Case Digest of Assigned Cases

GENEROSA C. GENOSA
JRISDICTION ELECTIVES
September 18, 2021

1. Herrera vs. Barretto 25 PHIL 245 9.10.13

FACTS: The case at bar involves a motion for certiorari by the

petitioner against Judge Barretto for allegedly acting without
jurisdiction on the case involving the cockpit license permit of
Constancio Joaquin which the petitioner, in his capacity of the
Caloocan Municipal President revoked (cancel, repel, rescind) to
operate. Respondent judge apparently issued a provisional
license upon the filing of Joaquin for a mandatory injunction
without notice to the petitioner. The petitioner now files a
motion for certiorari before the higher court against the
respondent for acting in excess of jurisdiction for issuing
the mandatory injunction of provisional license.

ISSUE: WON a writ of certiorari the proper action on the case at

bar.

RULING: No. A writ for certiorari is not issued unless it is

established whether or not the court to which it is directed
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. Once the court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties in a case all
decisions exercised within its jurisdiction, however erroneous or
irregular, cannot be corrected by certiorari. The court held that
the CFI has the jurisdiction over the present case to resolve all
matters arising in question.

Court held that Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and

determine a cause —the right to act in a case. Since it is the
power to hear and determine, it does not depend either upon the
regularity of the exercise of that power or upon the rightfulness
of the decisions made. Jurisdiction should therefore be
distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to
decide a cause at all, and not the decision rendered
therein, is what makes up jurisdiction.

Certiorari on one hand may not be used to correct errors

committed within the jurisdiction of the court no matter how
irregular or erroneous it is.

2. G.R. No. L-14723             May 29, 1959

NORBERTO LUMPAY, VALENTIN SUPERABLE, ANTONIO PACLE,
BENJAMIN PACLE, VICENTE CALABIA, SEVERO CAIGOY and
ALFONSO HEMBRA, petitioners,
vs. HON. SEGUNDO MOSCOSO, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, Branch I, respondent.
LABRADOR, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioners in the above-entitled case were the defendants in a criminal

complaint filed by a sergeant of the Constabulary in case No. 218 of the
Justice of the Peace Court of Tunga, Leyte (Annex "D"). The complaint
charges the defendants in that case, petitioners herein, with the crime of
robbery in band with double homicide, frustrated homicide and less
serious physical injuries, committed in said municipality of Tunga, Leyte.
The complaint is dated April 25, 1958. On June 18, 1958, the provincial
fiscal of Leyte petitioned the Secretary of Justice for authority to file said
case in the branch of the Court of First Instance at Tacloban, instead
of before the branch of the Court at Carigara, 6th Branch, praying for the
non-application of the provisions of Justice Administrative Order No.
175, dated December 13, 1954, which assign the town of Tunga to the
district presided over by the judge stationed at Carigara, Leyte. The
reason alleged for transferring the trial of the case is that the accused
have many relatives and followers in the town of Jaro and Tunga, and
may harass the prosecution witness while going back and forth to
Carigara (Annex "H"). On July 3, the Secretary of Justice approved the
petition of the fiscal, so the information was filed before the Tacloban
Branch of the court. However, counsel for the accused moved the Court
of First Instance to have the case transferred to Carigara for trial on the
merits.

ISSUE:

Whether or not any judge of the six (6) branches of the Court of First
Instance of the province of Leyte, Tacloban and Ormoc cities may try
any case coming from any municipality, with the previous approval of
this Department.

HELD:

This Court agrees with the argument of the court below that jurisdiction
is fixed by law and that once jurisdiction has attached by the filing of a
complaint or information with a court of concurrent jurisdiction, the latter
may not be divested thereof especially by an administrative order or
circular. But the court below predicates the argument on the incorrect
premise that the six branches of the court of first instance of Leyte are
six different courts. There is only one court of first instance of Leyte;
each of its six branches is not a court separate and distinct from the five
other branches. Jurisdiction, furthermore, is vested in the court, not in
the judges. So, when a complaint or information is filed before one
branch or judge, jurisdiction does not attach to said branch or judge
alone, to the exclusion of the others. Trial may be had or proceedings
may continue by and before another branch or judge. It is for this reason
that Section 57 of the Judiciary Act, expressly grants the Secretary of
Justice, upon recommendation of the district judge, the administrative
right or power to apportion the cases among the different branches, both
for the convenience of the parties and for the coordination of the work by
the six branches and the judges presiding each branch. The
apportionment does not involve a grant or limitation of jurisdiction; this
continues to be vested in the court of first instance of the province as
whole and trial may be had by any branch or judge of the court.

This Court finds , therefore, that the judge below erred in consideration
each of the six branches of the court of first instance of Leyte as
independent and different court, distinct and separate from all the
others. So did it err in holding that once a judge has started to try a
case, this may no longer be transferred to and tried by another.
Administrative Order No. 175 and the law under which it is adopted are
 based on the theory that authority to try cases is vested in the whole
court, or in all or any of the branches or judges of the province or judicial
district, and that the actual determination of who among the judges
should try a given case is an administrative matter to be made pursuant
to the arrangement to be adopted in accordance with Section 57 of the
Judiciary Act. Cognizant of the difficulties that may arise in the
apportionment of the cases among the different branches of the court
sitting in different municipalities, the legislature has authorized the
district judge and the secretary of Justice to adopt an apportionment
best suited to the interests of a speedy administration of justice. This
apportionment must be respected by the judges in the interest of order
and coordination in the dispatch of cases. The administrative
arrangement does not violate jurisdiction because as this Court had
stated above jurisdiction to try cases is vested in the court or in all the
branches thereof in the province or judicial district.

3. El Banco Espanol vs. Palanca G.R. No. L-11390;  March

26, 1918

FACTS:
Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel
of land as security to his debt which amounted to Php 218, 294.
10 while his property was worth Php 75, 000 more than what he
owed. Due to his failure to pay, El Banco executed an instrument
to mortgage the former's property. However, Engracio left for
Amoy, China and eventually died there. The mortgagor then
instituted foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is a non-
resident, it was necessary to give notice by publication. The Clerk
of Court was also directed to send copy of the summons to the
defendant's last known address but it was not shown whether the
Clerk complied with this requirement. Nevertheless, after
publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the case
proceeded and judgment by default was rendered. The decision
was likewise published and afterwards sale by public auction was
held with the bank as the highest bidder and the same was
confirmed by the court. However, about seven years after the
confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca,
as administrator of the estate of the original defendant, wherein
he requested the court to set aside the order of default and the
judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto.
On the ground that the order of default and the judgment
rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired
jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant
and the subject matter or the action.
HELD:
Where the defendant in a mortgage foreclosure lives outside of
the country and refuses to appear or otherwise submit himself to
the authority of the court, the jurisdiction of the latter is limited
to the mortgaged property, with respect to which jurisdiction of
the court is based upon the fact that the property is located
within the district and that the court, under the provisions of
law applicable in such cases is vested with the power to
subject property to the obligation created by the
mortgage. In such case personal jurisdiction over the non-
resident defendant is non-essential and in fact cannot be
acquired.

4. THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY VS. THE ATTORNEY-

GENERAL (G.R. No. 6287) criminal procedure cases
Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases.
Effect of defect in jurisdiction.
G.R. No. 6287             December 1, 1911
THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL, representing the Insular
Government, et al., defendants-appellants.
FACTS:– This is a case of appeal from CFI Tarlac’s judgment
dismissing the action before it on motion of the plaintiff upon the
ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter.
– On December 1907, Manila Railroad Co. began an action in CFI
Tarlac for the condemnation of 69,910 sq. m. real estate located
in Tarlac. This is for construction of a railroad line “from Paniqui
to Tayug in Tarlac,” as authorized by law.
– Before beginning the action, Manila Railroad had caused to be
made a thorough search in the Office of the Registry of Property
and of the Tax where the lands sought to be condemned were
located and to whom they belonged. As a result of such
investigations, it alleged that the lands in question were located
in Tarlac.
– After filing and duly serving the complaint, the plaintiff,
pursuant to law and pending final determination of the action,
took possession of and occupied the lands described in the
complaint, building its line and putting the same in operation.
–  On October 4, Manila Railroad gave notice to the defendants
that on October 9, a motion would be made to the court to
dismiss the action upon the ground that the court had no
jurisdiction of the subject matter, it having just been ascertained
by the plaintiff that the land sought to be condemned was
situated in the Province of Nueva Ecija, instead of the Province of
Tarlac, as alleged in the complaint.

– This motion was heard and, after due consideration, the trial
court dismissed the action upon the ground presented by the
plaintiff. Thus, the case was appealed.

ISSUES:
1. WON CFI Tarlac has power and authority to take cognizance of
condemnation of real estate located in another province

2. WON Sec. 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Act. No.
1258 are applicable and so the CFI has no jurisdiction.

HELD:
1. YES, CFI Tarlac has power and authority to take cognizance of
condemnation of real estate located in another province.
  Ratio Sections 55 and 56 of Act No. 136 of the Philippine
Commission confer perfect and complete jurisdiction upon the CFI
of these Islands with respect to real estate in the Philippine
Islands. Such jurisdiction is not made to depend upon locality.
There is no suggestion of limitation. The jurisdiction is universal.
It is nowhere suggested, much less provided, that a CFI of one
province, regularly sitting in said province, may not under certain
conditions take cognizance of an action arising in another
province or of an action relating to real estate located outside of
the boundaries of the province to which it may at the time be
assigned.
JURISDICTION OF COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE OVER ACTIONS AFFECTING

REALTY. — Sections 55 and 56 of Act No. 136 of the Philippine Commission

confer upon the Courts of First Instance complete and perfect jurisdiction over

all of the lands within the Philippine Islands. Such jurisdiction is not made to

depend upon locality. There is no limitation. It is universal. So far as

jurisdiction over the subject matter is concerned, the Court of First Instance

of one province may, if there is no objection by any of the parties, take

cognizance of an action in reference to real estate located in another

province.
There is, of course, an important distinction between person and
subject matter are both conferred by law. As to the subject
matter, nothing can change the jurisdiction of the court over
diminish it or dictate when it shall attach or when it shall be
removed. That is a matter of legislative enactment which none
but the legislature may change. On the other hand, the
jurisdiction of the court over the person is, in some instances,
made to defend on the consent or objection, on the acts or
omissions of the parties or any of them. Jurisdiction over the
person, however, may be conferred by consent, expressly or
impliedly given, or it may, by an objection, be prevented from
attaching or removed after it has attached.

2. NO.
Ratio  Sec. 377 contains no express inhibition against the court.
The prohibition provided therein is clearly directed against the
one who begins the action and lays the venue. The court, before
the action is commenced, has nothing to do with it either. The
plaintiff does both. Only when that is done does the section begin
to operate effectively so far as the court is concerned. The
prohibition is not a limitation on the power of the court but on the
rights of the plaintiff. It establishes a relation not between the
court and the subject, but between the plaintiff and the
defendant. It relates not to jurisdiction but to trial. It simply gives
to defendant the unqualified right, if he desires it, to have the
trial take place where his land lies and where, probably, all of his
witnesses live. Its object is to secure to him a convenient trial.
The fact that such a provision appears in the procedural law at
once raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with
the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. It becomes
merely a matter of method, of convenience to the parties litigant.
If their interests are best subserved by bringing in the Court
Instance of the city of Manila an action affecting lands in the
Province of Ilocos Norte, there is no controlling reason why such
a course should not be followed. The matter is, under the law,
entirely within the control of either party. The plaintiff’s interests
select the venue. If such selection is not in accordance with
section 377, the defendant may make timely objection and, as a
result, the venue is changed to meet the requirements of the law.

Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to

actions by railroad corporations to condemn lands; and that,
while with the consent of defendants express or implied the
venue may be laid and the action tried in any province selected
by the plaintiff nevertheless the defendants whose lands lie in one
province, or any one of such defendants, may, by timely
application to the court, require the venue as to their, or, if one
defendant, his, lands to be changed to the province where their
or his lands lie. In such case the action as to all of the defendants
not objecting would continue in the province where originally
begun. It would be severed as to the objecting defendants and
ordered continued before the court of the appropriate province or
provinces. While we are of that opinion and so hold it can not
affect the decision in the case before us for the reason that the
defendants are not objecting to the venue and are not asking for
a change thereof. They have not only expressly submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the court but are here asking
that that jurisdiction be maintained against the efforts of the
plaintiff to remove it.
5. ANGEL OTIBAR, and ANASTACIO OTIBAR, petitioners,
vs. HON. DEMETRIO G. VINSON, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, JOAQUIN BADIABLE, CELSO
INABAÑGAN, ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. L-18023 May 30, 1962

BARRERA, J.:

APPEAL AND ERROR; DISMISSAL OF APPEAL FROM JP TO CFI; REMAND THE CASE TO
JP. — Once an appeal from the Justice of the Peace Court to the Court of First Instance
in a forcible entry and detainer case is dismissed, the latter court loses jurisdiction to
proceed with the case. The only step left to it under the circumstances, is to remand
the case to the Justice of the Peace Court for the due execution of the judgment which
is revived upon the dismissal of the appeal. (Capunu v. Llorente, 29 Phil. 392; see also
Marco v. Muñoz, 72 Phil. 270; Fortuna v. Viloria, 14 Phil. 232; and Caisip v. Cabangon,
109 Phil., 150.)

Section 13-1-110 - Appeal bond defective or insufficient

If, at any time pending an appeal in any action, suit, or other proceeding, it appears to
the appellate court that the appeal bond or undertaking is defective or insufficient or
that any surety thereon has died, or has removed or is about to remove from this state,
or has become or is likely to become insolvent, such appellate court shall order
another appeal bond or undertaking, or such other and further security as to the
appellate court seems proper, if the appellant or his attorney of record has been served
with at least twenty-four hours' written notice of an application of the appellee for
such order. If the appellant fails to comply with said order within ten days after
the making of the same, the appeal shall be dismissed.

In an action for forcible entry instituted by Anastacio Rocha,

predecessor-in-interest of petitioners Angel and Anastacio Otibar,
in the Justice of the Peace Court of Carigara, Leyte (Civil
Case No. 151), against respondents Joaquin, Maria, and
Silvestra Badiable, and Celso Inabañgan

Judgment was rendered by said court on February 8, 1960 in

favor of Rocha against respondents, ordering the latter to vacate
the land subject of the action and to deliver its possession to
Rocha and to pay the said plaintiff the sum of P5.00 as damages
plus P100.00 as attorney's fees.

From said decision, respondents appealed to the Court of

First Instance of Leyte, presided by respondent Judge
Demetrio G. Vinson (Civil Case No. 612), but said appeal was,
on June 11, 1960, dismissed by the latter court upon motion
of plaintiff, on the ground that the appeal bond was
defective. No appeal appears to have been taken from this order
of dismissal. The plaintiff, instead of asking for the remand of
the case to the Justice of the Peace Court from which it
originated, petitioned the Court of First Instance for the
immediate execution of the Judgment of the court of
origin, which motion was, granted by the respondent Judge.
The Provincial Sheriff fully served the writ of execution on
respondents. Respondents, however, refused to deliver
possession of the land. On June 25, therefore, Rocha filed in
the same Court of First Instance, a motion for contempt
against respondents. On July 25, he also filed a motion to
garnish the salary check of respondent Celso Inabañgan to
satisfy the judgment. On July 26, he filed a second motion for
contempt and a third motion for contempt on July 27. On July
30, 1960, the respondent Judge, in view of the difficulty in
identifying the property in question, issued an order requiring
the Sheriff "to relocate" said property. On August 16, Rocha
filed a fourth motion for contempt. On August 29, he filed an
ex parte motion praying that respondents be ordered to
abide by the Sheriff's report. On September 20, he filed an
ex parte motion for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of
respondents. Acting on the latter motion, the respondent
Judge issued an order requiring respondents to explain why
they should not be punished for contempt. In October,
respondent Judge issued another order requiring the
Sheriff to "constitute in the place and deliver the land in
question to the plaintiff" (Rocha). On October 13, 1960,
Rocha filed an urgent ex parte motion for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest and another similar motion for warrant of
arrest on October 22.

On November 12, 1960, respondent Judge still issued

another order requiring a commissioner to conduct an
"ocular inspection" of the land in question and to constitute
(identify) the same.

On November 28, 1960, Rocha filed a motion, this time

praying respondent Judge to order the return of the record
of the case to the Justice of the Peace Court of Carigara
"for resolution of the questions raised with reference to
the execution of the judgment" (of said Justice of the Peace
Court dated February 8, 1960), for the reason that having
dismissed the appeal of respondents on June 11, 1960,
respondent Judge was deprived of jurisdiction to continue
proceeding with the case, and the enforcement of the judgment
of the Justice of the Peace Court which has become final and
executory has become the exclusive concern of said court (Justice
of the Peace Court). Said motion was denied by respondent Judge
on January 7, 1961, for lack of merit.

On February 7, 1961, petitioners (claiming to be the legal heirs of

Rocha, the plaintiff in the cases below) filed with this Court the
present petition for certiorari with mandamus.

In this instance, petitioners claim that respondent Judge acted

without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in deciding to continue with the proceedings in
his court, notwithstanding his dismissal of respondents'
appeal from the decision of the Justice of the Peace Court
on June 11, 1960.

ISSUE:
Whether or not either the Justice of the Peace Court or the
Court of First Instance acquired appellate jurisdiction for
resolution of the questions raised with reference to the
execution of the judgment".

RULING:

Upon the facts of the case, the Court of First Instance either
acquired no appellate jurisdiction because the appeal had never
been perfected, or if it did, it lost its jurisdiction to proceed
with the case upon dismissal of the appeal. The only step left
to the Court of First Instance, under the circumstances, was to
remand the case to the Justice of the Peace Court for the
due execution of the judgment which was revived upon the
dismissal of the appeal. (Capunu v. Llorente, 29 Phil. 392; see
also Morco v. Muñoz, 72 Phil. 270; Fortuna v. Viloria, 14 Phil.
232, and Caisip v. Cabangon, L-14684, August 26, 1960).

In failing to do so and in entertaining Rocha's several

motions for execution, contempt, arrest, etc. all filed
subsequent to the dismissal of the appeal, respondent
Judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction and
with grave abuse of discretion, remediable by certiorari.

Respondents contend that petitioners, by filing said motions

notwithstanding the dismissal of their appeal, are guilty of
negligence or laches and, therefore, are estopped or precluded
from seeking the present remedy of certiorari and mandamus in
this Court.

The contention is untenable because jurisdiction can not

be conferred by laches or even consent of the parties, and
herein petitioners are assailing the jurisdiction of
respondent Judge to issue the various orders aforesaid in
the case he had previously dismissed, which question may
be raised at any stage of the proceedings (See Garganta, et
al. v. Court of Appeals, L-12104, March 31, 1959).

The Supreme Court granted the writs of certiorari and

mandamus (a judicial writ issued as a command to an inferior
court or ordering a person to perform a public or statutory
duty."a writ of mandamus") prayed for by petitioners.
Respondent Judge's orders subsequent to his dismissal of
the case (Civil Case No. 151, Justice of the Peace Court of
Carigara) are set aside and declared null and void, and he
is directed to remand the case to the Justice of the Peace
Court of Carigara for execution of the latter's judgment
dated February 8, 1960.

This Court ruled:

A rule, which has never been seriously questioned, is that

money in the hands of public officers, although it may be
due government employees, is not liable to the creditors of
these employees in the process of garnishment, ... . Another
reason is that moneys sought to be garnished as long as
they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the
Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant
may be entitled to a specific portion thereof. And still
another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that
every consideration of public policy forbids it.

6. SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL. vs. MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY

alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO G.R. No.
L-21450; April 15, 1968
FACTS:
The action at bar, which is a suit for collection of a sum of
money in the sum of exactly P 1,908.00, exclusive of interest
filed by Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog against Spouses
Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio, was originally
instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19,
1948.
Defendants filed a counter bond with Manila Surety and Fidelity
Co (Surety). Judgement was in favour of the plaintiffs, a writ of
execution was issued against the defendant. Defendants moved
for writ of execution against surety which was granted.
The Surety moved to quash the writ but it was denied. Thus, they
appealed to CA without raising the issue on lack of
jurisdiction. The CA affirmed the appealed decision.
The Surety then filed Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction against CFI Cebu in view of the effectivity
of Judiciary Act of 1948 a month before the filing of the petition
for recovery. The Act placed original exclusive jurisdiction of
inferior courts all civil actions for demands not exceeding
2,000 exclusive of interest. The CA set aside its earlier
decision and referred the case to SC since it has exclusive
jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior
court is in issue.
ISSUE: Whether or not Surety can raise the question of lack of
jurisdiction for the first time on appeal?
HELD: NO.
The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and as the lack of it
affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the
case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstances of
the present case, the Supreme Court had the opinion that the
Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late
hour for the purpose of annuling everything done heretofore in
the case with its active participation. The facts of this case show
that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party July 31,
1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction
of the CFI to take cognizance of the present action by reason of
the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in
force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior
courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the
proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals,
it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief
and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It
was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the CA that it
finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. A party may
be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways
and for different reasons. Thus this Court speaks of estoppel in
pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by
laches. Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which,
by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled
to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of “stale demands” is based upon
grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society,
the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of
limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a
question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or
claim to be enforced or asserted. It has been held that a party
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief
against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such
relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.

7. JOSE PEREZ CARDENAS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

PEDRO CAMUS, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-17191 July 30, 1962
DIZON, J.:

On May 26, 1941 appellant Pedro Camus, with appellee J. Perez

Cardenas as guarantor in solidum, executed in favor of Jose
Garrido a promissory note in the sum of P2,000.00, payable as
follows:
During the first twelve consecutive months beginning June
1941, the sum of P360.00 in twelve equal installments of P30.00,
each installment to be paid on or before the fifth day of every
month;

Then the balance of P1,640.00 in thirty-two equal

installments of P50.00 and one installment of P40.00
beginning the thirteenth month and consecutively
thereafter, each installment to be paid on or before the fifth day
of every month;

The note further provided that if any two installments

were not paid as stated therein, the whole unpaid principal
shall forthwith become due and payable.

[According to the Supreme Court, pactum commisorium exists

when there is an agreement giving the creditor the right to
automatically claim the property given as security to the principal
obligation in case the debtor fails to pay without undergoing
foreclosure proceedings and public sale (Edralin v.
PhilippineVeterans Bank, G.R. No. 168523, March 9, 2011)].

Appellant and appellee having failed to pay as agreed

upon, Garrido instituted against them the corresponding
action (Civil Case No. 21439) in the Court of First Instance
of Manila. As appellant could not be served with summons, the
case proceeded with respect to herein appellee only,
against which decision was rendered for "the sum of P2,000.00
with 6% interest thereon from the filing of the complaint until its
full payment, plus the sum of P200.00 for attorney's fees."

The above decision was affirmed by the CA on appeal and, after

the case was returned to the lower court for execution, appellee
paid the total sum of P2,910.00 in full satisfaction thereof.

Thereafter appellee made verbal as well as written demands for

payment upon appellant and, as a result thereof, in the month of
September, 1958, the parties agreed that appellant would
pay appellee the total sum of P3,123.00 at the rate of
P25.00 every payday beginning from December 24, 1958.

After making three of these payments, however, appellant

defaulted, thus giving rise to the institution of the present
action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal.

The answer filed by appellant, alleged the following affirmative

defenses:

1. That under Rule 8, Sec. 1(e) plaintiff's cause of action is barred

by a prior judgment and by the statute of limitations, he having
failed to interpose a cross-claim against the herein defendant in
Civil Case No. 21439;

2. That no moral damages may be recovered as this case does

not fall within those enumerated in Art. 2219 of the Civil Code
and no corrective or exemplary damages can be interposed
under Sec. 5, Arts. 2229-2233 of the Civil Code as the case is not
included therein aside from the fact that plaintiff is not entitled
to moral damages and therefore in accordance with Art. 2234
of the Civil Code cannot claim for the same.

3. That no attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other

than judicial costs, can be recovered under Art. 2208 as
this case does not fall within any of the exceptions mentioned
therein.

Issues having thus been joined, the case was set for trial,
appellant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that (a) "the court had no jurisdiction over the
case, the venue of the action having been improperly laid"
and (b) "that plaintiff's cause of action is barred by prior
judgment due to his failure to interpose a cross-claim
against the herein defendant who was his co-defendant in
Civil Case No. 21439 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila."

Appellant set this motion for hearing on Saturday, March 26,

1960, that is, four days after the date set for the trial of the case
on the merits. On the same day — March 18, 1960 — appellant
also filed a motion for continuance.

When the case was called for trial on March 18, nobody appeared
for appellant, and the lower court, after denying his motion for
continuance for lack of merit, received appellee's evidence, and
on March 23, 1960, it rendered judgment one in favor of
plaintiff and against the defendant, by ordering the
defendant Pedro Camus to pay to plaintiff the total sum of
P3,048.45, with legal rate of interest thereon from the date of
the filing of this case until fully paid for; by ordering the same
defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of P500.00 by way of
attorney's fees in this case; and for the defendant to pay the
costs. In view of the nature of this case and the transaction
involved, the court cannot grant any moral and correctional
damages.

From the above judgment appellant took the present appeal

claiming the lower court to have committed the following errors:

1. ignoring defendant's motion to dismiss and failing to decide the

same before trying and deciding this case.

2. denying defendant's motion for continuance considering the

fact that there was a motion to dismiss still pending which
challenged the very jurisdiction of the court.

3. assuming jurisdiction of this case when the venue of the action

was improperly laid.

RULING:
The motion for continuance filed by appellant was
correctly denied. The granting or denial of a motion of such
kind is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. In
this case the following circumstances:

In the first place, appellant had filed his answer to the

complaint after having been served with notice setting the trial of
the case, that he filed his motion for continuance and his
motion to dismiss the complaint, the latter upon grounds
substantially the same as the affirmative defenses set forth in his
answer.

In the second place, appellant set the hearing of his

motion to dismiss two days after the date set for the trial
of the case, when he could very well have set it for hearing on
this latter date, giving the trial court no other alternative
but to grant the continuance sought.

In the third place, it is obvious that the motion for

continuance was intended to delay the trial and
termination of the case. Thus, the Supreme Court find no
way clear to disturbing the action taken by the lower court
in the premises.

With respect to the motion to dismiss the complaint, said

motion was not only a mere reiteration of the defenses set forth
in the answer, but appellant set it for hearing four days after
the date fixed for the trial on the merits. Appellant had no
right to do so as a means of forcing upon the court and his
opponent the desired postponement of the trial. Moreover,
after denying appellant's motion for continuance, it cannot
be said that the trial court was still under obligation to
pass upon the motion to dismiss which appellant set for
hearing four days later.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined upon

the allegations made in the complaint, irrespective of
whether the plaintiff is entitled or not entitled to recover
upon all or some of the claims asserted therein — a matter
resolved only after and result of the trial. Neither can the
jurisdiction of the court be made to depend upon the pleas or
defenses pleaded by the defendant in his answer or motion to
dismiss, for, were we to be governed by such rule, the question
of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely upon the defendant.

8. [G.R. No. L-20843. June 23, 1965.]

THE EDWARD J. NELL COMPANY, Petitioner, v. RICARDO
CUBACUB and THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,
Respondents.
MAKALINTAL, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner is a domestic corporation and respondent Ricardo

Cubacub was one of its employees. On September 5, 1962,
Cubacub filed a petition against the company in
respondent Court of Industrial Relations for
"reinstatement" and payment of "back wages" and
attorney’s fees (Case No. 1740-V).

Petitioner here filed a motion to dismiss on three grounds: (1)

that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the
case; (2) that the action had prescribed; and (3) that the petition
states no cause of action.

Cubacub opposed the motion and petitioner replied to the

opposition. On November 15, 1962 respondent court, over the
signature of Judge Arsenio J. Martinez, issued the following order:

"After going over the pleadings of the parties, the court finds that
questions of law and fact are involved in this case. Therefore, the
determination of respondent’s motion to dismiss is hereby
deferred until the trial, so that all questions of law and fact
may be determined in a single proceeding and decided in a
single decision in pursuance of Section 3, Rule 8 of the Rules of
Court."

A motion to reconsider the foregoing order was filed, but was

denied by the court en banc on January 5, 1963, whereupon the
instant petition for certiorari and prohibition was
presented here, to set aside the orders of November 15,
1962 and January 5, 1963, and to enjoin (Enjoin is the verb
form of injunction. A court enjoins something when it issues an
injunction against it. ) respondent court from further
proceeding.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent court had jurisdiction over the case

and, if it had none, whether or not it committed a grave abuse of
discretion in deferring until after trial the consideration of
petitioner’s motion for dismissal.

RULING:

The question of jurisdiction could be resolved on the basis

of the allegations in Cubacub’s petition alone.

It is a settled rule that the jurisdiction of a court over the

subject-matter is determined by the allegations in the
complaint; and when a motion to dismiss is filed for lack of
jurisdiction those allegations are deemed admitted for purposes
of such motion, so that it may be resolved without waiting for the
trial. Thus it has been held that the consideration thereof
may not be postponed in the hope that the evidence may
yield other qualifying or concurring data which would
bring the case under the court’s jurisdiction.

Is the claim of respondent Cubacub for reinstatement and

back wages, as recited in the petition filed by him below,
within the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations?
The Court stated in a number of cases that for said court to have
jurisdiction in a controversy, the following circumstances must be
present:

(a) that there exists between the parties an employer-

employee relationship, or the claimant seeks his
reinstatement, and

(b) the controversy relates to a case certified by the President to

the Court of Industrial Relations as one involving national
interest, or has a bearing on an unfair labor practice charge, or
arises either under the Eight-Hour Labor Law or under the
Minimum Wage Law.

The claim or demand here in question does not meet those

requirements. While respondent Cubacub seeks
reinstatement, he having ceased to be employed since
1955, none of the other circumstances is present.

In the case at bar there was merely a deferment of the

consideration of a similar motion makes no material differences,
for if the lack of jurisdiction is clear from the very allegations of
the complaint or petition, further proceedings in the case would
be a nullity and waste of time, and therefore although such order
is interlocutory in nature they may be stopped by a writ of
certiorari and prohibition.

Judging from his own allegations, respondent Cubacub virtually

ceased to be an employee of petitioner when he was convicted of
homicide and sentenced to a term of imprisonment, which he
served from 1958 to 1962, and his petition below was for
reemployment based on an alleged promise of the employer to
take him back to work "after his criminal case was settled." The
action therefore is one for specific performance, that is, for
the enforcement of such promise, and is cognizable by
ordinary courts and not by the Court of Industrial
Relations.
Last case discussed
9. G.R. No. L-25547. November 27, 1967.
JUAN M. SERRANO and SILVER LINERS, INC., Plaintiffs-
Appellants, v. MUÑOZ (HI) MOTORS, INC., DM TRANSIT
CORPORATION, BENITO MACROHON, as Sheriff of Quezon
City, and ENRIQUE MEDINA, as Public Service
Commissioner, Defendants-Appellees.

CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:

Juan M. Serrano was granted by the Public Service Commission

(PSC) a certificate of public convenience to operate in Manila and
Quezon City eight auto-trucks for passengers and freight.
On August 22, 1963 Serrano mortgaged this certificate to
Muñoz (Hi) Motors, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the MHMI),
as additional collateral to secure an indebtedness on
account of the purchase of four buses. The parties to this
chattel mortgage thereafter applied to the PSC for approval
thereof. At the instance of the MHMI, the sheriff of Quezon City
foreclosed the chattel mortgage and, executed a certificate of
sale in favor of the MHMI as the highest bidder.

The MHMI sold some units and certificates of public

convenience, among them, the certificate granted to Serrano,
to the DM Transit Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the
DMTC). Acting on the petition filed jointly by the MHMI and the
DMTC, the PSC, thru Commissioner Medina, in an order
issued on March 4, 1965, provisionally approved the said
sale, and authorized the DMTC to operate "under the
provisional authority here granted." Serrano moved to have
this order set aside.

On March 26, 1965 Serrano sold to the Silver Liners, Inc.

(hereinafter referred to as the SLI) the line he was
authorized to operate by virtue of the certificate of public
convenience issued in PSC Case 83104, and authorized the
latter to file with the PSC the corresponding application for
approval of the social sale.

On April 5, 1965 Commissioner Medina issued an order

to give all the parties sufficient and ample opportunity to present
their evidence, pro and con, in support of their respective
allegations, and for the Sheriff, if necessary, to make the
corrections if any error has been committed." 

At the instance of the MHMI, the sheriff of Quezon City "once

more announced the foreclosure of the chattel mortgages dated
October 24, 1961 and August 22, 1963," and the sale of among
others, "the certificate of public convenience issued in PSC Case
No. 83104," to be held on June 14, 1965.

In view of this development, Serrano and the SLI, on June 9,

1965, filed the present complaint.

Acting on the complaint and on an urgent motion subsequently

filed by the plaintiffs for the issuance of an ex parte writ of
preliminary injunction, the court directed the parties to
maintain the status quo upon the filing by the plaintiffs of a
P5,000 bond, and set the motion for hearing on June 26, 1965.
The defendants opposed the motion.

Commissioner Medina, moved for the dismissal of the

complaint against him on three grounds: that the CFI has
no jurisdiction over not only the subject-matter of the
action but as well his person as Public Service
Commissioner; that the complaint states no cause of action
against him; and that "Article 32 of the Civil Code is not
applicable to judicial orders." 

The rest of the defendants, alleged, that the certificate of

public convenience issued in PSC case 83104 is included in
the chattel mortgage; that the PSC had in fact approved
the said mortgage; that the said certificate was actually
included in the foreclosure sale conducted by the sheriff of
Quezon City, although the latter, through inadvertence,
failed to mention it in the certificate of sale; and that the
MHMI has requested the sheriff "to conduct another
foreclosure sale in order to supplement and correct the
first one." They further alleged that the complaint states
no cause of action, and that the plaintiffs are in estoppel
and guilty of laches. They accordingly prayed that the
complaint be dismissed as against them, and that the
sheriff of Quezon City be ordered to proceed with the
foreclosure sale.

The plaintiffs, on July 8, 1965, opposed the motion to

dismiss filed by Commissioner Medina.

By its order of July 19, 1965 the CFI dismissed the complaint
as against Commissioner Medina. The plaintiffs moved to
have this order set aside or clarified, because it did not specify
any ground for the dismissal.

The MHMI and the DMTC moved to dismiss the complaint

on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject-matter of the action which the plaintiffs thereafter
filed their opposition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CFI erred in dismissing the complaint for lack
of jurisdiction over the subject-matter thereof.

RULING:

The Court held that jurisdiction over the subject-matter is

determined by the allegations of the complaint,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein —
a matter that can be resolved only after and as a result of
the trial. Nor may the jurisdiction of the court be made to
depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the
motion to dismiss, for, were we to be governed by such rule, the
question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely upon
the defendant.

The PSC has Jurisdiction and CFI is correct in dismissing

the case.

As can be gleaned from the portions of the complaint

hereinbefore quoted, three distinct issues present themselves for
resolution.

1. According to the appellants, this order "presupposes the

existence of a sale and transfer of the certificate of public
convenience issued in Case No. 83104 by the Sheriff of Quezon
City to Muñoz (Hi) Motors Inc., which is not a fact, "because
the said certificates of public convenience was not
mentioned in the sheriff’s certificate of sale of October 31,
1964; the PSC order approving provisionally the sale by the
MHMI in favor of the DMTC, of, among others, the said certificate,
and authorizing the latter to operate the line covered thereby,
thus deprived Serrano of his property "without due process of
law," and prevented the appellants from operating the eight units
attacked to the said certificate and Serrano from substituting four
of the said units.

In sum, therefore, paragraphs 11 and 15 assail the PSC order

of March 4, 1965 as erroneous because the MHMI could not
have legally transferred the certificate of public
convenience in question to the DMTC for the reason that
the sheriff’s certificate of sale of October 31, 1964 did not
include the said certificate of public convenience among
the properties sold to the MHMI in the foreclosure sale.

The Supreme Court viewed that the resolution of this

aspect of the case falls within the exclusive province of the
PSC.

Under section 20(g) of the Public Service Law, the PSC is the
body invested with the power and authority to approve a
sale or transfer of a certificate of public convenience. As
emphasized in Garcia v. Bonifacio, Et Al., that.

" [i]f as appellant represents, the certificate sold to him

was later illegally transferred to Peña, who now holds the
Commission’s approval and certificate, there is no better
place than the Commission itself to thresh out the
respective rights of the parties, bearing in mind that said
Commission is the only entity empowered to withdraw the
certificate from Peña and to transfer it to herein plaintiff or
grant him a new certificate." 

We have indeed sustained the power and authority of the PSC (a)
to approve provisionally the transfer of a certificate of public
convenience where the conditions laid down by section 20(g) are
satisfied, and (b) to grant provisional authority to a vendee to
operate a franchise pending determination of the legality of the
sale.

Entirely apart from the above considerations, we note from the

order of March 4, 1965 that Serrano has filed an "urgent motion
to set (it) aside." Orderly procedure demands that the PSC pass
upon this phase of the controversy; from an adverse resolution
thereon, the appellants may yet appeal to this Court.

" [t]he commission having jurisdiction to determine

whether a corporation has the right to do or not to do a
thing for which the commission’s approval is sought,
orderly procedure requires that the commission pass upon
that phase of the controversy before the courts adjudge it.
The reason for this is stated: ‘Otherwise different phases of
the same case might be pending before the commission
and the courts at one time, which would cause endless
confusion.’"

The order of the PSC did not deprive Serrano of his

property "without due process of law." The order is
provisional in nature, "may be modified or revoked by the
Commission at any time," is "subject to whatever action that
may be taken on the basic application" for the sale and transfer
filed by the MHMI in favor of the DMTC, and is "valid only during
the pendency of said application," which period, has already
expired.

Neither were the appellants deprived of their day in court.

For, the PSC, in its order of April 5, 1965, clearly stated that "in
fairness to all" and "to give all the parties sufficient and ample
opportunity to present their evidence, pro and con, in support of
their respective allegation," "the hearing of this case should be
postponed until June 15, 1965, at 9:00 a.m." 

2. The CFI likewise did not err in dismissing the complaint,

even if it prayed for damages against Commissioner
Medina, for failure to state a sufficient cause of action.
Article 32 of the Civil Code, relied upon by the appellants in
support of their claim for damages, provides in its last paragraph
that the responsibility for damages "herein set forth is not
demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a
violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute." whether
article 32 of the Civil Code may be utilized as the legal basis of an
action for damages against a PSC commissioner. It does not
charge him with knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, or
rendering an unjust judgment by reason of inexcusable
negligence or ignorance, or knowingly rendering an unjust
interlocutory order or decree, or transgressing any other penal
law.

3. Finally, the CFI did not err in dismissing the complaint

against the rest of the defendants. The complaint does not
state a cause of action against them. Paragraph 6 thereof
alleges that Serrano filed a motion with the PSC withdrawing the
application filed by him and the MHMI for approval of the chattel
mortgage over the certificate of public convenience in question,
"on the ground that the mortgagee, Defendant Muñoz (HI)
Motors, Inc., had violated their agreement," and, on the basis,
paragraph 14 asserts that "the announced sale on June 14, 1965
is at once illegal and violative of the rights of the plaintiffs," and
the if the sheriff of Quezon City be not immediately restrained
from proceeding with the rights of the plaintiffs," and that if the
sheriff of Quezon City be not immediately restrained from
proceeding with the intended foreclosure and sale of the said
certificate, they "will suffer great and irreparable injury." These
averments are altogether too imprecise and therefore
cannot be dignified as constituting a legally sufficient
statement of the "ultimate facts" required in the
formulation of a course of action; they are at best mere
conclusions of law which, obviously, cannot take the place
of "ultimate facts."

10. EMILIO V. REYES, Protestant-Appellant, -versus-

APOLONIO R. DIAZ, Protestee-Appellee.
G.R. No. 48754 November 26, 1941
MORAN, J.

73 Phil. 484

MORAN, J.:
This case is certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals upon the
ground that the jurisdiction of the trial court is in issue. The
supposed questions of jurisdiction are, first, whether or not there is
sufficient evidence to show that the protestant has duly filed his certificate
of candidacy, and second, whether the trial court has or has no authority to
pass upon the validity of the ballots adjudicated to the protestant which
have not been challenged by the protestee in his counter-protest.

Article VIII, section 2, No. 3, of the Constitution confers upon the Supreme
Court jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any trial court
is in issue." Section 138, No. 3, of the Revised Administrative Code as
amended by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 3 and 259, provides that the
Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over "all cases in which the
jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue." It has been held that the word
"jurisdiction" as used in the constitutions and in the statutes "means
jurisdiction as to the subject-matter only, unless an exception arises by
reason of its employment in a broader sense." (15 C. J. 735;
Johnson vs. Wells, 91 Fed. 1; U. S. vs. Lee, 84 Fed. 626;
Vinal vs. Continental Constr., etc. Co., 34 Fed. 228; Starnes vs. Mutual
Loan etc., Co., 102 Ga. 597; 29 SE 452.) There is in our Constitution or in
the law aforecited nothing which may lend the word "jurisdiction" therein
used a broader meaning than jurisdiction over the subject-matter. On the
contrary, having due regard to the manifest purpose of the law, which is to
confine the appellate jurisdiction of this Court to cases of vital importance
involving questions of fundamental char- acter, such, for instance, as the
question of validity of statute, treaty or ordinance, or the legality of any tax,
import or assessment which may affect the very existence of the
government, or criminal cases wherein life imprisonment or death penalty
is imposed, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the issue of jurisdiction
which confers appellate powers upon this Court in a given case is not such
question as is dependent exclusively upon minor matters of fact or upon a
mere construction of the pleadings, but that which has reference to the
more important question of jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject-
matter as determined by law.

Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is the power to hear and determine

cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong (C. J.
S., p. 36) and is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the
court and defines its powers (Banco Espafiol Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil.
921; Perkins vs. Dizon, 40 Off. Gaz. No. 7, 3d Sup. p. 216; Ng Si
Chok vs. Vera, G. R. No. 45674). The question, therefore, of whether a court
has jurisdiction over the subject-matter, calls for interpretation and
application of the law of jurisdiction which distributes the judicial power
among the different courts in the Philippines, and since the ruling on the
matter is of far-reaching consequences, affecting, as it may, the very life and
structure of our judicial system, the law has deemed it wise to place the
power and authority to act thereon in the highest court of the land. In the
instant case, there is no such question of jurisdiction as above described.
Both parties agree that if the due filing of the protestant's certificate of
candidacy is proven, the trial court has jurisdiction, but that if such fact is
not proven the trial court has no jurisdiction except to dismiss the case.
There is, therefore, no question between the parties as to what the
jurisdiction of the trial court is according to law in either case. The real
question between them is one of fact whether or not the protestant's
certificate of candidacy has been duly filed. And not until this fact is proved
can the question of jurisdiction be determined. Neither is the second
question one of jurisdiction within the purview of the legal provisions above
quoted. Whether certain ballots are or are not pertinent to the issue raised
in the pleadings, is merely a question of relevancy of evidence. It may be
true that the court by an erroneous ruling on such question may encroach
upon issues completely foreign to those defined in the pleadings, but in
such case the question of jurisdiction that may arise would not be one of
jurisdiction over the subject-matter but of jurisdiction over the issue. In
order that a court may validly try and decide a case, it must have
jurisdiction over the subject-matter and jurisdiction over the persons of the
parties. (Banco Espafiol Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921;
Perkins vs. Dizon, 40 Off. Gaz. No. 7, 3d Sup. p. 216.) But in some instances
it is said that the court should also have jurisdiction over the issue (15 C. J.
734; Hutts vs. Martin, 134 Ind. 587, 33 N.E. 676), meaning thereby that the
issue being tried and decided by the court be within the issues raised in the
pleadings. But this kind of jurisdiction should be distinguished from
jurisdiction over the subject-matter, the latter being conferred by law and
the former by the pleadings. Jurisdiction over the issue, unlike jurisdiction
over the subject-matter, may be conferred by consent either express or
implied of the parties. (Rule 17, sec. 4, Rules of Court.) Although an issue is
not duly pleaded it may validly be tried and decided if no timely objection is
made thereto by the parties. This cannot be done when jurisdiction over the
subject-matter is involved. In truth, jurisdiction over the issue is an
expression of a principle that is involved in jurisdiction over the persons of
the parties. Where, for instance, an issue is not duly pleaded in the
complaint, the defendant cannot be said to have been served with process
as to that issue. (Cf. Atkins etc. Co. vs. Domingo, 44 Phil. 680). At any rate,
whether or not the court has jurisdiction over a specific issue is a question
that requires nothing except an examination of the pleadings, and this
function is without such importance as to call for the intervention of this
Court.

Furthermore, this question of jurisdiction is unsubstantial. It is a well-

settled rule that the institution of suffrage is of public, not private, interest,
and the court may examine all the ballots after the ballot boxes are opened
in order to determine which are legal and which are illegal, even though
neither of the parties raised any question as to their illegality.
(Yalung vs. Atienza, 52 Phil. 781; Cecilio vs. Tomacruz, 62 Phil. 689;
Cosculluela vs. Gaston, 63 Phil. 41).

Wherefore, this case is hereby remanded to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings.

Avanceña, C.J., Abad Santos, Diaz, Horritteno, and Ozaeta, JJ., concur.

Laurel, J., concurs in the result.

This case is certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals upon

the ground that the jurisdiction of the trial court is in issue.

ISSUES:
1. First, whether or not there is sufficient evidence to show
that the protestant has duly filed his certificate of candidacy,
and
2. Second, whether the trial court has or has no authority to
pass upon the validity of the ballots adjudicated to the
protestant which have not been challenged by the protestee
in his counterprotest.

RULING:

Article VIII, section 2, No. 3, of the Constitution confers upon the

Supreme Court jurisdiction over “all cases in which the
jurisdiction of any trial court is in issue.” Section 138, No. 3, of
the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth
Acts Nos. 3 and 259, provides that the Supreme Court shall have
appellate jurisdiction over “all cases in which the jurisdiction of
any inferior court is in issue.” It has been held that the word
“jurisdiction” as used in the constitutions and in the
statutes “means jurisdiction as to the subject matter only,
unless an exception arises by reason of its employment in
a broader sense.”
There is in our Constitution or in the law aforecited nothing which
may lend the word “jurisdiction” therein used a broader meaning
than jurisdiction over the subject-matter. On the contrary, having
due regard to the manifest purpose of the law, which is to confine
the appellate jurisdiction of this Court to cases of vital importance
involving questions of fundamental character, such, for instance,
as the question of validity of statute, treaty or ordinance, or the
legality of any tax, import or assessment which may affect the
very existence of the government, or criminal cases wherein life
imprisonment or death penalty is imposed, we are of the opinion,
and so hold, that the issue of jurisdiction which confers appellate
powers upon this Court in a given case is not such question as is
dependent exclusively upon minor matters of fact or upon a mere
construction of the pleadings, but that which has reference to the
more important question of jurisdiction of the trial court over the
subject-matter as determined by law.
Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is the power to hear and
determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in
question belong (C. J. S., p. 36) and is conferred by the
sovereign authority which organizes the court and defines its
powers.

The question, therefore, of whether a court has jurisdiction over

the subject-matter, the law has deemed it wise to place the
power and authority to act thereon in the highest court of the
land.

In the instant case, there is no such question of jurisdiction as

above described. Both parties agree that if the due filing of the
protestant’s certificate of candidacy is proven, the trial court has
jurisdiction, but that if such fact is not proven the trial court has
no jurisdiction except to dismiss the case. There is, therefore, no
question between the parties as to what the jurisdiction of the
trial court is according to law in either case. The real question
between them is one of fact — whether or not the protestant’s
certificate of candidacy has been duly filed. And not until this fact
is proved can the question of jurisdiction be determined.
Topic: JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-48754 November 26, 1941
EMILIO V. REYES, protestant-appellant, vs APOLONIO R. DIAZ, protestee-
appellee.
Penned by MORAN, J.:

FACTS:
Both parties agreed that if the due filing of the protestant’s certificate of candidacy is
proven, the trial court would have no jurisdiction except to dismiss the case.
(the facts were not really discussed)

ISSUE:
Whether or not the question of jurisdiction that may arise would be one of jurisdiction
over the subject matter or jurisdiction over the issue.

HELD:
There is no such question of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
In order that a court may validly try and decide a case,
it must have jurisdiction over the persons of the parties. But in some instances,
it is said that the court should also have jurisdiction over the issue,
meaning thereby that the issue being tried and decided by the court be within
the issues raised in the pleadings. But this kind of jurisdiction should be
distinguished from jurisdiction over the subject-matter the latter being conferred
by law and the former by the pleadings.

Jurisdiction over the issue, unlike jurisdiction over the subject-matter, may be
conferred by consent either express or implied of the parties. (Rule 17, sec. 4,
Rules of Court.)
Although an issue is not duly pleaded it may validly be tried and decided if no timely
objection is made thereto by the parties. This cannot be done when jurisdiction
over the subject-matter is involved.

In truth, jurisdiction over the issue is an expression of a principle that is involved in

jurisdiction over the persons of the parties. Where, for instance, an issue is not duly
pleaded in the complaint, the defendant cannot be said to have been served
with process as to that issue. (Cf. Atkins etc. Co. vs.Domingo, 44 Phil. 680). At
any rate, whether or not the court has jurisdiction over a specific issue is a
question that requires nothing except an examination of the pleadings, and this
function is without such importance as call for the intervention of this Court.

Furthermore, this question of jurisdiction is unsubstantial. It is well-settled rule that the

institution of suffrage is of public, not private, interest, and the court may examine all the
ballots after the ballot boxes are opened in order to determine which are legal and
which are illegal, even though neither of the parties raised any question as to their
illegality. This case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

11. Manchester vs CA
149 SCRA 562 – Remedial Law – Civil Procedure – Payment of
Docket Fees – Claimed
Damages must be Stated in the BODY and PRAYER of pleadings

FACTS:
A complaint for specific performance was filed by Manchester
Development Corporation against City Land Development
Corporation to compel the latter to execute a deed of sale in favor
Manchester. Manchester also alleged that City Land forfeited the
former’s tender of payment for a certain transaction thereby
causing damages to Manchester amounting to P78,750,000.00.
This amount was alleged in the BODY of their Complaint but it
was not reiterated in the PRAYER of same complaint. Manchester
paid a docket fee of P410.00 only. Said docket fee is premised on
the allegation of Manchester that their action is primarily for
specific performance hence it is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. The court ruled that there is an under assessment of
docket fees hence it ordered Manchester to amend its complaint.
Manchester complied but what it did was to lower the amount of
claim for damages to P10M. Said amount was however again not
stated in the PRAYER.

ISSUE: Whether or not the amended complaint should be

admitted.

HELD: No. The docket fee, its computation, should be based on

the original complaint. A case is deemed filed only upon
payment of the appropriate docket fee regardless of the actual
date of filing in court. Here, since the proper docket fee was not
paid for the original complaint, it’s as if there is no complaint
to speak of. As a consequence, there is no original complaint
duly filed which can be amended. So, any subsequent proceeding
taken in consideration of the amended complaint is void.
Manchester’s defense that this case is primarily an action for
specific performance is not merited.
The Supreme Court ruled that based on the allegations and
the prayer of the complaint, this case is an action for
damages and for specific performance. Hence, it is capable
of pecuniary estimation.
Further, the amount for damages in the original complaint was
already provided in the body of the complaint. Its omission in
the PRAYER clearly constitutes an attempt to evade the
payment of the proper filing fees. To stop the happenstance
of similar irregularities in the future, the Supreme Court ruled
that from this case on, all complaints, petitions, answers
and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of
damages being prayed for not only in the body of the
pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be
considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case.
Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not
bib accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from
the record.
File leave of Court is asking permission to make an amended
complaint.

12. Sun Insurance v Asuncion Digest G.R. Nos. 79937-38

February 13, 1989

FACTS: Petitioner Sun Insurance (or SIOL) files a

complaint for the annulment of a decision on the
consignation of fire insurance policy. Subsequently, the
Private Respondent (PR) files a complaint for the refund of
premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment in
a civil case against SIOL. In addition, PR also claims for damages,
attorney’s fees, litigation costs, etc., however, the prayer did not
state the amount of damages sought although from the body of
the complaint it can be inferred to be in amount of P 50 million.
Hence, PR originally paid only PhP 210.00 in docket fees. The
complaint underwent a number of amendments to make way for
subsequent re-assessments of the amount of damages sought as
well as the corresponding docket fees. The respondent
demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the
additional docket fees as required.

ISSUE: Did the Court acquire jurisdiction over the case even if
private respondent did not pay the correct or sufficient docket
fees?

RULING: YES.
It was held that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or
appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action.
Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by
payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of
the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglamentary period. Same rule
goes for permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar
pleadings.

In herein case, obviously, there was the intent on the part of PR

to defraud the government of the docket fee due not only in the
filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second
amended complaint. However, a more liberal interpretation of the
rules is called for considering that, unlike in Manchester, the
private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the
rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.

Where a trial court acquires jurisdiction in like manner, but

subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the
pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination
by the court, the additional filing fee shall constitute a lien
on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of
Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and
assess and collect the additional fee.
13. Tacay vs RTC of Tagum
GR Nos. 88075-77 December 20, 1989
MAXIMO TACAY, PONCIANO PANES and ANTONIA NOEL,
petitioners, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF TAGUM Davao del
Norte, Branches 1 and 2, Presided by Hon. Marcial Fernandez and
Hon. Jesus Matas, respectively, PATSITA GAMUTAN, Clerk of
Court, and GODOFREDO PINEDA, respondents.

FACTS:
These were two separate cases originally filed by Godofredo
Pineda at the RTC of Tagum for recovery of possession (accion
publiciana) against three defendants, namely Antonio Noel,
Ponciano Panes, and Maximo Tacay. Pineda was the owner of 790
sq. meter land evidence by TCT No. T-56560. The previous owner
of such land allowed the three defendants to use or occupy the
same by mere tolerance. Pineda having himself the need to use
the property, demanded the defendants to vacate the
premises and pay reasonable rental therefore, but
such demands were refused. The complaint was
challenged in the Motions to Dismiss filed by each defendant
alleging that it did not specify the amounts of actual, nominal and
exemplary damages, nor the assessed value of the property, that
being a ground to bar the determination of the RTC’s jurisdiction
in deciding the case. The Motions to Dismiss were denied and the
claims for damages in the complaint were expunged for
failure to specify the amounts. Thus, the defendants filed a
Joint Petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, as well as
a temporary restraining order against the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the amount of damages claimed and the assessed
value of the property are relevant in the determination of the
court’s jurisdiction in a case for recovery of possession of
property.

HELD: Yes.
Where the action involves real property and a related claim for
damages as well, the legal fees shall be assessed on the
basis of both (a) the value of the property and (b) the total
amount of related damages sought. The Court acquires
jurisdiction over the action if the filing of the initiatory pleading is
accompanied by the payment of the requisite fees, or, if the fees
are not paid at the time of the filing of the pleading, as of the
time of full payment of the fees within such reasonable time as
the court may grant, unless, of course, prescription has set in the
meantime. But whereas in the case at bar- the fees prescribed
for an action involving real property have been paid,
but the amounts of certain of the related damages (actual,
moral and nominal) being demanded are unspecified, the
action may not be dismissed. The Court undeniably has
jurisdiction over the action involving the real property, acquiring
it upon the filing of the complaint or similar pleading and
payment of the prescribed fee. And it is not divested
of that authority by the circumstance that it may not
have acquired jurisdiction over the accompanying claims for
damages because of lack of specification thereof. What should be
done is simply to expunge those claims for damages as to which
no amounts are stated, which is what the respondent Courts
did, or allow, on motion, a reasonable time for the
amendment of the complaints so as to allege the precise
amount of each item of damages and accept payment
of the requisite fees therefore within the relevant
prescriptive period.

The Clerk of Court will assess the amount of the filing fee.

14. FILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORP. vs. COURT OF

APPEALS

In Filipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. vs. CA, the Supreme Court

had occasion to rule that:

"Filing fees are intended to take care of court expenses in the handling of
 cases in terms of cost of supplies, use of equipment, salaries and fringe
benefits of personnel, etc. computed as to man hours used in handling
each case. The payment of said fees therefore cannot be made dependent
on the result of the action taken without entailing tremendous losses to
the government and to the judiciary in particular." virtua1aw library

FACTS: Adrian dela Paz sued all oil companies (Shell,

Caltex, Mobil, etc.) of the Philippines for infringement of
patent with prayer for the payment of reasonable
compensation for damages. According to him, these companies
used in their operation a certain type of machine which he
claimed he invented. His patent was infringed. Thus, all
these companies are all liable to him for royalties. The
estimated yearly royalty due him is P236,572. Since the
violation has been for many years already, his claims reached
millions. The trial court ordered him to pay P945,636.90 as
docket fee. He had no money so he questioned it. So, the
Court said that it will allow de la Paz to file the case and the
docket fee is deductible from whatever judgment of damages
shall be awarded by the court.” So, as if, file now pay later.
ISSUE:
Whether or not docket fee can be paid later, after the
judgement of the case is being awarded by the court.

HELD:
There is no such thing as file now pay later. No justification
can be found to convert such payment to something akin to a
contingent fee which would depend on the result of the case.
“Filing fees are intended to take care of court expenses in
the handling of cases in terms of cost of supplies, use of
equipments, salaries and fringe benefits of personnel, etc.,
computed as to man hours used in handling of each case. The
payment of said fees therefore, cannot be made dependent on
the result of the action taken, without entailing tremendous
losses to the government and to the judiciary in particular.”
Holding that the additional filing fee could constitute a lien on
the judgment, the RTC considered respondents as indigent
litigants, with no property to cover the additional fees. The RTC
also noted that filing fees, albeit insufficient, were initially paid by
respondents and there was no intention on their part to defraud
the government. These circumstances, according to the RTC,
justified the relaxation of the Manchester rule and called for the
application of the following pronouncement in Sun
Insurance:

Plainly, while the payment of prescribed docket fee is a

jurisdictional requirement, even its non-payment at the
time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of
the case, as long as the fee is paid within the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period, more so when the party
involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules
prescribing such payment. Thus, when insufficient filing fees were
initially paid by the plaintiffs and there was no intention to
defraud the government, the Manchester rule does not apply.
In view of the CA's Decision, it directed the RTC Clerk of
Court to reassess and determine the correct amount of
docket fees to be paid by respondents.

The Court accordingly finds no cogent reason to hold that

indigence was belatedly raised by respondents. As Pilipinas
Shell demonstrates, an application to litigate as an indigent
party may be made when additional filing fees are imposed
subsequent to the filing of the complaint and even after
the issue of docket fees had undergone appellate review.

The amount of additional docket fees is unclear. While

respondents alleged that the filing fees had been recomputed by
the Clerk of Court at P39,172,020.00, it appears from the RTC's
November 21, 2011
Resolution that the additional filing fee is still undetermined as it
directed the Clerk of Court to reassess the correct amount of
docket fees to be paid by respondents. Petitioner itself has
submitted a figure nearly 40% more than the alleged
reassessment of the Clerk of Court.

Access to justice by the impoverished is held sacrosanct under

Article III, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. The idea of
paying docket fees at P39,172,020.00, as alleged by respondents,
or P62,903,240.00, as computed by petitioner, is enough to give
anyone pause. To an indigent, it is scarcely within the realm of
possibility. The Court, thus, finds it more in keeping with the free
access clause under the Bill of Rights to accord respondents a
chance to establish their indigence. Besides, the court will still
have to be convinced that they qualify for exemption as indigent
parties based on the standards set in Section 21, Rule 3 and
Section 19, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. Should the authority
to litigate as indigent parties be granted, the legal fees will still be
a lien on any judgment favorable to them unless the court directs
otherwise.

Furthermore, Section 21 of Rule 3 provides that the adverse

party may later still contest the grant of such privilege at any
time before judgment is rendered by the trial court, possibly
based on newly discovered evidence not obtained at the time the
application was heard. Should the trial court, after hearing,
determine that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a
person with sufficient income or property, the clerk of court shall
assess and collect the proper docket and other lawful fees. If the
fees so assessed are not paid within the time fixed by the trial
court, execution shall issue or the payment of the prescribed fees
shall be made, without prejudice to other sanctions that may be
imposed by the trial court.

15. LACSON vs. REYES 182 SCRA 729

 FACTS: There was a case filed and then the lawyer filed a
motion to direct the plaintiff to pay him his attorney’s fees – a
motion for payment of attorney’s fees.

HELD: “It may be true that the claim for attorney's fees was
but an incident in the main case, still, it is not an escape value
from the payment of docket fees because as in all actions,
whether separate or as an offshoot of a pending proceeding,
the payment of docket fees is mandatory. The docket fee
should be paid before the court would validly act on the
motion.”

G.R. No. 86250 February 26, 1990

ALBERTO F. LACSON, EDITHA F. LACSON, ROMEO F.
LACSON and ZENA F. VELASCO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. LUIS R. REYES, in his capacity as presiding judge of
Branch 22 of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 22,
and/or Multiple Sala, Imus, Cavite, and EPHRAIM J.
SERQUINA, respondents.

SARMIENTO,  J.:

FACTS:

On August 26, 1987, the private respondent, Ephraim Serquina,

petitioned the respondent court for the probate of the last will
and testament of Carmelita Farlin. In His petition, Atty. Ephraim
J. Serquina, is the Petitioner." He also petitioned the court in
his capacity as counsel for the heirs, the herein petitioners, and
as executor under the will.

The petition was not opposed and hence, the respondent court
issued a "certificate of allowance."  
 the Court renders certification that subject will and
testament is accordingly allowed in accordance with
Sec. 13 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court.

On March 14, 1988, Atty. Ephraim Serquina filed a "motion for

attorney's fees"  against the petitioners, alleging that the heirs
had agreed to pay, as and for his legal services rendered, the
sum of P68,000.00.

Thereafter summonses were served upon the heirs "as if it were a

complaint against said heirs"  directing them to answer the
motion.

Thereafter, the heirs filed their answer and denied the claim for
P68,000.00 alleging that the sum agreed upon was only
P7,000.00, a sum they had allegedly already paid.

Eleven days after the heirs received a copy of the decision, the

latter filed a notice of appeal.

The respondent court issued an order directing the heirs to

amend their notice of appeal. 

The respondent court issued an order "noting" the notice on

appeal "appellants [the heirs] having failed to correct or complete
the same within the reglementary period to effect an appeal." 

The respondent court issued yet another order denying the notice
of appeal for failure of the heirs to file a record on appeal.

Thereafter, Atty. Serquina moved for execution. The respondent

court issued an order granting execution. 

The petitioners submit that the decision, and the orders are null
and void for the following reasons: (1) the respondent court
never acquired jurisdiction over the "motion for attorney's fees"
for failure on the part of the movant, Ephraim Serquina, to pay
docket fees; (2) the respondent court gravely abused its
discretion in denying the heirs' notice of appeal for their failure to
file a record on appeal; and (3) the respondent court also gravely
abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees contrary to the
provisions of Section 7, of Rule 85, of the Rules of Court.

Anent docket fees, it has been held  that the court acquires

jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the
prescribed docket fee.

In the case at bar, the "motion for attorney's fees" was clearly in
the nature of an action commenced by a lawyer against his
clients for attorney's fees.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an administrator or executor may be allowed fees

for the necessary expenses he has incurred as such, but he may
not recover attorney's fees from the estate.

RULING:

The rule is therefore clear that an administrator or executor may

be allowed fees for the necessary expenses he has incurred as
such, but he may not recover attorney's fees from the estate. His
compensation is fixed by the rule but such a compensation
is in the nature of executor's or administrator's
commissions, and never as attorney's fees.

In one case,  this Court held that "a greater sum [other than that
established by the rule] may be allowed 'in any special case,
where the estate is large, and the settlement has been attended
with great difficulty, and has required a high degree of capacity
on the part of the executor or administrator.'"  It is also left to
the sound discretion of the court.  With respect to attorney's fees,
the rule, as we have seen, disallows them. Accordingly, to the
extent that the trial court set aside the sum of P65,000.00 as and
for Mr. Serquina's attorney's fees, to operate as a "lien on the
subject properties,"  the trial judge must be said to have gravely
abused its discretion (apart from the fact that it never acquired
jurisdiction, in the first place, to act on said Mr. Serquina's
"motion for attorney's fees").

The next question: Who shoulders attorney's fees?

This Court held that a lawyer of an administrator or executor may

not charge the estate for his fees, but rather, his client.  Mutatis
mutandis, where the administrator is himself the counsel
for the heirs, it is the latter who must pay therefor.

In that connection, attorney's fees are in the nature of actual

damages, which must be duly proved.  They are also subject to
certain standards, to wit: (1) they must be reasonable, that is to
say, they must have a bearing on the importance of the subject
matter in controversy; (2) the extent of the services rendered;
and (3) the professional standing of the lawyer.  In all cases, they
must be addressed in a full-blown trial and not on the bare word
of the parties.  And always, they are subject to the moderating
hand of the courts.

The Court is not persuaded from the facts above that Atty.
Serquina is entitled to the sum claimed by him (P68,000.00) or
that awarded by the lower court (P65,000.00). The Court
observes that these are acts performed routinely since they form
part of what any lawyer worth his salt is expected to do. The will
was furthermore not contested. They are not, so Justice Pedro
Tuason wrote, "a case [where] the administrator was able to stop
what appeared to be an improvident disbursement of a
substantial amount without having to employ outside legal help at
an additional expense to the estate," to entitle him to a bigger
compensation. He did not exactly achieve anything out of the
ordinary.

The records also reveal that Atty. Serquina has already been paid
the sum of P6,000.00.  It is our considered opinion that he should
be entitled to P15,000.00 for his efforts on a quantum
meruit basis. Hence, we hold the heirs liable for P9,000.00 more.
16. ERIBERTO M. SUSON vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
DAVID S. ODILAO 278 SCRA 284 [August 21, 1997) [G.R. No.
126749.]

The issue in this case is whether or not a party litigant, whose complaint has been
dismissed by a Regional Trial Court due to improper venue, can seek an authorization
from the Supreme Court thru the Deputy Court Administrator to re-file his complaint in
the court of proper venue without payment of the prescribed docket fee.

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to review
the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals which dismissed petitioner’s petition
for certiorari assailing the order of the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City which denied his
motion to dismiss for lack of merit.

FACTS:
On 15 November 1993, private respondent Odilao filed a P5.15 million civil suit for
damages against petitioner Suson before the Regional Trial Court of San Juan, Southern
Leyte. Private respondent claimed that petitioner made false and groundless
accusations of graft and corruption against him before the Office of the Ombudsman,
and thereafter caused their publication in a Cebu-based local daily under the headline
"ODILAO SUED FOR GRAFT." According to private respondent, Suson’s machinations
had cast dishonor, discredit and contempt upon his person which besmirched his
reputation and caused him to suffer moral shock and social humiliation.

Private respondent paid the sum of P25,600.00 in docket fees to the Regional Trial
Court of Southern Leyte

On 17 December 1993, petitioner Suson filed a motion to dismiss the complaint of

private respondent Odilao on the ground of improper venue, alleging therein that Odilao
resides in Talisay, Cebu and not in Himonganan, Southern Leyte. Finding merit in
petitioner’s arguments in his motion to dismiss, the lower court (RTC Southern Leyte)
granted petitioner’s aforesaid motion.

Private respondent went to the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City to re-file the same
complaint that was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court of Southern Leyte. Private
respondent avers that upon showing the official receipts as proof of payment of the
docket fees in the Regional Trial Court of Southern Leyte to the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, the latter advised his counsel to file a formal request
with this Court, thru the Court Administrator, for an "authority" to apply the payment
for docket fees previously made to the Regional Trial Court, Southern Leyte to the
docket fees of Regional Trial Court Cebu City.

Private respondent, thru counsel, wrote a letter addressed to the SC Court

Administrator, requesting for an authorization to consider the filing fees previously paid
to the Regional Trial Court of San Juan, Southern Leyte as payment for the filing fees in
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City where the case was re-filed.
The Supreme Court Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo P. Abesamis sent a reply to
private respondent’s counsel stating that private respondent’s counsel can re (-)file the
.com

case at RTC Cebu City and present the official receipt corresponding to the filing fees
paid at RTC, Branch 26 San Juan, Southern Leyte.

Thereafter, private respondent presented the letter-reply of Deputy Court Administrator

Abesamis to the clerk of court of the RTC of Cebu City upon re-filing his complaint. On
the basis of the aforesaid letter-reply, the clerk of court docketed private respondent’s
complaint as Civil Case without requiring private respondent to pay anew the prescribed
docket fees.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the Civil Case on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and
lack of cause of action. Petitioner argued that private respondent "did not pay (even) a
single centavo of the P25,000.00 filing fee; hence, the court, RTC of Cebu City, did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case.”
irtua1aw library

The RTC of Cebu City, issued an order denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss. The court
held that said plaintiff re(-)filed the same case with this Court, asked permission from
es.com.ph

the Supreme Court, through the Court Administrator, for authority to apply the filing
fees paid by the plaintiff in the RTC of Southern Leyte, for the filing fees in the instant
case. Said request was granted by the Court Administrator. The validity of the authority
given by the Deputy Administrator regarding the application of the filing fees in this
case can not be questioned before this forum. Indeed the Court finds it to be in keeping
with justice and equity and the spirit of liberality in construing the Rules. In fact there is
no prohibition in that direction. It should be stated here that P25,000.00 filing fee paid
by the plaintiff in the Regional Trial Court of San Juan, Southern Leyte, is no picayune
amount for one to do away with, and sense of fairness demands that plaintiff be
allowed to apply the same in the filing of this case."

Petitioner elevated the RTC Judge of Cebu City’s order for review on certiorari to the
Court of Appeals which agreed with the trial court’s dispositions. The Court of Appeals
ratiocinated that: "To require respondent Odilao to pay anew the docket fee of P25,600
jgc:

in its totality that he has already paid when he filed the case that was earlier dismissed
on the ground of improper venue, for him to re-file the same case in the proper court is
to unduly exact from him a premium on his constitutional right to free access to the
courts for redress of a wrong (Section 11, Article III, 1987 Constitution; See Tan v.
Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 397, 404).

ISSUE:

Whether the Deputy Court Administrator is empowered to allow the filing of a case in
court without paying the required docket fee.

Said issue is resolved in the affirmative in favor of respondent Odilao.

RULING:

In legal contemplation, the Leyte Court had acquired jurisdiction over Civil Case upon
the payment of the prescribed docket fee(s) and its order dismissing the case due to
improper venue was a final disposition of the case pursuant to the exercise of said
jurisdiction.

Petitioner further contends that the case later filed in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City (Branch 6) by private respondent is "a distinct and separate case from that of the
Leyte court as it has a new docket number (CEB-16336) although the allegations
therein are entirely the same as Civil Case No. P-417 filed in the RTC of Southern Leyte
(Branch 26)." cralaw virtua1aw library

In his comment, private respondent Odilao contends that "it is incorrect for petitioner to
insist that Odilao failed to pay the required filing fees." He (Odilao) was not granted an
"exemption" from the payment of filing fees by Deputy Court Administrator Abesamis
but merely an authority to apply the filing fees he paid in Civil Case No. P-417 filed in
RTC Southern Leyte as "payment for filing fees of the same case" re-filed in the RTC of
Cebu.

In Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. v. CA, The SC ruled that: "Filing fees are intended to
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

take care of court expenses in the handling of cases in terms of cost of supplies, use of
equipment, salaries and fringe benefits of personnel, etc. computed as to man hours
used in handling each case. The payment of said fees therefore cannot be made
dependent on the result of the action taken without entailing tremendous losses to the
government and to the judiciary in particular." cralaw virtua1aw library

In the later cases, the SC ruled that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of
the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing of the case in court.

In 1987, in Manchester Development Corporation v. CA (149 SCRA 564), the SC further

refined the principle, as it ruled, that "a court acquires jurisdiction over any case only
upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee", and in order to curb the unethical
practice of misleading the docket clerk in the assessment of the correct filing fee, it laid
down the rule that "henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar
pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body
of the pleading, but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the
assessment of the filing fees in any case."

Two (2) years later, Sun Insurance Office Ltd. v. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion affirmed
the basic principle laid down in Manchester but ‘’reduced its stringency somewhat by
providing that only those claims as to which the amounts were not specified
would be refused acceptance or expunged and that, in any case, the defect
was not necessarily fatal or irremediable as the plaintiff could, on motion, be
granted a reasonable time within which to amend his complaint and pay the
requisite filing fees, unless in the meantime, the period of limitation of the
right of action was completed." In that case, the Court en banc laid down the
following rules: c:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.

"2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar
pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed
therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time
but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

"3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the
judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has
been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall
constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or
his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional
fee." cralaw

virtua1aw library

In the case at bar, in the strict sense, private respondent’s complaint cannot be
deemed to have been "re-filed" in the RTC of Cebu City (Branch 6) because it was not
originally filed in the same court but in the RTC of Southern Leyte (Branch 26). Thus,
when private respondent’s complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-16336 by the
clerk of court of the RTC Cebu City, it became an entirely separate case from Civil Case
No. that was dismissed by the RTC of Leyte due to improper venue.

From a procedural point of view therefore, to "re-file" the case before the same court
would be an obvious faux pas. As a remedial measure, the plaintiff whose complaint
was dismissed due to improper venue can still file another complaint, but this time in
the court of proper venue.

Theoretically, the plaintiff may decide to file a complaint containing substantially the
same allegations and prayer as the previously dismissed complaint, or he may decide to
amend the same and pray for a different relief. In this case, the principle remains
unchanged, that is, the court (of proper venue) will only acquire jurisdiction
over the case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee thereon.

Article III, Sec. 11 of the 1987 Constitution states that "Free access to the courts and
quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by
reason of poverty." It is for this reason that under Rule 141, Sec. 16 of the Rules of
Court, pauper-litigants are exempted from the payment of court fees, which includes
the filing fee in instituting a complaint. Nonetheless, the rule provides that the legal
fees shall be a lien on the monetary or property judgment rendered in favor of the
pauper-litigant.

The Deputy Court Administrator committed an error when he stated in his

letter reply to private respondent’s counsel that he can "re-file the complaint
in the RTC Cebu City and present the official receipt corresponding to the filing
fees paid in the RTC Branch 26, San Jose, Southern Leyte."
alaw virtua1aw library

Since his case has already been docketed as Civil Case in the RTC Cebu City,
the procedural remedy of paying the prescribed docket fees is still available to
him provided, of course, that the applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period has not yet set in.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City is hereby ordered to require private respondent to pay the prescribed
docket fees in Civil Case No. 16336 as a condition precedent for further
hearing the case.

17. SPOUSES ROSALINA S. DE LEON and ALEJANDRO L. DE

LEON, Petitioners, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, GLICERIO MA. ELAYDA II,
FEDERICO ELAYDA and DANILO ELAYDA, Respondents.

287 SCRA 94; GR No. 104796, March 6, 1998

(Civil Procedure – Jurisdiction, Civil action not capable of
pecuniary estimation, Docket Fees)

The question for decision is whether in assessing the docket fees to be paid for the
filing of an action for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale, the value of the real
property, subject matter of the contract, should be used as basis, or whether the action
should be considered as one which is not capable of pecuniary estimation and therefore
the fee charged should be a flat rate of P400.00 as provided in Rule 141, 7(b)(1) of the
Rules of Court. The trial court held the fees should be based on the value of the
property, but the Court of Appeals reversed and held that the flat rate should be
charged. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

FACTS:

On August 8, 1991, private respondents filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
a complaint for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale of two (2) parcels of land
against petitioners, praying for the following reliefs:

1. Ordering the nullification or rescission of the Contract of Conditional Sale

(Supplementary Agreement) for having violated the rights of plaintiffs (private
respondents) guaranteed to them under Article 886 of the Civil Code and/or violation of
the terms and conditions of the said contract.
2. Declaring void ab initio the Deed of Absolute Sale for being absolutely simulated; and
3. Ordering defendants (petitioners) to pay plaintiffs (private respondents) attorneys
fees in the amount of P100,000.00.
Other reliefs and remedies as are just and equitable in the premises are also prayed
for.cräläwvirtualibräry

Upon the filing of the complaint, the clerk of court required private respondents to pay
docket and legal fees in the total amount of P610.00, broken down as follows:
P 450.00 - Docket fee for the Judicial Development Fund
150.00 - Docket fee for the General Fund
10.00 - for the Legal Research Fund

Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by reason of private respondents non-
payment of the correct amount of docket fees. Petitioners contended that in addition to
the fees already paid based on the claim for P100,000.00 for attorneys fees, private
respondents should have paid docket fees in the amount of P21,640.00, based on the
alleged value of the two (2) parcels of land subject matter of the contract of sale sought
to be annulled.

Private respondents filed opposition to the motion to dismiss.

Petitioners filed a reply to which private respondents filed, a rejoinder.

On October 21, 1991, the trial court denied petitioners motion to dismiss but required
private respondents to pay the amount of docket fees based on the estimated value of
the parcels of land in litigation as stated in the complaint.

Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration but their motion was denied by
the trial court. They therefore, brought the matter to the Court of Appeals which, on
February 26, 1992, rendered a decision annulling the orders of the trial court. The
appellate court held that an action for rescission or annulment of contract is
not susceptible of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, the docket fees should
not be based on the value of the real property, subject matter of the contract
sought to be annulled or rescinded. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but their
motion was denied in a resolution dated March 25, 1992 of the appellate court. Hence,
this petition for review on certiorari.

Rule 141 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts. - (a) For filing an action or a permissive
counter-claim or money claim against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing
with leave of court a third-party, fourth-party, etc. complaint, or a complaint in
intervention, and for all clerical services in the same, if the total-sum claimed, exclusive
of interest, or the stated value of the property in litigation, is:

1. Not more than P20,000.00 .............P120.00

2. More than P20,000.00 but less than

P 40,000.00 ......................... 150.00

3. P40,000.00 or more but less than

P 60,000.00 ......................... 200.00

4. P60,000.00 or more but less than

P 80,000.00 ... ...................... 250.00

5. P80,000.00 or more but less than

P 100,000.00 ........................... 400.00

6. P100,000.00 or more but less than

P 150,000.00 ........................... 600.00

7. For each P1,000.00 in excess of

P 150,000.00 ............................. 5.00

(b) For filing:

1. Actions where the value of the subject

matter cannot be estimated ............. P400.00

2. Special civil actions except judicial

foreclosure of mortgage which shall be

governed by paragraph (a) above .... 400.00

3. All other actions not involving

property........................... 400.00

In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated
value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the
fees . (emphasis added)

Petitioners argue that an action for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale of real
property is a real action and, therefore, the amount of the docket fees to be paid by
private respondent should be based either on the assessed value of the property,
subject matter of the action, or its estimated value as alleged in the complaint,
pursuant to the last paragraph of 7(b) of Rule 141, as amended by the Resolution of
the Court dated September 12, 1990. Since private respondents alleged that the land,
in which they claimed an interest as heirs, had been sold for P4,378,000.00 to
petitioners, this amount should be considered the estimated value of the land for the
purpose of determining the docket fees.
On the other hand, private respondents counter that an action for annulment or
rescission of a contract of sale of real property is incapable of pecuniary estimation and,
so, the docket fees should be the fixed amount of P400.00 in Rule 141, 7(b)(1). In
support of their argument, they cite the cases of Lapitan v. Scandia, Inc.
[7 and Bautista v. Lim.[8 In Lapitan this Court, in an opinion by Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
held:

A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining whether an

action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this
Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal
courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim.
However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of
money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the
contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a
judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as cases
where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance. The rationale of the rule is plainly that
the second class cases, besides the determination of damages, demand an inquiry into
other factors which the law has deemed to be more within the competence of courts of
first instance, which were the lowest courts of record at the time that the first organic
laws of the Judiciary were enacted allocating jurisdiction (Act 136 of the Philippine
Commission of June 11, 1901).

Actions for specific performance of contracts have been expressly pronounced to be

exclusively cognizable by courts of first instance: De Jesus vs. Judge Garcia, L-26816,
February 28, 1967; Manufacturers Distributors, Inc. vs. Yu Siu Liong, L-21285, April 29,
1966. And no cogent reason appears, and none is here advanced by the parties, why an
action for rescission (or resolution) should be differently treated, a rescission being a
counterpart, so to speak, of specific performance. In both cases, the court would
certainly have to undertake an investigation into facts that would justify one act or the
other. No award for damages may be had in an action for rescission without first
conducting an inquiry into matters which would justify the setting aside of a contract, in
the same manner that courts of first instance would have to make findings of fact and
law in actions not capable of pecuniary estimation expressly held to be so by this Court,
arising from issues like those raised in Arroz v. Alojado, et al., L-22153, March 31, 1967
(the legality or illegality of the conveyance sought for and the determination of the
validity of the money deposit made); De Ursua v. Pelayo, L-13285, April 18, 1950
(validity of a judgment); Bunayog v. Tunas, L-12707, December 23, 1959 (validity of a
mortgage); Baito v. Sarmiento, L-13105, August 25, 1960 (the relations of the parties,
the right to support created by the relation, etc., in actions for support); De Rivera, et
al. v. Halili, L-15159, September 30, 1963 (the validity or nullity of documents upon
which claims are predicated). Issues of the same nature may be raised by a party
against whom an action for rescission has been brought, or by the plaintiff himself. It
is, therefore, difficult to see why a prayer for damages in an action for rescission should
be taken as the basis for concluding such action as one capable of pecuniary estimation
a prayer which must be included in the main action if plaintiff is to be compensated for
what he may have suffered as a result of the breach committed by defendant, and not
later on precluded from recovering damages by the rule against splitting a cause of
action and discouraging multiplicity of suits.

Conformably with this discussion of actions where the value of the case cannot be
estimated, the Court in Bautista v. Lim, held that an action for rescission of contract is
one which cannot be estimated and therefore the docket fee for its filing should be the
flat amount of P200.00 as then fixed in the former Rule 141, 5(10). Said this Court:

We hold that Judge Dalisay did not err in considering Civil Case No. V-144 as basically
one for rescission or annulment of contract which is not susceptible of pecuniary
estimation (1 Morans Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed, p. 55; Lapitan vs.
Scandia, Inc., L-24668, July 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 479, 481-483).

Consequently, the fee for docketing it is P200, an amount already paid by plaintiff, now
respondent Matilda Lim. (She should pay also the two pesos legal research fund fee, if
she has not paid it, as required in Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3870, the charter of the
U.P. Law Center).

Thus, although eventually the result may be the recovery of land, it is the
nature of the action as one for rescission of contract which is controlling. The
Court of Appeals correctly applied these cases to the present one. As it said:

We would like to add the observations that since the action of petitioners [private
respondents] against private respondents [petitioners] is solely for annulment or
rescission which is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation, the action should not be
confused and equated with the value of the property subject of the transaction; that by
the very nature of the case, the allegations, and specific prayer in the complaint, sans
any prayer for recovery of money and/or value of the transaction, or for actual or
compensatory damages, the assessment and collection of the legal fees should not be
intertwined with the merits of the case and/or what may be its end result; and that to
sustain private respondents [petitioners] position on what the respondent
court may decide after all, then the assessment should be deferred and finally
assessed only after the court had finally decided the case, which cannot be
done because the rules require that filing fees should be based on what is
alleged and prayed for in the face of the complaint and paid upon the filing of
the complaint.

WHEREFORE , the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado (Chairman), Melo, Puno and Martinez, JJ., concur.