jose Tan claim self-defense and denial,
respectively, alleging as follows:
B. Evidence for the Defense:
On September 6, 1993 in Bgy. Gatbo, Ocampo, Camarines Sur, at about 4:00 oclock
in the afternoon, Jose Tan was then watching a basketball game while his brother
Norlito Tan was playing basketball. At about 5:30 oclock PM, they left together to go
home but on their way home, they passed the road and dropped by at the house of
Wilfredo Bale to chew betel and betelnut. While they were in yard of Wilfredo Bale,
the latter told accused Norlito Tan to go home as Modesto Olos might chase him
again. Heeding the advice of Wifredo, Norlito left to go home, while Jose remained
on the yard of Wilfredo. While Norlito was on his was home, Modesto Olos who was
then in the ricefield walked fast towards the road and met the former who evaded the
latter by proceeding to the other side of the road as Modesto had been blocking his
way and telling him that Norlito would be buried alive. Then Modesto drew a knife
and stabbed Norlito who was able to parry the thrust and holds the formers hand
holding the knife. Norly Tan immediately drew his knife from his boot and retaliated
by stabbing Modesto who was hit and fell to the ground. Then Ramon Nueca arrived
and embraced Norlito, and at this moment, Angel Paular who was holding a stone ran
towards him but Norlito was able to extricate himself from the hold of Ramon and ran
away.
When Modesto and Norlito were then fighting, Jose Tan was in front of the house of
Wilfredo Bele. Then, when Norlito was fleeing and passing by the house of Wilfredo,
Jose Tan also ran away.
At the time of said incident, Jose Tan was then below sixteen (16) years old as he was
born on September 18, 1977 as per birth certificate submitted to the trial court.
The Trial Courts Ruling
In convicting Appellant Norlito Tan of murder, the trial court ruled that his claim of self-
defense was negated by the evidence on record. It added that when an accused pleads self-defense,
the burden of proof shifts on him, a burden Norlito Tan failed to discharge. Jose Tans denial was
equally unavailing in view of the credible prosecution witnesses identification of him.
The lower court held that treachery and evident premeditation accompanied the killing and,
thus, the crime committed was murder. However, the court a quo dismissed the prosecutions claim
of conspiracy and adjudged Jose Tan guilty merely as an accomplice.
The Assigned Errors
Appellants fault the trial court with the following errors:
1. The court a quo seriously erred in finding that accused Norlito Tan treacherously
killed Modesto Olos and that accused Jose Tan helped his brother in the fatal stabbing
of the victim.
2. The court a quo gravely erred in relying solely [on] and giving full credence [to] the
testimonies of Ramon Nueca and Ofelia Olos and in disregarding the testimonies of
both accused and their witnesses.
3. The court a quo seriously erred in finding that both accused eluded the
apprehending authorities indicating that they are guilty of the crime charged.
4. The court a quo imposed an excessive penalty upon both accused granting but not
admitting that accused Norlito Tan is guilty of the crime charged and accused Jose
Tan being a minor below 16 years old is guilty as an accomplice;
5. The court a quo seriously erred in convicting accused Norlito Tan of the crime of
murder and accused Jose Tan as an accomplice.[11]
To resolve the case, the Court believes that the following points should be discussed: (1)
credibility of witnesses; (2) self-defense and burden of proof; and (3) characterization of the crime
and the applicable penalty.
The Courts Ruling
The trial court correctly convicted the appellants, but erred in imposing the proper penalty.
First Issue:
Credibility of Witnesses
Well-rooted is the rule that factual findings of the trial judge who tried the case and heard the
witnesses are not to be disturbed on appeal, unless there are circumstances of weight and substance
which have been overlooked and which, if properly considered, might affect the result of the
case.[12] Because the trial court is in a better position to examine the demeanor and conduct of the
witnesses while testifying on the stand, its conclusions and findings on their credibility are entitled
to great weight on appeal and should not be changed except for strong and valid reasons.[13]
Alleged Irregularities
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of
Prosecution Witnesses Ramon Nueca and Ofelia Olos, considering that the defense was not able
to cross-examine Nueca thoroughly. With regard to Olos, appellants claim that her presentation as
a rebuttal witness was irregular and, as such, should not have been allowed by the court a quo.
There is no merit to appellants assertion of procedural prejudice. True, Ramon Nueca did not
return to court to finish his cross-examination; however, this does not mean that his testimony
should be expunged, as appellants insists.It must be noted that his failure to appear before the court
was not the fault of prosecution. More important, the defense had the opportunity to cross-examine
him, as in fact he was actually subjected to cross-examination by the appellants counsel, Atty.
Crispo Q. Borja Jr.[14] The cross-examination touched on the material points elicited from Nueca
during his direct examination his eyewitness description of Norly and Jose Tans participation in
the killing.
Neither can the presentation of Ofelia Olos as a rebuttal witness be deemed

irregular. Considering that the appellants claimed self-defense only after the prosecution had rested
its case, the latter, after being allowed by the trial court, exercised its prerogative to present Olos,
so that she could testify that the attack on her husband was sudden and unexpected. Furthermore,
it is within the sound discretion of a trial judge to allow a party that has rested its case to introduce
rebuttal evidence.[15]
Alleged Inconsistencies
Appellants insist that the testimonies of Nueca and Olos were tainted with contradictions and
inconsistencies, viz.:
The vital and material points of the testimony of Ramon Nueca which require careful
considerations are as follows, to wit:
1. He saw [his] brother-in-law Modesto Olos stabbed thrice by Norlito Tan, hitting
him twice at the back and once in front of the body, (pp. 12 & 14, tsn, 7-3-96),
contrary to the testimony of Dr. Gonzales who testified that the victim suffered
injuries at the left portion of the backside body (intercostal post line), at the left front
side below the nipple, and on his abdomen. (pp. 11, 12 & 14, tsn, 8-14-96).
2. The reason why both accused killed his brother-in-law was that they were
apprehended by the victim in the house of Flores per information given to him by said
victim (p. 21, tsn, 7-3-96), while in his sworn statement marked Exh. 1, he stated that
he [did] not know of any motive why accused Norlito stabbed and Jose stoned him.
3. Norlito hid and emerged from the talahib grass and immediately stabbed his
brother-in-law (pp. 13, 15 & 40, tsn, 7-3-96), while in exhibit 1, he stated that while
he was walking on the road going to Gatbo, he was approached by Norlito and Jose,
and then Modesto was stabbed by Norlito.
xxx xxx xxx
With respect to the vital and material; points/parts of the testimony of Ofelia Olos
which likewise require careful consideration are as follows:
1. That before the stabbing incident, she saw Norlito suddenly emerged from the
talahib grass and immediately stabbed her husband -- this is contrary to her statement
given during the preliminary inquiry conducted by the presiding judge of MTC,
Ocampo, Camarines Sur, which statement is part of the record of this case. In said
statement, she said that when she was out of her house after cooking, she saw her
husband being stabbed by Norlito and before her husband was stabbed, he was
standing on the road and about to pick up a stone when attacked by both accused. She
did not mention any talahib grass in said statement.
2. That while Norlito was stabbing her husband, Jose shouted at his brother to stop; -
These allegations of Ofelia are contrary to human experience for the simple reason
that if accused Jose really shouted at his brother to stop stabbing Modesto Olos, he
would not throw stones at the latter.
3. That her house is six (6) meters away from the road and in between her house and
the road, there are irrigation canal, ricefield, and a vacant lot (Pp. 16-17, tsn 3-10-
97); This is contrary to the testimony of her brother-in-law as according to him, the
house of Ofelia is thirty (30) meters away from the road, and between the road and the
house of Olos, there are two (2) irrigation canals and a ricefield in between said canals
(P.30, tsn 7-3-96). Thus, it is improbable that the house of Ofelia is only 6 meters
away from the road, and she could not see the person on the other side of the talahib
grass from her house as the grass is higher than the height of a person and the distance
from the house is 30 meters to the road as testified by Ramon Nueca (Pp. 34-36, tsn 7-
3-96).
4. That her husband was twice stabbed at the back on the left side back shoulder (P.
24. Tsn 3-10-97). This is [contrary] to the testimony of Dr. Tomas Gonzales as
already mention in the foregoing.
Considering the foregoing testimony of Ofelia Olos, it is indubitable that she was
telling lies when she testified in court and was not an eye-witness to the
incident. Taking into consideration both testimonies of Ramon Nueca whose
testimony on cross-examination was not finished for his failure to return to court and
of Ofelia Olos on rebuttal stage whose testimony is improper for consideration for
reason already aforestated, we contend that the trial court gravely erred in relying
solely and giving full credence to the testimonies of said prosecution witnesses and in
finding that accused Norlito Tan treacherously killed Modesto Olos and finding also
that Jose [T]an helped his brother in the fatal stabbing of the victim.
These arguments do not persuade. The prosecution witnesses clearly placed the appellants at
the scene of the crime and established that Norly Tan stabbed Olos. These facts were admitted by
Norly Tan, who claimed self-defense.True, there are some apparent minor inconsistencies in the
testimonies of Nueca and Olos, but they do not detract from the clarity, the cohesiveness or the
consistency of their testimonies on how Norly Tan killed the victim. Nueca testified thus:
Q Now, were you able to see the persons responsible for the stabbing of Rudy Olos?
xxx xxx xxx
A Yes, sir, there were two (2) persons.
Q Were you able to recognize them?
A Yes, sir.
Q Can you tell the Honorable Court their names?
A Yes, sir, Norly Tan and Jose Tan.
Q How is this Norly Tan related to the Norlito Tan impleaded in this case who stabbed Magdalino Rudy
Olos?
A The same person, sir.
Q And please tell the Honorable Courtwhat did Norly Tan do?
A Norlito Tan stabbed Magdalino Rudy Olos.
Q Were you able to see the instrument which was used by Norly Tan in stabbing Magdalino Rudy Olos?
A Yes, sir, a kind of knife which is known in our dialect as tabak, or gatab.
Q Will you please describe to the Honorable Court the weapon otherwise called as gatab in your locality?
A Somewhat small knife which is about eight (8) inches long.
Q Was that eight inches long including the handle?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, was Magdalino Rudy Olos hit by the thrusts of Norly Tan?
A Yes, sir.
Q In what part of the body of Magdalino rudy Olos was hit by Norly tan?
A At the back, sir.
COURT
Q Which part of the back?
A Upper portion of his back, Your Honor. At this juncture, witness is pointing the upper right portion
of his back.
xxx xxx xxx
FISCAL RAMOS
Q By the way, what was Magdalino Rudy Olos doing in the road when he was actually assaulted by
Norly Tan?
A He was on his way home, sir.
Q Now, in relation to the victim Magdalino Rudy Olos, where was Norly Tan when he stabbed Olos?
A He was on the left side of Magdalino Olos, sir.
Q And where did Norly Tan emerge or where did he come from before he stabbed Magdalino Olos?
A He came from the talahib.
COURT
Q How many times did he stab the victim?
A Three (3) times your honor.
xxx xxx xxx
FISCAL RAMOS
Q And what injury sustained by victim Magdalino Rudy Olos at his back [--] was that the injury resulting
from his death or which of the stabbing blows made by Norly Tan xxx [h]it him?
A They all hit him, sir.
Q How about the stabbing blow for the second time?
A Still at the back, sir.
Q How about the third time?
A He was hit on the abdomen.
Q Now, you mentioned earlier that Norly Tan emerged from the grassy portion, will you please tell the
Honorable Court how tall [was the] grassy portion where Norly Tan emerged?
A It is higher than a person, sir.
Q How far is that grassy portion where Magdalino Olos came from?
A Just beside the road, sir.
Q Will you please tell the Honorable Court of your own knowledge or observation, was Olos able to see
Norly Tan before the latter emerged from the grassy portion?
A He could not have seen Norly Tan because Magdalino Olos already passed when Norlito Tan emerged
from the grassy portion of the field.
Q Now, for how long had time elapsed when Norly Tan emerged from the grassy portion of the field
and stabbed Olos?
A Around one (1) second, sir.
Q When the victim Olos was stabbed by Norly Tan for the first time at his back, what did Olos do, if
any?
A When he faced Norly tan, Norly Tan stabbed him in his abdomen?
COURT
Q So the second stab was also in the abdomen of the victim?
A No, your honor, the two (2) stabs hit his back and the third stab hit his abdomen.
xxx xxx xxx
FISCAL RAMOS
Q Now, how about Jose Tan, do you know where he was at the time his brother Norly Tan emerged
from the talahib?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where was he?
A He was at the middle of the road.
Q Now, in relation to where Magdalino Rudy Olos was walking at the middle of the road where was
Jose Tan at that time?
A In front of Olos.
Q How far was Jose Tan at that time?
A About five (5) meters.
COURT
Q So they saw each other?
A yes, your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
FISCAL RAMOS
Q What if any, did Jose Tan do?
A He stoned Olos.
Q At what moment did Jose Tan throw [stones at] Magdalino Rudy Olos[?]
A After his brother Norly Tan stabbed Olos, sir.
Q And was Olos hit by the stone of Jose Tan?
A Yes, sir.
Q In what part of his body was he hit was Jose Tan?
A In his neck.
Q How many times did he stone Magdalino Rudy Olos?
A Only one (1) sir.
Q How about you, what did you do while Norly Tan was stabbing the victim, Magdalino Olos?
A I was about to run away to them in order to pacify them, but when the two (2) brothers saw me, they
fled.
Q Towards what direction [did] they [flee?].
A Towards the direction of their uncles house.[16]
The above-quoted testimony jibes with that of Ofelia Olos as to how the incident
happened,[17] and with that of Dr. Gonzales as to the number of wounds sustained by the victim.
The inconsistencies pointed out by the appellants refer to their alleged motive for killing the
victim, the distance of the witnesses from the locus criminis and the location of the wounds
inflicted. However, motive is not important when there is no doubt about the identity of the
perpetrator of the crime,[18] as in the present case. True, there was variance in the witnesses
testimonies as to their distance from stabbing incident. However, the sketch presented in court
showed that they had a clear view of the scene.[19] And although they could not pinpoint precise
locations, they were able to give the correct number of wounds sustained by the victim. their
perception as to where the victim was struck was likewise correct.
In any case, the inconsistencies cited by the appellants are not substantial enough to impair
the credibility of these witnesses. Rather, such minor lapses manifest truthfulness and candor and
erase suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.[20]
In all, we cannot fault the trial court for upholding the relevant portions of the prosecution
witnesses testimonies.
Second Issue:
Self-Defense
When the accused invoke self-defense, the burden of proof is shifted to them to prove that the
killing was justified and that they incurred no criminal liability therefor. They must rely on the
strength of their own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if the
latter is weak, it could not be disbelieved after their open admission of responsibility for the
killing.[21]
In the present case, it is incumbent upon Appellant Norly Tan to prove self-defense. Thus, he
must prove that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, that the means employed
to prevent it were reasonable, and that there was lack of sufficient provocation o his part. However,
he failed to discharge this burden.
True, he alleges that it was the victim, Magdalino Olos, who was the aggressor who had started
the fracas:
Q When Modesto Olos met you on the left side of the road, what else did he do?
A When we were on the left side of the road, Modesto Olos asked me why I was there and then I told
him that I was a resident and then he told me that he will bury me alive and at the same time he
thrust his bladed weapon and stabbed me.
COURT
Q Did he hit you?
A I was able to parry the thrust and [hold] his arm with the weapon. When I was able to hold his hand
with the bolo, I was also able to draw my own bladed weapon and I was able to stab him.
Q From where did you draw that weapon which you used in stabbing Modesto Olos?
A I drew it from inside my boot.
xxx xxx xxx[22]
The above-quoted testimony, however, shows some inherent contradictions. If it was the
victim who had attacked Norly Tan, then why did the former suffer three stab wounds and the
latter none? Likewise, the Court finds it hard to believe that Norly Tan was able to subdue the
victim with one hand and at the same time get his weapon from his boot.Clearly then, his self-
serving allegation would not suffice. It pales in comparison with the positive and categorical
declaration of the prosecution witnesses that the attack on the victim was sudden an unprovoked.
Third Issue:
Crime and Its Punishment
The trial court correctly ruled that the killing was attended by treachery; hence, the crime was
murder.
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, without the slightest
provocation on the part of the person attacked.[23] Treachery is present when the offender commits
any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof,
which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk arising from the defense
which the offended party might make.[24] In the case at bar, the attack on Magdalino Olos was
treacherous, because he was caught off guard and was therefore unable to defend himself, as
testified to by the prosecution witnesses and as indicated by the wounds inflicted on him.
Culpability of Jose Tan
We agree with the court a quo that the prosecution was not able to establish conspiracy in the
killing of the victim; thus, Appellant Jose Tan is guilty only as an accomplice. Worth quoting is
the trial courts disquisition on the matter:
However, the evidence of the prosecution regarding the participation of the other
accused, Jose Tan is not so satisfactory specially regarding its theory of conspiracy. In
fact, according to the widow Ofelio Olos, she even heard Jose Tan telling and
pleading with his brother to stop his attack and stabbing of the victim. the most
therefore that said accused could be liable for is merely that of an accomplice, who,
not being a principal cooperated in the execution of the offense by previous and
simultaneous acts, that in this case, by his stoning the victim Modesto Olos and hitting
him on the neck. However, the accused Jose Tans act of stoning was not a direct
participation nor indispensable to the killing of the victim. also, as held by the
Supreme court, when doubt exists whether an accused acted as principal or
accomplice, the court should favor the lesser or milder identity (People vs. Irenea,
G.R. No. 44410, August 5, 1988).[25]
The above-quoted ruling follows legal and jurisprudential precepts. The Revised Penal Code
defines accomplicesas those persons who, not being included in article 17,[26] cooperate in the
execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.[27]
In the present case, the prosecution was not able to prove that Jose Tan conspired with his
brother to commit the murder. Neither was it shown that he had prior knowledge of the latters
criminal intent. Absent a conspiracy, the responsibility of the accused is individual, not collective,
and each is to be punished only for his separate acts.
The penalty of Appellant Jose Tan as an accomplice is one degree lower than that of the
principal, which in murder cases is reclusion temporal, in its maximum period, to
death. Considering that he is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority,[28] because he was only sixteen years old when the crime was committed,[29] the trial court
should have lowered his penalty by two degrees, i.e. prision correccional maximum to prision
mayor medium. Likewise, he is entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Since no aggravating or mitigating circumstance was proven, the imposable penalty on Norlito
Tan is reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that
Appellant Norlito Tan, as principal, is sentenced to reclusion perpetua; while Appellant Jose Tan,
as an accomplice and a minor, is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of one (1) year and
five (5) months of prision correccional as minimum, to seven (7) years of prision mayor as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 90185 March 1, 1995 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. ERNESTO B. ABARRI, ET AL.:
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 90185. March 1, 1995.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ERNESTO ABARRI y BATTING,

CLEMENTE CAWALING y CIRINIO, CONRADO ESTRADA y CAWALING, JOSELITO
PAJALAGO y GONZALES & RONNIE ANDALES y ROMIROSA, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
QUIASON, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 124, Kaloocan City in
Criminal Case No. C-31521, finding accused Ernesto Abarri y Batting, Clemente Cawaling y Cirinio,
Conrado Estrada y Cawaling, Joselito Pajalago y Gonzales and Ronnie Andales y Romirosa guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with rape and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. chan roble s.com : vi rtua l law lib rary
The information filed against the accused reads as follows: jgc:chan roble s.com.p h
"That on or about the 14th day of October 1988, in Kaloocan City, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually
helping one another with intent to gain and by means of force, threats and intimidation upon the
person of GREGORIA GAN y LIM, that is by poking a knife at the latter, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away the following articles, to wit: cha nrob 1es vi rtua l 1aw lib rary
one (1) Chinese gold ring P5,000.00
one (1) lady’s wristwatch 2,000.00
Cash money amount (sic) to 250.00
————
TOTAL P7,250.00
belonging to said Gregoria Gan y Lim, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the
aforementioned total amount of P7,250.00; and on the occasion thereof, said accused with the use
of force, violence and intimidation and with lewd designs, have sexual intercourse with one
GREGORIA GAN y LIM, against the latter’s will and without her consent." (Rollo, p. 7). chanro bles vi rt ual lawli bra ry
Upon arraignment, all the accused entered a plea of not guilty.
On May 22, 1989, the trial court rendered its decision convicting all appellants of the crime of
robbery with rape, the dispositive portion of which reads: jgc:chan roble s.com.p h
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds the accused ERNESTO ABARRI Y BATTING,
CLEMENTE CAWALING Y CIRINIO, CONRADO ESTRADA Y CAWALING, JOSELITO PAJALAGO Y
GONZALES and RONNIE ANDALES Y ROMIROSA guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in
the special complex offense of robbery with rape as described and penalized under paragraph 2 of
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. This Court appreciates the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of nocturnity and there being no appreciable mitigating circumstance,
this Court sentences each of the accused to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. This Court
likewise hereby orders the five accused to indemnify the victim jointly and severally, the amount of
P20,000.00 as consequential damages; to return the amount of P250.00, the Seiko watch and the
Chinese gold necklace, subject matter of the robbery, and if unable to do so, to pay the value
thereof, jointly and severally, in the amount of P7,250.00; and to pay the costs.
The accused shall be credited in the services of their sentences with full time the accused have
undergone preventive imprisonment, pursuant to the provisions of Article 29 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended" (Rollo, p. 32).
Hence, this appeal.
II
On October 14, 1988, at around 7:30 P.M., while Gregoria Gan was walking along 4th Avenue,
Kaloocan City on her way home, Ernesto Abarri and Ronnie Andales stopped her and each poked a
knife at her neck. Abarri then grabbed Gan’s bag and warned: "Kung gusto mong mabuhay, huwag
kang sisigaw." Gan was dragged by the two and brought inside a fenced, vacant lot strewn with
garbage and covered with tall grass. Clemente Cawaling, Conrado Estrada and Joselito Pajalago
followed them inside the vacant lot. Cawaling and Estrada were former employees of Gan. chanrobles. com : virtual law l ibra ry
Once inside the vacant lot, Abarri, with the use of a "balisong," tore the upper portion of Gan’s
blouse. The other accused then started tearing the rest of the blouse and pulling down her pants.
The torn blouse was used to tie her mouth, hands and feet. When she was completely naked, the
accused started touching her private parts.
Abarri opened Gan’s handbag and took a bunch of keys, which included the key for her store at
Carmen Planas Street in Binondo, Manila. He also got her watch valued at P2,000.00, necklace
valued at P5,000.00 and wallet containing P250.00.
After robbing Gan, appellants left except Andales. Before leaving, Cawaling told Andales: "Nognog,
(referring to Andales) bahala ka na, sampung taon na rin na hindi nakakatikim ‘yan, makatas pa
‘yan."
cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry
Andales then dragged Gan to a dark spot and after loosening the tie on her legs, raped her twice.
After satisfying his lust, Andales left.
Gan waited for about 20 minutes before she started to roll over to the middle of the lot. In the
process, the tie on her mouth loosened and she was able to shout for help. Responding to her
cries, neighbors came and untied her hands.
Meanwhile, at around 8:30 P.M. of the same day, Barangay Captain Anita Alejo was informed by a
resident that somebody was opening the store of Gan. Repairing at the place, Alejo saw Abarri and
Estrada. She noticed that the door of the store had been partly opened. When she asked the two
what they were doing there, Abarri answered that Gan instructed them to get the latter’s pants.
Alejo brought them to the barangay hall for investigation. Upon further questioning, Abarri
admitted to forcibly bringing Gan to a vacant lot and binding her arms and legs. Alejo turned over
the two to the custody of the police detachment in Binondo. chanrob les.co m:cra law:red
The police brought Abarri and Andales to the crime scene. However, Gan was no longer there when
they arrived. The police proceeded to Gan’s house where the latter positively identified the two as
among those persons who robbed her.
The findings of NBI Medico Legal Officer Roberto Garcia were as follows: (1) there were physical
injuries outside the victim’s genitals, the age of which was consistent with the alleged time of
commission of the crime at about 7:30 P.M. of October 14, 1988; (2) the victim’s hymen had old
healed lacerations; (3) the opening of the hymen was big enough to accommodate or to allow the
penetration of an average-sized adult male organ in erection without producing any new injury to
the hymen.
III
The defense rests on denial and alibi. All of the accused claim that they were not at the scene of
the crime as each of them was somewhere else.
Abarri testified that at around 8:00 P.M. of October 14, 1988, he and Estrada were on their way
home from work. While walking in Pulgeras in Binondo, Manila, they were accosted by some
barangay tanod who accused them of breaking into a store. At first they denied their involvement.
But after they were mauled at the Binondo Police Station, they were forced to admit their
involvement in the robbery.
Estrada corroborated the version of Abarri as to their whereabouts on the night of the robbery. He
further testified that he and Cawaling were former employees of Gan.
Cawaling, Pajalago and Andales all claimed that they were at their respected homes that night
when the crime was committed. Cawaling claimed that he was coerced by the police to admit his
complicity. Andales claimed that he came to know his co-accused only at the city jail. chanrob les.co m.ph : vi rtual law lib rary
We have consistently ruled that for alibi to prosper as a defense, two requirement must be satisfied
— that the accused was not at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed and that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the place and time (People v. Gaguban, G.R. No. 96287, April
25, 1994). The requisites of time and place must be strictly met (People v. Empleo, 226 SCRA 454
[1993]).
In the case at bench, appellants failed to show that it was physically impossible for them to be at
the scene of the crime when it was committed.
The defense posits that no direct evidence on the conspiracy was established by the prosecution.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it. Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence, as
the agreement itself may be inferred from the conduct of the parties disclosing a common
understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense (People v. Uy, 206 SCRA
270 [1992]; People v. Dela Cruz, 190 SCRA 328 [1990]).
The common intent of robbing the victim and committing the acts of lasciviousness can be inferred
from their behaviors.
Abarri and Andales each poked a knife at Gan’s neck and forcibly brought her to the vacant lot. The
other appellants followed them and watched while Abarri divested the victim of her valuables. After
robbing the victim, Abarri with the use of a "balisong," tore the upper portion of the victim’s blouse
and all the other appellants participated in removing her clothes, pawing her and biting her
nipples.cha nro blesvi rtua lawlib rary
The presence or absence of lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and the
environment circumstances (People v. Balbas, 129 Phil. 358 [1967]). We find that the acts of
appellants in striping naked and hogtying the victim and touching her private parts constitute lewd
designs.
However, in the case of Andales, the acts of lasciviousness committed by him culminated in the
raping of the victim when he was left alone with her. Nothing in the records show that the other
accused had knowledge or were aware of the rape committed by Andales. Consequently, he alone
is guilty of robbery with rape (People v. Hamiana, 89 Phil. 225 [1951]).
Likewise, we do not regard the remarks made by Cawaling to Andales as sufficient to make him a
principal by inducement or a co-conspirator. Before a remark can produce such an effect, the same
must be of a nature and uttered in such a manner as to become the determining cause of the
crime (People v. Canial, 46 SCRA 634 [1972]). The inducer must have such an overpowering moral
ascendency over the actor (People v. Balderama, 226 SCRA 537 [1993]), as to make the utterance
a command from a superior to a subordinate. In the case at bench, it appears that the decision of
Andales to rape the victim had been made before Cawaling uttered the remarks. Cawaling was
then leaving the place with Abarri, Estrada and Pajalago whiled Andales purposely stayed behind
with the victim. There is not even a showing that Cawaling had any moral influence over Andales.
The trial court, therefore, erred in convicting all the appellants of the crime of robbery with rape. In
view of the fact that the charge of rape includes abusos deshonestos, the appellants, other than
Andales, can be found guilty of committing the crime of robbery with abusos deshonestos. chanrob les.co m:cral aw:red
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from its MODIFIED Ernesto Abarri, Clemente Cawaling,
Conrado Estrada and Joselito Pajalago are GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the separate crimes
of robbery and acts of lasciviousness. This Court sentences each of them to an indeterminate
penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS of arresto mayor as minimum to SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional
as maximum for the crime of acts of lasciviousness, and to indemnify Gregoria Gan jointly and
severally in the amount of P10,000.00 as moral damages. For the crime of robbery, they are
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS and 2 MONTHS of prision
correccional as minimum and to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor as maximum and to indemnify
jointly and severally Gregoria Gan in the amount of P7,250.00 as actual damages.
Ronnie Andales is FOUND GUILTY of the crime of robbery with rape. He is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify Gregoria Gan in the amount of P30,000.00 as moral
damages, and jointly and severally with the other appellants, the amount of P7,250.00 as actual
damages. chanrobles. com.ph : vi rtua l law lib ra ry
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner
vs.
JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City [Br.
103], SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AURELIO TRAMPE, PROSECUTOR FERDINAND R.
ABESAMIS, AND CITY ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR EULOGIO MANANQUIL, NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM, BRIG. GEN. EDGAR DULA TORRES
(Superintendent of the Northern Police District) AND/ OR ANY AND ALL PERSONS WHO MAY
HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON OF JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
G.R. No. 92164 June 5, 1990
SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO AND ERLINDA E. PANLILIO, petitioners,

vs.
PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE, FFRDINAND R. ABESAMIS,
AND EULOGIO C. MANANQUIL, and HON. JAIME W. SALAZAR, JR., in his capacity as
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 103, respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal jurisprudence, People vs. Hernandez 1 once more takes center stage as the focus of a
confrontation at law that would re-examine, if not the validity of its doctrine, the limits of its applicability. To be sure, the intervening period
saw a number of similar cases 2 that took issue with the ruling-all with a marked lack of success-but none, it would Beem, where season and
circumstance had more effectively conspired to attract wide public attention and excite impassioned debate, even among laymen; none,
certainly, which has seen quite the kind and range of arguments that are now brought to bear on the same question.
The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader
Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the
National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941. The warrant had
issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of
Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant
City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda
Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to
December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft
Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in
the arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas
Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the
Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.3
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition
for habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990),
alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having been:
(a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books;
(b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was
initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied due
process;
(c) denied his right to bail; and
(d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who
issued it first having personally determined the existence of probable cause. 4
The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990 and set the plea for hearing on March
6, 1990. 5 On March 5, 1990, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated return 6 for the respondents in
this case and in G.R. No. 92164 7 Which had been contemporaneously but separately filed by two of
Senator Enrile's co-accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and raised similar
questions. Said return urged that the petitioners' case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling
because-and this is putting it very simply-the information in Hernandezcharged murders and other
common crimes committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion, whereas the
information against Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the
occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion. Stated otherwise, the Solicitor General would
distinguish between the complex crime ("delito complejo") arising from an offense being a necessary
means for committing another, which is referred to in the second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal
Code, and is the subject of the Hernandez ruling, and the compound crime ("delito compuesto")
arising from a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave offenses referred to in the first
clause of the same paragraph, with which Hernandez was not concerned and to which, therefore, it
should not apply.
The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on March 6, 1990, after which the Court
issued its Resolution of the same date 8 granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses provisional
liberty conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours from notice, cash or surety bonds of P100,000.00
(for Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios), respectively. The Resolution stated that it
was issued without prejudice to a more extended resolution on the matter of the provisional liberty of
the petitioners and stressed that it was not passing upon the legal issues raised in both cases. Four
Members of the Court 9 voted against granting bail to Senator Enrile, and two 10 against granting bail
to the Panlilios.
The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are raised and litigated in Senator Enrile's
petition, G.R. No. 92163.
The parties' oral and written pleas presented the Court with the following options:
(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed in the main dissent of
Justice Montemayor in said case that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes,
and that under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code rebellion may properly be
complexed with common offenses, so-called; this option was suggested by the
Solicitor General in oral argument although it is not offered in his written pleadings;
(b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as a

necessary means for the commission, of rebellion, but not to acts committed in the
course of a rebellion which also constitute "common" crimes of grave or less grave
character;
(c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses
committed in its course, whether or not necessary to its commission or in furtherance
thereof.
On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against abandoning Hernandez. Two (2)
Members felt that the doctrine should be re-examined. 10-A In the view of the majority, the ruling
remains good law, its substantive and logical bases have withstood all subsequent challenges and
no new ones are presented here persuasive enough to warrant a complete reversal. This view is
reinforced by the fact that not too long ago, the incumbent President, exercising her powers under
the 1986 Freedom Constitution, saw fit to repeal, among others, Presidential Decree No. 942 of the
former regime which precisely sought to nullify or neutralize Hernandez by enacting a new provision
(Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code to the effect that "(w)hen by reason, or on the occasion, of
any of the crimes penalized in this Chapter (Chapter I of Title 3, which includes rebellion), acts which
constitute offenses upon which graver penalties are imposed by law are committed, the penalty for
the most serious offense in its maximum period shall be imposed upon the offender."' 11 In thus
acting, the President in effect by legislative flat reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine with the
effect of law. The Court can do no less than accord it the same recognition, absent any sufficiently
powerful reason against so doing.
On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the theory that Hernandez is, or should
be, limited in its application to offenses committed as a necessary means for the commission of
rebellion and that the ruling should not be interpreted as prohibiting the complexing of rebellion with
other common crimes committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, thereof. While four
Members of the Court felt that the proponents' arguments were not entirely devoid of merit, the
consensus was that they were not sufficient to overcome what appears to be the real thrust
of Hernandez to rule out the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed in its course
under either of the aforecited clauses of Article 48, as is made clear by the following excerpt from the
majority opinion in that case:
There is one other reason-and a fundamental one at that-why Article 48 of our Penal
Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with
rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be
done), the following penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for
the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the
corresponding period, depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but
never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying
circumstances present. in other words, in the absence of aggravating
circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However, under
Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a
single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with
the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring the
culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that which would be
proper if the several acts performed by him were punished separately. In the words
of Rodriguez Navarro:
La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a que

hace referencia este articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932), esta basado
francamente en el principio pro reo.' (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal
Supremo de Espana, p. 2168.)
We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71 (later 75) of the
Spanish Penal Code (the counterpart of our Article 48), as amended in 1908 and
then in 1932, reading:
Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso

de que un solo hecho constituya dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno
de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el otro.
En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito

mas grave en su grado maximo, hasta el limite que represents la
suma de las que pudieran imponerse, penando separadamente los
delitos.
Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se sancionaran

los delitos por separado. (Rodriguez Navarro, Doctrina Penal del
Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163)
and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said amendment,
restricting the imposition of the penalty for the graver offense in its maximum period
to the case when it does not exceed the sum total of the penalties imposable if the
acts charged were dealt with separately. The absence of said limitation in our Penal
Code does not, to our mind, affect substantially the spirit of said Article 48. Indeed, if
one act constitutes two or more offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a
punishment graver than that prescribed for each one of said offenses put together. In
directing that the penalty for the graver offense be, in such case, imposed in its
maximum period, Article 48 could have had no other purpose than to prescribe a
penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties for each offense, if imposed
separately. The reason for this benevolent spirit of article 48 is readily discernible.
When two or more crimes are the result of a single act, the offender is deemed less
perverse than when he commits said crimes thru separate and distinct acts. Instead
of sentencing him for each crime independently from the other, he must suffer the
maximum of the penalty for the more serious one, on the assumption that it is less
grave than the sum total of the separate penalties for each offense. 12
The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which is
that Hernandezremains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any
other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or
as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioner's guilt or innocence is not here inquired
into, much less adjudged. That is for the trial court to do at the proper time. The Court's ruling merely
provides a take-off point for the disposition of other questions relevant to the petitioner's complaints
about the denial of his rights and to the propriety of the recourse he has taken.
The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information filed against the petitioner does in
fact charge an offense. Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with
murder and multiple frustrated murder, that indictment is to be read as charging simple rebellion.
Thus, in Hernandez, the Court said:
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended information against
defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the murders, arsons and robberies
described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed
by said defendants, as means "necessary" (4) for the perpetration of said offense of
rebellion; that the crime charged in the aforementioned amended information is,
therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder,
arsons and robberies; that the maximum penalty imposable under such charge
cannot exceed twelve (12) years of prision mayor and a fine of P2H,HHH; and that,
in conformity with the policy of this court in dealing with accused persons amenable
to a similar punishment, said defendant may be allowed bail. 13
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute
books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed
with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight
of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with
a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.
Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed and/or preliminary
investigation conducted? The record shows otherwise, that a complaint against petitioner for simple
rebellion was filed by the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, and that on the strength of
said complaint a preliminary investigation was conducted by the respondent prosecutors,
culminating in the filing of the questioned information. 14There is nothing inherently irregular or
contrary to law in filing against a respondent an indictment for an offense different from what is
charged in the initiatory complaint, if warranted by the evidence developed during the preliminary
investigation.
It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for petitioner's arrest without
first personallydetermining the existence of probable cause by examining under oath or affirmation
the complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of the Constitution. 15 This Court has
already ruled, however, that it is not the unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal
examination, it being sufficient that he follows established procedure by personally evaluating the
report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor.16Petitioner claims that the warrant
of arrest issued barely one hour and twenty minutes after the case was raffled off to the respondent
Judge, which hardly gave the latter sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records of
the preliminary investigation. 17 Merely because said respondent had what some might consider only
a relatively brief period within which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had
not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's reaffirmation
of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the
information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is
bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct proposition. But the question
remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court
the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial?
The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's
right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny
bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by
filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the
evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review
jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of
Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.
Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by the Hernandez ruling, the information charges
a non-existent crime or, contrarily, theorizing on the same basis that it charges more than one
offense, would not excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies. Under either hypothesis, the
obvious recourse would have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal action before the
respondent Judge. 18
There thus seems to be no question that All the grounds upon which petitioner has founded the
present petition, whether these went into the substance of what is charged in the information or
imputed error or omission on the part of the prosecuting panel or of the respondent Judge in dealing
with the charges against him, were originally justiciable in the criminal case before said Judge and
should have been brought up there instead of directly to this Court.
There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions was beyond the
ability or competence of the respondent Judge-indeed such an assumption would be demeaning and
less than fair to our trial courts; none whatever to hold them to be of such complexity or
transcendental importance as to disqualify every court, except this Court, from deciding them; none,
in short that would justify by passing established judicial processes designed to orderly move
litigation through the hierarchy of our courts. Parenthentically, this is the reason behind the vote of
four Members of the Court against the grant of bail to petitioner: the view that the trial court should
not thus be precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail, and if it erred in that
matter, denied an opportunity to correct its error. It makes no difference that the respondent Judge
here issued a warrant of arrest fixing no bail. Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the
prosecutor's recommendation regarding bail, though it may be perceived as the better course for the
judge motu proprio to set a bail hearing where a capital offense is charged.19 It is, in any event,
incumbent on the accused as to whom no bail has been recommended or fixed to claim the right to a
bail hearing and thereby put to proof the strength or weakness of the evidence against him.
It is apropos to point out that the present petition has triggered a rush to this Court of other parties in
a similar situation, all apparently taking their cue from it, distrustful or contemptuous of the efficacy of
seeking recourse in the regular manner just outlined. The proliferation of such pleas has only
contributed to the delay that the petitioner may have hoped to avoid by coming directly to this Court.
Not only because popular interest seems focused on the outcome of the present petition, but also
because to wash the Court's hand off it on jurisdictional grounds would only compound the delay that
it has already gone through, the Court now decides the same on the merits. But in so doing, the
Court cannot express too strongly the view that said petition interdicted the ordered and orderly
progression of proceedings that should have started with the trial court and reached this Court only if
the relief appealed for was denied by the former and, in a proper case, by the Court of Appeals on
review.
Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer countenance, but will give short shrift
to, pleas like the present, that clearly short-circuit the judicial process and burden it with the
resolution of issues properly within the original competence of the lower courts. What has thus far
been stated is equally applicable to and decisive of the petition of the Panlilio spouses (G.R. No.
92164) which is virtually Identical to that of petitioner Enrile in factual milieu and is therefore
determinable on the same principles already set forth. Said spouses have uncontestedly
pleaded 20 that warrants of arrest issued against them as co-accused of petitioner Enrile in Criminal
Case No. 90-10941, that when they appeared before NBI Director Alfredo Lim in the afternoon of
March 1, 1990, they were taken into custody and detained without bail on the strength of said
warrants in violation-they claim-of their constitutional rights.
It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion has lost that quitessentiany
quixotic quality that justifies the relative leniency with which it is regarded and punished by law, that
present-day rebels are less impelled by love of country than by lust for power and have become no
better than mere terrorists to whom nothing, not even the sanctity of human life, is allowed to stand
in the way of their ambitions. Nothing so underscores this aberration as the rash of seemingly
senseless killings, bombings, kidnappings and assorted mayhem so much in the news these days,
as often perpetrated against innocent civilians as against the military, but by and large attributable
to, or even claimed by so-called rebels to be part of, an ongoing rebellion.
It is enough to give anyone pause-and the Court is no exception-that not even the crowded streets of
our capital City seem safe from such unsettling violence that is disruptive of the public peace and
stymies every effort at national economic recovery. There is an apparent need to restructure the law
on rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to
be considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for
every sort of illegal activity undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to effect such change,
for it can only interpret the law as it stands at any given time, and what is needed lies beyond
interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for promptly seizing the initiative in this
matter, which is properly within its province.
WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs.
Hernandez, the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses
Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners
are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to
petitioners being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered
REMANDED to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once
bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this
Court shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayco and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Medialdea, J., concurs in G.R. No. 92164 but took no part in G.R. No. 92163.
Cortes and Griño-Aquino, JJ., are on leave.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 109266 December 2, 1993
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JUSTICE FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Amado M. Santiago, Jr. for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the People of the Philippines.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside: (a) the
Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case
No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) and to declare Presiding Justice Francis
Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan, disqualified from acting in said criminal case; and (b) the
Resolution of said court promulgated on
March 14, 1993, which deemed as "filed" the 32 Amended Informations against petitioner (Rollo, pp.
2-35 and pp. 36-94).
On May 1, 1991, petitioner was charged in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan with
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed by her favoring "unqualified" aliens with the benefits of
the Alien Legalization Program (Rollo, p. 36).
On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with us a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R.
No. 99289-99290 (Santiago v. Vasquez, 205 SCRA 162 [1992]), to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 on the ground that said case was intended solely to
harass her as she was then a presidential candidate. She alleged that this was in violation of Section
10, Article IX-C of the Constitution which provides that "(b)ona fide candidates for any public office
shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination." The petition was dismissed on
January 13, 1992.
On October 16, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for inhibition of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, which
motion was set for hearing on November 13, 1992 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, pp. 38-41).
On October 27, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division), of which Presiding Justice Garchitorena is
a member, set the criminal case for arraignment on November 13, 1992 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, p. 42)
On November 6, 1992, petitioner moved to defer the arraignment on the grounds that there was a
pending motion for inhibition, and that petitioner intended to file a motion for a bill of particulars
(Rollo, pp. 43-44).
On November 9, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied the motion to defer the
arraignment (Rollo, p. 45).
On November 10, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for a bill of particulars (Rollo, pp. 47-48). The
motion stated that while the information alleged that petitioner had approved the application or
legalization of "aliens" and gave them indirect benefits and advantages it lacked a list of the favored
aliens. According to petitioner, unless she was furnished with the names and identities of the aliens,
she could not properly plead and prepare for trial.
On November 12, 1992 and upon motion of petitioner in G.R.

No. 107598 (Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al.), we directed the Sandiganbayan
(First Division) to reset the arraignment to a later date and to dispose of the two incidents pending
before it (Re: disqualification of Presiding Justice Garchitorena and the motion for the bill of
particulars).
At the hearing on November 13, 1992 on the motion for a bill of particulars, the prosecution stated
categorically that they would file only one amended information against petitioner.
However, on December 8, 1992, the prosecution filed a motion to

admit the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402; Rollo, pp. 61-126).
On March 3, 1993, Presiding Justice Garchitorena issued the questioned Resolution dated March
11, 1993, denying the motion for his disqualification (Rollo, pp. 151-164).
On March 14, 1993, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated a resolution, admitting the 32
Amended Informations and ordering petitioner to post the corresponding bail bonds within ten days
from notice (Rollo, pp. 165-185). Petitioner's arraignment on the 32 Amended Informations was set
for
April 12, 1993 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, p. 186).
Hence, the filing of the instant petition.
Acting on the petition for the issuance of a restraining order, we issued the Resolution dated March
25, 1993, ordering Presiding Justice Garchitorena "to CEASE and DESIST from sitting in the case
until the question of his disqualification is finally resolved by this Court and from enforcing the
resolution dated March 11, 1993, ordering petitioner to post bail bonds for the 32 Amended
Informations and from proceeding with the arraignment on
April 12, 1993" (Rollo, p. 194).
Re: Disqualification of the Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice
The petition for disqualification of Presiding Justice Garchitorena is based on the publication of is
letter in the July 29, 1992 issue of the Philippine Star, which to petitioner "prejudged" the validity of
the information filed
against her. Petitioner claims that Presiding Justice Garchitorena "cannot be expected to change the
conclusions he has subconsciously drawn in his public statements . . . when he sits in judgment on
the merits of the case . . ." (Rollo, pp. 16-17).
The letter in question was written in response to an item in Teodoro Benigno's column in the July 22,
1992 issue of the Philippine Star, criticizing the Sandiganbayan for issuing on July 11, 1992 a hold-
departure order against petitioner. Benigno wrote that said order reflected a "perverse morality" of
the Sandiganbayan and the lack of "legal morality" of its Presiding Justice, thus:
I cannot, for example accept the legal morality of Sandiganbayan Justice Francis
Garchitorena who would stop Miriam Defensor Santiago from going abroad for a
Harvard scholarship because of graft charges against her. Some of the most
perfidious Filipinos I know have come and gone, left and returned to these shores
without Mr. Garchitorena kicking any kind of rumpus. Compared to the peccadilloes
of this country's outstanding felons, what Miriam is accused of is kindergarten stuff.
The Sandiganbayan Supremo got a lot of headlines for stopping Miriam but I contend
this is the kind of perverse morality we can do without (Rollo, p. 156).
The portion of the letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, which petitioner finds objectionable, reads
as follows:
(c) Mrs. Santiago has never informed any court where her cases are pending of her
intention to travel, whether the Regional Trial Court where she is charged with
soliciting donations from people transacting with her office at Immigration or before
the Sandiganbayan where she is charged with having favored unqualified aliens with
the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program nor even the Supreme Court where
her petition is still pending (Rollo, p. 158).
In particular, petitioner considered as prejudgment the statement of Presiding Justice Garchitorena

that petitioner had been charged before the Sandiganbayan "with having favored unqualified aliens
with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program."
The statement complained of was just a restatement of the Information filed against petitioner in
Criminal Case No. 16698 in connection with which the hold-departure order was issued. Said
Information specified the act constituting the offense charged, thus:
That on or about October 17, 1988, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Miriam Defensor-Santiago, being then the Commissioner of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the application for legalization of
aliens who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive
Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which does not allow the legalization of the
same, thereby causing undue injury to the government and giving unwarranted
benefits and advantages to said aliens in the discharge of the official and
administrative functions of said accused (Rollo, p. 36).
It appears that petitioner tried to leave the country without first securing the permission of the
Sandiganbayan, prompting it to issue the hold-departure order which Benigno viewed as uncalled
for. The letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, written in defense of the dignity and integrity of the
Sandiganbayan, merely stated that all persons facing criminal charges in court, with no exception,
have to secure permission to leave the country. Nowhere in the letter is the merit of the charge
against petitioner ever touched. Certainly, there would have been no occasion for the letter had
Benigno not written his diatribe, unfair at that, against the Sandiganbayan.
Notwithstanding petitioner's misgiving, it should be taken into consideration that the Sandiganbayan
sits in three divisions with three justices in each division. Unanimity among the three members is
mandatory for arriving at any decision of a division (P.D. No. 1606, Sec. 5). The collegiate character
of the Sandiganbayan thus renders baseless petitioner's fear of prejudice and bias on the part of
Presiding Justice Garchitorena (Paredes v. Gopengco, 29 SCRA 688 [1969] ).
Re: Claim of denial of due process

Petitioner cannot complain that her constitutional rights to due process were violated by reason of
the delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation. According to her, while the offense was
allegedly committed "on or before October 17, 1988", the information was filed only on May 9, 1991
and the amended informations on December 8, 1992 (Rollo, p. 14).
Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 [1988] is inapplicable to petitioner's case. In Tatad, there
indeed was an unexplained inaction on the part of the public prosecutors inspite of the simplicity of
the legal and factual issues involved therein.
In the case at bench, there was a continuum of the investigatory process but it got snarled because
of the complexity of the issues involved. The act complained of in the original information came to
the attention of the Ombudsman only when it was first reported in the January 10, 1989 issue of
the Manila Standard. Immediately thereafter, the investigatory process was set in motion. The
investigation was first assigned to Special Prosecutor Gualberto dela Llana but on request of
petitioner herself the investigation was first assigned to Special Prosecutor Gualberto dela Llana but
on request of petitioner herself the investigation was re-assigned to the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon. The case was handled by a panel of four prosecutors, who submitted a draft
resolution for the filing of the charges on March 29, 1990. The draft resolution had to undergo the
hierarchy of review, normal for a draft resolution with a dissenting vote, until it reached the
Ombudsman in March 1991.
We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before us involving Criminal Case No.
16698 (G.R. Nos. 99289-99290; G.R.
No. 107598). Petitioner has not explained why she failed to raise the issue of delay in the preliminary
investigation and the filing of the information against her in those petitions. a piece-meal
presentation of issues, like the splitting of causes of action, is self-defeating.
Petitioner next claims that the Amended Informations did not charge any offense punishable under
Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 because the official acts complained of therein were authorized under
Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation
adopted the policy of approving applications for legalization of spouses and unmarried, minor
children of "qualified aliens" even though they had arrived in the Philippines after December 31,
1983. she concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her motion to quash the
informations (Rollo, pp. 25-31).
In a motion to quash, the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact in the information
(People v. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963] ). Therefore, petitioner admitted hypothetically in her motion
that:
(1) She was a public officer;
(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived in
the Philippines after January 1, 1984;
(3) Those aliens were disqualified;
(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and
(5) She acted in "evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her
official functions."
The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the offense defined in Section 3 (e) of
R.A. No. 3019.
The claims that the acts complained of were indeed authorized under Executive Order No. 324, that
petitioner merely followed in good faith the policy adopted by the Board of Commissioners and that
the aliens were spouses or unmarried minor children of persons qualified for legalization of stay, are
matters of defense which she can establish at the trial.
Anent petitioner's claim that the Amended Informations did not allege that she had caused "undue
injury to any party, including the Government," there are two ways of violating Section 3 (e) of R.A.
No. 3019. These are: (a) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; and (b) by
giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference.
In Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100334, December 5, 1991, we held:
The use of the distinctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of
Section 3 (a). In other words the act of giving any private party any unwarranted
benefit, advantage or preference is not an indispensable element of the offense of
"causing any undue injury to any party" as claimed by petitioners although there may
be instances where both elements concur.
Re: Delito continuado
Be that as it may, our attention was attracted by the allegation in the petition that the public
prosecutors filed 32 Amended Informations against petitioner, after manifesting to the
Sandiganbayan that they would only file one amended information (Rollo, pp. 6-61). We also noted
that petitioner questioned in her opposition to the motion to admit the 32 Amended Informations, the
splitting of the original information (Rollo, pp. 127-129). In the furtherance of justice, we therefore
proceed to inquire deeper into the validity of said plant, which petitioner failed to pursue with vigor in
her petition.
We find that, technically, there was only one crime that was committed in petitioner's case, and
hence, there should only be one information to be file against her.
The 32 Amended Informations charge what is known as delito continuado or "continued crime" and
sometimes referred to as "continuous crime."
In fairness to the Ombudsman's Office of the Special Prosecutor, it should be borne in mind that the
concept of delito continuado has been a vexing problem in Criminal Law — difficult as it is to define
and more difficult to apply.
According to Cuello Calon, for delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts performed
during a period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose,
which means that two or more violations of the same penal provisions are united in one and same
instant or resolution leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim
(II Derecho Penal, p. 520; I Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 630, 1987 ed.).
According to Guevarra, in appearance, a delito continuado consists of several crimes but in reality
there is only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator (Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code,
1957 ed., p. 102; Penal Science and Philippine Criminal Law, p. 152).
Padilla views such offense as consisting of a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or
resolution (Criminal Law, 1988 ed. pp. 53-54).
Applying the concept of delito continuado, we treated as constituting only one offense the following
cases:
(1) The theft of 13 cows belonging to two different owners committed by the accused
at the same time and at the same period of time (People v. Tumlos, 67 Phil. 320
[1939] ).
(2) The theft of six roosters belonging to two different owners from the same coop
and at the same period of time (People v. Jaranillo, 55 SCRA 563 [1974] ).
(3) The theft of two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion (People v.
De Leon, 49 Phil. 437 [1926] ).
(4) The illegal charging of fees for services rendered by a lawyer every time he
collects veteran's benefits on behalf of a client, who agreed that the attorney's fees
shall be paid out of said benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964] ). The
collection of the legal fees were impelled by the same motive, that of collecting fees
for services rendered, and all acts of collection were made under the same criminal
impulse (People v. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975 [1955] ).
On the other hand, we declined to apply the concept to the following cases:
(1) Two estafa cases, one of which was committed during the period from January 19
to December 1955 and the other from January 1956 to July 1956 (People v. Dichupa,
113 Phil. 306 [1961] ). The said acts were committed on two different occasions.
(2) Several malversations committed in May, June and July, 1936, and falsifications
to conceal said offenses committed in August and October 1936. The malversations
and falsifications "were not the result of only one purpose or of only one resolution to
embezzle and falsify . . ." (People v. Cid, 66 Phil. 354 [1938] ).
(3) Two estafa cases, one committed in December 1963 involving the failure of the
collector to turn over the installments for a radio and the other in June 1964 involving
the pocketing of the installments for a sewing machine (People v. Ledesma, 73
SCRA 77 [1976] ).
(4) 75 estafa cases committed by the conversion by the agent of collections from
customers of the employer made on different dates (Gamboa v. Court of Appeals, 68
SCRA 308 [1975]).
The concept of delito continuado, although an outcry of the Spanish Penal Code, has been applied
to crimes penalized under special laws,
e.g. violation of R.A. No. 145 penalizing the charging of fees for services rendered following up
claims for war veteran's benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964] ).
Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be supplementary to special laws,
unless the latter provide the contrary. Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may
be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws.
The question of whether a series of criminal acts over a period of time creates a single offense or
separate offenses has troubled also American Criminal Law and perplexed American courts as
shown by the several theories that have evolved in theft cases.
The trend in theft cases is to follow the so-called "single larceny" doctrine, that is, the taking of
several things, whether belonging to the same or different owners, at the same time and place
constitutes but one larceny. Many courts have abandoned the "separate larceny doctrine," under
which there is a distinct larceny as to the property of each victim. Also abandoned was the doctrine
that the government has the discretion to prosecute the accused or one offense or for as many
distinct offenses as there are victims (annotation, 37 ALR 3rd 1407, 1410-1414).
The American courts following the "single larceny" rule, look at the commission of the different
criminal acts as but one continuous act involving the same "transaction" or as done on the same
"occasion" (State v. Sampson, 157 Iowa 257, 138 NW 473; People v. Johnson, 81 Mich. 573, 45 NW
1119; State v. Larson, 85 Iowa 659, 52 NW 539).
An American court held that a contrary rule would violate the constitutional guarantee against putting
a man in jeopardy twice for the same offense (Annotation, 28 ALR 2d 1179). Another court observed
that the doctrine is a humane rule, since if a separate charge could be filed for each act, the accused
may be sentenced to the penitentiary for the rest of his life (Annotation, 28 ALR 2d 1179).
In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with performing a single criminal act
— that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to enjoy
such privilege.
The original information also averred that the criminal act : (i) committed by petitioner was in
violation of a law — Executive Order No. 324 dated
April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one offended party, the Government, and (iii) was done
on a single day, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988.
The 32 Amended Informations reproduced verbatim the allegation of the original information, except
that instead of the word "aliens" in the original information each amended information states the
name of the individual whose stay was legalized.
At the hearing of the motion for a bill of particulars, the public prosecutors manifested that they
would file only one amended information embodying the legalization of stay of the 32 aliens. As
stated in the Order dated November 12, 1992 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division):
On the matter of the Bill of Particulars, the prosecution has conceded categorically
that the accusation against Miriam Defensor Santiago consists of one violation of the
law represented by the approval of the applications of 32 foreign nationals for
availment (sic) of the Alien Legalization Program. In this respect, and responding
directly to the concerns of the accused through counsel, the prosecution is
categorical that there will not be 32 accusations but only one . . . (Rollo, p. 59).
The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the same period of
time, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The strong probability even exists that the approval of the
application or the legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke of the pen, as
when the approval was embodied in the same document.
Likewise, the public prosecutors manifested at the hearing the motion for a bill of particulars that the
Government suffered a single harm or injury. The Sandiganbayan in its Order dated November 13,
1992 stated as follows:
. . . Equally, the prosecution has stated that insofar as the damage and prejudice to
the government is concerned, the same is represented not only by the very fact of
the violation of the law itself but because of the adverse effect on the stability and
security of the country in granting citizenship to those not qualified (Rollo, p. 59).
WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) is AFFIRMED and its Resolution dated March 11, 1993 in Criminal
Case No. 16698 is MODIFIED in the sense that the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of
the Ombudsman is directed to consolidate the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos.
18371 to 18402) into one information charging only one offense under the original case number, i.e.,
No. 16698. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on March 25, 1993 is LIFTED
insofar as to the disqualification of Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena is concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Puno, JJ.,
concur.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., concurring and dissenting:
While I share the view expressed by Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in his dissent from the
majority opinion in Miriam Defensor-Santiago vs. Conrado Vasquez, et al. (205 SCRA 162), the
decision in said case, however, having become final, has, in my view, the effect of foreclosing the
issues there involved.
Accordingly, in this petition now at bench (G.R. No. 109266, I vote with the majority in simply
directing, for the reasons expressed for the Court by
Mr. Justice Camilo D. Quiason, the consolidation of the thirty-two Amended Informations into a
single Information.
FELICIANO, J., dissenting:

I dissent from the opinion written for the majority by Mr. Justice Quiason, to the extent that that
opinion directed the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman to consolidate
the thirty-two (32) Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 and 18402) into one
Information under the original case number, i.e., No. 16698.
I believe that the Court should order the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the thirty-two (32) Amended
Informations, for that court seriously erred in not granting petitioner's Motion to Quash those
Informations. The grounds for my submission in this respect were spelled out in detail in my
dissenting opinion 1 in Miriam Defensor-Santiago v.Conrado M. Vasquez, Ombudsman, et al. (205
SCRA 162 at 174-180 [1992] ), which I beg leave to reproduce here:
The information filed before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 16698 charges
the petitioner as follows:
That on or about October 17, 1988, or for sometime prior or

subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago, being
the Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the application
for legalization of aliens who arrived in the Philippines after January
1, 1984 in violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988
which does not allow the legalization of the same, thereby causing
undue injury to the government and giving unwarranted benefits and
advantage to the said aliens in the discharge of the official and
administrative functions of said accused.
Contrary to law.
Essentially, the above information charges that petitioner had, in violation of the
provisions of Executive Order No. 324 approved applications for legalization of the
stay of aliens who had arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984. The
information takes the position that the Executive Order "does not allow the
legalization of the same."
Executive Order No. 324 entitled "Waiving Passport Requirements for Immigrants
under Certain Conditions," dated April 13, 1988, was promulgated pursuant to
section 47 (A)(3) of C.A. No. 613, as amended, the Philippine Immigration Act of
1940, which provides that
Notwithstanding the provisions of this Act, the President is

authorized:
(a) when the public interest to warrants:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) to waive the passport requirements for immigrants, under such

conditions as he may prescribe.
Executive Order No. 324 provides that an alien may apply with the Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation for waiver of passport beginning on a date to be
designated by the Commissioner. The Order provides, among other things, that the
alien "must establish that he entered the Philippines before January 1, 1984 and that
he has resided continuously in the Philippines in an unlawful status from such date to
the filing of his application."
Petitioner is charged with having unlawfully waived the passport requirements of

certain aliens who arrived after January 1, 1984. It is clear from the record of this
case, especially of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the
Special Prosecutor, that petitioner herself stated that she had allowed aliens who had
arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984, but who were the spouses or minor
children of qualified aliens — the latter being alien spouses or parents who had
entered the Philippines before January 1, 1984 and who were themselves qualified
for waiver of passport requirements under Executive Order No. 324 — to apply for
waiver of passport requirements and, after compliance with requirements of
Executive Order No. 324, approved such "legalization."
Executive Order No. 324 is not itself a statute prescribing penal sanctions for certain
acts. Thus, disregard of Executive Order No. 324 would not, by itself, give rise to
criminal liability. The criminal information in this case in effect links up Executive
Order No. 324 with Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Act reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
It must be noted, firstly, that petitioner, as the then Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation, was expressly authorized and obliged by Executive Order No. 324 to
apply and administer and enforce its provisions. Indeed, petitioner was authorized to
issue rules and regulations to implement that Executive Order (paragraph 16).
Secondly, the application and administration of Executive Order No. 324 involve, not
ministerial or mechanical acts, but rather the exercise of judgment and discretion,
adjudicatory and hence quasi-judicial in nature. Thirdly, and perhaps most notably,
paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Executive Order provide as follows:
11. Except as provided in Paragraph 12, herein, the Commissioner of

Immigration and Deportation may waive exclusion grounds under the
Immigration Act in the cases of individual aliens for humanitarian
purposes to assure family unity or for the public interest.
12. The following grounds for exclusion may not be waived by the
Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation, namely, (a) those
relating to criminals; (b) those relating to aliens likely to become
public charges; (c) those relating to drug offenses, except for so
much of those provisions as relates to a single offense of simple
possession of marijuana; and (d) those relating to national security
and members of subversive organization.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Paragraph 11, it will be seen, expressly authorizes petitioner to waive grounds for
exclusion of aliens under the Immigration Act in two (2) cases: (a) "for humanitarian
purposes to assure family unity;" and (b) "for the public interest." Under Section 29
(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, the classes of aliens
excluded from entry into the Philippines include:
(17) Persons not properly documented for admission as may be

required under the provisions of this Act.2
Upon the other hand, paragraph 12 specifies the categories of persons in whose
cases no waiver of grounds of exclusion may be granted.
It will be seen that the acts of petitioner, which the information assumes to be
criminal in nature, constituted official acts of petitioner done in the course of applying,
interpreting and construing Executive Order No. 324. There is no question that the
applications for waiver of passport requirements by the spouses and minor children
of qualified aliens were admitted and approved by petitioner "for humanitarian
purposes to assure family unity." It is also not disputed that the said alien spouses
and minor children did not fall under any of the (non-waivable) excluded classes
listed in paragraph 12 of Executive Order No. 324. It is similarly undisputed that no
one has pretended that petitioner had anypersonal or corrupt interest in any of the
cases of alien spouses and minor children of qualified aliens she had acted upon. No
one has suggested, for instance that the fees specified in paragraph 9 of Executive
Order No. 324 either were not collected by petitioner and converted to her own use.
It may be noted, incidentally, that paragraph 9 expressly authorizes the

Commissioner "in her discretion, [to] charge a lower fee for the spouse and minor
children below 21 years old of the applicant." The criminal information, as noted
above, included an allegation of "evident bad faith and manifest partiality." It is clear,
however, that the facts brought out in the preliminary investigation offered absolutely
no basis for such an allegation which actually a conclusion offered by the Special
Prosecutor, much like the words "wilfully, unlawfully and criminally" which are recited
redundantly in the criminal information here. Again, the facts disclosed in the
preliminary investigation showed no undue injury, "to the Government and no
unwarranted benefit or advantage" to the aliens outside of the simple acceptance
and approval of the applications for waiver of passport requirements (so called
"legalization") by petitioner. In other words, if the interpretation or construction given
by petitioner to Executive Order
No. 324 is correct — i.e., that applications for waiver of passport requirements by
alien wives and minor children, arriving after January 1, 1984, of qualified aliens who
had themselves arrived in the Philippines before January 1, 1984 and who were
otherwise eligible under the terms and conditions of Executive Order No. 324 may be
granted for humanitarian purposes in the interest of allowing or restoring family unity
— there would be no "injury," let alone an "undue injury," to the Government. Neither
can the benefit of waiver of passport requirements in the cases of such spouses and
minor children of qualified aliens be deemed to be an "unwarranted" benefit to such
aliens if petitioner's interpretation of Executive Order
No. 324 be held to be correct.
It is a rule too firmly established to require documentation that contemporaneous

interpretations of a statute or implementing regulation by the executive or
administrative officials precisely charged with the implementation of such a stature or
regulation, are entitled to great weight and respect from the courts. This Court itself
has in many instances deferred to such interpretations rendered by such
administrative officers. (See, e.g., Ramos v. Court of Industrial Relations, 21 SCRA
1282 [1967]; Salavaria v. Buenviaje, 81 SCRA 722 [1978]; Asturias Sugar Central,
Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, 29 SCRA 617 [1969]; University of the Philippines
v. Court of Appeals, 37 SCRA 54 [1971]; Lim Hao Ting v. Central Bank, 104 Phil. 573
[1958] ). But even if an administrative interpretation be ultimately found to be
incorrect as a matter of law by this Court, the official responsible for such
interpretation is not, for that reason alone, to be held liable personally, whether civilly
or criminally or administratively. It is just as firmly settled that to impose liability upon
the public officer who has so acted, something far graver that error of law or error of
judgment must be clearly shown and that is corrupt personal intentions, personal
malice or bad faith. (See generally Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan, 185 SCRA 346
[1990]). As noted above, no such allegations were made during the preliminary
investigation in Criminal Case No. 16698.
My submission, with respect, is that whether the acts admittedly done by petitioner
were criminal in nature, is a legal question, on which petitioner in effect asks us to
rule in this Petition. I believe, further, that there is nothing to prevent this Court from
addressing and ruling on this legal issue. There is no real need for proof of any
additional essential facts apart from those already admitted by petitioner. It seems to
me that a public officer is entitled to have legal questions like that before this Court
resolved at the earliest possible opportunity, that a public officer should not be
compelled to go through the aggravation, humiliation and expense of the whole
process of criminal trial, if the legal characterization of the acts charged as criminal is
the very issue at stake.
I respectfully submit, still further, that the acts charged do not, as a matter of law,
constitute a crime.Indeed, if the acts which petitioner admits having done constitute a
criminal offense, very serious consequences would follow for the administration of
law and government rules and regulations in general. For the thrust of the criminal
information here would appear to be that public officers interpret and apply statutory
and regulatory provisions at their own peril and at the risk of criminal liability,
notwithstanding the absence of any corrupt intent to profit personally by any such
interpretation and application. (Emphasis in the penultimate and ultimate paragraphs
supplied)
The Information, quoted internally above, was filed in Criminal Case

No. 16698 back in 1 May 1991. approximately two-and-a-half (2-1/2) years later, the proceedings
before the Sandiganbayan are still going on, and indeed appear to me to be back where the case
was at the time the original Information was filed. Had this Court ruled on the legal question which
petitioner in effect had asked us to rule in Santiago v. Vasquez (supra), the case should be
terminated by now, one way or the other. Once more, I respectfully submit that a public officer
should not be compelled to go through the aggravation, humiliation and expense of the whole
process of criminal trial, if the legal nature of the acts charged as criminal is the very issue at stake.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari and to require the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the thirty-two
(32) Amended Informations.
Romero, J., concurs.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 137953-58. April 11, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellant, vs. WILFREDO DELA

TORRE, appellee.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The prosecution cannot appeal a decision in a criminal case whether to reverse an

acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed in a conviction.
The Case
The prosecution appeals the March 31, 1998 Decision[1] and June 3, 1998
Order[2] issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iba, Zambales (Branch 69)[3] in
Criminal Cases Nos. 2179-I, 2180-I, 2181-I, 2182-I, 2183-I and 2184-I. The assailed
Decision convicted Wilfredo Dela Torre of two counts of acts of lasciviousness and
four counts of rape, while the challenged Order denied the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by plaintiff (now appellant).
The dispositive portion of the Decision is reproduced hereunder:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Wilfredo dela Torre is found GUILTY

beyond reasonable doubt as follows:
1) In Crim. Case No. RTC 2179-I of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness, defined and penalized
under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, is sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of six (6)
months and one (1) day to two (2) years of prision correccional, and to indemnify Mary Rose
dela Torre in the amount of P10,000.00 as and by way of civil damages.
2) In Crim. Case No. RTC 2180-I of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness, defined and penalized
under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, is sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of six (6)
months and one (1) day to two (2) years of prision correccional, and to indemnify Mary Rose
dela Torre in the amount of P10,000.00 as and by way of civil damages.
3) In Crim. Case No. RTC 2181-I of the crime of Rape, defined and penalized under Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code, is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to
indemnify Mary Rose dela Torre in the amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of civil damages.
indemnify Mary Rose dela Torre in the amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of civil
damages.[4]
The two Amended Informations for acts of lasciviousness, dated July 1, 1997, were
similarly worded as follows:
That on or about the 30th day of September, 1996 at Brgy. Guisguis, municipality of
Sta. Cruz, Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, being the father of one Mary Rose de la Torre,
actuated by lust and by means of coercion, threats, intimidation and other
consideration, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of
lasciviousness on the person of Mary Rose de la Torre, a minor of 11 years old, to the
damage and prejudice of the said Mary Rose de la Torre.[5]
The other Information[6] charged appellee with the same crime against the same
victim on a different date, October 10, 1996.
On the other hand, the four Informations charging him with rape, dated July 1, 1997,
similarly read as follows:
That on or about the 18th day of October, 1996 at Brgy. Guisguis, municipality of Sta.
Cruz, Province of Zambales, Philippine[s], and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, being the father of one Mary Rose de la Torre,
with lewd design by means of coercion, threats, intimidation and other consideration,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal knowledge with
one Mary Rose de la Torre, a minor of 11 years old, without her consent and against
her will, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.[7]
The three other Amended Informations recited the same allegations on different
dates: November 1,[8] November 12[9] and December 23,[10] 1996. When arraigned on
August 13, 1997, appellee pleaded[11] not guilty[12] to all six (6) Informations. After trial
in due course, the RTC rendered the challenged Decision.
Appellee did not appeal, but the prosecution filed a Notice of Appeal [13] dated June
9, 1998.
The Facts
Appellants Version
In its Brief,[14] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the prosecutions
version of the facts as follows:
Appellee Wilfredo dela Torre had a common-law relationship with Melinda dela
Torre. The latter gave birth to three children, Mary Rose, Mark Anthony, and Mark
Domil. When Mary Rose was about seven (7) years old, her mother left the conjugal
abode with Mark Domil, leaving her and sibling Mark Anthony in the care of
appellee, who resided with his progeny in a one-room hut in Sitio Pao, Guis-guis, Sta.
Cruz, Zambales.
Mary Rose and her brother Mark Anthony studied at the Guinabon Elementary
School. She was the brightest in her class, even though because of their poverty, she
had to walk from their hut to the school everyday.
In January of 1997, Felita Sobrevilla, noticed a sudden change in the behavior and
performance of Mary Rose, who was twelve-year[s] old at th[at] time. The latter
appeared sleepy, hungry and snobbish. She also urinated on her panty.When
confronted by Generosa Mayo, the head teacher, Mary Rose admitted to her that she
was abused repeatedly by appellee. Mayo informed Elpidia Balindo, the aunt of Mary
Rose, about the abuses. They then decided to refer the matter to the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), who took Mary Rose under its custody.
It turned out that on September 30, 1996, Mary Rose was about to sleep when
appellee told her, anak puwede ba nating subukan? She did not understand what that
meant and continued to sleep. Appellee then placed himself on top of Mary
Rose. After removing her shorts as well as his shorts, he poked his penis into her
organ. He also kissed and embraced Mary Rose, who just wept. The same incident
was repeated in the evening of October 10, 1996.
In the evening of October 18, 1996, appellee was able to insert his penis into the
vagina of Mary Rose. After the act, her whole body ached. She started to fear
appellee. He also had sexual intercourse with his minor daughter on three more
occasions, that is, on November 1 and 12 and December 23, 1996.
A medical examination conducted by Dr. Milagrina Mayor, Rural Health Physician of

Sta. Cruz, Zambales, on Mary Rose revealed that her vagina admitted one finger with
ease. She was no longer a virgin. Her hymen was broken with healed lacerations at the
3:00, 6:00 and 9:00 nine oclock positions. The girl also suffered from urinary tract
infection.[15] (Citations omitted)
Appellees Version
On the other hand, appellees statement of facts,[16] as contained in his Brief,[17] is

reproduced as follows:
Appellee WILFREDO DELA TORRE had three (3) children with Melinda Torre,
namely: Mary Rose, Mark Anthony and Mark Ronnil. Melinda left her family when
Mary Rose was about seven (7) years old bringing with her Mark Ronnil. The victim
lived with her father and brother Mark Anthony in Sta. Cruz, Zambales.
Felina Sobrevilla, teacher of Mary Rose, noticed sudden changes in her behavior and
when confronted, the latter admitted that she was sexually abused by her father. Her
head teacher informed her Aunt Elpidia Balindo about the sexual abuses. They
referred the case to the DSWD who took her under its custody.
Mary Rose testified that her father committed sexual abuses on her on the following
dates: September 30, 1996, October 10, 1996, October 18, 1996, November 01, 1996,
November 12, 1996 and December 23, 1996.
Appellee, on the other hand denies vehemently the charges being imputed on him by
her daughter and said that the only reason he can think of why the daughter filed the
charges is because he did not allow her to stay with her teacher, Mrs.
Sobrevilla.[18] (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Trial Court
The RTC ruled that it was duly established that accused Wilfredo committed acts
of lasciviousness against Mary Rose on 30 September 1996 and 10 October 1996, and
had carnal knowledge [of] Mary Rose on 18 October 1996, 01 November 1996, 12
November 1996 and 23 December 1996.[19] Further, the trial court added that the moral
ascendancy of appellee over the victim was equivalent to intimidation. It did not give
any probative value to his uncorroborated and unsubstantiated defenses of denial and
alibi.
However, the court a quo refused to impose the supreme penalty of death on
appellee. It maintained that there were circumstances that mitigated the gravity of the
offenses, as follows:
1. As testified to (supra) there was absence of any actual, physical violence or

intimidation in the commission of the acts complained of.
xxxxxxxxx
2. The abandonement by Melinda (common-law wife of accused Wilfredo and

mother of Mary Rose) when Mary Rose was seven (7) years old leaving
behind Wilfredo, Mary Rose and her brother, Mark Anthony.
3. The extreme poverty on the life of Wilfredo, Mary Rose and Mark
Anthony.
4. After the mother of Mary Rose left the conjugal home, for more than five
(5) years, Wilfredo, Mary Rose and Mark Anthony were living together as
a family and Mary Rose was never molested by her father.
5. There is reason to deprive Wilfredo of the love of her daughter Mary Rose
but there is no reason to deprive Mark Anthony of the love of his father
considering that both Mary Rose and Mark Anthony have no one to call as
a mother.[20]
Hence, this appeal.[21]
The Issue
In this appeal, the solicitor general assigns this single error for our consideration:
The Court a quo erred in penalizing appellee with reclusion perpetua in each of the
four indictments for rape, instead of imposing the supreme penalty of death as
mandated by R.A. No. 7659.[22]
The Courts Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
Lone Issue:
Propriety of Appeal by the Prosecution
The prosecution asks this Court to modify the RTC Decision by imposing the
supreme penalty of death on the accused. It argues that it has proven that the victim is
the daughter of the accused, and that she was below eighteen (18) years old when the
rapes took place. As a consequence, the trial court should have imposed the penalty of
death pursuant to Section 11 of RA 7659.[23]
Under Section 1, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, any party may
appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double
jeopardy. This provision is substantially the same as that provided by the 1985 Rules.
The question now is whether an increase in the penalty imposed by the lower court
will violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy.
In several cases, this Court has already definitively ruled on this issue. Recently,
in People v. Leones,[24] it unmistakably declared that [w]hile it is true that this Court is
the Court of last resort, there are allegations of error committed by a lower court which
we ought not to look into to uphold the right of the accused. Such is the case in an
appeal by the prosecution seeking to increase the penalty imposed upon the accused for
this runs afoul of the right of the accused against double jeopardy.[25] It added:
This Court has not just once ruled that where the accused after conviction by the trial
court did not appeal his conviction, an appeal by the government seeking to increase
the penalty imposed by the trial court places the accused in double jeopardy and
should therefore be dismissed.[26]
This doctrine was applied as early as 1904 in Kepner v. United

States[27] (hereinafter Kepner), as follows:
The Court of First Instance, having jurisdiction to try the question of the guilt or
innocence of the accused, found Kepner not guilty; to try him again upon the merits,
even in an appellate court, is to put him a second time in jeopardy for the same
offense.[28]
The Kepner doctrine was clarified in a 1987 case.[29] Speaking through Justice
Isagani A. Cruz, the Court explained that an appeal of the prosecution from a judgment
of acquittal (or for the purpose of increasing the penalty imposed upon the convict)
would place him in double jeopardy.[30]
Double jeopardy provides three related protections: (1) against a second

prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) against a second prosecution for the
same offense after conviction, and (3) against multiple punishments for the same
offense.[31]
Although Kepner technically involved only a single proceeding, the Court regarded
the practice as equivalent to two separate trials, and the evil that the Court saw in the
procedure was plainly that of multiple prosecution.[32]
The ban on double jeopardy is deeply rooted in jurisprudence. The doctrine has
several avowed purposes.Primarily, it prevents the State from using its criminal
processes as an instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of
cases with accumulated trials.[33] It also serves the additional purpose of precluding the
State, following an acquittal, from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of
securing a conviction.[34] And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from
retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty. [35]
Being violative of the right against double jeopardy, the instant appeal filed by the
prosecution cannot prosper. The rule is clear -- the prosecution cannot appeal on the
ground that the accused should have been given a more severe penalty.[36]
Besides, even assuming that the penalties imposed by the RTC were erroneous,
these cannot be corrected by this Court on an appeal by the prosecution. Said the Court:
Whatever error may have been committed by the lower court was merely an error of
judgment and not of jurisdiction.It did not affect the intrinsic validity of the
decision. This is the kind of error that can no longer be rectified on appeal by the
prosecution no matter how obvious the error may be.[37]
The only way to nullify an acquittal or to increase the penalty is through a proper
petition for certiorari to show grave abuse of discretion. This was explained in People
v. CA and Maquiling[38] as follows:
While certiorari may be used to correct an abusive acquittal, the petitioner in such
extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly
abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense
justice. On the other hand, if the petition, regardless of its nomenclature, merely calls
for an ordinary review of the findings of the court a quo, the constitutional right
against double jeopardy would be violated. Such recourse is tantamount to converting
the petition for certiorari into an appeal, contrary to the express injunction of the
Constitution, the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence on double jeopardy. [39]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

Crim Rev Atty Diwa Part 1 31-40

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CRIM REV ATTY DIWA PART 1 41-50

Jeross Romano Aguilar

[G.R. No. 137050. July 11, 2001]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GEORGE CORTES y

Contrary to law: In violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.[2]

Hence, this review.[6]

According to the accused, the prosecution failed to prove the aggravating

[G.R. No. 130508. April 5, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARMANDO

The information against accused-appellant on November 27, 1995, filed by

"That on or about September 11, 1995, in the evening thereof, at

CONTRARY TO LAW. [1]

Accused-appellant was apprehended by the police four days after the

The prosecution presented three witnesses: Dra. Conchita Ulanday, Municipal

The prosecutions version is stated in Appellees Brief as follows: Sccalr

"On September 11, 1995, at about 9:00 oclock in the evening at

Appellant and his companions entered the house through the

Nerissa and her grandmother were hogtied by appellant and his

The defense presented accused-appellant who testified that on September

"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds

Armando has appealed to this Court pleading that: Scedp

(1) THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT

(2) THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING

which alleged errors were discussed jointly.

In essence, accused-appellant questions the sufficiency of the prosecutions

We affirm the judgment of conviction.

There was sufficient evidence to establish the identity of accused-appellant as

Consuelo Arevalo testified and corroborated the testimony of her

We are not persuaded by the contention of accused-appellant that the

both Nerissa and Consuelo positively identified Regala as there was a

"1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when for any

occasion of robbery will not increase the penalty. In People vs.

could be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. In People vs.

clearly made so by the statute. [23]

In view of the foregoing, the additional rape committed by herein accused-

As regards the civil indemnity, we find well-taken the recommendation of the

damages to the victim since it is recognized that the victims injury is

WHEREFORE, the judgment convicting Armando Regala y Abriol guilty

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,

G.R. No. L-28232 February 6, 1971

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

Mabanag, Eliger and Associates for defendant-appellant Basilio Pineda, Jr.

The undersigned complainant accuses JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, BASILIO PINEDA,

1. Use of a motor vehicle.

3. Abuse of superior strength;

4. That means were employed or circumstances brought about which added

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or

The imposition of multiple death penalties is decried by some as a useless formality,

Barredo and Teehankee, JJ., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-20183 June 30, 1966

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee,

This is an automatic review of death sentence pursuant to the Rules of Court.1

The records show the prosecution's evidence, as follows:

CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM:

Hemorrhage extensive, subarachnoid brain.

Laceration, blood vessels, brain and spleen.

Contusion, posterior lung, bilateral.

Congestion, lungs, bilateral.

Hemoperitoneum about 100 cc. blood, abdominal cavity.

SPLEEN: Maceration spleen.