CITY OF MANILA v.
IAC Cemetery, and was told that the remains of her late husband had
FACTS:
The case stemmed from an action for damages filed by Irene Sto.
Domingo, the widow of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. against
the City of Manila; Evangeline Suva of the City Health Office; Sergio
Mallari, officer-in-charge of the North Cemetery; and Joseph
Helmuth, the latter's predecessor as officer-in-charge of the said
burial grounds owned and operated by the City Government of
Manila.
Vivencio died on June 4,1971 and buried on June 6,1971 in Lot No.
159, Block No. 194 of the North Cemetery which lot was leased by
the city to Irene Sto. Domingo for the period from June 6, 1971 to
June 6, 2021 per an Official Receipt dated June 6, 1971. Full
payment of the rental of P50.00 is evidenced by the said receipt.
Apart from the receipt, no other document was executed to embody
such lease over the burial lot in question. In fact, the burial record for
Block No. 194 of Manila North Cemetery in which subject Lot No.
159 is situated does not reflect the term of duration of the lease in
favor of the Sto. Domingos.
Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 5, Series of 1975 of the City
Mayor of Manila prescribing uniform procedure and guidelines in the
processing of documents pertaining to and for the use and
disposition of burial lots and plots within the North Cemetery, etc.,
and believing in good faith that the subject lot was leased to the
bereaved family for five years only, such lot was certified on January
25, 1978 as ready for exhumation.
On the basis of such certification, the authorities of the North
Cemetery then headed by defendant Joseph Helmuth authorized the
exhumation. They placed the remains of Vivencio in a bag and kept
the same in the depository of the cemetery. Subsequently, the same
lot in question was rented out to another lessee so that when the
Sto. Domingos went to said lot on All Souls Day in their shock and
dismay, that the resting place of their dear departed did not anymore
bear the stone marker which they lovingly placed on the tomb. Irene
Sto. Domingo then inquired from the officer-in-charge of the North
been taken from the burial lot in question which was given to another
lessee.
Petitioners alleged in their petition that the North Cemetery is
exclusively devoted for public use or purpose. They conclude that
since the City is a political subdivision in the performance of its
governmental function, it is immune from tort liability which may be
caused by its public officers and subordinate employees. Private
respondents on the other hand maintain that the City of Manila
entered into a contract of lease which involve the exercise of
proprietary functions with private respondent Irene Sto. Domingo.
The city and its officers therefore can be sued for any-violation of the
contract of lease.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the operations and functions of a public cemetery are
a governmental, or a corporate or proprietary function of the City of
Manila
RULING:
It is a proprietary function of the City of Manila. The City of Manila is
a political body corporate. It may sue and be sued, and contract and
be contracted with. Its powers are twofold in character – public,
governmental or political on the one hand, and corporate, private and
proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are those exercised
in administering the powers of the state and promoting the public
welfare and they include the legislative, judicial, public and political.
Municipal powers on the one hand are exercised for the special
benefit and advantage of the community and include those which are
ministerial, private and corporate.
In connection with the powers of a municipal corporation, it may
acquire property in its public or governmental capacity, and private or
proprietary capacity. The New Civil Code divides such properties into
property for public use and patrimonial properties. With respect to
proprietary functions, the settled rule is that a municipal corporation
can be held liable to third persons ex contractu. Maintenance of
parks, golf courses, cemeteries and airports among others, are
recognized as municipal or city activities of a proprietary character.

Under the foregoing considerations and in the absence of a special

law, the North Cemetery is a patrimonial property of the City of
Manila. The administration and government of the cemetery are
under the City Health Officer; the order and police of the cemetery,
the opening of graves, niches, or tombs, the exhuming of remains,
and the purification of the same are under the charge and
responsibility of the superintendent of the cemetery. The City of
Manila furthermore prescribes the procedure and guidelines for the
use and dispositions of burial lots and plots within the North
Cemetery. With the acts of dominion, there is, therefore no doubt
that the North Cemetery is within the class of property which the City
of Manila owns in its proprietary or private character. Furthermore,
there is no dispute that the burial lot was leased in favor of the
private respondents. Hence, obligations arising from contracts have
the force of law between the contracting parties. Thus, a lease
contract executed by the lessor and lessee remains as the law
between them. Therefore, a breach of contractual provision entitles
the other party to damages even if no penalty for such breach is
prescribed in the contract.

Under the doctrine of respondent superior, the City of Manila is liable

for the tortious act committed by its agents who failed to verify and
check the duration of the contract of lease.
 RURAL BANK OF MAKATI, INC., ESTEBAN S. SILVA and
MAGDALENA V. LANDICHO vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI and ATTY. VICTOR A. L. VALERO
FACTS:
In 1990, Atty. Victor Valero, then the municipal attorney of the
Municipality of Makati, went to petitioner bank to inquire about the
bank’s payments of taxes and fees to the municipality. He was
informed, however, by petitioner Landicho, corporate secretary of the
bank, that the bank was exempt from paying taxes under R.A. 720,
as amended. Subsequently, two Information was filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court against petitioners for non-payment of the
mayor’s permit fee and for non-payment of annual business tax.
While said cases were pending with the municipal court, respondent
municipality ordered the closure of the bank. This prompted
petitioners to pay, under protest, the mayor’s permit fee and the
annual fixed tax in the amount of P82,408.66, and filed with the RTC
a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages. They alleged that they
were constrained to pay the amount because of the closure order.
They averred that the collection of the taxes/fees was oppressive,
arbitrary, unjust and illegal.
In its Answer, respondent municipality asserted that petitioners’
payment of P82,408.66 was for a legal obligation because the
payment of the mayor’s permit fee as well as the municipal business
license was required of all business concerns, and that said
requirement was in furtherance of the police power of the
municipality to regulate businesses.
The RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the bank was
engaged in business as a rural bank. Hence, it should secure the
necessary permit and business license, as well as pay the
corresponding charges and fees. It ruled that the municipality had
authority to impose licenses and permit fees on persons engaging in
business, under its police power embodied under the general welfare
clause. On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. It
ruled that the exercise of police power by the municipality was
mandated by the general welfare clause, which authorizes the local
government units to enact ordinances, not only to carry into effect
and discharge such duties as are conferred upon them by law, but
also those for the good of the municipality and its inhabitants.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner bank is liable to pay the business
taxes and mayor’s permit fees imposed by respondent
2. Whether or not the closure of petitioner bank is valid
RULING:
1. Yes. Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 720, as amended by
Republic Act No. 4106, had exempted rural banks with net
assets not exceeding one million pesos (P1,000,000) from
the payment of all taxes, charges and fees, and petitioner
bank’s net assets amounted only to P745,432.29. Hence,
under Rep. Act No. 720, petitioner bank could claim to be
exempt from payment of all taxes, charges and fees under
the aforementioned provision.
However, on December 17, 1986, Executive Order No. 93
was issued withdrawing all tax and duty incentives with
certain exceptions. Notably, not included among the
exceptions were those granted to rural banks under Rep. Act
No. 720. With the passage of said law, petitioner could no
longer claim any exemption from payment of business taxes
and permit fees.
2. No. Although municipality had authority to impose licenses
and permit fees on persons engaging in business, under its
police power embodied under the general welfare clause,
the outright closure of petitioner bank was not warranted.
The Local Government Code of 1991 was not yet in effect
when the municipality ordered petitioner bank’s closure,
however, the general welfare clause was already provided
for in Section 7 of the Local Government Code or Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337 which was then in effect. The Court held
that municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the
promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as
such are endowed with police powers in order to effectively
accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their
creation.
The general welfare clause has two branches. The first,
known as the general legislative power, authorizes the
municipal council to enact ordinances and make regulations
not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into
effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon
the municipal council by law. The second, known as
the police power proper, authorizes the municipality to enact
ordinances as may be necessary and proper for the health
and safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good order, comfort,
and convenience of the municipality and its inhabitants, and
for the protection of their property.
The payment of other revenues accruing to local
governments shall be enforced by legal action.
The above provision did not provide for closure. The Court
ruled that the order of closure violated petitioner’s right to
due process, considering that the records show that the
bank exercised good faith and presented what it thought was
a valid and legal justification for not paying the required
taxes and fees. The violation of a municipal ordinance does
not empower a municipal mayor to avail of extrajudicial
remedies. It should have observed due process before
ordering the bank’s closure.

In the case at bar, the ordinances imposing licenses and

requiring permits for any business establishment, for
purposes of regulation enacted by the municipal council of
Makati, fall within the purview of the first branch of the
general welfare clause. Moreover, the ordinance of the
municipality imposing the annual business tax is part of the
power of taxation vested upon local governments.

However, the Court found that the bank was not engaged in
any illegal or immoral activities to warrant its outright closure.
It ruled that the appropriate remedy to enforce payment of
delinquent taxes or fees are provided for in Section 62 of the
Local Tax Code, to wit:

SEC. 62. Civil Remedies. – The civil remedies

available to enforce payment of delinquent taxes
shall be by distraint of personal property, and by
legal action. Either of these remedies or both
simultaneously may be pursued at the discretion of
the proper authority.
 ACEBEDO OPTICAL COMPANY vs. CA
FACTS:
Petitioner applied with the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan for a
business permit. Respondent City Mayor issued Business Permit No.
5342 subject to the following conditions:
1.
but only a commercial store;
2.
optical glasses for patients, because these are functions of
optical clinics;
3.
prescription having first been made by an independent
optometrist (not its employee) or independent optical clinic.
Acebedo can only sell directly to the public, without need of a
prescription, Ray-Ban and similar eyeglasses;
4.
advertise Ray-Ban and similar glasses and frames;
5.
of an independent optometrist.
Private respondent Samahan ng Optometrist Sa Pilipinas (SOPI),
lodged a complaint before the Office of the City Mayor, alleging that
Acebedo had violated the conditions set forth in its business permit
and requesting the cancellation and/or revocation of such permit.
Acting on such complaint, City Legal Officer Cahanap was
designated to conduct an investigation on the matter. Subsequently,
respondent City Legal Officer submitted a report to the City Mayor
finding the herein petitioner guilty of violating all the conditions of its
business permit and recommending the disqualification of petitioner
from operating its business in Iligan City. Thus, the City Mayor sent
petitioner a Notice of Resolution and Cancellation of Business Permit
effective as of said date and giving petitioner three (3) months to
wind up its affairs.
Petitioner thenbrought a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with prayer for restraining order/preliminary injunction
against the respondents, City Mayor, City Legal Officer and SOPI,
before the RTC-Iligan City, alleging that: (1) it was denied due
process because it was not given an opportunity to present its
evidence during the investigation conducted by the City Legal
Officer; (2) it was denied equal protection of the laws as the
limitations imposed on its business permit were not imposed on
similar businesses in Iligan City; (3) the City Mayor had no authority
to impose the special conditions on its business permit; and (4) the
City Legal Officer had no authority to conduct the investigation as the
matter falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Professional
Regulation Commission and the Board of Optometry.
The RTC dismissed the petition for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. Thus, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with the CA seeking to set aside the questioned
Order of Dismissal. On January 24, 1991, the CA dismissed the
petition for lack of merit.
Issues:
1.
imposing the conditions in the business permit;
6.
Illigan was entered into by the latter in the performance of its
proprietary functions.
Ruling
1.
authority in imposing the assailed conditions in subject business
permit as he had no basis in law or any ordinance.
Public respondents, City Mayor and City Legal Officer, private
respondent SOPI and the Office of the Solicitor General contend that
as a valid exercise of police power, respondent City Mayor has the
authority to impose, as he did, special conditions in the grant of
business permits.
The State, through the legislature, has delegated the exercise of
police power to local government units, as agencies of the State, in
order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of
their creation. This delegation of police power is embodied in the
general welfare clause of the Local Government Code which
provides:
Sec. 6. General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall
exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental
for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall
ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right
of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the
development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment
among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the
comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
The authority of city mayors to issue or grant licenses and business
permits is provided for by law. Section 171, par. 2 of the Local
Government Code of 1983, reads:
Sec. 171. The City Mayor shall:
x x x           x x x          x x x
n) Grant or refuse to grant, pursuant to law, city licenses or permits,
and revoke the same for violation of law or ordinance or the
conditions upon which they are granted.
However, the power to grant or issue licenses or business permits
must always be exercised in accordance with law, with utmost
observance of the rights of all concerned to due process and equal
protection of the law. While a business may be regulated, such
regulation must be within the bounds of reason, i.e., the regulatory
ordinance must be reasonable, and its provision cannot be
oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business
or calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not,
under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even
by the exercise of police power.
If the City Mayor is empowered to grant or refuse to grant a license,
which is a broader power, it stands to reason that he can also
exercise a lesser power that is reasonably incidental to his express
power, i.e. to restrict a license through the imposition of certain
conditions, especially so that there is no positive prohibition to the
exercise of such prerogative by the City Mayor, nor is there any
particular official or body vested with such authority.
However, distinction must be made between the grant of a license or
permit to do business and the issuance of a license to engage in the
practice of a particular profession. The first is usually granted by the
local authorities and the second is issued by the Board or
Commission tasked to regulate the particular profession. A business
permit authorizes the person, natural or otherwise, to engage in
business or some form of commercial activity. A professional license,
on the other hand, is the grant of authority to a natural person to
engage in the practice or exercise of his or her profession.
In the case at bar, what is sought by petitioner from respondent City
Mayor is a permit to engage in the business of running an optical
shop. It does not purport to seek a license to engage in the practice
of optometry as a corporate body or entity. The objective of the
imposition of conditions on petitioner's business permit could be
attained by requiring the optometrists in petitioner's employ to
produce a valid certificate of registration as optometrist, from the
Board of Examiners in Optometry. A business permit is issued
primarily to regulate the conduct of business and the City Mayor
cannot, through the issuance of such permit, regulate the practice of
a profession, like that of optometry. Such a function is within the
exclusive domain of the administrative agency specifically
empowered by law to supervise the profession, in this case the
Professional Regulations Commission and the Board of Examiners in
Optometry.
7.
special privilege. It is not a property in the constitutional sense,
as to which the constitutional proscription against impairment of
the obligation of contracts may extend. A license is not in any
way vested, permanent or absolute.
It is therefore decisively clear that estoppel cannot apply in this case.
The fact that petitioner acquiesced in the special conditions imposed
by the City Mayor in subject business permit does not preclude it
from challenging the said imposition, which is ultra vires or beyond
the ambit of authority of respondent City Mayor. Ultra vires acts or
acts which are clearly beyond the scope of one's authority are null
and void and cannot be given any effect. The doctrine of estoppel
cannot operate to give effect to an act which is otherwise null and
void or ultra vires.

The CA erred in adjudging subject business permit as having been

issued by responded City Mayor in the performance of proprietary
functions of Iligan City. The issuance of business licenses and
permits by a municipality or city is essentially regulatory in nature.
The authority, which devolved upon local government units to issue
or grant such licenses or permits, is essentially in the exercise of the
police power of the State within the contemplation of the general
welfare clause of the Local Government Code.

Disposition:
The Decision of the CA is reversed and the respondent City Mayor is
hereby ordered to reissue petitioner's business permit in accordance
with law and with this disposition.
 BINAY AND MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI v. DOMINGO
FACTS:
The Municipality, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60
which provides for a burial assistance program. The funds to be
taken out of unappropriated funds in the municipal treasury.
Qualified beneficiaries, under the Burial Assistance Program, are
bereaved families of Makati whose gross family income does not
exceed Php 2,000/month. The beneficiaries, upon fulfillment of other
requirements, would receive the amount of five hundred pesos Php
500 cash relief from the Municipality of Makati. Metro Manila
Commission (MMC) approved Resolution No. 60. Thereafter, the
municipal secretary certified a disbursement fund of Php 400,000 for
the implementation of the Burial Assistance Program. The resolution
was referred to COA for its expected allowance in audit. COA
disapproved Resolution No. 60 and disallowed in audit the
disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof. The 2 letters
for reconsideration filed by Mayor Binay were denied. The grounds
for the denial are the ff: (1) the resolution and the intended
disbursements fall within the twin principles of ‘police power’ and
‘parens patriae and (2) MMC already appropriated Php 400,000 to
implement said resolution, and the only function of COA on the
matter is to allow the financial assistance in question.
ISSUE:
W/N the Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of
the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under
the general welfare clause.
HELD:
YES. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent
attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. Its
fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and
convenience of the people. Police power is inherent in the state
but not in municipal corporations. Before a municipal
corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid
delegation of such power by the legislature which is the
repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation
of police power may arise from express delegation, or be inferred
from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and
as a general rule, municipal corporations may exercise police
powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation which
are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly
granted, and statutes conferring powers on public corporations
have been construed as empowering them to do the things
essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of
the people. The so-called inferred police powers of such
corporations are as much delegated powers as are those conferred
in express terms, the inference of their delegation growing out of the
fact of the creation of the municipal corporation and the additional
fact that the corporation can only fully accomplish the objects of its
creation by exercising such powers. Furthermore, municipal
corporations, as governmental agencies, must have such
measures of the power as are necessary to enable them to
perform their governmental functions. The power is a
continuing one, founded on public necessity. Thus, not only does
the State effectuate its purposes through the exercise of the police
power but the municipality does also.
Municipal governments exercise this power under the general
welfare clause: pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to
"enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be
necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred
upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide
for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and
order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general
welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the
protection of property therein." And under Section 7 of BP 337,
"every local government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well
as powers necessary and proper for governance such as to
promote health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals,
and maintain peace and order in the local government unit, and
preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though not
therein." complete. The loss of a member of a family is a painful
experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially
In the case at bar, COA is of the position that there is "no perceptible burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words
connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained of the late President Ramon Magsaysay "those who have less in
under Resolution No. 60, s. 1988, supra, and the alleged public life, should have more in law."
safety, general welfare etc. of the inhabitants of Makati." Apparently,
COA tries to redefine the scope of police power by circumscribing its
exercise to "public safety, general welfare, etc. of the inhabitants of
Makati." Police power is not capable of an exact definition but
has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its
all-comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet the
exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it
could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and
flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus
assuring the greatest benefits. The police power of a municipal
corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate with,
but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people
in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as
may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs,
and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every
function of the municipal government. Thus, it is deemed
inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall
absolutely indicate the limits of police power.

ISSUE: W/N the the classification of pauper beneficiaries is violative

of the equal protection clause in the constitution.

HELD: NO. There is no violation of the equal protection clause in

classifying paupers as subject of legislation. Paupers may be
reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying
treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our
local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes
have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled,
emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil,
housing the urban poor, etc. Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under
Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the
continuing program of our government towards social justice. The

PEOPLE v. FAJARDO
SYLLABUS
1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW;
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE; BUILDING PERMIT; UNDEFINED AND
UNLIMITED DELEGATION OF POWER. — Where an ordinance of
a Municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any standard to
guide or limit the mayor's action; expresses no purpose to be
attained by requiring a permit; enumerates no conditions for its grant
or refusal; and entirely lacks standards thus confering upon the
mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance
of building permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and
unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity, per se
lawful. (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil., 56; Primicias vs. Fugoso, 80 Phil.
71; Schloss Poster Adv. Co., Inc. vs. City of Rock Hill, et al., 2 SE
[2d], pp. 394-395)
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN REASONABLE AND OPPRESSIVE. — A
Municipal Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive if it operates to
permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property;
it then oversteps the bounds of police power without just
compensation. We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to
regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the
comfort and happiness of residents. But while property may be
regulated in the interest of the general welfare and, in its pursuit, the
State may prohibit structures offensive to sight (Churchill and Tait vs.
Rafferty, 32 Phil., 580), the State may not, under guise of police
power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their
property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure
the aesthetic appearance of the community. To legally achieve that
result, the landowner should be given just compensation and an
opportunity to be heard.
FACTS:
Defendant-appellant were charged of violation of Ordinance No. 7,
Series of 1950, of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, for
having constructed without a permit from the municipal mayor a
building that destroys the view of the public plaza.
Defendants filed a written request with the incumbent municipal
mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline
station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located
along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a
creek. The request was denied over again. Appellants then
proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit,
because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former
house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had
been living on leased property.
Appellants were charged before and convicted by the justice of the
peace court of Baao, Camarines Sur, for violation of the ordinance in
question. Defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance, which
affirmed the conviction, and sentenced appellants to pay a fine of
P35 each and the costs, as well as to demolish the building in
question because it destroys the view of the public plaza of Baao, in
that "it hinders the view of travelers from the National Highway to the
said public plaza." From this decision, the accused appealed to the
Court of Appeals, but the latter forwarded the records to us because
the appeal attacks the constitutionality of the ordinance in question.
ISSUE:
WON the Ordinance was a valid exercise of police power.
HELD:
NO. No purpose to be attained by requiring the permit is expressed;
no conditions for its grant or refusal are enumerated. It is not merely
a case of deficient standards; standards are entirely lacking. The
ordinance thus confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted
power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, and it is a
settled rule that such an undefined and unlimited delegation of power
to allow or prevent an activity, per se lawful, is invalid
The ordinance in question in no way controls or guides the discretion from the highway. The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to
vested thereby in the respondents. It prescribes no uniform rule upon let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for
which the special permission of the city is to be granted. Thus the which it is best suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve
city is clothed with the uncontrolled power to capriciously grant the that result, the municipality must give appellants just compensation
privilege to some and deny it to others; to refuse the application of and an opportunity to be heard.
one landowner or lessee and to grant that of another, when for all
material purposes, the two are applying for precisely the same
privileges under the same circumstances. The danger of such an
ordinance is that it makes possible arbitrary discriminations and
abuses in its execution, depending upon no conditions or
qualifications whatever, other than the unregulated arbitrary will of
the city authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be
tested. Fundamental rights under our government do not depend for
their existence upon such a slender and uncertain thread.
Ordinances which thus invest a city council with a discretion which is
purely arbitrary, and which may be exercised in the interest of a
favored few, are unreasonable and invalid. The ordinance should
have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be
secured. The refusal of the Mayor of Baao to issue a building permit
to the appellant was predicated on the ground that the proposed
building would "destroy the view of the public plaza" by preventing its
being seen from the public highway. Even thus interpreted, the
ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates — to
permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property;
hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a
taking of appellants property without just compensation. We do not
overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of
neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of
residents. But while property may be regulated in the interest of the
general welfare, and in its pursuit, the State may prohibit structures
offensive to the sight, the State may not, under the guise of police
power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their
property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure
the aesthetic appearance of the community. As the case now stands,
every structure that may be erected on appellants' land, regardless
of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in
question, because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza

LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC. v. JAC LINER, INC.
FACTS:
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena enacted Ordinance Nos.
1631 (granting Lucena Grand Central Terminal Inc. a 25-year
franchise) and 1778 (regulating the entry of buses, mini-buses, out of
town jeepneys to the City of Lucena)
These ordinances, by granting an exclusive franchise to one entity
for the construction and operation of one common bus and jeepney
terminal facility in Lucena City, to be located outside the city proper,
were professedly aimed towards alleviating the traffic congestion
alleged to have been caused by the existence of various bus and
jeepney terminals within the city,
A petition for prohibition and injunction was filed before the RTC of
Lucena City to declare the subject ordinances unconstitutional for
being an invalid exercise of police power, undue taking of private
property, and a violation of the constitutional prohibition against
monopolies.
The trial court rendered judgment declaring City Ordinance No. 1631
valid while ordering to cease and desist from implementing
Ordinance No. 1778 for being ultra vires. CA affirmed the decision of
the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether the City of Lucena properly exercised its police power when
it enacted the subject ordinances.
RULING:
The requisites for a valid exercise of police power are 1) interests of
the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the interference of the State, and 2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. These
two tests are known as the tests of lawful subject and lawful means.
The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective
of relieving traffic congestion in the City of Lucena, indeed involve
public interest warranting the interference of the State. In this case,
the firs requisite is present.
As regards the second requisite, the ordinances assailed herein are
characterized by overbreadth. They go beyond what is reasonably
necessary to solve the traffic problem. Prohibiting other franchises
from conducting their business and centralizing transportation to a
single entity do not meet the criteria of reasonable means. What
should have been done was to determine exactly where the problem
lies and then to stop it right there. The true role of Constitutional Law
is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights
are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are
enacted with due deference to rights.
Neither are terminals public nuisances as petitioner argues. For their
operation is a legitimate business which, by itself, cannot be said to
be injurious to the rights of property, health, or comfort of the
community Unless a thing is nuisance per se , however, it may not
be abated via an ordinance, without judicial proceedings, as was
done in the case at bar.
It must be remembered that it is not the effectiveness of the law
which bears upon its constitutionality, rather it is the reasonableness
of the ordinance which matters in this issue.

CONCEPCION PARAYNO vs.  JOSE JOVELLANOS and the
MUNICIPALITY OF CALASIAO, PANGASINAN
FACTS:
Petitioner was the owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao,
Pangasinan. In 1989, some residents of Calasiao petitioned the
Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality for the closure or
transfer of the station to another location. The matter was referred to
the Municipal Engineer, Chief of Police, Municipal Health Officer and
the Bureau of Fire Protection for investigation. Upon their advise, the
Sangguniang Bayan recommended to the Mayor the closure or
transfer of location of petitioner’s gasoline station. In Resolution No.
50, it declared that the existing gasoline station is a blatant violation
and disregard of existing law.
According to the Resolution:
1)
Code of Calasiao, Art. 6, Section 44, the nearest school
building which is San Miguel Elementary School and church,
the distances are less than 100 meters. (No neighbors were
called as witnesses when actual measurements were done
by HLURB Staff, Baguio City dated 22 June 1989);
2)
buildings, houses closed (sic) to each other which still
endangers the lives and safety of the people in case of fire;
3)
smell of gasoline most of the time especially during gas
filling which tend to expose residents to illness, and
4)
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the resolution but was
denied by the SB. Hence she filed a case before the RTC claiming
that the gasoline filling station was not covered under Sec 44 of the
mentioned law but is under Sec 21. Case was denied by the court
and by the CA. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the closure/transfer of her gasoline filling station by
respondent municipality was an invalid exercise of the latter’s police
powers.
HELD:
The Principle of Ejusdem Generis
The zoning ordinance of respondent municipality made a clear
distinction between "gasoline service station" and "gasoline filling
station.”
Respondent municipality thus could not find solace in the legal
maxim of ejusdem generis which means "of the same kind, class or
nature." Under this maxim, where general words follow the
enumeration of particular classes of persons or things, the general
words will apply only to persons or things of the same general nature
or class as those enumerated.
Instead, what applied in this case was the legal maxim expressio
unius est exclusio alterius which means that the express mention of
one thing implies the exclusion of others. Hence, because of the
distinct and definite meanings alluded to the two terms by the zoning
ordinance, respondents could not insist that "gasoline service
station" under Section 44 necessarily included "gasoline filling
station" under Section 21. Indeed, the activities undertaken in a "gas
service station" did not automatically embrace those in a "gas filling
station."
The Exercise of Police Powers
The court held that the respondent municipality invalidly used its
police powers in ordering the closure/transfer of petitioner’s gasoline
station. While it had, under RA 7160, the power to take actions and
enact measures to promote the health and general welfare of its
constituents, it should have given due deference to the law and the DISPOSITION:
rights of petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
A local government is considered to have properly exercised its resolution of the Court of the Appeals is REVERSED and SET
police powers only when the following requisites are met: (1) the ASIDE. Respondent Municipality of Calasiao is hereby directed to
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a cease and desist from enforcing Resolution No. 50 against petitioner
particular class, require the interference of the State and (2) the insofar as it seeks to close down or transfer her gasoline station to
means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the another location.
object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive. The
first requirement refers to the equal protection clause and the
second, to the due process clause of the Constitution.
Respondent municipality failed to comply with the due process
clause when it passed Resolution No. 50. While it maintained that
the gasoline filling station of petitioner was less than 100 meters from
the nearest public school and church, the records do not show that it
even attempted to measure the distance, notwithstanding that such
distance was crucial in determining whether there was an actual
violation of Section 44. The different local offices that respondent
municipality tapped to conduct an investigation never conducted
such measurement either.
Moreover, petitioner’s business could not be considered a nuisance
which respondent municipality could summarily abate in the guise of
exercising its police powers. The abatement of a nuisance without
judicial proceedings is possible only if it is a nuisance per se. A gas
station is not a nuisance per se or one affecting the immediate safety
of persons and property, hence, it cannot be closed down or
transferred summarily to another location.
On the alleged hazardous effects of the gasoline station to the lives
and properties of the people of Calasiao, we again note: “Hence, the
Board is inclined to believe that the project being hazardous to life
and property is more perceived than factual. For, after all, even the
Fire Station Commander.. recommended “to build such buildings
after conform (sic) all the requirements of PP 1185.” It is further
alleged by the complainants that the proposed location is “in the
heart of the thickly populated residential area of Calasiao.” Again,
findings of the [HLURB] staff negate the allegations as the same is
within a designated Business/Commercial Zone per the Zoning
Ordinance.

CELESTINO TATEL vs. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC
FACTS:
On the basis of complaints received from the residents of barrio Sta.
Elena against the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca
bailing machine inside the warehouse of petitioner which affected the
peace and tranquility of the neighborhood due to the smoke,
obnoxious odor and dust emitted by the machine, a committee was
appointed by the municipal council of Virac to investigate the matter.
The committee noted the crowded nature of the neighborhood with
narrow roads and the surrounding residential houses, so much so
that an accidental fire within the warehouse of the petitioner
occasioned by the continuance of the activity inside the warehouse
and the storing of inflammable materials created a danger to the
lives and properties of the people within the neighborhood.
Resultantly, Resolution No. 29 was passed by the Municipal Council
of Virac declaring the warehouse owned and operated by petitioner a
public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the New Civil
Code.  law, and must be in consonance with certain well established and
Respondent municipal officials contend that petitioner's warehouse
was constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952,
prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses
either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary
distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of
lives and properties by accidental fire. On the other hand, petitioner
contends that said ordinance is unconstitutional, contrary to the due
process and equal protection clause of the Constitution and null and
void for not having been passed in accordance with law.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Ordinance No. 13, s. 1952 is constitutional.
2. W/N the trial court erred in giving the ordinance a meaning other
than and different from what it provided
3. W/N the trial court erred in refusing to take judicial notice of the
fact that in the municipality, there are numerous establishments
similarly situated as appellants' warehouses but which are not
prosecuted
HELD:
1. YES. Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, was passed by the
Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is a
settled principle of law that municipal corporations are agencies of
the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-
government and as such are endowed with the police powers in
order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of
their creation. Its authority emanates from the general welfare clause
under the Administrative Code. For an ordinance to be valid, it must
not only be within the corporate powers of the municipality to enact
but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by
basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles require that
a municipal ordinance (1) must not contravene the Constitution or
any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be
partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must
not be unreasonable. Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1952, meets these
criteria.
2. NO. In spite of its fractured syntax, basically, what is regulated by
the ordinance is the construction of warehouses wherein
inflammable materials are stored where such warehouses are
located at a distance of 200 meters from a block of houses and not
the construction  per se of a warehouse. The purpose is to avoid the
loss of life and property in case of fire which is one of the primordial
obligation of the government. The lower court did NOT add meaning
other than or different from what was  provided in the ordinance in
question. It merely stated the purpose of the ordinance and what it
intends to prohibit to accomplish its purpose.

3. NO. Suffice it to say that the mere fact that the municipal
authorities of Virac have not proceeded against other warehouses in
the municipality allegedly violating Ordinance No. 13 is no reason to
claim that the ordinance is discriminatory. A distinction must be
made between the law itself and the manner in which said law is
implemented by the agencies in charge with its administration and
enforcement. There is no valid reason for the petitioner to complain,
in the absence of proof that the other bodegas mentioned by him are
operating in violation of the ordinance and that the complaints have
been lodged against the bodegas concerned without the municipal
authorities doing anything about it.

The objections interposed by the petitioner to the validity of the

ordinance have not been substantiated. Its purpose is well within the
objectives of sound government. No undue restraint is placed upon
the petitioner or for anybody to engage in trade but merely a
prohibition from storing inflammable products in the warehouse
because of the danger of fire to the lives and properties of the people
residing in the vicinity. As far as public policy is concerned, there can
be no better policy than what has been conceived by the municipal
government.

BALACUIT v. CFI OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE AND BUTUAN CITY
FACTS:
The municipal board of Butuan City enacted Ordinance No. 640
penalizing any person, group of persons, entity or corporation
engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie or
other public exhibitions, games, contests or other performances to
require children between 7 and 12 years of age to pay full payment
for tickets intended for adults but should charge only one-half of the
said ticket. Aggrieved, petitioners Carlos Balacuit Lamberto Tan, and
Sergio Yu Carcel managers of the Maya and Dalisay Theaters, the
Crown Theater, and the Diamond Theater, respectively, filed a
complaint before the CFI of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City
praying, inter alia, that the subject ordinance be declared
unconstitutional and, therefore, void and unenforceable. Upon
motion of the petitioners, a TRO was issued by the court a quo
enjoining the respondent and its officials from enforcing the
ordinance. The litigants filed their stipulation of facts. 5 The
respondent court rendered its decision declaring Ordinance No. 640
of the City of Butuan constitutional and valid. Petitioners filed their
motion for reconsideration which was denied. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners attack the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No.
640 on the grounds that it is ultra vires and an invalid exercise of
police power. They contend that Ordinance No. 640 is not within the
power of' the Municipal Board to enact as provided for in Section
15(n) of RA 523, the Charter of the City of Butuan, which states that
the power to regulate and fix the amount of license fees for theaters,
theatrical performances, cinematographs, public exhibitions and
other places of amusement has been expressly granted to the City of
Butuan under its charter. It did not state that it can fix admission
rates. The respondent attempts to justify the enactment of the
ordinance by invoking the general welfare clause embodied in
Section 15(nn) of the cited law.
ISSUE:
W/N Ordinance No. 640 is constitutional.
HELD:
NO. The question which needs to be resolved in this case is: does
this power to regulate include the authority to interfere in the fixing of
prices of admission to these places of exhibition and amusement
whether under its general grant of power or under the general
welfare clause as invoked by the City? This is the first time this Court
is confronted with the question of direct interference by the local
government with the operation of theaters, among others, to the
extent of fixing the prices of admission to these places. In this
jurisdiction, it is already settled that the operation of theaters,
cinematographs and other places of public exhibition are subject to
regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of delegated
police power by the local government.
The City of Butuan, apparently realizing that it has no authority to
enact the ordinance in question under its power to regulate
embodied in Section 15(n), now invokes the police power as
delegated to it under the general welfare clause to justify the
enactment of said ordinance. To invoke the exercise of police power,
not only must it appear that the interest of the public generally
requires an interference with private rights, but the means adopted
must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
The ordinance is not justified by any necessity for the public
interest. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on
public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist
between purposes and means. The evident purpose of the ordinance
is to help ease the burden of cost on the part of parents who have to lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights The right of the
shell out the same amount of money for the admission of their owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an
children, as they would for themselves, A reduction in the price of inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the
admission would mean corresponding savings for the parents; protection of the due process clause. Hence, the proprietors of a
however, the petitioners are the ones made to bear the cost of theater have a right to manage their property in their own way,
these savings. The ordinance does not only make the to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own
petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but it likewise penalizes advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay
them for failure to comply with it. away.
There is nothing pernicious in demanding equal price for both
children and adults. The petitioners are merely conducting their
legitimate businesses. The object of every business entrepreneur is
to make a profit out of his venture. There is nothing immoral or
injurious in charging the same price for both children and adults. In
fact, no person is under compulsion to purchase a ticket. It is a totally
voluntary act on the part of the purchaser if he buys a ticket to such
performances. A theater ticket has been described to be either a
mere license, revocable at the will of the proprietor of the theater or it
may be evidence of a contract whereby, for a valuable consideration,
the purchaser has acquired the right to enter the theater and observe
the performance on condition that he behaves properly. Such ticket,
therefore, represents a right, positive or conditional, as the case
may be, according to the terms of the original contract of sale. The
ticket which represents that right is also, necessarily, a species
of property. As such, the owner thereof, in the absence of any
condition to the contrary in the contract by which he obtained it,
has the clear right to dispose of it, to sell it to whom he pleases
and at such price as he can obtain. So that an act prohibiting
the sale of tickets to theaters or other places of amusement at
more than the regular price was held invalid as conflicting with
the state constitution securing the right of property. 
While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally
true that such regulation must be within the bounds of reason,
that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its
provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary
interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A
lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be
unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power. A
police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and
operation of a business should not encroach upon the legitimate and

VILLANUEVA vs. CASTANEDA
FACTS:
In 1961, the municipal council of San Fernando adopted Resolution
No. 218 authorizing 24 members of Fernandino United Merchants
and Traders Associationto construct permanent stalls and sell in the
subject property within the vicinity of the public market. The
Resolution was protested, and Civil Case No. 2040 was filed. CFI
issued writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the construction of
stalls.  HELD:
While the case was pending, the municipal council adopted
Resolution No. 29 which declared the subject area as a parking
place and as the public plaza of the municipality. CFI decided Civil
Case No. 2040 and held that the subject land was public in nature
and was beyond the commerce of man. The preliminary injunction
was made permanent.  dominion, to be devoted to public use and to be made available to
The decision was apparently not enforced, for the petitioners were
not evicted from the place. They were assigned specific areas and
were made to pay daily fees to the municipal government for use of
the area.  Applying this well-settled doctrine, we rule that the petitioners had no
On January 12, 1982 (more than 13 years after CFI decision),
the Association of Concerned Citizens and Consumers of San
Fernando filed a petition for the immediate implementation of
Resolution No. 29, to restore the subject property "to its original and
customary use as a public plaza. 
After investigation was conducted by the municipal attorney,
Macalino, officer‐in-charge of the office of the mayor, issued a
resolution ordering the demolition of the stalls in the subject area. 
Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition with the CFI, which was
denied. 
Hence, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the SC.
Petitioners argued that they had right to occupy the area by virtue of
lease contracts entered into with the municipal government, and
later, by virtue of space allocations made in their favor for which they
paid daily fees. The municipality denied that they entered into
said agreements. It argued that even if the leases were valid, the
same could be terminated at will because rent was collected daily. 
ISSUE:
Whether or not the vendors had the right to occupy and make use of
the property. 
No. A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and so cannot be
the subject of lease or any other contractual undertaking. The town
plaza cannot be used for the construction of market stalls, specially
of residences, and that such structures constitute a nuisance subject
to abatement according to law. Town plazas are properties of public
the public in general. They are outside the common of man and
cannot be disposed of or even leased by the municipality to private
parties.
right in the first place to occupy the disputed premises and cannot
insist in remaining there now on the strength of their alleged lease
contracts.
Since the occupation of the place by the vendors, it
had deteriorated to the prejudice of the community. Stalls, being
made of flammable materials, became a potential fire trap; access to
and from the market was obstructed; there were aggravated health
and sanitation problems; flow of traffic was obstructed; stallholders in
the public market were deprived of a sizable volume of business; the
people were deprived of the use of the place as a public plaza. 

The problems caused by the usurpation of the place by the

petitioners are covered by the police power as delegated to the
municipality under the general welfare clause. This authorizes the
municipal council "to enact such ordinances and make such
regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into
effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law
and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the
health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals,
peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and
the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein."
This authority was validly exercised in this case through
the adoption of Resolution No. 29, series of 1964, by the municipal
council of San Fernando.

Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution

could have effectively terminated the agreement for it is settled that
the police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through
the medium of a contract.  In fact, every contract affecting the public
interest suffers a congenital infirmity in that it contains an implied
reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal
order. This power can be activated at any time to change the
provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the
promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not
militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited
by the paramount police power. 

FRANSISCO DACANAY v. ASISTIO, Jr.
FACTS:
The former city mayor of Caloocan City caused the demolition of the
market stalls on Heroes del '96, V. Gozon and Gonzales streets. To
stop Mayor Martinez' efforts to clear the city streets, stallowners filed
an action for prohibition against the City of Caloocan in the RTC.
The RTC issued the writ prayed for. However, it later dismissed the
petition and lifted the writ of preliminary injunction which it had earlier
issued after finding that Heroes del '96, Gozon and Gonzales streets
are of public dominion, hence, outside the commerce of man.
Then, respondent mayor took office but did not pursue his
predecessor’s policy of clearing and cleaning up the city streets.
Thus, petitioner, a Caloocan resident, filed a special civil action of
mandamus to compel respondent city officials to remove market
stalls from three city streets which they designated as flea markets
under MMC Ordinance No. 79-02.
ISSUE:
May public streets or thoroughfares be leased or licensed to market
stallholders by virtue of a city ordinance or resolution of the Metro
Manila Commission?
RULING:
NO. There is no doubt that the disputed areas from which the private
respondents' market stalls are sought to be evicted are public
streets, as found by the trial court in Civil Case No. C-12921. A
public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce
of man (Arts. 420, 424, Civil Code). Being outside the commerce of
man, it may not be the subject of lease or other contract.
As the stallholders pay fees to the City Government for the right to
occupy portions of the public street, the City Government, contrary to
law, has been leasing portions of the streets to them. Such leases or
licenses are null and void for being contrary to law. The right of the
public to use the city streets may not be bargained away through
contract. The interests of a few should not prevail over the good of
the greater number in the community whose health, peace, safety,
good order and general welfare, the respondent city officials are
under legal obligation to protect.
The petitioner and the general public have a legal right to the relief
demanded, so the public respondents have the corresponding duty,
arising from public office, to clear the city streets and restore them to
their specific public purpose. The respondents City Mayor and City
Engineer of Caloocan City or their successors in office are hereby
ordered to immediately enforce and implement the decision in Civil
Case No. C-1292 declaring that Heroes del '96, V. Gozon, and
Gonzales Streets are public streets for public use, and they are
ordered to remove or demolish, or cause to be removed or
demolished, the market stalls occupying said city streets

POLICARPIO VIRAY v. CITY OF CALOOCAN
FACTS:
Petitioners, all residents of the City of Manila, instituted the present
appeal, questioning the authority of the City of Caloocan to impose a
fee of P10.00 or P5.00 as the case may be, for every cadaver
coming from other places and buried in private cemeteries within that
city. It appears from the records that in addition to a burial permit
costing P0.50, each of herein plaintiffs-appellants was required to
pay, and in fact did pay, so-called entrance fee for the burial of his
relative at the La Loma cemetery, a burial place not owned by the
city government of Caloocan, allegedly pursuant to Ordinance No.
94, series of 1962. The petitioners demanded refund from the City
Treasurer of the corresponding entrance fees paid by them but the
latter refused.
The court dismissed the case, on the ground that the questioned
ordinance was authorized under the charter of the City of Caloocan
and other pertinent laws.
Defendants-appellees, answering plaintiffs-appellants’ contention
that the collection of the amounts involved in this appeal was
unauthorized, claim that it was justified by the general grant of
taxation to chartered cities by Republic Act 2264, otherwise known
as the Local Autonomy Act and as a valid exercise of police power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of Ordinance No. 94, series of 1962
providing for additional fees in private cemeteries is valid.
RULING:
NO. Although the ordinance which regulates the exhumation and/or
transfer of corpses from other burial grounds to those located in the
City of Caloocan is within the legislative power of the respondent city
government to enact, the imposition of the transfer fees under
Ordinance No. 94, on the interment of the respective dead relatives
of herein appellants in the La Loma cemetery, was not justified.
With regard to the defenses interposed on behalf of the respondent
City, premised upon the provisions of the Local Autonomy Act,
suffice it to observe that, while section 2 (on Taxation) of Republic
Act 2264 confers on chartered cities and municipalities —
"authority to impose municipal license taxes or fees upon persons
engaged in any occupation or business, or exercising privileges in
chartered cities or municipalities . . . by requiring them to secure
licenses at rates fixed by the municipal board or city council."
respondents have failed to show that the persons merely burying a
cadaver in a private cemetery constitutes either an occupation or
business or the exercise of privileges that would justify the imposition
of taxes thereon within the terms and intent of the enabling act, the
terms employed by the statute in themselves denoting habituality or
a repetition of acts, and not a solitary act.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed and the
questioned portion of Ordinance No. 94, series of 1962 of the City of
Caloocan, is declared ultra vires and void.
 Whether or not there is a contract between homeowners and Ayala
Corporation violated in opening the Jupiter street for public use.

HELD:

No. There was no contract to speak of in the case, hence nothing

was violated.

Petitioners cannot successfully rely on the alleged promise by Ayala

Corporation, to build a “[f]ence along Jupiter [street] with gate for
entrance and/or exit as evidence of Ayala’s alleged continuing
obligation to maintain a wall between the residential and commercial
sections. Assuming there was a contract violated, it was still
overtaken by the passage of zoning ordinances which represent a
legitimate exercise of police power. The petitioners have not shown
why Courts should hold otherwise other than for the supposed “non-
impairment” guaranty of the Constitution, which is secondary to the
more compelling interests of general welfare. The Ordinance has not
been shown to be capricious or arbitrary or unreasonable to warrant
SANGALANG v. IAC the reversal of the judgments so appealed.
Doctrine from TLV notes: If act is in the concept of police power no
need for just compensation.

FACTS:

The Mayor of Makati directed Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA) to

opening of several streets to the general public, after a series of
developments in zoning regulations. All but Jupiter St. was
voluntarily opened. The strong opposition later gave way when the
municipal officials force-opened the gates of said street for public
use. The area ceased to be purely residential. Action for damages
was brought against Ayala Corporation and BAVA for alleged breach
of contract, to maintain the purely residential status of the area.
Other similarly situated also filed their respective cases. All were
dismissed in the trial court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the said
dismissals.

ISSUE: