ASSIGNMENT NO.

2
CASE DIGESTS
Generosa C. Genosa

1. SUMIFRU (PHILIPPINES) CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES

DANILO CEREÑO AND CERINA CEREÑO, Respondents.
writ of preliminary injunction
FACTS:
Sumifru is a domestic corporation engaged in the production and export of
Cavendish bananas and has its principal office at Km. 20, Tibungco, Davao
City. It is the surviving corporation in a merger, made effective in June
2008, among several corporations, including the Davao Fruits Corporation
(DFC).
DFC then, now Sumifru, entered into several growership agreements with
respondents spouses Danilo and Cerina Cereño (spouses Cereño)
covering the latter's titled lands with a total land area of 56,901 square
meters (sq. m.) located in Tamayong, Calinan District, Davao City.
Under the parties' PPA and GEPASAs, the spouses Cereño, as growers,
undertook, among others, to sell and deliver exclusively to Sumifru the
bananas produced from the contracted areas, which conform to the volume
and quality specifications defined by their agreements.
Sumifru filed a Complaint for Injunction and Specific Performance
with Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order against the spouses Cereño before the RTC. The
complaint alleged that sometime in February 2007, the spouses Cereño
flagrantly violated their PPA and GEPASAs, when they harvested the
bananas without the consent of Sumifru, packed them in boxes not
provided by Sumifru, and sold them to buyers other than Sumifru. Sumifru
made several demands upon the spouses Cereño to comply with their
contractual obligations, but they refused to heed the demands.
Hence, in seeking the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Prohibitory/Mandatory Injunction and praying for a Temporary Restraining
Order, Sumifru pleaded that the spouses Cereño be restrained from
committing any or all of the following acts: (a) harvesting the bananas
grown on the contracted growership areas without the consent of Sumifru,
(b) packing the bananas in boxes other than those provided by Sumifru, (c)
selling the produce to persons or entities other than Sumifru, and (d)
committing any other act in violation of their PPA and GEPASAs. Sumifru
likewise prayed that the spouses Cereño be compelled to faithfully comply
with their obligations under the PPA and GEPASAs.
The Ruling of the RTC
The RTC denied Sumifru's application for issuance of a writ of
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction for lack of merit.
The RTC found that there was no urgency to issue the injunctive reliefs
prayed for in order to prevent injury or irreparable damage to Sumifru
while the main case was being heard. The RTC held that in seeking the
issuance of the injunctive writ, Sumifru was practically praying for a
favorable ruling in the main case, which in effect would dispose of the
merits of the main case and leave only the matter of damages to be
determined by the trial court.
Sumifru's motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC.
Hence, Sumifru filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.
The Decision of the CA
The CA denied the petition of Sumifru. It held that the RTC did not abuse
its discretion in not issuing the writ of preliminary injunction since Sumifru
did not satisfy all of the legal requisites for its issuance. The CA found that
Sumifru's rights under the agreements are disputed, and the injury, which
Sumifru claims it may suffer, is capable of mathematical computation and
can be compensated by damages. The CA upheld the RTC in finding that
the issuance of the injunctive writ would have the effect of disposing of the
main case.
The CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Sumifru.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred when it denied the grant
of application for a writ of preliminary injunction.

RULING OF THE COURT:

Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court defines a preliminary injunction as
an order granted at any stage of an action prior to the judgment or final
order requiring a party, court, agency, or person to refrain from a particular
act or acts. It may also require the performance of a particular act or acts,
in which case it shall be known as a preliminary mandatory injunction.
Section 3 of the same Rule provides the grounds for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction:
SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary
injunction may be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or
part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of
the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or
acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts
complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the
applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is
attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts
probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of
the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
Thus, the following requisites must be proved before a writ of
preliminary injunction, whether mandatory or prohibitory, will be
issued:

(1) the applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be

protected, that is a right in esse (actual being  existence  essential);
(2) there is a material and substantial invasion of such right;
(3) there is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the
applicant; and
(4) no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the
infliction of irreparable injury.
A writ of preliminary injunction, being an extraordinary event, must be
granted only in the face of injury to actual and existing substantial
rights.
A right to be protected by injunction means a right clearly founded on or
granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law.
An injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or
future rights; it will not issue to protect a right not in esse, and which may
never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of
action.
When the complainant's right is doubtful or disputed, he does not
have a clear legal right and, therefore, injunction is not proper.
Sumifru failed to establish a clear and unmistakable right as to necessitate
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The spouses Cereño
consistently disputed Sumifru's rights under the agreements by claiming
that the agreements were already terminated.
There is no irreparable injury to be suffered by Sumifru. Injury is irreparable
where there is no standard by which its amount can be measured with
reasonable accuracy. Clearly, the injury alleged by Sumifru is capable of
pecuniary estimation, and any loss it may suffer, if proven, is fully
compensable by damages. As to Sumifru's allegations of potential suits and
damage to reputation, these are speculative at best, with no proof adduced
to substantiate them.
Finally, a preliminary injunction is merely a provisional remedy, an
adjunct to the main case subject to the latter's outcome, the sole
objective of which is to preserve the status quo until the trial court
hears fully the merits of the case.
The status quo usually preserved by a preliminary injunction is the last
actual, peaceable, and uncontested status which preceded the actual
controversy, or that existing at the time of the filing of the case. In this case,
the status quo can no longer be enforced. Petition, denied.
2. ROSARIO E. CAHAMBING, Petitioner, v. VICTOR ESPINOSA AND
JUANA ANG, Respondents. PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent Victor Espinosa are siblings and the children of
deceased spouses Librado and Brigida Espinosa, the latter bequeathing
their properties, among which is Lot B or Lot 354 with an area of 1,341
square meters, more or less, situated in Maasin City, Southern Leyte, to
the said siblings in the same deceased spouses' respective Last Wills and
Testaments which were duly probated.
Deceased Librado and Brigida bequeathed their respective shares over Lot
354 to respondent Victor Espinosa, however, Brigida subsequently revoked
and cancelled her will, giving her one-half (1/2) share over Lot 354 to
petitioner.
Brigida Espinosa and respondent Victor Espinosa, after the death of
Librado Espinosa, entered into an Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate
subdividing Lot 354 into Lot 354-A, with an area of 503.5 square meters
adjudicated to Brigida Espinosa, and Lot 354-B, with an area of 837.5
square meters, adjudicated to respondent Victor Espinosa, who eventually
obtained a certificate of title in his name.
Not being included in the partition of Lot 354, petitioner filed a complaint
against respondent Victor Espinosa and his representative, respondent
Juana Ang, for, among others, the annulment of the Extrajudicial Partition
of Real Property as a Civil Case.
Incidentally, a commercial building named as Espinosa Building stands on
Lot No. 354. At the time of the filing of the complaint, the same building had
twelve (12) lessees, four (4) of whom pay rentals to petitioner, namely:
Pacifica Agrivet Supplies, Family Circle, Ariane's Gift Items, and Julie's
Bakeshop. Petitioner alleged that respondent Juana Ang prevailed upon
Pacifica Agrivet Supplies not to renew its lease contract with petitioner but
to enter into a contract of lease with respondent Victor Espinosa instead.
According to petitioner, respondent Juana Ang also threatened to do the
same thing with Julie's Bakeshop.
In one of the pre-trial conferences, the Clerk of Court, acting as
Commissioner, issued an Order directing the parties to maintain the status
quo.
Thereafter, respondent Victor Espinosa filed an Application for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order against petitioner alleging
that the latter violated the status quo ante order by allowing her sons
to occupy the space rented by Jhanel's Pharmacy which is one of
respondent Victor Espinosa's tenants. Respondent Victor Espinosa,
through his attorney-in-fact, private respondent Juana Ang, alleged that
petitioner's sons constructed a connecting door through the partition
separating their cellular phone shop from Jhanel's Pharmacy and that the
contract of lease between the latter and respondent Victor Espinosa is still
subsisting, hence, the entry by petitioner's sons into the pharmacy's
commercial space disturbed the status quo ante.
The RTC, finding merit to the application for temporary restraining order
filed by respondent Victor Espinosa, granted the same. Thereafter, the
RTC, issued an Order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
After the denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed a
petition on certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA
imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it granted
the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction filed by
respondent Victor Espinosa.
The CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court of appeals committed legal error in validating the
writ of preliminary injunction in favor of private respondents.
RULING:
The factual findings of the Court of Appeals, when supported by substantial
evidence, are generally conclusive and binding on the parties and are no
longer reviewable unless the case falls under the recognized exceptions.
Thus, reiterated that the sole object of a preliminary injunction is to
maintain the status quo until the merits can be heard. A preliminary
injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to judgment or
final order, requiring a party, court, agency, or person to refrain from a
particular act or acts. It is a preservative remedy to ensure the protection of
a party's substantive rights or interests pending the final judgment in the
principal action. A plea for an injunctive writ lies upon the existence of
a claimed emergency or extraordinary situation which should be
avoided for otherwise, the outcome of a litigation would be useless as
far as the party applying for the writ is concerned.
The Writ of Preliminary Injunction are prescribed in Section 3 of Rule 58 of
the Rules of Court.
SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary
injunction may be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole
or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance
of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or
acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts
complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the
applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is
attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts
probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual.
Otherwise stated, for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to issue, the following
requisites must be present, to wit: (1) the existence of a clear and
unmistakable right that must be protected, and (2) an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
This Court has likewise stressed that the very foundation of the jurisdiction
to issue a writ of injunction rests in the existence of a cause of action and in
the probability of irreparable injury, inadequacy of pecuniary compensation,
and the prevention of multiplicity of suits. Sine dubio, the grant or denial of
a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case, rests in the sound
discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case since the assessment
and evaluation of evidence towards that end involve findings of facts left to
the said court for its conclusive determination. Hence, the exercise of
judicial discretion by a court in injunctive matters must not be interfered
with except when there is grave abuse of discretion.
This Court agrees with the CA and the RTC that the elements for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction are present in this case. As aptly
ruled by the CA:
In this case, respondent court correctly found that private respondent Victor
Espinosa had established a clear and unmistakable right to a commercial
space heretofore occupied by Jhanel's Pharmacy. Correspondingly, the
commercial space occupied by Jhanel's Pharmacy must be deemed to be
under the possession and control of private respondent Victor Espinosa as
of the time of the issuance of the status quo order. The right of possession
and control is a clear right already established by the circumstances
obtaining at that time. Hence, petitioner's act of entering the premises
of Jhanel's Pharmacy, through her sons, is a material and substantial
violation of private respondent Victor Espinosa's right, which act
must be enjoined.
The RTC was also able to make the following factual findings that shows
the urgency and the necessity of the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction in order to prevent serious damage. By allowing the plaintiff to
disturb the status quo ante (previously existing state of affairs) which, for purposes
of this instant application, great and irreparable injury would result to
defendant not just because he would be deprived of his right to collect rent
from Jhanel's Pharmacy but more importantly, because it would make
doing business with him risky, unstable and unsound, especially with
respect to his other tenants having existing contracts with the defendant.
In this case, no manifest abuse can be attributed to the RTC that issued the
questioned writ. This Court has also held that no grave abuse of discretion
can be attributed to a judge or body issuing a writ of preliminary injunction
where a party has not been deprived of its day in court as it was heard and
it exhaustively presented all its arguments and defenses. Verily, petitioner
was given her day in court to present her side but as in all litigations, only
one party prevails.
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of
petitioner Rosario E. Cahambing is DENIED.

3. EVY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,

PETITIONER, V. VALIANT ROLL FORMING SALES CORPORATION,
RESPONDENT, LEONEN, J.:
This application sought to restrain the Register of Deeds from
compelling Evy Construction to surrender its owner's copy of
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 168590 and from further
annotating encumbrances relative to a civil case between its
predecessor-in-interest and a third party.
FACTS:
On September 4, 2007, Evy Construction purchased a parcel of land
covered by TCT No. 134890 in Lipa, Batangas from Linda N. Ang (Ang)
and Senen T. Uyan (Uyan). They executed a Deed of Absolute Sale, which
was notarized on September 11, 2007. At the time of the sale, no lien or
encumbrance was annotated on the title, except for a notice of adverse
claim filed by Ang.
On September 18, 2007, the Register of Deeds annotated a Notice of Levy
on Attachment on TCT No. 134890 by virtue of the Writ of Preliminary
Attachment issued by the Regional Trial Court in a Civil Case, entitled
Valiant Roll Forming Sales Corporation v. Angeli Lumber and Hardware,
Inc., and Linda Ngo Ang. Two (2) other encumbrances were also annotated
on the title.
Evy Construction registered the Deed of Absolute Sale with the Register of
Deeds on November 20, 2007. TCT No. 168590 was issued in its name;
however, it contained the annotation of the prior Notice of Levy on
Attachment, as well as a Notice of Attachment/Levy upon Realty dated
October 2, 2007 and a Notice of Levy on Preliminary Attachment dated
November 8, 2007.
Subsequently, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision in Civil Case in
favor of Valiant Roll Forming Sales Corporation (Valiant). A Writ of
Execution and a Notice of Levy were issued against the property covered
by TCT No. 134890.
Evy Construction filed a Notice of Third-Party Claim in Civil Case, informing
the court that it had already filed with the sheriff an Affidavit of
Title/Ownership on May 20, 2008, in accordance with Rule 57 of the Rules
of Court. Valiant posted an Indemnity Bond of P745,700.00 to answer for
any damages that Evy Construction may suffer should execution of the
Regional Trial Court Decision proceed.
By virtue of a Writ of Execution issued in a filed Civil Case, the Sheriff
issued a Notice of Sale on Execution of Real Property of Ang's properties,
including the property covered by TCT No. 134890. A Certificate of Sale
was eventually issued to Valiant as the winning bidder of the property
covered by TCT No. 134890.
Evy Construction filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City, Batangas
its Complaint for Quieting of Title/Removal of Cloud, Annulment of
Execution Sale and Certificate of Sale, and Damages, with application
for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction.
It prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the Register of Deeds from compelling it to
surrender its copy of TCT No. 168590 and from annotating any further
transactions relating to a Civil Case.
The Regional Trial Court issued an Order denying the application for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order for having no legal basis.
Evy Construction's Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence,
it filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision. It held that Evy Construction
failed to sufficiently establish that it would suffer grave and irreparable
injury if additional recording and annotation of further transactions, orders,
or processes relating to the sale of the property to Valiant were made on
the title. It observed that the grounds raised already touched on the merits
of its Complaint, resolution of which would amount to prejudgment of the
case. The CA likewise pointed out that Evy Construction could still sue for
damages if the trial court eventually finds that the sale of the property to
Valiant was invalid. It also reminded Evy Construction that it had the
remedy of proceeding against the indemnity bond posted by Valiant for any
damages it might suffer as a result of the sale.

Evy Construction filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by

the Court of Appeals. Hence, this Petition was filed.

ISSUES:
First, whether or not petitioner Evy Construction and Development
Corporation was denied due process when its application for a writ of
preliminary injunction and for a temporary restraining order was denied;
and
Second, whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
in denying petitioner Evy Construction and Development Corporation's
application for injunctive relief.
RULING:
I
The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary
remedy of preliminary injunction which cannot exist except only as part or
an incident of an independent action or proceeding. As a matter of course,
in an action for injunction, the auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction,
whether prohibitory or mandatory, may issue. Under the law, the main
action for injunction seeks a judgment embodying a final injunction which is
distinct from, and should not be confused with, the provisional remedy of
preliminary injunction, the sole object of which is to preserve the status quo
until the merits can be heard. A preliminary injunction is granted at any
stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order. It
persists until it is dissolved or until the termination of the action
without the court issuing a final injunction.
Petitioner claims that it was denied due process when "no valid hearing for
the application for preliminary injunction was ever set" by the trial court and
it "was NOT even allowed to present its summary arguments and its
witness in support of its application for a [temporary restraining order]."
A temporary restraining order may be issued ex parte "to preserve the
status quo until the hearing of the application for preliminary injunction
which cannot be issued ex parte." Otherwise stated, a trial court may issue
a temporary restraining order even without a prior hearing for a limited
period of 72 hours "if the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will
suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury." In this instance, a summary
hearing, separate from the application of the preliminary injunction, is
required only to determine if a 72-hour temporary restraining order
should be extended.
A trial court may also issue ex parte a temporary restraining order for 20
days "if it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified
application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant
before the matter can be heard on notice." The trial court has 20 days from
its issuance to resolve the application for preliminary injunction. If no action
is taken on the application for preliminary injunction during this period, the
temporary restraining order is deemed to have expired. Notably, the Rules
do not require that a hearing on the application for preliminary
injunction be conducted during this period.
Section 5 states that "no preliminary injunction shall be granted without
hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined,"
Inversely stated, an application for preliminary injunction may be denied
even without the conduct of a hearing separate from that of the summary
hearing of an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
In this case, the November 9, 2009 hearing was denominated as a "hearing
on the application for temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction." Petitioner's counsel was allowed to present its arguments and
its witness but conceded that the issues before the trial court were legal in
nature. Thus, the trial court resolved that there was no need to present the
witness, which petitioner's counsel accepted without objection.
The trial court did not find any need to conduct a further hearing on the
application for preliminary injunction since petitioner was unable to
substantiate its entitlement to a temporary restraining order. Thus, there
can be no denial of due process if the party alleging it has already
been granted an opportunity to be heard.
II. A
Under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a preliminary injunction "is an order
granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or
final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a
particular act or acts" or an order "requiring the performance of a particular
act or acts." It is an ancillary relief granted by the court where the main
action or proceeding is pending. In order to be granted the writ, it must be
established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and
the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b)That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the
act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work
injustice to the applicant; or
(c)That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or
is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or
acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual.
The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is considered an
"extraordinary event," being a "strong arm of equity or a transcendent
remedy." Thus, the power to issue the writ "should be exercised sparingly,
with utmost care, and with great caution and deliberation.''
An injunctive writ is granted only to applicants with "actual and existing
substantial rights" or rights in esse. Further, the applicant must show "that
the invasion of the right is material and substantial and that there is an
urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage."
Thus, the writ will not issue to applicants whose rights are merely
contingent or to compel or restrain acts that do not give rise to a cause of
action.
Under the Torrens system of registration, a person who deals with the
registered owner of the property is not bound to look beyond the title for
any liens or encumbrances that have not been annotated.
Thus, in determining whether or not petitioner is entitled to injunctive
relief, the courts would have to pass upon the inevitable issue of
which between petitioner and respondent has the better right over the
property, the very issue to be resolved in the main case.
This Court held: A levy on attachment, duly registered, has preference
over a prior unregistered sale and, even if the prior unregistered sale
is subsequently registered before the sale on execution but after the
levy is made, the validity of the execution sale should be upheld
because it retroacts to the date of levy.
The prior levy on attachment carries over to the new certificate of title,
effectively placing the buyers in the position of their vendor under litigation.
The validity of the liens and the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale are
factual matters that have yet to be resolved by the trial court. The trial
court must also determine whether or not respondent had prior
knowledge of the sale.
Thus, no injunctive writ could be issued pending a final determination
of petitioner's actual and existing right over the property. The grant of
an injunctive writ could operate as a prejudgment of the main case.
II.B
Petitioner still failed to prove the urgent and paramount necessity to enjoin
the Register of Deeds from making further annotations on TCT No. 168590.
Petitioner failed to establish the urgent and paramount necessity of
preventing further annotations on the title.
Injunctive relief would have no practical effect considering that the
purported damage it seeks to be protected from has already been done.
Therefore, its proper remedy is not the issuance of an injunctive writ but to
thresh out the merits of its Complaint before the trial court.
In Cortez-Estrada v. Heirs of Samut, this Court held:
The grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case
rests in sound discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case since
the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end involve
findings of facts left to the said court for its conclusive determination.
The court's discretion is not interfered with unless there is a showing that
the grant or denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
The trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, denied petitioner's
application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of
preliminary injunction on the ground that petitioner would still have
sufficient relief in its prayer for damages in its Complaint. In the event that
the annotations on petitioner's title are found by the trial court to be invalid,
petitioner would have adequate relief in the removal of the annotations and
in the award of damages. Therefore, the trial court acted within the bounds
of its discretion. Petition is DENIED.

4. BICOL MEDICAL CENTER v. NOE B. BOTOR, LEONEN, J.:

FACTS:
Camarines Sur Provincial Hospital was established in 1933 as a 25-bed
provincial hospital located along Mabini Street, now Peñafrancia Avenue,
Naga City. The Camarines Sur Provincial Government eventually
subsidized the operations of a private hospital located at Concepcion
Pequeña, Naga City and transferred the Provincial Hospital there. Road Lot
No. 3, is a service road which leads to the Provincial Hospital.
The Provincial Hospital was eventually converted to the Bicol Regional
Training and Teaching Hospital.
Sometime in 1982, the Camarines Sur Provincial Government donated
about five (5) hectares of land to the Ministry of Health, now the
Department of Health, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 13693. The Training and Teaching Hospital and Road Lot No. 3 were
included in this donation.
The Training and Teaching Hospital became the Bicol Medical Center
(BMC) in 1995.
Sometime in 2009, BMC constructed a steel gate along J. Miranda Avenue
to control the flow of vehicle and pedestrian traffic entering the hospital
premises.
On March 21, 2012, Dr. Efren SJ. Nerva (Dr. Nerva), BMC Chief I, issued
Hospital Memorandum No. 0310, which ordered the rerouting of traffic
inside the BMC Compound.
This rerouting scheme closed the steel gate for vehicles and pedestrians,
relocating it from the eastern side of the hospital to the western side. The
relocation of this gate was implemented for security reasons and to make
way for "massive development within the Complex."
The gate closure drew a lot of criticism from the community, more
particularly, Atty. Noe Botor (Atty. Botor) wrote to Naga City Mayor John
Bongat (Mayor Bongat), asking for the reopening or dismantling of the gate
for being a public nuisance.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Naga City passed a resolution authorizing
Mayor Bongat to dismantle the gate. However, instead of dismantling it,
Mayor Bongat filed a Verified Petition with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction against BMC. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 2012-
0073 and raffled to Branch 24, Regional Trial Court, Naga City.
Atty. Botor, Celjun F. Yap, Ismael A. Albao, Augusto S. Quilon, Edgar F.
Esplana II, and Josefina F. Esplana (Intervenors) were allowed to intervene
and submit their complaint-in-intervention.
A few months later, ground-breaking ceremonies for the construction of the
Cancer Center Building were conducted, with construction intended to
begin in January 2013. When fully completed, the Cancer Center Building
would take over ''about three-fourths (¾) of the width of Road Lot No.
3."The Regional Trial Court denied Naga City's application for injunctive
relief, ruling that Naga City failed to prove a clear and unmistakable right to
the writ prayed for, as well as denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
the Intervenors. Only the Intervenors filed a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted the petition and
emphasized that only a prima facie showing of an applicant's right to the
writ is required in an application for writ of injunctive relief.
Petitioners BMC and the Department of Health filed this Petition for Review
on Certiorari before this Court.
The preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the Court of Appeals had
the effect of halting construction of a government project, a violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1818[36] and this Court's Administrative Circular
No. 11-2000, which reiterated the prohibition on the issuance of injunctions
in cases involving government infrastructure projects.
Petitioners claim that the P51,999,475.26 contract for the Cancer Center
Building has been awarded to OCM Steel Corporation, the winning
contractor, and the Notice to Proceed dated February 3, 2014 has been
issued, signalling the mobilization stage of the construction of the Cancer
Center Building.
Petitioners emphasize that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the
injunction over the relocation of the service road and closure of the gate did
not violate Presidential Decree No. 1818 because the Cancer Center
Building, a government project, will be constructed right where the gate
stands. Petitioners likewise underscore that Road Lot No. 3 was a public
road or that they had a clear right to the injunctive relief prayed for.
Petitioners applied for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction to prevent the reopening of the gate since doing so
would affect the construction of the Cancer Center Building.
This Court issued two (2) Resolutions. The first Resolution granted
petitioners' motion for extension to file their petition. The second Resolution
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the implementation of the
Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution, which directed the Regional
Trial Court to issue a writ of mandatory preliminary injunction on the closure
of Road Lot No. 3. The second Resolution also required respondents to
comment on the petition.
Respondents ask that this Court lift its issued temporary restraining order
against the assailed Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution. In its
Resolution, this Court noted respondents' comment and denied their prayer
to lift the temporary restraining order. It likewise directed petitioners to file
their reply to the comment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in directing the Regional Trial
Court to issue a writ of preliminary injunction on the closure of Road Lot
No. 3.
RULING:
I
A writ of preliminary injunction is issued to:
Preserve the status quo ante, upon the applicant's showing of two
important requisite conditions, namely: (1) the right to be protected exists
prima facie, and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right.
It must be proven that the violation sought to be prevented would cause an
irreparable injustice.
Rule 58, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides the instances when a writ
of preliminary injunction may be issued:
Section 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. — A preliminary
injunction may be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or
part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of
the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or
acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts
complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the
applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is
attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts
probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of
the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
Jurisprudence has likewise established that the following requisites must
be proven first before a writ of preliminary injunction, whether mandatory or
prohibitory, may be issued:
(1) The applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected,
that is a right in esse;
(2) There is a material and substantial invasion of such right;
(3) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the
applicant; and
(4) No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the
infliction of irreparable injury.
In satisfying these requisites, the applicant for the writ need not
substantiate his or her claim with complete and conclusive evidence
since only prima facie evidence or a sampling is required "to give the
court an idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction pending
the decision of the case on the merits."
Thus, where the plaintiff's right is doubtful or disputed, a preliminary
injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without
proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for a preliminary
injunction.
BMC presented TCT No. 13693, as the registered owner. It is not disputed
that Road Lot No. 3 is part of the property covered by TCT No. 13693.
BMC likewise presented a certification from the City Engineer of Naga City
that the road from Panganiban Drive up to the entrance and exit gate of
Bicol Medical Center is not included in the list of Inventory of City Road[s]
of Naga City.
II
This Court finds that the Court of Appeals erred in limiting prima facie
evidence merely to the evidence presented by Naga City and respondents
and in disregarding altogether petitioners' evidence, which had the effect of
squarely rebutting Naga City and respondents' assertions. The Court of
Appeals failed to appreciate the nature of the ancillary remedy of a writ of
preliminary injunction as against the ex parte nature of a temporary
restraining order.
During the hearing for the application for writ of preliminary injunction, the
trial court correctly weighed the evidence presented by both parties before
dismissing Naga City's application.
Writs of preliminary injunction are granted only upon prior notice to the
party sought to be enjoined and upon their due hearing. Rule 58, Section 5
of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. - No
preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to
the party or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts
shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable
injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on
notice, the court to which the application for preliminary injunction was
made, may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order to be effective only
for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or person sought
to be enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the said twenty-day
period, the court must order said party or person to show cause, at a
specified time and place, why the injunction should not be granted,
determine within the same period whether or not the preliminary injunction
shall be granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order.
By focusing solely on Naga City and respondents' evidence to determine if
there was prima facie evidence to issue the writ of preliminary injunction
while the case was being heard in the lower court, the Court of Appeals
misappreciated the nature of a writ of preliminary injunction. To reiterate, a
preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy issued after due hearing where
both parties are given the opportunity to present their respective evidence.
Thus, both their evidence should be considered.
As it is, absent a finding of grave abuse of discretion, there was no reason
for the Court of Appeals to reverse the trial court's denial of respondents'
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondents
were unable to present prima facie evidence of their clear and
unmistakable right to use Road Lot No. 3. Petition granted.
The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued by
this Court in its Resolution is made PERMANENT.