SATURNINA GALMAN, et. al vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R.No. L-72670. September 12, 1986. (TEEHANKEE, C.J.)

Facts:
Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was killed from his
plane that had just landed at the Manila International Airport. His brain was smashed by a bullet
fired point-blank into the back of his head by an assassin. The military investigators reported
within a span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to
be unknown and was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman) was a communist-hired
gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in turn.

President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large
masses of people who joined in the ten-day period of national mourning yearning for the truth,
justice and freedom. The investigating committee conducted an investigation and it appears that
majority and minority reports showed that they are unconvinced on the participation of Galman
as the assassin of late Sen. Aquino and branded him instead as the fall guy as opposed to the
military reports. Majority reports recommended the 26 military respondents as indictable for the
premeditated killing of Aquino and Galman which the Sandiganbayan did not give due
consideration.

The office of the Tanod Bayan was originally preparing a resolution charging the 26
military accused as principal to the crime against Aquino but was recalled upon the intervention
of President Marcos who insist on the innocence of the accused. Marcos however recommended
the filing of murder charge and to implement the acquittal as planned so that double jeopardy
may be invoked later on.

Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged,
declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. Petitioners sought
reconsideration, but their motion was denied.

The petitioners filed another motion for miscarriage of justice against the Sandiganbayan
and gross violation of constitutional rights of the petitioners for failure to exert genuine efforts in
allowing the prosecution to present vital documentary evidence and prayed for nullifying the bias
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial before an impartial tribunal.

All the respondents raised the issue of double jeopardy, and invoked that the issues had
become moot and academic because of the rendition of the Sandiganbayan’s judgment of
acquittal of all respondents-accused.

Issue: Whether or not the order of re-trial would place the accused in double jeopardy.

Ruling:
 No. The prosecution was deprived of due process and fair opportunity to prosecute and
prove their case which grossly violates the due process clause. There could be no double
jeopardy since legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent
court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil.
851).

In this case, The judgment of acquittal rendered by the Sandiganbayan was not competent
as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process. In
effect the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further
hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first
jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.

Moreover, the Court held that the previous trial was a mock trial where the authoritarian
President ordered the Sandiganbayan and Tanod Bayan to rig and closely monitor the trial which
was undertaken with due pressure to the judiciary. The court’s decision of acquittal is one void of
jurisdiction owing to its failure in observing due process during the trial therefore the judgment
was also deemed void and double jeopardy cannot be invoked. More so the trial was one vitiated
with lack of due process on the account of collusion between the lower court and Sandiganbayan
for the rendition of a pre-determined verdict of the accused.

The denial on the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners by the court was set aside
and rendered the decision of acquittal of the accused null and void. An order for a re-trial was
granted.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. MONICO O, CERVERA,

defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-26395. November 21, 1969. (CONCEPCION, C.J.)

Facts:
On September 29, 1962, Ambrosio Elequin filed, with the Municipal Court of Sibalom,
Antique, two criminal complaints against Monico O. Cervera. In the first complaint, Cervera was
charged with grave oral defamation, later changed to slight defamation. In the second complaint,
Cervera was charged with grave threats.

On April 15, 1963, the defendant filed a motion to quash the complaint for grave threats,
upon the ground: (1) that the charge therein should have been for light threats, the acts imputed
to him having been allegedly committed in the heat of anger; and (2) that he would be placed
twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same act. However, the motion was denied.

The two cases were jointly tried an the court rendered judgment in the two cases,
acquitting the defendant for slight oral defamation, but finding him guilty of light threats. The
defendant appealed from the judgment and contended that his acquittal under the first complaint
was a bar to his prosecution for light threats, both the oral defamation and the light threats having
been allegedly committed on one and the same occasion.

Issue: Whether or not acquittal under the first complaint charging oral defamation is a bar for the
prosecution of the second complaint charging light threat.

Ruling:
No. Offense of oral defamation is not necessarily included in that of light threats. Where
the complaint for oral defamation, when considered in its entirety, strongly suggests the intention
of asserting that the acts therein set forth were performed for no other purpose than to insult the
complainant, the crime of light threat is not necessarily included in the charge contained in said
complaint.

Therefore, acquittal under the first complaint charging oral defamation does not bar
prosecution for the second complaint charging light threat.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SILVESTRE LIWANAG

alias LINDA BIE, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-27683. October 19, 1976.

Facts:
Silvestre Liwanag, a young man from the farms of Concepcion, Lubao, Pampanga, fired
by patriotic fervor, joined the “Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon”, more popularly known by its
acronym “Hukbalahap” which was later renamed to “Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB).
An organization whose purpose, as its name implies, was to resist the Japanese occupation forces
in the Philippines. The organization was disbanded but was later revived.

In the evening of June 21, 1960, a PC patrol led by then Major Wilfredo Encarnacion
captured Liwanag and his wife, Rosita Manuel, in their hideout at Barrio Kalungusan, Orion,
Bataan.

Liwanag was charged for violating the provisions of Republic Act No. 1700, otherwise
known as the Anti-Subversion Act, in an information filed before the Court of First Instance of
Bataan, for having unlawfully and wilfully continued and remained as officer and/or ranking
leader of the outlawed Communist Party of the Philippines and its military arm, the Hukbong
Mapagpalaya ng Bayan. He filed a motion to quash the information upon the grounds that the
defendant has been previously convicted of rebellion based upon the same overt acts as in the
instant case, and that Republic Act No. 1700 is an ex post facto law (bill of attainder) in that it
changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment or penalty than that annexed to the
crime when committed. However, the court denied the motion.
 The trial court rendered the appealed decision finding the accused guilty of the crime of
subversion, as charged. On appeal, he further claim that he had been charged with rebellion and
subversion based upon the same overt act, and since he had already been convicted of rebellion,
he cannot now be prosecuted for subversion.

Issue:

Ruling:
No. Violation of Republic Act No. 1700, or subversion, as it is more commonly called, is
a crime distinct from that of actual rebellion. The crime of rebellion is committed by rising
publicly and taking up arms against the Government for any of the purposes specified in Article
134 of the Revised Penal Code; while the Anti-Subversion Act (Republic Act No. 1700) punishes
affiliation or membership in a subversive organization as defined therein. In rebellion, there must
be a public uprising and the taking of arms against the 19 Government; whereas, in subversion,
mere membership in a subversive association is sufficient, and the taking up of arms by a
member of a subversive organization against the Government is but a circumstance which raises
the penalty to be imposed upon the offender.

In this case, Liwanag and several others were charged and convicted of rebellion for
having risen publicly and taken up arms against the Government for the purpose of removing the
allegiance of the Republic of the Philippines or its laws, the territory of the Philippines, and in
furtherance thereof, engaged in combat against the forces of the Government, destroyed property,
and committed serious violence during the period from May 28, 1946 to June 19, 1957. He also
prosecuted under Republic Act No. 1700 for having remained a high ranking member of the
Communist Party of the Philippines and its military arm, the HMB, from January, 1946 to June
21, 1960, without having renounced his membership in said organizations; and, being a member
or officer of said subversive association, has taken up arms against the Government.

Although the information charges the appellant with having taken up. arms against the
Government, the same is not specific as to the period covered-by it. But, since the appellant is
prosecuted for violation of Republic Act No. 1700 it is deducible that the period covered is that
from June 20, 1957, when the Act took effect, up to June 21, 1960, when the appellant was
captured. Inasmuch as the rebellion case covered the period up to June 19, 1957 and the period
covered in the instant case is from June 20, 1957 to June 21, 1960, the claim of having been put
twice in jeopardy for the same act cannot be sustained.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee vs. PASCUAL CASTRO,
defendant and appellant.
G.R. No. L-6407. July 29, 1954. (BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.)

Facts:
 Apolonio Bustos, the complainant, was the head teacher of the barrio school of San Jose,
Macabebe, Pampanga, and Pascual Castro, the accused, a teacher in said school. In the morning
of January 19, 1952, while the complainant was on his way to the barrio chapel to hear mass he
met a group of persons including the accused. The complainant invited the accused to hear mass
but instead of accepting his invitation a discussion ensued in the course of which the accused
gave the complainant a fist blow on the face causing him injuries which required medical
attendance for a period of five days.

On April 14, 1952, a complaint for slight physical injuries was lodged by the complainant
against the accused in the Justice of the Peace Court of Macabebe, Pampanga. After trial, the
accused was found guilty as charged.

From this decision, the accused appealed to the CFI where he pleaded not guilty. Before
trial on the merits, but after he had entered his plea, the accused moved to dismiss the charge on
the ground that the crime had already prescribed. This plea was ignored, and after the
presentation of evidence, the court rendered judgment reiterating the same penalty imposed upon
the accused by the inferior court. Hence, this appeal.

The accused contended that had already prescribed and as such it cannot serve as basis of
criminal prosecution hence, the lower court erred in not dismissing the information on the
ground that the offense charged had already prescribed, but the Solicitor General does not agree
with this contention. He claims that, since the accused failed to move to quash before pleading,
he must be deemed to have waived this defense.

Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in not dismissing the information on the ground that
the offense charged had already prescribed.

Ruling:
Yes. The crime of slight physical injuries is a light offense which prescribes in two
months as provided by Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. The failure of the accused to move
to quash before pleading does not constitute a waiver to raise the question of prescription at a
later stage of the case.

As a rule, the plea of prescription should be set up before arraignment, or before the
accused pleads to the charge; otherwise, the defense would be deemed waived. But this rule is
not of absolute application, especially when it conflicts with a substantive provision of the law,
such as that which refers to prescription of crimes. The rule about waiver of the plea of
prescription of crimes cannot be interpreted or given such scope or extent that would come into
conflict or defeat an express provision of our substantive law. Hence, prescription of crimes may
be raised even after arraignment.

In this case, the offense was committed on on January 19, 1952 and the complaint was
only filed on April 14, 1952, or after the period of two months had elapsed.
 Therefore, the lower court erred in not dismissing the information on the ground that the
offense charged had already prescribed.

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS,

BERNABE BUSCAYNO, JOSE MA. SISON and JULIET SISON, petitioners, vs.
MILITARY COMMISSIONS NOS. 1, 2, 6 and 25, GENERAL FABIAN VER, GENERAL
FIDEL RAMOS, LIEUTENANT COLONEL VIRGILIO SALDAJENO, CAPTAIN
MELCHOR A. ACOSTA and REVIEW BOARD OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. L-58284. November 19, 1981. (Aquino, J.)
Facts:
Buscayno and Aquino were charged before Military Commission No. 2 dated August 14,
1973 with subversion or violation of the Anti-Subversion Law, Republic Act No. 1700. Jose Ma.
Sison was charged with subversion in a 1978 charge sheet. His wife, Juliet de Lima, was charged
with subversion in a 1972 charge sheet. The three petitioners were all charged with rebellion in
an amended charge sheet dated November 8, 1977. All charges were filed before a military court.
Only the subversion case against Buscayno was decided but the decision is still subject to review.

The petitioners prayed that the charges of rebellion and subversion be dismissed for being
in contravention of the rule on double jeopardy, they contended that rebellion is an element of
the crime of subversion.

Issues: Whether or not petitioners are placed in double jeopardy because of the pendency of two
charges.

Ruling:
No. For an accused to be in jeopardy, it is necessary (1) that a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction is
filed against him; (2) that the charge is filed in a court of competent jurisdiction and (3) that after
he had pleaded to the charge, he was convicted or acquitted or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent (People vs. Pilpa, L-30250,
September 22,1977, 79 SCRA 81). To be in jeopardy, the case against the accused must be
terminated by means of a final conviction, acquittal or dismissal without his express consent. If
the case is not yet terminated, then jeopardy does not set in.

In this case, petitioners cannot invoke the rule on double jeopardy because no case
against the petitioners has been terminated. The petitioners have not yet been placed in jeopardy.

Moreover, the contention of the petitioners that rebellion is an element of subversion is

not correct because subversion does not necessarily include rebellion. Subversion, like treason, is
a crime against national security. Rebellion is a crime against public order.
DEMOCRITO SILVESTRE, petitioner vs. MILITARY COMMISSION No. 21 and the
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH XVIII, respondents.
No. L-46366. March 8, 1978. (FERNANDEZ, J.)

Facts:
On November 6, 1976, a Saturday, at about 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon, Jose Balatbat
was hacked to death at Capitol Site, Quezon City, allegedly by the petitioner, Democrito
Silvestre. After the killing, the petitioner surrendered to the Quezon City police.

Assistant City Fiscal David M. Reyes filed an information for homicide with the Court of
First Instance of Rizal at Quezon City against Democrito Silvestre. Thereafter, Marcelo Balatbat,
the father of the deceased, Jose Balatbat, wrote the Commanding General of the Philippine
Constabulary requesting investigation of the killing of his son and that pursuant to the request,
the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) conducted an investigation. The CIS found that the
attack on Jose Balatbat was treacherous and that the petitioner, Democrito Silvestre, was aided in
the killing by his wife, Remedios Pamintuan Silvestre, and one Eduardo Dizon; that on the basis
of the CIS findings, the Judge Advocate General’s Office (JAGO) conducted a preliminary
investigation of the charge of murder committed by a band instituted against the petitioner, his
wife and Eduardo Dizon. The JAGO filed with the respondent Military Commission No. 21 a
charge for murder committed by a band against the petitioner, his wife Remedios Pamintuan
Silvestre and Eduardo Dizon.

Peitioner contended that the filing of criminal case for murder against him before the
Military Commision No. 21 places him in double jeopardy.

Issue: Whether or not there was violation of the rule on double jeopardy.

Ruling:
No. The defense of double jeopardy is available to the accused only where he was either
convicted or acquitted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
consent.

In this case, both cases against the petitioner are pending. There was no conviction,
acquittal or dismissal or termination of the case without his consent.

Hence, there was no violation of the rule on double jeopardy when the Prosecution filed
another charge against the petitioner before the Military Commission No. 21.

-----------RULE 118--------
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE PEDRO T. SANTIAGO,
in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 101 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City and SEGUNDINA ROSARIO y SEMBRANO, respondents.
G.R. No. 80778. June 20, 1989. (GANCAYCO, J .)

Facts:
An information for violation of P.D. No. 772 against Segundina Rosario y
Sembrano(accused) in RTC for constructing her house on the land registered in the name of the
University of the Philippibes (UP) by taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the latter.

Upon arraignment the accused pleaded not guilty and a pretrial conference was held
wherein U.P. presented its title and plan showing that the accused built a structure within its
property. The accused by her proffer of exhibits and manifestation pretended to have a title to the
questioned land. However, as stressed by U.P., the titled property of accused is located in
Marikina and not in Quezon City and said title could not cover the very lot in question which is
at Pook Amorsolo, U.P. Campus where the structure of accused was built. The trial court did not
even rule on the admissibility of the exhibits of the accused and concluded that the accused did
not build her structure illegally as she has a title to the property in question is without any factual
or legal basis. The accused was acquitted by the trial court without trial on merits. Hence, this
petition.

Issues:
1) Whether or not the decision rendered by the trial court acquitting the accused is valid.
2) Whether or not U.P., as the private offended party, can file this special civil action for
certiorari questioning the validity of said decision of the trial court should be answered in the
affirmative.

Ruling:
1) No. The respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in rendering the
aforestated decision without affording the prosecution the opportunity to have its day in court.

The issue cannot be determined by a mere examination of the titles and documents
submitted by the parties. A trial on the merits should be undertaken to determine once and for all
whether the place where the structure was built by the accused belongs to U.P. or to the accused.
The conclusion of the trial court that the accused did not build her structure illegally as she has a
title to the property in question is without any factual or legal basis.

Hence, the acquittal of the accused is a nullity for want of due process. The prosecution
was not given the opportunity to present its evidence or even to rebut the representations of the
accused. The prosecution is as much entitled to due process as the accused in a criminal case.
Double jeopardy cannot be invoked as a bar to another prosecution in this case. There is
double jeopardy only when:
1) there is a valid complaint or information;
 2) filed before a competent court;
3) to which defendant had pleaded; and
4) of which he has previously been convicted or acquitted or which was dismissed
or terminated without his express consent.

In this case, the prosecution was deprived of an opportunity to prosecute and prove its
case. The decision that was rendered in disregard of such imperative is void for lack of
jurisdiction. It was not a court of competent jurisdiction when it precipitately rendered a decision
of acquittal after a pre-trial. A trial should follow a pre-trial. That is the mandate of the rules.
Obviously, double jeopardy has not set in in this case.

2) Yes. It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the
interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability.
Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainant’s role is limited to that of a witness for
the prosecution.

If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal

therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor
General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The
private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said offended
party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED

UNITED GENERAL INDUSTRIES, INC., plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE PALER and JOSE
DE LA RAMA, defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-30205. March 15, 1982. (ABAD SANTOS, J.)

Facts:
Jose Paler and his wife Purificacion Paler, purchased from the plaintiff a Zenith 23” TV
set on installment basis. In order to secure the payment of the purchase price, Paler and his wife
executed in favor of the plaintiff a promissory note in the amount of P2,690.00. They also
executed a chattel mortgage over the above-described television set in favor of the plaintiff
which mortgage was duly registered in the chattel mortgage registry to further guarantee the
payment of the aforementioned promisory note. However, Jose Paler and his wife violated the
the terms and conditions of the chattel mortgage for selling the television set without the consent
of the plaintiff-mortgagee which cause the latter to file a case for estafa against spouses Paler.

When the case was called for pre-trial, neither the defendants, nor their counsel appeared,
notwithstanding the fact that said defendants were notified of the pre-trial. Upon motion of the
plaintiff, said defendants were declared as in default. Likewise, upon motion of counsel for the
plaintiff, this case was submitted for judgment on the pleadings.
 The trial court rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, sentencing
said defendants to pay to the plaintiff.

The appellants, Paler and de la Rama, claim in their appeal that the complaint should
have been dismissed because “the obligation sought to be enforced by plaintiff-appellee against
defendants-appellants arose or was incurred in consideration for the compounding of a crime.”

Issue: Whether or not there can be recovery against Jose de la Rama who incidentally apppears
to have been an accommodation signer of the promissory note which is vitiated by the illegality
of the cause.

Ruling:
Yes. In the case of Arroyo vs. Berwin, it was held that an agreement to stiflethe
prosecution of a crime is manifestly contrary to public policy and due administration of justice
and will not be enforced in a court of law.

Under the law and jurisprudence, there can be no recovery against Jose de la Rama who
incidentally apppears to have been an accommodation signer only of the promissory note which
is vitiated by the illegality of the cause.

But it is different with Jose Paler who bought a television set from the appellee, did not
pay for it and even sold the set without the written consent of the mortgagee which accordingly
brought about the filing of the estafa case. He has an obligation to the appellee independently of
the promissory note which was co-signed by Jose de la Rama. For Paler to escape payment of a
just obligation will result in an unjust enrichment at the expense of another. This we cannot in
conscience allow.