CASE DIGESTS

GENEROSA C. GENOSA
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES

1. G.R. No. 193821, November 23, 2015

Phil-Air Conditioning Center vs RCJ Lines and Rolando Abadilla,
Jr.,

FACTS:

On various dates between March 5, 1990, and August 29, 1990, petitioner
Phil-Air sold to respondent RCJ Lines four Carrier Paris 240 air
conditioning units for buses (units).

The total purchases amounted to P1,240,000.00. RCJ Lines paid

P400,000.00, leaving a balance of P840,000.00.

Phil-Air allegedly performed regular maintenance checks on the units

pursuant to the one-year warranty on parts and labor. RCJ Lines issued
three post-dated checks in favor of Phil-Air to partly cover the unpaid
balance.

All the post-dated checks were dishonored when Phil-Air subsequently

presented them for payment.

Before presenting the third check for payment, Phil-Air sent a demand
letter to Rolando Abadilla, Sr., asking him to fund the post-dated checks.

On July 17, 1996, Phil-Air demanded payment from Rolando Abadilla, Jr.,
for the total amount of P734,994.00 plus interest, and attorney's fees
equivalent to 25% of the amount due.

In view of the failure of RCJ Lines to pay the balance despite demand,
Phil-Air filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. 
(A writ of preliminary attachment is defined as a provisional remedy issued upon order of the
court where an action is pending to be levied upon the property or properties of the defendant
therein, the same to be held thereafter by the sheriff as security for the satisfaction of whatever
judgment might be secured in said action by the attaching creditor against the defendant (Adlawan v.
Tomol, 184 SCRA 31 [1990] citing Virata v. Aquino, 53 SCRA 30-31 [1973]).
In its answer with compulsory counterclaim, RCJ Lines admitted that it
purchased the units in the total amount of PI,240,000.00 and that it had
only paid P400,000.00. It refused to pay the balance because Phil-Air
allegedly breached its warranty. RCJ Lines averred that the units did not
sufficiently cool the buses despite repeated repairs.

Phil-Air allegedly represented that the units were in accord with RCJ Lines'
cooling requirements as shown in Phil-Air's price quotation.  The price
quotation provided that full payment should be made upon the units'
complete installation.

Complete installation, according to RCJ Lines, is equivalent to being in

operational condition. The Carrier Paris 240 model was not suited to the 45
to 49-seater buses operated by RCJ Lines. The units, were defective and
did not attain full operational condition.

RCJ Lines claimed that it was also entitled to be reimbursed for costs
and damages occasioned by the enforcement of the writ of
attachment.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether the claim of Phil-Air was barred by laches;

(2) Whether Phil-Air should reimburse RCJ Lines for the counterbond
premium and its alleged unrealized profits;
(3) Whether RCJ Lines proved its alleged unrealized profits arising
from the enforcement of the preliminary writ of attachment.
(4) Whether RCJ Lines proved that Phil-Air breached its warranty.

HELD:

1. Phil-Air’s claim is not barred by laches.

Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and

unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The court resolves whether the claimant asserted its claim within a
reasonable time and whether its failure to do so warrants the presumption
that it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. The court
determines the claimant’s intent to assert its claim based on its past
actions or lack of action.

In the present case, both parties admit the existence and validity of the
contract of sale. They recognize that the price quotation  contained the
terms and conditions of the sale contract. They also agree that the price
and description of the units were indicated on the sales invoice.

On the other hand, if the law gives the period within which to enforce a
claim or file an action in court, the court confirms whether the claim is
asserted or the action is filed in court within the prescriptive period.

The court determines the claimant’s intent to assert its claim by

simply measuring the time elapsed from the proper reckoning point
(e.g., the date of the written contract) to the filing of the action or
assertion of the claim.

In sum, where the law provides the period within which to assert a claim or
file an action in court, the assertion of the claim or the filing of the
action in court at any time within the prescriptive period
is generally deemed reasonable, and thus, does not call for the
application of laches.

In general, there is no room to apply the concept of laches when the

law provides the period within which to enforce a claim or file an
action in court.

Phil-Air’s complaint for sum of money is based on a written contract of sale.

The ten-year prescriptive period under Article 1144 of the Civil Code thus
applies.

2. Phil-Air is not directly liable for the counter-bond premium and RCJ
Lines’ alleged unrealized profits.

A writ of preliminary attachment is a provisional remedy issued by the

court where an action is pending to be levied upon the property or
properties of the defendant. The property is held by the sheriff as security
for the satisfaction of whatever judgment that might be secured by
the attaching party against the defendant.

The grant of the writ is conditioned not only on the finding of the
court that there exists a valid ground for its issuance. The Rules also
require the applicant to post a bond.

Section 4 of Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “the party
applying for the order must…give a bond executed to the adverse party
in the amount fixed by the court in its order granting the issuance of the
writ, conditioned that the latter will pay all the costs that may be
adjudged to the adverse party and all damages that he may sustain by
reason of the attachment, if the court shall finally adjudge that the
applicant was not entitled thereto.”

The enforcement of the writ notwithstanding, the party whose property is

attached is afforded relief to have the attachment lifted. There are various
modes of discharging an attachment under Rule 57: (1) by depositing
cash or posting a counter-bond under Section 12; RCJ Lines availed of
the first mode by posting a counter-bond.

Under the first mode, the court will order the discharge of the attachment
after
(1) the movant makes a cash deposit or posts a counterbond; and
(2) the court hears the motion to discharge the attachment with due notice
to the adverse party.

The amount of the cash deposit or counter-bond must be equal to that

fixed by the court in the order of attachment, exclusive of costs. The
cash deposit or counter-bond shall secure the payment of any
judgment that the attaching party may recover in the action.
The RTC, instead of declaring Phil-Air liable for the alleged unrealized
profits and counter-bond premium, should have ordered the
execution of the judgment award on the attachment bond. To impose
direct liability to Phil-Air would defeat the purpose of the attachment bond,
which was not dissolved despite the lifting of the writ of preliminary
attachment.
The premium payment may be deemed a cost incurred by RCJ Lines to lift
the attachment. Such cost may be charged against the attachment bond.
3. RCJ Lines failed to prove its alleged unrealized profits.

The evidence adduced by RCJ Lines to show actual damages fell short of
the required proof.
This Court recognizes that RCJ Lines suffered some form of pecuniary loss
when two of its buses were wrongfully seized, although the amount cannot
be determined with certainty.

The Court noted that in its prayer for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
attachment, Phil-Air alleged that RCJ Lines was guilty of fraud in entering
into the sale transaction. A perusal of the record, however, would show that
Phil-Air failed to prove this bare assertion which justifies an award of
temperate or moderate damages in the amount of Php 50,000.00.

4. The allegation of breach of express warranty was not proved.

Based on the Court’s examination of the record reveals that the RTC and
CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. This
Court held that the evidence that RCJ Lines submitted failed to prove
breach of express warranty.

As to the testimonial evidence

Based on the foregoing analysis, The Court finds that RCJ Lines
failed to prove its allegation that Phil-Air breached its express
warranty. RCJ Lines is thus held liable to pay the balance of the
purchase price plus interest and attorney's fees. RCJ Lines,
however, is entitled to temperate damages as a result of
the wrongful attachment of its buses and to the refund of
the premium payment for the counter-bond.

2. SECURITY BANK vs. GREAT WALL

Security Bank Corporation Vs. Great Wall Commercial Press Company,
Inc., et al. G.R. No. 219345    January 30, 2017
FACTS:
Security Bank filed a Complaint for Sum of Money (with Application for
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment) against respondents Great
Wall Commercial Press Company, Inc. (Great Wall) and its sureties,
Alfredo Buriel Atienza, Fredino Cheng Atienza, and Spouses Frederick
Cheng Atienza and Monica Cu Atienza (respondents), before the RTC.
The complaint sought to recover from respondents their unpaid
obligations under a credit facility covered by several trust receipts
and surety agreements, as well as interests, attorney's fees and costs.
Respondents filed their Motion to Lift Writ of Preliminary Attachment Ad
Cautelam, claiming that the writ was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
The RTC denied respondents' motion to lift, explaining that the Credit
Agreement and the Continuing Suretyship Agreement contained provisions
on representations and warranties
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the
RTC.
When appealed to the CA, it lifted the writ of preliminary attachment.
The appellate court explained that the allegations of Security Bank were
insufficient to warrant the provisional remedy of preliminary attachment. It
pointed out that fraudulent intent could not be inferred from a
debtor's inability to pay or comply with its obligations.
Security Bank moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied by the
CA
ISSUES:
Whether or not the court of appeals erred in nullifying the writ of preliminary
attachment issued by the trial court.
RULING:
A writ of preliminary attachment is a provisional remedy issued upon
the order of the court where an action is pending. Through the writ, the
property or properties of the defendant may be levied upon and held
thereafter by the sheriff as security for the satisfaction of whatever
judgment might be secured by the attaching creditor against the defendant.
The provisional remedy of attachment is available in order that the
defendant may not dispose of the property attached, and thus prevent the
satisfaction of any judgment that may be secured by the plaintiff from the
former.
The present case, only deals with the civil fraud in the non-compliance
with the trust receipts to warrant the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attached. A fortiori, in a civil case involving a trust receipt, the
entrustee's failure to comply with its obligations under the trust
receipt constitute as civil fraud provided that it is alleged, and
substantiated with specificity, in the complaint, its attachments and
supporting evidence.
Security Bank's complaint stated that Great Wall, through its Vice President
Fredino Cheng Atienza, executed various trust receipt agreements in
relation to its loan transactions.
By signing the trust receipt agreements, respondents fully acknowledged
the consequences under the law once they failed to abide by their
obligations therein. The said trust receipt agreements were attached to the
complaint.
Upon the maturity date, however, respondents failed to deliver the
proceeds of the sale to Security Bank or to return the goods in case of non-
sale.
The Court viewed that Security Bank's allegations of violation of the trust
receipts in its complaint was specific and sufficient to assert fraud on the
part of respondents. These allegations were duly substantiated by the
attachments thereto and the testimony of Security Bank's witness.
The CA’s assailed decision that fraud must only be present at the time of
contracting the obligation, and not thereafter. In this regard, the CA erred.
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure issued by the Court, Section 1(d) of
Rule 57 conspicuously included the phrase "in the performance thereof."
Hence, the fraud committed in the performance of the obligation (dolo
incidente) was included as a ground for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment.
The fraud committed by respondents in the performance of their
obligation undoubtedly support the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment in favor of Security Bank.
The Court finds that Security Bank has substantiated its allegation of fraud
against respondents to warrant the issuance of writ or preliminary
attachment, this finding should not in any manner affect the merits of the
principal case. The writ of preliminary attachment is only a provisional
remedy, which is not a cause of action in itself but is merely adjunct
to a main suit.
The Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Attachment
by the Regional Trial Court, is upheld. 

3. G.R. No. 181721 WATERCRAFT VENTURE CORPORATION,

represented by its Vice-President, ROSARIO E. RANOA,  vs.
ALFRED RAYMOND WOLFE 

FACTS:
Sometime in June 1997, Watercraft hired respondent Alfred Raymond
Wolfe (Wolfe), a British national and resident of Subic Bay Freeport Zone,
Zambales, as its Shipyard Manager.
During his employment, Wolfe stored the sailboat, Knotty Gull, within
Watercraft’s boat storage facilities, but never paid for the storage fees.
On March 7, 2002, Watercraft terminated the employment of Wolfe.
Sometime in June 2002, Wolfe pulled out his sailboat from Watercraft's
storage facilities after signing a Boat Pull-Out Clearance dated June 29,
2002 where he allegedly acknowledged the outstanding obligation of
Sixteen Thousand Three Hundred and Twenty-Four and 82/100 US Dollars
(US$16,324.82) representing unpaid boat storage fees for the period of
June 1997 to June 2002. Despite repeated demands, he failed to pay the
said amount.

Watercraft filed against Wolfe a Complaint for Collection of Sum of

Money with Damages with an Application for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Attachment.

In his Answer, Wolfe denied owing Watercraft the amount of US$16,324.82

representing storage fees for the sailboat. He explained that the sailboat
was purchased in February 1998 as part of an agreement between him and
Watercraft’s then General Manager, Barry Bailey, and its President, Ricky
Sandoval, for it to be repaired and used as training or fill-in project for the
staff, and to be sold later on. He added that pursuant to a central Listing
Agreement for the sale... of the sailboat, he was appointed as agent,
placed in possession thereof and entitled to a ten percent (10%) sales
commission. He insisted that nowhere in the agreement was there a
stipulation that berthing and storage fees will be charged during the entire
time that the sailboat was in Watercraft's dockyard.
Wolfe pointed out that the complaint was an offshoot of an illegal dismissal
case he filed against Watercraft which had been decided in his favor by the
Labor Arbiter.
Finding Watercraft's ex-parte application for writ of preliminary
attachment sufficient in form and in substance pursuant to Section 1
of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, the RTC granted the same.
Pursuant to the Order the Writ of Attachment and the Notice of Attachment
were issued, and Wolfe's two vehicles, a gray Mercedes Benz and a
maroon Toyota Corolla were levied upon. Wolfe's accounts at the Bank of
the Philippine Islands were also garnished.
Wolfe filed a Motion to Discharge the Writ of Attachment, arguing that
Watercraft failed to show the existence of fraud and that the mere failure to
pay or perform an obligation does not amount to fraud.
He also claimed that he is not a flight risk for the. In an Order, the RTC
denied Wolfe's Motion to Discharge Writ of Attachment and Motion for
Preliminary Hearing for lack of merit.
Wolfe filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.
The CA granted Wolfe's petition in a Decision. The CA ruled that the act of
issuing the writ of preliminary attachment ex-parte constitutes grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the RTC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the allegations in the affidavit of merit concerning fraud are
sufficient to warrant the issuance of a preliminary writ of attachment
rendered petitioner liable for damages

RULING:
The Court agrees with the CA that Watercraft failed to state with
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud, as required by
Section 5, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. Wolfe's mere failure to pay the
boat storage fees does not necessarily amount to fraud, absent any
showing that such failure was due to insidious machinations and
intent on his part to defraud Watercraft of the amount due it.
Fraudulent intent is not a physical entity, but a condition of the mind
beyond the reach of the senses, usually kept secret, very unlikely to be
confessed, and therefore, can only be proved by unguarded
expressions, conduct and circumstances. The particulars of such
circumstances necessarily include the time, persons, places and specific
acts of fraud committed. An affidavit which does not contain concrete
and specific grounds is inadequate to sustain the issuance of such
writ.
Mere general averments render the writ defective and the court that
ordered its issuance acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction.
In this case, Watercraft's Affidavit of Preliminary Attachment does not
contain specific allegations of other factual circumstances to show
that Wolfe, at the time of contracting the obligation, had a
preconceived plan or intention not to pay. Neither can it be inferred
from such affidavit the particulars of why he was guilty of fraud in the
performance of such obligation.
Watercraft's following allegation is unsupported by any particular averment
of circumstances which is not an allegation of essential facts
constituting Watercraft's causes of action, but a mere conclusion of
law.
The CA correctly ruled that Watercraft failed to meet one of the
requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, i.e.,
that the case is one of those mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 57, and
that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in improvidently issuing
such writ. Watercraft failed to particularly state in its affidavit of merit the
circumstances constituting intent to defraud creditors on the part of
Wolfe in contracting or in the performance of his purported obligation
to pay boat storage fees, as well as to establish that he is a flight risk.
Indeed, if all the requisites for granting such writ are not present, then the
court which issues it acts in excess of its jurisdiction. Petition is DENIED.
The Court of Appeals Decision and its Resolution are AFFIRMED.
4. G.R. No. 193572, April 04, 2018
TSUNEISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES (CEBU), INC., PETITIONER, VS. MIS
MARITIME CORPORATION, RESPONDENT

FACTS:

Respondent MIS Maritime Corporation (MIS) contracted Tsuneishi to dry

dock and repair its vessel M/T MIS-1 through an Agreement. Hence, the
vessel dry docked in Tsuneishi's shipyard. Tsuneishi rendered the required
services.

About a month later and while the vessel was still dry docked, Tsuneishi
conducted an engine test on M/T MIS-1. The vessel's engine emitted
smoke. The parties eventually discovered that this was caused by a burnt
crank journal. The crankpin also showed hairline cracks due to defective
lubrication or deterioration. Tsuneishi insists that the damage was not its
fault while MIS insists on the contrary. Nevertheless, as an act of good will,
Tsuneishi paid for the vessel's new engine crankshaft, crankpin, and main
bearings.

Tsuneishi billed MIS the amount of US$318,571.50 for payment of its repair
and dry docking services. MIS refused to pay this amount. Instead, it
demanded that Tsuneishi pay US$471,462.60 as payment for the income
that the vessel lost in the six months that it was not operational and dry
docked at Tsuneishi's shipyard. It also asked that its claim be set off
against the amount billed by Tsuneishi. MIS further insisted that after the
set off, Tsuneishi still had the obligation to pay it the amount of
US$152,891.10. 

Tsuneishi rejected MIS' demands and delivered the vessel to MIS.

MIS signed an Agreement for Final Price. However, despite repeated

demands, MIS refused to pay Tsuneishi the amount billed under their
contract.

Tsuneishi filed a complaint against MIS before the RTC invoking the
admiralty jurisdiction of the RTC to enforce a maritime lien under
Section 21 of the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 (Ship Mortgage
Decree). The complaint included a prayer for the issuance of arrest
order/writ of preliminary attachment.

To support this prayer, the complaint alleged that Section 21 of the Ship
Mortgage Decree as well as Rule 57 of the Rules of Court on attachment
authorize the issuance of an order of arrest of vessel and/or writ of
preliminary attachment.

The RTC issued a writ of preliminary attachment in an Order without

hearing. Consequently, MIS' condominium units located in the financial
district of Makati, cash deposits with various banks, charter hire receivables
from Shell amounting to P26.6 Million and MT MIS-1 were attached.

MIS filed a motion to discharge the attachment. 

The RTC denied this motion. MIS filed a motion for reconsideration which
the RTC also denied. MIS then filed a special civil action
for certiorari before the CA assailing the three Orders.

MIS argued that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
ordered the issuance of a preliminary writ of attachment and denied MIS'
motion to discharge and motion for reconsideration. The CA ruled in favor
of MIS. It reversed the three assailed Orders after finding that the RTC
acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary
attachment.

The CA held that the evidence on record shows that MIS has sufficient
properties to cover the claim. The RTC is deemed to have acted with grave
abuse of discretion. Consequently, the writ of preliminary attachment is
fatally defective. The CA further highlighted that a writ of preliminary
attachment is a harsh and rigorous remedy. Thus, the rules must be strictly
construed. Courts have the duty to ensure that all the requisites are
complied with. The CA also found that the RTC ordered the issuance of the
writ of preliminary attachment despite Tsuneishi's failure to prove the
presence of fraud.

It held that the bare and unsubstantiated allegation in the Bitera Affidavit
that MIS willfully refused to pay its obligation is not sufficient to
establish prima facie fraud. The CA emphasized that a debtor's mere
inability to pay is not fraud. Moreover, Tsuneishi's allegations of fraud
were general. Thus, they failed to comply with the requirement in the
Rules of Court that in averments of fraud, the circumstances
constituting it must be alleged with particularity.

The CA added that while notice and hearing are not required for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, it may become necessary in
instances where the applicant makes grave accusations based on grounds
alleged in general terms. The CA also found that Tsuneishi failed to comply
with the requirement that the affidavit must state that MIS has no other
sufficient security to cover the amount of its obligation.

The CA disposed of the case, and rendered the order of the RTC as
annulled and set aside.

Tsuneishi filed this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court challenging the CA's ruling. Tsuneishi pleads that this case
involves a novel question of law. It argues that while Section 21 of the Ship
Mortgage Decree grants it a maritime lien, the law itself, unfortunately,
does not provide for the procedure for its enforcement. It posits that to give
meaning to this maritime lien, this Court must rule that the procedure for its
enforcement is Rule 57 of the Rules of Court on the issuance of the writ of
preliminary attachment. Thus, it proposes that aside from the identified
grounds for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment in the Rules of
Court, the maritime character of this action should be considered as
another basis to issue the writ.

To support its application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary

attachment, Tsuneishi also invokes a provision in its contract with MIS.
It insists that the writ of preliminary attachment must be issued so as to
give effect to this provision in the contract. Tsuneishi also disputes the CA's
finding that it Failed to show fraud in MIS' performance of its obligation.
Tsuneishi adds that the CA erred in holding that the RTC acted with grave
abuse of discretion when it failed to conduct a hearing prior to the issuance
of the writ of preliminary attachment. It insisted that the Rules of Court, as
well as jurisprudence, does not require a hearing prior to issuance.

The CA reversed the RTC because it found that the element of fraud
was not duly established. Thus, there was no ground for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary attachment.

MIS contends that fraud cannot be inferred from a debtor's mere inability to
pay. There is no distinction between inability and a refusal to pay where the
refusal is based on its claim that Tsuneishi damaged its vessel.

Finally, MIS agrees with the CA that the RTC should have conducted a
hearing. While it is true that a hearing is not required by the Rules of Court,
jurisprudence provides that a hearing is necessary where the allegations in
the complaint and the affidavit are mere general averments. Further, where
a motion to discharge directly contests the allegation in the complaint and
affidavit, the applicant has the burden of proving its claims of fraud.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether the CA correctly ruled that Tsuneishi failed to comply with the
requirements for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

RULING:

On issue no. 1

The Supreme Court begins by classifying the legal concepts of lien,

maritime lien and the provisional remedy of preliminary attachment.

A lien is a "legal claim or charge on property, either real or personal, as a

collateral or security for the payment of some debt or obligation." It attaches
to a property by operation of law and once attached, it follows the property
until it is discharged to give the party in whose favor the lien exists the right
to have a debt satisfied out of a particular thing. It is a legal claim or charge
on the property which functions as a collateral or security for the payment
of the obligation. Section 21 of the Ship Mortgage Decree establishes a
lien. It states:

Sec. 21. Maritime Lien for Necessaries; Persons entitled to such Lien.

– Any person furnishing repairs, supplies, towage, use of dry dock or
marine railway, or other necessaries to any vessel, whether foreign or
domestic, upon the order of the owner of such vessel, or of a person
authorized by the owner, shall have a maritime lien on the vessel, which
may be enforced by suit in rem and it shall be necessary to allege or prove
that credit was given to the vessel.

In practical terms, this means that the holder of the lien has the right to
bring an action to seek the sale of the vessel and the application of the
proceeds of this sale to the outstanding obligation. Through this lien, a
person who furnishes repair, supplies, towage, use of dry dock or marine
railway, or other necessaries to any vessel, in accordance with the
requirements under Section 21, is able to obtain security for the payment of
the obligation to him.

A party who has a lien in his or her favor has a remedy in law to hold the
property liable for the payment of the obligation.

A lienholder has the remedy of filing an action in court for the

enforcement of the lien. In such action, a lienholder must establish
that the obligation and the corresponding lien exist before he or she
can demand that the property subject to the lien be sold for the
payment of the obligation. Thus, a lien functions as a form of security for
an obligation. Liens, as in the case of a maritime lien, arise in accordance
with the provision of particular laws providing for their creation, such as the
Ship Mortgage Decree which clearly states that certain persons who
provide services or materials can possess a lien over a vessel. In the Rules
of Court, Rule 57 governs the procedure for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment. Also provide for a provisional remedy which
effectively operates as a lien.

A writ of preliminary attachment is a provisional remedy issued by a court

where an action is pending. In simple terms, a writ of preliminary
attachment allows the levy of a property which shall then be held by the
sheriff. This property will stand as security for the satisfaction of the
judgment that the court may render in favor of the attaching party. This
Court explained that the purpose of a writ of preliminary attachment is
twofold:

First, it seizes upon property of an alleged debtor in advance of final

judgment and holds it subject to appropriation, thereby preventing the loss
or dissipation of the property through fraud or other means. Second, it
subjects the property of the debtor to the payment of a creditor's claim, in
those cases in which personal service upon the debtor cannot be obtained. 

This remedy is meant to secure a contingent lien on the defendant's

property until the plaintiff can, by appropriate proceedings, obtain a
judgment and have the property applied to its satisfaction, or to make
some provision for unsecured debts in cases in which the means of
satisfaction thereof arc liable to be removed beyond the jurisdiction,
or improperly disposed of or concealed, or otherwise placed beyond
the reach of creditors. 

This Court reiterates, that when a lien already exists, this is already
equivalent to an attachment. This is where Tsuneishi's argument fails.
Clearly, because it claims a maritime lien in accordance with the Ship
Mortgage Decree, all Tsuneishi had to do is to file a proper action in
court for its enforcement. The issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment on the pretext that it is the only means to enforce a
maritime lien is superfluous. The reason that the Ship Mortgage Decree
does not provide for a detailed procedure for the enforcement of a maritime
lien is because it is not necessary.

Section 21 already provides for the simple procedure—file an action in

rem before the court. Clearly, what was prayed for in the proceedings
below was not an attachment for the enforcement of a maritime lien
but an attachment, plain and simple.

On issue No. 2

Civil law grants Tsuneishi various remedies in the event that the trial court
rules in its favor such as the payment of the obligation, damages and
legal interest. The issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment is not
one of those remedies

Jurisprudence has consistently held that a court that issues a writ of

preliminary attachment when the requisites are not present acts in excess
of its jurisdiction.

This Court held that the rules on the issuance of a writ of attachment must
be construed strictly against the applicants. This stringency is required
because the remedy of attachment is harsh, extraordinary and summary
in nature. If all the requisites for the granting of the writ are not present,
then the court which issues it acts in excess of its jurisdiction. This Court
affirms the ruling of the CA that the RTC, in issuing a writ of
preliminary attachment when the requisites under the Rules of Court
were clearly not present, acted with grave abuse of discretion. Petition
is DENIED.