DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION vs.
JANIOLA same and belated filing of the civil case is lawful
FACTS:
In October 2004, Petitioner filed a complaint Affidavit
dated October 5, 2004 for violation of BP 22 against
respondent Janiola. Correspondingly, petitioner filed
criminal information for violation of BP 22 against
respondent with the MTC on February 2, 2005. On
September 20, 2006, respondent instituted a civil
complaint against petitioner by filing a complaint dated
August 2006 for the rescission of an alleged
construction agreement between parties, as well as for
damages. The case was filed with the RTC.
On July 25, 2007, respondent filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings in the criminal case alleging that the civil
and criminal cases involved facts and issues similar or
intimately related such that in resolution of the issues in
the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined. In other words,
respondent claimed that the civil case posed a
prejudicial question as against the criminal cases.
1. There is no prejudicial question as the rescission
of the contract upon which the bouncing checks
were issued is a separate and distinct issue from
the violation of BP22
2. Sec 7, rule 11 of ROC states that one of the
elements of a prejudicial question is that “the
previously instituted civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action.” Thus,
this element is missing as the criminal case
preceded the civil case.
Respondent cites Art. 36 of the NCC and argues that
the phrase “before any criminal prosecution may be
instituted or may proceed” must be interpreted to
mean that a prejudicial question exists when the
civil action is filed either before the institution of
the criminal action or during its pendency. There is
prejudicial question presented in the civil case even
if the criminal cases preceded the filing of the civil
case.
METC: Granted the motion to suspend. Rescission
of contract and nullification of the checks are the
since a motion for suspension of a criminal action
may be filed at any time before the prosecution
rests. MR denied
RTC: The fact that civil action was instituted after
the criminal action does not render the issues in the
civil action any less prejudicial in char
ISSUE:
W/N the motion for suspension on the criminal case
based on “prejudicial question” in civil case can be
granted
HELD:
No. Elements of prejudicial question are:
The provision was amended:
1. The previously instituted civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action
2. Resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed
The amendment is clear, with the addition of
“previously” and “subsequent” that the civil action
must precede the criminal action. Thus, a prejudicial
question is that which must precede the criminal
action and which requires a decision before a final
judgement can be rendered in the criminal action.
Civil action must be instituted prior to the
institution of criminal action. The clause “before
any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may
proceed” in Art. 36 of NCC is interpreted as the
motion to suspend the criminal action may be filed
during the preliminary investigation or during the
trial. This would harmonize Art. 36 with Sec. 7 rule
III of ROC. Filing of a civil action was merely
instituted to delay the criminal proceedings. Civil
action was filed 2 years after the institution of the
criminal complaint. Further, the resolution of the
civil case is not determinative of the prosecution of
the criminal action as there is no prejudicial
question. Petitioner argues that element number 2
is lacking but respondent argues that if the
construction agreement between them is declared
null and void, the checks issued would become
mere scraps of paper and cannot be the basis of
criminal prosecution. The fact that there exists a
valid contract to support the issuance of the check/s
does not make up the elements of violation of BP
22. It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the
offense is the mere act of issuing a bouncing check.
As such, even if the court declares the agreement
void, this would not affect the prosecution of
respondent in the criminal case. The fact is that the
respondent indeed issued checks which were
subsequently dishonoured for insufficient funds.
Thus, 2nd element, that the resolution of civil case
would determine whether the criminal action may
proceed, is absent.
QUIAMBAO vs. OSORIO
FACTS:
In a complaint for forcible entry filed by
respondents, it was alleged that respondents were
the legitimate possessors of a lot in Rizal by virtue
of the Agreement to Sell executed in their favour by
DAR. That under cover of darkness, petitioner, by
force, intimidation, strategy and stealth, entered
into a 400sqm thereof, placed bamboo posts and
began construction of a house; that these acts
entitled private respondents to a writ of preliminary
injunction and to the ejectment of petitioner from
the lot.
Petitioner filed motion to dismiss, and denied the
allegations, averring that the agreement upon
which respondents base their possession had
already been cancelled by DAR. As a ground for
dismissing the case, petitioner alleged the pendency
of LA. Case 968, an administrative case between
same parties and involving same lot. In said case,
petitioner disputed respondent’s right of possession
over the property in question by reason of the
latter’s default in the instalment payments for the
purchase of said lot. Petitioner asserts that this
administrative case was determinative of
respondent’s right to eject him from the lot in
question; hence a prejudicial question which bars a
judicial action until after its termination.
MTC denied the motion to dismiss. CFI of Rizal
issued a restraining order enjoining further
proceedings in the ejectment case. Respondents
however filed a motion to dismiss, maintaining that
the administrative case did not constitute a
prejudicial question as it involved the question of
ownership, unlike the ejectment case which
involved merely the question of possession.
LA filed petition for certiorari and prayed that the
ejectment complaint be dismissed and the Office of
LA be allowed to decide the matter exclusively. This
was denied, hence the appeal by Quiambao and LA.
ISSUE:
W/N the administrative case constitutes prejudicial
question which would operate as a bar to said
ejectment case
HELD:
Doctrine of prejudicial question generally comes
into play in a situation where civil and criminal
actions are pending and the issues involved in both
cases are similar or so closely related that an issue
must be pre-emptively resolved in the civil case
before the criminal action can proceed. Apparent is
the intimate correlation between said two
proceedings, stemming from the fact that the right
of respondents to eject petitioner from the
disputed land depends primarily on the resolution
of the pending administrative case. Their right of
possession was terminated by the cancellation by
the LA of the agreement to sell executed in their
favour. If the cancellation of the agreement is
voided, then respondents’ would have every right
to eject petitioner from the area. Otherwise,
respondent’s right of possession is lost and so
would their right to eject petitioner. To allow
parties to undergo trial notwithstanding the
possibility of petitioner’s right of possession being
upheld in the pending administrative case is to
needlessly require not only the parties but the court
 as well to expend time, effort and money in what
may turn out to be a sheer exercise of futility.
YAP vs. PARAS
FACTS:
Petitioner Yap was the sister of respondent Paras.
According to Yap, Paras sold to her his share in the
intestate estate of their parents for 300php. 19
years later, Paras sold the same property to Saya-
ang for 5,000php evidenced by a notarized Deed of
Absolute Sale. When Yap learned about this, she
filed a complaint for estafa against Paras and Saya-
ang. On the same date, she filed a complaint for the
nullification of the said sale with the RTC. After
investigation, the provincial prosecutor instituted a
criminal complaint for estafa against Paras with the
MTC of South Cotabato. Before arraignment of the
accused, trial judge dismissed the case stating that
there is a prejudicial question to a civil action which
must be ventilated in the proper civil action.
Petitioner’s contention is that where there is a
prejudicial question in civil case, the criminal action
may not be dismissed but only suspended and such
cannot be done motu proprio by the judge.
ISSUE:
W/N respondent judge commit grave abuse of
discretion in motu proprio issuing the order of
dismissal
W/N a prejudicial question to a civil action exists
HELD:
1. Yes. Law says that suspension of the criminal action
based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question
in a civil action may be made only upon petition and
not at the instance of the judge alone, and it also
says suspension, not dismissal.
2. Judge misunderstood concept of prejudicial
question. The prejudicial question must be
determinative of the case before the court but the
jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be
lodged in another court. For a civil case to be
considered prejudicial to a criminal action, it must
appear not only that the civil case involves the same
facts upon which the criminal prosecution is based,
but also that the resolution of the issues raised in
civil action would be necessarily determinative of
the guilt or innocence of the accused. It is the issue
in the civil action that is prejudicial to the
continuation of criminal action, not otherwise.
There was no motion to suspend the criminal case
in the case at bar and respondent judge had not
been informed of the defense Paras was raising in
the civil action. He could not have ascertained then
if the issue raised in the civil action would
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in
the criminal case. The dismissal without motion and
even without the accused indicating his defense in
the civil action for annulment of second case, is
ignorance of the law and bias on the part of the
judge.
FORTICH-CELDRAN vs. CELDRAN, et.al
A suit for annulment of an extrajudicial partition of
properties was filed in CIF of Cebu. Appearing therein as
plaintiffs were herein respondents and defendants were
herein petitioners. After the defendants answered, a
motion to withdraw as co-plaintiff was filed and signed
“Ignacio Celdran.” Subsequently, plaintiffs filed an
amended complaint impleading Ignacio Celdran as
defendant. Ignacio filed an answer with counterclaim
and cross-claim. After trial but before judgement, the
police were on the view that the document for the
motion to withdraw contained falsified signature.
Ignacio asked for a new trial but denied.
All the parties, except Ignacio, recognized as valid the
aforementioned extrajudicial partition. Regarding
Ignacio, the court declared the partition valid for having
been ratified by him. Specifically, Ignacio signed the
motion to withdraw after he received 10,000php of the
agreed 20,000 and two residential lots to be given to
him in return for aforesaid ratification of the partition.
Said decision was later amended to require Pedro III,
Antonio, Jesus, Miguel and Vicente, all surnamed
Fortich-Celdran, to pay Ignacio the balance of 20,000
and to deliver to him the promised lands.
Ignacio appealed and is still pending. Now, at the
instance of Ignacio, an Information for falsification of a
public document was filed in CFI of Misamis Occidental.
Accused were the defendants of the civil case. As
complainant, Ignacio moved to suspend the criminal
action on the ground of prejudicial question as the
alleged falsification of the same document is at issue in
the civil case pending in CA.
CFI denied and Ignacio filed in CA certiorari with
preliminary injunction to enjoin CFI of M.O from
proceeding with the criminal action. CA ordered
suspension of the criminal case due to prejudicial
question.
Accused in the criminal case appealed. They contend
that there is no prejudicial question involved. Records
show that Ignacio ratified the partition agreement.
Disputing this, Ignacio maintains that it was forgery.
ISSUE:
W/N criminal case should be suspended on the ground
of prejudicial question
HELD:
Since ratification is principal issue in the civil action
pending in CA, and the falsification or genuineness of
the motion to withdraw – presented and marked as
evidence in the civil case – is among the questions
involved in said issue, it follows that the civil action
poses prejudicial question to the criminal prosecution
for alleged falsification of the same document.
Resolution of the authenticity of document assailed in
the civil action is determinative of the guilt or innocence
of the accused in the criminal suit. As such, it should be
decided first.
Filing by Ignacio of a motion to suspend criminal case is
complied with Sec. 5 of rule iii of ROC. Denial of the
motion to suspend the criminal case was therefore
attended with grave abuse of discretion. CA decision
affirmed.
MERCADO vs. TAN
FACTS:
Mercado and Tan got married in June 1991before MTCC
Bacolod which a marriage contract was duly executed
and signed by both parties. As entered in said
document, the status of the accused was single.
Accused was actually a married man having been in
lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva, in a marriage
solemnized in Cebu which marriage certificate was also
blessed by Rev. Fr. Baur in religious rites. Likewise, the
civil marriage between accused and complainant was
confirmed in a church ceremony in the Diocese of
Bacolod. Marriages were blessed with two children
(Oliva) and a son respectively.
Complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant against
accused. One month after the bigamy case was filed,
the accused filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage against Ma. Thelma Oliva and this was
granted.
Accused is charged with bigamy for having contracted
second marriage with Tan when at that time of
marriage he was previously united in lawful marriage
with Oliva without said first marriage having been
legally dissolved. While acknowledging the existence of
the two marriages, accused defended that his previous
marriage had been judicially declared null and void and
that the complainant had knowledge of the first
marriage of accused. It is an admitted fact that when
the 2nd marriage was entered, accused’s prior marriage
with Oliva was subsisting, no judicial action having yet
been initiated or any declaration of nullity.
CA: Absolute nullity of marriage (Aft. 40 Family code)
may be invoked for purpose of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgement declaring such previous
marriage void. But here, the nullity came after the case
for bigamy against accused was already tried in court.
And the crime of bigamy is the act of any person who
shall contract second marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved.
Petitioner contends that he obtained nullity of first
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby
rendering it void ab initio. He argues that a void
marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all
thus there is no first marriage to speak of. Respondent
on the one hand, admits that the first marriage was
declared null and void under Art 26 of FC but points out
that declaration came only after the Info had been filed.
Hence, a crime by then had already been
consummated.
HELD:
When the Information for bigamy was filed, all the
elements for such crime were present. While first
marriage was still subsisting, he contracted 2nd
marriage.
Administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Wilson
Po Cham against Atty. Pizarro for commission of
falsehood and misinterpretations in violation of a
lawyer’s oath.
Sometime in 1995, he was offered a land in Morong,
Bataan. Thus, a meeting between him and Pizarro was
made in Navarro’s residence where Pizarro represented
to him that the property being offered for sale was
alienable and disposable.

Mendoza: Declaration of nullity not needed

Domingo: underscored the need for a judicial

declaration of nullity of a void marriage on the basis of a
new provision of the FC which came into effect several
years after the promulgation of Mendoza and Aragon
which relied on Marriage Law which provided that any
marriage subsequently contracted by any person during
the lifetime of the 1st spouse shall be illegal and void
from its performance and no judicial decree is necessary
to invalidate it.

However, Art. 40 of FC expressly requires judicial

declaration of nullity of the previous marriage. In this
light, the ruling in Mendoza and Aragon has been cast
aside by Art. 40 of the FC. Significantly, the second
marriage contracted without declaration of nullity of
the first marriage is a bigamous and criminal act.

In the case, petitioner contracted 2nd marriage

although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity
of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the petition
for nullity after complainant had filed a complaint
charging him with bigamy. Crime had already been
consummated by then.

His view effectively encourages delay in the prosecution

of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a petition
to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the
pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the
criminal case. Court does not allow that.

PO CHAM vs. PIZARRO

FACTS: